THE desire thou intimatedst to me, to see something written by one of the so­ciety of friends, in favor of the exemption from military service, which we, from religi­ous motives, feel it our duty to adhere to, and upon principles of [...] right, to expect will not be denied us, in the United-States of America; and the satisfaction I derive from conferring with thee on subjects of serious import, prompt me to address thee at this time.

To do justice to the subject, is what I do not pretend; nor shall I enter into a conside­ration of the soundness or fallacy of the rea­sons, which dictate to us, the observance of this conduct—Theological controversy, or an attempt to confute the religious tenets of any sect, is, in my opinion, improper. Let [Page 4] every one have free access to every source of human information in religious concerns, of which mankind is possessed; and practise with­out controul, those precepts, which he be­lieves it is his duty to observe. If this be conceded, it necessarily follows, that it would be equally improper for me, to insist upon the orthodoxy of a practice, which thy sense of religious obligation does not enjoin thee to, in order to convince thee of the expedi­ence of leaving me to the exercise of it.

It is not, therefore, upon the ground of our scrupulousness, in this respect, being well founded, that we require to be exempted, (though it be the real one for our refusing to do military service,) but, upon the ground of unrestrained FREEDOM of OPINIONS, which is the BIRTH-RIGHT—the CON­STITUTIONAL RIGHT of EVERY CITIZEN of THESE STATES, whether in re­ligious or other concerns: to enjoy which, was the leading object of the grant for the territory of Pennsylvania being obtained from Charles the second, by William Penn, under whose auspices, our ancestors migrated thither, and first began to feel the blessings which their inoffensiveness, and mortal and religious ha­bits were suited to afford them, under the benign influence of religious liberty—blessings, in the enjoyment of which we were (though a British colony) up to the late revolution in America.—And will the citizens of this new born nation, place us in a worse situation than we were before, and debar us from con­tinuing [Page 5] to enjoy them? Would it be con­sistent with the spirit which actuated them to undertake, and in accomplishing that revo­lution? Every one who has learnt the politi­cal creed of 1774, knows that it would not.—The constitution of the union, which is in­tended to secure to the citizens, as well qua­kers, as others, those blessings, which they acquired by the revolution, declares that it is not: "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or PROHIBIT­ING THE FREE EXERCISE THEREOF."

I am aware, that it has been tauntingly ob­served by some, that it is from the impulse of fear and cowardice, and not from a sense of religious duty, that we desert the scenes of human bloodshed, and renounce the laurels which adorn the hero. This observation, however, I am persuaded, obtains belief with few, if any, who have had an opportunity of associating with many of the society of friends; and those who have never had such an oppor­tunity, are incompetent judges of the truth of the observation:—The ardor of youth, ambition, and other powerful springs, which exist in the human breast, it may be reason­ably supposed, are common to the members of our, as well as to those of every other society; but it is the early and assiduous care, which is bestowed upon the formation of our minds, and the direction of our ideas, which first initiates us into the habit of restraining our ambition, and other passions; and finally deters us from engaging in the field of battle: [Page 6] and permit me to add, that true bravery as assuredly exists, where fortitude and human­ity reside, as that, the man who can restrain the force of his passions, is possessed of no small share of those qualities.

The effects of conscientious scrupulousness upon a religious mind, can not be better ex­emplified, than they were in William Penn:—the sacrifices, which were made by him, in the spring of his life, can not be accounted for, upon any other ground, than that of a religious sense of duty; unless they be attri­buted to an eccentricity of mind, or a dere­liction of his senses: causes, to which the uni­formity of his subsequent conduct, the con­sistency and success which distinguished his arduous and philanthoropic enterprises and writings, and (if I may be allowed to add) the patronage of his sovereign, unite to for­bid is from ascribing the great and deserved respect and fame, which wait upon, and per­petuate his memory.

And yet some of those very precepts of this great and worthy christian, have been occasionally the sport of many, and the cause of much suffering and distress to individuals of the society, imposed on them too, by par­liamentary authority; until they have sunk their professors below the level of public ven­geance, or private scorn; and again have ac­quired to them, the respect and esteem of most, and been adopted by many.

The scruples of friends are several, and it may serve to evince the materiality in which [Page 7] we hold an observance of them, to enquire whether we relaxed or grew less tenacious in adhering to them, either from the sufferings to which they subjected us, or from the pro­gressive elapse of time.

One of them respects the conforming to the taking an oath. Friends hold the truth obligatory on them always, and that the true intention of a corporal or external ceremony, preparatory to speaking it on occasions of mo­ment; is to make the person, by solemnly un­dertaking to adhere to it, in any particular, liable to incur the legal penalties, which await a violation of it, in that particular: but we refuse to impart solemnity to a ceremony of that kind, as frequently practised, by making an appeal to, and use of the name of the Dei­ty: from a conviction, that to do so, is profane, and repugnant to the text, which enjoins to "swear not at all;" though we object not to an innocent form of submission to be punished, if we violate the truth. This form I need not tell thee, is by oral affirmation; for which we were persecuted under the statute of 13 & 14 C. II. Ch. 1. and by the magistracy of that time, in a manner which is equally disgrace­ful to the government of England, and officers under it. Although branded with infamy, for refusing the oaths of allegiance, supremacy and abjuration, and subjected to lingering con­finements, loathsome prisons, without neces­sary subsistence, or the communion of friends or relatives, under pretext that our refusal proceeded from disaffection to the royal family, [Page 8] to the renunciation of papal authority, and to the government of Great Britain, yet the steady and inflexible perseverance of the society, in not complying, surmounted and sur­vived parliamentary opposition, and magisterial tyranny.

After the society were exposed to and expe­rienced these evils during many years, for supposed criminality, resulting from the mis­take, perhaps intentional, on the part of go­vernment, of attributing the conscientious scrupulousness of the quaker, to the disloy­alty of the subject, they were mitigated by the act of 8 G. I. Ch. 6: the effects of which however were but little felt in the courts of justice in England, until the 22. G. II. Ch. 46 § 36. To this day, in that country, a quaker is not admitted to affirm in criminal cases, to serve on juries, or bear any office of profit under government.

Friends scrupled also to pay tithes, rates, or other payments, for the stipend or main­tenance of hireling ministers or curates; on which account, in England, the society have laboured under much imposition, from the mode in which they are distrained for, and collected. The annual amounts of these are set forth, in the epistles from the yearly-meet­ings of friends, and amount to a far greater tax than they would do, were they paid vo­luntarily; notwithstanding which, the pay­ment of them is refused to this day.

Thus, the government of England im­posed upon the quakers, penalties for dissent­ing [Page 9] from the regulations and doctrines of its church, as soon as the society made its appear­ance, which was about the restoration; at the same time, that the same government were exercising the like discretion or privi­lege, in denying the dogmas of the church of Rome, and resisting the papal authority, which they had, for between eight and nine centu­ries, before acknowledged and submitted to.

In America, our society is relieved from the grievances to which it is subjected in Great Britain, in these respects—nor do I see why re­ligious liberty should be limitted to these pri­vileges only—it is to be hoped, and reasona­bly to be expected, that we shall not be com­pelled to suffer so much in America, before we attain to the enjoyment of the same share of discretion in carrying arms, as we suffered in England on account of our scrupulousness to swear, and to contribute to the mainte­tenace of the ministers of other religious socie­ties; that arbitrary acts of congress will not be passed in imitation of the statute of Charles II. to take away the freedom of the mind in re­ligious concerns, whilst the liberty of politi­cal opinions, which are more apt to affect the harmony of social compacts, be preserved in­violate and unlimited.

The dust of time, would never hide the stain which such a measure would throw upon the national character of this country—it has tarnished, and will tarnish for ever the lustre with which Great Britain once excelled eve­ry contending rival; though it may be remem­bered, [Page 10] that the statute of Charles originated whilst, and where witchcraft and sorcery, in­chantment and conjuration, were seriously pro­hibited, and severely punished, by legislative interference—but, as the minds of men are more enlarged and enlightened by the progress of science, experience and civilization, the opinions, and tenets, and, it is to be hoped, the scruples of each other become more and more generally respected, though more vari­ant and divers; as the clouds of superstition pass from over the heads of the majority of the people, these phantoms of ignorance va­nish from their minds, and the rigor of pe­nalties, inflicted upon difference in opinions, is moderated and done away—the illiberal and prejudiced state, in which minds so bewil­dered must have been, is the best excuse that can be made, for the persecuting spirit with which they pursued the few who dared to dissent from the generally received opinions of the nation, an excuse, however, which could never be offered for the imitation of such an example in this country.

That the infliction of fines, or other pu­nishments, would be as ineffectual in reccon­ciling quakers in America, to carry arms, as they proved in prevailing upon them in En­gland to make oath; there is no reason to doubt.

It is therefore, with much uneasiness, that I learn from the 17th clause of the militia bill, which is postponed until the next session of congress, that such citizens as are consci­entiously [Page 11] scrupulous of bearing arms, are to be exempted from doing so, upon paying a fine—to pay a fine, in lieu of bearing arms, would be as repugnant to the principles of friends, as the performance of the service, from which it were to exempt them; and for reasons synonymous to those, which deter them from contributing to the support and maintenance of hireling ministers—to collect these fines, therefore, the subordinate magis­tracy of the country must interpose their authority, which will put it in their power (and their inclination to exercise it in general can­not be denied) to impose upon and distress the unfortunate victims of their rapacity, to a-degree far beyond every benefit, which the country could derive from such a source of revenue. The molestation and disturbance of that class of the citizens, denominated qua­kers, which constitutes too, in some places, the more considerable part, would, as well as be unjust and unconstitutional in itself, serve to interrupt the harmony, and to destroy the wholesome effect, which the decorous and ju­dicious discipline and regulations of that socie­ty, are calculated to produce to every class of a community; and which candor cannot but acknowledge, are distinguished excellencies in the pacific department of municipal science. The advantages which the community derive from these, would be felt no more: and the amount of the fines, after being extorted, would not compensate the loss of them. It is a maxim, that the law ought not to require [Page 12] impossibilities; and it is the language of rea­son, and religion, that a man should not be forced to wrong his own conscience: and a quaker must either do the latter, or be inca­pable of complying with the requisites of this clause of the bill—it would be tantamount to the taxing the opinions of one class of the citizens, in exclusion of every other. To tax a man for not doing a particular service, which his conscience forbids him to do, in or­der to make up for that omission, is as un­reasonable, as it would be to extra-tax the members of a community, who possess one kind of property, to make their contribution equivalent to that, which the public coffers receive from those who possess another kind of property.

Why then should friends be prohibited the exemption from military service which they claim? Let us proceed to enquire into some of the reasons which are assigned against it.

One of them, and which is said to display the absurdity of the claim, is, that if such a scruple were to prevail in the breasts of a large majority of a nation, self defence must be dispensed with, and the nation submit to the injustice and will of their invaders.

I might safely admit the reason, so far as it is applicable to this subject, without receiving any injury from its force—for, though a ma­jority of the people view a religious tenet as ridiculous or absurd, yet the voice of the ma­jority cannot, consistent with the federal con­stitution, forbid the exercise of it: otherwise, [Page 13] a majority would establish a national religion. But I think no such absurdity is apparent, and without soliciting thy acquiescence in my reasons for thinking so, I will barely state them.

Let me first take the objection, upon the largest possible scale; and suppose the princi­ple of friends in this respect, to be observed by every nation in the world—in this point of view, the objection vanishes. The energy of the principle, itself, becomes the bulwark of self-defence—no violence would be offered to the rights of each other, to require opposition; but this mode of reasoning, however just, were mankind as they ought to be, regardful of the rights of one another, is objectionable on ac­count of the inapplicability of it, to the actu­al state in which mankind are—then, the question results to this: viewing the states of human societies, as they really exist, might the invasions of the rights of nations or states, which take place, be prevented or adjusted without having recourse to arms? For and against this question, much metaphysical and theoretic reasoning might be adduced—but as thy own ingenuity may suggest, and thy own judgment decide upon it, perhaps as well without, as with many comments of mine, I shall do little more than recur to the test of ex­perience for the solution of the query.

Experience teaches, that man can effect more by the powers of his mind, than he can by those of his body. The latter, form the first and chief dependence of man, in a state of nature, as well to support, as to protect and defend [Page 14] himself. But, they barely enable the savage to obtain a scanty nourishment for his body, whilst the citizen, by the former, is put into the full enjoyment, of not only the necessa­ries, but all the elegancies and luxuries of life. However, to protect and defend ourselves, in the enjoyment of these advantages, we seem to remain in a natural state, resorting to vio­lence and oppression against the invader; ad­hering to the same system, which man, in a barbarous and rude state, is impelled to observe, for the purposes of abstract self-preservation. Little doubt exists with me, but that an al­ternative may always be found out, if as much ingenuity were expended for the purpose, as there usually is to excel in arts of cruelty; and which might be as superior to the use of arms, as the civilized pursuits of agriculture, commerce, and navigation, are to the robust toils of the chace, for the acquirement of the necessaries and comforts of life.

It is inconsistent with christianity to resort to arms—one crime will not justify another. The lex talionis is not a part of the christian religion, and the using of arms, to resist an attack, is returning violence for violence, and opposing force with force; involving our­selves in the like criminality; and making ourselves as deserving of chastisement as they are on whom we inflict it, for imitating the evil example which incurs our displeasure. Even, if in this instance, the rules of religion were inconsistent with the exigency of the occasion, the latter ought to submit to the [Page 15] former; but such an exigency cannot exist, for it were to create a dilemma in the mind of a christian, to render it necessary for him to do that, which it is his duty not to do—in­deed, I think, this has teen fairly tried and evinced, in the settlement of Pennsylvania.

That country was inhabited by, and in the possession of the aborigines, at the time that William Penn landed there. They regarded the soil as their own. They were in a savage state, disposed to be inimical to whoever at­tempted to settle upon their lands, and to op­pose the encroachments of European emi­grants. But the measures of William Penn were not those of force, not the use of arms, not the exertion of power, he sought not to entwine his temples with the trophies of con­quest, or to reader himself terrible—he sha­ded his brow with the olive, and distributed its branches among the belligerent tribes—his measures were at once adequate to the attain­ment of every object that he had in view, and were calculated to establish and preserve har­mony with, to acquire the friendship of, and to do justice to those, who were the prior oc­cupants of the soil. No bloodshed, no stra­tagem, no outrage took place, but the securi­ty of the colony, rested upon the confidence of the Indians, and was preserved by a due adherence to justice and humanity.

Contrast the progress and occurrences on this occasion, with those of the colonization of New-Spain, and say, what benefit was there which was derived by the Spanish settlers, [Page 16] which was not enjoyed by the companions of William Penn? And yet, the former conquer­ed by massacre, whilst the latter subdued the savage, by contributing to the alleviation of his necessities. The former triumphed by the arts of war, the latter, by those of peace. Hence, I think, it may be inferred, that the impracticability of effecting by pacific mea­sures, all that violent ones are capable of, is at least very problematical, if not improbable.

The same spirit which dictated the policy of states and nations to decide differences be­tween them by arms, it may be reasonably be­lieved, suggested those sanguinary codes of criminal jurisprudence, which prevail, in most, for the preservation of tranquillity and order among the individuals of each, and for the punishment of such as transgress, the munici­pal regulations of them.

The injustice and cruelty of these codes, have, of late years, been greatly deprecated, and owe their continuance in a great measure, to a belief, that more moderate ones would be found less adequate to the prevention of crimes. But this opinion grows weaker and weaker every day; and the state of Pennsyl­vania, has set an example, in trying the ex­periment of a reform in this respect, the ex­cellencies, and success of which, render it worthy of imitation in every civilized coun­try.

Another objection, which is made to the exemption of friends from military service, is the unfairness and unreasonableness of a part [Page 17] only of the citizens, being compellable to per­form it. But, if this be a natural, a consti­tutional right, reserved to the citizens of that description, with which however all dispense, who come not within the already cited clause of the constitution, no unfairness, or unreason­ableness exists, because it is the free and vo­luntary act of those, who do not claim the ex­emption, which imposes upon them the per­formance of such service: or, if this were not the case, ought not the degree in which friends contribute to the preservation of tran­quillity and order, in a state, and the rarity of its laws, being violated by members of the so­ciety, to entitle them to some indulgence of their conscientious scrupulousness to enter in­to military service?

That such an exemption would not afford an opportunity to others, who might be de­sirous of eluding military service; to avoid the performance of it, will appear manifest to every one, who makes enquiry into the ri­gid discipline of the society, in identifying those, who are entitled to membership in it, and of particularly disclaiming the pretensions of such as are not. But as thou art, though not one of the society, sufficiently informed on this point, it is unnecessary for me, to en­ter into a detail of the regulations and rules of the society, to display the impossibility of such an evasion becoming practicable.

[Page 18] I therefore dismiss the subject here, nor shall I detain thy attention longer, with assur­ance of personal regard, persuaded as I am, that it is unnecessary for me to express, with how much esteem and sincerity, I continue thy friend, and well-wisher,

FIFTH MONTH, 12, 1795.