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A SERIOUS ADDRESS TO SUCH OF THE PEOPLE CALLED QUAKERS, On the CONTINENT of NORTH-AMERICA, As profess SCRUPLES relative to the PRESENT GOVERMENT: EXHIBITING The ancient real TESTIMONY of that PEOPLE, concerning OBEDIENCE to CIVIL AUTHORITY. WRITTEN before the DEPARTURE of the BRITISH ARMY from Philadelphia, 1778. BY A NATIVE OF PENNSYLVANIA. To which are added, for the Information of all RATIONAL ENQUIRERS, AN APPENDIX, CONSISTING OF EXTRACTS from an ESSAY concerning OBEDIENCE to the SUPREME POWERS, and the DUTY of SUBJECTS in all REVOLUTIONS, published in England soon after the Revolu­tion of 1688.

PHILADELPHIA: Printed by R. BELL, next Door to St. Paul's Church, Third street. M.DCC.LXXVIII.

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A serious ADDRESS to the People called QUAKERS, on the Continent of North-America, relative to the late great Revolution.

AS there are divers opinions in the Society, respecting the presont Government, and doubts in the minds of some, whether it be right or proper to withdraw their obedience from preceding rulers and powers, and to submit to rulers and powers, who are separated from, and set up in the stead and without the consent of, the former: The right understanding and settling of this point appears to be the first necessary consideration. I would therefore, in the first place, observe and lay it down as an axiom, that, in cases of such maguitude as the present, there must certainly be something more than human, and that God Al­mighty, the Supreme Governor of the Universe, who is no re­specter of persons, who doeth whatsoever he pleaseth with the powers of this world, setteth up and pulleth down whomsoever he pleaseth, and, for causes best known unto himself, hath allow­ed and permitted, and still doth allow and permit, changes and alterations in and of states and empires, to take place. It may not be amiss to call to mind the va­tious mighty and well-known re­volutions that he hath permitted at different times, not only a­mongst the people of Great Bri­tain, but most if not all the em­pires and people upon the face of the earth, to the subduing and setting aside one, and raising up another in the room thereof, from the times of Saul and David down to this very day; some of which, for the sake of the doubting, un­informed, or inconsiderate, I shall remark, as concisely as conveni­ently may be.

The kingdom of Saul, which was the first we read of in Holy Writ, although regularly and so­lemnly established, yet by degrees was weakened and reduced, and that of David by degrees raised over it; the introduction and rise of whose government we may see 1 Sam. 22, where we find that, on account of Saul's tyranny, David fled ‘and escaped to the cave of Adullam, and when his brethren, and all his fa­ther's house heard it, they went down thither to him, and every one that was in distress, and every one that was in debt, and every one that was discon­tented, and gathered them­selves unto him, and he be­came a Captain over them:’ This was the beginning of Da­vid's power, and these men, we learn, continued together with David until he was made King in Saul's stead, which, though by the order and appointment of Providence, yet it may be ob­served that it was contrary to na­ture, as well as to the usual cus­toms of all ages, since David not being heir to the crown, the claim thereto upon those principles be­longing to the house of Saul, which I think, was notwithstand­ing declared should grow weaker and weaker, and that of David stronger and stronger.

[Page 2] And of Solomon, (David's son and immediate successor) the Lord declared, ‘Forasmuch as thou hast nor kept my covenant and my statutes which I have com­manded thee, I will surely rend the kingdom from thee, and will give it to thy servant. Notwithstanding in thy days, I will not do it, (for David thy father's sake) but I will rend it out of the hand of thy son. Howbeit I will not rend away all the kingdom, but will give one tribe to thy son, (for Da­vid my servant's sake, and for Jerusalem's sake, which I have chosen.’) And in the next verse it is expressly declared, that The Lord stirred up an adversary unto Solomon, Hadad the E­domite.’—And in the 23 d verse it is again said, that God stirred him up another adversa­ry, Rezon the son of Eliadah.’ Which passiges clearly manifest, that the hand of the Lord is in such events, and particularly the fulfilling of the foregoing pre­diction, which we find consumed by the declaration of the Prophet to Jeroboam, as also by the exem­plification of the rent garment; the Prophet telling him in the name of the Lord, "I will take thee, and thou shalt reign accord­ing so all that thy soul desireth, and shalt be King over Israel," ver. 37.—which accordingly came to pass by the revolt of the ten tribes, as we may see in the 12th chap. upon the unjust, ha [...]sh and insolent answer, which Re [...]oboam gave to the petitions of the peo­ple.

Another instance of the deal­ings of the Lord with the king­doms of men, we may see in the 16th chap, of I. Kings, where "the word of the Lord came to Jehu, the son of Hanani, against Baasha, (King of Israel) saying, forasmuch as I exalted thee out of the dust, and made thee Prince over my people Israel, and thou hast walked in the way of Jero­boam; behold, I will take away the POSTERITY of Baasha, and the POSTERITY of his house."— And in the 9th of II. Kings, we find that the Prophet Elisha fore­told the reign of Jehu, the son of Jehoshaphat, (though a servant) in preference to his master, who had 70 sons, saying unto Jehu, by a messenger which he sent for that purpose, ‘Thus faith the Lord God of Israel, I have anointed thee King over the people of the Lord, even over Israel, and thou shalt smite the house of Ahab thy master,’—which was accordingly fulfilled, notwith­standing the contemptuous speech of the impudent woman Jezebel, who, upon his entering the city of Jezteel, cried out, ‘Had Zimri peace, who flew his master?’—but she lived not long to repeat her folly:—Of this Jehu, although he flew his master and his 70 sons, by orders for that purpose, yet, according to the 30th ver. of 10th chap. the Lord said unto him, because thou hast done my will in exe­cuting that which is right in my eyes, and hast done unto the house of Ahab, according to all that was commanded thee, thy children of the fourth generation shall sit on the throne of Israel.

Our ancient friend George Fox, in an address to Kings and Rulers of all sorts, wherein he speaks of the Lord's power and dealings, says, ‘his hand is turned against Kings, and shall turn wife men [Page 3]backward, will bring their crowns to the dust, and lay them low and level with the earth.—Journ. p. 135.’ And the same friend, in a paper given forth in the year 1660, p. 309, says,— ‘All friends, concerning the changing of times and go­vernments, let not that trouble any of you, for God hath a mighty work and hand there­in’

Edward Burrough, in a piece called a representation to Lon­don, an. 1659, page 610 of his works, says,— ‘Now friends, do but truly consider, and with an humble mind, what the work of the Lord hath been in these nations, for divers years, and how he hath proceeded to over­throw and overturn powers and authorities, princes and rulers, and made them of no account before him; and because of the oppression of Rulers among us, the nation hath groaned, and been left without a com­forter from any man, and could not repose confidence in its Princes and Rulers, and this was that the nation might look unto the Lord, and that thro' him they might be saved, and expect healing from him alone; and in all these overturnings, you need not fear but the hand of the Lord hath been in them, and his arm hath suffered and even brought these things to pass; and therefore, why should you murmur against God, and be unsatisfied in what he hath done.’—The same author, page 672, speaking concerning the sufferings of King Charles, says,— ‘As for the afflictions and sufferings sustained by him, so far as they were just and righ­teous judgments from God because of iniquity, can no man be charged with, but that is on God's account, who was pleased to chastise with afflicti­ons and sufferings, and no man can be blamed with injustice, for that affliction which cometh from the hand of God.’ The public causes of Charles's suffer­ings are well known, and who can say but the case is the same at this very time; of which the very permission of the present op­position is a strong presumptive proof.

Francis Howgill, an ancient and eminent minister and author amongst us, in an address to the army, committee of safety, and parliament, p. 325 of his works, about the year—, speaking of the end and intent of rule and authority, saith,— ‘For the thing intended being lost, the Ruler or Rulers rule no more for God, neither doth he ac­count them such, whatever they may account themselves; and therefore hath raised ano­ther thing to overthrow that power, as hath been evident in this nation, in these many re­volutions, although that pow­er which was first in being," (no doubt meaning the King's) which was ordained for the end aforesaid, might say to that which rose up against it, that it was rebellion and treason, and declare it to be such in the ears of the people, as hath been done by divers, which is in the memory of most; so that I need not instance, when I say it was not so accounted by the Lord, and he hath given a testimony of this by the over­throwing of the former, and [Page 4]raising up the latter;’—and a little further, speaking of the form of government, says,— ‘Was not Israel governed some­time by Judges, sometime by Elders, and sometime by Kings? and while they stood in the counsel of the Lord, the peo­ple hearkened to them, was not the Lord among them, and sometimes raised up unlikely means, as David a shepherd's boy, and Gideon a thresher, and he was made a Judge and a Redeemer of Israel out of their slavery.’—By which ob­servations it appears, that Francis Howgill was a strong friend to public justice, and that he did not apprehend an attachment to any particular form of govern­ment merely as such, by any means essential or indispensible. —The same author, page 320, further saith,— ‘Now many are so doting on the name of a parliament, as though it were essential, or the name to be the foundation of government, and cry up the privilege of parliament, as some have done prerogative, and would fight about a name in their heat and passion, and lose the thing in­tended, though they be the representative of the people, to do good to the people, and not hurt, they are accounted as good servants to God, and to them that elected them; but if they would, so soon as got together, set up a particular interest to the imbondaging of the whole," (as the parliament of Great-Britain towards this country "in all cases whatsoever") and then cry up their privilege to do what they list; then it is no rebellion in God's account, neither in the account of just men to call them away, w [...]a they do not perform the thing intended, and will not hearken to the cry of their masters (the people) but perhaps call them rebels and traitors, if they should be turned out.’—And page 329 of the same work, speak­ing of the conduct of the parlia­ment, with regard to their ob­struction of the liberties of the people, he saith, ‘Therefore the army in putting a stop to that which did retard and draw back from the end aforesaid, in God's sight and in the sight of illuminated men, is no re­bellion, no treachery.

The numerous changes and revolutions in the kingdoms and empires of the earth, clearly de­scribed and foretold by the Pro­phets Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Amos and Zephaniah, particularly concerning the Phi­listines, Ammonites, Edomites, Mo­abites, Damascus, Babylon, Jeru­salem, Tyre, Sydon, Media, Per­sia, Graecia, Assyria, Ethiopia, &c. as may be seen in holy writ, and which, for brevity sake, are not now repeated, fully prove the truth of the axiom laid down in the beginning; and though that mode of communicating to man­kind the will and purposes of God concerning the powers of this world, may be now almost ceased or at least suspended, yet the Creator of Heaven and Earth, who seeth from everlasting to e­verlasting, no doubt takes the same cognizance, and exercises the same superintending and exe­cutive power he did in days of old.

The prous and judicious Rollin, author of the ancient history, [Page 5]considering and remarking the great changes, which often take place in human affairs, and par­ti [...]u [...]arly the case of Nebach [...]d­n [...]zzar, says, they ‘shew the predigiou, case with which all the power and riches of a king­dom are carried away, when God appoints the revolution, and shift like a garment to a new Owner.’ Vol. 1, p. 100. —The same author, vol. 7, p. 340, speaking of the fall of Car­thage, says, that ‘Scipio, on that occasion, reflected that cities, nations and empi [...]es, are liable to revolutions no less than particular men,’ and had the truth (observes Rollia) en­lightened his soul, he would have discovered what we are taught in the Scriptures, that ‘because of unrighteous dealings, inju­ries and riches got by deceit, a kingdom is translated from one people to another.’ Ecc. 10, 8.—And [...] 298 of the same vol. treating of the accomplish­ment of Daniel's prophecies, re­lative to earthly kingdoms, says, ‘What man but must adore that sovereign power, which God exercises in a secret manner, over Kings and Princes, whose very crimes he renders subser­vient to the execution of his sacred will, and the accom­plishment of his eternal de­crees; in which all events, both general and particular, have their appointed time and place fix [...]d beyond the possibi­lity of failing, even those which depend most on the choice and liberty of man­kind.’ He further informs us, vol. 8, p. 298, that, on ac­count of the arbitrary and unjust behaviour of Antiochus, (to whom part of Daniel's prophecy related) the people revolted from him; and page 369, speaking of his successor S [...]l [...]u [...]us, whose fate ap­p [...]ars to be predicted by Daniel, chap. xi, v. 20, where the text says, ‘then shall stand up in his (Antiochus) estate, a raiser of taxes, in the glory of his king­dom, but within few days he shall be destroyed;’ or, ac­cording to the Hebrew text. ‘There shall arise up in his (Antiochus) place, a man who, as an extortioner, a col­lector of taxes, shall destroy the glory of the kingdom;’ which clearly point out the mi­serable effects, and just punish­ment, consequent of such arbi­trary conduct: The foregoing author, at the conclusion of his history of the ancients, p: 224, recounting the varions kingdoms, states and empires of the world, their governments, customs, arts, sciences, grandeur, power, rich­er, &c. remarks thus, ‘But whilst we are in admiration of so many shining accomplish­ments, the Supreme Judge, who can alone estimate all things, sees nothing in them but trifle, meanness, vanity and pride; and whilst man­kind are continually busied in perpetuating the power of their families, in founding king­doms, and eternizing them­selves, (if that were possible) God from his throne on high overthrows all their projects, and makes even their ambition the means of executing his o­perations and designs; [...]llagres are present to him: He [...] from everlasting to everlasting. (Ecc. 39, 19) He has [...] [Page 6]all empires their fate and du­ration. In the different revo­lutions, (which he had related) we have seen that nothing has come to pass by chance.’

Before I leave this part of the subject, it may not be amiss to insert some further observations of E. Burrough before mentioned, in answer to some queries propo­sed to the people called Quakers, by one of King Charles's friends, supposed to have been the Earl of Clarendon; to which Edw. Bur­rough replied thus, ‘Yet not­withstanding must still say, and it is my judgment, that there was very great oppression and vexation under the go­vernment of the late King, and Bishops under his power, which the Lord was offended with, and many good people op­pressed by; for which cause, the Lord might and did justly raise up some to oppose, and strive against oppressions and injustice, and to press after reformation in all things. This principle of sincerity, which in some things carried them on in opposing oppressions, and press­ing after reformation, I can never deny, but acknowledge it.’—See Sew [...]ll's hist. p. 283.

The foregoing precedents and observations one would think might be sufficient to satisfy the doubting, that the present revo­lution is the work of the Lord, and according to the plan and design of his providence, and tend to prove the safety and pro­priety of a submission to the pow­ers which now rule: But it may be objected in justification of the present scruples and refusal by some, that the present powers and government are usurped and con­trary to law: To this it may be answered, that the same objection would have held good under eve­ry revolution which has hereto­fore been brought about, as they must no doubt have been contra­ry to the authority of the pre­ceding powers, and by their friends and adherents been deemed usurpations, which might also have been alledged against the present constitution of Great­Britain, as may be hereafter re­marked.

It appears to me that it is for those who chuse not to have any hand in the formation of govern­ments, to take governments such as they find them, and comply with their laws, so far as they are clear of infringing religious rights and matters of faith toward God: It cannot perhaps be found that friends, ever since they were a people, ever refused to assist in the support of govern­ment, but have ever held it right and necessary to comply with the laws of the various governments under which they lived; for as, according to our own repeated declarations as a society, (see Sewell's hist. p. 748, &c.)—the ‘setting up and putting down Kings and Governments is God's peculiar prerogative for causes best known to himself, and that it is not our work or business to have any hand or contrivance therein, nor to be busy bodies in matters above our stations.’ Whether then can such a people, by any means, undertake to weaken or oppose the present government, seeing these things are allowed to belong only unto God, is a matter wor­thy of consideration: for though some may say that the King's [Page 7]right is infringed, and that no other power than the King hath a right to this country and the go­vernment thereof, it may be al­ledged in return, that the King hath long since actually and ex­pressly put the people of this country out of his own protecti­on, without distinction of per­sons, whether private or public, civil or religious: But I would seriously ask how any one knows, or can undertake to say, that the above assertion, on the part of the King, is really the case, and al­together right in the sight of God, who doth whatsoever he pleaseth in the kingdoms of this world. How know we, but as hath been the sentiment of divers living and powerful servant [...] of the Lord, and members of society in these days, but that the Al­mighty, ‘for canses best known unto himself,’ may have a special hand in this work, as was generally agreed by friends that he had at the beginning, even in the apparently usurped revolution under Oliver Cromwell, as may be seen by the epistles of Francis Howgill, E Burrough, and di­vers others written to him; which if it be the case, we possibly, and not without strong probability in the view of some, may ‘be found fighters against God,’ which is a most awful considera­tion, and ought strongly to ope­rate in the minds of all; so that if they cannot actively unite with, they be very careful, by no means, to op [...]ose [...] powers that now are, and which we are now under; unless they can say as a church, that it is clearly revealed unto them from God, that this government shall not stand, but come to nought, which I judge none will adventure to say: Let us then, I beseech of us, attend to the above mentioned profession and declaration, and see that if we are to have no hand in such matters, it may be uniform, if not on one side, neither on the other; for our declaration is that we have no hand ‘either in the setting up or p [...]lling [...]own,’ neither by this way or that way, as a religious society, there is no distinction made of what King or of what government, if not as to one, so neither as to another: if not by encouraging, so neither by discouraging.

As to the acknowledgement of submission and fidelity to the diff­erent governments we have lived under, the aeras or time in which such acknowledgments have been necessary, have been so distant, and so few, that there has not been much said on that head in the society; indeed the assenting practice of friends on these occa­sions, where no oath has been re­quired, has been so common and uncontended, that it has hither­to occasioned ve [...] little observa­tion, and now one would think needed little or nothing said on the occasion: Nevertheless it is necessary to observe that George Fox, in a letter to Oliver Crom­well, during his protectorship, an. 1655, tells him, ‘many are cast into prison, and made a prey upon, because they can­not take the oath of abjurati­on, though they denied and that is ABJURED in it; and by that means, many of the mes­sengers and ministers of the Lord Jesus Christ are cast into prison.’—Jour. p. 152. From which it appears clearly, that the refusal, even of the ministers in [Page 8]society, at that time, and under that revolution, which was built not only upon the opposition but hanishment and destruction of a King, arose from no other seru­pie than merely because it was [...]ministered in the form of an path, which otherwise, as appears by this letter, they would reacily have taken, although it was not simply a declaration of fidelity, but an abjuration ; that is to say, a renouncing of all opposite pow­ers, claims, and pretensions: in­deed the common and f [...]quent answer of friend, when they were questioned or persecuted for not taking the oaths of allegi [...]ce and supremacy, was, ‘we can­not take an oath, if we could take any oath, we could take this’—Now if George Fox and the friend of that day could have [...]fely and freely given a de­claration of fidelity to Oliver Cromwell, [...] w [...]ll as a renuncia­tion of all other temporal autho­rity, what hinders that the s [...]me may be done [...]

At the revolution which hap­pened under King William, upon James's being obliged to quit the kingdom, it appe [...]rs by Sewell's hiaory, p. 705, that the parlia­ment, in compliance with the people called Quakers, framed and enacted a Test, which, tho' of a very str [...]ct and binding na­ture, W. Sewell speaks of with great satisfaction, notwithstand­ing it was to be performed to a [...]son, who (though worthy of the trust reposed in him) yet, by her [...]di [...]ary right, had no claim to the crown.

The Test is as follows: ‘I A. B. do sincerely promise, and solemnly d [...]clare before God and the would, that I will be true and faithful to King William and Queen Mary; and I do solemnly profess and declare, that I do from my heart abhor, detest and re­nounce, as impious and here­tical, that damnable doctrine and position, that Princes ex­communicated, or deprived by the Pope, or any authority of the See of Rome, may be de­posed or murdered by their subjects, or any other whatso­ever. And I declare that no foreign Prince, Person, Pre­late, State or Pot [...]n [...]a [...], hath, or ought to have any power, j [...]isdiction, superi [...]ri [...], pre­eminence or authority, eccle­s [...]tical or spiritual, within this realm.’ This was the Tes [...] mad [...] for and accepted by the society, although expressly for [...]ec [...]a [...]ion of the natural lawful [...]eir, who, at the very same time, maintained a court, and was en­couraged and supported by one of the most powerful states in Eu­rope; a Prince who had [...]dered the society many signal services and favours, and who, it is re­marked, had received more ad­dresses from the people he go­verned, than perhaps any other King in the same space of time; particularly from the London friends, who, but about two years before this act of abj [...]rati­on or renunciation, told him, ‘It should be their ende [...]vour (with God's help) ALWAYS to approve ourselves the King's faithful and loving subjects,— praying God to bless him, his royal family and people, with grace and peace, and that af­ter a long and prosperous reign here, he might receive a better crown among the blessed.’[Page 9]See the address in Sewell's hist. p. 683—Also the whole body of friends, in and from the yearly meeting of London, 1687, in the conclusion of an address, tell him that while we live, it shall be our endeavour (thro' God's grace) to demean ourselves, as in conscience to God, and du­ty to the King, we are obliged, his peaceable, loving and faith­ful subjects.’

Several other instances might be adduced on this occasion, but it is apprehended that these may be sufficient to shew, that not­withstanding preceding obligati­ons, attachments and declarati­ons, the society have not appre­hended themselves implicitly and unexceptionably bound to any King or Power, further than they governed according to the funda­mental principles of the empire; but that they were dissolved from their promises and declarations, when the Prince manifestly and actually attempted to subvert the principles of the constitution; otherwise how can we reconcile the solemn declaration and pro­mises made to King James, with the promises and declarations made to King William, and those who succeeded.

Now seeing this has been the real and declared sentiment and conduct of society on former oc­casions, would it not be hard for them to censure or condemn those who apprehend themselves ex­cusable for conforming or sub­mitting to the present powers, which, according to Scripture, must be allowed "to be of God." This appears to some to be going a great length; but let us consi­der that if we examine the con­duct and characters of former Rulers and Governors, particu­larly those concerning whom the Apostle makes that solemn ac­knowledgment, we shall have reason to believe that they were not more likely to be ordained of God, than the powers which are now set over us, seeing they were superstitious and warlike Hea­thens immersed in gross idolatry: —But it may be objected the proceedings against King James, and the subsequent conformity of friends and others to the succeed­ing powers, was chiefly upon a religious account and principle, which he evidently attempted unlawfully to infringe: This is granted; but are not all laws and obligations between men conditi­onal, and no longer binding than the terms, upon which they were made, are kept and observed, agreeable to that well known maxim adopted by Wm. Penn in his famous trial, — ‘Cessante ratione legis, cessa [...] Lex.’ That is, The reason of the law ceasing, the law itself ceaseth: This must have been the princi­ple upon which they acted; and shall those be now censured for acting as to civil affairs, what the society itself did as to religi­ous concerns? Are not promises and obligations made equally va­lid in both, and the breakers of the one criminal (in such cases) as well as the other?

Without entering far into a political disquisition of the merits of the cause now in agitation, I would just refer to consideration the glaring undeniable and re­peated strokes given to, and breaches made in the constitution under which we have heretofore lived, by those who were bound and sworn to maintain it inviola­bly, [Page 10]even at the risque of their eternal salvation, as may be ga­thered from W. Penn's works, v. I, p. 685, &c. where, amongst other things, he recites the sen­tence pronounced against the breakers of the articles in the Great Charter, which is as fol­lows: — ‘In the name of the Father, the Son, and the Ho­ly Ghost, Amen. Whereas our Sovereign Lord the King, to the honour of God and of Holy Church, and for the common profit of the realm, hath granted for him, and his heirs for ever, these articles above written. Robert, Arch­bishop of Canterbury, Primate of all England, admonished all his province, once, twice and thrice, because that shortness will not suffer so much delay, as to give knowledge to all the people of England of these presents in writing: We there­fore enjoin all persons of what estate soever they be, that they, and every of them, as much as in them is, shall uphold and maintain these articles granted by our Sovereign Lord the King, in all points: And all those that in any point do resist or break, or in any manner hereafter procure, counsel, or in any wise assent to resist or break those ordinances, or go about it, by word or deed, openly or privily, by any manner of pretence or colour; We the aforesaid Archbishops, by our authority in this writ­ing expressed, do excommuni­cate and accurse, and from the body of our Lord Jesus Christ, and from all the company of Heaven, and from all the sa­craments of Holy Church do sequester and exclude.’

Upon which W. Penn observes, ‘We may here see, that in the obscurest times of popery, they were not without a sense of justice and a care of freedom, and that even Papists, whom many think no friends to liber­ty and property, under dreadful penalties, enjoin an inviolable observance of this Great Char­ter, by which they are con­firmed. And though I am no Roman Catholic, and as little value their other curses pro­nounced upon religious dissen­ters, yet I declare ingenuously I would not, for the world, incur this curse, as every man DESERVEDLY DOTH, that of­fers violence to the fundamental freedoms thereby repeated and confirmed

Now if Kings, as well as o­thers, deserved the penalties here mentioned, for a breach of that charter, then the mere renuncia­tion or refusal of their right to a small spot of this earth, must cer­tainly be considered in the mild­est point of view. Plutarch (in Pyrrh. p. 390) says that ‘Kings, when any revolution happens in their dominions, are apt to complain bitterly of their sub­jects unfaithfulness and disloy­alty; but they do them wrong, and forget that it was them­selves, who gave them the first lessons of their disloyalty, by disregarding justice and fideli­ty, which they sacrificed to their own particular interests.’

The judicious Rollin, author of the ancient history, vol. 2, p. 288, after treating of the cause of the declension in the Assyrian empire, says, ‘Surely the oaths by which Treaties were sealed and ratified, and the Deity [Page 11]brought in not only as present but as guarantee of the condi­tions stipulated, (as was the case between the Kings of Great-Britain and their sub­jects) is a most sacred and au­gust ceremony, very proper for the subjecting of earthly Princes to the Supreme Judge of Heaven and Earth.—Now if Princes, by their unfaithful­ness, will teach their people not to stand in fear of the Su­preme Being, how shall they be able to secure respect and reverence to themselves?—Nor is it all astonishing, that the contempt which an impious Prince, who has no regard to the sanctity of an oath, shews of God and religion, should shake the very foundations of the firmest and best established empires, and sooner or later occasion their utter destructi­on.’ And page 275, the same author says, that ‘Among other causes which brought the ruin of that empire, the four follow­ing may be looked upon as the principal: Their excessive mag­nificence and luxury, the ab­ject subjection and slavery of the people, the bad education of their Princes, and their want of faith in the execution of their Treaties, Oaths and Engagements.’

As to the renunciation of the King's heirs and successors, which seems to be a material cause of objection with some, do we not find that when any person or per­sons forfeit their estates to the King or country where they dwell, that their heirs and succes­sors are also deprived of the same; indeed nothing can be claimed by an heir, as such, but in virtue or right of his ancestor or proge­nitor; and if there be no right in them, or the right, if any, were forfeit or lost, it is also lost to their heirs and successors; for though right not forfeited or ali­ened, does not die, though it may sleep, yet right once for­feited or properly lost, can never properly be regained: Beside the King (as hath been observed) has already put the people of this country, without distinction, out of his protection, by express de­claration; and as protection and allegiance being reciprocal, is an established maxim in all states, and is according to the nature and reason of things: Upon this principle, by the King's own act, the allegiance of the people is dis­solved —The same may be said with regard to these States, if, by the will of Providence, they should hereafter be subdued, and no longer capable of yielding protection; which is according to the declaration of Congress, as well as to the preamble of the act for securing the present govern­ment, which expressly declares that protection and allegiance are reciprocal: This is the object and ultimatum of the act, and is the natural, simple and true con­struction of the same, being, without doubt, no other than what must be intended and ex­pected at the framing of the same, as is allowed by the judg­ment of those now in power, nor can it indeed be otherways right­ly understood.

Having said thus much as to declarations of fidelity and renun­ciation, it may not be amiss to add something on the subject of the payment of Taxes.

For this purpose I shall pro­duce [Page 12]an epistle of George Fox, taken from his book of epistles, p. 137, where he advises, All friends every where, who are dead to all carnal weapons, and have beaten them to pie­ces, stand in that which takes away the occasion of wars, which saves mens lives, and destroys none, nor would have others;—and as for the Rulers that are to keep peace, for peace sake, and for the advan­tage of truth, give them their tribute; but to bear and carry weapons to fight with, the men of peace, (who live in that which takes away the oc­casion of wars) they cannot act in such things, under the seve­ral powers, but have paid their Tribute, which they may do still for peace sake, and not hold back the earth, but go over it, and in so doing friends may better claim their liberty.’

W. Penn, in an address to the high court of parliament, anno 1671, vol. 1, p. 41, tells them, that "We both own and are ready to yield obedience to every ordinance of man, relating to hu­man affairs, and that for consci­ence sake; and that IN ALL RE­VOLUTIONS, we have demeaned ourselves with much peace and patience, disowning all contrary actings; and that we have lived most peaceably under all the vari­ous governments that have been since our first appearance,"— which could not have been said with propriety, unless they had submitted to the civil ordinances of men, as above declared.

Thomas Story, in his Journal, p. 269, speaking concerning a law made to enforce the bearing of arms, which he disapproved, yet in the course of the debate, which he had with the judge of a court, saith,— ‘I began with the example of Christ himself for the payment of a Tax, tho' applied by Caesar unto the uses of war, and other exigences of his government;’ and was going to shew the difference be­tween a law that directly and principally affects the person in war, requiring personal service, and a law which only requires a general tax, to be applied by Rulers as they see cause;—for though we as a people readily pay such taxes impartially assessed, yet as the kingdom of Christ is not of this world, his servants will not fight, though they may and ought to pay taxes, accord­ing to the example of Christ their head:" And what that instance and example was, he relates p. 410, where he says, that "The Lord Jesus Christ obeyed all the righteous laws both of Jews and Romans, so far as his condition in this world subjected him to them: For though he was, and is the peaceable Saviour, and came not to destroy mens lives, but to save them, yet in obedience to the laws of men, where not opposite to or interfering with the laws of God, he wrought a miracle to pay a poll-tax, where in strictness the law did not require it of him, nor of his disciples; for having Roman privileges by virtue of an old league between the Jews and Romans, whereby they were as children and not strangers, never­theless to obviate all occasion of offence, he submitted to it, tho' only an ordinance of men, and his apostles likewise, as an exam­ple to his church through all ages then to come."

[Page 13] Though this example is gene­rally well known, it may not be improper here to recite it, which was thus: "And when they came to Capernaum, they that received Tribute money, came to Peter, and said, doth your master pay Tribute? He saith yes. And when he was come into the house, Jesus prevented him, saying, what thinkest thou, Simon? Of whom do the Kings of the earth take Custom or Tribute; of their own children or of strangers? Pe­ter saith unto him, of strangers. Jesus saith unto him, then are the children free. Notwithstanding lest we should offend them, go thou to the sea, and cast an hook, and take up the fish that first cometh up, and when thou hast opened his mouth, thou shalt find a piece of money: That take, and give unto them for me and thee." Mat. 17th, v. 24, 25, 26, 27.

It is here remarkable that our Saviour appears to have revolved in his mind the whole nature of the case, and of the demand that was made; for upon Peter's in­forming the Tax-gatherers, that his master paid Tribute, our Lord took occasion to remind him by a gentle rep ehension, that he had gone further in his reply than he was bound to do, or than was re­quisite from the nature of their condition and circumstances; and immediately upon Peter's enter­ing the house, prevented his speaking by making use of a very strong and lively argument to convince Peter, that he had been quite as quick as was necessary; and that instead of being bound to pay the Tax, they were, ac­cording to the custom of the country, exempt and free; yet notwithstanding this freedom and privilege, or without the least objection to the use to which the money might be applied, though the Romans were in general Hea­then idolaters, and about that time, as appears from history, actually engaged in war on seve­ral sides, and the character of their Emperor Tiberius marked as debauched, unjust, cruel, tyran­nic, sanguinary and inhuman.— Yet Christ our Lord, tho' cloath­ed with majesty and power above all the laws and powers of this world, and was thereby able to have subdued all things unto himself, and made them subser­vient to his will, was so tender of giving uneasiness to the powers that then bore rule, that he or­dered Peter, by producing an a­stonishing miracle, as we have read, to comply and pay the Tax for this very striking reason, " let we should offend."

Thomas Story before mentioned, in his journal, page 413 saith, ‘That the sufferings of the faithful in Christ, in all ages, have not arose from the breach of any laws relating only to ci­vil government, which they do readily observe and conscien­tiously obey.’—And in the same page, adds, ‘That as there always is and must be, in the nature of things, a great and necessary charge attending go­vernment, (a kingdom or state being but as one great house or family, and no private or par­ticular family c [...]n subsist with­out charge) for that cause, all are to pay Tribute, as justly (or equally) imposed by the legislature.’

The said author, in a confer­ence had with the Czar of Mus­covy, [Page 14]saith, ‘Though we are prohibited arms and fighting in person, as inconsistent (we think) with the roles of the gospel of Jesus Christ; yet we can, and do, by his example, readily and cheerfully pay unto every government, and in every form, where we happen to be subjects, such sums and assess­ments as are required of us by the respective laws under which we live. For when a general Tax was laid by the Roman Czar, upon his extensive em­pire, and the time of payment came, the Lord Jesus Christ (according to Scripture, Mat. 25, as recited by T. Story) ‘wrought a miracle to pay a Tax, where yet it was not strictly due; we, by so great an example, do freely pay our Taxes to Caesar, who of right hath the direction and application of them, to the various ends of government, to peace or to war, as it pleaseth him, or as need may, accord­ing to the constitution or laws of his kingdom.’ Jour. p. 125.

W. Penn, vol. 2, p 33, saith, ‘That since we are as large contributors to the government as our antagonists, we are in­titled to as large protection from it.’—Now this saying could not have been true, unless they paid all the public Taxes, in common with other men, which no doubt their antagonists did; and by analogous conclusion, if we, under the present dispensati­on, refuse to contribute to the government under which we live, how can we expect to be intitled to its protection, not only at pre­sent, but in case the Almighty should see meet further and fully to establish it.

The said Author, in the same vol. p 788, in answer to some objections made against the soci­ety, observes among other things, that it was said ‘The Quakers will not support civil govern­ment,’ &c.—To which he an­swers, ‘This is also untrue upon experience; for what people, (says, he) under government, pay their Taxes better than they do.’

Samuel Bownas, in the account of his life, relates an epistolary argument he had with one Ray, a Priest, who charged friends with an inconsistency in that, while they actually paid and even collected Tax for the purposes of carrying on a war against France with vigour: They yet refused to pay Tythes and Militia-assess­ments.— To which S. Bownas re­plies, ‘We are still of the same mind with R. Barclay, that wars and fightings are incon­sistent with the gospel princi­ples, and still lie under suffer­ings with respect to the militia, being careful to walk by the rule of Christ's doctrine; and yet do not think ourselves in­consistent in actively comply­ing with the law of Taxes, in rendering unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's, and he may do therewith what pleaseth him.—Where it may be well to observe, that he there speaks of Taxes as due unto Caesar; thereby no doubt meaning the power that for the present bears rule, whether Emperor, Protec­tor, King, or Congress.

From what has been observed, I think it may plainly appear that friends heretofore have been so far from censuring or condemn­ing their members on such occa­stions, [Page 15]that they have rather en­couraged the Payment of Taxes, (except those in lieu of personal service) and advised a submission to the powers that bore rule, un­der the various governments and revolutions in which they lived; but if this be doubted, or any thing has been advanced that is not conformable to the truth, it will be well for any one to point out the same; but if they are consistent with reason, justice and truth, it will be well to be cau­tious how any thing is acted op­posite thereto; and whilst we de­clare that we cannot have a hand in public revolutions, (as belong­ing unto God) by promoting and encouraging, we may beware of taking an active part by opposing and discouraging, whether as to Non-payment of Taxes, or other civil acts; and then of conse­quence, none can, with propriety or consistency, be censured or condemned concerning the same, especially in cases where no pre­cedent for censure or condemna­tion can be found in the history or proceedings of friends.

As it is queried by some, whe­ther Friends paid their Taxes un­der the government of Oliver Cromwell, although there is as great or greater reason to con­clude they did, than there is to suppose or prove that they did not; yet it may be observed that the practice of friends, ever since the time of Geo. Fox, has been to keep a particular account of the sufferings they sustained, and the amount thereof, when it was on a conscientious or religious account, which have been record­ed, and transmitted down to as from time to time: Now as it never yet has appeared in the ac­counts of friends sufferings, that any thing was taken from them, on account of Taxes, even under Cromwell's government, the com­mittee of safety, or any of the then powers, which, if on a reli­gious account, they had refused to pay, would have amounted to a very considerable sum, equal if not superior to any re­corded by them, and would no doubt have been taken particular notice of amongst their other suf­ferings; but as nothing of this kind appears, it is therefore more than probable, and may be very safely concluded, that they sub­mitted in these respects to the se­veral governments, of what kind soever, under which they lived; and that they paid their Taxes for the support of those govern­ments, in common with other men, according to their uniform practice as a people.

To the above Testimony of the dead, let us attend also to one of the living, an anonymus author; though well known to be Timo­thy Davis; a worthy friend and minister of the gospel; in a letter to some of his intimate friends on the subject of paying Taxes to the present government, printed at Watertown about two years ago, and sold by B. Edes, near the Bridge, has fully declared his sentiments in the following man­ner:

"If it be safe to follow the ex­ample of our predecessors, why not comply.—"What did they do?"—I answer, they have from their very first appearance, as a separate society, been subject to such who were invested with the authority of the nation, without meddling with the various dis­putes that have arisen since their [Page 16]time, concerning regal authority, and on whom it ought to devolve. For a farther consideration hereof, you may remember, that Friends made their appearance in the reign of King Charles the First; who by his too much aspiring af­ter sovereignty or despotism, a­larmed the people; who, headed by Oliver Cromwell, prevailed against the king, and took the reigns of government into his own hands, and governed the kingdom himself, under the cha­racter of lord protector.—

Here we do not find but that Friends, who had paid their alle­giance and their taxes to the king, continued to pay them to Oliver Cromwell, during the time he held the reins of government: And what can be said of him, but that he headed the populace, and was an opposer of kingly autho­rity, not merely as such, but as it became, through the hands of the king, subversive of the rights and priviledges of the people: What harder things can be said of those who are at the head of the present opposition, that may render them less worthy of recei­ving taxes to defray the charges of government. By all that I have been able to discover, our society in England have ever made a point of being careful and exact in paying all taxes that are legally assessed, except the Priests rates.

After CROMWELL, king Charles the second came to the throne, and they paid taxes to him also. After which, the crown continued in the family of Stew­arts, until the disturbances in king James the second's reign; who, by his favouring popery, justly alarmed and incens'd the people against him, that thinking himself not safe among a justly provoked people, took shelter in France, which made way for the Prince of Orange. Here we find the line of Stewarts interrupted again, which devolved on them according to legal succession, and the Prince, in conjunction with the people, opposing the then kingly government in James; much the same as is laid to the charge of those who are at the head of the present opposition; and Friends who were desirous to live in peace with all men, paid taxes to him likewise; but say they—"James favoured popery and endeavoured to introduce po­pish government, and therefore forfeited his right to the crown." Be it so—but is favouring popery the only instance in which the kings of England can forfeit their rights to reign over a free peo­ple?"—I should think, that when the sword is put into the hands of a king, to be directed for the punishment of evil doers, and praise to them that do well, we might have some reason to expect him to act, in some measure, an­swerable to his exalted station, and the trust the people have re­posed in him, (askingly authority originates from the people)—But if to the contrary he should act so far below his exalted station as to turn the point of [...]e sword at the vitals of the people, it must be very alarming, especially when they have confer'd all the favours upon him, that were in their power, consistent with the safety of the kingdom, he as fully for­feits his right to reign over them, as in the case of popery.

Every considerate man, no doubt, would be glad of such a [Page 17]form of government as might be unexceptionable; but we have no reason to expect it, in this imper­fect state of things: Yet we ought to use all just and reasonable means to rectify all disorders in government, that are in the com­pass of our power, consistent with the peaceable profession we make; and at the same time, to be as careful not to complain without just cause, but be as content as we can, under such a form of government, as it hath pleased Divine Providence to cast our lots: And it must be a very bad one indeed, that is not preferable to a state of anarchy. In a word, let a man be under any form of government he can imagine to himself, where he receives any advantage by it, and while he remains under it, he ought to bear his proportion of the charge of it; for the thoughts of having our lives and every thing that is near and dear to us, lie wholly at the mercy of every invader, with­out any possibility of redress from any legal authority, I should think would incline us to be wil­ling to bear our just proportion of the charge of such government as we are under, if it should not in every respect be consistent with the most perfect system.

Our Saviour hath set this mat­ter in an indisputable light to me, by the conversation he had with Peter on that subject, at a time when those who received tribute­money came to Peter querying with him, whether their Master paid Tribute or not, Peter said he did. Christ willing, it appears, to take advantage of this oppor­tunity to leave an example to fu­ture ages of his approbation of paying taxes, in a case similar to the present, in every thing essen­tial to the present argument, and as an additional weight to the holy example, introduc'd a con­versation with Peter, not waiting for him to introduce it, or pro­pound any questions on the sub­ject, but prevented him, as if with design to remove every hesitation, proceeded thus, What thinkest thou Simon, of whom do the kings of earth take custom or tribute, of their own children or of strangers? Peter saith unto him, of strangers. Jesus saith unto him, Then are the children free. As much as if he had said, "then have they no just demand on us, we being children, may very well refuse paying of it.—Nevertheless, least we should offend them, it is best it should be paid, therefore I would have thee do it," which he was enabled to do by an extraor­dinary miracle. I cannot see how it is possible for any thing to be express'd more clearly to remove every scruple. It is further ob­servable, that there is not one word of objection either from Christ or Peter, that part of this tribute money went to defray mi­litary charges, (for it undoubted­ly did) which we might expect to find here if any where, seeing they were then upon the point of paying taxes.

If our rulers pursue measures for the defence and support of civil government, that we think not strictly consistent with the rules of the gospel, even by re­pelling force by force, to the shed­ding of human blood, it is out of our power to help it; they pro­ceed in the defence of govern­ment as it suits them best; and if their manner doth not suit us, that may not hinder, but we may [Page 18]receive as much advantage from it as if they pursued such mea­sures as we may think we could point out. However, let them proceed in a hostile manner or not, in the defence of our rights and privileges, it is certain, if we receive advantage from civil government, we ought to bear our part of the charge of main­taining of it, or else have no recourse to it in any case whate­ver; for it would be very odd for us to seek protection against the encroachments or abuse of our fellow creatures, from an autho­rity that we refuse to help to sup­port. It may farther be observ­ed, that the tribute that Peter paid by our Saviour's direction, was at a time when the Jews were under the Romans and Cesar at great expence in supporting his legions for the defence of his em­pire: That as Christ by the hand of Peter, paid a tax, He must consequently pay a proportiona­ble part of such charge.

In one place Christ saith, Ren­der to Caesar the things that are his; but in the instance before us, he sets us an example of paying the requisition of civil authority, not only when the soldiers recei­ved a part of it, but even where not strictly due, rather than give offence; altho' it helped to up­hold a government under which they ( i. c. the Jews) were [...]ed [...] ­ced by the dint of sword; an ex­ample of meekness that ought to have place in every considerate mind; that whilst we remain stea­dy to our testimony against shed­ding human blood, we may pre­serve ear consciences v [...]id of of­fence toward God and man, and by no means, at any time, throw out any unbecoming reflections against those in authority, nor mistake will for tender scruple of conscience in paying taxes, or in any thing else, nor give civil au­thority any unnecessary trouble."

The matter now under consi­deration is serious. Many valua­ble members of society, both public and private, at this time, in different places, do not think themselves called or bound to join in the refusals and scruples which some make, and many more who have not yet fully considered the matter, will probably be of the same mind; if this be allowed, which I believe may safely be done, will it not be exceeding hard that they should be denied the privileges of that society, in whose ways they have been edu­cated, and whose religious prin­ciples they profess and hold, and to which they are closely attach­ed? In time past, though there was diversity of sentiments with regard to some matters, yet we bore one with another without censure, in that spirit of conde­scension and brotherly regard, which is peculiarly characteristic of the followers of the lamb, and shall we now, in very similar ca­ses, give up that christian tem­per, cast one another off, and produce a sparation, when love and union might be preserved as well as in former days, and for which there is probably as much occasion as ever there was since the foundation of the province.

If indeed we think it proper as a society, to maintain an oppo­sition to the present powers of government, in civil as well as religious respects, it may preclude the use of the present observati­ons, or at least render any ser­vice, which might be expected [Page 19]from them, very improbable; but as that would appear to be so contrary to the profession we have made, as well as inconsistent with our established principles, that I presume it cannot really be the case: I have therefore taken the freedom of laying these observa­tions before us for our serious consideration.

Never was there a people more deeply interested in the event of public proceedings, than we now are. We are considerably nume­rous in various parts of the conti­nent, and particularly so in this state. We are not only in­terested ourselves, but future ge­nerations may likewise be deeply affected by the part we now act. I wish us therefore so to conduct, as that Jew nor Gentile, or the church of Christ, either at this or any future time, may have just occasion of offence.

Now, notwithstanding what has been offered, as there may be some who may alledge that their scruples and non compliance with the demands of the present go­vernment, as to civil affairs, a­rises from a principle of consci­ence, which I am sensible is a very delicate point to touch upon, yet as I have no other end in view, but the good of society, as well as individuals, I would therefore beg them to consider that con­science, according to the general idea annexed to it, is a very sa­cred thing. Let us therefore be cautious how we apply is to com­mon, civil, and merely human affairs, lest we make the plea for it upon more important occasions of too light ellimation: It is deeply expedient for us to consi­der its nature, or what we are to understand thereby in religious affairs, and what are the proper and sit objects and subjects there­of, which may be necessary to claim and assert as independent of the power of the civil magis­trate: For this purpose let us ob­serve Rob. Barclay's sentiment of the matter, who, in the latter part of the 5th and 6th propositi­on, after speaking of the light of Christ, and the light of man's natural conscience, saith, ‘To the light of Christ then in the conscience, and not to man's natural conscience, it is that we commend men: This, not that, it is which we preach up and direct people to, as to a most certain guide unto eter­nal life.’—From hence we may safely infer, that no objecti­on arising from any thing short of the light of Christ, can be suffici­ent to operate with the professors of Christ our Lord, as a christian church, in their proceedings and determinations; so that it essen­tially be [...]oves them, certainly to know, that it is altogether from the illumination and power there­of, and not at all from the other, that they are a [...]tuated: —This appears to be abso­lutely and indispens [...] necessa­ry for the right and true support of a pure christian testimony, and which I heartily with only be deeply and sufficiently att [...]ded to by all the active members of society; for in vain is it [...]o en­deavour to list up a standard to the nations, unless in and by that power alone which is able to strengthen for the work; without which pure and unmixed qualifi­cation it will prove too large and too heavy; so that being beaten and driven by the winds, it will fall to the ground, to the shame [Page 20]and confusion of those who at­tempted to erect and support it.

The said author, in the 14th proposicion of the apology, treat­ing of the power of the civil ma­gistrate, saith, "The question is first, whether the civil magistrate hath power to force men in things religious, to do contrary to their consciences, and if they will not, to punish them in their goods, li­berties and lives? This (saith h [...]) we hold in the negative — but secondly,— as we would have the magistrate to avoid this extreme of incroaching upon mens con­sciences; so, on the other hand, we are far from joining with or strengthening such libertines, as would stretch the liberty of their consciences to the prejudice of their neighbours, or the ruin of human society.—We understand therefore by matters of conscience, such as immediately relate be­twixt God and man, or men and men, as to meet together to wor­ship God in that way which they judge is most acceptable unto him; and not to incroach upon or feek to force their neighbours, otherwise than by reason, or such other means as Christ and his a­postles used, viz. preaching, and instructing such as will hear and receive it; but not at all for men under the notion of conscience, to do any thing contrary to the mo­ral and perpetual statutes general­ly acknowledged by all christians; in which case the magistrate may very lawfully use his authority." — The doctrine here preached is excellent both for those in, as well as those under authority, as it may clearly appear from thence that "in things religious," such as he there mentions, he appre­hends the magistrate has no just power, and that conscience may safely be pleaded; but observe the care and caution with which he writes, and how positively he excludes from that sacred claim ‘any thing that is acted contra­ry to the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledg­ed by all christians.’—But it may be asked, what are those moral and perpetual statutes? I at once take it for granted, that the laying and paying of Taxes for the support of human and ci­vil governments, and acknow­ledging the authority of the same, are material parts; seeing they have been very generally assented and submitted unto by christians of all sects and denominations, at and from the personal appearance of our Lord Jesus Christ, in all countries, and under all revolu­tions, down to this very day; and without which "human so­ciety" could not be supported, but inevitably verge into confu­sion and ruin:—From which I would as concisely as possible, according to the worthy author's manner, and nearly in his own words, lay down a position, and then draw and prove what I ap­prehend to be an undeniable and conclutive argument, as follows: —Pos. That it is unlawful and improper to counteract the moral and perpetual statutes generally acknowledged by christians.

But the laying and paying of Taxes for the support of human and civil governments, and ac­knowledging the authority of the same, are of those moral and perpetual statutes, &c.

Therefore, it is unlawful and improper to counteract them.

If the cause of refusal and non­compliance were a matter of mere [Page 21]faith and conscience toward God, the case would be exceedingly different, and there would pro­bably be no dissent; but as it appears to be only of civil con­cern, and relates solely to human affairs, it is therefore apprehend­ed not censurable by the church, or properly cognizable thereby: And here I cannot but remark one reason why I believe many among us are led into a mistake, and scruples arise against paying of Taxes for want of a well in­formed judgment. It is a receiv­ed opinion among us, that all wars without distinction are sin­ful: Hence arises this scruple a­gainst paying of Taxes for the support of war; but this is not the genuine doctrine of our anci­ent friends, as will fully appear in the following extract from the writings of Isaac Pennington, where speaking to what he very properly stiles "a weighty ques­tion concerning the magistrates protection of the innocent." It is to be observed, that this en­lightned author views magistracy and defensive war, as the same thing, or, if I may use a simile, as one building (tho' consisting of divers parts) standing on the same foundation. The question is as follows: Vol. 1st, p. 444. ‘Whether the magistrate, in righteousness and equity, is engaged to defend such, who (by the peaceableness and love which God hath wrought in their spirits, and by that law of life, mercy, good-will, and forgiveness, which God, by his own finger, hath written in their hearts) are taken off from fighting, and cannot use a weapon destructive to any creature.’

Answer: ‘Magistracy was in­tended by God for the defence of the people; not only of those who have ability, and can fight for them, but of such also who cannot, or are for­bidden by the love and law of God, written in their hearts so to do. Thus women, children, sick persons, aged persons, and also priests in nations (who have ability to fight, but are exempted by their function, which is not equivalent to the exemption which God makes by the law of his spirit in the heart) have the benefit of the law, and of the magistrates protection, without fighting for the defence of either.’

Now if magistracy be appoint­ed by God, and it be the magis­trates duty to defend such, who are either not able, or cannot for conscience sake defend them­selves; is it possible any can be right who lay waste this ordi­nance, or speak of such defence as sinful? If any man be appoint­ed by God to defend my life, is it possible that God can authorise me to call him a sinner for doing his duty? or is it possible that I can, consistent with my duty, re­fuse him that tribute which is ab­solutely necessary to enable him thus to defend me? But had I much greater abilities to speak to this subject than I am conscious of, no reasoning of mine could be of equal authority with the author above quoted. Hear him therefore again, p. 448, where, treating on this peaceable princi­ple professed by the society, he says, ‘I speak not this against any magistrates or peoples de­fending themselves against fo­reign invasions, or making use [Page 22]of the sword to suppress the violent and evil-doers within their own borders; for this the present state of things may and doth require, and a great bles­sing will attend the sword, when it is uprightly borne to that end, and its use will be honourable; and while there is need of a sword, the Lord will not suffer that government, or those governors, to want sitting instruments under them for the management thereof, who wait on him in his fear to have the edge of it rightly directed; but yet there is a better st [...]te which the Lord hath alrealy brought some into, and which nations are to expect and travel to­wards.’

A candid and judicious author, to wit, Richard Finch, in a Treatise called Second Thoughts concerning War, see page 95, after the above quotation, further adds, ‘It is evident that this great man holds forth plainly the divine oeconomy I have hinted at above. We see it was his judgment that men using the sword, in this gospel day, may be God's instru­ments; and that herein, tho' not come to the better state or summit of christian perfection, they may yet be good enough to use or direct the sword to be used religiously in God's fear: When perhaps many would think that religion in all, in­stead of using the sword, would if regarded, lead directly from the use of it; but it seems this writer, though a great advo­cate for our doctrine, thought otherwise; and I profess my­self to be his proselyte, though at present, it there are a few persons so pious, I should al­most as soon expect to find the philosophers stone, as an whole army of such warriours: And I am persuaded a due regard to what may be urged upon his and my principle, will re­quire more benevolence and reflection of mind than can be expected from unthinking bi­gotry.’ Again the same au­thor, ‘I admire the wisdom and charity of this writer, in his prudent and generous conces­sions, though some may think he thereby gives his cause a­way; but I believe them so essential to the preservation of it, that what he writes is the very truth, and that without such concessions it will be im­possible to maintain our ground against a keen adversary. All attempts to explain and defend our doctrine, which go upon the literal sense of the precept, or consider defensive war as a thing in itself wicked, how specious soever worked up or received by shallow judges, instead of honouring and serv­ing, have injured a good cause by multiplying many if not needless absurdities and con­tradictions upon all such ill judged attempts to state and clear the controversy.’ The same author, page 100: ‘The sword then which in tenderness of conscience thou canst not draw, may in another (whom for wise reasons it hath not pleased God to lead in the manner he hath cone thee) become the cutward providen­tial means to preserve thee and others, as well as himself; up­on which principle his arms may protect thy person and [Page 23]property, and thy virtue and piety be a defence and blessing upon his arms.’ Again, p. 118: ‘King William the Third was a great warriour, and a great blessing to England, as he interposed for its deliver­ance in a trying time, when the liberty of the subject, un­der a specious solemnity of preserving is, was secretly un­dermined; and the great duke of Marlborough, instead of being convinced of our princi­ple, was a glorious instrument in a warlike way. From what has been laid down we may strongly conclude, that though a measure of divine grace, ac­cording to scripture, is given to every man, yet there may be an infinite diversity in de­grees, and all things consider­ed, it seems even impossible that it should by the giver, in every age and person, be de­signed to make precisely the same discoveries, and exalt to the same degrees of knowledge and perfection.’

The above doctrine corre­sponds with a matter of fact, wherein the apostle Paul himself was nearly interested: It was at the time when upwards of forty of the Jews had "bound them­selves under a curse, saying that they would neither eat nor drink till they had killed Paul." Acts 23d chap. from the 16th to the 24th v. And when Pauls sister [...] son heard of their lying in wait, he went and entered into the cas­tle, and told Paul. Then Paul called one of the centurious unto him, and said, Bring this young man unto the chief captain: for he hath a certain thing to tell him. So he took him, and brought him to the chief captain, and said, Paul the prisoner called me unto him, and prayed me to bring this young man unto thee, who hath something to say unto thee. Then the chief captain took him by the hand, and went with him aside privately, and ask­ed him, What is that thou hast to tell me? And he said, The Jews have agreed to desire thee that thou wouldest bring down Paul to-morrow into the council, as though they would enquire some­what of him more perfectly. But do not thou yield unto them: for there lie in wait for him of them more than forty men, which have bound themselves with an oath, that they will neither eat nor drink till they have killed him: and now are they ready, looking for a promise from thee. So the chief captain then let the young man depart, and charged him, See thou tell no man that thou hast shewed these things to me. And he called unto him two centuri­ons, saying. Make ready two hundred soldiers to go to Cesarea, and horsemen threescore and ten, and spearmen two hundred, at the third hour of the night. And provide them beasts, that they may set Paul on, and bring him safe unto Felix the governor." It is evident here that the apos­tle's life was preserved through the interposition of the chief cap­tain; and Paul hesitated not to put himself under his protection, although he had been previously assured of the Lord's particular providence and protection; the Lord having stood by him, and said, "Be of good cheer, Paul, for as thou hast restined of me in Jerusalem, so must thou bear witness also at Rome."

[Page 24] Upon the whole, much more might be produced to shew that it is perfectly consistent with the doctrines of christianity, and the practice of friends to acknowledge allegiance to the government that God, in the course of his provi­dence, has thought proper should take place, and to conscientious­ly pay our proportion of Taxes for the support thereof; but it is hoped the above is sufficient with every unprejudiced mind.

END OF THE ADDRESS.

ADVERTISEMENT

SINCE the foregoing sheets were prepared for the press, there having fallen into my hands a Treatise entituled an essay con­cerning obedience to the supreme powers, and the duty of subjects in all revolutions; it was first published in the year 1694, and written to justify the revolution in England, in 1688, against the doctrine of kings ruling by divine right, &c. and to shew the reci­procal duties of prince and peo­ple. The present revolution in America, being a case in many respects similar, and the argu­ments advanced in the aforesaid Treatise, appearing equally strong to justify obedience to the present American government, the fol­lowing extracts are subjoined by way of appendix.

[Page]

APPENDIX shewing the Reasonableness of Obedience to the Supreme Powers, and the Duty of Subjects in all Revolutions.

CHAP. I. Of Government, and the Origin of it.

Government, as 'tis usually defin'd, is The care of other peoples safety; which consists in protecting and securing them from being destroy'd or oppress'd by one another, as well as by stran­gers; and redressing the grievances of those who are injur'd, and preventing the like for the future, by punishing offenders. In order to which, the governor must have a right to command the natural force of those who expect his protection, to enable him to put his laws and decrees in executi­on. Tho' without power go­vernment cannot consist, yet pow­er and government are not one and the same thing; a man may be in the power of another, and yet not be govern'd by him: It is necessary that this power be made use of for protection, with­out which 'tis impossible to be protected; so that protection and government are the same thing: for where people are not protect­ed, they are still in the state of nature, and without government.

It is government alone which gives the form, life, and unity to a civil society or body politick, by which the several members have their mutual influence, sym­pathy, and connection: so that to be a member of a civil society, and to be under government, is the same thing; and to be with­out government, and to be in the state of nature, are reciprocal, and predicated of one another. None can pretend to be, or claim any civil rights as a member of a society, without owning the actu­al government which makes it a society: and they who disown the government of the society they live in, 'do outlaw them­selves, and virtually declare they are no members of it; because they have reduc'd themselves to a state of nature, by disowning there is among them a common judge, who has a right to decide their controversies, and redress their injuries, and in whose de­terminations they are oblig'd to acquiesce.

God, who is the author of e­very good thing, may be said in a more special manner to be so of government, because 'tis abso­lutely necessary to the well-being of mankind; and, by the law of nature, which obliges mankind to act for their good, he has in­stituted it, and by his positive law since ratify'd and confirm'd it. Yet he did not constitute any particular form of government, but left mankind at liberty to dispose of themselves, as (when they instituted societies) they thought fit. God was so far from depriving any nation of this liberty, that when he was pleas'd to take upon him the office of a king over his own people the Jews, he first requir'd their con­sent; and a contract between God and the people (as is plain by the 19th of Exodus) was the [Page 26]foundation of the Theocracy. And since it is not by God's po­sitive law, that one form of go­vernment, rather than another, is any where establish'd, there remains no other way by which any government can be erected, or that one man can have a right to command over others, than by the law of nature, or by the con­sent of the parties concern'd. But there is no law of nature for any one form of government, so as to make the rest unlawful, or that one person rather than another shou'd have the sovereign admi­nistration of affairs: Nor can there be any one law of nature urg'd, why any particular person shou'd have a power over so many millions of different families, with no manner of relation or dependance one upon another, and who are by nature equal, be­ing of the same rank, promiscu­ously born to the same advantages of nature, and to the use of the same common faculties. And therefore it remains, that govern­ment must be deriv'd from con­sent.

CHAP. II. Of the Publick Good.

I Suppose I need not spend ma­ny words to shew the absolute necessity of government, for the good and well-being of mankind; or that it was for no other reason that men parted with their liber­ties (for what else cou'd be an e­quivalent?) than the mutual de­fence and security they receive by government, which is the sole design and end of all laws, pu­nishments and rewards. As this reason was at first the sole motive for submitting to particular per­sons, so 'tis the only reason still for continuing allegiance to them; and when this reason ceases, na­tural liberty returns, and then men are oblig'd, for the sake of their own safety and preservation, to pay allegiance where 'tis most for their interest and advantage.

Obedience is due to govern­ment, and not to the person who governs, but on the account and for the sake of it; otherwise peo­ple might be oblig'd to pay alle­giance to a king after he had re­sign'd his regal office. 'Tis im­possible for a king to lose his go­vernment, and not lose the allegi­ance of his subjects, because they are relatives; and according to the nature of all relatives, one cannot subsist without the other.

Natural relations, as that be­tween father and son, last as long as both parties live; but those which are artificial (if I may so term 'em) as between master and servant, king and subject, may be destroy'd during their lives: and when these relations cease, all obligations on both sides cease. The relation between sovereign and subjects is destroy'd, when the sovereign will no longer pro­tect his people, and so freely withdraws from the government; or when he is depriv'd of the power of protecting 'em, and so is driven from his government: [Page 27]which, as to the people, (for whose sake government was insti­tuted) has the same effect: and they equally lose that protection and defence for the sake of which alone allegiance is paid, whether the sovereign will not or cannot any longer govern 'em, and is forc'd to leave his government in the hands of others, whereby those who were his subjects are as incapable of paying him allegi­ance, as he is to protect 'em; and the same force which justifies his leaving 'em, will equally justify their transferring their allegiance. And since no society is able to subsist without having justice ad­minister'd, and enjoying those other blessings deriv'd from go­vernment; either they must by living without government be­come a prey to every one, or else there is a necessity of preserving themselves by paying allegiance to the new government.

For none can have a right in­consistent with the publick good, which is the only fundamental law of all societies; contrary to which, no law (and consequently no le­gal right, which is built upon law) can be valid; to which, as to a center, each man's actions ought to tend, because the more universal any good is, the more it ought to be imbrac'd: And societies cou'd not subsist, but must necessarily fall into a state of war and confusion, if every man shou'd prefer the advantage of any parti­cular person before the good of the whole.

As every particular person's interest must yield to the general good of the society, so must that of a particular society to the more universal good of all societies; and no principles can be true, (however they may serve a parti­cular turn) which, if generally practis'd, wou'd be against the good of all societies. But no­thing can be more destructive and pernicious to all human societies, than those principles which assert that allegiance must be only paid to him who has a legal title; be­cause it must oblige vast numbers in all revolutions to be destroy'd for the sake of a single person, rather than submit to another who is in the same station, and by whose power they might be govern'd and protected.

Can it be suppos'd, that when men submitted to government, (because 'twas absolutely necessa­ry for their preservation) they did it on such terms, as shou'd oblige 'em in so many cases to run into those inconveniences which they desir'd to shun, rather than live peaceably under a government which actually protects 'em?

Nothing can justify such prin­ciples, unless the misery and de­struction, not the preservation of human societies, be the supreme law; or that 'tis a sin to act for the general good of a society, and a duty in the people to expose themselves to certain destruction, rather than act for their own good in a matter solely instituted for their benefit.

A man may be oblig'd to suf­fer rather than act against his duty; but that he shou'd be o­blig'd to suffer rather than do his duty, in promoting the general good of the nation, is a strange paradox. If it be a duty to act for the publick good, and the general interest of a society; and it the more universal the good be, the more it ought to be sought for; then the means necessary to [Page 28]this duty, or end, must be as ne­cessary as the end itself, because the end prescribes the means.

The paying obedience to those in possession, is a doctrine which tends so much to the interest of human societies, and of all the particular members thereof, that even they who oppose it, did they consult their own happiness, must wish it were true: And what greater argument can there be of the truth of it, than that 'tis so conducive to the good of of mankind?

And that common objection, or rather reflection, That 'tis in­terest makes these tenets, which require obedience to the present government, so universally im­brac'd, (however uncharitably design'd) is so far from destroy­ing the credit of 'em, that 'tis a demonstration of their truth; be­cause they are for the good of particulars, of which the publick is made up.

CHAP. III. Of the Obligation of Human Laws.

ALL writers allow, That the leagues and contracts which princes make with one another, do oblige them no longer than they are in possession of their kingdoms; because the sole rea­sons of making these leagues were upon the power each king­dom had to afford mutual assist­ance and benefit to one another. And if this be a constant practice with kings, that their treaties o­blige them no longer than while each king has possession of his kingdom; why will they not al­low the same reason to hold for subjects, that they shou'd be free from all obligations to princes, when they no longer receive any protection from 'em? Seeing that was the only ground and sole cause of their paying allegiance; and in truth they cannot be any longer oblig'd, than the reason for obliging 'em holds. For why shou'd people be oblig'd, when there is no reason they shou'd be so? No laws can bind any longer, than the reason for enacting 'em holds good; and when the sole reason which made 'em laws ceases, the laws them­selves must so too: much more must any particular law be null and void, when not only the rea­son of keeping it ceases, but the keeping it thwarts the general intent of all laws, which is the happiness of the societies, to which all laws are but means: and there is no reason that the means shou'd oblige, when the end for whose sake the means were ordain'd cannot be obtain'd by those means, much less when they become destructive of the sole end for which they were or­dain'd.

If there were a law that ships shou'd sail on such a side of the channel, and the sole reason, whether express'd or not, were for avoiding the dangerous sands on the other side; shou'd the [Page 29]sands chance to be remov'd to the safe side of the channel, the pilot wou'd be so far from being bound because of that law, to run his ship on the sands, that he wou'd break the law if he kept to the letter of it, and wou'd observe it by going contrary to the letter. So again, if a law, which re­quir'd obedience to one particu­lar person, shou'd happen to be destructive of the publick good, and of fatal consequence to the community, the letter of the law wou'd oblige no more in one case than in the other; nay, the rea­son of not observing the last wou'd be stronger on account of the disproportion of the number: But the true meaning and intent of the law wou'd in one case as well as the other, oblige people to act contrary to the letter of it; and they wou'd be as much bound to pay obedience, where 'tis for the publick good, as in the other case the ship wou'd be to sail on the safe side of the channel.

CHAP. IV. Objections answer'd.

Object. THO' the good of the society be suppos'd the grand ultimate law, yet those principles, which require obedience to the possessor, cannot be true, be­cause they are against the peace and happiness of nations, by incouraging rebellion against all princes, in o­bliging people to pay the same alle­giance, 'ven to those who unjustly depose' em.

Answ. These principles are so far from being destructive to the peace and quiet of nations, or incouraging rebellion against their governors, that they require obe­dience to all in possession, upon pain of damnation; but if nei­ther the fear of eternal punish­ment in the next life, nor the se­verest which can be inflicted upon 'em in this, can secure people from rebelling, I must confess, I know nothing that can. It is the duty of all subjects to do their utmost to defend the government; that's only a just return, and what's due for its protecting and defending 'em: But if by the chance of war, or any other way, it shou'd lose the power of pro­tecting 'em, they are not oblig'd to have their throats cut, rather than pay allegiance to that go­vernment, by whose savour and protection they subsist, and enjoy what they have. And that prince is very unreasonable, and acts a­gainst the rules of humanity as well as charity, who when able no longer to protect the people, wou'd rather have 'em destroy'd, than own that government which can.

Nothing can justify such an inhuman and barbarous opinion, unless it can be prov'd that men enter'd into societies barely for the sake and interest of a single person; and that if his pleasure or profit require it, millions of lives must be indispensably sacri­fic'd. This is to place men in a worse condition than beasts, if they are in conscience oblig'd to lose their lives to gratify the un­limited [Page 30]pride, ambition, revenge, o [...] interest of a single person.

It is strange that any English­men, who are the freest nation in the world, shou'd think they are no other than the King's proper­ty: Tho' 'tis but reasonable that men who design to bring the most insupportable slavery on them­selves, shou'd be qualify'd for it by notions and principles so much below the dignity of human na­ture. While the contrary prin­ciples are so far from being any ways prejudicial to mankind; that it is they alone which in all revolutions can secure human so­cieties, and make governments easy and safe both to kings and subjects, by putting an end to those otherwise endless disputes of titles. And princes may with­out fears or jealousies mind the publick good, because it secures them who are in possession against all pretences.

The most that can be objected is, That a prince who has once lost his dominions, may by these principles chance to lose the hopes of ever recovering 'em again.

A prince unjustly expelled, ought to acquiesce, if he has no way of recovering his kingdom but by disturbing the peace and quiet of a nation; he ought not to make use of such unlawful means for the recovery of his kingdom: and certainly others can have no reason to act against the good of the community for his interest, when he himself is oblig'd not to act.

The interest of a prince is only more sacred than another's, when that of the publick is involv'd in it; but when that is no longer concern'd in his actions, he ceases to be the publick person, and is upon equal terms with other pri­vate men, and ought as well as any other to acquiesce, rather than disturb the quiet of a nation. And there is then the same reason for not endeavouring to restore him, as there was at first for not turning him out.

All the ill consequences which can happen in this case are, That the less hopes princes have of be­ing restor'd by such unlawful means, the more careful (it's hop'd) they will be in governing the commonwealth, and more a­fraid of arbitrary and illegal practices.

Object. If all persons, how un­justly soever they get a crown, have the same right to the obedience of the people, to wit their consent, then there can be no such thing as an usurper.

Answ. He who without any just cause destroys the right which any prince has to the allegiance of his subjects, by making him uncapable to protect 'em, and protects 'em himself, may be call'd an usurper: Tho' the peo­ple by the former prince's losing his power to protect 'em, are re­duc'd to the state of nature, and by consequence free from any al­legiance; and may lawfully, or rather are oblig'd (every one else being out of a capacity to protect 'em) to consent to be govern'd by him who has the power to protect 'em; who being so chosen, has the only right a king can have, the consent of the people, who are as much oblig'd to obey him, as they are any king whatever. The former king is so far then from being their legal king, that he is none at all, nor has any manner of right to their allegi­ance. 'Tis true, the usurper [Page 31]having done him anjury, ought to make him satisfaction, and (if he [...]n without any damage to the publick) to place him in that condition he was in before he made him uncapable to protect the people; who then, for the sake of protection which they re­ceive from him, are oblig'd to pay him obedience. The having a right to be restor'd by the usur­per, is the only right a prince unjustly depriv'd of his regal of­fice can pretend to. And when I speak of his legal right, I mean only this by it: Among the Jews, tho' none cou'd have a le­gal right except one of their own nation, because they were oblig'd by God himself to chuse a king from among their brethren, and God afterward entail'd the crown on the posterity of David; yet when these were disabled to pro­tect the people by their being in the power of strangers, 'twas so far from being a crime, that 'twas their duty (notwithstanding the divine legal right any of their brethren cou'd pretend to) to pay allegiance to 'em, tho' for the most part they were usurpers, having no just cause to conquer 'em.

CHAP. V. Of Possession.

ALL writers, I think, allow, that after a possession of a long continuance (tho' they ex­tremely differ how much time is necessary) a right accrues to the possessor, tho' there are some of the right line still in being. If it be unjust to pay the first pos­sessor obedience, I don't see how a long possession can alter the case. A continuance in an in­justice may make the injustice greater, but not alter the nature of things, and make the greatest wrong to be right: Though all things are done in time, yet time itself operates nothing.

This mistake, like many o­thers, is occasion'd by the paral­lel men draw between private persons (who are ty'd up by laws enacted by the supreme powers) and the supreme powers them­selves. By the laws of most na­tions, if private men neglect to make a legal demand of their rights in a certain time appointed they lose 'em, and a right accures to the possessor; but this depends on a law enacted by the supreme powers, who have a right to dis­pose of private estates as they judge best for the publick good, whose laws can oblige only their own subjects. But what authority have the subjects, or the possessor, to dispose of the legal prince's rights? Besides, it might justly be imputed to a private man's own neglect, if, when the law is open, he does not recover his right: It may well be presum'd he has relinquish'd it. But that can't be said of a prince who has no court of justice to appeal to, or any other likely way to reco­ver his right; yet by bearing the arms and title, and by other ways, still asserts his right.

How numerous are the instan­ces [Page 32]of princes possess'd of territo­ries belonging to others, and who have been so for a great many years? Yet none dare affirm, the subjects who pay'em allegiance, are, and have been all along trai­tors. To give but one instance among hundreds: The kings of England have a right to the king­dom of France, and have con­stantly claim'd it by causing themselves to be stil'd kings of France, and by bearing the arms of that crown; yet none will con­demn the French as traitors, who have all along paid allegiance to the French kings. But if the kings of England by tract of time lost their right to the obedience of the French. and before that time 'twas treason for those of that na­tion to pay allegiance to the French kings, I shou'd be glad to know what month, or year, it ceas'd to be treason; for 'tis a thing of mighty consequence to know how long 'tis treason to o­bey a king in pessession, and when it becomes treason not to obey him. In short, if a king can have a right to a country, and it be no crime in those of that country not to pay him alle­giance, it demonstrates that alle­giance is not annex'd to the title, but is due to the person who pro­tects 'em.

Object. Tho' time does not give a right, yet the acts, or the no acts, that is, the omission of some, may in time amount to a resignation of the right of the legal prince to the u­surpers.

Answ. I grant a man's mind may be express'd by acts as well as words; yet 'twou'd be very hard to condemn all those of trea­son who have paid allegiance to the possessors, before they had sufficient grounds to believe, the legal prince or his heirs had by their acts (if such acts cou'd de­stroy the right of the next of kin) resign'd their and their legal suc­cessors right to the usurper. In how few cases is there reason for such presumption? If till then all people shou'd be oblig'd to be destroy'd rather than pay allegi­ance, what a destruction wou'd it make in the world: Wou'd it not in most cases expose, at least the good and conscientious, to certain ruin? And others cou'd not pre­serve themselves without a sin, the reward of which is damnation.

Long possession is not at all ne­cessary to justify the peoples obe­dience; for that very moment the people receive protection and de­fence from the new powers, they ought to pay 'em the same allegi­ance as if they had been in pos­session of the government a thou­sand years. The less time a na­tion has been settled, the more need it has of rest and peace, and the more dangerous wou'd any violent revolution be.

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CHAP. VI. Of Protection.

IF any wou'd not be thought enemies to the society, but part of it, ought they not to act equally with the rest for the peace and quiet of it, and submit to the head, that rules and governs it? How can they pretend to be members of the society, and con­sequently claim any civil rights by being so, without owning the actual government which makes 'em so? Do they not, by disown­ing it, renounce the benefit of the laws (which only can be put in execution by the government) and out-law themselves? How can they have any more right to the protection of the government, if they out law themselves, than if the government, by putting 'em out of its protection, had out-law'd 'em? So that 'tis whol­ly by the favour of the govern­ment (for they have no true pre­tence to 'em) that they enjoy any legal rights. If they think they shou'd be severely dealt with, did not the government protect 'em, why do they not what is necessary to enable the government to pro­tect 'em? If they will the conse­quence, the protection of the go­vernment, ought they not to will the antecedent, all that is neces­sary to it? And if it be lawful to desire and to receive the advan­tages which flow from govern­ment (which I suppose no Jaco­bite will be so hardy as to deny) why must not the means necessary to obtain these advantages, be so too?

How can they who are willing to be protected by any person, be unwilling (except they desire contradictions) that he shou'd have a power to govern 'em, since without such a power he can't protect 'em? And they who are willing to receive a universal pro­tection, are presum'd to be will­ing to pay all obedience necessary for that end; which is as univer­sal as the protection they expect. 'Tis evident, that he who is wil­ling to receive a universal pro­tection from a government, is willing that the government shou'd have a coercive power o­ver all others, to restrain 'em from injuring him; and that it shou'd have sufficient authority to do justice, and oblige all to pay obedience to the laws, when put in execution for his sake, because in it wholly consists his protecti­on: And he who is for the go­vernment's having power over all other people on his account, ought to be willing it shou'd have the same over him, for the sake of others, except he'd be the on­ly man in the nation without go­vernment; and is unwilling to do that himself, which he'd have all others (whatever their principles are) to do.

If the nonjurors desire to be protected, and do actually receive the protection of the government (tho' at the same time they pre­tend 'tis against their consciences) 'tis manifest they own the go­vernment, and by their actions [Page 34]consent to submit to it: And what force can a protestation have against their own acts?

Do not all who go into any fo­reign princes dominions, during their stay, by receiving the pro­tection of the government, own themselves subject to it (except embassadors, over whom sove­reigns have agreed to suspend the exercise of their right) and are they not oblig'd equally with the natives, to pay allegiance; and alike guilty of treason, and so try'd, if they attempt any thing against it? And upon this head, all private attempts upon a prince in his own country, have been abhor'd by all nations: and they who design'd any thing of this nature, have not been treated as just enemies, tho' in time of war; because 'tis presum'd, they enter as subjects into the dominions of that prince who protects 'em.

By examining what 'tis which gives government a right to the obedience of men who are by nature free, twill the better ap­pear what right the present go­vernment has to the allegiance of those it protects.

The reason usually given, why people are oblig'd to obey any particular government, is (no prince being ridiculous enough to pretend a right, as the first-born in a direct line from Adam or No­ah) because 'twas the intent of those who first form'd the society, that such person, and their suc­cessors (if they made the govern­ment hereditary) shou'd have a right to govern the nation for e­ver. But how cou'd they, whose authority with their being ceas'd so long since, oblige the consci­ences of those who were not then in being? Or how cou'd any acts or compacts of their ancestors take away the natural liberty of those who were born so many years after, and who have the same right to freedom as they had? Or how cou'd their com­pacts oblige those who are not de­scended from 'em, but come from other countries into the society; and make it a sin in them not to obey the present governors of any society, on whose authority alone and not on the founders of the society, depends the validity of ali former laws, which can only bind, because 'tis the will of the present powers they shou'd? o­therwise no laws cou'd be repeal'd if their very being did not depend upon the pleasure of the present supreme powers, who design they shall oblige, till they declare the contrary.

Every person, tho' born free, yet he is for the sake of his own safety oblig'd to part with his li­berty, and put himself under the protection of government. Nor can he be secure in what he en­joys any other way. Nor can he have a right in a country (which is already possest) to any thing, but by owning the government of that country. And by pre­tending to the privileges the rest of the society enjoy, he has own'd himself a member of the society, and a subject of the government of it. And this is the only way that any (except by verbal pro­mises) consent to become subject to a government.

Whatever society people chance to be members of, whether their native or any other, they are dur­ing their stay equally oblig'd, for the sake of the protection they receive, to pay allegiance to the governors of that society. 'Tis [Page 35]not material, whether they enjoy properties for their lives, years, weeks, or days; the greatest part of the natives have no more pro­perties, or enjoy no greater ad­vantages by the government than foreigners, yet they are oblig'd to pay the same allegiance the rest of the society do.

Tho' they who reside in a fo­reign society are equally subject with the natives to the laws of it, and by opposing the government wou'd be equally guilty of trea­son; yet if during their stay, a [...] alteration happens in the govern­ment contrary to the laws, they never scruple to pay allegiance to him who gets possession of the go­vernment, tho' his title be ever so illegal I see no reason why they shou'd not do the same in their first society, since whatever soci­ety they are in during their stay, [...]y are equally oblig'd to ob [...]y the laws of it.

Are not these reasons as strong for paying allegiance to the pre­sent government? Can any m [...] enjoy the privileges of the socie­ty, without being a member of it? Or can any one be a member of a society, without owning the power, or paying allegiance to it? Or is there any other head that rules and governs the members, than the present powers? Is it not by their authority, that the members of the society receive a universal protection, as to their lives, liberties and estates; under whose government they are or else under none, but in the it [...] of nature? And there is no [...]ea­son or law, to oblige people to reman in a state so inconsitent with their happiness. And 'twoud be injustice for any to remain in that state, because they wou'd be their own judges in all the dis­putes they had with others, who were willing to refer their differ­ences to a standing impartial judge. After this, what pretence can any member of the society have of refusing to pay their alle­giance to a power, whom they have all along by their actions own'd, and by whom they have been secur'd from groaning un­der the wor't of slaveries, which had been to them the more into­lerable, because of the great li­berty and freedom they before enjoy'd? So that all the reasons which can well be imagin'd to o­blige [...]ecple firmly and intirely [...]o any human authority, do con­spite to tie'em up in [...] strongest bo [...]ds of allegiance an [...] fidelity to the present government.

CHAP. VII. Of Oaths of Fidelity.

PERHAPS 'twill be faid, Th [...]' upon supposition there is no reason why people shou'd pay alle­giance any longer than they are protected, yet if they have other­wise ty'd themselves by their oaths, they are in conscience oblig'd by those oaths. But I answer:

Such oaths, if ever they were impos'd, wou'd be so far from binding, that they wou'd be [...]ull upon the account of the sinfulnes; [Page 36]of 'em, as being directly against the good of human society. In all promises and oaths concerning things not moral, this tacit con­dition is always included, of their not being, or upon altera­tion of the circumstances becom­ing contrary to the publick good: and this is without all doubt to be observ'd about government, because 'twas instituted for no o­ther reason than the publick good.

Oaths do not alter the nature of allegiance, or make it due where it was not before; or any ways extend it, but only add a new tie to pay that allegiance which is due on the account of protection. He who lives under a government, tho' he has not sworn to it, owes it the same al­legiance as he who has; and if he shou'd deny his allegiance to it, wou'd be equally guilty of treason, though not of perjury. 'Tis evident by the universal practice of mankind, that no subjects ever thought themselves oblig'd by their oaths of fidelity, which governments have con­stantly impos'd on 'em, when they ceas'd to be protected by 'em. The legislative power, e­specially where the people have a share in it, are presum'd to re­cede as little as possible from na­tural equity, and to design, by imposing such oaths, the good and preservation of the society; whose interest it is, that they who have the publick administration of affairs shou'd not be disturb'd. But 'tis not at all material whe­ther this or that man, provided they are well manag'd, has the direction of 'em: Nor can it without the greatest absurdity be suppos'd, that such numbers of men as societies are compos'd of, who are by nature equal, shou'd oblige themselves by the most so­lemn ues to become most misera­ble, by living without protecti­on; nay, to lose even their lives rather than own the government which can protect 'em, for no o­ther reason than barely an extra­ordinary fondness to one of their number, to give him not the ne­cessaries or real conveniences of life, but only an office (for go­vernment is no other) which is but an imaginary happiness: For it government were a real happi­ness to the persons who possess it, several upon their parting with it wou'd not have found themselves happier than before. That peo­ple shou'd be true to those who have the administration of civil affairs, is all which oaths of fide­lity require; and 'tis evident by the words of it, that the late oath of allegiance requir'd no more; and to extend it further than the power in possession, is not recon­cilable with the reason, end, and design of paying obedience, which is the peace and happiness of the society, and which can never be maintain'd, if people may, for the take of a single person, dis­turb 'em who have the admini­stration of their common affairs: and 'twoud require impossibili­ties, because a private person is incapable of paying allegiance to a king when out of possession of the government.

[Page 37]

CHAP. VIII. Of Proofs of Scripture concerning Obedience to those who actually administer Government.

CHRIST in the directions he gave, Mat. 23, to his dis­ciples, and to the multitude, about their behaviour to the Scribes and Pharisees, requires obedience to be paid 'em only on the account of possession; saying, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moses's [...], all therefore whatso­ever they bid you observe, that ob­serve and do. And he gives no other reason for this great obedi­ence in doing and observing whatever they command, than because they sat in Moses's sear; that is, were possess'd of Moses's authority, who in the Theocracy was the chief magistrate. Not that the Scribes and Pharisees had so great a power as Moses; but as far as they did enjoy his seat, throne and authority, so far they were to be obey'd: They were then the greatest, as well as chief­est part of the grand Sanhedrin, which in all causes where the Ro­mans had left the Jews to their liberty, had the supreme power both in civil and ecclesiastical matters. (There were not in the Jewish republick two distinct in­dependent powers, one for civil, another for ecclesiastical causes) If the people were then oblig'd to pay so great obedience, barely on account of possession, why may not the same direction serve for a standing rule to the multitude in all times? And not only to the inferiors, but even to the su­preme magistrate himself, Christ requires obedience on no other account than that of possession. If Cesar be in possession of the empire, as it did appear by his coining of money, and stamping his image upon it, that being a mark of sovereignty and empire, but not of any legal title to it; then Cesar is to have tribute and all other parts of allegiance paid him.

And St. Paul in express terms requires obcoience to the powers which be, and declares there is no power but what is from God. The Jews being influenc'd by the Priests and Pharisees, and o­blig'd by their law to place no stranger over 'em, scrupl'd to pay obedience to the Roman emperors, because they were strangers, and not capable of a legal right; not considering that the law oblig'd 'em only when it was in their own choice, and not when they were under the power of the Romans, to whom for the sake of pro [...]cti­on they were oblig'd to pay obe­dience. St. Paul therefore, to take away these scruples, assures 'em all powers are from God: But had he only meant legal powers, since only Jews were ca­pable of being such, he had con­firm'd 'em in their error. But the reason why he obliges men to submit, will demonstrate that all actual rulers are meant, and only they, because they alone are a terror to evil works, and a praise to the good; none but the actual [Page 38]ruler is a minister of God, a re­venger to execute wrath upon him who does evil, or a minister of God for good. What can more fully demonstrate that the reason of o­bedience is for the benefits men receive by government? And what makes the crime of resisting 'em so great, is, that men oppose those by whom they receive so many advantages: It is, because they have the power of the sword (which includes all manner of punishment) by which they se­cure and protect their subjects from all manner of injury and violence from ill men. And be­ing ministers of God for good, includes all the good they receive both to their persons and proper­ties: for which cause you pay tri­bute also, for they are God's ministers, continually attending upon this very thing. 'Tis their dis­pensing these advantages to man­kind, that makes 'em God's mi­nisters and God's ordinance; the scripture affirming those things which are necessary for the good of mankind to come from God, as plowing and sowing, Isa. 28, 23 —29. If it once be known, as the discovery can't be difficult, who 'tis that bears the sword, who administers justice, who re­wards, and who punishes; and the apostle's word may be taken, subjection is not only due to him for wrath, but for conscience­sake. And the same apostle ex­horts, That prayers be made for kings, and all in authority, that we may lead a quiet and peaceable life in all godliness and honesty. These reasons can only concern those who have actual power and authority, by whose protection they who live under 'em may lead such lives; and if it be our duty to pray that we may lead such lives, it must be our duty to enable them who have authority over us, to secure us in the en­joyment of a peaceable and quiet life.

And St. Peter for the same rea­son requires people to submit to the supreme magistrate, whom he calls the ordinance of man; so that 'tis plain, that God by approving this human ordinance, approves it as human, and requires obedi­ence to it for the same reasons that men a [...] first inftituted it. And 'tis the power governors have to do good, which makes 'em to be not only God's ordinance, and God's ministers, but even Gods: for since they are not Gods by nature (tho' by some peoples way of arguing one wou'd suppose they thought 'em such, or at least beings in themselves superior to to the rest of mankind) it must be for the protection they afford that they are term'd so; who when they no longer protect the people, cease to be a human or­dinance, and then too they cease to be a divine one. And the same reason which obliges people to submit to 'em, when they act for the good of the society, as much obliges people to oppose 'em, if they design to ruin and destroy 'em. It can't well be suppos'd, that God, who has o­blig'd mankind to preserve their lives, and consequently to use the means necessary for that end, shou'd require people to suffer themselves to be destroy'd, only to gratify the lust or barbarity of a single person, or a few, who are by nature but their equals, and only above 'em by being in an office which they erected only for their convenience.

[Page 39] Object. St. Paul makes no man­ner of exception, but declares, Whoever resists shall receive dam­nation.

Answ. As the apostle requires obedience to parents in all things; and to masters, husbands, pastors, without mentioning any excepti­ons: so here he declares (which was sufficient for his purpose) that all people ought to obey the supreme powers, without menti­oning this exception: which ne­cessarily flows from the nature, end, and design of government, and even from those reasons he gives for obedience.

It can't be presum'd that Christ authoriz'd his apostles to make slaves of mankind, by giving the emperors a new power, who be­fore by no law of God or nature had such a power over peoples lives. All the power the Roman government had, was immediate­ly from the people; who, as 'tis plain in history, by their mutual consent erected that common­wealth: and what power the em­perors had, was given 'em too by the people, who by the Lex Regia confer'd it upon 'em.

All that can be deduc'd from scripture is, That obedience is due to those who protect the peo­ple; and nothing can be plainer than those Texts which require it: By which plain and ignorant people may know their duty as well as the learned and wise. 'Twou'd have been inconsistent with the goodness of God to re­quire obedience on the greatest penalties, and yet leave it so un­certain, as the Jacobitish princi­ples wou'd render it, to whom o­bedience is to be paid. What can be more uncertain than ge­nerally titles are? And are there not innumerable intricate diffi­culties, about long possession, presum'd consent, a just cause for a total conquest? &c. If about these points the learned so ex­tremely differ, as any one may perceive who examines what au­thors have writ upon it, who give good reasons for destroying one another's hypothesis, but none for confirming their own, which are not liable to equal excepti­ons; What means or possibility have almost all mankind, the unlearned and common people, of knowing their duty?

The primitive christians all a­long comply'd with the revoluti­ons of the empire; and whoever was in possession of it, without examining his title, they paid him allegiance, and thought him invested with God's authority: And as the Goths and Vandals, and other barbarous nations on the one hand, and the Saracens, Turks and Persians on the other, without any just cause, overturn'd the Roman empire; the christians were so far from disputing their titles, or refusing to transfer their allegiance to 'em, that they never scrupled to own their go­vernment. If these Pharisaical notions had been then believ'd or practis'd, those nations wou'd have extirpated all the professors of christianity as enemies to go­vernment and order, instead of being converted to their religion, as most of the northern nations were. Nor do the christians who now live under the dominions of the infidels vary from this primi­tive practice, or scruple to trans­fer their allegiance to any who gets possession of the sacred office of governing, though the legal prince be still alive. Did not the [Page 40] Jews, tho' commanded by a di­vine law to take a king from a­mong their brethren, and God himself had intail'd the crown on the posterity of David, practise the same as they fell under the power of the four great empires? And did they not submit to A­lexander, without endeavouring to oppose him, when Darius, to whom they had sworn obedience, cou'd no longer protect 'em?

I shall add only one instance more, and that shall be of Da­vid, who thought it not unlaw­ful, when Saul design'd to take away his life, to transser his al­legiance, and fly to Achish, king of Gath, for protection, who made him keeper of his head, or captain of his guard: and whilst he was under his protection, he thought it his duty to pay all manner of allegiance to him; and (tho' contrary to his interest, and the hopes he had of being king after Saul's death) even to join with the uncircumcis'd to invade his own country, and fight against the Lord's anointed, his late king and father-in-law; and, as appears by 1 Sam. 29, 8, he was much g [...]iev'd, and hum­bly expostulates with the king for not permitting him to attend him in the battle: But what have I done? or what hast thou found in thy servant, so long as I have been with thee until this day, that I may not go and fight against the e­nemies of my Lord the King? Saul by designing to destroy David, had freed him from the allegiance he ow'd him: for he who designs to destroy a person, can't have a mind to govern that person; and if he will not govern him, he is free from his government, and at liberty to pay his allegiance where he thinks best. And if David expected from the king of Gath a universal protection from all his enemies, he ought to pay the king a universal obedience.

If a private person be freed from the government which de­signs to destroy him, the argu­ment will hold as strong in be­half of a nation design'd to be de­stroy'd; and whoever attempts it, not only renounces the govern­ment of the nation, but puts himself in a state of war, and de­clares he is an utter enemy to 'em, who are as much oblig'd to resist him, as they are any other enemy.

Upon this head the Jews, in the time of the Maccabees, took up a [...]ms against their legal king Antiochus (whom they all along acknowledg'd as such, and who was successor to Alexander, who had the same right to their obe­dience as the Persians or Assyrians had) who was resolv'd to extir­pate'em if they wou'd not turn idolaters. And'tis manifest that God, by the miraculous assistance he gave'em (for what they did must be imp [...]ted to more than human force) did approve of their design. And the same reasons will justify any nation for oppos­ing that prince who endeavours, upon a religious or any other ac­count, to destroy'em.

By what has been said I hope'tis plain, that by the positive law of God, by the law of right reason, by the law of nations, the universal practice of mankind, and the express law of the land, obedience is due to that power who actually governs the peo­ple: which right I think has been sufficiently demonstrated by those who have writ on that subject, at [Page 41]least to lawyers, and men who are competent judges in such points; of which a great many can judge no better, than of ma­thematical demonstrations, which are nevertheless demonstrations. But none can be mistaken who they are that actually govern the nation; and if obedience for that reason be due to 'em, other in­quiries are needless.

To conclude, I hope I have demonstrated, That 'tis the duty of all people to bear true faith and allegiance to the present govern­ment, by reasons and arguments which are as firm as government itself, and which will endure as long as that, because built upon the same foundation, The good of societies; and which may serve for directions in all changes and revolutions, as well as for the justification of that happy one, which (by the blessing of God on his Majesty King William's he­roick endeavours) preserves us in the enjoyment of all our happi­ness both spiritual and temporal.

THE END.

Lately published, and now selling at BELL's BOOK-STORE, next Door to ST. PAUL's Church, in Third-street, Philadelphia, PHILOSOPHICAL, and POLITICAL STRICTURES, on the good and bad EFFECTS of NATIONAL PRIDE: Translated from the German of Mr. ZIMMERMAN, Physician in Ordinary to his Britannic Majesty at Hanover.
EXTRACT from the Preface by the English TRANSLATOR.

THIS production bears so much the stamp of truth, freedom and virtue, that it is sur­prising a work of such character has not yet been translated into Eng­lish, and laid before a nation never wanting to countenance merit, wherever met with. The author is a SWISS, and writes with the freedom becoming a virtuous man, born in a country from whence li­berty, virtue, truth and simplicity, have not yet been expelled by op­pression, vice, battery, and luxury. The applause of his own country and of Germany has rendered four large impressions necessary; to the last of which the author made im­portant additions. The French, a people not easily pleased in works of this nature, have read this per­formance, translated into their lan­guage, with distinguished appro­bation; and some of their capital writers have bestowed their enco­miums upon it.

Impartial judges will, on peru­sal of this work, find it to abound with sterling sense and judicious sentiments; and although it may possibly appear to disadvantage in the translation, there will however still remain some of the masterly strokes of our author, however weakened through the transfusion of his original ideas into English expressions.

But what gives us the best grounded hopes of the success of this publication is derived from our au­thor's aim to combat prejudice, and to promote the cause of liberty and virtue, which have always found the most numerous and most zealous friends in the thinking part of this great and wealthy nation.

[Page]

A few COPIES of the following much-esteemed modern Work, may be had at BELL's Book-STORE, next Door to ST. PAUL's Church, in Third-street, Philadelphia, An ESSAY ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS: WRITTEN by the MARQUIS BECCARIA, of MILAN. With a COMMENTARY, Attributed to Monsieur De VOLTAIRE.
EXTRACT from the PREFACE of the TRANSLATOR.

PENAL laws, so considerable a part of every system of legisla­tion, and of so great importance to the happiness, peace and security of every member of society, are still so imperfect, and are attended with so many unnecessary circum­stances of cruelty in all nations, that an attempt to reduce them to the standard of reason must be in­teresting to all mankind. It is not surprising, then, that this little book hath engaged the attention of all ranks of people in every part of Europe. It is now about eighteen months since the first publication; in which time it hath passed no less than six editions in the origi­nal language, the third of which was printed within six months af­ter its first appearance. It hath been translated into French; that translation hath also been several times reprinted, and perhaps no book on any subject was ever recei­ved with more avidity, more ge­nerally read, or more universaly applauded.

N. B. At Bell's Book-Store may also be had, great variety of Books in all arts, sciences, and lan­guages; especially Greek, Latin, French, and Eng­lish classics, Bibles of various kinds, likewise the very best French and English Dictionaries.

[Page] N. B. The observations and quotations, which are found in this pomphlet from the ninth line of the first column of page 21, to the end of the Address, were added by a Friend of the Author's, who was entrusted with the publication while he was in the country, with a discretionary power to add whatsoever he thought necessary.

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