A LETTER; IN WHICH TWO OF THE Rev. Mr. FLETCHER's PRINCIPLES ARE COMPARED, AND PROVED TO BE INCONSISTENT WITH EACH OTHER. AND IN WHICH IS ALSO, AN ATTEMPT TO SHOW WHAT IS THE TRUTH, BY DENYING WHICH THIS AUTHOR CONTRADICTED HIMSELF.
BY PLATT BUFFET, OF SMITH-TOWN, LONG-ISLAND.
NEW-YORK: PRINTED BY JOHN HARRISSON, (YORICK'S HEAD) NO. 3, PECK-SLIP. —1794 —
PREFACE.
THE author of the following letter, has been desired, by some of the followers of Mr. Fletcher, to state in writing his objections to that author's works. But to point out all the absurdities attending such a mixture of truth and falsehood, would require much time and pains. The [...] of the letter therefore has, as yet, attempted to expose but one contradiction attending that author's principles. But this, if it be a real contradiction, is sufficient, 'tis presumed, to convince persons of sense and candor, that Mr. F—r's writings contain no consistent scheme of christian doctrines.
This letter when first written was by no means designed for the press; but only as a letter to a private friend at his own request. But as some to whom it was first read, expressed a desire to have it printed; and as it will in this way, be, not only better understood, but more extensively read; and as Mr. F—r's works are rapidly spreading among us, and many are hastily embracing his doctrines, the letter is submitted to public perusal and examination.
Our ablest divines view Mr. F—r's works as beneath their notice. And tis true, that he is a very absurd and inconsistent writer. But it is equally true that his writings, being very agreeable to corrupt human nature, are doing much mischief in some parts of Long-Island. It is highly necessary therefore, that some body take a [Page iv] little pains to expose some of his absurdities and inconsistences.
Some perhaps will object that the author of the letter is a young writer, ambitious to excel, and has therefore published this, with a view merely to display his abilities. That this is not the case, he will not undertake to prove with his pen. He means to judge others by their fruits in general; and exctpes thus to be judged himself.
But suppose he has published this with no other view than merely to display his abilities; what then? Will it certainly follow that Mr. F—r has not contradicted himself? Or will it certainly follow that the contradiction is too trifling to be worthy of notice?
In answer to the first part of the objection, that the author of the letter is a young writer it may be observed, that perhaps he will be found old enough to point out at least one grand contradiction attending Mr. F—r's principles: And perhaps more if the cause of religion should require it. Besides, if from the following letter, it shall appear that a young writer can point out such a contradiction of principles in that author's works, what may we not suppose an old writer could do?
It will be further objected, perhaps, that this letter will offend the followers of Mr. F—r? If it should offend any of them, let the impartial judge whether such will not be offended principally because one of their errors of sentiment is [Page v] made manifest to themselves and others? And if this should be the case, will they not have reason to doubt their own pious sincerity, in proportion as they may be offended? Let such read, John iii. 20 and 21. This letter will offend none, tis presumed, but such as are much under the influence of prejudice. And if we must not point out and expose errors for fear of offending such, all writing and preaching to defend the truth, must be laid aside.
LETTER, &c.
YOU doubtless recollect that you lately desired me to state to you in writing my objections to Mr. Fletcher's scheme. I beg then you would do me, and yourself the kindness to read with impartiality, condor, care and attention the following pages:
You may observe that this author is bitterly opposed to all necessity in moral matters. One important and essential principle in his scheme is this, That all absolute necessity either of our doing moral evil, or of our being the subjects of moral evil, is absolutely inconsistent with our being either blamable or punishable for such moral evil: Or in other words; That God cannot, consistently with his perfections, blame or punish s for doing or being what we cannot avoid. I will cite some of his own assertions to this effect.
‘And that the absolute necessity of all human actions is incompatible with a moral law and a day of judgement, is (says he) an axiom in every prejudiced mind.’ Vol. iii. page 201. ‘And conscience declares, that it is unjust and [Page 8] cruel to inflict fearful, eternal punishments upon beings that have only moved and acted by absolute necessity.’ Vol. iii. page 206. ‘Absolute necessity and a righteous judgement are absolutely incompatible.’ Vol. iii. page 206. ‘If through the saving grace of God which has appeared to all men, we were not again endued with an awful power to chuse life, and to be faithful, it would be as injudicious to punish or recompence mankind, as to whip a dead horse for not moving, damn fire for burning, or grant water an eternal reward for its fluidity.’ Vol. iii. page 91. ‘And when you insinuate, that the lawgiver of the universe will send all workers of iniquity to hell, for not doing what is lawful and right to save their souls alive, or for not avoiding sin, when he never gave them the least power personally so to do, you pour almost as much contempt upon his perfections, as if you said that he will one day raise all creeping insects to judge them according to their steps, and to cast into a place of torment as many as did not move as swift as a race horse.’ Vol. iii. page 92. ‘But the scheme which I oppose, instead of leaving men without excuse, opens their mouths and fills them with the best apology in the world. Absolute necessity and complete impossibility, caused by another before we were born. An apology this which no candid person can ever object to.’ Vol. iii. page 172.
Such you know, Sir, is his language throughout a considerable part of the third and fourth volumes. And the principle he advances in the places, I have here cited, is a principle upon [Page 9] which he lays great stress, as every one must be sensible who has ever perused this author. Indeed, almost or quite all his reasoning against the absolute decrees of God, the sovereignty of grace and the like, is found upon this principle.
You see then that one important and essential principle in his scheme is, That all absolute necessity either of our doing moral evil, or of our being the subjects of moral evil, is absolutely inconsistent with our being either blamable or punishable for such moral evil: Or, That God cannot, consistently with his perfections, blame or punish us for doing or being what we cannot avoid.
Now, Sir, I will endeavour to show, from this author's own words, that another important and essential part of his scheme is founded upon a principle which is absolutely inconsistent with the above mentioned principle; and directly contradictory to it. The principle upon which this part of his scheme is founded is the following one: That absolute necessity of our doing moral evil, or of our being the subjects of moral evil, is perfectly consistent with our being both blamable and punishable for such moral evil: Or in other words; That God could, consistently with his perfections blame and punish us for doing such moral evil as we could not avoid. And if I fully and clearly show that one part of Mr F—r's scheme is founded upon this last mentioned principle, I hope you will have candor enough to acknowledge that he has absolutely contradicted himself, and that one part of his scheme is absolutely inconsistent with the other.
[Page 10]In the first place then, he holds that the fall of Adam brought mankind into a state, in which they could, without a Saviour, have done nothing but moral evil. They must necessarily have gone on in nothing but sin and wickedness. For he undertakes to vindicate what Mr. Wesley asserted (viz.) The total fall of man, and that by nature man's will is only free to evil. See vol. i. [...] 16 and 21. And Mr F—r expressly says, that he agrees with Mr. Hill in this; ‘That the will of man, considered as fallen in Adam, and unassisted by the grace of God, is only free to evil—free to live in the element of sin, as a sea fish is only free to live in salt water.’ Vol. ii. page 210. And in another place. ‘without him (that is Christ) we have (says he) nothing but helplessness; we can do nothing but sin.’ Vol. ii. page 200. Again. ‘The language of a penitent sinner, is (says he) Lord, I pray and hear, I fast and receive, I give alms, and keep the Sabbath, but after all I am an umprofitable servant. I must work out my own salvation with fear and trembling, and yet without thee I can do nothing. I cannot change my heart. I cannot root up from my breast the desire of praise, the thirst of pleasure, and the hankering after gold, vanity, beauty, or sensual gratifications which I continually feel. Without thee I cannot force my stubborn heart to repent, believe and love; to be meek and lowly, calm and devout. Lord deliver me from this body of death; Lord save or I perish.’ Vol. iii. page 52. And in another place the author has these words. ‘I protes in opposition to Pharisaic pride, that we have [Page 11] no power to do good works pleasant and acceptable to God, without the grace of God preventing us, that we may have a good will, and working with us when we have that good will.’ Vol. iv. page 135. Once more. ‘From what has been observed it follows (says he) that before any one can believe in the gospel sense of the word, he must be convinced of sin by the spirit of God He must feel himself a guilty, lost, and helpless sinner, unable to recover the favour and image of God by his own strength and righteousness.’ Vol. iii. page 44.
Many more passages of the same import I could easily cite from this author: But these I trust are sufficient to show he holds that the fall of Adam brought mankind into a state in which they could, without a Saviour, have done nothing but moral evil: That they must necessarily and unavoidably have gone on in sin and wickedness.
In the second place, this author holds that mankind would have been blamable and punishable for their necessary and unavoidable sin and wickedness, had a Saviour never been provided, this appears from his expressions which I have already cited: Such as these; ‘The will of man considerered as fallen in Adam, and unassisted by the grace of God, is only free to evil—free to live in the element of sin, as a sea-fish is only free to live in salt water.’ ‘Without him (that is Christ) we have nothing but helplessness; we have nothing but sin,’ &c. By evil, and by sin and the like here, we are undoubtedly to understand that for which mankind are blamable and punishable; otherwise it cannot be moral evil: It cannot be sin. If then without Christ [Page 12] mankind have nothing but helplessness; nothing but sin, and their wills be free only to evil and the like, it follows that without a Saviour mankind would necessarily and unavoidably have been both blamable and punishable. They would have been, according to what Mr. F—r holds, under an absolute necessity of going on in sin, so as to have been guilty, blamable, and punishable. And he evidently grants all this in saying that a person before he believes in the gospel, ‘Must feel himself a guilty, lost, and helpless sinner,’ &c.
But we need not rest the matter here: For in other places he is very full and express to the purpose. He holds that all mankind are, by nature and without Christ, under the first covenant made with Adam. And he holds that it is impossible for any mere man since the fall to keep this covenant. At the same time he holds that all mankind, without Christ; are under the curse, children of wrath, and condemned for not keeping it. ‘This first covenant (says he) we have all broken in our first parents; for in Adam all died—By one man sin entered into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all men, for that all have sinned.; Rom. v. 12. We are then all born or conceived in sin; Ps. li. 5. And consequently we are by nature children of wrath; Eph. ii. 3. But this is not all: This root of original sin produces in every man many actual iniquities; whereby we imitate Adams rebellion, so we make the guilt of it our own, and fasten the curs [...] [...]tending that guilt, upon our own souls. Rom. vii. 25. Therefore, while we remain in our natural state, or to speak more intelligibly, while we continue [Page 13] in sin, guilt, and total impenitency, we not [...] trample the covenant of grace under foot, but we stand upon the covenant of works; and consequently lie under the dreadful curse, which is already denounced against every transgressor of the law’ Gal. iii 10. Vol. iii. page 40.
Is this then the case? Have we all broken the first covenant in our first parents! Have we all sinned in this way? And are we by nature children of wrath? And does this root of original sin produce in every man many actual iniquities, so that we fasten the curse upon our own souls? And he under the dreadful curse which is already denounced against every transgressor of the law? Have we all then broken the first covenant, and for breaking it are we thus, children of wrath and under the dreadful curse and the like? Would not all the posterity of Adam then, have been blamable and punishable for their necessary and unavoidable sin and wickedness, had a Saviour never been provided? If Mr. F—r was now here, how would he avoid this consequence? Does it not inevitably follow from his own premises? Surely he would not pretend that Christ has, by his coming, brought us under the first covenant, and made us thus guilty, blamable and punishable for breaking it? If he should pretend this, he would contradict himself in another particular: For he holds that Christ came to free us from the first covenant, and from the guilt, blame, and condemnation which we have incurred by breaking it. See vol. iv. page 162. If then Christ had never come, all the posterity of Adam would have been under an absolute necessity of being sinful [Page 14] guilty, blamable, punishable; and of being condemned for ever.
Equally full and express to the purpose he is in another place. ‘Under the first covenant, absolute, unsinning, universal obedience in our own persons is (says he) required; and such obedience we, in our fallen state, can never perform.’ Vol. iii. page 43. But surely God does not require more of us than he can justly blame and punish us for not doing. It would be blasphemy to suppose that he does: For it would be nothing less than supposing him to require more than he ought to require or could justly require. It follows then, that had a Saviour never been provided, God could justly, and in fact would have blamed and punished mankind for their necessary and unavoidable guilt, and wickedness.
Once more, ‘The second covenant or the gospel is (he tells in another place) a dispensation of free grace and mercy to poor, lost, helpless sinners, who seeing and feeling themselves condemned by the law of innocence; and utterly unable to obtain justification upon the terms of the first covenant, come to Jesus Christ,’ &c. Vol. iii. page 42. Here then I ask what would these have done if no Saviour had been provided? Must they not necessarily and unavoidably have been condemned by the law of innocence? And must not this condemnation have necessarily and unavoidably come upon all the fallen race of Adam?
Again: ‘Total death, or a full departure of the Holy Spirit. This (says Mr. F—r) passed upon Adam and all mankind in him, when he lost God's moral image; fell into selfish nature, [Page 15] and was buried in sin, guilt, shame and horror.’ Vol. i. page 259. According to this author, therefore, spiritual death passed upon all mankind in Adam when he lost God's moral image. And thus judgement came upon all men to condemnation; so that even infants must be justified by Christ or be damned. We therefore find him speaking of the justification which passes upon infants, thus; ‘That which passes upon all infants universally, and is thus described by St. Paul; as by the offence of one judgement came upon all men to condemnation; even so by the righteousness of one, the free gift came upon all men, unto justification from original sin.’ &c. Vol. i. page 263. And in another place, speaking respecting the four degrees of justification, he has these words respecting that which passes upon us in our infancy. ‘All these degrees of justification are equally merited by Christ. We do nothing in order to the first, because it finds us in a state of total death.’ Vol. i. page 264.
But infants could not stand in need of this justifitation by Christ if they were not guilty, blamable and punishable. It follows then that if Christ had never come and merited these degrees of justification, the very infants must have been blamable, punishable and condemned. But could infants have prevented the offence of their first parent Adam? It will not be pretended It follows then that, if a Saviour had never been provided, all the posterity of Adam, who might have died in their very infancy would have been under an absolute necessity of being, guilty, blamable and punishable. Nay, all such must according [Page 16] to Mr. F—r, have necessarily been condemned forever. This is going a great stretch indeed. This author ought to blush at mentiontioning even the name of "Rigid calvinists." For I trust there are few who will equal [...] in rigidness with regard to this matter.
Does it not appear then that all the posterity of Adam would, according to Mr. F—r, have been blamable and punishable for their necessary and unavoidable guilt, and wickedness? I could easily produce many more of his assertions of the same import. But these I trust are amply sufficient to show that, according to this author, God could justly have blamed and punished mankind for such sin, guilt and wickedness as they could not possibly have avoided, in case a Saviour had never been provided. All the posterity of Adam would have been under an absolute necessity of being guilty, and consequently of being condemned.
But how does all this agree with the first mentioned principle of his (viz.) that ‘Absolute necessity and a righteous judgement are absolute, incompatible,’ and the like: Or which I take to be the same thing, that absolute necessity either of our doing moral evil, or being the subjects of moral evil, is absolutely inconsistent with our being either blamable or punishable for such moral evil. If I can understand language here is an express and manifest contradiction in these two principles belonging to Mr. F—r's scheme. And, Sir, how does he help himself out of this dilemma? How does he free his scheme from this entanglement? Will you say he holds that God has provided a Saviour, and by him freed all the posterity of Adam from this absolute necessity of sinning, [Page 17] of being guilty, blamable and punishable, and of being condemned? I grant it. He does hold to this. We therefore find him expressing himself in the following manner:
‘Every anti Calvinist may, and I for one do believe, that in every man born into the world, and considered according to the first covenant, original corruption, (nor Adam's transgression) deserves God's wrath and damnation at the hands of an holy and righteous God, without dreaming that any man shall ever be damned for it: Seeing that according to God's mercy and goodness displayed in the second covenant. Christ the second Adam, is come to taste death for every man and to be a Saviour of all men; so that for his sake the free gift is come upon all men unto justification of life.’ Vol. ii. page 245.
It seems then that original corruption in every man born into the world, and considered according to the first covenant, deserves, (according to this author's own words) God's wrath and damnation at the hands of an holy and righteous God. But is it possible for Adam's posterity to avoid original corruption? He does not pretend it. Why then may not the posterity of Adam be, not only blamable and punishable, but damned for what they could not possibly, avoid? Because, ‘Christ the second Adam (says Mr. F—r) is come to taste death for every man, and to be a Saviour of all men; so that for his sake the free gift is come upon all men unto justification of life’ This is his solution of the difficulty. Let us then pay particular attention to it. Let us carefully [Page 18] examine this answer and see whether it is really helping the matter.
Here then let it be observed, that Mr. F—r holds that the gift of a Saviour was a free gift as in the words just cited from him. And you, Sir, know very well I trust, that he holds to the same throughout his writings. He holds that the gift of a Saviour was a free gift and wholly of free grace. He holds that the capacity which Christ has given all mankind to repent and chuse life, and that the power which Christ has given all mankind to believe and repent; and that the day of salvation, with a talent of living light, and rectified free agency and the like, are all of free grace. I could produce a great variety of his own assertions to prove what I here assert. But it is needless for no one, who has ever perused this author, will, I presume, pretend to deny that he holds all mankind have these favours of free grace.
If then the gift of a Saviour be a free gift and wholly of free grace, it follows that God was under no obligations to give us Christ; nor any of the blessings which flow to us through him. Consequently he might justly have with-held the gift of a Saviour, and all these blessings from mankind, and left them in their fallen condition. And then what would have been the condition of mankind? All the posterity of Adam would have been under an absolute necessity of being totally corrupt, and of going on in sin and wickedness. And they would, according to what Mr. F—r tells us, have deserved God's wrath and damnation even for their original corruption. And surely they [Page 19] would have deserved as much as this for their actual transgressions of the law of innocence.
Does this author then help the matter in this way? No person of sense and candor will suppose it: For according to his own principles, God might justly have with-held the gift of a Saviour and all free grace. And if so, it follows that every man born into the world would have deserved God's wrath and damnation even for that original corruption which they could not possibly have avoided; but must necessarily have had. And besides their original corruption they would have had many actual iniquities. And most certainly these would have deserved as much as their original corruption.
But how does these things harmonize with this author's favorite principle, that, ‘Absolute necessity and a righteous judgment are absolutely incompatible?’ And how do they harmonize with the following assertion of his: ‘If, through the saving grace of God which has appeared to all men, we were not again endued with an awful power to chuse life, and to be faithful, it would be as insidious to punish or recompense mankind, as to whip a dead horse for not moving, damn fire for burning, or grant water an eternal reward for its fluidity.’ Let candor and common sense judge whether here be not a most awful jaring of principles. Does not Mr. F—r hold to two principles which must be at eternal war with each other?
‘We oppose (says he) the doctrine of absolute necessity, or the Calvinian must as being inseparable from Manicheism; and we assert that there is no needs must in the eternal [Page 20] death of any man; because Christ imparts a degree of temporary salvation to all, with power to obey, and a promise to bestow eternal salvation upon all that will obey.’ Vol. iv. page 88.
From what this author here says it seems that the reason why there is no ‘ Needs must in the eternal death of any man,’ is the coming of Christ and imparting a degree of temporary salvation to all with power to obey and a promise to bestow eternal salvation upon all that will obey. This, as well as what he says otherwhere, implies that if Christ had never come, there would have been a " Needs must" in the eternal death of some. It implies that there would have been a " Needs must" in the eternal death of all Adam's posterity. But as the gift of Christ was, as Mr. F—r allows, a free gift and of free grace, God was under no obligations to give us Christ, or to provide any Saviour for mankind. Consequently he might justly have with-held the gift of a Saviour, and left mankind with a needs must in the eternal death of every one of Adam's posterity; and of all mankind after the sail. Does not this author then oppose himself in opposing the doctrine of Absolute necessity? ‘We must renounce the mistakes of rigid Calvinists, (says he) or give up the doctrines of justice.’ It appears to me as though some of the followers of Mr. F—r must renounce some of his mistakes, or give up the doctrine of perfection.
In short; according to one part of this author's scheme, the great necessity of a Saviour to mankind, arises from their being under an absolute necessity of sinning, of being guilty, blamable, [Page 21] perishable and condemned forever without one. So that not only the necessity, but even the grace of the gospel to Adam's posterity, is founded upon this very supposition that God might justly have blamed and punished his creatures, for doing that which they would have been under an absolute necessity of doing; and for being what they would have been under an absolute necessity of being. At the same time this writer has founded another important part of his scheme upon the supposition or principle, That God cannot, and never could in any case, consistently with his perfections, blame or punish his creatures for doing or being what they could not avoid.
Does then this author help the matter in the least by saying, that God has freely given to mankind a Saviour, to free them from that absolute necessity of sinning, and of perishing [...] they would otherwise have been under? On the contrary; Does he [...] make the matter worse? Does not the very gift of a Saviour show that all the posterity of Adam were in a lost, helpless, and undone condition? Does not the gift of a Saviour prove that they [...] possibly have avoided sin go [...] blame and [...] without one? Consequently [...] not prove that God might justly have [...] all the posterity of Adam in a state of [...] necessary guilt, blame and [...] if it were, as Mr F—r [...] a gracious gift [...] his [...] course [...] a Saviour, [...] [Page 22] that, in this way, he has, if possible, entangled it the more.
And indeed he himself appears to have been in some measure sensible of the impossibility of reconciling his jaring principles in this way. We therefore find him quitting this ground, and having recourse to another expedient. But let us follow him.
‘And we assert (says he in Vol. iv. page 38) that if God had not graciously designed to replace all mankind in a state of initial salvation from sin and hell, according to the various dispensations of his redeeming grace, he would have punished Adam's sin by a personal damnation. Nor would he have suffered him to propagate his fallen race, unless the second Adam had extended the blessings of redemption so far as to save from eternal misery all who die in their infancy; and to put all who live long enough to act as moral agents, in a capacity of avoiding hell by working out their own eternal salvation in the day of their temporary salvation; a day this, which inconsistent Calvinists call the day of grace.’
Here is something extraordinary indeed for one who has boasted of his talents at reasoning as Mr. F—r. Here we see him, so far from standing his ground, that he is evidently giving way to this grand difficulty attendending his scheme. He tells us that if a Saviour had not been provided, God would not have suffered Adam to propagate his fallen race 'Tis as much as if he had said; God could consistently with his perfections, have suffered Adam to propagate his race in such a state that they might have been under [Page 23] an absolute necessity of being sinful, guilty, blamable and justly punishable, had a Saviour never been provided: But I do not believe he would have suffered it. This is granting that God could justly have blamed and punished Adam's posterity for doing that which they could not possibly have avoided; and for being such creatures as they would have been under an absolute necessity of being. But how does this agree with the following assertion of his: ‘If, through the saving grace of God which has appeared to all men, we were not again endued with an awful power to chuse life, and to be faithful, it would be as injudicious to punish or recompense mankind, as to whip a dead horse for not moving, damn fire for burning, grant water an eternal reward for its fluidity.’ In short, how does this agree with a principle upon which he has founded an important part of his scheme, (viz.) that "Absolute necessity and a righteous judgment are absolutely incompatible?"
But perhaps, Sir, you will say that Mr. F—r's meaning here was not that God could, but that he could not, consistently with his perfections, have suffered Adam thus to propagate his fallen race without providing a Saviour? Then it comes to this, that God, as soon as he suffered Adam to propagate his fallen race, was under obligations to provide a Saviour for all his posterity. But if so, how was the gift of a Saviour to mankind a purely free and gracious gift? It certainly was not, according to this, wholly of a free grace to Adams posterity
But as Mr. F—r holds that the gift of a Saviour was a free gift and a purely gracious gift [Page 24] to all mankind; it follows that God might, consistently with his justice and all his other attributes, have suffered Adam to propagate his fallen race, without ever providing any Saviour for them. And then all the posterity of Adam would have been left under the first covenant: According to which ‘An absolute, unsinning, universal obedience in our own persons is required; and such obedience, we in our fallen state, (says this author) can never perform.’ Suppose then God had never provided a Saviour, what would have been our condition? We should, if what he [...] be true, have been required by the Deity to perform that in our own persons which we never could have performed: Nay, all the posterity of Adam would have deserved God's wrath and damnation even for their original corruption And this they could not poss [...] have avoided, since it would have been brought upon them by their first parent Adam. Would not all the posterity of Adam then, have been upon Mr F—r's principles, justly blamable, punishable and damnable for that which they could not possibly have avoided? Let reason, candor and common sense judge. I once more then ask with what appearance of consistency or propriety he could assert thus. ‘If through the saving grace of God which has appeared to all men, we were not [...] endued with an awful power to chuse life, and to be faithful, it would be as injudicious to punish or recompense mankind, as to whip a dead horse for not moving, dam [...] fire for burning, or grant water an eternal reward for its fluidity?’ Or with what prop [...] could [...] assert, that ‘Absolute necessity and a righteous judgment [Page 25] are absolutely incompatable?’
‘Thus, (says this writer, Vol. ii. page 245) by looking at our divine compass, the word of God, we [...] through the straits of error, keeping at an equal distance from the rocks against which Calvinists run on the right hand, and Pelagians on the left.’ From Mr. F—r's steerage through the straits of error, one would suppose he looked at his divine compass blindfolded: For he has made a very crooked path; and is in my humble opinion, taken up by a rock at last. And over this rock, I presume, he will never run. Sir, do you not think, that this author ought first to have cast the beam out of his own eye, before he had undertaken to pull the mote out of other peoples eyes? That is; ought he not to have reconciled Mr. F—r with Mr. F—r, before he had undertaken to reconcile the Calvinists and Arminians by endeavoring to persuade them to embrace his plan.
What has this author said to extricate himself from this dilemma? I can find nothing. From his having recourse first to one solution of the difficulty and then to another, 'tis evident he felt his scheme in distress. He did not fall into this grand inconsistency by mere inattention. He was necessarily and unavoidably driven to it, in case he held the free grace of the gospel and his favorite principle, that ‘Absolute necessity and a righteous judgment are absolutely incompatible:’ For if, in supporting this principle, he had been consistent with himself throughout his writings, he must have said, at all times, that God could never, if a Saviour had not been [Page 26] provided, have required more of the posterity of Adam, than they could have done. And if so; they might have obtained righteousness by the law: For they could have done what they could. And, upon this principle, God could have required no more. And ‘If there had been a law given which could have given life, verily righteousness. (says the Apostle) should have been by the law.’ Gal. iii 21. And, ‘If righteousness come by the law, then Christ is dead in vain.’ Gal. ii. 21. Thus to all Adam's posterity Christ would have been dead in vain. This consequence would have been manifest to the most [...], if this author had been consistent with himself with regard to his favorite principle: Nay more; he must have expressly contradicted his first gospel axiom that ‘All our salvation is of God in Christ, and therefore of grace.’ Upon this principle, our salvation would not have been in Christ; and at the same time of grace: For all the posterity of Adam could have discharged the whole of their duty without Christ. Consequently, they could have obtained salvation without Christ.
If, on the other hand, this author had universally granted moral necessity to be consistant with blame and punishment, praise and reward, then he would had little or no room left to object against the absolute decrees of God, the sovereignty of grace and the like. His prejudices therefore against the truth led him to contradict himself; and adopt two principles, both of which are essential to his scheme, and yet at eternal war with each other. This then is your much boasted [Page 27] of Mr. F—r with all his triumphing and parade of learning.
I have not attempted to point out but one contradiction in this author's works. And if any person will show me that here is not a contradiction; then I will show him a number of places in which he his in fact contradicted both himself and the scriptures. But I suppose it would not trouble in the least, those who agree with Mr. F—r, if I were to point out a thousand contradictions in his works. For ‘Opposite docdrines are (says he), as essential to the fulness of Christ's gospel, as the two eyes, nostrails, and cheeks, which compose our faces, are essential to the completeness of human beauty.’ See vol. iii. page 241. No wonder then that this writer holds to opposite doctrines in supporting the gospel. Indeed he is perfectly right if this be the case: If there be opposite doctrines in the gospel he must necessarily hold to opposite doctrines, if he mean to support the gospel. But Sir, what sort of a gospel is Mr. F—. endeavoring to support? He calls it Christ's gospel. But surely he cannot mean the gospel of Christ Jesus the righteous, the eternal Son of God, who spake as never man spake? No; he must have found some new Christ whose gospel with opposite doctrines he is laboring to support. And whose new gospel can this be? By looking at the front-page of the first volume, we find he has given his works the following title: ‘A Vindication of the Rev. Mr. Westey's Last Minutes.’ We see then whose gospel Mr. F—r is labouring to support. This must undoubtedly be the gospel to whose fulness opposite doctrines are so very [Page 28] essential. And no doubt this was the "compas [...] at which Mr. F—r looked when he underto [...] to fall through the straits of error. No wond [...] then he has split upon a rock and made shipwre [...]. And no wonder that many others who take t [...] compass for a guide, finally make shipwreck [...] only with respect to a scheme of christian doctrines, but even of faith and good conscience.
Perhaps, Sir, you are ready to object he [...] and say that I have not as yet attempted so mu [...] as to show where the truth lies, as to prove th [...] Mr. F—r has contradicted himself? I acknowledge it. Nor would it be consistent with [...] present design of brevity, to go into a full explanation of the subject respecting natural and moral necessity and inability. However, that y [...] may not conceive erroniously with regard to [...] sentiments, and that I may, as far as I am capable help you to a knowledge of the truth, I wi [...] give you as concisely as possible, my ideas upon t [...] subject with some of my reasons for believing [...] I do.
There are two general kinds of necessity a [...] inability. One is called natural. It has refere [...] to nature as the word is used in opposition to th [...] will. If a person be unable to do an action, [...] be under a necessity of not doing it, for want [...] bodily powers, understanding or some natural faculty, he is under a natural necessity of not doing it. His inability to do this action is of the n [...] ral kind. And we readily grant that such an [...] ability and such a necessity are absolutely inconsistent with commands and prohibitions, prai [...] and blame, rewards and punishments.
[Page 29]The other kind of necessity and inability is called moral; because it has reference to the heart or will, which is the moral faculty. To illustrate this, let us suppose a person should be commanded to do an action which he could not do; not for want of bodily powers, understanding or any natural faculty, but wholly for want of a will or heart to do it. This person would be under a moral necessity of not doing this action. His inability to do it would be wholly of the moral kind. Thus, ‘They that are in the flesh (that is, in an unregenerate state) cannot please God.’ Rom. viii. 8. But why? Is it for want of bodily powers, or any natural faculty? No; but only for want of a will to please him. Their inability, therefore, to please God is wholly of the moral kind. And if God should give these persons a will to love him, so as to please him, and should maintain this will in them, they would be under a moral necessity of loving and pleasing God.
This moral kind of necessity and inability may be as absolute as the natural. And in many respects it resembles the natural kind. But it is very different in its nature. For the most absolute moral necessity and inability are perfectly consistent with commands and prohibitions, praise and blame, rewards and punishments: Whereas, natural necessity and inability are absolutely inconsistent with these things.
That absolute moral necessity and inability are perfectly consistent with praise and reward, appears from the state of the Deity: For the scripture expressly declares that God cannot lie; and that the judge of all the earth cannot but do right. [Page 30] His will is perfectly holy. And he cannot have any other but a holy will. Consequently, he is under an absolute moral necessity of being holy. But no one, I presume, will pretend to say that God is not worthy of praise and reward for his holiness. It follows then that the most absolute moral necessity to do good, is perfectly consistent with praise and reward. The same appears from a consideration of the state of holy men and angels in Heaven. And from the same consideration it appears that absolute moral necessity to do good, and absolute moral inability to do evil, are consistent with commands and prohibitions: For though saints and angels in Heaven are under an absolute moral necessity of being holy, and an absolute moral inability to do evil, yet they are all subjects of commands and prohibitions. This is plain from the general tennor of scripture.
That absolute moral necessity to do good, so as to persevere in holiness, is consistent with praise and reward; commands and prohibitions, might be proved also from the state of those who are regenerated. For, "Whosoever is born of God doth not commit sin; (says the apostle John) for his seed remaineth in him: And he cannot sin because he is born of God." But, Sir, if you will not allow this argument to be conclusive, you cannot deny but that I have mentioned some which are conclusive with regard to this matter.
Since then absolute moral necessity to do good is perfectly consistent with commands and prohibitions, praise and reward, why should not absolute moral necessity to do evil, be consistent with commands and prohibitions, blame and punishment? No reason I presume can be given. But [Page 31] there is no need of resting the matter here: For the arguments to prove this fact are various, and such as amount, I conceive to absolute demonstration. I will mention two or three; of which I desire particular notice may be taken.
In the first place then. All, I presume, will agree to the following propositions. God commands all mankind to render at all times universal obedience to the law we are under; to live and the entirely free from sin And he considers us blamable and punishable for every transgression, however small. But for want of good hearts all mankind cannot thus render at all times, universal obedience. Notwithstanding all Christ has done, 'tis impossible for all mankind to live and die moral agents without transgressing the law they are under some time or other It follows then that absolute moral necessity to do [...] is consistent with commands, with blame and punishment. [...] inevitably follows, if there be, or ever has been a single individual of mankind thus under necessity from an evil heart, of transgressing at any time, in any instance, the law he is or was under, whether that be the law of liberty, the Mosaic or Adamic law. Indeed, it is so far from being the case that all mankind can thus live and die without sinning, that no mere man since the last ever has been or ever will be [...] notwithstanding all Christ has done, thus to render universal obedience from the time he became or shall become a moral agent to the time of his death All, on account of evil hearts, do necessarily and unavoidably sin sooner or later. This is a [...] evident from scripture. And it is what Mr. F—r himself allows in a great [Page 32] variety of places, as every one must be sensible who has ever read his works. It appears then to a demonstration that moral necessity to do evil, and moral inability to do good, are perfectly consistent with commands and prohibitions, blame and punishment. The same appears from a consideration of the state of the devils and damned, and of those who are given up to a reprobate mind: For they are all blamable and punishable, not only for the sins which brought them into that state, but also for those which they now commit; and which they are under an absolute necessity of committing. From a great variety of such arguments and from many express passages of scripture to this effect that, "They that are in the flesh cannot please God," and that many cannot, like the apostle, do the things that they would and ought to do; 'tis evident that absolute moral necessity to do evil, and absolute moral inability to do good, are perfectly consistent with commands and prohibitions, blame and punishment. The same then we may safely lay down as an eternal maxim of truth abundantly taught in the holy oricles of God
Now, Sir, if you will take this maxim; and make it your compass, as being a plain doctrine of scripture, you will steer clear of the rock upon which Mr. F—r has split, and made shipwreck. And I presume you can avoid it in no other way: For suppose God had suffered Adam to propagate his fallen race without ever providing a Saviour for them. They would as Mr. F—r tells us, have had nothing but helplessness; nothing but sin. They must necessarily have gone on in sin and wickedness. But this necessity [Page 33] would have been wholly of the moral kind; or such as would have proceeded from the state of their wills. And such a necessity we have found to be perfectly consistent with blame and punishment, and consequently with a righteous judgement. Therefore, God could, consistently with his perfections, have blamed and punished the fallen race of Adam, for their actual and personal wickedness; notwithstanding they would have been under an absolute moral necessity of committing it. Allowing this to be the case, we may clearly see how it is that, after the fall, righteousness could not come by the law to any man. Consequently we may see the great necessity of a Saviour, and also the grace there is in the gift of Christ as a redeemer.
From what I have here said, you may form some idea, Sir, of the great distinction which is made between natural necessity and inability, and moral I have here but just hinted to you the difference. If you are disposed to make further enquiery respecting this matter, I would refer you to what President Edwards has said upon the subject in his piece on the human will. The whole of it is worthy of your close attention. At the same time, by reading this book, and comparing the same with your favorite author's representation of it, you will see for yourself one of Mr. F—r's gross misrepresentations. The most charitable conclusion is that this writer had never read it.
From what I have here suggected you may see also, if you act a candid part, where the fallacy lies of Mr. F—r's reasoning against the Calvinistic [Page 34] doctrines of the sovereignty of grace, the absolute decrees of God, regeneration, faith and repentance. The whole force of a great part of his arguments against these doctrines, depends upon the truth of this one proposition, That there is no difference between moral necessity and inability, and natural, as to nature. In all his reasonings, declamations, and addresses to the passions of mankind with regard to these things, he made a practice of comparing the necessity and inability which arise from the state of the will or heart; to the necessity and inability which arise from the state of the bodily powers or natural faculties. That this is in fact the case every one must be sensible who has ever read this author's works.
But, Sir, where has Mr. F—r shown that these two kinds of necessity and inability are not thus different in their nature? He has not so much as attempted it in any of his works whch I have read: Whereas this ought to have been one of his first steps. Since, therefore, he has taken no notice of this distinction between natural necessity and moral, we who make it, and maintain that it is taken from scripture, shall, till it is shown to be groundless, consider as vain and futile all his arguments, declamations, and addresses whose whole force depend upon there being no such distinction in nature. The greater part of the learned world make this distinction. And I trust that the scriptures make it. And it is a distinction upon which much indeed depends. If, therefore, you would act a fair and candid part, never more use arguments whose whole force depends upon there being [Page 35] no such distinction; till you have shown that it is groundless.
Finally, from what has been said, you may see also how difficult it is to form a consistent scheme of religion, or to reconcile the doctrines of scripture with each other, without granting that moral necessity and moral inability are consistent with commands and prohibitions, praise and blame, rewards and punishments. No writer ever laboured harder perhaps to exclude all kinds of necessity and inability from his scheme, than Mr. F—r has done. But with what success, I leave for the candid, who may read what I have here written, to judge. For my own part I am fully and firmly of the opinion that the doctrines of scripture can be reconciled with each other, in no other way than by allowing that moral necessity to do evil is consistent with commands, with blame and punishment; and that moral necessity to do good is consistent with commands, with praise and reward. But I profess to be one whole mind is open to conviction. And I hope that you will manifest yourself to be a serious and candid enquirer after divine truth. May He, then, who is the Wise Disposer of all events, lead to a saving knowledge of the truth, you,