AN accurate and critical knowledge of law (ſuch as can only be acquired by much reading and long experience in the profeſſion) is indeed a neceſſary qualification for thoſe perſons who undertake to deliver their opinions concerning the nicer and more difficult queſtions of juriſprudence, but when the Natural Rights of any of our fellow ſubjects are apparently at ſtake, every man has a right to judge for himſelf, and to declare his ſentiments, as far as plain concluſions of reaſon and common ſenſe will fairly warrant; and ſuch only are referred to in the following Declaration of the Natural Right of popular Repreſentation in the Legiſlature.

Amongſt all the rights and privileges appertaining unto us, ſaid that truly noble lawyer Lord SommersJudgment of whole Kingdoms, &c. P. • 4., that of having a ſhare in the legiſlation, and being to be governed by ſuch laws as we ourſelves ſhall chuſe, is the moſt fundamental and eſſential, as well as the moſt advantageous and beneficial, &c.

And as all Britiſh ſubjects, whether in Great Britain, Ireland, or the Colonies, are equally free by the Law of Nature, they certainly are equally entitled to the ſame Natural Rights that are eſſential for their own preſervation, becauſe this privilege of "having a ſhare in the legiſlation" is not merely a Britiſh Right, peculiar to this iſland, but it is alſo a Natural Right, which cannot, without the moſt flagrant and ſtimulating injuſtice, be withdrawn from any part of the Britiſh empire by any worldly authority whatſoever, becauſe, by the Natural Law, whereunto he [Almighty God] hath made all ſubject, ſays the learned HookerHooker's Eccleſiaſtical Polity, lib. 1, § 10, p. 87., the lawful power of making laws, to command whole politic ſocieties of men, belongeth ſo properly unto the ſame entire ſocieties, that for any Prince or Potentate, of what kind ſoever upon earth, to exerciſe the ſame of himſelf, [or themſelves,] and not either by expreſs commiſſion immediately and perſonally received from God, or elſe by authority derived at the firſt from their conſent upon whoſe perſons they impoſe laws, it is no better than mere tyranny! Laws they are not, therefore, which public approbation hath not made ſo. Agreeable to the ſame juſt principles of natural equity is that maxim of the Engliſh conſtitution, that "LAW, TO BIND ALL, MUST BE ASSENTED TO BY ALL," (Principia Leg. et Equit. p. 56.) and there can be no legal appearance of ASSENT without ſome degree of REPRESENTATION.

It muſt indeed be acknowledged, that the Repreſentation of the people of England is not ſo perfect as equity may ſeem to require, ſince very many individuals have no vote in elections and conſequently cannot be ſaid expreſsly to give their aſſent to the laws by which they are governed. Nevertheleſs, the whole country which they inhabit, and in which they earn their bread, and even the very houſes in which they live (whether they are houſekeepers or lodgers) are repreſentedI muſt beg leave to refer the reader alſo to ſome excellent obſervations on this head, in a pamphlet publiſhed ſince the above was written, entitled An Argument in Defence of the Colonies, p. 76, 77, and 78. by the votes of the reſpective proprietors, ſince every Freeholder has a right to vote; ſo that, in this one reſpect, the repreſentation is general; and, though far from equal, would ſtill be a ſufficient check againſt arbitrary power; and afford ſufficient ſecurity for the lives and property of thoſe perſons who have no vote, if the laws againſt parliamentary corruption (and eſpecially that act of 7 and 8 Wil. III. c. 4.) were duly enforced; and alſo if all perſons, who are entruſted with the diſpoſal of public money, were required to render a ſtrict account of it, and to be ſeverely puniſhed whenever convicted of exerting the influence of the public treaſury againſt public liberty, which is the moſt baneful treachery and diſhoneſty that men in office (who are the ſervants of the public as well as of the King) can poſſibly commit. But, notwithſtanding the inequality of the Engliſh repreſentation, and the various means practiſed to corrupt it, yet it has been the principal inſtrument of preſerving amongſt us thoſe remains of natural Liberty which we ſtill enjoy in a greater proportion than moſt other kingdoms, and has occaſioned more examples of juſt retribution on Tyrants, Traitors, and Court Favourites, in the Engliſh annals, than the hiſtory of any other nation affords; ſo that Mr. Rapin is thereby led to conclude his account of K. Richard II. (that notorious corrupter of parliaments, and enemy to the privileges of London and other corporations) with the following reflection: That, in a government ſuch as that of England, all the efforts that the Sovereign makes to uſurp an abſolute authority, are ſo many ſteps which lead him towards the precipice. C'eſt que dans un Gouvernement tel que celui d' Angleterre, tous les efforts que le Souverain fait pour uſurper un pouvoir abſolu ſont autant de pas qui le conduiſent vers le precipice. Tom. iii. liv. x. p. 329. It is manifeſt, therefore, that the conſtitutional government of England, even with all its defects, is infinitely better than any other form of government whereby the people are deprived of their juſt ſhare in the legiſlature;The celebrated Chancellor Forteſcue aſſerts, that a limited or politic government (like that of England) is infinitely more eligible, for the intereſt and ſatisfaction even of the Prince himſelf, than an abſolute regal power:—Non jugum ſed libertas eſt politicè regere populum; ſecuritas quoque maxima nedum plebi, ſed et ipſi regi; allevatio etiam non minima ſolicitudinis ſuae:—Viz. That to rule the people by government politic is no yoke, but liberty, and great ſecurity, not only to the ſubjects, but alſo to the King himſelf; and further, no ſmall lightening or eaſement to his charge. (De Laud. Leg. Angl. cap. 34, p. 78.) So that thoſe politicians, who plead the neceſſity of ſecuring, at any rate, a majority in parliament, to vote implicitly for whatever the miniſter propoſes, do miſerably betray the true intereſt and peace of their Sovereign! for this fixes upon the King and his miniſters (as in arbitrary governments) the blame and ignominy of every determination that happens to be wrong, which would otherwiſe either have been overruled by the free council of the nation, or elſe muſt have been equally imputed to the people themſelves; and yet this wretched policy has alternately been adopted by all parties, notwithſtanding that it is founded (like many of Machiavel's doctrines) on that abominable antichriſtian principle of mere worldly minded men,—"Let us do evil that good may come;"—"whoſe damnation (ſays the apoſtle to the Romans) is juſt." Rom. iii. 8. The evil of an undue parliamentary influence they endeavour to excuſe by the plea of neceſſity for the good of the ſtate, though it is certainly the moſt flagrant violation of the fundamental principles of the ſtate, and is abſolutely deſtructive of the true intereſt both of the prince and people! ſo that the inequality of Repreſentation in this iſland, affords no juſt argument for ſetting aſide the Repreſentation of the people in other parts of the Britiſh empire, becauſe experience teaches us, that even a defective Repreſentation is better than none at all; and therefore it is highly unreaſonable, and contrary to natural equity, to pretend that our brethren and fellow ſubjects in the more diſtant parts of the Britiſh empire ought to be deprived entirely of their natural Rights and Liberties, merely becauſe our own liberties are not entirely perfect! or becauſe our own repreſentation in the legiſlature appears, in ſome few reſpects, to be defective! and it would be quite as unreaſonable to alledge, that the principle or reaſon of the maxim before quoted (viz. that law, to bind all, muſt be aſſented to by all) is unjuſt and inconcluſive, merely becauſe it would be very difficult to accompliſh it literally by the expreſs aſſent of every individual! but it is clearly ſufficient that the maxim be conſtrued to ſignify that delegated aſſent of the people by a majority of their legal repreſentatives, which is conſtitutionally neceſſary to make all laws binding; Nedum principis voluntate, ſed et totius regni aſſenſu, ipſa (i. e. Angliae ſtatuta) conduntur, quo populi laeſuram illa efficere nequeunt, vel non eorum commodum procurare, &c.—Et ſi ſtatuta haec, tanta ſolen • itate et prudentia edita, efficaciae tantae, quantae conditorum cupiebat intentio, non eſſe contingant, concito reformari ipſa poſſunt, et non fine communitatis et procerum regni illius aſſenſu, quali ipſa primitus 〈◊〉 , &c. Chancel. Forteſc. de Laud. Leg. Ang. c. 18, p. 40. b. and ſuch a legal repreſentation of the people is therefore abſolutely neceſſary to conſtitute an effectual Legiſlature for any part of the Britiſh empire; for no tax can be levied without manifeſt robbery and injuſtice where his legal and conſtitutional Repreſentation is wanting; becauſe the Engliſh law abhors the idea of taking the leaſt property from freemen without their free conſent—It is iniquitous iniquum eſt, ſays the maxim 〈◊〉 ingenuis hominibus non eſſe liberam rerum ſuarum 〈◊〉 . Co. Lit. 223. And again: Quod noſtrum eſt, fine facto five defectu noſtro, amitti 〈◊〉 in alium tranſferri non poteſt. 8 Co. 92. Rerum ſuarum quilibet eſt moderator et arbiter. Co. Lit. 223. Regulariter non valet pactum de re mea non alienanda. Co. Lit. 223. And again: Non poteſt rex ſubditum renitentem onerare impoſitionibus. 2 Inſt. 61. from Forteſcue, c. 9, and 18. that freemen ſhould not have the free diſpoſal of their own effects;—and whatever is iniquitous can never be made lawful Quicquid eſt contra normam recti eſt injuria. 3 Bulſ. 313. And Lex nemini operatur iniquum—nemini facit injuriam. Jenk. Cent. 22. And therefore Quod contra legem fit pro infectu habetur. 4 Co. 31. by any authority on earth; not even by the united authority of King, Lords, and Commons; for that would be contrary to the eternal"Lex eſt ab aeterno." Jenk. Cent. 34. Laws of God, which are ſupreme.—"Etiam fi aliquid ſtatutem eſſet editum contra eas," (leges divinas,) "nullius vigoris in legibus Angliae cenſeri debet," &c. Doct. et Stud. c. 6, p. 18.

In every point of view, the making laws for the ſubjects of any part of the Britiſh Empire, without their participation and aſſent, in iniquitous, and therefore unlawful; for though the purport of any law, ſo made, be in itſelf perfectly juſt and equitable, yet it becomes otherwiſe Qui aliquid ſtatuerit parte inaudita altera, aequum licet dixerit, haud aequum fecerit. Princip. Leg. et AEquit. p. 90. or—"haud aequus fuerit." 6 Co. 52. (that is, unjuſt and iniquitous, and therefore unlawful) by the want of theſe neceſſary legal formalities"Forma legalis forma eſſentialis." 10. Co.—100. And "Forma non obſervata infertur adnullatio actus." 12 Co. 7. of Repreſentation and Aſſent; for if the inhabitants of one part of the empire might determine a queſtion, or enact a law, for the peculiar advantage only of that one part, though to the manifeſt detriment and injury of another part, without the Repreſentation of the latter, the former part would be made judges in their own cauſe, a circumſtance that would be literally partial! the very reverſe of juſtice and and natural equity, and which muſt, therefore, be eſteemed iniquity, even to a fundamental maxim,"Iniquum eſt aliquem rei ſui eſſe judicem."—In propria cauſa nemo judex. Principia Legis et AEquitatis, p. 41. viz. it is iniquitous for any one to be a judge in his own cauſe. Partiality is, therefore, ſuch an abomination in the eye of the law, that no power on earth can make it lawful; for "even an Act of Parliament" (ſays the learned Judge Hobart, Rep. 87.) made againſt natural equity, as to make a man judge in his own caſe, (the example, obſerve, is the very point in queſtion) is void in itſelf; for jura naturae ſunt immutabilia, and they are leges legum.

Every King of England (apparently for the ſame reaſon) is reſtrained by the law from changing or making new laws without the aſſent or conſent of his whole Kingdom in Parliament expreſſed. Neque Rex ibidem, per ſe, aut miniſtros ſuos, tallagia, ſubſidia, aut quaevis onera alia, imponit legiis ſuis, aut leges eorum mutat, vel novas condit, fine conceſſione vel aſſenſu totius regni ſui in parliamento ſuo expreſſo, &c. Chancell. Forteſcue de Laudibus Legum Angliae, c. 36, p. 84. b. And the whole Kingdom, even of Great-Britain itſelf, is only a part of the Britiſh empire; and therefore, by a parity of reaſoning, cannot juſtly or equitably be permitted to make laws for the whole, becauſe where the ſame reaſon is, the ſame law (or right) muſt prevail: "Ubi eadem ratio, ibi idem lex," or "jus." Principia Leg. et Aequit. p. 116. for "turpis eſt pars quae non convenit cum ſuo toto;" (Plowden, 161.) and nihil in lege intolerabilius eſt, eandem rem diverſo jure cenſeri. 4 Co. 83. The free repreſentation of the people in the legiſlature is, therefore, to be eſteemed, of all our rights, the moſt eſſential, (as Lord Sommers has declared) to maintain that excellent equilibrium of power, or mixt government, limited by law, which our anceſtors have always moſt zealouſly aſſerted, and tranſmitted to us, as our beſt birthright and inheritance Major haereditas venit unicuique noſtrum a jure et legibus quam a parentibus. 2 Inſt. 56. ; ſo that every attempt to ſet the ſame aſide in any degree, or in any part of the empire, or to corrupt it by undue influence of places and penſions, or bribes with public money, is treaſon againſt the conſtitution; the higheſt of treaſon The firſt and higheſt treaſon is that which is committed againſt the conſtitution. Lord Sommer's judgment of whole kingdoms, p. 8.—Eſt autem injuria omne quod non jure fit. Fleta, l. 2, c. 1. And on the other hand, they neither are, nor can be traitors, who endeavour to preſerve and maintain the conſtitution; but they are the traitors, who deſign and purſue the ſubverſion of it; they are the rebels, that go about to overthrow the government of their country; whereas ſuch as ſeek to ſupport and defend it are the truly loyal perſons, and do act conformable to the ties and obligation of fealty. Lord Sommers, p. 9.—Agreeable to this doctrine was the anſwer of Dr. Sharp, Archbiſhop of York, when the queſtion was put to him, How a perſon, who had ſworn allegiance to King James, could, with a good conſcience, take the ſame oath to King William? To which he replied, That the laws of the land are the only rule of our conſcience in this matter, and we are no further bound to pay obedience to governors, nor to any other governors, than the Laws enjoin. If, therefore, King William, in the eye of the Law, be our King, we muſt in conſcience pay obedience to to him as ſuch. I take this (ſays he) for a certain truth, that as the law makes the King, ſo the ſame law extends, or limits, or tranſfers, our obedience and allegiance; and all oaths, impoſed by law, oblige the conſcience no farther than the law meant they ſhould oblige. Only this is always to be remembered, that whatever obedience the laws of the land require of us, it is to be underſtood with this proviſo, that it be not contradictory to the laws of God. But in that caſe we muſt obey paſſively, though we cannot obey actively; and with this tacit condition, I do ſuppoſe, all oaths of fidelity in the world are given and taken. Life of Abp. Sharp, part 3d, pag. 24, 25, and 26. MS. wrote by his Son, for the uſe of his Grandchildren. : and therefore whatſoever is ordained, that can clearly be proved to be contrary to the conſtitution, muſt be allowed to be fundamentally wrong, and therefore null and void of itſelf; for, "ſublato fundamento, cadit opus." (Jenk. Cent. 106.)

But more particularly the Parliament has no power to give up the ancient and eſtabliſhed right of the people to be repreſented in the legiſlature, becauſe an act for ſo baſe a purpoſe would entirely ſubvert the principles and conſtitution on which the very exiſtence of the legiſlature itſelf, which ordained it, is formed! ſo that ſuch an unnatural act of the ſtate would be parallel to the crime of felo de ſe in a private perſon; and, being thus contrary to the nature of things, can never be rendered valid by any authority whatſoever Quae rerum naturâ prohibentur nulla lege confirmata ſunt. Finch, 74. And Nihil quod eſt contra rationem eſt licitum. Co. Lit. 97. .

And indeed it is laid down as a maxim, by the great Lord Sommers, that no man or ſociety of men have power to deliver up their preſervation, or the means of it, to the abſolute will of any man (or men) and they will have always a right to preſerve what they have not power to part with. P. 26. And if a politic ſociety has no juſt power to deliver up even its own preſervation, it certainly has much leſs right to deliver up the neceſſary preſervation of other ſocieties of their brethern and friends (not repreſented among them) without their conſent; and all ſuch attempts muſt neceſſarily be deemed void and ineffectual, becauſe there is no neceſſity to obey, where there is no authority to ordain Ubi non eſt condendi authoritas, ibi non eſt parendi neceſſitas. Dav. 69. And Judicium a non ſuo judice datum nullius eſt momenti. 10 Co. 76. . For as it ſo clearly appears, from what has been ſaid, that natural equity does not permit even the inferior property of lands, goods, chattels, or money, to be alienated without the conſent or fault of the proprietors, much leſs can it permit the alienation, annulling, or changing, of our moſt valuable inheritance, the law, without the due aſſent and conſent of the heritors themſelves, the people at large, or their lawful Repreſentatives in their reſpective aſſemblies or parliaments Nam non poteſt rex Angliae, ad libitum ſuum, leges mutare regni ſui. Principatu namque nedum regali, ſed et politico, ipſe ſuo populo dominatur. And again: Quia nec leges, ipſe [rex] fine ſubditorum aſſenſu mutare poterit, nec ſubjectum populum renitentem onerare inpoſitionibus peregrinis; quare populus ejus libere fruetur bonis ſuis, legibus, quas cupit, regulatus, nec per regem ſuum, aut quemvis alium depilatur, &c. Chancel. Forteſcue de Laud. Leg. Ang. c. 9, p. 26. ! This is a neceſſary concluſion of reaſon and common ſenſe, drawn from the effect and force of natural equity, even in caſes of much leſs conſequence (viz. reſpecting goods and common pecuniary property;) ſo that the diſtinction, which ſome great and able politicians have lately made, between Taxation and Legiſlation (in the late diſputes about taxing the Colonies) was certainly erroneous, though well intended; ſince it plainly appears, that the right of legiſlation is not leſs inſeparable, by natural equity, from the people of every part of the Britiſh empire than the right of granting or with-holding taxes; for, otherwiſe, the free ſubjects of one part of the empire would be liable to be moſt materially injured in their greateſt and moſt valuable inheritance, the law, by the haſty deciſions of men on the other ſide of the empire, with whom probably they would be totally unacquainted, and whoſe intereſt might perhaps be as widely different from theirs (for any thing they could know to the contrary) as their ſituation upon the face of the globe is diſtant; that is, as widely different as the eaſt is from the weſt! Would this be equitable? Could ſuch notorious injuſtice Si a jure diſcedas, vagus eris, et erunt omnia omnibus incerta. Co. Lit. 227. And, Rerum ordo confunditur, ſi unicuique juriſdictio non ſervetur. 4 Inſt. proem. For if the fundamental rule of the Conſtitution be ſet aſide even in one inſtance, the baneful influence of ſuch an evil precedent will ſoon prepare the way for the deſtruction of the whole law, becauſe uno abſurdo dato, infinita ſequuntur. 1 Coke, 102. be ever made lawful?

The true conſtitutional mode of connecting Bririſh dominions, that are otherwiſe ſeparated by nature, is demonſtrated by the eſtabliſhed example of the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, which, by long experience, has proved to be ſufficiently effectual. It muſt be acknowledged, indeed, that an act of Parliament was made in the 6th of George 1. chap. 5. wherein it is laid down, that the King and Parliament of Great-Britain may make laws to bind Ireland.

If the preceding arguments are not ſufficient to prove in what light the ſaid Act is to be conſidered, yet the preſent diſtinct and ſeparate juriſdiction of the Iriſh Parliament, the continuation of their ancient and conſtitutional privileges, notwithſtanding the doctrine aſſerted in the ſaid Act, and their annual tranſactions, both in taxation and legiſlation, are facts which prove (better than arguments) that the people of Ireland have an inherent right to enact laws independant of the Britiſh Parliament; otherwiſe the King's aſſent would not be ſufficient to render the ſaid laws valid and binding without the eſpecial approbation and conſent alſo of the Britiſh Parliament, which indeed is never required; ſo far is it from being neceſſary! And, farther, the inhabitants of Great-Britain would think it extremely unreaſonable and unjuſt, if the Parliament of Ireland ſhould claim a right of making laws, with the King's aſſent, to bind any part of this iſland! The argument is reciprocal; ſo that, if we ſhould really deteſt ſuch a meaſure againſt ourſelves, the law of laws forbids us to claim the like power over any of our fellow ſubjects, without their free conſent. "Non facias alteri quod tibi non vis fieri." This is laid down as one of the moſt common precepts of the law of reaſon, (Doct. and Stud. c. 2, p. 7.) and ſuch is the immutability of the law of reaſon, that againſt it there can be no preſcription, ſtatute, or cuſtom; and if any are made contrary thereto, they are not to be eſteemed ſtatutes or cuſtoms, but corruptelae, i. e. corruptions or depravities.—Non ſunt ſtatuta five conſuetudines, ſed corruptelae. Doct. and Stud. c. 2, p. 5. To the ſame effect is that command of Chriſt himſelf (recorded in Matt. vii. 12.) which our Lord declared to be the Law and the Prophets; viz. Whatſoever ye would that men ſhould do to you, do ye even ſo to them; for this is the Law and the Prophets; ſo that it may juſtly be entituled, the Law of Laws; and a ſtatute, therefore, which is contrary thereto, is doubly unlawful.

The ſeparate intereſts of the two kingdoms are ſufficiently reſtrained, with reſpect to each other, by our excellent conſtitution of ſtate, which requires the aſſent of the people (that is of thoſe which are concerned reſpectively) to render any law valid and binding upon either nation; which the foregoing arguments demonſtrate; and I hope the ingenious and ſenſible author of the Argument in Defence of the Colonies (lately publiſhed) will acknowledge, that he has allowed too much, when he admits, in page 114, that the whole kingdom of Ireland is bound by the acts of the ſupreme legiſlature, &c. which doctrine leads him afterwards to make a diſtinction between Taxation and Legiſlation.

And again, the two kingdoms are ſo firmly united by the bands of allegiance, to one head (or monarchy) of limited power, that their intereſts in all material external exigencies are thereby rendered mutual, as well as their internal intereſt, in the maintenance of natural and conſtitutional liberty, in each kingdom reſpectively, becauſe one of them cannot be deprived of this (as they are governed by the ſame head) without haſtening the deſtruction of the other. And this intimate connexion of mutual intereſt in the conſtitution of ſtate, and in the reciprocal enjoyment of the ſame reaſonable common law, whereby each kingdom enjoys an equality of privilege and natural freedom, renders the union of the two kingdoms more juſt and equitable, and, conſequently, more ſafe and durable than it could poſſibly have been made by any other means; and the inhabitants of both iſlands (though ſprung from a variety of jarring, jealous, and fierce nations) have, by theſe means, acquired a certain mutual conſideration for each other, as fellow ſubjects, which could never have been produced by mere alliances, guarantees, or defenſive leagues; nor, perhaps, by any other mode of government whatever, than that by which divine providence has effected it, viz. the Engliſh conſtitution; this has firmly united the ſtrength of the two iſlands; whereby reciprocal ſuccour, in time of need, is inſured to both.