CHAPTER I.

BEFORE any discussion of the principal point in dispute, it will be convenient to disentangle it from some questions which have a tendency to perplex it.

I do not mean (any more than M—) to go back to the origin of the war, or to investigate its justice on the part of the two Princes who first united in support of monarchy in France: I am afraid there is but too much reason to believe that it has con­tributed to lead to the scaffold the King, whom they wished to confirm on his throne, and to make those very principles triumphant, which they intended to exterminate.

But, whatever may be thought of preceding cir­cumstances, it cannot be denied that Great Britain did not join the confederacy, until the principles of Anarchy were triumphant in France; until that nation [Page 6] had avowed its project of disseminating them univer­sally, and until it had actually commenced hostilities against States with which Great Britain had defensive alliances. In justice to the British Government, this circumstance ought not to be overlooked; nor should we judge of the policy of its conduct, by the bad suc­cess which has hitherto attended it; but by the actual situation of Europe, at the time when this country acceded to the confederacy; when the people were generally taught to look upon the French Revolution as realising every airy vision of political happiness; while in truth it menaced mankind with a far more dreadful scourge than that under which we now suffer. We should revert to the time when, in very many countries, the people seemed advancing, from admiration of the French theories, to an impatience for putting them in practice. If, at so dangerous a moment, there were Statesmen cool enough to resist the general enthusiasm, who foresaw the inevitable consequence of those theories, and, in order to pre­vent it, adopted the bold measure of drawing on their country towards an evil, distressing no doubt, but neither unusual, nor without remedy, with a view to save it from the irreparable mischief of revo­lutionary anarchy—Statesmen wise enough to rouse that popular zeal in defence of social order, which else might have been seduced to subvert it; perhaps the gratitude of future ages will be in proportion to the courage with which they have dared to oppose the clamours of the day.

The Author of the Reflections on Peace, however, bit­terly reproaches them for not knowing how to avoid the scourge of revolutionary principles, but by the scourge of war, instead of lowering all their sails during the storm. But before we decide whether it was best boldly to bear up against it, or to let the vessel drive before it, at the mercy of the waves, the bursting out of the storm should be considered. This [Page 7] same writer calls it a new aera. It was indeed a time, when an unheard-of and most dangerous doc­trine was zealously propagated with a sort of philo­sophic parade, which fascinated many even of the thinking part of the world; and when conse­quently it became the duty of those who foresaw the mischief, to give a contrary direction to popular enthusiasm. If this so-much-blamed war, for which the French gave such justifying provocation, or, if you insist upon it, so specious a pretence, has kept their neighbours under the restraint of law, prevented turbulence by giving employment, and strengthened the existing governments, by uniting in their defence those active spirits, which else might have been united for their destruction:—if, which is indis­putable, this political pestilence has already cost France ten times more lives than all the nations of Europe together have lost, in defending themselves from it by war:—but beyond all other considera­tions, if the British Constitution has triumphed, and will descend unchanged to posterity;—I am con­vinced that future ages will look on the sacrifices of the present day, as signal benefits.—Bloody they are, no doubt, and calamitous; but infinitely less so than the poisoned present of the revolutionary system which the French have offered to the world.

If it is said that the nations which have not made such bloody sacrifices to internal tranquillity, have neither felt the mischiefs of war, nor been infected with this revolutionary contagion; I would ask what advantages those nations which are within the grasp of France have found, from a disposition to neutrality? Was it any security to Savoy, Holland, or the Palatinate? But waving what might be said respecting them, I wish to consider what has really been the situation of those other neutral States (so exclusively fortunate) to which the war has not reached, whose wisdom and happiness is so greatly [Page 8] extolled; and which are set up as patterns of the only line of conduct which the belligent Powers should have adopted, and as instances of the profound security which would have been the consequence.

Next to Denmark, the Author of the Reflections on Peace mentions Sweden, which, we are told, owes its tranquillity to the system of neutrality adopted by the prudence of the Regent. And yet, in the midst of this tranquil Neutrality, this very Regent has detected a Conspiracy, which he represents as atrocious, and as having put the independence and the quiet of Sweden in imminent danger. Is it forgotten that, in claiming from the Court of Naples, the person accused of contriving this conspiracy, the Regent of Sweden, in December 1793, represented that, in this disastrous epoch, when Europe is agitated from one end to the other, the Courts of it ought to guard their common in­terests more vigilantly than ever? It is whimsical enough that the Regent of Sweden, so much praised for not having joined with the rest of Europe, to guard vigilantly those common interests, should actually have addressed this language to Naples, a Court which has made very considerable exertions in the com­mon cause. It is still more so, that a Prince who can plead it as an undeniable truth, that whoever protects traitors, exposes himself to become the victim of their attempts, should be at the head of affairs in a country, which, if it has not actually given mi­litary assistance to the French Regicides, has at least, in very many other respects, contributed largely to their resources. But what is more strange than all is, that the kingdom, whose tran­quil neutrality M— extolls so much, is the only one which, during its Neutrality, has seen one of its Kings assassinated, and an atrocious conspiracy contrived against his successor. ^*

[Page 9]But at least, says M—, we must acknowledge that the Americans are enriching themselves by their neutrality. I admit it, and I am very far from bla­ming them; but if they profit by the losses of the Old World, what a risk have they not run of being torn in pieces by its Anarchy! Among them too the Convention has sent emissaries commissioned to drive, if possible, the Patriarch of the New World from his senatorial chair. They failed, indeed, in completing their infernal work; but they succeeded too well in kindling a civil war, and obliging parents to arm against their children; while, at most, the belligerent Powers of the Old World have only been obliged to arm against a foreign enemy. Who can conjecture what might have been the consequences of this civil war, if Washington had not been alive, to give energy to law, to unite and arm the body of American Pro­prietors, who, under his direction, readily submitted to the painful duty of a fatiguing march against their misguided countrymen? In America they found the necessity of pulling up by the roots these trees of pre­tended Liberty which French Anarchy was beginning to plant in its remotest forests. And yet we are coolly told that the neutral States have been very far from imitating the example of the French! and we are to infer, that a people separated from them by the Straits of Dover has been to blame for providing effectually against a contagion malignant enough to reach beyond the Atlantic! But when we see that France has repaid the sincere unarmed neutrality of the New World by instigating its inhabitants to po­litical suicide, we may judge what would have been the fate of the governments in her vicinity, if they [Page 10] had remained unarmed and unprepared for resistance. Yet, by a strange injustice, though in England every seditious movement has been easily suppressed by a slight exertion of civil authority; and in America, neutral from interest and upon principle, the Go­vernment has been forced to raise on a sudden no less than 16000 men, to suppress an insurrection entirely owing to doctrines of anarchy disseminated by French emissaries; yet the British Cabinet, in the person of Mr. Pitt, is reproached with having persuaded the people of property in England, that nothing but war could protect the Nation from the contagion of French politics.

But (continues the author, page 8) has not Swis­serland, at the very doors of the French Revolution, avoided its introduction, and escaped the horrors of war, by a prudent neutrality? No; it is certain that their disposition to maintain peace would not have saved them, but for the concurrence of some other very particular circumstances. A war was actually undertaken against them, notwithstanding their avowed neutrality, and they were at one time in the most imminent danger. The French Republic had sent positive orders to their General, Montesquiou, to invade Swisserland; but this was prevented, in the first instance, by the little State of Geneva, which adopted measures of resistance, and became a barrier between the army of the Alps and the Pays de Vaud, till the Helvetic Body had time to arm itself. The French General, too, had virtue enough to protract the execution of his orders, and succeeded in pro­curing them to be revoked; but not without deter­mining to ruin himself rather than decline repre­senting to his employers the great injustice and the danger of the war which they were kindling. ^* And [Page 11] the revolution to which Geneva voluntarily submitted soon after, took away their pretence for invading Swisserland. The deplorable fate of that interesting city is but too generally known, as well as the ini­quitous declaration in the Convention, which said, ‘There must be a Revolution in Geneva, or our own must fail.’ We know that Swisserland, though by this time prepared for resistance, had no way of avoiding a war but by withdrawing its troops from the neighbourhood of Geneva, and leaving it to its fate; and we know, too, that the pretended crime of that city was having procured itself to be included in the Helvetic Neutrality, which, said Brissot, is nothing but an ill-disguised accession to the Coalition of Princes. ^†

Yet in sight of this unfortunate city, which the French have polluted, by every atrocity of their own Revolution—close to the gates of a city whose Neutrality was its crime, a philosophic writer re­proaches other nations for not having trusted to a similar Neutrality!

I am, however, convinced, that nothing but the existing calamities of the war, could have led M— to lose sight of the far more terrible calamities from which, in all probability, Europe has been preserved by it. Quite overjoyed to see the French Revolution all at once take so moderate a turn, M— does not observe that it is the war, which, by exhausting that nation, has brought it so soon to an epoch when the principles which led to it have lost their attraction, [Page 12] even with the French themselves; and when they are as candid in avowing the disastrous consequences of those principles, as formerly they were zealous in trying to persuade other nations, that the adoption of them would renovate the world, and restore the golden age.

Indeed there is now no longer any danger that other nations will be tempted to drink this political poison, from which France at present feels such fatal effects. They need no other warning against it than the following frightful, but the salutary declaration of the very persons who, a few years since, were so anxious in recommending it.

France, says Isnard, has been drenched with blood, and inundated with tears. The sovereignty of the Nation has been wronged; we have seen whole troops of victims dragged to the scaffold. Wretches! (ad­dressing himself to a part of his colleagues) look at your clothes! they are still spotted with blood. Be grateful for the generosity which restrains me from dis­playing the immensity of your crimes. ^*

[Page 13] France! (exclaimed Le Gendre, on the 24th of March) France is in ruins. Whichever way I look, what do I behold, but desolation and death! In the south I see the Rhone rolling its bloody waters to the Mediterranean! The public places in Paris have been covered with the dead! The cities of the south have been in flames! The north has been devastated and decimated by a ferocious savage! The Republic has been one vast Bastille, and tyranny has presided within these walls.

Terror (says Bailleul) subdued every soul, compressed the emotions of every heart. Terror was the strength of the Government; of such a government, that the numerous inhabitants of a vast territory seemed to have lost those qualities which distinguish men from brutes. [Page 14] They seemed to have no life but what their despots de­signed to allow them. Every man lost the consciousness of his own existence, and was a mere machine, coming, going, thinking, or not thinking, as he was impelled or animated by tyranny.

France (says Rovère) during the despotism of kings, was inhabited by courtiers and slaves: under the ty­ranny of Robespierre it contained only executioners and victims.

The history of the present Convention (says the Abbé Sieyes) may be divided into two epochs: during the first it was constantly enslaved by the people; during the second it was enslaved by Robespierre, by his accomplices, and by the different factions which have succeeded them.

It is a vain attempt (said Collot d'Herbois, on the 24th of March) to blot out your part from the History of the Revolution. The people seconded us all.

Tyranny has been exercised upon the people (says Sa­ladin); terror has been the soul of the government. Prisons and scaffolds have covered the soil of France; and innocent blood has flowed in every part of it.

But listen to Barrere!— What has commanded these terrible measures? THE REVOLUTION. Through what medium? Through persons deputed by the people. Who executed those measures? The Revolutionary Com­mittees. Who approved them? The Convention. Who superintended them? The Committee of General Safety. LIBERTY, like Victory, weeps over the evils she is com­pelled to be the cause of.

These dreadful confessions are extracted from the debates of the Convention itself. We observe, that the very men who make them, and who so candidly avow them, are unanimous in declaring that France is become a Hell. They only differ in the name of the Demon who has made it so. Rovère calls him Terror; Le Gendre calls him Robespierre; Collot d'Herbois, & Abbé Sieyes, name the Convention and [Page 15] the People; Barrere closes the list with openly accu­sing Liberty and the Revolution.

Undoubtedly these are reasons why an imitation of the French Revolution need no longer be dreaded: but if from these declarations, which so strongly indi­cate that France is verging towards a regular govern­ment, we are to conclude, that because the original object of the war is nearly attained, we should there­fore immediately propose a peace, in order that the new leaders of the French may be in a situation to effect the reforms which are necessary; and that Europe may enjoy the quiet for which she has been fighting, and which she so anxiously desires;—To those who argue in this way I answer, that, in the first place, we ought to ascertain whether the new French leaders do sincerely wish for a general peace, and whether in fact they are not internally convinced that it will destroy their authority. But, besides that they have never yet expressed such a wish, even if they had expressed it, the only pledge we can have of the sincerity of such professions, will be an offer to make a complete restitution of their conquests.

This consideration leads to another not less impor­tant— Whether, even in that case, any engagements made by the Girondist party, who once more take the lead, can be depended on? The author of this pam­phlet was one of those who negociated and signed, on the part of Geneva, the first treaty made by the French Republic; and can give evidence from his own ex­perience, how little the good faith of that Republic, or any engagement entered into by its Girondist leaders, can be trusted. This very Faction, after giv­ing its Minister full powers to negociate a treaty with the Genevese, waited till the latter had executed it on their part, and then coolly told them, they ought to have been aware that the only admissible treaty was a communication of principles. It remains to be considered (said Brissot in his report on this subject) whether a [Page 16] free people can or ought to bind itself by treaties; whe­ther they are not useless between Republics which ought to be guided by a community of principles; and indecent with every other form of Government which does not derive its authority immediately from the People. On those questions depend the SECRET of your own Revolu­tion, and of those which are PREPARING. ^§

Since we know that such principles as these induced the Girondist party, which at that time was all-power­ful in France, to violate and annul the first treaty signed by the French Republic, it remains perhaps to be considered whether it would be wise to place implicit confidence in any new treaties which that party may now be disposed to enter into, with any Government which does not (in their opinion) derive its authority immediately from the people. Considering however that circumstances are now very much changed; and aware too that their conduct may differ according to [Page 17] the magnitude of the object; I will admit that in the present state of things we may confide in the sincerity of the French Republic; but I still deny that we can rely on the solidity of any peace, unless she will gua­rantee it by a restitution of all her conquests; and I must add, that nothing less than such a restitution will restore the balance of power in Europe.

Whatever our new Preceptors may pretend, this balance of power is the salvation of Europe: it pre­serves its tranquillity, precisely in the same way that the balances of the British Constitution preserve the liberties of the people: it protects weak nations from the usurpations of powerful ones, and provides a ge­neral security against the abuse of strength in a general coalition to repress it. This admirable equipoise of the forces of Europe has now been for two centuries the palladium of her civilization. Formed by it into one extensive and wealthy confederation, she has been saved from the devastations of savage invaders.—It is only since the adoption of this system (accompanied and assisted by the Reformation) that barbarism has vanished from Europe. Like Greece during a similar equipoise among her Republics, she has since that [Page 18] period enjoyed in an eminent degree the blessings of social order, and protection from oppression; and has cultivated with unexampled success, the arts of which peace is the parent, and the sciences of which she is the nurse. Favoured by this system, the nations of Europe were hourly acquiring knowledge, freedom, and happiness, when this new philosophy appeared, to tell them that they were ignorant and superstitious slaves. It is nevertheless this equipoise of force that has given Europe such a decided superiority over the other two great divisions of the ancient world, which though in many respects more favoured by nature, yet will never emerge from their present abject condition, until some divisions of power are established among them; some federal system, adapted to their circum­stances, which can secure them from conquest, and protect the independence of the weak from the vio­lence of the strong.

Let us calculate, if possible, all the advantages which Europe has derived from this system since the treaty of Westphalia, and then estimate the miseries which she brought upon herself by neglecting it when Louis XIV. first began his enterprises. Can any one who considers the subject, believe that the war which ravaged almost all Europe about a century ago, would ever have taken place, if in 1667 (the period of the first attack by Louis XVI.) the parties to the treaty of Westphalia had understood their true inte­rests well enough to see, that then was the moment to unite against the ambition of France? The exertions which might have effectually stopped Louis in the beginning of his career, and compelled him to retreat within his own territories, would have been nothing in comparison of the sacrifices which they were after­vards obliged to make, merely to prevent him from passing the new boundary to which his first enterprise enabled him to extend his dominions.

Who will deny that the French Republic is now what Louis XVI. was in 1667, with the same over-bearing [Page 19] temper, the same thirst of dominion, the same passion for aggrandisement? Who does not shudder at the prospect of the torrents of blood which must slow for an age to come, if, by ceding to this military Republic any portion of its immense conquests, we in­toxicate it with the ambitious desire of increasing them hereafter; or if we adopt the immoral policy of yielding at present, with the secret intention of re­newing the contest at a more favourable opportunity?

The restitution of her conquests—of all of them without exception, must be the only basis of a solid peace; and now that the fury of the revolutionary storm is so much abated, the ultimate object of the war, an object which Europe and Great-Britain should never lose sight of, is to preserve in full force the confederation of Westphalia. I do not hesitate to say that if the greater part of the allied Powers should be pusillanimous enough to wish to purchase leave to retain what they have remaining, by finally abandon­ing what they have lost; still the solemn engagements of Great-Britain, her dignity, and her interest, re­quire of her to exert all the authority which she derives from her preponderance in the alliance, in prevailing on them not to betray their own cause; and, under any circumstances, to employ her whole force in defending it.

But possibly her Allies, fatigued with the contest, may say, "If the French Republic persist in refusing to restore her conquests, must we have no alternative; but be obliged to allow her an opportunity of adding to them, by prolonging a war which has already given her so many provinces, and added so much to her resources for pursuing it with increasing success?"

As to her resources, they no longer exist, or, at any rate, must very soon be totally exhausted. It is upon this circumstance that Europe should fix its attention; for it inevitably leads to a complete restitution of the provinces which have been lost. At present the en­thusiasm [Page 20] of her enemies is abated, and the war differs from former wars in these respects only: 1st, That the German States complain of being exhausted before they have suffered a third part of what the seven-years war cost them; 2dly, That the French, by bring­ing into action the whole of their resources at once, and pushing on with their national impetuosity, have hitherto been irresistible; and 3dly, That as to the relative situation of the conquerors and the conquered, the former are infinitely more exhausted than the latter.

If there be a political truth, which the history of modern Europe puts out of all controversy, it is this: that every war is now more or less a war of finance, invariably terminating to the disadvantage of that Power whose pecuniary resources are soonest exhausted. The great Frederic learned this axiom from his father, never lost sight of it, and owed to it all his success. If we read his works, we shall find, that it was only by an admirable management of his revenues, and by his care to have always new resources in reserve, that he was able to sup­port, for seven successive years, and at last to ter­minate with glory, a contest full of disasters, and during which his enemies overran the whole of his dominions. When at last he obliged them to re­treat, and to restore all that they had taken from him, it was because they felt an inability to persist in the war, the necessary consequence of exhausted resources; while, with a foresight which secured success, the great abilities of Frederic had been directed as much to recruit his treasures as his armies.

It is true, that when the means of war altogether depended on the accumulation of treasure, its duration might be more easily be calculated beforehand than now, that nations have discovered the dangerous secret of charging its expences on unborn gene­rations, [Page 21] by additional debts. But still, if, in com­paring the strength of contending Powers, we add to their existing resources, those which are derived from credit, we may foretell with sufficient certainty which of them will ultimately be the most powerful, and consequently which has the best reason to expect success from perseverance. In the present war, there­fore, before a thought is admitted on the part of the Allies of buying a peace by sacrifices, which must necessarily render it insecure; before we give way to despondency, we should examine whether our antagonist is not much nearer the end of his treasures and his credit than we are; whether the distress resulting from this circumstance does not more than counterbalance any victory in the field; and whe­ther, in spite of his wide-extended acquisitions, he is not on the point of being in a situation to say with Pyrrhus, One victory more, and I am undone.

An object then at present of the greatest import­ance, is to compare the military resources, or, which in truth is the same thing, the finances and the credit of France with those of Great Britain; for it is from such a comparison only that we can decide whether the latter ought to make any concession for the sake of peace.

CHAPTER II.

THE Author of the Reflections on Peace begins with the following bold assertion: ‘The whole power of the French Revolution consists in the art of exciting popular enthusiasm, and directing it to political pur­poses.’ Page 1, line 1.

This (though assumed, and afterwards relied on as a fundamental proposition) I must deny without any hesitation. In the commencement of the Revo­lution it might be true, but has long since ceased to be so: for, admitting that popular enthusiasm, with liberty for its object, was the instrument employed to overturn the French Monarchy, and to repel the attempts of the Combined Powers to restore it; yet the republican system which succeeded it, could neither have been founded nor supported so long, but by a cause more simple, more durable, and more unremittingly active:—I mean self-interest, which has been stimulated by the invention of assignats. In them, and in them only, consists at present all the power of the French Revolution. It is by them that it has succeeded in bribing every personal con­sideration. By stipends to civil officers, who are [Page 23] every one preachers of the new-fashioned doctrines, it has succeeded in spreading them to every corner of France. Even its foreign conquests are merely to be attributed to the assignats, which have hitherto pro­vided for 1,200,000 soldiers; and no doubt so extraordinary a number must necessarily have pro­duced extraordinary effects. If the conquests of the French Republic have been three times as extensive as those of Louis XIV. it is because the assignats have enabled it to maintain armies three times as numerous. ^* What we have to consider is, whether the resources of France have not been wasted with infinitely greater profusion; and whether she is not, in this respect, on the eve of a catastrophe, propor­tionably more violent than that which she experienced in the beginning of this century; and whether she will be able much longer to delay this catastrophe, by delaying the total depreciation of her paper money.

So long as the assignats were issued in any sort of proportion to the confiscations which were pledged for them, they had a real value, and the project was greatly successful. But from the time that the Con­vention, intoxicated by a discovery so unexpected, [Page 24] and by means so immense, began to employ itself in contriving pretences for new wars, in order to bring them into action; when it began to work this rich mine, as if absolutely inexhaustible; every intel­ligent observer foresaw the rapid and complete de­preciation of its produce. The calculation that no­thing could prolong the existence of assignats beyond two or three years, has indeed proved erroneous; but it has proved so, merely because it was impossi­ble to conjecture that such extraordinary means would be adopted for supporting them; and that Robes­pierre would come forward to prop them up, when tottering, by his two additional projects of spoliation and terror.

His process is well known. He began by a de­cree, which seized all the specie that could be found, of every sort, and paid for it with assignats. He then imposed the Law of the Maximum, and that of Requisitions; measures which, so long as they could be borne, gave this new money a forced circulation, and a pretended value. But as decrees so oppressive could not be enforced without having innumerable officers and informers, ^* to compel the people to sub­mit to them, he met the difficulties resulting from this multiplication of expence, by contriving a new security for new emissions of assignats.

For this purpose the system of terror was adopted in its fullest extent, merely as a measure of finance, in which view Robespierre undoubtedly considered it; and such was the success of his horrible proscriptions, [Page 25] that in some instances the very same estates have actually been three times confiscated and sold again. The assignats issued were but a sort of bills of exchange, drawn on the Revolutionary Tribunal, and paid by the Guillotine, which Robespierre is said to have called an engine for coining money.

In this way, as soon as the inferior and subaltern robbers of their country were grown rich enough to be worth plundering, the Guillotine transferred their wealth to the State, and furnished the security wanted for new emissions of assignats: this sanguinary con­trivance had the desired effect on the infatuated mul­titude, who imagined that their value would not alter, at least in the interior of the Republic, as long as they could find any demagogues to load with riches one day, and to plunder on the next. It was by this terrible round of confiscations, dilapidations of pub­lic wealth, executions, and emissions of new paper, that the credit of the assignats was supported for more than a year, and the Republic was actually enabled to provision her fourteen armies at a cheaper rate, though with paper money, than the Allies could their forces with specie. To produce this political miracle, cost Robespierre nothing more than a decla­ration that half the property of France was to change its owners by violent means.

However, those who were thus enriched, not finding themselves at all more secure than those who were suffered to retain their property, began of course to unite with them for the destruction of a tyrant equally dangerous to both: almost a year elapsed before the object could be gained; but at last he, in his turn, was dragged to execution; and by his death began a new epoch in the history of assignats.

Every preceding faction, however atrocious its measures, had been regularly supplanted by another proposing measures still more atrocious; but as it was impossible to go beyond Robespierre in [Page 26] cruelty, those who supplanted him had no way to secure themselves, but by promising to be more moderate; and particularly they found themselves obliged to begin with abolishing the law of the Maximum, and leaving the Guillotine which had supported it, without employment.

But though they could not but know that the sup­pression of the maximum must be fatal to the assignats, yet they never once dreamt of proposing a general peace; though it was the only measure which was likely to prevent further depreciation, by making further emissions unnecessary. They obstinately per­sisted in carrying on the war, though they were no longer able to fix the currency, or to keep up the value of the assignats, which they were obliged to issue for its expence.

From that time their relative value has fallen, and must continue to fall in the compound ratio of the depreciation of the existing mass (already much greater than can be brought into circulation), and of its continual augmentation. Nor is this all—for their depreciation is advancing with a rapidity continually and inevitably accelerated by this very simple cir­cumstance, that the lower those which have been al­ready issued fall in one month, to the greater nominal amount must new ones be issued in the next, in order to defray equal expences; and the Convention can only bear up against the effect of their present progressive diminution of value, by means which hasten their ruin. By increasing the quantity which they issue in one month, they condemn themselves to issue a still greater quantity in the next. I appeal, for the truth of this, to the last monthly report of their expenditure which we are acquainted with, that of Nivose, which, though by no means a time of gene­ral military operations, cost near eighteeen millions of pounds sterling, almost twice as much as the month [Page 27] preceding. ^* I appeal too to the care which the M [...]ers of the Convention have taken to double their own salaries, which was done the 13th of last Ja­nuary. The principle on which they did it is just; and indeed, as Cambon observed at the time, the same principle might have allowed them to increase the sum almost fourfold; because, even then, the assignats were at a discount of no less than 73 per cent. No wonder then that, ten days after, the Con­vention found itself obliged to decree the same aug­mentation of pay to those in all other civil employ­ments; it is rather surprising, that it has hitherto refrained from doubling in the same way the pay of its fourteen armies; and it would be still more sur­prising, if it could avoid a progressive increase of all the salaries, according to the progressive depreciation of its paper money.

The law of the maximum, and its train of terrors, gave an artificial credit to the assignats; and of conse­quence, when the Convention was reduced to the ne­cessity of taking away this only support of them, their fall was proportionably rapid. The people no sooner began to perceive this, than an unbounded spirit of jobbing shewed itself with respect to every sort of com­modity, to every thing which could possibly be ex­changed for paper; and this spirit has extended to every part of France, and to the lowest classes of so­ciety. ^† Goods of all sorts changing their owners al­most every day and every hour, are each time sold for more and more assignats. Avarice cannot resist the [Page 28] temptation of selling, for perhaps 150 livres, what a few days before cost but 100; and yet these 150 livres are hardly in the pocket, before their value is so much fallen, as to make it an object to part with them again as soon as possible for something else, whose value will rise in proportion to their depreciation.

It is true, that in the neutral towns, and on the fron­tiers of France, the discredit of the assignats has by no means been so rapid as in the interior; but the reason is obvious. In those places they had before a regular exchange for specie, the course of which de­pended upon commercial opinion, uncontrouled by the maximum, or the guillotine; and instead of a forced value, they were previously subject to a dis­count which varied according to circumstances. But as the exchange of assignats on the frontiers is the only rule to estimate their former value, or to guess at their future discredit, it is enough to observe, that between the 24th of January, and the 24th of March, 1795, they fell one half in Swisserland; having been at a discount, which, during that period, progressively increased from 80 to 90 per cent.; so that, in the short space of two months, they fell from a fifth to a tenth only of their original value.

The consequence of this rapidly progressive depre­ciation must be obvious to every one; since there cannot be a doubt but, if they continue to fall at the rate of 50 per cent. every two months, in a very short time the assignats now in circulation will not be worth the trouble and expence of issuing them. But suppose this event can be delayed to the end of the present year, or even beyond it, in the present state of things it must inevitably h [...]en; and when it does happen, I ask what possible resource the Republic will have for the preservation of its conquests, and the provi­sion necessary for the numerous armies which maintain those conquests; and which no longer consist of vo­lunteers and enthusiasts, but of forced levies, and [Page 29] mere disciplined mercenaries. Its only step must be to disband its armies before they mutiny for want of pay, to restore its conquests before the troops desert them, and offer a peace before they are compelled to sue for it from absolute necessity: so that a restitution of all the conquests made by the Republic, and a solid and lasting peace, must speedily be the consequence of the rapid and inevitable fall of the assignats, if the Allies will but have patience and steadiness enough to wait the event without relaxing their military exertions.

I say, if the Allies have but steadiness enough to wait the event without relaxing their military exertions; be­cause it is evident that the progressive fall of the as­signats arises principally from the necessity of issuing new ones. But since this necessity must continue as long as the war lasts, and must be urgent in pro­portion to the exertions which the French are obliged to counteract, it seems evident, that the annihilation of this, their only remaining resource for carrying on the war, or preserving their conquests, will be the sooner effected, in proportion as the co-operation of the Allied Powers is more active and persevering; and that every one of those Powers which withdraws itself from the confederation, postpones this total bank­ruptcy, in proportion as the Republic, by being able to lessen its expences, is in a lesser degree obliged to accelerate its own ruin by issuing new assignats. The defection, however, of some of the Allies can do no more than postpone this event, which it is impossible to avoid, but by a general peace, the only measure which can put an end to the necessity of new emis­sions; and till that necessity is at an end, no attempt to support the credit of the existing assignats can an­swer any purpose.

I know that, in reply to this reasoning, it will be said, that however seemingly well founded it may be, yet unhappily experience has constantly proved its falla­ciousness; [Page 30] since France, far from being obliged to re­lax her efforts, has hitherto from time to time found means to double them; and has also doubled her triumphs, in consequence of this increasing exer­tion. But let us not lose sight of the circumstance that it is precisely this reduplication of her efforts which accelerates their termination. If those who considered this subject four years ago were mis­taken in anticipating this event, it was because they could not possibly take into the calculation the despe­rate measures adopted by Robespierre; measures, not at all tending to prevent it; but only to make it ul­timately more dreadful, in consequence of a tempo­rary suspension. How could they have conjectured that the Convention would have had recourse to the law of the Maximum, which, as they own them­selves, has destroyed commerce, and annihilated agricul­ture? ^* A measure, which has ruined industry, cheated the probity which was faithful to the laws, and enriched the criminal avidity which set them at defiance! ^† That they would have adopted so senseless a system of legisla­ture which made terror the order of the day, and en­couraged stock-jobbing—a legislation, says Boissy d'An­glas, ^‡ which enabled the Government to become the only merchant, farmer, and manufacturer, in the Republic; which enabled it to exercise a tyranny absolutely unknown upon the earth; and tending to universal annihilation of property, by the assassination of every man who possessed any.

Who could have thought that the Guillotine would be able to introduce this violent law, which supported the assignats; and to maintain it, by destroying indiscriminately the new possessors of property and the old? or have anticipated the dying words of Danton, that, to prolong a little its frightful existence, [Page 31] this revolutionary monster would at last devour its own offspring? Who could have thought that an unheard­of circle of spoliations, kept in constant motion by the dreadful agency of terror, would be able so sud­denly and so completely to enslave a warlike nation which allowed itself to be menaced with the scaffold, ^* at the very moment when it was boasting of having broken its fetters?

I may be told that the calamities of war may pos­sibly revive the system of terror; but this I posi­tively deny. This infernal prodigy in the French Revolution never can be repeated; even the Nero of France, with his legion of executioners, did not make it last longer than fourteen months; and I am not afraid to assert that it would have been a thousand times more easy for him to have prolonged its exist­ence another year, than for his successors, who owed their elevation to the abolition of it, to revive it for a single day.

I may also be told that Robespierre has left them an immense fund in the estates which, though al­ready confiscated, have not hitherto been sold, and which are a sufficient security for new emissions of assignats. I know that such has been their boast, and that in the beginning of this year they had the assurance to assert that there remained security enough for 6 or 8 milliards (250 to 330 millions sterling) of new paper-money.

But we want no better proof of the falsehood of such an assertion than this, that, precisely at the time when it was made, the assignats began to fall more rapidly than ever. And besides, this immense security, even if it existed, could not cover such expences as those of the last two months, for more than a single year.

Having traced the history of assignats through the three first parts of it—1st, Their credit derived [Page 32] from public confidence—2dly, Their reign by the influence of the maximum and of terror—and 3dly, Their discredit after the repeal of the maximum—it is now time to advert to the fourth Act of this Drama, beyond a doubt the most important, because it leads us to the catastrophe.

I have already said that Robespierre not having been able to support himself but by the utmost ex­cesses of the most flagrant injustice, his successors had in fact no way of securing themselves but by abso­lutely opposite measures: of any such measures the safest for them was an union with the Federalists, whose faction, though it had been crushed and dispersed by Robespierre, was still both numerous and powerful. As a measure of party, nothing could be more pru­dent than this union; but it must be allowed too that nothing could be more destructive to the assignats: for it was clearly impossible for the then prevailing members of the Convention to procure the support of the Federalists, without restoring the vast possessions they had been deprived of.

The decree for this restitution did not pass without violent debates for several days. Duhem exclaimed, that this first restitution would assassinate the country, and be a decree of counter-revolution; ^† others an­nounced that, in consequence of it, the assignats would lose the little value they still retained; and that to re­store the whole of their property to the families which had been plundered, would be to reduce the public wealth to nothing. Public wealth, replied Boissy d'Anglas, built on private poverty, is a barbarous so­phism, invented in the ferocious den of the Jacobins, who have offered to your creditors as a security, estates which they well knew they had no right to mortgage. At last, when one of the Deputies, alarmed at the measure, asked how they should pay the expences of [Page 33] the war. We are not at present, exclaimed Charrier, to enquire how the expence of the war shall be paid, but to do justice. We are to prove to the people of other States, that the Convention does not massacre her victims for the sake of their wealth, as the governments ^‡ of those States wish them to believe.

Induced by this eloquence, and by some respect for those principles of equity which it had so long tram­pled upon, at last, on the 20th of March, the Conven­tion decreed a suspension of sale▪ as a preliminary step to a restitution of the property of all persons condem­ned by the revolutionary tribunals of Robespierre.

It was not however so much a returning sense of justice which occasioned this decree, as necessity, re­sulting from a multitude of irresistible causes, which continue to operate, and will, sooner or later, bring on the restitution of the property of at least one de­scription of emigrants. ^§ In fact, though this decree [Page 34] has not been made more than six weeks, ^* we know already that it has been extended (and particularly at Lyons) to a number of families who were by no means of the Federalist party. How indeed can it be pos­ssible to revive the commerce of France, without re­calling the merchants? And to what purpose will the merchants and manufacturers be recalled, without restoring to them the means of carrying on their em­ployment?

Let it not be imagined that the Convention was taken by surprise, when they passed this important decree, and that, upon finding the total depreciation of the assignats attributed to it, that Assembly will be tempted to revoke it. They were perfectly well ap­prised beforehand of this, which had been predicted with much force, by Le Cointre, so long ago as the 10th of last December. I now ask you, (said he to his col­leagues) what will become of public credit, if you take but one step backward respecting property judicially con­fiscated, and applied to the use of the Republic?—What will become of the Finances?—In what a situation will you find yourselves?—Confidence will be at an end; and where in that case will you find purchasers?—If, with respect to the property in your hands, you but once look [Page 35] back wards!—but I check myself—I leave you to your reflections.

Surely the time when they were looking forward to these confiscations, was the time when Le Cointre should have awakened the reflections of his colleague Robespierre. It is not the decree of the 20th of March which has destroyed the assignats, by restoring pos­sessions that the State had no right to mortgage, and which it could not possibly retain any longer: but it was Robespierre, who, acquiring those possessions by rob­bery, in order to have security for new assignats, and then wasting these new assignats to extend the con­quests of the Republic—it was Robespierre that de­creed a Counter-revolution, and assassinated the Republic: for at present I do not scruple to assert that it will perish, as the Monarchy perished, BY THE RUIN OF HER FINANCES.

It is to no purpose that the greater part of those who have succeeded Robespierre, persist in attempting to deceive their countrymen, and Europe;—to no purpose that they still talk of ten or twelve milliards (4 or 500 millions sterling) which they pretend the property of the emigrants will produce, and which, they would persuade the world, is a security enough to redeem all the assignats in existence, and all that they may have occasion to issue. They themselves well know that nothing can be more untrue; for by their own calculations it may be proved, that all the confiscations which remain unsold are really not worth a fourth part of such a sum. ^*

[Page 36]Accordingly Le Sage, Boissy d'Anglas, Cambaceres, La Reveilliere, and Thibault, begin to remove the [Page 37] veil which has hitherto been used to hide the dreadful state of the French Finances.— As to the security of [Page 38] your assignats, says Le Sage, it is French integrity and the probity of the nation.—Boissy d'Anglas, who six weeks before had affirmed that the assignats were un­doubtedly a property of incontestable solidity, a debt of the Nation secured on the firmest basis, suddenly changed his language in the Convention:— Your assignats, said he on the 20th of March, are bills guaranteed by your integrity, resting much more on the credit which we have a right to, than on any other basis. Ten days after this, Cambaceres tells the Convention, that, if it should dissolve itself, it would leave the Finances exhausted. ^* We must instantly, exclaims La Reveilliere, remedy the disorder of the finances, by means simple, equitable, and of immediate efficacy—If they perish, we must perish with them, and the State with us.—And lastly, to crown all these alarming confessions, Thibault tells the Con­vention, on the 1st of April, that there were three sub­jects which should never be publicly mentioned; they are, says he, the State of Provisions, Religion, and the Fi­nances.

Let their transient Republic continue then, if it will, to inscribe on its new assignats the pompous phrase of NATIONAL DOMAINS: no intelligent person can help substituting instead of it this alarming acknowledgement:— Exhausted Finances!—Security overloaded!—Restitution begun!—New emissions of Paper!—and continued Depreciation!

I presume a further explanation would be unneces­sary, to shew the way in which each effect of this [Page 39] continued depreciation of assignats, becomes, in its turn, a cause accelerating their ruin, which must ap­proach with increasing rapidity, that nothing can check but a general peace. I would willingly believe that the present leaders of the Revolution have more integrity than their predecessors; but, as I cannot believe that they have greater ability, I am convinced they cannot discover any other way of carrying on the war than by new emissions of depreciated assignats. I defy them to give any sort of permanent value to that immense mass which has been issued, but by a general peace; or to put off much longer the day when their people, wearied with misery, will compel them to abandon all projects of aggrandisement, and to sacrifice all their conquests, for so necessary an object; especially if Great-Britain will but honourably persist in rejecting any overture which does not propose a complete restitution of all the French conquests, as a prelimi­nary article.

Some persons however, either interested in misre­presenting the question, or possibly deceived by the quackery of the French Committee of Finance, seem to imagine that some or other of the visionary schemes which that Committee either entertains, or wishes its constituents to entertain, may be practicable—schemes which are to bring back the assignats into the public trea­sury by means purely voluntary.

First then, as to the idea of Johannot, in a report of the 12th of last December, that the value of the mortgaged property increases in exact proportion to the multiplication of assignats, and that it is to this constant inverted ratio between the value of the republican money, and that of the national property, that the French are indebted for those inexhaustible resources, which have astonished Europe, and have prepared the means of triumph for fourteen armies. But I must deny that there has been such a constant inverted ratio between the fall of the assignats, and the rise in the price of national property. If this progression had existed at the time when Jo­hannot [Page] made this report, assignats being then at a dis­count of about 75 per cent. or only a fourth of their first value, estates paid for in assignats would conse­quently have sold at four times the usual price: one, for instance, which at thirty years purchase, (the usual value before the war) would have sold for 1500 l. in specie, would last December have sold for 6000 l. in assignats. But in the same speech, he says, that the national domains sell at only forty years purchase; so that, by his own acknowledgement, the value of estates had only risen a fourth, while that of assignats had fallen three fourths.

Possibly some persons may attribute this astonishing fall of the assignats, not to their want of a real value, but solely to the quantity of this representative of wealth, multiplied in such a degree, as to destroy all proportion between it and the objects which it represents; ^* so that, by diminishing their mass, and relieving the circulation from half of the existing assignats, the remaining half would recover their original value.

It is now five months since this object engaged the attention of the Committee of Finance, and that they declared such a diminution indispensable: but after having presented report upon report, and project upon project, all that they have really done, has been to increase the enormous mass of assignats, by forcing almost as many new ones into circulation as they pur­posed to withdraw from it. They have however sug­gested the following plans for their diminution, whic [...] possibly will not be thought quite so easy in practice as in speculation.

The first was, of either an extraordinary loan, or revolutionary tax: ^† but as to the first of these measures. [Page 41] Cambon observed, that the losses by the law of the maximum had been too great to allow of entertaining such a project; and as to revolutionary taxes, he avowed ingenuously on the 3d of February, that the forced loan of about a milliard (about 41 millions sterling) had only produced between 180 and 200 millions (about 8 millions sterling). A strange de­falcation, especially when we recollect that it was while the system of terror was in its full force!

A second project was a lottery of four milliards (about 165 millions sterling), which was to induce the holders of assignats to bring them into the public treasury, on receiving instead of them, in the shape of prizes, effects which the Republic found itself unable to sell in any other way. But then, said Cambon, we must offer some premium—and he calculated that by allowing 10 per cent. it would cost the nation 390 millions, and an annual interest of 131 millions.— A curious way of relieving the finances! Besides, whether as a lottery or as a tontine, the project is impos­sible; for either the purchase of tickets must be vo­luntary, in which case a security would be expected for their value, that does not exist; or else this resump­tion of assignats must be effected by force, and, far from improving the credit of any new emissions, would only be evidence of their fate.

The third of Cambon's projects was a forced reduc­tion of the nominal value of assignats—But, said he, very candidly, if we arbitrarily reduce the value of those already in existence, what credit will the new emissions have? We should find it absolutely impossible to carry on the war.

Force, however, is by no means necessary to bring about this reduction of value. The bankruptcy is [Page 42] begun, and wants no decree to complete it: the only difference is, that it will not be openly confessed, until the Convention finds, as it soon must find, its new assignats so entirely without value, that nobody will take them.

But as to Cambon's observation, that in this case the Republic will find it impossible to carry on the war— some persons imagine perhaps, that as the Convention must long since have foreseen the total depreciation of its paper-money, it must of course have made a pro­vision for that event, out of the immense quantity of of treasure which it procured by the pillage of the churches. With respect to this treasure, the Conven­tion itself admits that it has been squandered with the same thoughtless profusion, as the paper-money; and Cambon declared on the 2d of November, that the whole of the plate taken from the churches, and of which Europe had heard such exaggerated accounts, did not produce more than between 25 and 30 millions ^* (about 11 or 1200,000 l. sterling).

Let us allow that this produce of sacrilege still re­mains hoarded up, yet it is not equivalent to the nominal expence of two days of the last month: but, since it is in specie, let us suppose it applied in dis­charging expences equivalent to those of Great-Britain: it may then last about fifteen days; and when that time is past, I ask once more—To what wil [...] the French Republic have recourse, in order to pro­tract the war, and to defend its conquests? To its ancient abundant resources? Let us consider the state to which the Convention has reduced them.—What were those resources? Its COMMERCE?—It has re­ceved a deadly blow, says Boissy d'Anglas. ^*— Yes, adds Columbel, we all agree that every thing has been done ^† [Page 43] to destroy commerce, and but too successfully. ^*— Its MANUFACTURES?—They are annihilated; the work­shops are deserted, and the workmen are driven from the country, says Echasseriaux. ^†— Its AGRICULTURE? —Listen to Pellet— The tree of reproduction is cut off at the roots.—Its CREDIT?—That credit to which, says Boissy d'Anglas, they have a right. Where are the revenues on which it can now attempt to borrow? Considering the sort of half-confession of Cambon, I very much doubt whether the present receipts amount to more than 150 millions (6,250,000 l. sterling); and in assignats, not very likely, I should suppose, to pro­mise any great surplus to borrow upon. Besides, where will they find dupes to lend them, or indeed any monied men, connected with France, who have any thing left to lend, but assignats.

But to anticipate at once any speculations on the means which the French may be supposed to adopt for protracting the war—let us imagine, that by a stretch of authority the Convention actually reduces the nominal value of the assignats, or that the people, by general consent, agree to give up half or three-fourths of those in their hands, to retrieve the value of the remainder. Whatever resource might be found in such measures, after a general peace; yet, while the war continues, they would be useless: for nothing but a general peace can take away the necessity of new emissions: and besides, to propose such a measure to the French, in order to continue the war, would be modestly asking them to burn half their fortunes, only to give the Convention an opportunity of annihilating the remainder—exhausting the little life that is left, in grasping for a few months more Savoy and Belgium, and putting off for a short time longer the return of the Stadtholder.

[Page 44]I think I have said enough to prove that it is not possible for France to carry on a war of which aggran­disement is the only object, while the assignats, her means of carrying it on, are in such a state of depre­ciation; and equally impossible to prevent that de­preciation, now that a system of moderation, adopted from absolute necessity, prevents plunder and confis­cation adequate to the waste. With the an [...]hilation of all their remaining value, which soon must happen, will vanish every remaining charm of the Revolution; and a political convulsion must follow, productive of consequences which at present can hardly be conjec­tured. Such a bankruptcy of the State will most sensibly affect all the poorer classes, and particularly the soldiers, whose absence has deprived them of the opportunity of employing their paper in purcha­sing lands at a low rate, and who, when they return, will find no public property remaining to divide among them, as they were promised. If their indig­nation at finding their paper fortunes of no sort of value, should induce them to require the annulling all the sales of estates which have been made by the Convention, and which the Jacobins at home have purchased for almost nothing, while they have been bleeding on the frontiers;—such a measure would be strictly equitable, and would give the means of allow­ing some indemnification, both to them, and to the former proprietors. But, as it would produce nothing towards carrying on a war; then, and possibly not till then, the illusion on that subject will cease. Her Revolution will then leave France nothing to contem­plate, but the misery of her people, the ruins which cover her, and the madness with which her dema­gogues have wasted a resource, which, if prudently managed, would have effected and secured the du­ration of all the improvements in her government which she wanted. She will see their criminal absur­dity, in having sacrificed such an immense resource to [Page 45] the phantoms of military glory, and territorial aggran­disement. But what is past cannot now be remedied; and of her present misery the only cure is Peace, and her only future hope Economy. These words every Frenchman will very soon substitute instead of Conquest and Democracy. Having experienced that the jea­lousy of wealth, and of cultivated understanding, which is inherent in a pure Democracy, makes it the most ignorant of all forms of government, while the multitude and the avidity of its agents makes it the most expensive, they will direct all their wishes to­wards one less burdensome, more simple in its ar­rangements, and more powerful in its protection; in short, they will fly for refuge to the arms of a Monarchy.

I do not deny that this concluding scene of the French Revolution may be more or less delayed by different measures, and particularly by a peace; but the proposition which I have undertaken to examine, does not relate to the termination of the Revolution, but to that of the War: whether, if it be protracted, any thing can possibly delay much longer the annihi­lation of the paper-money, which, on the part of the French, is its only support; and whether Great-Britain should lose sight of this circumstance.

The case of America, however, is seemingly an example which directly contradicts all these conclu­sions by the sure test of experience; and may possibly influence many opinions in this country.

Those who consider it as a ca [...]e in point, will reply to me:— ‘Your calculations may be true, and the assignats may fall to nothing, even sooner than is ex­pected; and yet your conclusions may be false and illusive. A similar illusion led us to persist in the American war. At a great expence we persevered, till at last the paper-money there was much more depreciated than that of France has yet been, or perhaps ever will be; and yet, at that very time, the [Page 46] Congress was able to augment its forces, instead of diminishing them. To what purpose did we oppose our real to their artificial treasure? The 140 millions which we spent, enabled us only to spin out the war, which the Americans carried on against us with increasing success. They sur­mounted all obstacles, made an advantageous peace; and now, that hardly twelve years have elapsed, their public credit is restored, their re­venues greatly exceed their expences, and their future prosperity seems incalculable.’

This representation is true, so far as it applies to America, and so far only; for between that country and France there is no sort of analogy. What re­semblance is there between America, engaged in a contest at home, by no means expensive, and in which all Europe was on her side; and France ob­stinately persisting in a foreign war, in which her finances are opposed by almost all the wealth of Eu­rope? What resemblance between a Congress, re­presenting property by the principal proprietors, supported gratuitously by the armies and fleets of France, Spain, and Holland, who made her cause their own—and the French Convention, a mob, ap­pointed by a mob; which, so far from having a single ally, has been obliged to spend very large sums in purchasing the inactivity of several of the governments which she had not provoked to take part against her? The Congress, when the depreciation of their paper currency made it requisite to negociate foreign loans, had France and Holland ready to guarantee them, and immense tracts of unappropriated land to offer as a security; a property which, with some moderate taxes, has proved an ample fund for discharging their debt, and of course has raised it to its original value. But where are the persons who will now advance any money to the French Convention? Where are the Governments which will guarantee the repayment? and [Page 47] what is the security which it can offer? In her strug­gle for independence, America was not at one twelfth part of the expence of her antagonist; while France, on the contrary, spends at present eight or ten times as much as the whole Coalition against her. In America the expences both of her friends and her enemies in­creased very much her circulating specie; but in France gold and silver have almost vanished. Paper-money was indeed depreciated in America; but it was the provincial money which fell almost to nothing, and never recovered itself; while that issued by the Congress never lost three-fourths of its original value, and was restored to it by means of which France is wholly destitute.

But indeed what possible resemblance can be dis­covered between America, with resources constantly improving, even during the contest, by a reproduction of the necessaries of life, far greater than the consump­tion of her own people; resources directed all along by the same leaders, men previously practised in the arts of government, to one uniform object, and in a war at home—and France, with wants continually in­creasing, with reproduction greatly reduced, continu­ally changing its leaders, and its arrangements; and fighting at a distance, m [...]rely for aggrandisement by conquests, much more expensive to preserve, than difficult to make?—What resemblance between the French, who have hardly advanced a step without some novelty in wickedness, and whose successes, by a natu­ral consequence, give full scope to domestic strife; and the Americans whose union was cemented by danger, who regulated their conduct as much as pos­sible by the established laws of civilized nations, and who were anxious not to disgrace their cause by the licentious ferocity of savages?

Any comparison of the situation, resources, and the conduct of these two nations, proves that they re­semble one another in nothing, but that each was [Page 48] distressed by a revolutionary struggle; which the one had means of bringing to a successful conclusion, of which the other is totally destitute. A contempla­tion of the progress of the American Revolution proves that paper money is not a permanent resource; and the circumstances attending that of France prove that, when her paper-money fails, she will find no substitute.

I cannot too often repeat that nothing short of this failure will convince the French of the absolute neces­sity of agreeing to a full restitution of their conquests. Whatever may be the military events of the war, this object will be obtained by the perseverance of the Allies; and upon it depends the only reasonable hope they now have of terminating it on equitable and safe conditions.

A Peace on such conditions, I consider as so inesti­mably valuable, and as so certain a reward of fortitude on their part, that even if we were to begin this cam­paign with the melancholy certainty that at the end of it there would be no material alteration in the mili­tary situation of the two armies,—yet still, no sacri­fices should be spared, because no sacrifices can be too great, when the object is to drive back and confine within their own country these modern Goths and Vandals, who have already conceived the design of overrunning the rest of Europe. At present indeed they seem to have suspended their design; but the national character of the French will never allow them to relinquish it, if an example of disunion, and humi­liating concession, should ever give them a prospect of success; and reduce the rest of Europe, either to the necessity of becoming their Allies, and thereby gradually falling into the deplorable situation of those islands which under that name submitted to the domi­neering insolence of the democracy of Athens; or of maintaining a perpetual state of warfare, in defence of their independence, against French violence and French intrigue.

CHAPTER III.

IN attempting to form a conjecture of the probable issue of a war, merely from a view of the pecuniary resources of the contending Powers, it is not enough to shew that those of one of the parties are on the point of being totally exhausted, unless we also prove that those of its antagonist are in such a state as to enable it still to continue the contest.

To avoid any imputation of blending resources which may possibly be thought doubtful, with those which we can demonstrate to be real; in cal­culating the means which the Allies have of pay­ing the future expences of the war, we will only take into the account those of Great-Britain, and will even suppose it possible that the whole of them must be furnished by her. It will hardly be denied but that, if money can be found, the allied Powers can furnish a military force sufficient to maintain a war of posts, at least till the impending distress of the French obliges them to retreat.— Now admitting that even the whole sum necessary for such a purpose, must be advanced by Great-Britain; and that, in consequence, she would be obliged to raise 25 millions sterling, per annum, [Page 50] during the continuance of the war; the circum­stances which I am about to enumerate, will enable us to form a judgment how far she is competent to such an expence.

[Page 51]The wise and important provision, in the act of 1787, for consolidating all the funds and revenues of the country, which renders it necessary to lay before Parliament, the amount of all taxes imposed for paying the interest of money borrowed, has en­abled us to ascertain, by the accounts laid before the House of Commons, that the income of the bur­dens laid upon the public, since that time, is more than sufficient to pay the charge incurred by new loans, and even to provide for the payment of the interest of the debt incurred, which is not funded.

In the above expenditure, it will be observed, is included the annual million applied by Mr. Pitt's bill, which passed in 1786; by the operation of which, with the application of an additional sum, as above stated also, since 1792, of 200,000 l. to­gether with the falling in of annuities, there was paid off, of the national debt, on the 5th of January 1795, 14,912,400 l. of the capital; and the sum now annually applied for the reduction of the debt, is, in the whole, 1,965,992 l. which will necessarily continue to increase from the interest of the debt paid off, an­nuities falling in, &c. &c. &c.

3dly, The nation, instead of being obliged to sus­pend the operations of this fund during the war, has not only found no difficulty in borrowing 33,500,000 l. sterling, for that purpose, in the last three years; but has laid new taxes adequate to pay the interest of this new debt, and to augment the above fund in a due proportion to the augmentation of the debt, by an addition of 1 per cent. per ann. on every 100 l. of capital created in conformity with the provisions con­tained in the act passed in 1792.—And though these new taxes are calculated as likely to produce the im­mense sum of 2,785,000 l. ^* per ann. yet, in no in­stance [Page 52] have they excited less opposition or discon­tent.

4thly, The usual effect of war is, that while the consumption of national wealth increases, the springs are diminished by which the reservoir is replenished; and yet in the year 1794, the commercial balance in favour of Great-Britain amounted to 4,446,000 l. no less than 2,704,000 l. more than the average of the four prosperous years of peace, which immediately preceded the war.

Nor does this favourable commercial balance arise merely from the difference between exports and im­ports, each of which have diminished; but it is between exports and imports, each most rapidly increasing even under the pressure of the war. The exports of last year are 4,960,000 l. greater than the average of the four years preceding the war; a de­monstration that the internal activity of the kingdom is not materially affected by the war.—And the im­ports were 3,218,000 l. more than during the same four years; a demonstration how little injury the French are able to do to the trade of Great-Britain, when compared with the advantage which it derives from their wilful annihilation of their own.

And this, notwithstanding such a number of men have been taken from their common employments, that her army is now greater than in any former period by more than eighty thousand men: and if unusual means have been adopted to procure sailors for her navy, it has been because the usual means have been less rigorously enforced, because the navy too is greater and more numerous than at any former period, and because the commerce conti­nuing far more extensive than in any former war, ne­cessarily retains a far greater number of sailors.

[Page 53]4thly, Notwithstanding the increase of the debt, the addition of £.2,785,000 to the taxes since 1791, the immense current expences of the war, and its dis­asters ^* on the continent; yet now, in the third year of it, the stocks continue higher than they were at the same period of the last war with France; so that Mr. Pitt has made his loan at 1 per cent less interest, and on conditions in other respects more favourable, than that made by Lord North, in the corresponding period of the former war. Mo­ney too is so plenty, that the subscribers to this loan have taken an unusual advantage of the dis­count allowed, as on former occasions, for prompt payment, and advanced more than ten millions, soon after the deposit, instead of waiting to pay that sum by the regulated instalments.

This concise view of the present resources of Great-Britain, is drawn from well-known facts, and authentic accounts; and is, I imagine, quite enough to decide on her ability to continue the war as long as it can, by any possible means, be pro­tracted by her enemy.

‘But what (it may be said) is all this to the purpose? Consider how all the springs of the machine are strained; ^† the whole is kept in mo­tion merely by public credit, and that very credit is an instrument of public ruin: for it has [Page 54] cursed Great-Britain with a national debt; a gulf which, instead of being filled up, is con­tinually growing wider and wider, and into which this vain nation is falling, which believes herself the richest in Europe, only because all Europe does not contain so much money as she owes herself.’

Nearly such as this was the language of Dr. Price at about the same period of the last war; and which has been so completely refuted by experience. These antiquated declamations on the national debt of Great-Britain, which are still so fashionable abroad among the partizans of the French, may be completely answered, by observing—1st, That she cannot be distressed by a sudden call upon her for the capital of the debt, because it is not demandable; 2dly, That effectual means have been provided for its extinction; and, 3dly, That the payment of the interest is perfectly secure. When we wish to as­certain which of two individuals is in the best cir­cumstances, we do not limit ourselves to the observa­tion that one of them has a mortgage on his estate, while that of the other is unencumbered; but if the first, after deducting the interest of his mortgage, has still the greater income, we can have no doubt that of the two he is the richer.

But another objection is fashionable with the same class of political arithmeticians, on the continent.— ‘If (say they) the taxes of Great-Britain, of which the produce has hitherto been adequate to her present debt, go on increasing continually in a proportion adequate to the increase of that debt; if, notwithstanding their present immense amount, they are added to year after year; they must at last become more insupportably heavy than those taxes which have occasioned insurrections in other countries; and can it be expected that the people will then so patiently submit to them? And, [Page 55] besides, if this pretended public wealth results entirely from privations to which the individuals who compose the State must submit, the whole is merely a confusion of ideas.’

Either I am very much mistaken, or there is no other confusion than what results from mis-stating the argument; which may be easily put in a clearer point of view by considering, that the comparative burden of taxes on any families or nations, is not to be estimated by the sterling amount of the sums which they pay, but by the proportion which those sums re­spectively bear to the incomes which they derive from property or industry.

Let this rule be applied to the taxes paid by the people of Great-Britain; and it will be found that though their amount, when compared with the popu­lation, is perhaps greater than in any considerable country, Holland excepted, yet there is no country which supports its government almost entirely by public contributions, ^* where the burden is so lightly felt: the weight which sinks inferior animals to the earth, is hardly perceived when borne by the elephant. But, in fact, the people of Great-Britain feel less than any other the burden of taxation, for the following reasons: 1st, It is the only country where those who are poor pay less in proportion to their incomes than these who are rich. 2dly, This takes place in a wise gradation, from the lowest to the highest of the community; many taxes being assessed in an increa­sing ratio, regulated by circumstances which indicate a proportionate increase of wealth, and others being of a nature which confines their operation almost ex­clusively to the opulent. 3dly, There is no country [Page 56] where the mode of collecting them is so little vexa­tious, or the means of providing for the demand, so ready; in consequence of a facility in exchanging property, or procuring money on its credit, which in most other countries is unknown. ^† If these reasons [Page 57] are inconclusive, we must admit that the Savoyards, who, though the amount of their taxes, compared with [Page 58] their population, was trifling; yet, comparing that amount with their poverty, were perhaps the most ag­grieved by them of any people in Europe; that they must be considered as being taxed only one twelfth part as heavily as Great-Britain, because, in propor­tion to their number, their taxes were but one twelfth part as productive.

The only way of judging in what degree the taxes in any country are burdensome to the people, and to what extent they may be increased upon emergencies, is, first to ascertain the actual opulence of that country, and then investigate the sources of that opulence, in order to discover whether they are likely to become more abundant, and to be permanent. If such an investigation gives reason to believe that the opulence [Page 59] of Great-Britain has increased in any period to a given extent, her inhabitants need not be alarmed, if at the end of that period they find her public burdens in­creased in a proportionate extent.

The value of the reproductions in Great-Britain, and of the accumulation of every species of wealth within her, has been for many years increasing with a rapidity which has refuted the presages of melan­choly politicians, and excited the envy of her neigh­bours; and in such a situation, she ought not so much to be afraid of sacrifices which her prosperity enables her to make, as to be cautious, that neither the violence of her enemies, nor the indiscreet impa­tience of the advocates of immediate peace, succeed in depriving her of those sources from which her pro­sperity is derived. They are, at home, her agriculture and her manufactures, protected and encouraged by her Constitution; and abroad, her commerce, of which the balance of power in Europe is the shield.

Europe is the best market for her commerce; and her access to that market upon equal terms, as well as the opulence of those who trade with her in it, and which constitutes the value of it, depend, immediately, upon the tranquillity and independence of the nations which inhabit it; and ultimately, on the balance of power, by which that tranquillity and independence is essentially protected; so that the principal source of British opulence, that stream which fertilizes her fields, and moves the various mechanism of her mines, and manufactures, may be lost for ever, if she suffers the most formidable nation in Europe to increase an influ­ence, always hostilely directed, by any augmentation of her territory; or by allowing her to retain any politi­cal ascendency which she has gained by her present success. The culpable lassitude which could purchase peace on such conditions, would certainly be punished by a decay of foreign trade, and a diminution of inter­nal wealth, as rapid as its late increase has been.

[Page 60]God forbid that I should ever become the advocate of war on any other occasion, but when the object is self-preservation!—No one is more persuaded that even a successful termination of a just and defensive war, is so far from adding to the prosperity of the con­querors, that it greatly counteracts it—cutting off with the present generation, and its comforts, the sources of future population, and future enjoyments; drenching the earth with tears and blood; and pro­ducing for the victors, as well as the vanquished, no­thing but regret and repentance. ^* But surely the question is not whether the war is mischievous to [Page 61] Great-Britain; for no one can doubt it. Still less can it be a question whether peace is desirable; for [Page 62] who is there wicked enough to deny it? But it is to promote the duration of peace, by preferring of two evils (to one or the other of which we are compelled to submit) that which will most effectually contribute to its solidity. And this question clearly hinges on the four points which I have attempted to examine. 1st, Whether the preservation of the sources of British prosperity, does not essentially depend on the equi­poise, the independence, and the tranquillity of Eu­rope? 2dly, Whether that equipoise will not be abso­lutely destroyed, and her independence and tranquil­lity be continually in danger, from the moment that France is left in possession of any part of her con­quests? 3dly, Whether the near annihilation of the only resource which, during the war, she can make productive, does not give a better chance of depri­ving her of her conquests by perseverance? 4thly, Whether the resources of Great-Britain alone are not [Page 63] fully adequate to the expences of the war, during any probable calculation of its continuance; and whether their condition is such, as to give the French any shadow of reason for the hope which they so fondly cherish, of accomplishing their ruin, by protracting the war; a hope which has instigated a great part of their unprecedented exertions; and which now is the only probable cause of their apparent unwillingness to terminate the war, at least with Great-Britain.

I am aware that many persons on the Continent, who know no more of Great-Britain than what they read in the parliamentary debates, believe literally all the melancholy predictions of Opposition, and all those tales of misfortune, on which, as usual, so much stress is laid, whenever those who are adverse to the measures or the members of Administration, think proper to paint the disastrous effects of a war which they blame, and the immediate urgency of a peace which they re­commend. Struck, no doubt, with the eloquence with which Mr. Fox has described the abyss into which the obstinacy of Administration is plunging this country, by prolonging so hopeless a war—the Author of Reflections on Peace brings him forward to corroborate the evidence of the dangers of every kind, internal as well as external, from which nothing but a peace can preserve Great-Britain.

So much respect is due to the authority of Mr. Fox, that I would readily let the opinion of the fide­lity of my statement of the resources of Great-Bri­tain rest on his testimony. I go farther:—if Mr. Fox had been at the head of administration, and it had been proved to him that the French were determined to retain any part of their conquests; that the leaders of the Convention do not desire a general peace, or at least that they do not wish for it but by partial ones; that if they no longer persist in declaring that they will not sign it but on the ruins of the modern Carthage, yet they still tell their countrymen that the true guarantee of [Page 64] universal peace is to trace with a strong hand the limits of their Republic ^*; or, if the leaders of the Conven­tion persist in maintaining that Nature had decreed the Mediterranean shall belong to France ^†—I very much doubt whether Mr. Fox would admit the authority of such a demarcation on one side by Nature, and on the other with a strong hand by the armies of France. I rather imagine that, if such a map of France were of­fered him for his signature, he would not have the least difficulty in affirming on his part, that, rather than submit to such terms, Great-Britain ought to continue her present expence for years to come; that she is able, and will be able to do so; and that she must not put the evils which she has already borne, or may still be obliged to bear, in competition with the far greater, though not so immediate evils which they enable her to avoid. I believe too, that, instead of fancying that multiplied disasters would wear out Europe and England within a year ^‡, Mr. Fox would exert all his talents to prevent those disasters, by doubling the mili­tary exertions of the country, if necessary; and would not consent to sheath the sword, until, holding it with a strong hand, he had traced the limits of the French Republic; that is, until he had deprived her of all her conquests, and destroyed her influence in Holland. I am led to this opinion by his decided approbation of the conduct of Mr. Pitt in 1787 for taking an ac­tive part, in concert with Prussia, against the Anti-Stadholderian party in Holland. He not only went so far as to call that party usurpers; ^§ but he added, [Page 65] that it was not an object with him to investigate scrupulously which of the two parties in Holland [Page 66] was most in the right. ‘It was sufficient for him and for the House to consider which party in the Republic of the United Provinces was most in­clined to be friendly to Great Britain, and to renew the natural alliance with this country.’

He reminded the House ‘how repeatedly he had urged the treachery of France in the exer­tion of her influence in foreign States, even by arguments which had frequently been thought too strong;’—how often he had urged his apprehen­sions of the views of aggrandisement entertained by her, of her perfidious system of politics, and her adroit perseverance in intriguing, to gain an influ­ence in the governments in her neighbourhood, and of the extreme danger of trusting to her professions of good faith. ‘As for him, (added he) he did not wish to rest upon French declarations, or upon any French professions, whether perfectly made, or clearly expressed or not.’

On the present occasion, he gave his full assent to the address, which he considered as a public avowal from the Throne, and as public an acknowledgment on the part of that House, that those systems of politics, which had, at preceding periods, been called romantic, were serious systems, and such as it was the true interest of the country to be governed by; systems established on that sound and solid political maxim, that Great-Britain ought to look to the situation of affairs upon the Conti­nent, and to take such measures, upon every change [Page 67] of circumstances abroad, as should tend best to pre­serve the balance of power in Europe. Upon that maxim he had founded all his political conduct; and convinced as he was of its justness, he should continue to adhere to it, and consequently could not withhold his ready and sincere assent to an address admitting the maxim so completely. It was now confessed by Go­vernment, that it was necessary to come to the lower orders of the people, those who were labouring under the heaviest burdens, those who paid for their candles, their windows, and all the various necessaries of life, and say— ‘Severely taxed as we know you are, you must nevertheless contribute something towards the ex­pence of keeping political power upon a balance in Europe.’ This was open and manly; it was dic­tated by sound policy. Let therefore the expence of ef­fecting and enforcing the late measures in the Republic of Holland have been what it might, he should think the money well laid out, and would give any assistance in his power to the voting it cheerfully and freely.

He had always thought it his duty, and the duty of every member of Parliament, to consider himself as the Representative of the people of Great Britain, and to attend to the interests of Britons, let them be where, in what country, and at what distance they might. ^*

Do the French flatter themselves that a Statesman who in 1787 held this language, will in 1795 come for­ward in their favour, either as Minister, or as an Eng­lishman? ^† If Mr. Fox were now Minister, and the Author of the Reflections on Peace had advised him, in­stead of Mr. Pitt, to accelerate a pacification by noble sacrifices; had conjured him not to exhaust the nation in a retrograde struggle, ^‡ but to yield to the French as to one of those scourges in nature to which mankind submit [Page 68] from necessity; ^§ I cannot help thinking that Mr. Fox, if in that situation, would reply, perhaps in that Author's own words— England should consider the dan­gers of Europe as her own cause, and give up the absurd hope of continuing unshaken above the ruins of social order. ^‖

No! I cannot be persuaded that if Mr. Fox were charged with the destiny of the British dominions, he would think it either honourable or prudent to desert the cause of the Allies, at least so long as they do not desert it themselves.

But were the advocate for peace to think of talking to him of the contagion of French principles in England, and of those malcontents who in every country are the Allies of Revolution; ^¶ Mr. Fox, who ought to know that the French provoked the war principally because they mistook the language of the Opposition for the language of revolution, must smile to find that so absurd a mistake still induces them to persevere in it. He knows, and has triumphed in saying it, that the British Constitution never gave such proofs of its strength and stability, as now, when the French Re­volution has shaken almost all the rest of Europe. While, every where else, the former notions of go­vernment have been supplanted, or at least disturbed, the great body of Britons has, with a zeal and una­nimity almost without example, shewn their venera­tion for the constitution of their ancestors, by their exertions in its defence. No one knows this better than Mr. Fox, who has constantly blamed the Asso­ciations for its protection, constantly affirmed that there was not even a shadow of danger, and that its strength might be exhausted by such unnecessary exertions; many of whose friends have been patriots [Page 69] enough to suspend for the present their projects of reform, convinced that if some of the inhabitants of the edifice only suspected that the foundations were undermining, it was a sufficient reason for not busy­ing themselves about its decorations.

The Author of Reflections on Peace insinuates that there may be other chances and other events in the course of the war, which may lead the inhabitants of the edifice to prefer a negociation with its enemies, to the glory of being buried under its ruins. ^*

But what are these chances which await Great-Britain, if she prolongs this contest? What are these events beyond the reach of human foresight, and yet possibly within the reach of French exertions?—Is an invasion of this island meant? a scheme of landing here that swarm of Frenchmen whose lives are not at all regarded, ^† whom the Convention will turn adrift here, under the fallacious hope of being joined by an immense number of partisans, but with the real inten­tion of exposing them to certain death? ^‡

The Administration is preparing against such an event, as is their duty: but as to the danger of a descent, which no one here believes will happen; if ever the French should be wild enough to attempt it, and unfortunate enough to effect it, they may assure themselves beforehand, that they will not find here a sinking and distracted nation, as in Holland; that the same spirit which they themselves felt in the plains of Chalons, will unite the inhabitants of these islands, to a man, against any foreign invaders; and that the troops of republicans who will meet them, will be just as numerous as those vast bodies of royalists who waited for nothing but the appearance of the Duke of Brunswick to fly to his standard. If, from the Oak of Britain, a few leaves be shaken by the storm; if a [Page 70] few friends, light as they, fall from the Constitution; yet its branches will not bend before the blast.— Any hurry which such a descent might occasion, would be the effect of animation, not of terror; every sword would fly to the place of danger as by polar attraction; every petty jealousy, every party distinction, would be extinguished; every man would devote himself for his country. A descent might possibly spread through some small district the devastation of barbarians: in a village or two the demons of discord might dance round their tree of anarchy; for a decade or two, the worshippers of God might be driven from his temples: but in­dignation would repel the invaders; the ocean would close upon them; children's children would listen to their crimes and to their fate; and the names of Frenchman, Anarchist, and Atheist, be united in detestation for ever.

There can be no danger which Britain need decline; there can be no sacrifices wanted which are beyond her ability to make: and will she then, herself secure, united, armed, and opulent, desert her Allies, and leave them impoverished, weakened, divided, and despoiled? Regard for herself and for Europe, even benevolence to future generations in France, obliges her to compel the present generation to renounce all its conquests. Love of peace obliges her to think of no other, than one which can be sincere and solid: I repeat it, and I think I have proved it, that such a peace can only be signed on the former frontiers of France.

Should some of the Allies, by the events of war, find themselves again on those frontiers; should they, elated by success, attempt once more to pass them, once more become invaders, and try to dictate laws to France;—should political writers again propose a war of subjugation, and talk of chasing the Monster [Page 71] of Anarchy to his den!—then it may not be unseason­able to say that the mis-shapen edifice which has been raised on the ruins of law, of morals, and of religion, in France, can never be more effectually destroyed, than by those who built it; and that, by leaving them to themselves, we really leave them to the most dan­gerous enemies of their revolution. Then it will be seasonable to appeal to lessons taught by an experiment, which no one would wish to try over again. Then the wise and the truly pacific, in every country, will join in requesting the Author of the Reflections on Peace, to exert all his eloquence in supporting the cry of nations, and contributing to the triumph of humanity, by putting a stop to the effusion of blood. But till then, I conjure him and those who feel as he appears to do, to listen to the voice of reason, and reject the dangerous suggestions of impatience. On the energy and steadiness of the British character depends at this important moment the fate of the Christian world. The prudence which is recommended would be dis­graceful pusillanimity. The peace which Great-Britain is solicited to purchase from France, by suffering her to retain but a portion of her conquests, would be a preparation for new wars in Europe, new invasions of Germany, and new taxes at home. Such a peace would entail on future generations, bloodshed and expence, beyond comparison more than can possibly now be wanted to bring this war (though at present so disastrous) to a safe and honourable c [...]nclusion.

CHAPTER IV.

WILL the Republic, one, indivisible, and demo­cratic, be established in France? Will that great political body divide itself into Cantons, confederated like Swisserland? Will it adopt an elective Chief like the United States of America? Will not the French go back to their Constitution of 1791? Will they not, when weary of change, seek a refuge in their for­mer despotism? Will they not imitate the hereditary and limited Monarchy of Great-Britain?

The first of these questions is the only one on which I think we may, as yet, give a decided judgment; and if, with respect to that, I venture an opinion, after so many speculations have failed, it is because I am con­vinced that the third year of the French Republic has furnished data from which we can almost with cer­tainty affirm that the curtain will soon drop before this Republican Drama.

Let it not be said that their language is as repub­lican as ever; for, as to the French nation, what signi­fies the opinion of to-day, compared with the events which may change it to-morrow? Besides, I am very much deceived, if by this time there are not, even at [Page 73] Paris, many more royalists, concealed under the disguise of republicans, than there were republicans four years ago under the disguise of royalists. I have for some time suspected that even the present le [...]ders of the Convention are not so republican as they pre­tend; for if they were, they surely would not dream of extending the territory of France, already, beyond a doubt, so large as to be an insurmountable difficulty in the way of their system.

If those leaders were ever sincerely attached to that system, it could only be in the commencement of their revolutionary career; for the misery, the fears, and the personal dangers which those who survive of the Girondist faction have undergone, must have opened their eyes long before the public distress was great enough to open the eyes of the multitude. I would ask those Frenchmen of character and principle, who became Democrats only from exaggerated notions of human virtue,—do they still believe that the virtues and the talents which secure admiration and deference in private life, will be equally preeminent and com­manding in a crowd? I would refer this question to the conscience of that member of the Convention who, about three months ago, once more solicited his col­leagues to hasten the magnificent enterprise of forming a Democracy of twenty-four millions of men; or rather, I would decide it by that same member's eloquent descriptions in his discourse on terror. Every page of the history of every great Republic, will decide it; for there virtue is seen suffering and silenced, while the selfish passions only display themselves, and tri­umph.

One truth by this time the French ought to have learned in their school of adversity—that they have, in no respect whatever, the moral character which is in­dispensable for a popular government. To be fit for it, a nation must have education and moral habits unknown in France, and which can only be acquired [Page 74] by a long use of liberty; and in some degree even by its abuses. A republican ought to have that sort of discernment which can distinguish between faction and patriotism; between those who would agitate the people, and those who would protect them: he ought to have modesty enough to reverence the experience of age, and to give place on all occasions to superior talents. A republican government requires the strictest and most constant observation of social duties; it requires that parental and conjugal authority, that every domestic virtue, should come in aid of public force; it requires the moderated warmth which animates debate, and the wise circumspection which restrains it within due limits. A Republic, to support itself, must consist of a people which knows where to stop, when party degenerates into faction;—of a people austere in manners, grave in character, not hasty in giving its confidence, or changing its opinions; a people which has either the phlegm of the Dutch, the tardiness of the Swiss, the sagacity of Genoa, the prudence of Venice, or the information which Ame­rica has derived from the English school of Liberty. If ever the French should attain to so many qualities foreign to their nature, it will be a most extraordinary metamorphosis; one which nothing can ever effect but the gradual operation of a free Monarchy. Let them however once enter that port, and I am convinced they will not leave it again, but to return in a very short time, as the English did, and moor in it for ever.

If they should be so fortunate as to secure them­selves in that harbour, how much will they la­ment that they ever took the Republican Author of the Social Contract for their first guide to liberty, who, of all political writers, had least studied and least understood the nature of mixed monarchy, and representative governments? The latter, if we are to believe him, are derived from the unjust and absurd [Page 75] system of feudal government. ^* The Sovereignty of the People cannot be represented; the People is not free but during the election of its representatives; as soon as they are elected, it is a slave, it is nothing.

Here we see at once liberty confounded with autho­thority, nor can this be wondered at in a man who considered liberty and tranquillity as incompatible. We shall soon observe that another erroneous assertion of the same writer, Republics only possess Liberty, arises from a similar confusion of Despotism and mixed Monarchy.

If, after commencing, in his Social Contract, by preferring small States to great ones, Rousseau had confined to the former, his advice to adopt the re­publican form of government as being the best for them, this would have been consistent. ^† But when, afterwards, with his mind always full of Sparta and Geneva, he states the monarchical form as in every re­spect inferior to the Republican; when he constantly recommends to great nations all those vexatious pre­cautions which are the security of small ones, and en­deavours to startle them at even the shadow of a su­preme, hereditary chief; then he misapplies all his observations, and finds himself out of his sphere, for he is always wide of the question.

Kings, he says, always desire to be absolute. But have not Senates, National Assemblies, and any sort of popular bodies, the same desire? And when they [Page 76] gain their point, is their domination less oppressive than that of an absolute Monarch?

So obvious a remark, one should have supposed, would have led Rousseau to examine seriously, to which the necessary powers of government may be confided, with the best means of preventing their abuse, whether to a King, a Senate, or the People? and to a still more important question—Whether the best way of preventing the abuse is not, to divide those powers between all three with a sort of equality? But such an enquiry might have brought Rousseau to the question of Free Monarchies, ^* of which he seems to have hardly suspected the existence.

Every one, he adds, knows what follows, when Kings employ substitutes. A thing much better known is, that Kings can never do without them; and when they try to do without them, it is so much the worse for their subjects. But what sort of political authority is there where they are not necessary? The people of France, that Nation of Kings! have not they too em­ployed substitutes? have they been less numerous, more enlightened, less expensive, or more moderate, than those of their last unfortunate King?

There must then, he says, be intermediate orders; and consequently there must be Princes, Grandees, and Nobi­lity.— And where is the great misfortune of this, while they form an impregnable barrier ^† between the King and [Page 77] the People? while they c [...] protect, but have no power to oppress; and while admission to them is open to those born in any other rank? Thus modi­fied, they excite emulation, in a much greater degree than envy.

Rousseau continues— A Minister of real merit in a Monarchy, is almost as rare as a fool at the head of a Republican Government. With what degree of truth this applies to absolute Monarchies, it is not at present worth while to enquire; but if Rousseau had chosen to look to the British Monarchy, he might have seen, that a man of eminent and acknowledged merit, how­ever obscure or low his birth, is almost as sure of rising to a high situation, as he would be sure of being excluded from it in the greater part of modern Repub­lics; while, on the conrary, a man destitute of abili­ties, however high his rank, can never have much political consequence. Here we always see at the helm of administration, either the man whom public [Page 78] opinion ranks first in ability, or one whom it considers as equal or little inferior to the first: and the less favoured candidate cannot be considered as unfortu­nate, nor the State a sufferer: for though he does not direct the course and the ship, yet he watches the con­duct of the pilot, with the jealous vigilance of a rival, and, if he can convict him of mismanagement, is sure to be put in his place.

Hereditary crowns (Rousseau still goes on) expose a nation to have monsters and fools at its head. Such an event is not impossible, and, I acknowledge, is distress­ing: but human wisdom cannot devise a better pro­vision against this evil than the checks of a limited Monarchy. The great object of that system is, to give the State rather an ostensible than real chief; and to deposit in other hands, such an influence over his appointment of Ministers, that the nation may securely confide in their abilities; and, whatever benefit it may derive from his virtues, may have little or nothing to fear from his vices. And, not to mention the tempestuous interregnums where crowns are elective, if it be true that by that system a fool rarely sits on the throne, it is equally true that intrigue is the only way to it: intrigue almost always elevates to it some man of dangerous am­bition; frequently some mean instrument of the enemies of his country, who raise him to the throne for the purpose of subjugating it.

Princes (Rousseau goes on) are either men of narrow capacity, or bad principles, when they come to the throne, or the throne soon makes them so. My answer to this new objection is the same as to a former one; that a limited Monarchy, foreseeing the possibility of these two cases, provides against the inconveniences of both. In fact, it provides so perfect a security against the immorality of the supreme Chief, that I should be almost disposed to be more apprehensive of his virtues if too splendid, than of his vices. With such a Con­stitution, [Page 79] let the crown be placed on the head of a woman, or a child, it is comparatively of little conse­quence, so it be placed somewhere, and previously settled. In truth, though the Monarch holds the scep­tre, and in the choice of those whom he employs as his servants is under no legal restraint whatever, yet in the exercise of that choice he is necessarily so much swayed by prudential considerations, that he not un­frequently finds himself obliged to give up his own wishes in the nomination of his Ministers, and to be guided in it by preeminence of talents and public opinion.

We must then come to this conclusion, adds Rous­seau; we must declare that the King can do no wrong. And what is there so alarming in this fiction (if it can be called a fiction), when effectual precautions have been taken to prevent his doing any wrong; when his subjects are better able to resist an attack, than he is to make it; and when he can do no act of government without his Ministers, and of course the whole responsibility falls upon them?

"If it be so," the partisans of the Social Contract will reply ‘where is the use of this regal pomp, and of the immense burden of a Civil List?’ The answer may be contained in a very few words. To avoid civil wars, and reconcile what Rousseau con­sidered as not to be reconciled, Liberty and Peace; to prevent the birth of ambition; to save the people from the terrible convulsions which a great State is exposed to, whenever the first place in its Govern­ment is vacant; to save it from a constant and violent succession of Syllas, Cromwells, and Robespierres ^*

[Page 80]But not to dwell any longer at present on the ob­jections of the too eloquent Rousseau, I will refer his adherents to the work of his and my countryman, Mr. De Lolme—a work which cannot be too much valued, and which contains whatever the profoundest reasoning can add to those best of all possible proofs of the advantages of a limited Monarchy, the pro­sperity of the country which has adopted it, and the un­interrupted liberty and tranquillity of its inhabitants.

There is a book of another Genevan, not less valu­able, and particularly adapted to the French; but which unfortunately did not reach them till they were no longer in a state to comprehend it. The book I mean is, a Treatise on the Executive Power of great States, by Mr. Necker.

Besides these, there is another work still more com­plete, and if possible better calculated for the present situation of France, where preservation is now not so much the object, as renovation: it is the Defence of the American Constitutions, by the celebrated Mr. Adams, the present Vice-President of the Congress of the United States. I do not know whether it has yet been translated; but if it has not, it would be doing a [Page 83] real service to the French, to give them an opportu­nity of reading it; because it will demonstrate to them that liberty cannot exist, but where the executive, legislative, and judicial powers, are altogether distinct; that at all events their preposterous union must be prevented; and that hitherto the British is the only Constitution which has succeeded in doing it.

Mr. Adams makes no secret, that the whole of his doctrine is derived from that source; ^* but he does not confine his support of it to the happy effects of that Constitution in Britain; he gives an abridged history of all the nations, ancient and modern, who have thought themselves free; and he proves, that when­ever they have lost their liberty or their independence, it has been because they did not know how to associate Aristocracy with Democracy, or to place either of them under the protection of one supreme but limited Chief.

I need not say that by such a Chief, Mr. Adams does not mean, either that shadow of Royalty ap­pointed by the French Constitution of 1791, a King in name, but in fact nothing more than an expensive and useless pensioner; nor the office of Stadtholder in Hol­land, [Page 84] to which, in contradiction to common sense, no powers belong, but those which the people is most in­terested in reserving to itself, because it is able to exer­cise them itself without inconvenience. They have given the Stadtholder the right of appointing and re­moving the civil magistrates of the towns; but they have not allowed him any one of those powers for the exercise of which the office should have been consti­tuted; such as to declare war, to make peace, to no­minate Ambassadors, Generals, Judges, &c. to have a negative upon every proposal of a new law; and, if he sanctions it, to enforce its execution. Mr. Adams speaks of no Chief but one, decorated with these attributes of Royalty. Such a Chief may have the modest appellation of President, may be called Stadt­holder, or King, or Protector, the name signifies nothing; the important object is, that he be invested with every prerogative of the Chief Magistrate of Great-Britain and of America: and who can tell whether Holland would have been conquered, or even attacked, if she had had a Chief to defend her, invested with similar authority?

What! (some of the French will say, with their usual air of triumph before victory) is the absurd institution of a single supreme Chief, reduced to find its best defenders in three apostate Republicans! The associa­tion is odd, and I agree that the idea may have some truth; but so much the worse for Republics properly so called, if whatever is odious in the terms of apostate Republican belongs to the latter word only; for the real or pretended apostacy of these three authors, proves nothing but that they have learned by experience a truth which Abbé Sieyes formerly boasted of having discovered by the mere force of meditation, when he said he had gone through Republics without finding them free, or at least without finding in them the union of Liberty and Law.

[Page 85]This little digression I have been led to by a few words in the Reflections on Peace—If, says that Author, the Moderate party triumphs; if in the Constitution of America a form of government can be found which is really applicable to France; the principles of universal justice, and the austere virtues of a Republic, will soon be established there. By this remark the Author evidently means to recommend to France a Constitution per­fectly similar to that of the American States. I know of no plan which they can adopt so likely to perpetu­ate their misfortunes, or which would at least protract them as long as such a system would be endured. I admit that there is the same reason for calling the American Republic a veiled Monarchy, as for calling the British Monarchy a disguised Republic; but I once more repeat, that the name is nothing to the pur­pose; for besides that this veiled Monarchy is elective, the numerous functions which the people exercise under their different Constitutions in the United States, are in no respect applicable at present to the French, who, in my opinion, are far from being ripe for the full exercise of the rights which belong to the people under the British Constitution. The time may come when they will be worthy of such a Consti­tution; but to qualify them for it will not certainly be the work of a day; and their progress must be like that of the English themselves,—from the rigour of an almost unlimited Monarchy, to a form of govern­ment in which the subject enjoys rights gradually acquired, and the Sovereign submits to restrictions gradually imposed. ^*

[Page 86]How is it possible that a sensible writer could ever consider the institution of a Supreme Elective Chief as applicable to the French?—But the Americans find it so convenient! True; but their experiment is but of yesterday, and may be successful only so long as they have a Washington; and such men are phaenomena as seldom seen in a Republic, as a Vespasian, or a Titus, in an absolute Monarchy. And no one will venture to predict that they will always have tranquil elections of respectable Chiefs; they may indeed, while they continue cool, poor, ^* industrious, and free from formidable and intriguing neighbours: my earnest wish is, that they may long be happy under a [Page 87] Republican King like Washington, and that their elections may continue as peaceable and unanimous as his have been. It is a new experiment; and if it suc­ceeds, will, no doubt, be one of the most brilliant events in the history of man. But reason revolts at the idea of an elective head for a Republic of Frenchmen; for a people who may produce many a genius like Voltaire, before it produces a Washington, or educates, or even discovers the merits of a man of modesty, foresight, circumspection, and moderation equal to his. But let the French above all things beware of an elective Chief! let them adopt any part of the American Constitution but that. Every election would revive their present convulsions, and condemn them, first to the divisions, and at last to the dreadful catastrophe of Poland.

What an idea is this!—recommending an elective Chief to the French; to that vain, inconstant, restless, impetuous nation, for ever fretting with self-love; where every one feels it essent [...] to his happiness to be above the rest; ^* and if he is not first in his own little circle, thinks himself the last, and feels injured, in­sulted, and debased. If there is in the world a nation absolutely incapable of acknowledging superior abi­lities (I do not mean by momentary and clamorous applause, but by lasting approbation), I maintain that it is the French.

Always violent in hatred and in affection, and equally inconstant in both; applauding without mea­sure, and execrating without restraint; during the whole of their republican career, what sort of fidelity have they shewn to any of their leaders? The history of their Revolution marks their character more strongly than ever. The worshippers of their oppres­sors! the slaves of power! canonising to-day the monster of yesterday, and depositing his ashes in their [Page 88] sacrilegious Pantheon, that they may rake them up and give them to the winds to-morrow! consistent in nothing but their jealousy of authority, and their rap­turous admiration of every demagogue who comes forward to throw down the idol which themselves have raised! Marat—Brissot—Roberspierre—Barrere —what were all these but successive tyrants of France, who each improved upon the despotism of his prede­cessor, and each, during his momentary reign, ruled with unlimited sway, until some newer cruelty, some more ingenious system of oppression supplanted him?

Necker! the first object of their idolatry, a Mi­nister of purity and integrity, virtues which his errors can never efface; what has been his lot? La Fayette; who never appeared in public without being applauded like a demi-god; him they reduced to the alternative of choosing between the cruel injustice of his present fate, and the fury of his fickle adorers at home. The demagogues who have succeeded each other so quickly that Paris itself can hardly reckon up their names; the shouts of applause with which their followers have constantly insulted them as they went to the place of execution—all prove what I have asserted. One demagogue indeed has died in the full possession of their favour—Marat! con­genial friend of the people of Paris! And to one more only have they shewn any thing like fidelity, the only one whose popularity has lasted a twelvemonth, the only one whose fall his partisans endeavoured to prevent—Robespierre, who decimated the nation, and found out the art of conciliating their affections, while he ruled them with a rod of iron! and it is to a people such as this, that a periodical and free election of a supreme Chief is recommended! A people who can feel no severer punishment than to be obliged to make and elect governors from among their equals, and to avow their own inferiority by the acknowledge­ment of a superior from among themselves. Such an [Page 89] avowal as this, says the Author of Reflections, &c. is not to be expected from the French: by what inconcei­vable contradiction then can he imagine that the French will quietly repeat it every four years, by adopting the American Constitution, in which the Presidency is elec­tive? Such an avowal will never be extorted from them but by the sword of the most fortunate candidate, or the gold of the foreign nations who may take an interest in the event. Austria or Great-Britain will influence the election at their pleasure, and the nation will be as far from independence as from tranquility; nor will it ever secure either, till it restores royalty in a family whose superiority it has been habituated to acknow­ledge, but with restrictions which may limit, without too much reducing it.

Then, and not till then, the various struggles for superiority to which the revolution has given birth, if they are not quieted, will at least be limited in their object; for the place aimed at will no longer be the throne, but something by the side of it. Then the French, of their own accord, will return to their former habits of obedience as easily as a river which has been forced out of its channel returns to it when the obstacle is removed. They will again attach themselves without difficulty, and even with ardour, to a name which for so many centuries has commanded their respect, which flatters their vanity by recalling so many glorious events, and in their present frenzy occasionally excites, in the Convention itself, emotions of admiration and affection. ^* Their very treason against their late unfortunate Sovereign will increase their fidelity to his posterity. Never will the people [Page 90] feel the blessings of freedom, without recollecting that their King is descended from that patriot Monarch who first called himself a citizen of France, who sin­cerely desired to be the restorer of liberty, and was its martyr. Never will the vanity of Frenchmen cease to assume merit from the virtues of Henry IV. and if that vanity is become more irritable since it has tasted republican equality, it will the more easily console it­self, because it then will only have to give place to what they will call the accident of birth, or the chance of fortune. Even mediocrity of talents in the reign­ing family will not be without its consolation: Mon­tesquieu, with whose writings they are now so much dissatisfied, but who perfectly understood the cha­racter of his countrymen, seems to have had it in view when he says, to elect by lot is a method which hurts the pride of nobody.

The Polish nation, more than any other, resembles the French in impetuosity, in fickleness, inconsistency, party-spirit, and military courage. What have been the effects of elective monarchy in that country? A perpetual and bloody struggle between the great fa­milies, during which, though the people has acted with zeal, yet its interests have been constantly neg­lected; ambition has been sometimes gratified, but oftener disappointed; the country has been desolated; and the domination of Russia, first introduced under the disguise of protection, has at last been avowed by open subjugation.

What a singular contrast may some future histo­rian draw, when he relates the events which have lately happened in Europe! "This period," he may say, ‘is remarkable for two dreadful events, equally unforeseen, and both of them injurious to liberty. The Poles, too late enlightened by the consequences of the destructive right of electing their Kings, made a noble effort to renounce the title of Republicans, which till then had been their [Page 91] pride. Far from suffering themselves to be se­duced by the political reveries of Rousseau, whose dying advice to them was to attach themselves more and more to their republican forms, and never to give up the right of electing their supreme chief; but reduce him, by little and little, to a mere image of a King—far from being missed by such suggestions, they at last begun to have true notions of liberty, and directed their political views to a Constitution approaching to that of Great-Britain. Hardly was the standard of real liberty raised among them, before all their scanda­lous competitions were forgotten, and the proudest of their aristocracy ranged themselves under the banners of Kosciusko, in defence of a Constitution which controuled their own ambition, and was full of happy prospects for the people. If in the enfeebled state of that nation there was any thing like a hope of success in their attempt to substitute a rational Constitution for a turbulent Aristocracy and an elective Monarchy, it certainly was the ability and intrepid moderation of their leader. He failed in ^* [Page 92] the attempt, and the independence of his country did not out-live his captivity. The Polish nation is extinct; but the last page of her annals is the most honourable; for no people ever shewed them­selves more worthy of independence than they did at the very moment when they lost it; and from the struggle they made to preserve it, posterity may infer the use they would have made of it.’

‘In this glorious effort the Poles had but one avowed ally; and, will it be credited? that ally was France! France, who was at that time em­ployed in destroying her own hereditary and pro­sperous monarchy, and endeavouring to establish on its ruins the competition of equals, and to kindle the very passions which Poland was endeavouring to extinguish! The latter wished to preserve no­bility, and to make the monarchy hereditary; the former overturned an hereditary throne, and de­stroyed the nobility which supported it. The Poles were anxious for a limited government, re­sembling the British Constitution; the French [Page 93] never spoke of that Constitution but with the dis­dain which usually accompanies ignorance, and rejected every attempt to introduce it.’

This striking contrast the French either will not, or cannot observe. But, instead of advising them to imitate America, the friends of social order would do better to direct their attention to the annals of Poland; and endeavour to convince them that liberty does not depend on making the laws and the rulers of a nation subject to the people, but in making the people and their rulers subject to law; and that, in a great nation, a limited monarchy is the only way to unite liberty with authority; for a vacancy of the first place in any government is a source of inevitable competition, discord, and civil war.

After having refuted the opinion of Rousseau in favour of elective monarchies, I ought not to omit, that attached as he was to a republican government, yet it would have been the last of systems which he would have recommended to the French; knowing, as he did, the capricious levity of their character; and always asserting, as he did, that republican liberty cannot be maintained but by austere manners, and the most rigid virtue.

How much it is to be regretted that he could not foresee that the French would be the first to adopt his principles! that they would be the first to put themselves under the heavy yoke of a Republican Government! and that, with a view to realise his fan­ciful theories, they would, with their usual inconside­rate levity, take upon them a burden under the weight of which they have sunk! And how much it is to be regretted that he cannot now take a view of the nation which, for these last four years, has been raising altars to his system!

How would it revive the contempt which he always had for the Parisians, if he were to hear them [Page 94] call themselves his disciples? No doubt, he would ex­claim with indignation, ‘Observe that people of children! that mob of pretended philosophers! that seminary of mutiny! No sooner can they abandon themselves to a spirit of faction, than they give it the sacred name of Liberty. Its representatives are but conspirators, and they call themselves a Senate; just as they give the name of laws to their numerous and bloody proscriptions! Senseless people! They wish to be free, and yet know not how to be just!* No sooner did they see their beneficent King perish on the scaffold, than they cried in their delirium, 'Thank heaven! we are now Republicans! it was time.'— Republicans!—yes, just as, after having discovered a way of robbing themselves, they became, in their own opinion, the richest nation of the universe. When, afterwards, misconduct and misery reduced them to the coarsest fare, then they fancied them­selves Spartans! 'This,' they cried, 'is the black broth of Lycurgus, and now we are true Spartans.'— Spartans!—I only wait the day when they will again be scourged by a lieutenant of the police— with what transports will they cry, 'At last we breathe again; we are once more Frenchmen!’

I own I am very far from agreeing with those who imagine that they can ever again be Frenchmen in that sense of the word. Whether they will be better or worse, I cannot say; but I am as much convinced that they can never be compelled to submit again patiently to the old system, as I am that they will not continue to submit to their new one. The seeds of Liberty are universally planted; their growth may be ^† [Page 95] checked, but cannot be eradicated. The first pro­ductions may be harsh and unfit for the use of man; but a better sort may be grafted, may become habitu­ated to the climate; and, in a course of time, they may taste the blessings of cultivated Liberty.

Sooner or later the French must be free, but I would by no means pretend to fix the time. Their quarrels, their reconciliations, their dislikes, their caresses, every thing is so sudden and so violent, that, ere we can guess what they will do in any instance, we find they have done it. Who would have ventured to foretell that they would oblige Louis XVI. to swear to a Constitution before it was made? that the very steps to the altar of Confederation on which he took [...]hat oath, would have led him to the scaffold; and that the Judges who condemned him for infringing that Constitution, would themselves trample it under foot amid the acclamations of the very people who once affected to be enthusiasts in its favour? At the time when Robespierre triumphed over the Federalists, and thought that he had put all their leaders to death, [...]o would have thought that Federalism would again raise its head in the very Convention which had pro­scribed it? Who could have foreseen that the intrepid Charette would have ranged himself under the banners of the regicides; or that they would have proclaimed him Lieutenant-General of La Vendée? And yet all these events are but of yesterday; and since we can no longer doubt that the great body of the French desire some new change, and since any change must be for their advantage, who will be bold enough to affirm, that, before this year is at an end, the word Republican will not be as much execrated in France as the word Jacobin is now?

Among the various conjectures to which the present situation of France naturally gives birth, there is one which I feel a pleasure in entertaining, if not as the most probable, yet as certainly the most favourable to [Page 96] that country. It is, that the nation, weary of the present Convention, indignant at its scandalous con­duct, and shocked at the misery which it has brought and still brings upon their country, will oblige it to dissolve itself, to make room for those Members of the Constituent Assembly who still survive; substituting men who were only guilty of errors, instead of men whose whole conduct has been full of crimes. Could the scattered remains of that body be but sincerely reconciled; could they be brought to forgive one another; could Malouet, Cazales, La Fayette, Beau­metz, Mounier, Lally, Montesquiou, D' André, now assemble, after this terrible lesson of misfortune, with that knowledge of mankind, and those habits of re­flection, which are taught by experience; with distrust of those theories and speculations in which they for­merly so much confided; how different would their language now be to the people! Once little better than rhetoricians, they might now be fit to be states­men. No doubt their very first act would be to set aside their own absurd Constitution of 1791, too republican for a Monarchy, too monarchical for a Republic. No doubt they would think that the most effectual mode of securing liberty, is by ensuring obedience to legal authority. They commenced their political career with a declaration that France re­nounced all wa [...]s for the purpose of conquest: if again in power, it may be expected that their first measure would be to restore the conquests made during their proscription; their sincerity would not be doubted, and a peace with France would then be equally easy and secure. This great point once accomplished, they might then employ themselves in that important work, which the present leaders, though willing, cannot safely undertake; and which they have not power enough either to promote, or to prevent; though they are constantly exclaiming, in contradiction to their own consciences, that it is im­possible. [Page 97] But the oftener they repeat in the Conven­tion that they are not at all alarmed or afraid of the commencing cry of royalty, the more evident it is that they observe its progress.

For that happy moment when this commencing cry shall run from one end of France to the other, all Frenchmen who are friends to Monarchy should prepare themselves by uniting together, without at­tending to any slight shades of difference in their opinions on the subject. But the first object of them all should be to unite themselves to that respectable party of converted Republicans, who now hate De­mocracy as sincerely as they adored it before they were acquainted with it.

And since the press has hitherto so much influenced the fluctuating opinions of the French, all those au­thors, who like M— are yet attached to France by endearing recollections of former connexion, or by the ties of interest, should take advantage of the first moment which such a change in that nation will allow, to bring back its attention to the discussion with which it began, and which was not decided by argument, but declamation; that of a supreme here­ditary Executive Power, and a Legislative Body, con­sisting of two distinct Houses.

The surest way to accelerate this desirable event, would be to enlighten the French nation, with respect to some great errors in their notions of the British Constitution; the object which they ought always to have kept in view. Their present leaders endea­vour to confirm them in those errors; because they believe, and with reason, that their power depends on keeping the people in ignorance of the way to true liberty; an object to which they know that nothing conduces more than representing the English as (to use their own expression) slaves at home, and tyrants on the seas. How happy should I be, if I could in any degree accelerate liberty in the one nation, by doing justice to the enjoyment of it in the other!

CHAPTER V.

AMONG the great number of well-informed men in France, before the present Revolution, nothing was more uncommon than to find any who had tolerably correct ideas of the British Constitution; and it must be owned that in general the English who travelled there took no great pains to inform them on the sub­ject. Whether it is that the English are too much inclined to believe that few foreigners can compre­hend the principles of so complicated system; or that, with a view to complete the contrast between the character of the two nations, the English studiously affect to be indifferent to the opinion of foreigners; or that, from a principle of humanity, they are unwil­ling, when abroad, to remind other nations of their want of liberty; and on that account are afraid of ex­pressing too strongly the conviction which is inter­woven in every thought, and manifested in every action of an Englishman, that he, and he only, is free.

Till Mr. De Lolme published his work, those of the French who had any opinion at all on the subject, were almost all extravagant in praising the British Con­stitution, or equally extravagant in condemning it.

The former considered it as a system truly divine, unconnected with any human passions, the perfection of political virtue; while, on the contrary, it goes so [Page 97] entirely upon a consciousness of human imperfection, that it may very properly be called a complete system of human correction. It does not proceed upon the impossible speculation of eradicating the passions, or governing without them; but its arrangements are adapted to limit their career, to direct them to the bene­fit of social life, and even to govern by their assistance.

Next came the censurers, who formed their judg­ments, partly from writers as ignorant as themselves; and partly from the parliamentary debates, in which they understood every hyperbolical, metaphorical, or declamatory expression, in a literal sense.

First they gravely told you that the King is always carrying on a secret war against the Constitution; which has very little other meaning than that the Constitu­tion has provided effectually against open hostilities.

Next they told you that the House of Peers is evi­dently a sort of advanced post to the Crown, where the Nobles act the part of sentinels ana spies;—that the Peerage is evidently a satellite of the Crown, and only serves to strengthen it against the nation. Now, no one disputes but that the Peers are intended to guard the Crown, and that their situation does make them a sort of advanced post for its protection; but that post is defensive only: they have no privileges which give them the smallest power of attacking the constitu­tional rights of the Commons; and their political in­fluence, as a body, depends as much on preventing the despotism, as on maintaining the prerogatives of the Crown.

No matter, say the French of the present day; an hereditary Nobility is nothing but a great imposition upon society; it is an infringement of those equal rights which all men derive from nature. But admitting it is so, does it not prevent many other greater, and more dange­rous infringements? Are not eminent talents an in­fringement made by nature herself, of that perfect equality of right which is the foundation-stone in the [Page 98] new systems of government? Can any human regu­lations prevent that Aristocracy of talents ^* complained of in the Convention? Can we conceive a society which can prevent the Aristocracy of riches? and does not this latter even increase in proportion as a State is well governed? Is it less greedy, or more enlightened, than an hereditary Nobility? Is not this latter species of Aristocracy the best, indeed the only counterpoise, in a great State, to the former? Is the arrogance of upstarts less grating to the people, from among whom they came, or is their familiar insolence less insulting, than the haughty distance of an here­ditary Nobility?

Certainly there is in the British Constitution, a No­bility, or rather an hereditary Peerage; I will add too, that the single privilege which it possesses, is by its nature much superior to the whole multitude of petty privileges belonging to the nobles of all other countries in Europe: and let the French mention, if they can, any of the privileges of the British Peerage which are burdensome to the people, or in any way in­jurious to it.

The French are much mistaken, if they think that in this country wealth is enough to procure nobility; or that, if wealth could purchase it, it would give that exemption from taxes which is the ordinary conse­quence of it in most other countries. The British Peerage can hardly be said to possess more than one exclusive privilege, ^† which no doubt is a very great [Page 99] one, and that is, the hereditary right of succeeding to a seat in the House of Lords. I acknowledge that this is a privilege of great importance: but before it is censured as improper, it may be worth considering whether that hereditary succession has not a strong tendency to defend the fundamental principles of the Constitution, as well as to preserve certain great maxims of State, which might else be in danger, in case of the coincidence of a general election, with any violent popular agitation. No one can be ignorant of the effect which popular agitation must always have, in a greater or less degree, on an assembly elected by the people. The most zealous friend even of Democracy will not deny, that it often prevents sound judgment, and that any check upon its innovating spirit is wise, and should be adopted.

It should be recollected that the British Peers are by no means numerous ^* enough to eclipse the people; that, [Page 100] as the bulk of the estate usually goes with the title, their fortune gives them the means of a good education; and that, as their privilege is limited to judicial and political functions, it is only by a good education, and by the knowledge and the decorum of character, requi­site in those functions, that they can hope to derive any material advantage from their privilege. Education and practice create ability; and one may judge from this circumstance only, that, as a body, the British Nobility can never present, what is but too often seen in other countries, ignorance, pride, and poverty united. The same circumstance too gives them the ability to manage their private affairs better than the Nobility of other countries; and obliges them to be more attentive to character, because their consequence depends so much on public opinion.

Nor is this all: for the younger branches of their families, by being blended with the general mass, form a durable connexion between the Commons to whom they belong, and the Peers from whom they are sprung.

[Page 101]This is the kind of Nobility which the Constituent Assembly should have endeavoured to substitute, when, in their first delirium, they agitated the fatal decree which suppressed the rank of Nobility in France; a decree which, in its consequences, occa­sioned the destruction of those who had the misfor­tune to be of that order: for it led to the erection of all those bloody tribunals which sent them to the scaffold.

But, at that important crisis, nothing would have more effectually quieted the fears and dissipated the jealousy of the Tiers Etat, than telling them, that though there is an order of Nobility established in England, yet in point of taxation, or in any other respect, there is no difference between them and the Commons; that the word Commoner has no debasing sense attached to it, nor is a noble family consi­dered as disgraced by an alliance with one of that class: ^* that seats in the House of Peers are often the reward of distinguished talents; and that those who are so introduced into it, are not treated as up­starts and intruders, but with the respect due to their merit; and that, at the very time wher the National Assembly was declaiming against the haughty House of Peers, the two individuals of that body who were next, in point of rank, to the Royal Family, were both born of parents not above the middle class of life. ^† It is not now, perhaps, too late to present the following observation to the Tiers Etat of France, which has often excited my own admiration; I mean, that Great-Britain, where, without doubt, Nobility [Page 102] is more valuable, and therefore more desirable than in any other country, is yet the only one where there are a number of ancient and opulent families who have little or no inclination to be raised to that rank. Such is the effect of a Constitution which makes every rank respectable, and which can bestow its honours without humbling those who do not partake of them!

But, in fact, those who declaim, in France, against the British Constitution, inveigh chiefly against the House of Commons. ‘That House," say they, holds the strings of the purse; and if it is clamorous at any time, it is only with the hope of having its mouth stopped with gold. Thanks to the civil list, which it occasionally takes care to increase, the Ministers have always the means of bribing its members, and making them vote just as they please. If they do not give them money, they give them places; and when they have made their bargains, they can, with impunity, set public opinion at defiance.’

Some truth perhaps there is in this, mingled with a great deal of error; and a few explanations are ne­cessary, to distinguish the one from the other.

Without doubt, there exists a ministerial influence; and partly by conferring places, partly by promising them, that influence is very extensive. But before it is blamed, three points should be considered: 1st, Whether a majority of the members are under that influence? 2dly, Whether that influence, to the extent under which it exists, is more pernicious than useful? 3dly, Whether it can be exerted in cases which affect the liberty of the nation?

With a view to a solution of these questions, I shall consider the House of Commons as divided into three classes. The first is composed of those who support the Minister, either from considerations of personal attachment, or as holding places under Government, or as looking forwards to them. The second class [Page 103] includes the Opposition, and consists of those who wish to supplant the Ministry, and of their intimate connexions, who would follow them into power, and participate in their administration. The third con­sists of those who are not desirous of taking an active part in government, whose ambition is to shew the pride of independence, and to watch over the interests of the nation, without caring much which party is at the helm.—This class is usually more numerous than the Opposition, but perhaps less so than the immediate friends of Administration; and is a kind of neutral power, joining sometim [...]s the one, sometimes the other party, as it thinks most for the public good, and is sure to carry victory with it. On unimportant questions it thinks it a duty not to oppose Administration, even though not entirely satisfied with it; ^‡ but if it be dissatisfied on important questions, it then exerts its whole influence, and the Minister must give way to it.

This is what deceives foreigners, when they think that the majority is entirely composed of the ministe­rial party; though in fact the object of a very large proportion of that majority is, not to support the Mini­ster, but only the Government. The members who consider themselves as independent of both parties, no doubt, cannot be exempt from the partialities of human nature; and may, from various circumstances, have a preference for men or for measures, which may incline them more to one party than to the other; but their object is to act without being under the influence of either.

Whether Mr. Pitt or Mr. Fox be at the head of affairs, is not with them the most material point; but [Page 104] that the interests of the nation do not suffer, and that the rights of their constituents are not infringed—This class is particularly attentive to the public opinion; and though it checks the current of it when proceeding too much from popular agitation, yet it always adopts it, when clear and decided; and always succeeds in obliging the Minister, either to change his measures, or to quit his place, if he obstinately perseveres in them.

A majority must not be condemned in the mass as corrupt, unless that majority supports the Minister on important questions, with the same implicit confidence as in the common business of government: but that is by no means the case: for, not to go any farther back than the present administration of Mr. Pitt, if foreign­ers think that his name, his place, and his abilities, are magnets which draw to him on every occasion an invincible majority, it is perhaps because they have not observed that even Mr. Pitt, whom they consider as so all-powerful, has several times been in a minority; and that several times, on having proposed measures which he considered as important, but to which the public opinion was hostile, the very members who so generally support him, have strongly opposed him, and obliged him to withdraw them. ^*

[Page 105]More than one instance can be mentioned, when the influence of the Ministry ^* could not contend against the independence of Parliament; and when Mr. Pitt submitted to the representatives of the people, just as they submit to their constituents, not in the heat of po­pular agitation, but upon calm and deliberate con­sideration.

Another complaint is, that this House represents the people unequally. This is not denied; ^† but it is much more to the purpose to consider, whether it [Page 106] does not represent the opinion of the people, with as much fidelity, as a more equal representation would; and whether, considering the number of its members, their property, their education, and their personal in­fluence with their constituents as well as with Govern­ment, [Page 107] the House of Commons is not the best in­formed, and the most independent public assembly in the Universe.

[Page 108]"But, if it were so," some of the French will say, ‘how could that gradual increase of the influ­ence of the Crown arise, of which we have heard so much? and what necessity was there for that solemn declaration of the House of Commons in 1780, that the influence of the Crown has increased, is increasing, and ought to be diminished.’ What has constantly been observed with respect to that vote is so evident, that no additional arguments are necessary to remove this objection. That vote displaced the Minister, and is itself a proof that the influence com­plained of did not exist to the degree stated, and is too weak to oppose public opinion. And as to the increase of that influence, the following list of Acts of Parliament passed during the present reign, may assist our judgment on that point.

1. That which (by the desire of his present Majesty) set bounds to the civil list, and placed the administra­tion of that revenue in hands that are accountable to Parliament.

2. That which (by the like desire) increased the independence of the Judges, by continuing them in their places, notwithstanding a demise of the crown.

3. The Nullum Tempus Act, as it is generally called, by which the statutes of limitations were extended to the Crown. An immense acquisition in a country where property is every thing.

4. The Act, usually called Mr. Grenville's Bill, which passed in 1770, and which rescues the decisions on controverted elections from any ministerial in­fluence, by referring them to committees elected by ballot, and acting upon oath.

5. The Act passed in 1782, by which every person who holds a contract under Government is rendered incapable of sitting in the House of Commons.

6. Another Act passed in the same year, by which were suppressed a number of places long since established, and very lucrative; and by which the [Page 109] power of the Crown, with respect to granting pensions, was limited.

7. Another Act of the same year, which excluded a great number of persons holding appointments un­der Government from voting at elections for members of parliament.

8. The Act which passed three years ago, and which was intended to give additional security to the Liberty of the Press, by ascertaining the right of the Jury in prosecutions for libels, to decide not only upon the fact of publishing, but also upon the inno [...]ence or criminality of the publication. ^*

These restrictions and limitations have been so far from weakening the strength of Government, that they have tended very considerably to increase it, by increasing the confidence of the public, which is too well assured of its freedom, and too conscious of its strength, to be terrified or imposed upon by those who [Page 110] for their own purposes, would wish to keep it in a state of constant alarm. The nation at large cares very little who is Minister; and is, perhaps, less attentive to his conduct than it would otherwise be, if it did not know that the Opposition is ever on the watch for op­portunities to recommend itself to favour, by giv­ing notice of the slightest appearance of danger; and if it did not also know that the independent party in Parliament is ever at hand to interfere, and to prevent the danger (if there be any) from becoming fatal.

Whence come so many important ameliorations, and within so short a space of time, but from a prin­ciple in the Constitution which renders it capable of self-improvement, as well as self-protection? It can­not be that the Parliament, though unequally elected, either is so corrupt, or so disposed to indulge corrup­tion, as is sometimes believed: this principle in the Constitution puts it out of danger of those convulsions which regeneration has occasioned in France, and gives it a slow, but sure, and uninterrupted tendency towards every sort of amelioration; and makes it what D'Argenson called the perfection of Govern­ment, a perpetual innovation.

This chain of happy alterations sufficiently proves, in my opinion, that the construction of the British Parliament disposes it, of its own will, to adopt mea­sures of improvement depending on times and cir­cumstances; for it must be observed, that none of these measures were forced upon it by any popular commotions, and all of them were well considered and deliberately adopted.

Instead of such a Constitution, containing a prin­ciple of self-improvement, Abbé Sieyes has in­fluenced the opinions of the French Nation in favour of the American system of Conventions. In his discourse on the Veto, he seems to pity the ignorance of the English in not discovering so infallible a politi­cal remedy; whereas the very security of the British [Page 111] Constitution arises precisely from its never wanting it; from there being a well-constructed and well-balanced Legislature, and from this Legislature being alto­gether unlimited in the use of its powers. Conven­tions, whether occasional, or periodical, answer no other end but to produce a public fermentation, to which ambitious men will look forward, and by which they will endeavour to advance themseves by sowing trouble and discord: their tendency is to diminish the confidence of the people in their regular Legisla­tive Assemblies; to impede public business by per­petual doubts of their competency to treat it; to trans­fer the formation of a constitutional law, of which that body can best determine the propriety, to a Conven­tional Assembly, which can neither have the same general experience, nor the same means of judging of the convenience or necessity of the proposition.— Besides, whenever a Convention meets, every thing must necessarily be in commotion; all ideas are revo­lutionary, and sober deliberation is at an end. A Convention, and especially a French Convention, would think it a point of honour not to part with­out doing something; and innovations would be made, merely to avoid the disgrace of not having in­novated. Not one of these inconveniences attends the British Parliament, which enjoys the plenitude of legislative power. None contest its authority; it has no distinct political body behind it, to suspend, or modify, or reverse its decrees; and it is always able to change the existing laws, or adapt them to cir­cumstances.

It is really astonishing that experience has not yet corrected this erroneous opinion of the French on the nature of Conventions. By the new plan which Cambaceres lately presented, it may be observed that they still retain the absurd notion of limiting the powers of the legislative body, and of not permitting it to touch any of the constitutional laws. If they [Page 112] still persist in having Conventions, either extraordi­nary or periodical, they may be assured that Revo­lution must succeed Revolution, and the nation be perpetually on the eve of civil war.

What I have said respecting the British Constitution, as it appears in practice, I am sensible, is but an imperfect sketch; for the subject, even if I were capable of treat­ing it more accurately, is much too extensive, as well as too profound, for the limits of a pamphlet, written in haste, and on the spur of the occasion. My only object, in this Chapter, has been to turn the attention of the French to the absurdity of that declamatory abuse of the British Constitution, which, for five years past, has been employed to prejudice them against it, and induce them to think it as vicious in practice, as it is perfect in theory. All I desire is, to be able to correct some of the prevailing errors among them on this subject, and to induce them to believe it worth a fuller examination, and to read the publications which develope the elements of it. The most complete work on this subject is certainly that of Mr. De Lolme; none more clearly explains its principles, or is more explicit, on the manner in which its different branches are a check upon one another, and on the security it gives to personal liberty.

In France, I hardly know more than two authors who have comprehended, or have done justice to it; ^† I mean, Mr. Necker, and Mr. de Calonne. Of those, the former has undoubtedly considered the subject with most attention, and understands it best; and he too can say, with Mr. De Lolme:—"Born in a free [Page 113] State, though of a small extent, I not only have a native love of liberty, but have heard all the questions discussed which relate to it.—Is not the vital principle the same in an insect, as in an elephant? Is any one less able to study the republic of beavers, because he has long been employed in studying that of the bees?" Mr. de Calonne's residence in England gave him an opportunity of seeing the British Constitution in prac­tice; and he openly recommended it to his country­men, without recollecting that they would probably answer: " Genius invents, and scorns to imitate; we will not condescend to tread in the footsteps of the English."

It is a circumstance worthy remarking, that the two first writers who attempted to recommend the British Constitution to the French, were rival Ministers of Finance. Opposite and hostile on every other sub­ject; in this, and in this only, they agree, that the British Constitution, which both have studied, and both admire, may by some modifications be gradu­ally introduced into France.

Perhaps the most unfortunate step of the Consti­tuent Assembly, is one for which it has been very little censured; I mean, its having voted the Mo­narchy, exactly as the Convention has since voted the Republic,—by acclamation. If that Assembly had but calmly and gravely debated the important question of limited Monarchy; such a discussion, if carried to a sufficient extent, and closely investigated, might have shewn the French a great number of valuable political truths, which they were at that time still capable of attending to, and which might then have made a deep and lasting impression. But another opportunity may soon offer. Equally dissatisfied with the extremes of absolute Monarchy, and lawless De­mocracy, it is impossible but that the great majority of the nation should now wish for something between [Page 114] both. France, by the reflux of public opinion, may be brought back to the leaders with whom she began, and whose wish was a limited Monarchy: if that should ever happen, it is to be hoped that dear-bought experience will have taught them to deliberate before they decide.