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THE TRAVELS OF CYRUS. TO WHICH IS ANNEXED, A DISCOURSE UPON THE THEOLOGY AND MYTHOLOGY OF THE PAGANS.

BY THE CHEVALIER RAMSAY.

THE TENTH EDITION.—FIRST AMERICAN.

BURLINGTON, PRINTED BY ISAAC NEALE, OCT. 1, M,DCC,XCIII.

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TO THE RIGHT HONORABLE THE LORD LANSDOWN.

MY LORD,

THE most amiable virtues and the brightest talents formed the character of that HERO, whose travels I re­late: And to whom could I offer a picture of so fine a genius and so generous a mind, but to a person of YOUR LORDSHIP'S TASTE ?

THE singular friendship with which your Lordship honors me, gave rise to this undertaking; and my obli­gations are of such a nature, that to let pass the present opportunity of acknowledging them, would be the highest injustice, as well as ingratitude. Accept this mark of the inviolable attachment and profound respect of,

MY LORD,
YOUR LORDSHIP'S MOST OBLIGED, MOST OBEDIENT, AND MOST HUMBLE SERVANT, ANDREW RAMSAY.
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PREFACE.

EVER since the first edition of THE TRAVELS OF CYRUS, the author has listened with respect and deference to the judgment of the Public; and as se­veral specious objections have been made to the work, and many real faults discovered in it, his design in this preface is to give the best answer he can to the one, and to acquaint the reader with what he has done to correct the other.

THE most general defect in the former editions is the inaction of Cyrus, who through the whole course of his travels has too much of the indolent Philoso­pher, and too little of the Hero, who was one day to be the conqueror of Asia. The nature of this work not requiring the action of an epic poem, this fault might have been excused; the author has neverthe­less submitted to the judgment of the Public, and has made Cyrus act in the several countries through which he passes; and this without departing from the character of a young hero upon his travels, or shocking the reader with tales and fictions that have no foun­dation in antiquity. Besides this general defect there are [...] peculiar to each book.

[...], the narration is too hasty and concise: the reader feels a tender concern for Cassandana, loves her and fears to lose her; nevertheless she dis­appears on a sudden, and this episode concludes too abruptly. It has been likewise observed, that there is no relation between the virtuous love of Cyrus for Cassandana, and the criminal passion of Stryangeus for Zarina. Nor is this all, Cambyses and Mandana consent to their son's marriage contrary to all the rules of good policy. The author hopes he has cor­rected these faults, by the additions made to the first book, where he gives a view of the political state of Asia in Cyrus's time.

IN the second book the author had not assigned a proper motive for Cyrus's journey to see Zoroaster; [Page vi] the occasion of it at present is this. The Prince of Persia begins to entertain a contempt for Religion, and in order to guard him against this danger, Hy­staspes, his governor, engages him to make a visit to the Magi: the representation which Zoroaster makes of the wonders of nature, and the amiable ideas he gives him of the Divinity, satisfy his doubts, and set­tle his mind; and while he is thus instructed by phi­losophical reasonings, which could not be supposed very agreeable to a young Princess accustomed to the gayeties and diversions of the court of Ecbatan, the author to amuse Cassandana has introduced the wives of the Magi celebrating the festival of the God­dess Mythra; this description relaxes the mind, serves for an introduction to the Theology of the Persians, and makes a proper division of Zoroaster's discourse upon natural philosophy and religion.

THE third book was all narration, there was no ac­tion; the episode of Amenophis was thought interest­ing enough, but Cyrus seemed to be forgotten, and was remembered only by reflection. The author has found means to make this Prince present at the revo­lutions of Egypt, without becoming a prisoner with A­pries, or countenancing the usurpation of Amasis, dis­playing occasionally his military virtues and heroic sentiments.

IN the fourth and fifth books the Spartans and A­thenians were put to a great expence of men and ships only to amuse Cyrus. Virgil kills and maims some of the Athletae in the games in order to give a lustre to his heroes, but the author had exceeded the liberty taken by the Latin poet. To correct this fault he has related in his fourth book the war be­tween the Lacedaemonians and Tegeans, mentioned by Herodotus, and which happened precisely at the time when Cyrus is supposed to be at Sparta. This episode has given the author occasion to unfold, in a more extensive manner, the political state of Sparta, [Page vii] and the different opinions of Polybius and Plutarch concerning the designs of Lycurgus in his Laws and institutions of government. In the fifth book a sea fight is supposed between Megacles and Pisistratus, when the Persian Prince went into Attica.

IN the sixth book Pythagoras shewed clearly, that Thought could not be a property of Matter; but it was necessary some pages should be added, to evince that we have no reason to believe that extension and thought are properties of the same substance; and that the system of Spinoza, (who is meant by Anaxi­mander) is a series of loose suppositions without any demonstrations.

THE author has made a considerable addition to the seventh book with regard to the religion of the Tyrians and the death of Adonis. He thought he might take advantage of this beautiful part of my­thology, to explain the ancient tradition common to almost all nations concerning a middle God, who was to expiate and destroy moral evil by his own great sufferings. As the Phoenicians lived near Judea, they might possibly have clearer ideas of religion than other nations, and this bare possibility may perhaps justify that new episode. However it would be un­reasonable to expect, that what is put in the mouth of each philosopher relating to the religion of his own country, should be found word for word in the anci­ents. The author of Cyrus has only wrought into a connected system, the most beautiful hints of antiquity, in order to unfold the great principles of religion, and shew that all nations had from the beginning some ideas of those principles more or less confused.

IN the last book, several important reflections are added, to give more accuracy to the reasonings of E­leazar; and more strength to the discourse of Daniel: the latter proves the supernatural establishment of re­ligion by the only proper method for it, that is to say, by a relation of facts; but his discourse at present con­tains [Page viii] several corroborative hints, so shew that these facts are incontestible. And lastly, he refers Cyrus to the accomplishment of the prophecies in his own per­son, as an invincible proof of all the truths he had told him.

THE author has made several additions to his dis­course on the ancient mothology, in order to shew, that as all the fictions of the Pagans suppose the reality of the three states of the world, so all the Pagan di­vinities may be reduced to one supreme God, the prin­ciple of all beings, a Goddess his wife, sister or daugh­ter, and a middle God who is his son, his representa­tive or vicegerent. Besides these additions, which are the most important, there are many others less consi­derable, which the author thought necessary, to ren­der the transitions more easy and natural, the narra­tion more connected, the principles more palpable, and the reasonings more conclusive. This is what the au­thor has done, to correct the real faults in the former editions of his work. The objections, to which he thinks he can give a solid answer, without changing any thing in his plan, are as follow.

I. To begin with the least important of them, It has been objected, that the author is a plagiary, and that he has in several places transcribed whole pages from the Bishop of Meaux's universal history, M. de Tourreil's historical preface, Dr. Cudworth's intellec­tual system, and the life of Hay-Ebn-Yokdan, trans­lated from the Arabic.

THESE pretended thefts imposed at first upon those who were not in a condition to consult the originals, but upon a strict examination, the injustice and igno­rance of the critics appeared. The third took which treats of ancient Egypt contains several remarks, of which there is not the least trace in the Bishop of Meaux's universal history. The author has indeed in some places followed the translation made by that Prelate of certain passages in Diodorus Siculus, He­rodotus [Page ix] and Strabo: But is a man a plagiary because in his citations from the ancients he chuses rather to follow a good translation than a bad one? So in com­paring M. de Tourreil's preface with the fourth and fifth books of his work, the reader will find nothing common to them, except certain passages purely histo­rical. The life of Hay-Ebn-Yokdan, translated from the Arabic into Latin by Dr. Pocock, has no resem­blance with the author's history of Hermes the second, unless it be the general idea of a savage brought up in a desart; there is not the least likeness either in the matter or in the method of reasoning. The Arabian philosopher begins with very refined disquisitions in anatomy, passes thence to metaphysical discussions, and concludes, with the dreams of the Mahometan con­templatives. All the author's reasonings are, on the contrary, so managed, that they do not exceed the capacity of a common good understanding, who has no other instructor than nature: he has endeavored so to introduce his ideas as not to transgress the bounds of probability, to range each truth in its proper place, to mix speculation with sentiment, and to raise the soul by easy and natural gradations to the knowledge and love of the first Being. Lastly, as to Dr. Cudworth, notwithstanding his mistakes and want of method, he had penetrated farther into the mysteries of antiquity than the most part of critics: nevertheless this learned man says nothing of the three states of the world, which are the foundation of all that the author of Cy­rus advances upon religion. Far from being a plagi­ary he had not consulted enough the Doctor's excel­lent remarks concerning the three forms of the Divi­nity; he has made more use of them in this edition, but has always quoted him or the originals.

II. IT is thought that the episodes, in which the author speaks of love, are related with two much rapidity, so that the reader has not time enough to be touched, moved and transported.

[Page x] To this it may be answered, that those stories are related by persons who ought not to launch out into love-speeches, tender sentiments and sprightly images. The ancients are very sparing in words when the si­tuation and circumstances speak sufficiently of them­selves. When Homer is to paint the charms of Helen, he does it by a single stroke; she goes into the coun­cil of the old men, they fix their eyes upon her, are discomposed and suspend their deliberations. When Virgil makes Dido speak, her words are few, but each word is a sentiment: the tender passions lose their force and their delicacy when they become too elo­quent. Besides, all the author's fictions, where love is the object, are in the two first books, and tend to preserve Cyrus from the follies of youth, by shewing him, not so much the sweets of love, as the bitter ef­fects of it: as soon as he attains to a riper age, Cas­sandana dies, and the hero begins his travels. Thus history simply relates facts as they happen, without endeavoring after the intrigues, speeches and surpri­sing adventures of romance.

III. SOME object that the travels of Cyrus are not well imagined, and that any other hero would have suited better with the author's project than the con­queror of Asia.

Conquerors have generally no other view in ex­tending their dominions, than to satisfy their unbound­ed ambition: Cyrus on the contrary made use of his victories to procure the happiness of the conquered na­tions. The author's intention in making choice of such a Prince was to shew, that courage, great ex­ploits and military talents may indeed excite our ad­miration, but do not form the character of a true he­ro, without the addition of wisdom, virtue and noble sentiments. In order to form such a hero, it was thought allowable to make him travel; and the silence of Xenophon, who says nothing in his Cyropaedia of what happened to Cyrus from his sixteenth to his for­tieth, [Page xi] year, leaves the author at liberty to imagine this fiction. The relation of the Prince's travels furnishes an occasion to describe the religion, manners and po­litics of the several countries through which he passes. These travels cannot surely appear unnatural; a pru­dent Prince like Cambyses, a father who is supposed to be informed of the oracles concerning the future greatness of his son, a tributary King who knows the danger of sending the young Prince a second time to the court of Ecbatan, ought to be sensible that Cyrus at twenty-five years of age could not better employ his time during the interval of a profound peace, than by travelling into Egypt and Greece. It was neces­sary to prepare a Prince who was to be one day the founder and lawgiver of a mighty empire, to accom­plish his high destiny by acquiring in each country some knowledge worthy of his great genius. Is there any thing strained in all this? No other hero could an­swer the author's intention; had he made any other Prince travel, he would have lost all the advantages he has drawn from the choice of Cyrus, as the deli­verer of the people of God, as contemporary with the great men with whom he consults, and as living in an age, the learning, manners and events of which, could alone be suitable to the design of this work.

IV. THOSE who make no distinction between the plan of Telemachus and that of Cyrus, continually cry out that there is no unity of action in the latter.

NOTHING is more unreasonable than to compare two works of such different natures; instruction is in­deed the aim of both, but they are not formed upon the same originals; the author of Telemachus writes a continuation of an epic poem; the author of Cyrus fills up the chasm in a philosophical history; the one has imitated Homer with success, the other has taken Xe­nophon for his model. M. de Cambray strews every where the richest flowers of poesy; he paints nature in all her variety, and the objects themselves become [Page xii] visible, he describes all the motions of the heart of man, and makes us feel them successively; he renders the most sublime truths palpable, and never fatigues the mind with abstracted ideas; he passes from beautiful images to noble sentiments, and finding a shorter way to the heart than by reasoning; he walks, he flies, he sighs, he thunders, he mourns, he rejoices, he assumes all forms by turns, and never fails to transform us with him.

THE author's utmost ambition was to unfold the principles of his master, without daring to attempt an imitation of his graces; he chose a subject more pro­portioned to his capacity, a work in which he was to compare the philosophical ideas of others rather than exert a poetic invention; he did not pretend to write an epic poem: in this kind of fiction the hero should never disappear; it is he whom we listen to, it is he on­ly whom we love; the poet grows tiresome when he personates too much the philosopher: he is to instruct only by hints, and not by long and elaborate discussi­ons. The observation of these rules was incompatible with the author's views; his design was to shew the gradual progress of the mind in the search of truth, to compare the religions, governments, and laws of dif­ferent nations, and to form the legislator rather than the conqueror; unity of action is by no means neces­sary in a work of this nature, it is sufficient if there be unity of design. All the author's episodes tend to in­struction, and the instructions are, as he apprehends, proportioned to the age of Cyrus: in his youth he is in danger of being corrupted by vanity, love and ir­religion; Mandana, Hystaspes and Zoroaster preserve him from these snares. The history of Apries lays open to him all the artifices of a perfidious courtier; that of the Kings of Sparta, the dangers of an exces­sive confidence in favorites, or of an unjust diffidence of ministers; that of Periander, the fatal mischiefs which attend despotic power and the dispensing with [Page xiii] ancient laws; that of Pisistratus, the punishment of a base and crafty policy, and that of Nabuchodonosor, the dreadful consequences of relapsing into impiety, after due light and admonition. The Prince is at first instructed by fables, to preserve him from the passions of youth; he afterwards instructs himself by his own reflections, by the examples he sees, and by all the adventures he meets with in his travels; he goes from country to country, collecting all the treasures, con­versing with the great men he finds there, and per­forming heroic exploits as occasion presents.

V. SOME persons, to discredit the author's work, have insinuated that far from doing homage to religi­on he degrades it.

HE should think himself very unhappy to have pro­duced a work so contrary to his intentions. All that he advances upon religion may be reduced to two prin­cipal points: the first is to prove against the Atheists the existence of a supreme Deity, who produced the world by his power, and governs it by his wisdom. To this end Zoroaster unvails to us all the wonders of nature, Hermes consults the native and genuine tendency of the heart, and Pythagoras ascends to first principles: and thus the author endeavors to unite the strength of all that sense, natural sentiment, and reason can afford us for the proof of the first and most important of all truths. Tradition strikes in with phi­losophy: the author has endeavored to shew that the earliest opinions of the most knowing and civilized na­tions come nearer the truth than those of latter ages; that the theology of the Orientals is more pure than that of the Egyptians, that of the Egyptians less cor­rupted than that of the Greeks, and that of the Greeks more exalted than that of the Romans: that the pri­mitive system of the world was that of one supreme Deity; that in order to adapt this idea to the capacity of the vulgar, the divine attributes were represented by [Page xiv] allegories and hieroglyphics; that mankind sinking into matter quickly forgot the meaning of those sacred symbols, and fell into idolatry; that idolatry brought forth irreligion; that rash and inconsiderate minds not being able to distinguish between principles and the abuses of them, ran from one excess to another. Such have been the variations of the human mind, with regard to the Deity in almost all times and countries. The author's intention throughout his whole system was to shew the wild extravagance of those who maintain that the doctrines of religion are only the ef­fects of the ignorance and stupidity of the infant world; that the first men not knowing the physical causes, had recourse to invisible powers to explain the phaenome­na of nature; and lastly, that politicians refined and improved these indigested ideas, in order to compose a system of religion useful and necessary to society.

THE second point is to shew, in opposition to the Deists, that the principal doctrines of revealed religi­on, concerning the state of innocence, corruption and renovation, are as ancient as the world; that they were the foundation of Noah's religion; that he trans­mitted them to his children; that these traditions were thus spread throughout all nations; that the Pagans disfigured, degraded, and obscured them by their ab­surd fictions; and lastly, that these primitive truths have been no where preserved in their purity except in the true religion. When we see divers nations a­gree concerning the beginning, the decline and the re-establishment of a monarchy, the birth, exploits and virtues of the hero who is the restorer of it, is not this a sufficient proof of these principal facts, though the circumstances should be related differently and be even fabulous? The author in unfolding the ancient tradi­tions has distinguished between fable and truth, philo­sophical hypotheses and doctrines of faith, essence and form, the spirit and the letter which ought never to be separated, but which cannot be confounded with­out [Page xv] disguising and dishonoring Christianity; he hoped thereby to have given a plan of religion, equally ami­able and reasonable, and to have shewed that its prin­ciples are beautiful, its consequences natural, and its original ancient; that it enlightens the mind, com­forts the heart and establishes the welfare of society.

VI. THOSE who degraded the wisdom and Good­ness of God, under the pretence of extolling his Pow­er and Justice, have thought that Eleazar's discourse too plainly favored the opinions of Origen concern­ing the pre-existence of souls and the restitution of all spirits. One may venture to say, that whoever makes this objection does not understand the plan of the work; it is as follows: Each philosopher speaks to Cyrus the language of his own religion and coun­try. The Orientals, Egyptians, Greeks and Tyrians all agree in the original purity, present corruption and future restoration of mankind, but they wrap up these truths in different fables, each according to the genius of their nation. Eleazar clears their system from the Pagan fictions, but retains in his own the opinions of his sect. The errors which prevail at this day resemble those of former times. The mind of man sees but a small number of ideas, reviews them continually, and thinks them new only because it ex­presses them differently in different ages. The Magi in Cyrus's time were fallen into a kind of Atheism like that of Spinoza; Zoroaster, Hermes and Pythagoras adored one sole Deity, but they were Deists; Elea­zar resembled the Socinians, who are for subjecting re­ligion to philosophy; Daniel represents a perfect Christian, and the Hero of this book a young Prince who began to be corrupted by the maxims of irreligi­on. In order to set him right, the different philoso­phers with whom he converses successively unfold to him new truths mixt with errors. Zoroaster, con­futes the mistakes of the Magi; Pythogoras those of Zoroaster; Eleazar those of Pythagoras; Daniel re­jects [Page xvi] those of all others, and his doctrine is the only one which the author adopts. The order of these conversations shews the progress of the mind, the mat­ter being so disposed, that the Atheist becomes Deist, the Deist Socinian, and the Socinian Christian, by a plain and natural chain of ideas. The great art in instructing is to lead the mind gradually on, and to take advantage even of its errors to make it relish truth. That Cyrus might thus be conducted step by step, it was necessary to introduce a person of the re­ligion of the Hebrews, who should confute by reason, all the objections drawn from reason; Daniel could not act this part, it would not have become him to solve difficulties by uncertain conjectures; the philosopher might prepare the Prince by bare hypotheses, to sub­mit and to distrust his understanding: but it was ne­cessary that the phrophet should disengage Cyrus from all bold speculations, how refined and bright soever they might appear, and lead him to the belief of a su­pernatural religion, not by a philosophical demonstra­tion of its doctrines, but by proving them to be divine­ly revealed. In a word, he should fix the mind of the young hero by indisputable facts, which strike much more forcibly than abstract ideas. And it is for this reason that the author introduces in his last book two persons of very different characters, a philosopher and a phrophet; the one employs the powers of rea­son against incredulity, the other imposes silence on all reasonings by a supernatural authority. This is the only use which the author would make of the opinions of Origen; they answer the objections of the incredu­lous concerning the beginning and duration of evil; they shew, that since the weak reason of the philoso­phers can find a plausible solution of those great diffi­culties, we may well conclude that the infinite Wis­dom will be able one day to justify his ways, which are now impenetrable. So long as it is allowable to philosophise, the author exposes the most probable sy­stems [Page xvii] and hypotheses; but when the question is of faith, he reasons only upon palpable facts; in order to discover whether God has spoken to his creatures or not: the moment we were convinced of this, all doubtful opinions are lost and absorbed in the depth of the divine incomprehensibility.

VII. THOSE who thought the sketches of natural philosophy in this work misplaced, pretending that the ancients are represented more knowing than they re­ally were, will be much more shocked to see those philosophical descriptions augmented in the present edition. It is not surprising to hear this objection made by empty, superficial minds, who laugh at the Mosaic history, while they adopt the Greek fables concerning the origin of mankind; but it is astonish­ing to hear the same cavils from those who reverence revealed religion, who do not believe that man was created originally wild and savage, that he wandered in the woods and desarts without knowledge, religion or law, and who have philosophy enough to discern that the world could not come out of the hands of a wife, good, and powerful Creator in its present igno­rance, disorder, and corruption. These persons might easily be persuaded that the first men had knowledg­es of God and nature, which are lost in these latter ages; that the sacred writers did not talk at random when they extolled the profound learning of the O­rientals and Egyptians, even in the time of Moses; and lastly, that * Josephus was not a visionary, when he said that the Pagans of his time had an ancient tra­dition, that Abraham who was famous in Asia commu­nicated many sublime discoveries in natural philosophy to the Chaldeans and Egyptians. The author how­ever has no need of these pretexts to justify the philo­sophical descriptions in this work. His aim being to [Page xviii] set before the eyes of a young Prince those elements of science which might help to form his understanding and his heart, he thought those physical pictures more proper than poetical paintings to give his pupil a ge­neral idea of nature, inspire him with a taste of phi­losophy, and awaken his desire of knowledge. In pursuing this design he has taken the liberty to de­part from strict truth, content himself with probabili­ty and make anachronisms in natural as well as civil history.

VIII. SOME pretend that the author has but lightly touched a great many subjects, without going to the bottom of every one; that this book is rather a sum­mary than a work; that he steps too quick from one subject to another; and that his stile is every where too laconic, sometimes too metaphysical and abstruse, and often too void of ornament.

To this it may be answered, that profound reason­ing does not consist in a multiplicity of words; it is perhaps easier to write a great volume than a little one; the labor is not the less real because it is con­cealed. It was intended that each intelligent reader should have the pleasure of drawing the consequences from the principles, unfolding those first seeds of truth, cultivating them and gathering thence a harvest of knowledge, of which the author himself had perhaps no idea. We have a sufficient number of books which convey instruction by diffusive reasonings, ingenious aphorisms and florid illustrations. The author's de­sign was to habituate the mind of a young Prince to judge by principles, discover the connection of essen­tial truths and unite them under one view. He says to him upon each subject what is necessary to shew, that all nations had originally the same fundamental principles, that the duties of religion, morality and good policy flow from the same source, conspire to the same end, and mutually support and fortify each other: and in a word, that all the civil and human virtues, [Page xix] the laws of nature and nations are, so to speak, but consequences of THE LOVE OF ORDER, which is the e­ternal and universal law of all intelligences. In a work of this nature, it is necessary to unbend the mind of the reader, without carrying it off from its princi­pal object; all the flowers should be thoughts, the graces noble and tender sentiments, the paintings cha­racters, and the descriptions such pictures as make us acquainted with nature, and admire the Creator. The author [...]s sensible that he is far from having executed this vast design, but in the attempt he has made to­wards it, he was obliged to avoid all foreign embel­lishments, labored connections, and the ambitious or­naments of the Greek and Latin poesy.

To speak more clearly: poesy has had the same fate with philosophy. The Orientals, the Chaldeans, and above all, the Hebrews, painted nature without disgui­sing it, and gave life to every thing without deifying it. According to them every thing proceeds from God, and ought to flow back to him again. All the visible wonders of nature are faint images of his greatness, and the innumerable orders of spirits ema­nations from his wisdom. Mankind are all but one family of that immense republic of intelligences, of which God is the common Father. Each man is as a ray of light separated from its source, strayed into a corner of disordered nature, tossed about by the tu­multuous wind of passion, transported from climate to climate by restless desires, purified by all the mis­fortunes it meets with, till it becomes like a subtile vapour reascending to the superior regions from whence it fell. We have here a fruitful source of ideas, beautiful images and sublime expressions, such as we find in the holy scripture, and in Milton who has copied them. The Egyptians corporalized too much these ideas by their sensible symbols; but the Greek poets, and their imitators the Roman poets, entirely mangled and degraded them. The Divinity [Page xx] is no longer a sovereign wisdom but a blind destiny, man is but a mass of atoms, of which nothing remains after death but an empty shade, immortality is a dream, the Elysian fields a mere subterraneous cavern, and the habitation of the Gods a mountain of Greece: by this means a dark vail is drawn over the whole uni­verse, the source of noble ideas is dried up, and rea­son becomes a barren field: the imagination, destitute of principles, seeks to supply its indigence by creating a new world; it transforms all objects in order to embellish them, it exalts men into Gods, and debases Gods into men, it gives body to spirits and spirit to bodies; its descriptions are florid but false, and its marvellous degrades the divine Nature; the agreea­ble and the gay take the place of the true and sub­lime, and of that diviner poetry, which first leads man into his own heart, and then raises him above him­self. Such is the Greek poesy, always poor in the midst of its seeming abundance; had the author been able to imitate it, it is what he ought to have avoid­ed, as improper in a book of principles.

IT is not pretended by all that has been said, that this work, as now given to the public, is free from faults; there will no doubt always remain a great number; nor would the author have troubled the reader with these reflections, but to justify his main design and explain more fully the plan of his book.

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A DISCOURSE UPON THE THEOLOGY AND MYTHOLOGY OF THE PAGANS.

MY first design was to insert some critical notes in the margin of the foregoing book; but as the attending to such remarks would have diverted the reader's mind too much from the principal subject, I thought it better to digest them into the form of a discourse, which I divide into two parts. In the first I shall shew, that the most celebrated Philosophers of all ages and all countries have had the notion of a supreme Deity, who produced the world by his Pow­er, and governs it by his Wisdom. From the second it will appear, that there are traces of the principal doctrines of revealed religion, with regard to the three states of the world, to be found in the Mytho­logy of all nations.

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PART I. Of the THEOLOGY of the PAGANS.

TO begin with the Magi or Persian Philoso­phers; according to the testimony of Herodo­tus *, the ancient Persians had neither statues, nor temples, nor altars: ‘They think it ridiculous (says this author) to fancy like the Greeks, that the Gods have an human shape, or derive their original from men. They choose the highest mountains for the place of their sacrifice: they use neither li­bations, nor music, nor hallowed bread; but when any one has a mind to sacrifice, he leads the victim into a clean place, and wearing a wreath of myrtle about his Tiara, invokes the God to whom he in­tends to offer it. The priest is not allowed to pray for his own private good, but for that of the nati­on in general; each particular member finding his benefit in the prosperity of the whole.’

Strabo gives the same account of the ancient Persians. ‘They neither erected statues nor altars, says this historian; they sacrificed in a clean place and upon an eminence, where they offered up a vic­tim crowned. When the priest had cut it into small pieces, every one took his share. They left no portion of it for the Deities, saying, that Gods desire nothing but the souls of victims.’ The Ori­entals, full of the notion of transmigration imagined, that the victim was animated by a criminal soul, whose expiatory pains were completed by the sacri­fice.

The Persians indeed, as well as other Pagans, [Page 273] worshipped the fire, the sun, and the stars: but we shall see that they considered them only as visible i­mages and symbols of a supreme God, whom they be­lieved to be the sovereign Lord of nature. Plutarch has left us, in his treatise of Isis and Osiris, a frag­ment of the Theology of the Magi. This philosophi­cal historian assures us, that they called the great God, Oromazes, or the Principle of light, that pro­duced every thing, and worketh all in all *. They admitted however another God, but of an inferior nature and order, whom they called Mythras or the Middle God. They speak of him sometimes as a Be­ing co-eternal with the supreme Divinity, and at o­ther times as the first production of his power .

The finest definition we have of the Deity among all the writings of the ancients, is that of Zoroaster. It has been transmitted down to us by Eusebius in his Praeparatio Evangelica; an author so far from being over favorable to the Pagans, that he makes it his business continually to expose and degrade their philosophy. And yet he says, that he had read these express words in a book of Zoroaster that was extant in his time, and known by the title of, The sacred collection of Persian monuments.

God is the first of all incorruptible Beings, e­ternal and unbegotten: he is not compounded of parts: there is nothing equal to him, or like him. He is the author of all good, and entirely disinter­ested; the most excellent of all excellent beings, and the wisest of all intelligent natures; the father of equity, the parent of good laws, self-instructed, self-sufficient, and the first former of nature.’

The modern writers among the Arabians and Persians, who have preserved to us what remains of [Page 274] the ancient doctrine of Zoroaster among the [...] or worshippers of fire, maintain, that the first [...] admitted only one eternal Principle of [...] thing Abulfed [...], cited by the famous Dr. [...] according to the primitive doctrine of the Persians ‘God was prior to both light and darkness, and had existed from all eternity in an adorable soli­tude, without any companion or rival.’ Saristh [...], quoted by Dr. Hyde, says, ‘That the first Magi did not look upon the good and evil principles as co-eternal; they thought that light was indeed e­ternal, but that darkness was produced in time by the disloyalty of Ahriman, chief of the Genii.’

M. Bayle affirms in his dictionary, that the antient Persians were all Manicheans; but however he came to entertain this notion, he must certainly have given it up, if he had consulted the original authors: a method which that famous critic did not always take. He had a genius capable of going to the bottom of any subject whatever; but he wrote sometimes in a hurry, and treated superficially the gravest and most important subjects. Besides, there is no clearing him from the charge of loving too much the dismal obscu­rity of scepticism; he is ever upon his guard against all satisfactory ideas in religion; he shews with are and subtlety all the dark sides of a question, but he very rarely represents it in that point of light which shines with evidence. What encomiums would he not have merited, had he employed, his admirable ta­lents more for the benefit of mankind?

Such was the Theology of the ancient Persians, which in the foregoing work I have put in the mouth of Zoroaster; and the Egyptians had much the same principles. There is nothing more absurd than the * [Page 275] [...]otion generally given us of their Theology; nor is [...] thing more improbable than the allegorical sense which certain authors fancy they have discovered in [...] hieroglyphics. On one hand, it is hard to be­lieve that human nature could ever sink so low as to adore insects, reptiles and plants (which they see pro­duced, growing and dying every day) without ascri­bing certain divine virtues to them, or considering them as symbols of some invisible power. [...] the most barbarous countries we still find some knowledge of a superior Bring, which is the object of the hope and fear of the most stupid savages. But though we would suppose there are some nations in the world sunk into so gross an ignorance as to have no notion of a Deity, yet it is certain that Egypt cannot be charged with such a degree of stupidity. All histo­rians, as well sacred as profane, agree in speaking of this people as the wisest of all nations; and one of the encomiums that the holy Spirit gives to Moses, is, that he was learned in all the wisdom of the E­gyptians. Would the Holy Ghost ever have spoken in such a manner of a nation so senseless as to wor­ship onions, crocodiles and the most despicable rep­tiles? On the other hand, there are certain modern writers who exalt the Theology of the Egyptians too high, and fancy that they find in their hieroglyphics all the mysteries of the Christian religion. After the deluge, Noah doubtless would not leave his children ignorant of the great principles of religion, with re­gard to the three states of mankind; and that tradition might have been spread from generation to generati­on over all the nations of the world: but we should not infer from thence, that the Heathens had as clear notions of the divine Nature and the Messias, as the Jews had themselves. Such a supposition, far from doing honor to Holy Writ, would only derogate from its dignity. I shell endeavor to keep the just medium between these two extremes.

[Page 276] Plutarch, in his treatise of Isis and Osiris, tells us * that the Theology of the Egyptians had two mean­ings; the one holy and symbolical, the other vulgar and literal; and consequently that the figures of ani­mals which they had in their temples, and which they seemed to adore, were only so many hieroglyphics to represent the divine attributes. Pursuant to this distinction, he says, that Osiris signifies the active Principle, or the most holy Being ; Isis the Wisdom or Rule of his operation; Orus the first production of his Power, the model or plan by which he produ­ced every thing, or the archetype of the world. We shall see hereafter whether it be reasonable to think, that the Pagans had ever any knowledge of a trinity of distinct persons in the indivisible unity of the divine Nature. Thus much at least is plain, that the Chal­deans and Egyptians believed all the attributes of the Deity might be reduced to three, Power, Under­standing and Love. In reality, whenever we disen­gage ourselves from matter, impose silence on the senses and imagination, and raise our thoughts to the contemplation of the infinitely infinite Being, we find that the eternal Essence presents itself to our mind under the three forms of Power, Wisdom and Good­ness. These three attributes comprehend the totali­ty of his nature, and whatever we can conceive of him. Not to speak therefore of the primitive tradi­tions, which might possibly be the source of these three ideas concerning the divine Nature, it is no­thing extraordinary, if the Egyptians and Orientals, who had very refining metaphysical heads should of themselves have discovered them. The Greeks and Romans were fonder of the sciences which depend of sense and imagination; and for this reason we find their Mythology seldom turns upon any thing [Page 277] but the external operations of the Deity in the pro­ductions of nature, whereas that of the former chiefly regards his internal operations and attributes.

By the help of these principles the Theology of the Pagans may be reduced to three principal Divi­nities, without doing violence to original authors, and without racking one's brain to digest their ideas, which are often very confused, into an intelligible system. They universally acknowledged one su­preme God, whom they considered as the source of the Divinity, and the author of all beings; a God­dess his wife, daughter or sister, whom they repre­sented sometimes as the principle of the divine fecun­dity, at other times as an emanation from his wisdom, and often as the companion and subject of his opera­tions; and lastly, a subordinate God, the son and vice­roy of the Supreme. And thus we find among the Persians the great Oromazes, the Goddess Mythra, and the God Mythras; among the Egyptians Osiris, Isis and Orus; among the Greeks Jupiter, Minerva and Apollo.

In proportion as men departed from their primitive simplicity, and as imagination took the place of rea­son, the poets multiplied the names and images of these Gods, and the three superior Divinities were lost in a croud of inferior Deities. It is nevertheless certain, that the * Philosophers always preserved those three capital ideas. Socrates, Plato, Pythago­ras, Porphyry, Jambliehus, Plutarch, Macrobius and all the philosophical writers whose works have been transmitted to us, and who speak of the Gods of Egypt and Greece, assure us that Ptha, Amoun, Osi­ris, Apis, Serapis and Anubis are the same; that [Page 278] Mars, Mercury, Apollo, Hercules and Jupiter the Conductor are also the same; that Cybele, Venue, Urania, Juno, Minerva, Phebe and Proserpine are in like manner one and the same; whence we may fairly conclude, without falling into chimerical con­jectures, that Oromazes, Osiris, Coelus, Saturn and Jupiter Olympius are different names to express the one supreme God; that Mythra, Isis, Cybele, Ura­nia, Juno and Minerva denote the different attributes of the same Goddess; and lastly, that Mythras, Orus, Mercury, Apollo, Hercules and Jupiter the Conduc­tor are the several titles of the middle God, univer­sally acknowledged by the Pagans.

I know that the modern Materialists have endea­vored to reduce all the Pagan Divinities to one God and one Goddess, which according to them, express only the two principles of nature, whereof one is ac­tive or the infinite force, the cause of all the motions we behold in the universe; the other passive or the eternal matter, which is the subject of all the forms produced by that moving force: this idea is by far posterior to that of the Orientals, Egyptians and first Greeks, concerning the three forms of the Divinity. It was neither received nor known, in the sense of the Materialists, but by the disciples of Epicurus, as we shall see hereafter.

This distinction of the Gods into three classes, and that of the world into three states, may be of great service to clear up the confusion of the ancient My­thologies. I will venture to say, that neither Scali­ger, nor Bochart, nor Graevius, nor Gronovius, nor M. Huet, could succeed in this enterprize, because they were men of more learning than philosophy. Grammarians, Critics and those persons of strong me­mories, who employ themselves wholly in the study of words and facts, are rarely remarkable for a nice examination of principles, and are not always capable of entering into the sense of the philosophers, or dis­tinguishing [Page 279] the subtilty of their ideas. I confess in­deed, that it is dangerous to be too much attached to systems, but yet without a systematical genius it is impossible to carry the sciences to any great perfec­tion.

To return to Plutarch. He concludes his treatise of Isis and Osiris in this manner *; ‘As he who reads the works of Plato, may be said to read Plato, and he who acts the comedy of Menander may be said to act Menander; so the ancients gave the name of Gods to the various productions of the Deity.’ Plutarch had said a little before, ‘That care should be taken not to transform, dissolve and scatter the divine Nature into rivers, winds, vege­tables, or bodily forms and motions. This would be as ridiculous as to imagine, that the salts, the cables, the rigging and the anchor are the pilot; or that the thread, the woof, and shuttle are the weaver. Such senseless notions are an indignity to the heavenly powers, whom they blaspheme whilst they give the name of Gods to beings of an insensible, inanimate and corruptible nature.’ ‘No­thing, as he goes on, that is without a soul, nothing that is material and to be perceived by our senses, can be God. Nor yet must we imagine that there are different Gods, according to the different coun­tries of Greeks and Barbarians, Northern and Southern people. As the sun is common to all the world, though called by different names in differ­ent places; so there is but one sole supreme Mind or Reason, and one and the same Providence that governs the world, though he is worshipped under different names, and has appointed some inferior powers for his ministers.’ Such, according to Plu­tarch, was the doctrine of the first Egyptians with regard to the divine Nature.

[Page 280] Origen, who was contemporary with Plutar [...] follows the same principles in his book against Celsus a Pagan philosopher, who pretended to understand Christianity, because he understood some ceremonies of that religion, though he had never entered into the spirit of it. Now Origen expresses himself in this manner: * The Egyptian philosophers have sublime motions with regard to the divine Nature, which they keep secret, and never discover to the people but under a vail of fables and allegories. Celsus is like a man who has travelled into that country; and though he has conversed with none but the ignorant vulgar, yet takes it into his head, that he understands the Egyptian religion. All the Eastern nations, the Persians, the Indians, the Syrians conceal secret mysteries under their religi­ous fables. The wise men of all those religions see into the sense and true meaning of them, whilst the vulgar go no farther than the exterior symbol, and see only the bark that covers them.’

Let us next hear the testimony of Jamblichus, who had studied the religion of the Egyptians, and un­derstood it thoroughly. He lived in the beginning of the third century, and was a disciple of the famous Porphyry. As both St. Clement and St. Cyril of Alexandria assure us, there were at that time a great many Egyptian books extant, which have been since lost: several of these were highly respected for their antiquity, and ascribed to Hermes Trismegistus, or one of his first disciples. Jamblichus had read these books, which had been translated by the Greeks; and this is the account that he gives of the Theology which they taught. ‘According to the Egyptians, Eicton, or the first God, existed in his [Page 281] solitary unity before all Beings *. He is the foun­tain and original of every thing that either has un­derstanding or is to be understood. He is the first principle of all things, self-sufficient, incomprehen­sible, and the father of all essences.’ Hermes says likewise, ‘That this supreme God has constituted a­nother God, called Emeph, to be head over all spi­rits whether ethereal, empyrean or celestial; and that this second God, whom he stiles the guide, is a wisdom that transforms and converts into itself all spiritual beings. He makes nothing superior to this God-Guide, but only the first Intelligent, and first Intelligible, who ought to be adored in silence.’ He adds, ‘That the Spirit which produceth all things has different names, according to his different pro­perties and operations; that he is called in the E­gyptian language Amoun, as he is wise; Ptha, as he is the life of all things; and Osiris, as he is the author of all good.’ Thus, according to Jambli­chus, it is evident that the Egyptians admitted only one principle, and a middle God, like the Mythras of the Persians.

The notion of a spirit constituted by the supreme God, to be the head and guide of all spirits, is very ancient. The Hebrew Doctors believed that the soul of the Messias was created from the beginning of the world, and appointed to preside over all the orders of intelligences. This opinion was founded on a notion that finite natures cannot incessantly con­template the brightness and glories of the divine Es­sence; and must necessarily sometimes turn off their view, and adore the Creator in his work; that at such times there must be an Head to lead spirits [Page 282] through all the regions of immensity, and shew them all its beauties and wonders.

To have a more perfect knowledge of the Theo­logy of the Orientals and Egyptians, it may not be improper to examine that of the Greeks and Romans, which is derived originally from it. The philoso­phers of Greece went to study wisdom in Asia and Egypt—Thales, Pythagoras, Plato, drew the best of their knowledge from thence. The traces of O­riental tradition are now indeed in a manner worn out: but as there are several monuments of the Theology of the Greeks still preserved, we may judge of the masters by their disciples.

We must however distinguish between the Gods of the poets and those of the philosophers. Poetry de­ifies all the various parts of nature, and gives spirit to bodies as well as body to spirits; it expresses the operations and properties of matter by the actions and passions of such invisible powers, as the Pagans supposed to be directors of all the motions and events that we see in the universe. The poets pass in a mo­ment from allegory to the literal sense, and from the literal sense to allegory; from real Gods to fabulous Deities; and this occasions that jumble of their ima­ges, that absurdity in their fictions, and that indeco­rum in their expressions, which are so justly condem­ned by the philosophers. Notwithstanding this mul­tiplication of inferior Deities, these poets however acknowledged, that there was but one only supreme God. This will appear from the very ancient tradi­tions which we still have of the philosophy of Orphe­us. I am far from thinking that Orpheus was the author of those works which go under his name: I believe with the famous Grotius, that those books were wrote by the Pythagoreans, who professed themselves disciples of Orpheus: but whoever were the authors of these writings, it is certain that they are older than Herodotus and Plato, and were in [Page 283] great esteem among the Heathens; so that by the fragments of them still preserved, we may form a judgment of the ancient Theology of the Greeks. I shall begin with the abridgement which Timotheus the Cosmographer gives us of the doctrine of Orphe­us. This abridgement is preserved in Suidas *, Ce­drenus and Eusebius.

‘There is one unknown Being exalted above and prior to all beings, the author of all things, even of the aether, and of every thing that is below the aether; this exalted Being is Life, Light and Wis­dom; which three names express only one and the same Power, which drew all beings, visible and in­visible, out of nothing.’ It appears by this passage, that the doctrine of the creation, (or the production of substances) and that of the three forms of the di­vinity were not unknown to the heathen Philoso­phers: we shall soon find them in Plato.

Proclus has transmitted down to us this extraordi­nary passage of the Theology of Orpheus . ‘The universe was produced by Jupiter, the empyreum, the deep Tartarus, the earth, and the ocean, the immortal Gods and Goddesses; all that is, all that that has been, and all that shall be, was contained originally in the fruitful bosom of Jupiter. Jupiter is the first and the last, the beginning and the end. All beings derive their origin from him. He is the primitive Father and the immortal Virgin. He is the Life, the Cause, and the Energy of all things. There is but one only Power, one only God, and one sole universal King of all.’ This passage seems to insinuate, that the universe is a sub­stantial emanation from the divine Essence, and not a mere effect of his power; however this gross error [Page 284] is no proof of Atheism in him who maintains it, as we shall see hereafter.

I shall conclude the Theology of Orpheus with a famous passage of the author of the Argonautica, who is looked upon to be a disciple of his *. ‘We will sing first an hymn upon the ancient chaos; how the heavens, the sea, and the earth were form­ed out of it. We will sing likewise that eternal, wise and self-perfect love, which reduced this chaos into order.’ It is clear enough from the doctrine of the theogony or birth of the Gods, that the anci­ent poets ascribed all to a first Being, who disintan­gled the chaos. And it is for this reason that Ovid thus expresses himself in the first book of his Meta­morphoses ‘Before there was a sea and an earth, before there was any heaven to cover the world, universal nature was but one indigested sluggish mass, called a chaos. The seeds of all things jum­bled together were in a perpetual discord, till a be­neficent Deity put an end to the difference.’ Words which shew plainly that the Latin poet, who followed the Greek tradition, makes a distinction be­tween the chaos, and God, who by his Wisdom brought it out of confusion into order. I ought however in this place to observe, that the Greek and Roman Mythology, in relation to the chaos, is much more imperfect than that of the Orientals and Egypt­ians, who tell us that there was an happy and perfect state of the world prior to the chaos; that the good Principle could never produce any thing evil; that his first work could not be confusion and disorder; and in a word, that Physical evil is nothing else but a consequence of moral evil. It was the imagination of the Greek poets that first brought forth the mon­strous Manichean doctrine of two co-eternal princi­ples; [Page 285] a supreme Intelligence and a blind matter; light and darkness; an indigested chaos, and a Deity to reduce it into order.

Let any one read Homer and Virgil with a proper attention, and he will see, that notwithstanding the wild flights of their imagination, and the indecent al­legories by which they sometimes dishonor the Divine Nature, the marvelous which runs through their fa­ble is founded upon these three principles. 1. That there is one supreme God, whom they every where call the Father, and the sovereign Lord of Gods and men, the Architect of the world, the Prince and Go­vernor of the universe, the first God, and the great God. 2, That universal Nature is full of subordi­nate spirits, who are the ministers of that supreme God. 3. That good and evil, virtue and vice, knowledge and error, arise from the different influ­ence and inspiration of the good and evil Genii, who dwell in the air, the sea, the earth, and the heavens.

The tragic and lyric Poets express themselves after the same manner as the epic Poets. Euripides ex­pressly acknowledges the dependence of all beings upon one sole Principle. ‘O Father, and King of Gods and men! says he, why do we miserable mortals fancy that we know any thing, or can do any thing? Our fate depends upon thy will *.’

Sophocles represents the Deity to us as a sovereign Intelligence, which is truth, wisdom, and the eternal law of all spirits . 'Tis not, says he, to any mortal nature that laws owe their origin; they come from above; they come down from heaven itself; Jupiter Olympius is alone the father of them.

Plautus introduceth an inferior Deity speaking in this manner ‘I am a citizen of the celestial city, of which Jupiter, the Father of Gods and men, is [Page 286] the head. He commands the nations, and sends us over all kingdoms, to take an account of the con­duct and actions, the piety and virtue of men. In vain do mortals endeavor to bribe him with their oblations and sacrifices—They lose their pains, for he abhors the worship of the impious.’

‘O Muse, says Horace, pursuant to the custom of our ancestors, celebrate first the great Jove, who rules over Gods and men, the earth, the seas, and the whole universe: there is nothing greater than he, nothing that is like, nothing that is equal to him *!’

I shall conclude my quotations out of the poets with a surprising passage of Lucan. When Cato, af­ter crossing the deserts of Lybia, arrives at the temple of Jupiter Ammon, Labienus is for pursuading him to consult the Oracle. Upon which occasion the po­et puts this answer in the mouth of that philosophical hero, Why do you, Labienus propose to me to ask the Oracle whether we should choose to die in a state of freedom with our swords in our hands, rather than see tyranny enslave our country? Whether this mortal life be only a remora to a more lasting one? Whether violence can hurt a good man? Whether virtue does not make us su­perior to misfortunes? And whether true glory de­pends upon success? We know these things alrea­dy, and the Oracle cannot give us clearer answers than what God makes us feel every moment in the bottom of our heart. We are all united to the Deity. He has no need of words to convey his meaning to us; and he told us at our birth every thing that we have occasion to know. He hath not chosen the parched sands of Lybia to bury truth in those desarts, that it might be understood only by a small number. He makes himself known [Page 287] to all the world, he fills all places, the earth, the sea, the air, the heavens; he makes his particular abode in the soul of the just: why then should we seek him elsewhere?’ In the foregoing passage I have omitted this expression, Jupiter est quodcunque vides; not only because in some manuscripts we read Jupiter est cocunque vides, but also because the poet by the word quodcunque confounds the visible world with the etherial matter, which the Stoicks and Ori­entals considered as the body of the Divinity: how­ever he represents Cato as acknowledging a sovereign Intelligence, which is all that I would prove.

Let us pass from the poets to the philosophers, and begin with Thales the Milesian, chief of the Ionic school *, who lived about six hundred years before the birth of Christ. We have none of his works now left; but we have some of his maxims, which have been transmitted down to us by the most venerable writers of antiquity. ‘God is the most ancient of all Beings; he is the author of the universe, which is full of wonders ; he is the Mind which brought the chaos out of confusion into order ; he is with­out beginning and without ending, and nothing is hid from him §; nothing can resist the force of Fate; but this Fate is nothing but the immutable reason and eternal power of Providence .’ What is still more surprising in Thales, is his definition of the soul: he calls it ‘a self-moving principle’ , thereby to distinguish it from matter.

Pythagoras * is the second great philosopher after Thales, and chief of the Italic school. Every body [Page 288] knows the abstinence, silence, retirement and great purity of morals which he required of his disciples. He was very sensible that human understanding alone could never attain to the knowledge of divine things, unless the heart was purged of its passions. Now these are the notions which he has left us of the Dei­ty. * God is neither the object of sense, nor sub­ject to passion; but invisible, purely intelligible, and supremely intelligent. In his body [...] is like the light, and in his soul he resembles truth . He is the universal Spirit that pervades and diffuseth itself over all nature. All beings receive their life from him . There is but one only God, who is not, as some are apt to imagine, seated above the world, beyond the orb of the universe; but being all in himself, he sees all the beings that inhabit his Immensity. He is the sole Principle, the Light of heaven, the Father of all; he produces every thing, he orders and disposes every thing; he is the reason, the life, and the motion of all beings §.’

He taught that besides the first Principle, there were three sorts of intelligent beings, Cods, Heroes and Souls . He considered the first as the unalter­able images of the sovereign Mind, human souls as the least perfect of reasonable substances, and heroes as a sort of middle beings placed between the two o­thers, in order to raise up souls to the divine union . Thus he represents to us the divine Immensity as containing innumerable worlds inhabited by spirits of different orders. And this is the true sense of that famous expression ascribed to the Pythagoreans, that unity was the principle of all things, and that from [Page 289] this infinite Unity there sprung an infinite duality. We are not by this duality to understand the two principles of the Manichees; but, as some think, the second and third forms of the Orphean Trinity and triform Deity, or, rather, a world of intelligent and corporeal substances, which is the effect whereof uni­ty is the cause *. This is the sentiment of Porphyry, and it ought to be preferred before that of Plutarch, who is for ascribing the Manichean system to Pytha­goras, without producing for it any proof.

Pythagoras agreed with Thales in defining the Soul to be a self-moving Principle . He maintained farther, ‘That when it quits the body, it is re-united to the soul of the world ; that it is not a god, but the work of an eternal God §; and that it is immortal on account of its principle .’ This phi­losopher was of opinion that man was composed of three parts, a pure spirit, an ethereal matter, (which he called the subtile vehicle of the soul) and a mortal or gross body. The old Greek poets had dressed up this opinion in a different guise; they called the ethe­real body, the representation, the image, or the sha­dow; because they fancied that this subtile body, when it came down from heaven to animate the ter­restrial body, assumed its form just as melted metal takes that of the mould in which it is cast. They said, that after death the spirit, still clothed with this subtile vehicle, flew up to the regions of the moon, where they placed the Elysian fields. And there, as they imagined, a sort of second death ensued by the separation of the pure spirit from its vehicles: the one was united to the Gods, the other staid in the a­bode of the shades. This is the reason why Ulysses [Page 290] says in the Odysseis, ‘That he saw in the Elysian fields the divine Hercules, i.e. his image; for as for him, he is with the immortal Gods, and assists at their banquets *.’ Pythagoras did not adopt the poetic fiction of a second death. He held, that the pure spirit, and its subtile vehicle being born to­gether, were inseparable, and returned after death to the star from whence they descended. The Pla­tonists and almost all the ancient philosophers had the same notion . St. Paul, speaking of the resurrecti­on, seems to favor this distinction of the celestial and the terrestrial body; ‘but some will say, how are the dead raised up? and with what body do they come? Thou fool, that which thou sowest is not that body which shall be, but bare grain.—So also is the resurrection of the dead, it is sown in corruption, it is raised in incorruption; it is sown in dishonor, it is raised in glory; it is sown in weak­ness, it is raised in power; it is sown a natural bo­dy, it is raised a spiritual body.—Now this I say, brethren, because that flesh and blood cannot inhe­rit the kingdom of God .’ Hence it is, that some of the ancient fathers, as well as our modern divines §have concluded, that the mortal and terrestrial body, which is ever changing, and does not continue one moment the same is something merely accidental to our substance, and does not originally belong to it: a thick crust, a coarse covering cast over the celestial, spiritual, active and glorious body, which being un­vailed and enlarged at the resurrection, will appear in all its beauty; that this immortal seed, this incor­ruptible [Page 291] body, this hidden principle, which is perhaps at present the seat of the soul, will, for reasons known to God only, remain buried after death in the com­mon mass of matter till the last manifestation of the divine Power; and that then the face of the earth will be renewed by purifying flames, which will purge our globe of all that dark and earthly dross which it has contracted. And this notion renders the doctrine of the resurrection intelligible and philo­sophical.

I shall conclude the article of Pythagoras with a summary of his doctrine as it is given us by St. Cyril. ‘We see plainly, says this Father, that Pythagoras maintained, that there was but one God, the origi­nal and cause of all things, who enlightens every thing, animates every thing, and from whom every thing proceeds, who has given being to all things, and is the source of all motion *.’

After Pythagoras comes Anaxagoras of the Ionic sect, born at Clazomene, and master to Pericles the Athenian hero. This philosopher was the first after Thales in the Ionic school who perceived the necessi­ty of introducing a supreme Intelligence for the form­ation of the universe. He rejected with contempt, and with great strength of reason refuted the doc­trine of those who held that a blind necessity and the casual motions of matter had produced the world. He endeavored to prove that a pure and uncom­pounded Spirit presides over the universe.

According to Aristotle's account, the reasoning of Anaxagoras was founded upon these two principles: 1. ‘That the idea of matter not including that of active force, motion could not be one of its proper­ties. We must therefore, said he, seek somewhere else to find out the cause of its activity. Now this [Page 292] active principle, as it was the cause of motion, he called the soul, because it animates the universe *. 2. He distinguished between this universal principle of motion, and the thinking principle, which last he called the understanding . He saw nothing in matter that had any resemblance to this property; and from thence he inferred, that there was in na­ture another substance besides matter. But he ad­ded, that the soul and spirit were one and the same substance distinguished by us only in regard of its different operations; and that of all essences it was the most simple, the most pure, and the most ex­empt from all mixture and composition. This phi­losopher passed at Athens for an Atheist, because he denied that the stars and planets were Gods .’ He maintained, that the first were suns, and the lat­ter habitable worlds; so very ancient is the system of a plurality of worlds, which has been generally thought to be modern.

Plato § condemns Anaxagoras for having explain­ed all the phaenomena of nature by matter and mo­tion. Descartes has only revived this opinion. I cannot but think it very unjust to accuse the philoso­pher of Clazomene, or his follower, of Atheism, on this account, since they both lay it down for a princi­ple, that motion is not a property of matter, and con­sequently, that the moving force is altogether spirit­ual. It must nevertheless be allowed, that the French Philosopher is blameable in supposing that the visible world is the necessary and unavoidable effect of a mere impulsion given to an indefinite matter. Hence [...] would follow, 1. That the laws of motion are not arbitrary and dependant on a sovereign Intelligence who acts with wisdom and design; which totally de­stroys [Page 293] the idea of final causes. 2. That the world, such as we see it, with all its irregularities, defects and disorders, is precisely in the same state wherein it was at first produced by the Creator: these two principles were the fatal source of Spinoza's Atheism: believing with Descartes, that matter and extension are the same thing, and that all the different phaeno­mena of nature are the effect of the necessary laws of motion, he presently inferred that immense extension and infinite force might be properties of the same e­ternal substance, which acts by the immutable laws of a blind necessity.

The most sublime genius of our age, being sensible of these monstrous abuses of Cartesianism, resolved to undermine the foundations of that philosophy. He demonstrated that the primary laws of motion are purely arbitrary, and established with knowledge and design by an intelligent Architect, in order to the preservation of his work, and the accomplishment of such ends as are worthy of his wisdom. It is with great injustice that this Philosopher has been accused with throwing us back into the occult qualities of the Peripatetics. I confess indeed that the obscure and confused ideas which abound in the writings of some of his disciples, have given too much occasion to certain foreigners to reject the philosophy of Sir Isaac. Newton, at the same time that they admire his geo­metry; but it is clear from his * first writings, that he never considered attraction as a cause, but only as an effect, and that he always supposed that this effect might be produced by impulsion . Provided we re­ject [Page 294] the absolute plenum of the Cartesians, their ro­mantic elements, and their celestial vortices which are by no means geometrical, this incomparable philoso­pher * admits that there may be a subtile spirit, or ethereal matter diffused through all the immense spa­ces, to be the universal cause and spring of all the motions of the celestial and terrestrial bodies; of elas­ticity, electricity, cohesion, fluidity, vegetation and sensation; of the emission, refraction and reflection of light, and even of attraction itself, which he looks upon as the immediate cause of the most part of na­tural effects; he would not however pretend to ex­plain the laws of this ethereal fluid, for want of a suf­ficient number of experiments to prove them. It was an essential principle with him, that natural phi­losophy should be founded upon experiments, and that these should afterwards be applied to geometry, in order to gather from thence something more to be depended upon than ingenious conjectures. His wri­tings discover a wonderful sagacity, penetration and depth, and all the marks of a solid understanding, which allows nothing to imagination in matters of reason; and though Descartes must be granted to have surpassed him in perspicuity and method, he was unquestionably neither so profound nor so geometri­cal a genius, and gave a greater loose to imagination.

Socrates follows close after Anaxagoras. The common notion is, that he was a martyr for the Uni­ty of the Godhead, in having refused to pay his ho­mage to the Gods of Greece; but it is a mistake. In the apology that Plato makes for this Philosopher, Socrates acknowledgeth certain subordinate deities, and teaches, that the sun and the stars are animated by intelligences who ought to be worshipped with di­vine honors. The same Plato in his dialogue upon [Page 295] holiness * tells us, that Socrates was not punished for denying that there were inferior gods, but for de­claiming openly against the poets who ascribed human passions and enormous crimes to those deities.

Socrates, however, whilst he supposed several infe­rior gods, admitted all the while but only one eternal Principle. Xenophon has lest us an excellent abridg­ment of the Theology of that Philosopher. 'Tis perhaps the most important piece we have of anti­quity. It contains the conversation of Socrates with Aristodemus, who doubted of the existence of God. Socrates makes him at first take notice of all the cha­racters of design, of art, of the wisdom that appears all over the universe, and particularly in the human body. Do you believe, says he then to Aristode­mus, can you believe that you are the only intelli­gent being? you know that you possess but a little particle of that matter which composes the world, a small part of that water which moistens it, a spark of that flame which animates it. Is understanding peculiar to you alone? Have you so engrossed and confined it to yourself, that it is to be found no where else? Does blind chance work every thing, and is there no such thing as wisdom besides what you have?’ Aristodemus having replied, that he did not see that wife Architect of the universe; So­crates answers him, ‘Neither do you see the soul which governs your own body, and regulates all its motions. You might as well conclude, that you do nothing yourself with design and reason, as main­tain that every thing is done by blind chance in the universe.’ Aristodemus at length acknowledging a supreme Being, is still in doubt as to Providence; not being able to comprehend how the Deity can see every thing at once. Socrates replies, ‘If the spirit [Page 296] that resides in your body moves and disposes it at its pleasure, why should not that sovereign Wisdom which presides over the universe, be able likewise to regulate and order every thing as it pleases? if your eye can see objects at the distance of several furlongs; why should not the eye of God be able to see every thing at once? If your soul can think at the same time upon what is at Athens, in Egypt, and in Sicily; why should not the divine Mind be able to take care of every thing, being every where present to his work?’ Socrates perceiving at last that the infidelity of Aristodemus did not arise so much from his reason as from his heart, concludes with these words; ‘O Aristodemus, apply yourself sincerely to worship God; he will enlighten you, and all your doubts will soon be removed!’

Plato, a disciple of Socrates, follows the same prin­ciples. He lived about the hundredth Olympiad, at a time when the doctrine of Democritus had made a great progress at Athens. The design of all his Theology is to give us noble sentiments of the Deity. to shew us that souls were condemned to animate mortal bodies, only in order to expiate faults they had committed in a pre-existent state; and in fine, to teach that religion is the only way to restore us to our first glory and perfection, he despises all the ten­ets of the Athenian superstition, and endeavors to purge religion of them. The chief object of this phi­losopher is man in his immortal capacity: he speaks of him in his politic one, only to shew that the short­est way to immortality is to discharge all the duties of civil and social life for the pure love of virtue.

Plato in the beginning of his Timaeus distinguishes between being which is eternally, and being which has been made. And in another of his dialogues he defines God the efficient cause which makes things exist that had no being before *: a definition which [Page 297] [...]ews that he had an idea of the creation. Nor is it at all surprising that he should have this idea, since it implies no contradiction. In reality, when God cre­ates he does not draw a being out of nothing, as out of a subject upon which he works; but he makes something exist that did not exist before. The idea of infinite power necessarily supposes that of being a­ble to produce new substances as well as new forms. To make a substance exist which did not exist before, has nothing in it more inconceivable than the making form exist which was not before; for in both cases there is a new reality produced; and whatever diffi­culties there are in conceiving the passage from no­thing to being, they are as puzzling in the one as in the other. As therefore it cannot be denied but that there is a moving power, though we do not conceive low it acts; so neither must we deny that there is a creating power, because we have not a clear idea of it.

To return to Plato. He first considers the Deity in his eternal solitude before the production of finite beings. He says frequently like the Egyptians, ‘That this first source of Deity is surrounded with thick darkness, which no mortal can penetrate, and that this inaccessible God is to be adored only by silence.’ 'Tis this first Principle which he calls in several places the Being, the Unity, and the supreme Good *; the same in the intelligent world, that the sun is in the visible world. He afterwards represents to us this first Being as sallying out of his Unity to consider all the various manners by which he might represent himself exteriorly; and thus the ideal world, comprehending the ideas of all things, and the truths which result thence, was formed in the di­vine Understanding. Plato always distinguishes be­tween the supreme Good, and that Wisdom which is [Page 298] only an emanation from him. ‘That which presents truth to the mind, says he, and that which gives us reason is the supreme Good. He is the cause and source of truth *, He hath begotten it like him­self. As the light is not the sun, but an emanation from it; so truth is not the first Principle, but his emanation.’ And this is what he calls the Wis­dom, or the Logos. And lastly, he considers the first Mover displaying his power to form real beings, re­sembling those archetypal ideas. He stiles him The Energy, or sovereign Architect who created the universe and the gods, and who does whatsoe­ver he pleases in heaven, on the earth, and in the shades below.’ He calls him likewise, ‘Psyche, or the soul which presides over the world, rather than the soul of the world;’ to denote that this soul does not make a part of the universe, but ani­mates it, and gives it all its forms and movements. Sometimes he considers the three divine attributes as three causes, at other times as three beings, and often as three Gods: but he affirms that they are all but one sole Divinity; that there is no essential difference between them; that the second is the image of the first, and the third of the second; that they are not three suns, but one: and that they differ only as the light, its rays, and the reflection of those rays .

In other places, and especially in the Timaeus Lo­crus §, Plato speaks of three other Principles, by the first he understands the archetypal ideas contained in the divine Intellect: by the second, a primary mat­ter, incorruptible, eternal, uniform, without figure or division, but capable of receiving all forms and motions: by the third, the visible universe, bounded, [Page 299] corruptible, consisting of various parts; and this he stiles the sun, the effect and the work of the idea as the primitive father, and of the [...] as the universal mother of whatever exists. We ought never to con­found these three Principles of nature with the three forms of the Divinity, which he calls Agathos, Logos and Psyche; the sovereign Good, which is the Prin­ciple of Deity, the Intellect which drew the plan of the world, and the Energy which executed it.

Though we should suppose that Plato considered the Logos and the Psyche, the Intellect and the E­nergy, not only as two attributes, but as two hypos­tases, or emanations from the divine Substance, it would not follow that the Christians took their doc­trine of the Trinity from him. He might owe this idea to the ancient traditions transmitted from the infant world, whence the Orientals, Chaldeans, E­gyptians and Greeks originally drew their soundest notions in Divinity. The philosophers of all nations seem to have had some ideas, more or less confused of a certain Triplicity in the supreme Unity *.—Christianity has only unfolded this ancient doctrine. It teaches us that in the divine Essence there is a tri­ple distinction of Father, Son and Holy Spirit; that the actions of the one are not the actions of the o­ther; that the Father exists of himself, independent­ly, as the primitive source of Deity; that the Son comes forth from the Father by an incomprehensible generation; and the Holy Spirit from both by an inconceivable procession; and lastly, that these two emanations from the Divinity are necessary, co-eter­nal, consubstantial, infinite, and in all things equal to the Father, his independance only excepted. The church has been pleased to express this distinction by the word Persons; to denote that this Trinity is not [Page 300] a mere division of attributes, as the Sabellians held; nor yet three different substances, as the Tritheifts maintain. We have not a sufficiently clear idea of the eternal Nature to be able to deny, but it may admit of such a distinction. As to finite beings, in­deed, the only distinction we know in them, is that of modes and substances; but is this a reason to deny the possibility of another in the infinite Essence? Ig­norance may be a reason for doubting, but never for denying.

In order to silence the incredulous, and make this mystery intelligible to them, a famous * Doctor of the church of England, and as I am assured, the greatest philosopher of modern times, believed that it would do no prejudice to the faith to consider the three Persons of the Trinity as three individual A­gents, or three distinct Beings, though of the same substance. This opinion is as far above Arianism as Arianism is above Socinianism. Pausto-Socini main­tained, that the Son had never any existence before the incarnation. Arius held, that he was created or produced out of nothing like finite beings, but yet from all eternity, that is, before all time. The learn­ed Dr. Clarke maintains every where, that the Word is not a creature, but an emanation from the Father, co-eternal and consubstantial; that this emanation is as essential to the Deity as his veracity; that it is not possible for the Father to be without the Son, in any other sense than it is possible for God to lie ; and consequently that the Word is not a precarious being which God may annihilate.

I will not pretend to justify any inconsiderate ex­pressions which may have dropt from the Doctor; we find such in the Fathers themselves: but charity, which thinks no evil, believes all things, hopes all [Page 301] things, endures all things, will never insist upon the literal import of unguarded words, which are disa­vowed. It must nevertheless be granted that this doctrine, which is ascribed originally to sir Isaac Newton, explains nothing, and only plunges us in new difficulties greater than the first. There may easily be many distinct beings, of the same divisible and finite substance; but it is impossible to conceive three distinct beings of the infinite and indivisible sub­stance, without destroying his nature, and discerping the living and true God. Is it not better contented­ly to join with all Christian antiquity, in saying, that there is a triple distinction, real but incomprehensible in the Divinity, than to disturb the peace of the Church with defining the metaphysical nature of this distinction, by such ideas as lead to Tritheism, contra­ry to the invention of those who advance them? How easily are the most extensive geniuses led astray, when they shake off the yoke of authority to give themselves up to their speculations? But to proceed: Aristotle, Plato's disciple, and Prince of the Peri­patetic Philosophers, calls God * ‘The eternal and living Being, the most noble of all beings, a sub­stance entirely distinct from matter, without enten­sion, without division, without parts, and without succession; who understands every thing by one single act, and continuing himself immoveable, gives motion to all things, and enjoys in himself a perfect happiness, as knowing and contemplating himself with infinite pleasure.’ In his metaphysics he lays it down for a principle, ‘That God is a supreme Intelligence which acts with order, proportion and design; and is the source of all that is good, excel­lent and just.’ In his treatise of the soul, he says, [Page 302] ‘That the supreme Mind * is by its nature prior to all beings, that he has a sovereign dominion over all.’ And in other places he says, ‘That the first principle is neither the fire nor the earth nor the water, nor any thing that is the object of sense; but that a spiritual substance is the cause of the universe, and the source of all the order and all the beauties, as well as of all the motions and all the forms which we so much admire in it.’—These passages shew that though Aristotle held mat­ter to be eternal, he nevertheless considered it as a production of the divine intellect, and posterior in na­ture to it. He supposed the eternity of this produc­tion, because he could not conceive how the divine Mind, being all act, and all energy, could ever be in a state of inactivity. Besides this first and eternal Substance, he acknowledges several other intelligent beings that preside over the motions of the celestial spheres. ‘There is, says he, but one only Mover, and several inferior deities. All that is added about the human shape of these deities, is nothing else but fiction, invented [...] purpose to instruct the common people, and engage them to an observ­ance of good laws. All must be reduced to one only primitive Substance, and to several inferior substances, which govern in subordination to the first. This is the genuine doctrine of the ancients, which has happily escaped from the wreck of truth, amidst the rocks of vulgar errors and poetic fables.’

Cicero lived in an age when corruption of man­ners and scepticism were at their height. The sect of Epicurus had got the ascendant at Rome over that of Pythagoras; and some of the greatest men, when they were reasoning about the divine Nature, thought [Page 303] It to suspend their judgment, and waver between the two opinions of a supreme Intelligence and a Wind matter. Cicero, in his treatise of the nature of the Gods, pleads the cause of the academic Philo­sophers who doubted of every thing. It is however, to be observed, that he refutes Epicurus with great force of reason in his first book, and that the objecti­ons which he makes in his third, as an academic, are much weaker than the proofs which he draws from the wonders that appear in nature, which he insists so in his second book, to demonstrate the existence of a supreme Intelligence.

In his other works, and particularly in his book of laws, he describes the universe to us * ‘as a repub­lic of which Jupiter is the Prince and common fa­ther. The great law imprinted in the hearts of all men is to love the public good, and the members of the common society as themselves. This love of order is supreme justice, and this justice is amiable for its own sake. To love it only for the advan­tages it produces us, may be politic, but there is lit­tle of goodness in it. 'Tis the highest injustice to love justice only for the sake of recompense. In a word, the universal, immutable and eternal law of all intelligent beings, is to promote the happiness of one another like children of the same father.’ He next represents God to us as a sovereign Wisdom, from whose authority it is still more impracticable for intelligent natures to withdraw themselves than it is for corporeal ones ‘According to the opinion of the wisest and greatest men, says this philosopher, the law is not an invention of human understand­ing [...] the arbitrary constitution of men, but flows from the eternal Reason that governs the universe. The rape which Tarquin committed upon Lucretia, [Page 304] continues he, was not less criminal in its nature, be­cause there was not at that time any written law at Rome against such sort of violence. The tyrant was guilty of a breach of the eternal law, the obli­gation whereof did not commence from the time it was written, but from the moment it was made. Now its origin is as ancient as the divine intellect for the true, the primitive, and the supreme law is nothing else but the sovereign reason of the great Jove. This law, says he in another place * is universal, eternal, immutable. It does not vary according to times and places. It is not different now from what it was formerly. The same im­mortal law is a rule to all nations, because it has no author but the one only God who brought it forth and promulged it.’ Such were the reasonings of Cicero when he consulted natural light, and was not carried away by a fondness of shewing his wit in de­fending the doctrine of the Sceptics.

To come at last to Seneca the Stoic. He was Ne­ro's tutor, and lived in an age when Christianity was not in credit enough to engage the heathens to bor­row any philosophical principles from thence. 'Tis of very little consequence, say he, by what name you call the first Nature, and the divine Reason that presides over the universe, and fills all the parts of it. He is still the same God. He is called Ju­piter Stator, not as historians say, because he stop­ped the Roman armies as they were flying, but be­cause he is the constant support of all beings. They may call him Fate, because he is the first cause on which all others depend. We Stoics call him sometimes Father Bacchus, because he is the uni­versal [Page 305] life that animates nature: Hercules, because his power is invincible: Mercury, because he is the eternal Reason, Order and Wisdom. You may give him as many names as you please provided you allow but one sole Principle every where present.’

Agreeable to Plato's notions, he considers the di­vine Understanding as comprehending in itself the model of all things, which he styles the immutable and almighty ideas *, ‘Every workman, says he, hath a model by which he forms his work. It sig­nifies nothing whether this model exist outwardly and before his eyes, or be formed within him by the strength of his own genius; so God produces within himself that perfect model, which is the proportion, the order and the beauty of all beings. . The ancients, says he in another place, did not think Jove such a being as we represent him in the capitol, and in our other buildings. But by Jove they meant the guardian and the governor of the universe, the understanding and the mind, the Ma­ster and the Architect of this great machine. All names belong to him. You are not in the wrong if you call him Fate, for he is the cause of causes, and every thing depends on him. Would you call him Providence; you fall into no mistake, it is by his wisdom that this world is governed. Would you call him Nature; you will not offend in doing so, it is from him all beings derive their origin, it is by him that they live and breathe.’

There is no reading the works of Epictetus, of A­rian his disciple, and of Marcus Antoninus without admiration. We find in them rules of morality wor­thy of christianity; and yet these disciples of Zeno believed like their matter, that there was but one sub­stance; that the supreme intelligent Being was mate­rial, [Page 306] and that his Essence was a pure aether which filled all by local diffusion; that whatever was not extended was nothing; and in short, that infinite ex­tension was the same with the divine Immensity.—

* The Platonists represented to them, that it was a gross imagination to suppose that every thing, which is, exists by local diffusion; that were it so, the divine Essence would not be equally present every where; that there would be more of it in a great space than in a little one; that it is absurd to conceive that which is nothing but power, wisdom and goodness, under the form of length, breadth and thickness; that all other beings exist in God, but that he exists only in himself; that immense space is not the divine Immensity, as time everlasting is not the divine Eter­nity; that the Immensity of God is the manner of his existing in himself, without extension of parts, as his Eternity is the manner of his existing in himself without succession of thoughts; that space is but the manner wherein bodies exist in him, as time is but the manner in which finite beings exist with him, that the one measures the bounds of the parts, and the o­ther the variation of the modes; that we should have no idea of local extension; if there were no bodies, as we should have no idea of successive duration if there were no changes; and lastly, that indefinite unbounded extension is not immense in all senses; as it is not infinite in all respects: but that God is im­mense in all senses, as he is in all respects infinite.

It was thus that the Pagan philosophers talked of the divine Immensity before the rise of scholastic the­ology. The obscurity of our reasonings on this mat­ter proceeds from our want of a clear idea of substan­ces: we neither know nor distinguish them but by their properties: otherwise we should see that the [Page 307] supreme Unity may exist every where with [...] exten­sion of parts, as he exists for ever without succession of thoughts; that he is all in all places, as he beholds all beings with one glance. The reason of our not having a clear idea of the divine Immensity, is our not having an adequate idea of infinity; we ascribe to him certain properties, because we see that they are contained in the idea we have of him; but we are obliged at the same time, in order to avoid ab­surdities, to give him other attributes which we do not comprehend. Thus in geometry we admit the infinite divisibility of matter, and the doctrine of a­symptotes which follows from it, without having a clear idea of either of them.

But after all, the materialism of the Stoics does not evince that they were Atheists; a false notion a­bout the Deity being far from proving that they be­lieved none at all. What constitutes an Atheist, is not the maintaining with the Orientals, that matter is an expansion of the divine substance nor with the Stoics, that the infinite Essence is a pure aether; nor with the Platonists, that the universe is an eternal production of the Deity; but real Atheism consists in denying that there is a supreme Intelligence, who made the world by his power, and governs it by his wisdom.

For our suller satisfaction, with regard to the the­ology of the Heathens, let us see what the fathers of the church thought of it. They had sufficient op­portunities of knowing it thoroughly, by the frequent disputes which they held with them. As this is a matter of a very nice nature, it may be dangerous to indulge any thing to one's own conjectures: let us have recourse to wise antiquity. Arnobius * intro­duces the heathens complaining of the injustice of the Christians. ‘'Tis a mere calumny, say those heath­ens, [Page 308] to charge us with such a crime, as the denying of a supreme God. We call him Jove, the su­premely great and sovereignly good, we dedicate our most magnificent structures and our capitols to him, to shew that we exalt him above all other de­ities. * St. Peter in his preaching at Athens, says St. Clement of Alexandria insinuates that the Greeks had a knowledge of the Deity. He suppo­ses that those people adore the same God as we do, though not in the same manner. He does not for­bid us to adore the same God as the Greeks, but he forbids us to adore him after the same way. He orders us to change the manner, and not the object of our worship.’ ‘The heathens, says Lac­tantius , who admit several gods, say nevertheless that those subordinate deities, though they preside over all the various parts of the universe, do it in such a manner, as that there is still but one sole Ruler and supreme Governor. From whence it follows, that all other invisible powers are not pro­perly Gods, but ministers or deputies of the one great and almighty God, who appointed them exe­cutors of his will and pleasure.’ Eusebius of Cesa­rea goes farther. § The heathens own that there is but one only God, who fills, pervades and pre­sides, over universal nature; but they maintain, that as he is present to his work only in an incor­poreal and invisible manner, they are therefore in the right to worship him in his visible and corporeal effects.’ I shall conclude with a famous passage of St. Austin, who reduces the Polytheism of the heath­ens to the unity of one sole Principle. ‘Jupiter, says [Page 309] this father, is according to the philosophers, the soul of the world, who take different names according to the different effects which he produces. In the e­thereal spaces he is called Jupiter, in the air Juno, in the sea Neptune, in the earth Pluto, in hell Pro­serpine, in the element of fire Vulcan, in the sun Phoebus, in divination Apollo, in war Mars, in the vintage Bacchus, in the harvest Ceres, in the fo­rests Diana, and in the sciences Minerva. All that crowd of gods and goddesses are only the same Ju­piter, whose different powers and attributes are ex­pressed by different names.’ It is therefore evident by the testimony of profane poets, heathen philoso­phers, and fathers of the church, that the Pagans acknowledged one sole supreme Deity. The Orien­tals, the Egyptians, the Greeks, the Romans, and all nations agreed universally in teaching this truth.

About the fiftieth Olympiad, six hundred years be­fore the Christian aera, the Greeks having lost the traditional knowledge of the Orientals, began to lay aside the doctrine of the ancients, and to reason a­bout the divine Nature from prejudices, which their senses and imagination suggested. 1. Anaximander lived at that time, and was the first who set himself to destroy the belief of a supreme Intelligence, in or­der to account for every thing by the action of blind matter, which by necessity assumes all sorts of forms. He was followed by Leucippus, Democritus, Epicu­rus, Strato, Lucretius, and all the school of the ato­mical philosophers. 2. Pythagoras, Anaxagoras, So­crates, Plato, Aristotle, and all the great men of Greece opposed this impious doctrine, and endeavor­ed to re-establish the ancient Theology of the Orien­tals. These philosophers of a superior genius observ­ing in nature motion, thought and design, and the idea of matter including none of these three proper­ties; they inferred from thence, that there was in nature another substance besides matter. Greece be­ing [Page 310] thus divided into two sects, they disputed for a long time, without either party being convinced. 3. At length about the 120th Olympiad, Pyrrho formed a third sect, whose great principle was to doubt of e­very thing, and determine nothing. All the atomists, who had labored in vain to find out a demonstration of their false principles, presently struck in with the Pyrrhonian sect. They ran wildly into an universal doubting, and carried it almost to such an excess of frenzy, that they doubted of the clearest and most palpable truths. They maintained without any alle­gory, that every thing we see is only an illusion, and that the whole series of life is but a perpetual dream, of which those in the night are only so many images. 4. At last Zeno set up a fourth school about the 130th Olympiad. This philosopher endeavored to reconcile the disciples of Democritus with those of Plato, by maintaining that the first Principle was in­deed an infinite Wisdom, but that his essence was on­ly a pure aether, or a subtile light, which diffused it­self every where, to give life, motion and reason to all beings.

It is plain then that there were four sorts of philoso­phers among the ancients; the Atheists or Atomists, the Spiritualists or Theists, the Materialists or Stoics, the Py [...]honians or Academics. In these last ages, the modern Free thinkers have only revived the an­cient errors, disguising them under new terms.

1. Jordano Bruno, Vannini, and Spinoza have vamped up the monstrous system of Anaximander; and have added only some artful distinctions to im­pose upon weak minds. Spinoza perceiving clearly that thought could not be an effect of matter, endea­voured to prevent all objections against the Materi­alists, by maintaining, that * extention and thought are properties of the same substance; that the ideas [Page 311] of objects are really nothing different from the objects themselves ; that extention and matter are the same ; that infinite space is the immensity of God, as infinite time is his eternity §; and consequently that all essences are but different forms of the same substance . It must nevertheless be granted, that his atheism does not consist in these errors, since they have all been maintained by philosophers who had a sincere abhorrence of impiety. Spinoza's Atheism lies wholly in this, that he makes the one only Sub­stance, for which he contends, to act without know­ledge or design. 2. Descartes, Malebranche, Po [...]ret, Leibnitz, Sir Isaac Newton, Dr. Bentley, Dr. Clarke, Dr. Cheyne, and several philosophers of a genius equally subtile and profound, have endeavor­ed to refute these errors, and brought arguments to support the ancient theology. Besides the proofs which are drawn from the effects, they have insisted on others drawn from the idea of the first cause. They shew plainly, that the reasons for believing are infinitely stronger than those for doubting; and that it is absurd to deny what we see clearly, because we do not see farther. 3. Mr. Hobbes, and some phi­losophers of more faith, Behemen, and several caba­listical writers, have revived the errors of the Stoics, and pretend that extension is the basis of all substan­ces; that the soul differs from the body only as being more subtilized; that a spirit is but a rarified body, and a body a condensed spirit; and lastly that the in­finite Being, though indivisible, is extended by local diffusion. 4. To conclude, there are some superficial minds, who not being able to look upon truth with a steady view, nor to weigh the degrees of evidence, [Page 312] nor to compare the force of proofs with that of ob­jections, persuade themselves that the mind of man is not formed for the knowledge of truth, run headlong into an universal doubting, and fall at length into a senseless kind of Pyrrhonism, called Egomism, where every one fancies himself to be the only being that exists. The history of former times is like that of our own: human understanding takes almost the same forms in different ages, and loses its way in the same labyrinths; there are periodical diseases of the mind as well as of the body.

PART II. Of the MYTHOLOGY of the PAGANS.

MEN, left to the light of their reason alone, have always looked upon moral and physical evil as a shocking phaenomenon in the work of a Being infi­nitely wise, good and powerful. To account for it, the philosophers have had recourse to several hypo­thesis. Reason told them all, that what is supremely good could never produce any thing that was wicked or miserable. From hence they concluded, that souls are not now what they were at first; that they are degraded for some fault committed by them in a for­mer state; that this life is a state of exile and expia­tion; and in a word, that all beings are to be restor­ed to their proper order. Tradition struck in with reason, and this tradition had spread over all nations, certain opinions which they held in common, with [Page 313] regard to the three states of the world, as I shall shew in this second part, which will be a sort of a­bridgment of the traditional doctrine of the ancients.

I begin with the Mythology of the Greeks and Romans. All the Poets, speaking of the golden age, or reign of Saturn, describe it to us as an happy state, in which there were neither calamities, nor crimes, nor labor, nor pains, nor diseases, nor death *. They represent, on the contrary, the iron age, as the time when physical and moral evil first appeared; then it was that vices, sufferings, and all manner of e­vils came forth of Pandora's box, and overflowed the face of the earth . They speak to us of the golden age renewed, as of a time when Astraea was to return upon earth; when justice, peace and innocence were to flourish again with their original lustre; and when every thing was to be restored to its primitive per­fection . In a word, they sing on all occasions the exploits of a son of Jupiter, who was to quit his hea­venly abode and live among men. They give him different names, according to his different functions; sometimes he is Apollo fighting against Python and the Titans; sometimes he is Hercules, destroying monsters and giants, and purging the earth of their enormities and crimes; one while he is Mercury, or the messenger of Jove, flying about every where to execute his decrees; and another while he is Perseus, delivering Andromeda or human nature, from the monster that rose out of the great deep to devour her. He is always some son of Jupiter, giving bat­tles, and gaining victories. I will not insist upon [Page 314] these poetical descriptions, because they may perhaps be looked upon as mere fictions, and a machinery in­troduced to embellish a poem, and amuse the mind. Allegorical explications are liable to uncertainty and mistake; so that I shall go on directly to represent the doctrine of the philosophers, particularly that of Plato, which is the source from whence Plotinus, Proclus, and the Platonists of the third century drew their principle notions.

To begin with the dialogue of Phaedo, or of im­mortality, and give a short analysis of it: Phaedo gives his friend an account of the condition in which he saw Socrates at the time of his death. ‘He quit­ted life, says he, with a serene joy, and a noble in­tripidity.’ His friends asking him the reason of it, ‘I hope, says Socrates in his answer, to be re-united to the good and perfect Gods, and to be associated with better men than those I leave upon earth *.’ When Cebes objects to him that the soul vanishes af­ter death like a smoke, and is entirely annihilated, Socrates sets himself to refute that opinion, and en­deavours to prove that the soul had a real existence in an happy state, before it informed a human body.—This doctrine he ascribes to Orpheus ‘The dis­ciples of Orpheus, says he, called the body a prison, because the soul is here in a state of punishment till it has expiated the faults that it committed in heaven. Souls, continued Plato, that are too much given to bodily pleasures, and are in a manner besotted, wander upon the earth, and are put into new bo­dies §; for all sensuality and passion cause the soul to have a stronger attachment to the body, make her fancy that she is of the same nature, and render her in a manner corporeal; so that she contracts an incapacity of flying away into another life. Being [Page 315] oppressed with the weight of her impurity and cor­ruption, she sinks again into matter, and becomes thereby disabled to remount towards the regions of purity, and attain to a re-union with her Principle.’

Upon this foundation is built the doctrine of the transmigration of souls, which Plato represents in the second Timaeus as an allegory, and at other times as a thing real, where souls that have made themselves unworthy of the supreme Beatitude, s [...]urn and suf­fer successively in the bodies of different animals, till at last they are purged of their crimes, by the pains they undego. This hath made some philosophers be­lieve that the souls of beasts are degraded spirits. A very ancient doctrine, and common to all the Asiatics, from whom Pythagoras and Plato derived it; but the poets had much debased it by their fictions—They supposed that there was an universal and eter­nal metempsychosis; that all spirits were subject to it, without ever arriving at any fixed state. The phi­losophers, on the contrary, believed that none but depraved souls were destined to such a transmigrati­on, and that it would one day be at an end, when they were purified from their crimes *.

The Pythagoreans and Platonists not being able to persuade themselves that the brutes were absolutely insensible of pleasure and pain, or that matter was capable of sensation and consciousness, or that the Divine Justice could inflict sufferings on intelligences that had never offended, thought the doctrine of transmigration less absurd than that of mere ma­chines, material souls, or pure intelligences formed only to animate the bodies of beasts.

The first of these opinions is altogether contrary to experience; and though we may by general and ingenious hypotheses throw a mist before our eyes, yet whenever we examine nicely into all appearances [Page 316] of sensation discernible in beasts, we can never seri­ously doubt of it. I do not say the appearances of reflection, but of sensation; I am not unaware that in our own bodies we have frequent motions of which we are not conscious, and which nevertheless seem to be the effect of the most exact and geometrical reasonings. I speak therefore of the marks of plea­sure and pain which we observe in the brutes; and I think that we can have no pretence to reject such e­vidence, unless it be that we do not feel what hap­pens to them; but then, for the same reason, we might believe, that all other men are machines. The second opinion, which is that of material souls, held by the Peripatetics, tends to destroy all the proofs of the immateriality of our spirits. If matter be capable of sensation, it may likewise be capable of reflecting upon its own sensations, and the Materialists will gain their point. The third opinion destroys all our soundest notions of the Deity, by supposing that God can create beings which shall be immediately unhap­py, without any previous demerit on their part, de­grade pure intelligences without any reason, and when they for a while have acted in mortal bodies a part much below the dignity of their nature, reduce them again to nothing.

I will venture to say, that the doctrine of trans­migration is less repugnant not only to reason and experience, but likewise to religion, than either of the other three. We see in the * sacred Oracles that impure spirits may desire sometimes to enter into the bodies of the viles [...] animals. After all, a true philosopher will be prudently sceptical, with regard to all uncertain conjectures. The only use which I would make of what has been above advanced, is to shew the incredulous that they say nothing to the purpose against us, when they maintain that our [Page 317] souls die like those of the brutes; and farther, that the fictions of the ancients, how absurd soever they at first appear, are often more defensible than the syst­ems of the moderns, which are so much admired for a depth of penetration.

To return to Plato ‘Pure souls, adds he in his Phaedo, that have exerted themselves here below to get the better of all corruption, and free them­selves from the impurities of their terrestrial prison, retire after death into an invisible place, unknown to us, where the pure unites with the pure, the good cleaves to its like, and our immortal essence is united to the divine.’ He calls this place the first earth, where souls made their abode before their de­gradation, ‘The earth says he, is immense; we know and we inhabit only a small corner of it *. That ethereal earth, the ancient abode of souls, is placed in the pure regions of heaven, where the stars are seated. We that live in this low abyss are apt e­nough to fancy that we are in an high place, and we call the air the heavens; just like a man that from the bottom of the sea should view the sun and stars through the water, and fancy the ocean to be the firmanent itself. But if we had wings to mount on high, we should see that THERE is the true heaven, the true light, and the true earth. As in the sea every thing is altered, and disfigured by the salts that abound in it; so in our present earth every thing is deformed, corrupted, and in a ruinous condition, if compared with the primitive earth.’ Plato gives afterwards a pompous descrip­tion of that ethereal earth, of which ours is only a broken crust. He says ‘that every thing there was beautiful, harmonious and transparent; fruits of an exquisite taste grew there naturally; and it was watered with rivers of nectar. They there [Page 318] breathed the light, as we here breathe the air, and they drank waters which were purer than air itself.’ This notion of Plato agrees in a great measure with that of Descartes, about the nature of the planets; this modern Philosopher was of opinion that they were at first suns, which contracted afterwards a thick and opaque crust.

This same doctrine of Plato is likewise clearly ex­plained in his Timaeus *. There he tells us how So­lon in his travels discoursed with an Egyptian priest about the antiquity of the world, its origin, and the revolutions which had happened in it according to the Mythology of the Greeks. Upon which the E­gyptian priest says to him, ‘O Solon, you Greeks are always children, and you never come to an age of maturity; your understanding is young, and has no true knowledge of antiquity. There have been upon earth several deluges and conflagrations, caused by changes in the motion of the heavenly bodies. Your history of Phaeton, whatever air it has of a fable, is nevertheless not without a real foundation. We Egyptians have preserved the memory of these facts in our monuments and tem­ples; whereas it is but a very little while that the Greeks have had any knowledge of letters, of the muses, and of the sciences.’ This discourse puts Timaeus upon explaining to Socrates the origin of things, and the primitive state of the world . ‘Whatever has been produced, says he, has been produced by some cause. 'Tis no easy matter to know the nature of this Maker, and Father of the universe; and though you should discover it, it would be impossible for you to make the vulgar comprehend it. This Architect of the world, con­tinues he, had a model by which he produced every thing, and this model is himself. As he is good, [Page 319] and what is good has not the least tincture of envy, he made all things as far as was possible like himself. He made the world perfect in the whole of its con­stitution, perfect too in all the various parts that compose it, which were subject neither to diseases, nor to decay of age. The Father of all things, beholding this beautiful image of himself, took a complacency in his work, and this complacency rais­ed in him a desire of improving it to a nearer like­ness to its Model.’

In the dialogue which bears the title of Politicus, Plato mentioning this primitive state of the world, calls it the reign of Saturn, and describes it in this manner *. ‘God was then the Prince and common Father of all; he governed the world by himself, as he governs it now by inferior deities: rage and cruelty did not then prevail upon earth; war and sedition were not so much as known. God him­self took care of the sustenance of mankind, and was their guardian and shepherd; there were no ma­gistrates, nor civil polity as there are now. In those happy days men sprung out of the bosom of the earth, which produced them of itself, like flow­ers and trees. The fertile fields yielded fruits and corn without the labor of tillage. Mankind stood in no need of raiment to cover their bodies, being troubled with no inclemency of the seasons; and they took their rest upon beds of turf of a perpetual verdure. Under the reign of Jupiter, Saturn, the master of the universe, having quitted as it were the reins of his empire, hid himself in an inaccessi­ble retreat. The inferior gods who governed un­der him retired likewise; the very foundations of the world were shaken by motions contrary to its principle and its end, and it lost its beauty and its lustre. Then it was that good and evil were [Page 320] blended together. But in the end, lest the world should be plunged in an eternal abyss of confusion, God, the author of the primitive order, will appear again and resume the reins of empire. Then he will change, amend, embellish and restore the whole frame of nature, and put an end to decay of age, to diseases and death.’

In the dialogue under the title of Phaedrus, Plato more distinctly unfolds the secret causes of moral evil, which brought in physical evil. * There are in every one of us, says he, two principal springs of action, the desire of pleasure, and the love of vir­tue, which are the wings of the soul. When these wings are parted, when the love of pleasure and the love of virtue carry us contrary ways, then souls fall down into mortals bodies.’ Let us see here his notion of the pleasures which spirits taste in heaven, and of the manner how souls fell from the happy state which they enjoyed there. The great Jupiter, says he, animating his winged chari­ot, marches first, followed by all the inferior Gods and Genii, thus they traverse the heavens, admi­ring the infinite wonders thereof. But when they go to the great banquet, they raised themselves to the top of heaven, and mount above the spheres. None of our poets ever yet sung, or can sing that super-celestial place. It is there that souls contem­plate with the eyes of the understanding, the truly existing Essence, which has neither colour, nor fi­gure, nor is the object of any sense, but is purely [...]. There they see virtue, truth and ju­stice not as they are here below, but as they exist in him who is Being itself. There they satiate themselves with that light till they are no longer able to bear the glory of it, and then they return back to heaven, where they seed again on nectar [Page 321] and ambrosia—Such is the life of the Gods. Now continues Plato *, every soul which followeth God faithfully into that super-celestial place, preserves itself pure and without blemish; but if it takes up with nectar and ambrosia, and does not attend on Jupiter's chariot to go and contemplate truth, it grows heavy and sluggish, it breaks its wings, it falls upon the earth, and enters into a human body more or less vile, according as it has been more or less elevated. Souls less degraded than others dwell in the bodies of philosophers. The most despicable of all animate the bodies of tyrants and evil Prin­ces. Their condition alters after death, and be­comes more or less happy, according as they have loved virtue or vice in their life time. After ten thousand years souls will be re-united to their ori­gin.—During that space of time their wings grow again and are renewed .’

Such was the doctrine which Plato opposed to the profane sect of Democritus and Epicurus, who denied an eternal Providence on account of the physical and moral evil which they saw in the world. This Phi­losopher gives us a fine description of the universe: he considers it as an immensity filled with free spirits, which inhabit and inform innumerable worlds. These spirits are qualified to enjoy a double felicity; the one consisting in the contemplation of the divine Es­sence, the other in admiring his works. When souls no longer make their felicity consist in the knowledge of truth, and when lower pleasures turn them off from the love of the supreme Essence, they are thrown down into some planet, there to undergo expiatory punishments till they are cured by their sufferings.— [Page 322] These planets are consequently, according to Plato's notion, like hospitals, or places instituted for the cure of distempered intelligences. Such is the inviolable law established for the preservation of order in the celestial spheres. This double employment of the heavenly spirits is one of the sublimest notions of Pla­to, and shews the wonderful depth of his genius. It was the system adopted by the heathen philosophers, whenever they attempted to explain to us the origin of evil; and thus they reason:—If souls could with­out intermission contemplate the divine Essence by a direct view, they would be impeccable, the sight of the supreme Good necessarily engaging all the love of the will. To explain therefore the fall of spirits, they are forced to suppose an interval, when the soul withdraws from the divine presence, and quits the super-celestial abode, in order to admire the beauties of nature, and entertain herself with ambrosia, as a food less delicate, and more suitable to a finite being. It is in these intervals that she becomes false to her duty.

Pythagoras had learned the same doctrine among the Egyptians; we have still a very valuable monu­ment of it left in the commentary of Hierocles upon the golden verses ascribed to that philosopher *. ‘As our alienation from God, says this author, and the loss of the wings which used to raise us up to hea­venly things, hath thrown us down into this region of death, which is overrun with all manner of e­vils; so the stripping ourselves of earthly affecti­ons, and the revival of virtues in us make our wings grow again, and raise us up to the mansions of life, where true good is to be found without any mixture of evil. The essence of man being in the middle between beings that contemplate God with­out [Page 323] ceasing, and such as are not able to contem­plate him at all, he has it in his power to raise him­self up towards the one, or sink down towards the other *. The wicked man, says Hierocles in ano­ther place, does not care that the soul should be immortal, for fear he should live after death only to suffer punishment. But the judges of the shades below, as they form their judgment upon the rules of truth, do not decree, that the soul should exist no longer, but that it should be no longer vicious. Their business is to correct and cure it, by prescri­bing punishments for the health of nature, just as phy­sicians heal the most inveterate ulcers by incisions. These judges punish the crime in order to extirpate vice. They do not annihilate the essence of the soul, but bring it back to its true and genuine exist­ence, purifying it from all the passions that corrupt it. And therefore when we have sinned, we should be glad to embrace the punishment as the only remedy for vice.’

It is therefore evidently the doctrine of the most famous Greek philosophers, 1. That souls had a pre­existence in heaven. 2. That the Jupiter who marched at the head of souls before the loss of their wings, is distinct from the supreme Essence, and is very like the Mythras of the Persians, and the Orus of the Egyptians. 3. That souls lost their wings, and were thrust down into mortal bodies, because that instead of following Jupiter's chariot, they gave themselves too much up to the enjoyment of lower pleasures. 4. That at the end of a certain period of time, the wings of the soul shall grow again, and Sa­turn shall resume the reins of his empire in order to restore the universe to its original splendor.

Let us now examine the Egyptian Mythology, the [Page 324] source from whence that of the Greeks was derived. I shall not offer to maintain the mystical explications that Kircher gives of the famous table of Isis, and of the obelisks that are to be seen at Rome: I confine myself to Plutarch, who has preserved to us an ad­mirable monument of that Mythology. To repre­sent it in its real beauties, it will be proper to give a short and clear analysis of his treatise of Isis and Osi­ris, which is a letter written to Clea, priestess of Isis. *The Egyptian Mythology, says Plutarch, has two senses, the one sacred and sublime, the other sensible and palpable. 'Tis for that reason that the Egyptians put Sphinxes before the door of their temples; designing thereby to signify to us that their theology contains the secrets of wisdom under enigmatical words. This is also the sense of the inscription upon a statue of Pallas or Isis, at Sais, I AM ALL THAT IS, HAS BEEN, AND SHALL BE, AND NO MORTAL HAS EVER YET REMOVED THE VAIL THAT COVERS ME.’ He afterwards relates the Egyptian fable of Isis and Osiris. ‘They were both born of Rhea and the Sun; whilst they were still in their mother's womb, they jointly ingender­ed the God Orus the living image of their sub­stance. Typhon was not born, but burst violently through the ribs of Rhea. He afterwards revolted against Osiris, filled the universe with his rage and violence, tore the body of his brother in pieces, mangled his limbs, and scattered them about. E­ver since that time, Isis goes wandering about the earth to gather up the scattered limbs of her bro­ther and husband. The eternal and immortal soul of Osiris led his son Orus to the shades below, where he gave him instructions how to fight, and vanquish Typhon. Orus returned upon earth, sought and defeated Typhon, but did not kill him; [Page 325] he only bound him, and took away his power of doing mischief. The wicked one made his escape afterwards, and was going to throw all again into disorder: but Orus fought him in two bloody bat­tles, and destroyed him entirely.’ Plutarch goes on thus; * ‘Whoever applieth these allegories to the divine Nature, ever blessed and immortal, de­serves to be treated with contempt, We must not however believe that they are mere fables without any meaning, like those of the poets. They repre­sent to us things that really happened. It would be likewise a dangerous error, and manifest impiety to interpret what is said of the Gods, as Evemerus the Messenian did, and apply it to the ancient Kings and great generals. This would in the end serve to destroy religion, and estrange men from the Deity . There are others, adds he, much juster in their notions, who have wrote, that what­ever is related of Typhon, Osiris, Isis, and Orus must be understood of genn and demons. This was the opinion of Pythagoras, Plato, xenocrates and Chrysippus, who followed the ancient Theolo­gists in this notion. All those great men maintain­ed that these genii were very powerful, and far su­perior to mortals; chat they did not however par­take of the Deity in a pure and simple manner, but were composed of a spiritual and a corporeal na­ture, and were consequently capable of pleasures and pains, passions and changes; for there are vir­tues and vices among the genii as well as among men. Hence come the fables of the Greeks con­cerning the Titans and Giants, the engagements of Python against Apollo, and the furies and extrava­gancies of Bacchus, with several other fictions like those of Osiris and Typhon. Hence it is likewise that Homer speaks of good and evil demons. Plato [Page 326] calls the first tutelary deities, because they are me­diators between the Deity and men, carry up the prayers of mortals to heaven, and bring us from thence the knowledge and revelation of secrets and future things.’ ‘Empedocles, continues he, says that the evil demons are punished for the faults they have committed. First the sun precipitates them into the air; the air casts them into the deep sea; the sea vomits them up upon the land, and from the earth they are raised at last to heaven.—thus are they transported from one place to ano­ther, till being in the end punished and purified, they return to the place adapted to their nature.’ Plutarch, after having thus given a theological ex­planation of the Egyptian allegories, gives likewise the physical explications of them; but he rejects them all, and returns to his first doctrine. * Osiris is nei­ther the sun, nor the water, nor the earth, nor the heaven; but whatever there is in nature well dis­posed, well regulated, good and perfect, all that is the image of Osiris. Typhon is neither aridity, nor the fire, nor the sea; but whatever is hurtful, in­constant and irregular.’ We must observe that in this Egyptian allegory, Osiris does not signify, as in other places, the first principle of Deity, the Agathos of Plato, but the son of Ammon, the Apollo of the Greeks, Jupiter the Conductor, a god inferior to the supreme Deity. It was an ancient opinion among the Pagans and Hebrews, that the Divinity had uni­ted himself to the first and most perfect production of his power.

Plutarch goes farther in another treatise, and ex­plains to us the origin of evil: his reasoning [...] occasion is equally solid and subtile, and is as follows: ‘The maker of the world, being perfectly good, [Page 327] formed all things at first, as far as was possible like himself. The world at its birth received from him who made it, all sorts of good things; whatever it has at present of unhappy and wicked, is an indis­position foreign to its nature. God cannot be the cause of evil, because he is sovereignly good: mat­ter cannot be the cause of evil, because it has no active force; but evil comes from a third principle, neither so perfect as God, nor so imperfect as mat­ter. This third being is intelligent nature, which hath within itself a source, a principle, and cause of motion.’

I have already shewn that the schools of Pythago­ras and Plato asserted liberty of will. The former expresses it by that faculty of the soul, whereby it can either raise or debase itself; the other by the wings of the soul, that is the love of virtue and the love of pleasure, which may move different ways. Plutarch follows the same principles, and makes liberty consist in the activity of the soul, by which it is the source of its own determinations.

This opinion therefore ought not to be looked up­on as modern; it is at once both natural and philo­sophical. The soul can always separate and re-unite, recal and compare her ideas, and on this activity de­pends her liberty. We can always think upon other goods than those we are actually thinking of. It must be owned that the passions, by strong sensations they excite in us, sometimes take up all the capacity of the soul, and hinder it from reflecting; they dark­en its discerning faculty, and hurry it on to an assent, they transform objects, and place them in a wrong light; but strong as they are, they are never invin­cible; it is difficult indeed, but not impossible, to sur­mount them; it is always in our power gradually to diminish their force, and prevent their excess. This is the warfare of man on earth, and this is the tri­umph of virtue. The heathens feeling this tyranny [Page 328] of the passions, were convinced by the light of nature alone of the necessity of a celestial power to subdue them: they always represent virtue to us a [...] divine energy descending from heaven: they are continual­ly bringing into their poems guardian deities, who inspire, enlighten and strengthen us; to shew that heroic virtues can only proceed from the gods. These were the principle upon which the wise ancients went, in their arguments against those notions of fa­tality, which are alike destructive of religion, morali­ty and society.

To return to the Egyptians. Their doctrine, ac­cording to Plutarch, supposes, 1. That the world was created without any physical or moral evil, by a being infinitely good. 2. That several genii abusing their liberty, fell into crimes, and thereby into mise­ry. 3. That these genii must suffer expiatory pu­nishments till they are purified and restored to their first state. 4. That the God Orus, the son of Isis and Osiris, and who fights with the evil principle, is a subordinate deity, like Jupiter the Conductor the son of Saturn.

Let us consult next the Mythology of the Orien­tals: the nearer we approach the first origin of nati­on the more pure shall we find their theology. * ‘Zoroaster says Plutarch, taught that there are two gods contrary to each other in their operations; the one the anthor of all the good, the other of all the evil in nature. The good Principal he calls Oromazes, the other the demon Arimanius . He says that the one resembles light and truth, the o­ther darkness and ignorance. There is likewise a middle God between these two, named Mythras whom the Persians call the intercessor or Mediator. The Magi add, that Oromazes is born of the pur­est light, and Arimanius of darkness; that they [Page 329] make continually war with one another, and that Oromuzes made six genii, goodness, truth, justice, wisdom, plenty and joy; and Arimanius made six others to oppose them, malice, falshood, injustice, folly, want and sadness. Oromazes having with­drawn himself to as great a distance from the sphere of Arimanius, as the sun is from the earth, beauti­fied the heavens with stars and constellations. He created afterwards four and twenty other genii, and put them into an egg (by which the ancients mean the earth; but Arimanius and his genii broke through this shining egg, and immediately evil was blended and confounded with good. But there will come a time appointed by fate, when Arimani­us will be entirely destroyed and extirpated; the earth will change its form, and become plain and e­ven; and happy men will have only one and the same life, language and government.’ Theopom­pus writes also, ‘that according to the doctrine of the Magi, these gods must make war for nine thou­sand years, the one destroying the other's work, till at last hell shall be no more; then men shall be happy, and their bodies become transparent. The God who made all things keeps himself concealed that time; an interval not two long for a God, but rather like a moment of sleep.’

We have lost the ancient books of the first Persi­ans; so that in order to judge of their Mythology, we must have recourse to the oriental philosophers of our own time, and see if there be still left among the disciples of Zoroaster, any traces of the ancient doc­trine of their master. The famous Dr. Hyde, a di­vine of the Church of England, who had travelled into the East, and perfectly understood the language of the country, has translated the following passages out of Sharisthani, an Arabian Philosopher of the fif­teenth [Page 330] century * ‘The first Magi did not look upon the two Principles as coeternal, but believed that light was eternal, and that darkness was pro­duced in time: and the origin of this evil principle they account for in this manner: light can produce nothing but light, and can never be the origin of evil; how then was evil produced? Light say they, produced several beings, all of them spiritual, luminous and powerful; but their chief, whose name was Ahriman or Arimanius, had an evil though contrary to the light: he doubted, and by that doubting he became dark. From hence pro­ceeded all evils; dissention, malice, and every thing else of a contrary nature to the light. These two principles made war upon one another, till at last peace was concluded upon condition that the lower world should be in subjection to Arimanius, for se­ven thousand years: after this space of time he is to surrender back the world to the light.’ Here we see the four notions that I speak of in the fore­going work: 1. A state before good and evil were blended and confounded together. 2. A state after they were so blended and confounded. 3. A state when evil shall be entirely destroyed. 4. A middle God between the good and the evil Principle.

As the doctrine of the Persian Magi is a sequal of the doctrine of the Indian Brachmans, we must con­sult the one to put the other in a clear light. We have but few traces left of the ancient theology of the Gymnosophists, yet those which Strabo has pre­served, suppose the two states of the world, that of nature in its purity, and that of nature corrupted.—When this historian has described the life and man­ners of the Brachmans, he adds, Those philoso­phers [Page 331] look upon the state of men in this life to be like that of children in their mothers womb; death according to their notion, being a birth to a true and happy life. They believe, that whatever hap­pens to mortals here does not deserve the name ei­ther of good or evil. They have many notions in common with the Greeks; and like them believe that the world had a beginning, and will have an end: and that God who made it, and governs it, is every where present to his work.’ The same author goes on in this manner; ‘Onesecritus being sent by Alexander the Great to inform himself of the life, manners and doctrine of those philoso­phers, found a Brachman named Calanus, who taught him the following principles. Formerly, plenty reigned over all nature; milk, wine, honey and oil flowed from fountains, but men having made an ill use of this felicity, Jupiter deprived them of it, and condemned them to labor for the sustenance of their lives.’

In order to form a better judgment of the doctrine of the ancient Gymnosophists, I have consulted what has been translated of the Vedam, which is the sa­cred book of the modern Bramins; though its anti­quity be not perhaps so great as it is affirmed to be, yet there is no denying but it contains the ancient traditions of those people, and of their philosophers. 'Tis plain by this book, * That the Bramins ac­knowledge one sole and supreme God, whom they call Vistnou; that his first and most ancient pro­duction was a secondary god, named Brama, whom the supreme God formed out of a flower that float­ed upon the surface of the great deep before the formation of the world; and that Vistnou after­wards, on account of Brama's virtue, gratitude and [Page 332] fidelity, gave him power to form the universe.’ They believe moreover. That souls are eternal emanations from the divine Essence, or at least that they were produced long before the formation of the world; that they were originally in a state of purity, but having sinned, were thrown down into the bodies of men, or of beasts according to their respective demerits; so that the body, where the soul resides, is a sort of dungeon or prison. Lastly, they hold, that after a certain number of transmi­grations, all souls shall be re-united to their origin, re-admitted into the company of the Gods, and de­ified .’

I should hardly have thought these traditions au­thentic, or have brought myself to trust to the trans­lators of the Vedam, if this doctrine had not been perfectly agreeable to that of Pythagoras, which I gave an account of a little before: this philosopher taught the Greeks nothing but what he had learned form the Gymnosophists.

The discovery of these uniform and agreeing sen­timents in Greece, Egypt, Persia, and the Indies, made me desirous to advance farther into the East, and to carry my researches as far as China. I appli­ed myself accordingly to such as understood the lan­guage of that country, had spent several years in it, and were well versed in the original books of that nation. And in this point particularly I have made great use of the informations I have received from a gentleman of a superior genius, who does not care to be mentioned till he has published a large work upon these matters, which will be of service to religion, and do honor to human understanding. In the mean time he has allowed me to publish the following pas­sages, which he translated himself out of some ancient [Page 333] Chinese books that have been brought into Europe; and which may be both seen at Paris and at Rome; so that all who understand the language may judge of the faithfulness of the translation. The ancient commentaries on the book Yking, i.e. the book of Changes, continually speak of a double heaven, a pri­mitive and a posterior. The first heaven is there de­scribed in the following manner:

‘All things were then in a happy state, every thing was beautiful, every thing was good, all beings were perfect in their kind. In this happy age hea­ven and earth employed their virtues jointly to em­bellish nature. There was no jarring in the ele­ments, no inclemency in the air, all things grew without labor, an universal fertility reigned every where. The active and passive virtues conspired together without any effort or opposition, to pro­duce and perfect the universe.’ In the books which the Chinese call King or Sacred, we read the fol­lowing passage: ‘Whilst the first state of heaven lasted, a pure pleasure and a perfect tranquility reigned over all nature. There were neither la­bor, nor pains, nor sorrow, nor crimes—Nothing made opposition to the will of man.’ The philoso­phers who stuck to these ancient traditions, and par­ticularly Tchouangse, say, ‘that in the state of the first heaven, man was united inwardly to the su­perme Reason, and that outwardly he practised all the works of justice: The heart rejoiced in truth, and there was no mixture of falshood; then the four seasons of the year succeeded each other regu­larly without confusion: there were no impetuous winds nor excessive rains; the sun and the moon, without ever being clouded, furnished a light purer and brighter than at present. The five planets kept on their course without any inequality. There was nothing which did harm to man, or which suf­fered [Page 334] any hurt from him—An universal amity and harmony reigned over all nature.’

On the other hand, the philosopher Hoainantse speaking of the latter heaven, says, ‘The pillars of heaven were broken; the earth was shaken to its very foundations; the heavens sunk lower towards the north; the sun, the moon and the stars chang­ed their motions; the earth fell to pieces; the wa­ters enclosed within its bosom, burst forth with vi­olence and overflowed it. Man rebelling against heaven, the system of the universe was quite disor­dered; the sun was eclipsed, the planets altered their course, and the universal harmony was disturb­ed.’ The philosophers Wentse and Lietse, who liv­ed long before Hoainantse, express themselves almost in the same terms. ‘The universal fertility of na­ture, say these ancient authors, degenerated into an ugly barrenness, the plants faded, the trees wi­thered away, disconsolate nature refused to distri­bute her usual bounty. All creatures declared war against one another; miseries and crimes overflow­ed the face of the earth.’ ‘All these evils arose, says the book Liki, from man's despising the su­preme Monarch of the universe. He would needs dispute about truth and falshood, and these disputes banished the eternal Reason. He then fixed his looks on terrestrial objects, and loved them to excess; hence arose the passions; he became gradually transformed into the objects he loved, and the ce­lestial reason entirely abandoned him. Such was the original source of all crimes, which drew after them all manner of miseries sent by heaven for the punishment thereof.’

The same books speak of a time when every thing is to be restored to its first splendor, by the coming of a hero called Kiun-Tse, which signifies Shepherd and Prince, to whom they give likewise the names of, the most Holy, the universal Teacher, and the supreme [Page 335] Truth. He answers exactly to the Mythras of the Persians, the Orus, or second Osiris of the Egyptians, the Apollo or Mercury of the Greeks, and the Bra­ma of the Indians.

The Chinese books speak likewise of the sufferings and conflicts of Kiun-Tse, just as the Persians do of the combats of Mythras, the Egyptians of the mur­der of Osiris, the Tyrians of the death of Adonis, and the Greeks of the labors and painful exploits of a son of Jupiter, who came down upon earth to extermi­nate monsters. It looks as if the source of all these allegories was an ancient tradition common to all na­tions, that the middle God was not to expiate and put an end to crimes but by his own great sufferings. In speaking of the death of Adonis in the foregoing work, I have made advantage of this tradition to pave the way for what Daniel says afterward to Cy­rus concerning the the suffering Messiah. I shall here give the reader an account of what I find in the religion of the Tyrians, and in the doctrine of the ancients, to authorize the new allegory which is ad­ded in the present edition. 1. The Tyrians acknow­ledged one supreme God, named Bel, who is the same with the Jehovah of the Hebrews *. 2. They held likewise a subordinate God, whom they called Tham­muz, Adon, Adonis, which signifies the Lord. 3. A­donis, Osiris, Apollo and Hercules, are the same . 4. The death of Adonis, killed by a boar, is the same with the murder of Osiris slain by Typhon, or the e­vil principle . 5. Solemn days were instituted by the Phoenicians to bewail the death of Adonis, and to sing praises to him as risen from the dead §. 6. [Page 336] Some ancient and venerable writers among the Chri­stians believed, that the fable of Adonis was a corrup­tion of an old tradition concerning the suffering Mes­siah, and apply all the Tyrian ceremonies to our my­steries *. 7. Adonis loved Venus, espoused her, and she became the mother of the Gods . 8. Urania, Astarte, Venus and Proserpine are the same God­dess . 9. Some think that Astarte is the morning star, Lucifer, or a fallen star §. 10. According to the doctrine of the ancients, as well Pagan as He­brew, spirits fell not at once, but by degrees, that is to say, from the fixed stars into the region of the pla­nets, from the planets to the earth, and from the earth to the infernal regions : for which reason I have represented these three different falls of spirits by the three names of Astarte, venus and Proser­pine. These are the foundations on which I have built the allegory of Adonis and Urania, which Ame­nophis rehearses to Cyrus in the seventh book. The only liberty I have taken is to make Urania represent, not the divine Wisdom, but fallen intelligences; as Psyche in Apuleius does not represent the soul of the world, but souls unfaithful to love: these kinds of metonymy are frequent in the allegorical and mytho­logical writers.

We see then that the doctrines of the primitive perfection of nature, its fall, and its restoration by a divine Hero, are equally manifest in the Mythologies of the Greeks, Egyptians, Persians, Indians and Chi­nese.

Let us now look into the Hebrew Mythology. By this I mean Rabbinism, or the philosophy of the Jew­ifh [Page 337] doctors, and particularly of the Essenes. These philosophers asserted, according to the testimony of Josephus *, ‘that the literal sense of the sacred text was only an image of hidden truths. They chan­ged, says Philo, the words , and precepts of wis­dom into allegories, after the custom of their ances­tors, who had left them several books for their in­struction in this science.’ 'Twas the universal taste of the Orientals to make use of corporeal images to represent the properties and operations of spirits.

This symbolical style seems in a great measure au­thorized by the sacred writers. The prophet Da­niel represents God to us under the image of the AN­TIENT OF DAYS. The Hebrew Mythologists and Cabalists, who were a succession of the schools of the Essenes, took occasion from thence to express the di­vine attributes by the members of the body of the ANTIENT OF DAYS. We see this allegory carried to an extravagance in the books of the Rabbins. They speak there of the dew that distilled from the brain of the ANTIENT OF DAYS, from his skull, his hair, his forehead, his eyes, and especially from his wonderful beard. These comparisons are undoubt­edly absurd, and unbecoming the majesty of God but the cabalistical philosophers pretend to authorise them by some metaphysical notions.

The creation, according to them, is a picture of the divine perfections: all created beings are conse­quently images more or less perfect of the supreme Being, in proportion as they have more or less con­formity with their original. Hence it follows that all creatures are in some respect like one another, and that man or the microcosm has a resemblance of the great world or macrocosm; the material world, of the intelligible world; and the intelligible world, of [Page 338] the Archetype, which is God. Such are the princi­ples upon which the allegorical expressions of the Ca­balists are founded. If we strip their Mythology of this mysterious language, we shall find in it sublime notions very like those we have before admired in the heathen philosophers. I shall mention four, which are clearly enough expressed in the works of the Rabbin Irira, Moschech and Jitzack, which Rit­tangelius has translated in his Cabala denudata.

1. ‘All spiritual substances, angels, human souls, and even the soul of the Messiah *, were created from the beginning of the world: and consequently our first parent, of whom Moses speaks, represents not an individual person, but all mankind governed by one sole Head. In that primitive state every thing was glorious and perfect: there was no­thing in the universe that suffered, because there was no such thing as crime. Nature was a real and a spotless image of the divine perfections.’ This answers to the reign of Ammon, Oromazes and Saturn. 2. The soul of the Messiah, by his per­severance in the divine love, came to a strict union with the pure Godhead , and was deservedly ad­vanced to be the King, the Head, and the Guide of all spirits.’ This notion has some resemblance of those which the Persians had of Mythras, the Egyp­tians of Osiris and Orus, and the Greeks of Jupiter the Guide, who led souls into the super-celestial a­bode. 3. § ‘The virtue, perfection and beatitude of spirits or Zephirots , consisted in continually [Page 339] receiving and rendering back the rays which flow­ed from the infinite centre, that so there might be an eternal circulation of light and happiness in all spirits. Two sorts of Zephirots failed in the ob­servance of this eternal law. The Cherubim, who were of a superior order, did not render back this light, but kept it within themselves, swelled, and became like vessels that are too full; at last they burst in pieces, and their sphere was changed into a gloomy chaos. The Ischim, who were of an in­ferior order, shut their eyes against this light, turn­ing themselves towards sensible objects ; they forgat the supreme beatitude of their nature, and took up with the enjoyment of created pleasures. They fell thereby into mortal bodies. 4. Souls pass through several revolutions before they return to their primitive state; but after the coming of the Messiah, all spirits will be restored to order, and to the happiness which they enjoyed before the sin of our first parent.’ I shall now leave the read­er to judge whether these four notions have not a great resemblance of those which we have found in China, Persia, Egypt and Greece, and whether I had not sufficient authority to give the four mythological pictures which are in the foregoing work.

In all these systems we see that the ancient philo­sophers, in order to refute the objections of the impi­ous concerning the origin and duration of evil, adopt­ed the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, and their final restoration. Several Fathers of the Church maintained the first opinion, as the only philosophical way of explaining original sin; and Origen made use of the latter, to oppose the libertines of his time. It is far from my intention to defend these two opini­ons; all the use I would make of them is to shew, [Page 340] that reason alone furnishes arguments sufficient to confound such philosophers as refuse to believe unless they can comprehend.

It is for this reason that I make Daniel speak a dif­ferent language from Eleazer. The prophet advises Cyrus to lay aside all refined speculations, and to leave to God the care of justifying the incomprehensible steps of his providence; he plunges him again in an obscurity, more wholesome and more suitable to hu­man weakness, than all the conjectures of philoso­phers; he reduces what we are to believe on this subject to these four principal truths.

1. God being infinitely good, cannot produce wick­ed and miserable beings; and therefore the moral and physical evil, which we see in the universe, must come from the abuse that men make of their liberty. 2. Human nature is fallen from the first purity in which it was created; and this mortal life is a state of trial, in which souls are cured of their corruption, and merit a happy immortality by their virtue. 3. God united himself to human nature in order to expi­ate moral evil by his sacrifice: the Messiah will come at last in his glory to destroy physical evil, and renew the face of the earth. 4. These truths have been transmitted to us from age to age, from the time of the deluge till now, by an universal tradition; other nations have obscured and altered this tradition by their fables; it has been preserved in its purity no where but in the Holy Scriptures, the authority of which cannot be disputed with any shadow of reason.

It is a common notion that all the footsteps of na­tural and revealed religion which we see in the hea­then poets and philosophers, are originally owing to their having read the books of Moses; but it is im­possible to answer the objections which are made a­gainst this opinion. The Jews and their books were too long concealed in a corner of the earth, to be rea­sonably thought the primitive light of the Gentiles; [Page 341] we must go farther back, even to the deluge. It is surprising that those, who are convinced of the autho­rity of the sacred books, have not made advantage of this system to prove the truth of the Mosaic history concerning the origin of the world, the universal de­luge, and the re-peopling of the earth by Noah. It is hard to account for that uniformity of sentiments which we find in the religions of all nations, other­wise than by the doctrine which I have put in the mouth of Daniel.

As the four great principles, which I have menti­oned, are the foundation of our religion, my design was to do homage to it, by endeavoring to defend them against the vain cavils of audacious critics, and the superstitious prejudices of weak minds. One of the chief sources of modern incredulity is the false no­tion which impious men have entertained of Christia­nity. Nor indeed can we think it strange, if, while the Christian mysteries are represented in a wrong light, the principles of religion confounded with the abuses of those principles, and scholastic expositions with doctrines of faith, the miracles should pass for imposture, and the facts for fables. If we would en­gage those, who in simplicity of heart seek after truth, to listen to the proofs of revealed religion, we must begin by shewing them that its doctrines are worthy of God; and this has been my aim throughout the foregoing work. Whether I have succeeded or not, my intention was upright; and I shall not repine at the imperfection of this attempt, if I may have given occasion to any person of more learning and depth to recommend that philosophy, which teaches never to employ the imagination but as the servant of reason, to direct all improvements of the understanding to the purification of the heart, and avoiding all ostentati­ons parade of the sciences, to make use of them only to discover the beauties of eternal truth to those who are capable of being enamoured with them.

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A LETTER FROM M. FRERET (MEMBER OF THE ACADEMY OF INSCRIPTIONS AT PARIS) TO THE AUTHOR, CONCERNING THE CHRONOLOGY OF HIS WORK.

SIR,

THERE have, perhaps, been more different systems formed, to settle the history of Cyrus, and the chronology of the Kings of Babylon, than for any other part of ancient story. But these hypothesis are all so defective, and so ill connected with contemporary e­vents, that we are stopped almost at every step, by the contradictions and inconsistencies we meet with in them. This every man's experience shews him to be true, who reads the writings of Scaliger, Petau, Usher, Marsham, the bishop of Meaux and Prideaux.

But in your work you have wisely avoided these difficulties, and have hit upon the best method of re­conciling the contradictory accounts which Herodotus, Ctesias, Xenophon, and other ancient writers, give us of Cyrus. You have preserved this Prince's war with his grandfather Astyages; a war which the an­cients allow to be certain, and which Xenophon him­self acknowledges in his retreat of the ten thousand; he suppressed this fact in his Cyropaedia, only to a­void throwing a blemish on Cyrus's character, by a war which he thought contrary to natural duty: Prideaux has likewise thought fit to suppress it.— [Page 343] Marsham has invented a mere romance, and suppo­ses that there were two different kingdoms of the Medes, which were at the same time governed by two Astyages', one the grandfather and the other the enemy of Cyrus. The method you have taken is more simple, and more agreeable to ancient story; you have paved the way for this war, and conducted it in such a manner, that it does in no wise stain the character of your hero.

The omission of so considerable an event led Xeno­phon into two anachronisms in order to find employ­ment for Cyrus in his younger years: this author an­tedates the taking of Sardis 25 years, and that of Babylon 28. As this historian had nothing in view but military virtues and qualities of a true patriot, whereby to form his hero, his scheme did not furnish him with the same materials to fill up Cyrus's youth as yours does. He had no thoughts of instilling into his mind, such principles as would most effectually se­cure him from the dangers which beset the virtue of Princes, or of guarding him before hand against the corruption of false politics and false philosophy, which are, in their consequences, equally fatal to society. Xenophon, having been educated in Greece, was ac­quainted only with the kingdoms of Sparta and Ma­cedon, whose Kings were, properly speaking, nothing more than the chief persons in their state; and the magistrates were rather their colleagues than their ministers. He had no notion of the abuses of despotic powe [...], and therefore could have no thoughts of pre­venting them. Whereas your design being to form a King, rather than a conqueror, a Prince better qualified to make his people happy under his govern­ment, than to force them to submit to his laws; you are thereby enabled to give Cyrus full employment in his youth by making him travel, and that very consistent with true chronology.

Cyrus died the 218th year of Nabonassar, and 530 [Page 344] years before the Christian Aera, which I shall not lose time in proving, because acknowledged by all chronologers. This Prince was then 70 years of age, according to Dinon, the author of a celebrated history of Persia *. He was therefore born in the 148th year of Nabonassar, 600, or 599 years before Christ. He had reigned, according to the astronomi­cal canon, nine years at Babylon. This city was therefore taken in the 61st year of his age, the 209th of Nabonassar, and the 539th before Christ.

Sardis was taken, according to Sosicrates in Dio­genes Laertius , and according to Solinus , in the fourth year of the 58th Olympiad.; but according to Eusebius, in the first year of that Olympiad; and consequently either in the 545th or 548th year be­fore Christ, and the 52d or 55th year of Cyrus's life. He reigned 30 years over the Medes and Persians, according to Herodotus and Ctesias, and he was 40 years old according to Dinon, when he mounted the throne; which fixes the beginning of his reign to the 188th year of Nabonassar, the first year of the 55th Olympiad, and the 560th year before Christ. § E [...]sebius tells us, that all chronologists agreed in placing the beginning of Cyrus's reign over the Medes and Persians in this year of the 55th Olympi­ad. But historians have neither told us how many years Cyrus's war with the Medes lasted, nor any particulars of what happened in the first forty years of his life: you are therefore at full liberty to fill up this space with whatever you judge most proper to your design; and your chronology is not only agree­able to that of the Greeks and Persians, but likewise to that of the Babylonians.

Xenophon indeed has changed all this chronology: [Page 345] According to him Cyrus went to the court of Media at 12 years, stayed there 4 years, returned in his 16th year; entered into the class of the Young men in his 17th, and continued in it 10 years. To which he adds, that Astyages died in this interval, but this is not true; for that Prince reigned till he was con­quered by Cyrus in the year 560, and did not die till some years after: you have therefore done well in not following Xenophon. According to him, Cyrus entered Media at the head of 30000 men when he was 28 year of age; subdued the Armenians at 29; marched against the Lydians, and took Sardis at 30; and made himself master of Babylon at 33, about the year 567. This is the 179th year of Nabonassar, and the 36th of Nabuchodonosor, who reigned 7 years after it; these 7 years added to the 21 years of the four Kings who reigned in Babylon after him, make the 28 years of the anachronism above-mentioned. The rest of Xenophon's chronology is of no impor­tance to your work. He does not determine the time of the death either of Mandana or Cambyses, and therefore you are entirely at liberty to place these events as will best suit with your plan.

The city of Tyre was not taken till the 19th year of Nabuchodonosor, after a thirteen years siege, which began the seventh of that Prince's reign, ac­cording to the Phoenician annals which Josephus had read. In the year Jerusalem was taken, which was the 18th year of Nabuchodonosor, the phrophet Eze­kial threatens Tyre with approaching ruin; it there­fore was not taken at that time; Cyrus was then 15 years of age: now, as his travels are all placed be­tween the 28th and 32d year of his age, and as he does not go to Tyre till after his travels in Greece, you are guilty of no anachronism in this particular; moreover, what you relate of the history of this city sufficiently fills up the 15 or 16 years from the time of its being conquered by the Babylonians.

[Page 346] We have no where any express passage whereby to fix the time of Nabuchodonosor's madness; that he was mad is certain from Daniel, and it is very proba­ble it happened towards the end of his life; my rea­sons for it are these. Jehoiachin was carried into capativity in the 8th year of Nabuchodonosor's reign over Judea, and the 4th of his reign in Babylon; that is, the 148th year of Nabonassar, 600 years be­fore Christ, and the year Cyrus was born. We are told in Jeremiah *, and in the second book of Kings that in the 37th year of Jehoiachin's captivity, Evil­merodach ascended the throne of Babylon, took Je­hoiachin out of prison, admitted him to his own table, and heaped many honors upon him; this was the 184th year of Nabonassar, the 564th before Christ, and the 37th [...] Cyrus's age; at which time Nabu­chodonosor was yet alive, since he did not die till the 186th of Nabonassar, 562 years before Christ, and the 39th of Cyrus; Evilmerodach therefore did not only mount the throne in his father's life-time, but he governed without consulting him, and with so little dependance upon him, as not to fear provoking him by taking quite different measures from his, and heaping honors on a Prince, whom his father had all along kept in fetters. Berosus makes the Prince, whom he calls Evilmerodach, to have reigned 10 years, the astronomical canon allows him but two, and calls him Hovardam; the Scripture places him upon the throne three years before the death of his father.

All these difficulties will vanish, if we suppose that Nabuchodonosor's madness began eight years before his death, and that his son Evilmerodach was from that time looked upon as King, placed himself at the head of affairs, and governed the empire with his fa­ther's ministers; these eight years, joined with the [Page 347] two he reigned alone after his father's death, make up the ten years of Berosus; the holy scriptures be­gin his reign later, doubtless from the time that he removed the ministers who made him uneasy, which did not happen till the third year before the death of Nabuchodonosor. This Prince's madness continued but seven years; after that time he recovered his senses, re-assumed the government, and published an edict in favor of the Jews, which is related in Daniel; his name had all along been made use of in the public acts, and for this reason the astronomical canon makes his son Ilovarodam to have reigned but two years; this canon was drawn up from the public acts. Nabuchodonosor's madness must have produced great revolutions in the court of Babylon, and we may form an idea of them from what passed in the court of France during that of Charles VI. when the ma­nagement of affairs was one while lodged in the hands of the Queen, sometimes in those of his chil­dren and at other times in those of the great Lords and Princes of the blood. Upon this supposition which is both easy and necessary, Nabuchodonosor's madness will have happened in the 179th year of Nabonassar, the 569th before Christ, and the 32d of Cyrus's age; this Prince must have been informed of that event, for it was of great importance to him to know it; it is not to be doubted but it had its influ­ence in the war of the Medes and the Persians. The kings of Babylon were allied to those of the Medes: Nabuchodonosor had married a daughter of Astya­ges; the Babylonians would have taken some part in this war, had it not been for the weakness of their government, occasioned by the King's madness, and for the divisions which prevailed at court among the different parties that contended for the direction of affairs. Nay, it is probable that Queen Amytis en­deavored to reconcile the Medes and Persians; be­cause, independently of the ties of blood, it was a­gainst [Page 348] her interest to have either of those nations sub­due the other. The sight of so great a conqueror reduced to so deplorable a condition, must have been a very proper spectacle for the instruction of Cyrus, and you had great reason not to neglect it. He re­turned from his travels, according to your chronolo­gy, about the 32d year of his age, after Nabuchodo­nosor's madness had already seized him: Cyrus spent near seven years in Pesia, governing under his fa­ther; during which time all the intrigues between Cyaxares and Soranes were carried on, Cambyses made war with the Medes and Astyages died; after which Cyrus went to Babylon, to negotiate affairs with Amytis a little before Nabuchodonosor's mad­ness left him; this time was judiciously chosen to make the sight more affecting and instructive.

Your chronology, with regard to political affairs, and the revolutions which happened in Cyrus's time, is therefore perfectly agreeable to that of the Greeks, Babylonians and Hebrews; let us now enquire, whe­ther the great men whom you make Cyrus to have seen in his travels were his contemporaries; you may indeed be allowed a greater liberty in this case than in the former. You know how the ancients contra­dict one another with regard to the time when Zo­roaster lived; which doubtless proceeds from hence, that the name of Zoroaster was given to all those, who at different times, reformed the religion of the Magi. The last of these was the most famous, and is the only one who is known by that name, or by the name of Zardouseht in the East. Prideaux makes him contemporary with Cambyses and Darius the son of Hystaspes, but it is very probable he lived some time before them. The Orientals as may be seen in Dr. Hyde's works, make him to have lived under Gustaspes or Hystespes, the father of Darab, who is the first Darius according to the Greeks. This Gus­taspes was older than Cyrus, and may have been the [Page 349] same person whom you make his governor. Whence it necessarily follows, that the reformation of the re­ligion of the Magi must have been made during his reign, and that Zoroaster lived at that time. The reformation made by Darius supposes that the Magi had assumed to themselves very great authority, which he toook away from them. He likewise corrupted the purity of Zoroaster's religion, by a mixture of foreign idolatry. In his reign the worship of Anaitis was first brought into Persia, contrary to the hypo­thesis of Dr. Prideaux. Your scheme is more agreeable to the course of the history, and to those facts which are common to the Greek, Persian and Arabian writers.

Cyrus may have married Cassandana at 18 years of age, and have lived with her nine or ten years; so that he may have travelled into Egypt about the 29th year of his age. Your chronology agrees ex­actly with the age of Amasis. All chronologists con­cur in fixing the end of his reign to the year before Cambyses's expedition, that is, about the 525th year before Christ, and the 63d Olympiad. Herodotus makes his reign to have lasted 44 years; and conse­quently places the beginning of it in the 569th year before Christ, and the 52d Olympiad, and about the 30th year of Cyrus. Diodorus indeed, who makes Amasis to have reigned 55 years, supposes that he as­cended the throne in the 579th or 580th year before Christ, and the 20th year of Cyrus's age: but these two opinions are easily reconciled. Herodotus begins Amasis's reign at the end of the revolution which placed him on the throne, and Diodorus at the be­ginning of his revolt.

Apries must have lived but a little time after the taking of Jerusalem, since the prophet Jeremiah * foretells his death under the name of Pharaoh-Ho­phra, as what was soon to happen. Jerusalem was taken in the year 589 before Christ, and the 63d be­fore [Page 350] Amasis's death, which shew that the troubles in Egypt were already begun. According to your sy­stem Amasis governed all Egypt in tranquility when Cyrus went thither and Apries had already been dead several years ; which is agreeable both to pro­fane and sacred history, Cyrus being between 28 and 30 years of age when he travelled.

The Greek chronology indeed will not be so easily reconciled to yours, but the anachronism will not ex­ceed 12 or 14 years. Chilo was, according to Her­mippus, as quoted by Diogenes Laertius , advanced in age at the time of the 52d Olympiad. This Olym­piad began in the 573d year before Christ, and ended in the 570th, which was the 30th of Cyrus. This was before his Ephorate, which Pamphyla places in the 56th Olympiad, but this passage is manifestly cor­rupted. The anonymous author of the chronology of the Olympiads, fixes the time of the magistracy of Chilo to that of the archonship of Euthydemes at A­thens, that is, to the 81st year before Xerxes's pas­sage into Asia, according to the chronology § of the Arundelian marbles. This was the 561st year be­fore Christ, and the 38th of Cyrus, which agrees per­fectly well with your chronology; for Cyrus might have seen Chilo eight years before, as he went to Sparta, and when he was thirty years of age.

Periander died, according to Sosicrates, at the end of the 48th Olympiad, the 585th year before Christ, and the 16th of Cyrus. The ancients tell us he had reigned 40 years, and began to flourish about the 38th Olympiad. You postpone his death 12 or 14 years; but as you do this only to make Cyrus a witness of his desperate death, the anachronism is a beauty, and is otherwise of little importance.

[Page 351] Pisistratus's reign over the Athenians did not begin till 560 years before Christ, 71 before the battle of Marathon, according to Thucydides *, and 100 be­fore the tyranny of the 400 at Athens. Cyrus was then 40 years old, so that your anachronism here is only of 9 or 10 years. And with regard to Solon, you are guilty of no anachronism at all. His Archon­ship, and his reformation of the government of Athens were in the year 597 before Christ, and the 3d year of the 46th Olympiad He spent a considerable time in travelling, and did not return to Athens till he was advanced in years, which would not suffer him to be concerned in public affairs any more. He died at the age of 80 years, in the second year of Pisistra­tus's reign, according to Phanias of Eresa, and in the 41st year of Cyrus; who might therefore have con­versed with him nine or ten years before.

You ought likewise to give yourself as little con­cern about the bringing Pythagoras and Cyrus toge­ther. Dionysius Halicarnassus tells us , that the former went into Italy about the 50th Olympiad, that is about the 577th year before Christ. He makes use of the word PATA (about), which shew that this date need not be strictly taken. And indeed Diogenes Laertius shews us, that he flourished about the 60th Olympiad, that is, about 40 years after: which if we understand of the time of his death, which was at the age of 80, he will then have been 50 years old when he went into Italy, and he will appear to have been born about the 520th year before Christ. If Pytha­goras the philosopher be the same with him who of­fered to fight at the Olympic games among the chil­dren, and upon being rejected desired to be received among the men, and gained the prize in the 48th O­lympiad; he was 16 or 17 in the year 585 before Christ, and was scarce older than Cyrus. This is the [Page 352] opinion of Dr. Bentley, who is able to defend himsef against all the objections which have been made to him. But without entering into this dispute, it is sufficient for your vindication, that Pythagoras was returned from his travels, and capable of conferring with Cyrus when this Prince went into Greece, in the year 565 before Christ; which cannot be denied in any of the different systems which the learned have formed concerning the time of Pythagoras's life.

You have likewise sufficient foundation for bring­ing him into a dispute with Anaximander. This phi­losopher must have seen Pythagoras though he was older than he, being, according to Apossodorus in Diogenes Laertius, 64 years of age in the 2d year of the 48th Olympiad, that is, in the year 585 before Christ. And it is likewise a beauty in your work to see the young Pythagoras triumphing over the so­phistry of the Materialist. It is not to be doubted but the Milesian philosopher was the first inventor of the doctrine of the Atomists; as Aristotle, Cicero, Plutarch and Simplicius [...]. The TOU A [...]BIRON of Anaximander was an infinite matter: his doctrine is the same with that of Spinoza.

You see, Sir, that complaisance had no part in my approbation of the chronology of your book; you were not obliged to adhere so scrupulously to truth, you might have contented yourself with probability: the nature of your work did not require more; ne­vertheless this exactness will, I am persuaded give it new beauties in the opinion of those who are versed in ancient history. Exactness is not incompatable with a fine imagination; and [...] into dryness only when a writer [...] cold and heavy genius.

I am, &c.FRERET.
FINIS.

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