GIVE me leave to address you upon a subject of the greatest importance to you and your posterity; a subject which essentially concerns the welfare, hap­piness and grandeur of this state, and therefore worthy of your most deliberate and candid consideration; I mean the expediency of your acceding to the confederacy pro­posed to you by Congress, and now adopted and ratified by ten of the thirteen states of America. I cannot but con­sider a confederacy of the States as the great principle of union, which can alone establish our liberty, and exclude for ever the hopes of our inveterate and insidious enemies. No other mode can be devised to unite the wealth, the strength and councils of the whole. Without such a com­pact we shall be for ever exposed to external violence, and internal dissention. The public credit, or in other words, the value of our paper-money, depends greatly on the confederacy.

Every one may readily conceive the difficulty of com­bining, in one general system, the various sentiments and interests of a continent, divided into so many sovereign and independent states. Human wisdom could not form a plan exactly to answer the opinion and wishes of so many states, differing in habits, produce, manufactures, com­merce, and internal police. From hence it is obvious, that each state ought to be disposed to give up some fa­vourite opinion, arising either from policy or local attach­ment. Without such a spirit of compliance, it would be impossible to reconcile so many discordant, jarring inter­ests, and no hopes could remain of ever procuring a con­federacy of these states.

There were several things, which it was necessary each state should give up, in order to obtain the advantages re­sulting from a union of the whole. The states of Massa­chusetts-Bay, Connecticut, New-Jersey, and Pennsylvania, conceive themselves greatly injured by the article in the confederacy, which directs that the quota of troops to be furnished by each state should be in proportion to the num­ber of white inhabitants. They think it unreasonable, that the blacks in Maryland and the southern states should not be taken into the account; and argue, that while the blacks stay at home to cultivate the ground, a greater pro­portion of the whites of these states might go into the field. However they have given up their opinion, and acceded to the confederacy.

The larger states have had it greatly at heart to obtain an article in the confederacy, that each state should be en­titled to a vote in congress, in proportion to its extent of territory, wealth, importance, and numbers. This was in itself highly reasonable; for it is incontrovertible, that representation cannot be compleat, unless it is in propor­tion to numbers and property. It was notwithstanding given up, and the larger states of Virginia and Massachu­setts-Bay are not, by the confederacy, to have more weight on a question of war or peace, or in any other public delibe­ration, of the greatest importance, than the smaller states of Rhode Island, Delaware or Georgia; though between them there is not the smallest comparison in wealth or po­pulation.

Maryland and some other of the states conceive them­selves injured, by being excluded from the profits which may arise from a sale of the back lands, and which might enable them to defray part of their public burthens. I think their claim to a proportion of any benefit arising therefrom to be founded in justice; but I am inclined to think the advantages will not appear to considerable, as they have been imagined. If the states claiming the right to dispose of those lands should require the payment of purchase money, to any great value, or should reserve any quit-rent, a very small quantity of land only will be bought. It is probable, if quit-rents be reserved, they will only be paid for a few years. It will be impossible in the nature of things for Virginia and the other states claiming dominion over so extensive a territory, as they do, to exercise government over it. The energy of go­vernment cannot extend to, or be felt at so great a distance from its center. There can be no free government with­out an equal representation of the inhabitants of any state, and so far as any people are deprived of, or incapable, from their local or other circumstances, to exercise this right, they cease to be free. The distance from Williams­burg to the Mississippi is very great (I believe 700 miles) and will render an equal representation impracticable. Virginia therefore must either be divided, or cease to be a republic. Montesquieu tells us, that too great an extent of territory is, in the nature of things, subversive of a free government. The Apalachian mountain seems to me the natural boundary of Virginia; and it is probable, in a few years, a new state will be erected beyond it. Reason, justice, and policy, a love of liberty, and our example, will induce the settlers over the mountain to set it up; and it will be in vain for the government of Virginia to main­tain their dominion over them. Their numbers and situa­tion will render force inefficacious, and a separation will properly and naturally follow. By the confederacy, the United States will not be obliged to engage in such a con­test; it is left with each government to assert its own au­thority and jurisdiction over what they may call their re­volted subjects. Unless therefore Virginia and the other states should be wise enough to suffer them to separate peaceably, they may be involved in war and all its dread­ful consequences.

Let it be further considered, that the quota, to be paid by each state toward the expences of the whole, is to be in proportion to the value of the lands granted or surveyed in their respective territories. Hence it may happen, that what Virginia, or any other state, may gain, by the sale of their back lands, may be swallowed up and sunk by the greater proportion of taxes to be paid into the continental treasury. The lands, before they are granted or surveyed, can yield nothing, and afterwards they increase her pro­portion towards the continental burthen. The very great advantages expected from the back lands are in the imagi­nation only. It vanishes like one of those visionary felici­ties, in common life, which mankind press after, but in possession are found to be a shadow, or perhaps a misfor­tune.

Let it be admitted, that Virginia, and the other states claiming the back lands, will reap great profit from the sale of them, yet, under a consideration of all circum­stances, I think sound policy should determine the lesser states, and particularly my native country of Maryland, to accede to the confederacy. The six states of Georgia, North and South Carolina, Virginia, Connecticut, and Massachusetts-Bay, lay claim, under colour of their char­ters, to the back lands, and are interested, as they appre­hend themselves, to oppose other states having any share in them. These six, together with New-Hampshire, Rhode-Island, New-York, and Pennsylvania, have ratified the confederacy. There is therefore but little hopes that New-Jersey, Delaware, and Maryland, will succeed in their claim by a continuance of it, or by refusing to confe­derate. If any benefit should be derived from the sale of these lands, Maryland can never expect to share in it. If she does not confederate she can have but little prospect of success, and if she does, she only relinquishes what she can never expect to obtain. Shall we then forego all the ad­vantages of a union, without the least prospect of doing ourselves any service, by remaining unconnected? It is a rule in common life, that if we cannot have things as we would, we must take them as they are. If by relinquish­ing our claim we were to give up considerable profits, yet prudence and good policy demands the sacrifice. Some worthy and firm whigs among you, consulting only the generosity of their own tempers, and resenting a conduct, which they esteem unjust and ungenerous, are warm against the confederacy, and disdain to be connected with the states, which they think have injured them. This con­duct may be excused in an individual, but by no means justifiable in a body politic. An individual may be safe, and live in a great measure to himself, as we say, in socie­ty, but a state is to be considered as an individual in a state of nature; and in order to exist at all must form some alliance and connection with her neighbours. It is not to be questioned, that in a case of public moment, we must consult our interest, not our passions. It is puerile in us to injure ourselves, because others have not acted by us so generously as we expected. We should seriously reflect, whether we shall better our situation by refusing to confe­derate; we should consider of what account we shall be in the estimation of the powers of Europe, if we remain sepa­rate and unconnected. By what means shall we settle our difference with Virginia, about the jurisdiction of the ri­ver Patowmack; or the navigation, through the bay or capes of Chesapeak, within her charter? If we cannot ad­just it by negotiation, we shall have, unconfederated, no umpire but the sword. If Virginia should be so unjust as to claim a toll on our vessels passing through the capes (as the king of Denmark obliges those who pass to and from the Baltic, through the streights of Elsinour) we must ei­ther submit to the tax, or oppose it by arms. We shall be exposed in the same manner to any claims or encroach­ments by other states. Could we apply to any European power for her alliance and aid? the very proposal would be urged as a sufficient reason, by the confederated states, to invade us, and put an end to our government. They would contend, that their own safety would demand and justify it; because in such case this state would only be a footing for their enemies, and a means of attacking them to advantage. By what means shall we support our exist­ence as a republic, and prevent the confederated powers, in case of any difference, to divide us among themselves? In the partition, the western shore would naturally fall to Virginia, and the eastern shore (with Delaware) to the do­minion of Pennsylvania. If to this supposition it should be remarked, that in Europe there are smaller states which exist and support their independence, in the neighbour­hood of greater, it may be observed, that their security has arisen from this, more than any other cause, that the greater states could not agree among themselves about the division. If we should be invaded by a neighbouring state, to whom are we to fly for alliance and protection? The European world is too far off; and we may be conquered before any aid could arrive. We may remember the situation of Scotland before the union. The French, her ancient and firm ally, were seldom able to protect them, when invaded by England. It is also worthy of your enquiry, what shall protect our trade, if we continue disconnected? I fear we shall be a prey both at home and abroad, to all who chuse to insult, injure, or make war upon us. On the other hand, the advantages of our confederating are very great. By the mode established by the confederacy, we shall have a constant and safe court of justice to settle every difference with any of our neighbours. We shall have the whole power of the empire pledged to us to preserve all our rights and privileges, as a republic, inviolate. We shall have the strength of this vast body to defend us from the inva­sion of every foreign enemy. We shall have its fleet, and the fleets of those in alliance with it, to secure the freedom of our trade to every part and quarter of the world. We shall share in the riches, the splendour and the glory of this great confederate republic. We shall then have a prospect to remain, as long as the world endures, without war or bloodshed.

The credit of our paper money can only be secured by the confederacy. This concerns all ranks among you. Without a confederacy, there is no rule by which each state is bound to contribute, towards the sinking or re­deeming the vast emissions, which are likely to overwhelm us. On this subject I will not add, but leave the import­ance of it to your serious and dispassionate enquiry.

It ought to have some weight with us, that the alliance with France has been made, under a presumption, that the articles of confederacy had been agreed to by all the states. A disappointment in this particular may give this power an unfavourable idea of our sincerity, and may be followed by consequences, which may easily be conceived, but which it may not be prudent to express.

Considerations of general good to mankind ought to have weight with a free people. In a state of disunion, as at present, we ourselves will be unsafe, or at least inconsi­derable, if not insignificant; and in the mean time, the states already in the union will be less important, in the eyes of Europe, than they otherwise might be. By refusing to accede to the confederacy, we shall mar the beauty of the whole structure of the empire. We shall with-hold our­selves as a [...], which though not absolutely necessary to the existence, yet is wanting to the ornament and perfec­tion of the building. It becomes us to have some regard to posterity, who may curse us for our ill timed, improper, and, to them, cruel obstinacy. The wars in which they must of consequence be involved, will cause them to re­member our names with detestation to the latest ages. What! in order to procure a sum of money towards dis­charging a small part of the expences of a war, which in con­junction with the other states we had happily brought to a pe­riod, shall we foolishly stand it out, and deprive them of all the blessings of so natural and safe an alliance with their bre­thren? I am decided in my opinion, after mature considera­tion, that any pecuniary advantages resulting from our share of the back lands, are not to be compared with, or weighed against the benefits arising from the confederacy, or the many inconveniences or dangers we shall be exposed to, by excluding ourselves from it.

It is not to be supposed, that if we refuse at this time to confederate, we shall find it easy, at any time hereafter, to be admitted. It is not improbable that, to obtain admis­sion, terms may be imposed on us; at any rate it is much better now to accede to the confederacy, than hereafter to sue for admittance, and to have it thought a favour to ob­tain it.

It cannot have escaped your observation, that among those, who oppose your assent to the confederacy, and warmly dissuade you from it, are a considerable number of moderate men, neutrals, and tories. I cannot suppose that the opinion of such men can have any weight with you. When such rep­tiles presume to advise on public measures, you ought to hear them with diffidence and suspicion. I might listen to a drunkard haranguing on sobriety, a glutton on temperance, a thief on honesty; and a tory on patriotism and public virtue, but they would derive no weight from their per­sonal characters.

Great-Britain will continue to have some hopes of suc­cess, as long as we remain unconfederated. The powers and instructions to her commissioners prove this. Our friends in the other states will be uneasy and alarmed. Let us then, my countrymen, hesitate not a moment longer to place ourselves as a link in the grand and golden chain of the continent. Let us put an end to every expectation of our enemies. Let us relieve the fears, and gratify the wishes of our friends; by immediately acceding to the confedera­cy, and thereby erect an empire, for the security of our liberty, freedom and independence.