AN accurate and critical knowledge of law (such as can only be acquired by much reading and long experience in the profes­sion) is indeed a necessary qualification for those persons who undertake to deliver their opinions con­cerning the nicer and more difficult questions of jurisprudence, but when the Natural Rights of any of our fellow subjects are apparently at stake, every man has a right to judge for himself, and to declare his sentiments, as far as plain conclusions of reason and common sense will fairly warrant; and such only are referred to in the following Declaration of the Natural Right of popular Representation in the Legislature.

‘Amongst all the rights and privileges appertaining unto us,’ said that truly noble lawyer Lord Som­mers ⁽¹⁾, ‘that of having a share in the legislation, [Page 4] and being to be governed by such laws as we our­selves shall chuse, is the most fundamental and essential, as well as the most advantageous and be­neficial,’ &c.

And as all British subjects, whether in Great Bri­tain, Ireland, or the Colonies, are equally free by the Law of Nature, they certainly are equally en­titled to the same Natural Rights that are essential for their own preservation, because this privilege of "having a share in the legislation" is not merely a British Right, peculiar to this island, but it is also a Natural Right, which cannot, without the most flagrant and stimulating injustice, be withdrawn from any part of the British empire by any worldly authority whatsoever, because, ‘by the Natural Law, whereunto he [Almighty God] hath made all sub­ject,’ says the learned Hooker ⁽²⁾, ‘the lawful power of making laws, to command whole politic societies of men, belongeth so properly unto the same entire societies, that for any Prince or Po­tentate, of what kind soever upon earth, to ex­ercise the same of himself, [or themselves,] and not either by express commission immediately and personally received from God, or else by authority derived at the first from their consent upon whose persons they impose laws, it is no better than mere tyranny! Laws they are not, therefore, which public approbation hath not made so.’ Agree­able to the same just principles of natural equity is that maxim of the English constitution, that "LAW, TO BIND ALL, MUST BE ASSENTED TO BY ALL," (Principia Leg. et Equit. p. 56.) and there can be no legal appearance of ASSENT without some degree of REPRESENTATION.

[Page 5] It must indeed be acknowledged, that the Re­presentation of the people of England is not so per­fect as equity may seem to require, since very many individuals have no vote in elections and consequent­ly cannot be said expressly to give their assent to the laws by which they are governed. Nevertheless, the whole country which they inhabit, and in which they earn their bread, and even the very houses in which they live (whether they are housekeepers or lodgers) are represented ⁽³⁾ by the votes of the re­spective proprietors, since every Freeholder has a right to vote; so that, in this one respect, the re­presentation is general; and, though far from equal, would still be a sufficient check against arbitrary power; and afford sufficient security for the lives and property of those persons who have no vote, if the laws against parliamentary corruption (and especially that act of 7 and 8 Wil. III. c. 4.) were duly en­forced; and also if all persons, who are entrusted with the disposal of public money, were required to render a strict account of it, and to be severely pu­nished whenever convicted of exerting the influence of the public treasury against public liberty, which is the most baneful treachery and dishonesty that men in office (who are the servants of the public as well as of the King) can possibly commit. But, notwith­standing the inequality of the English representa­tion, and the various means practised to corrupt it, yet it has been the principal instrument of preserving amongst us those remains of natural Liberty which we still enjoy in a greater proportion than most other kingdoms, and has occasioned more examples of just retribution on Tyrants, Traitors, and Court [Page 6] Favourites, in the English annals, than the history of any other nation affords; so that Mr. Rapin is thereby led to conclude his account of K. Richard II. (that notorious corrupter of parliaments, and enemy to the privileges of London and other corporations) with the following reflection: ‘That, in a government such as that of England, all the efforts that the Sovereign makes to usurp an absolute authority, are so many steps which lead him towards the precipice.’ ⁽⁴⁾ It is manifest, therefore, that the constitutional government of England, even with all its defects, is infinitely better than any other form of government whereby the people are de­prived of their just share in the legislature; ⁽⁵⁾ so [Page 7] that the inequality of Representation in this island, affords no just argument for setting aside the Repre­sentation of the people in other parts of the British empire, because experience teaches us, that even a defective Representation is better than none at all; and therefore it is highly unreasonable, and contrary to natural equity, to pretend that our brethren and fellow subjects in the more distant parts of the British empire ought to be deprived entirely of their natural Rights and Liberties, merely because our own liberties are not entirely perfect! or because our own representation in the legislature appears, in some few respects, to be defective! and it would be quite as unreasonable to alledge, that the prin­ciple or reason of the maxim before quoted ( viz. that law, to bind all, must be assented to by all) is unjust and inconclusive, merely because it would be very difficult to accomplish it literally by the express assent of every individual! but it is clearly sufficient that the maxim be construed to signify that delegated assent of the people by a majority of their legal representatives, which is constitutionally necessary to make all laws binding; ⁽⁶⁾ and such a [Page 8] legal representation of the people is therefore abso­lutely necessary to constitute an effectual Legislature for any part of the British empire; for no tax can be levied without manifest robbery and injustice where his legal and constitutional Representation is wanting; because the English law abhors the idea of taking the least property from freemen without their free consent— ‘It is iniquitous’ ‘iniquum est,’ says the maxim ⁽⁷⁾ ‘that free­men should not have the free disposal of their own effects;’—and whatever is iniquitous can never be made lawful ⁽⁸⁾ by any authority on earth; not even by the united authority of King, Lords, and Commons; for that would be contrary to the eternal ⁽⁹⁾ Laws of God, which are supreme. ⁽¹⁰⁾

[Page 9] In every point of view, the making laws for the subjects of any part of the British Empire, without their participation and assent, in iniquitous, and therefore unlawful; for though the purport of any law, so made, be in itself perfectly just and equit­able, yet it becomes otherwise ⁽¹¹⁾ (that is, unjust and iniquitous, and therefore unlawful) by the want of these necessary legal formalities ⁽¹²⁾ of Re­presentation and Assent; for if the inhabitants of one part of the empire might determine a question, or enact a law, for the peculiar advantage only of that one part, though to the manifest detriment and injury of another part, without the Repre­sentation of the latter, the former part would be made judges in their own cause, a circum­stance that would be literally partial! the very reverse of justice and and natural equity, and which must, therefore, be esteemed iniquity, even to a fundamental maxim, ⁽¹³⁾ viz. ‘it is iniquit­ous for any one to be a judge in his own cause.’ Partiality is, therefore, such an abomination in the eye of the law, that no power on earth can make it lawful; for "even an Act of Parliament" (says the learned Judge Hobart, Rep. 87.) ‘made against natural equity, as to make a man judge in his own case,’ (the example, observe, is the very [Page 10] point in question) is void in itself; for ‘jura naturae sunt immutabilia,’ and they are ‘leges legum.’

Every King of England (apparently for the same reason) is restrained by the law from changing or making new laws ‘without the assent or consent of his whole Kingdom in Parliament expressed.’ ⁽¹⁴⁾ And the whole Kingdom, even of Great-Britain itself, is only a part of the British empire; and therefore, by a parity of reasoning, cannot justly or equitably be permitted to make laws for the whole, because ‘where the same reason is, the same law (or right) must prevail:’ ⁽¹⁵⁾ for "turpis est pars quae non convenit cum suo toto;" (Plowden, 161.) and ‘nihil in lege intolerabilius est, eandem rem diverso jure censeri.’ 4 Co. 83. The free representation of the people in the legis­lature is, therefore, to be esteemed, of all our rights, the most essential, (as Lord Sommers has declared) to maintain that excellent equilibrium of power, or mixt government, limited by law, which our ancestors have always most zealously asserted, and transmitted to us, as our best birthright and inheritance ⁽¹⁶⁾; so that every attempt to set the same aside in any degree, or in any part of the em­pire, [Page 11] or to corrupt it by undue influence of places and pensions, or bribes with public money, is treason against the constitution; the highest of trea­son ⁽¹⁷⁾: and therefore whatsoever is ordained, that can clearly be proved to be contrary to the constitution, must be allowed to be fundamentally wrong, and therefore null and void of itself; for, [Page 12] "sublato fundamento, cadit opus." (Jenk. Cent. 106.)

But more particularly the Parliament has no power to give up the ancient and established right of the people to be represented in the legislature, because an act for so base a purpose would entirely subvert the principles and constitution on which the very existence of the legislature itself, which ordain­ed it, is formed! so that such an unnatural act of the state would be parallel to the crime of felo de se in a private person; and, being thus contrary to ‘the nature of things, can never be rendered valid by any authority whatsoever’ ⁽¹⁸⁾.

And indeed it is laid down as a maxim, by the great Lord Sommers, that ‘no man or society of men have power to deliver up their preservation, or the means of it, to the absolute will of any man’ (or men) ‘and they will have always a right to preserve what they have not power to part with.’ P. 26. And if a politic society has no just power to deliver up even its own preserva­tion, it certainly has much less right to deliver up the necessary preservation of other societies of their brethern and friends (not represented among them) without their consent; and all such attempts must necessarily be deemed void and ineffectual, because ‘there is no necessity to obey, where there is no authority to ordain’ ⁽¹⁹⁾. For as it so clearly [Page 13] appears, from what has been said, that natural equity does not permit even the inferior property of lands, goods, chattels, or money, to be alienated without the consent or fault of the proprietors, much less can it permit the alienation, annulling, or changing, of our most valuable inheritance, the law, without the due assent and consent of the he­ritors themselves, the people at large, or their law­ful Representatives in their respective assemblies or parliaments ⁽²⁰⁾! This is a necessary conclusion of reason and common sense, drawn from the effect and force of natural equity, even in cases of much less consequence ( viz. respecting goods and common pecuniary property;) so that the distinction, which some great and able politicians have lately made, between Taxation and Legislation (in the late dis­putes about taxing the Colonies) was certainly er­roneous, though well intended; since it plainly ap­pears, that the right of legislation is not less inse­parable, by natural equity, from the people of every part of the British empire than the right of granting or with-holding taxes; for, otherwise, the free subjects of one part of the empire would be liable to be most materially injured in their greatest and most valuable inheritance, the law, by the hasty decisions of men on the other side of the empire, with whom probably they would be totally unac­quainted, and whose interest might perhaps be as [Page 14] widely different from theirs (for any thing they could know to the contrary) as their situation upon the face of the globe is distant; that is, as widely different as the east is from the west! Would this be equitable? Could such notorious injustice ⁽²¹⁾ be ever made lawful?

The true constitutional mode of connecting Bri­rish dominions, that are otherwise separated by na­ture, is demonstrated by the established example of the Union of Great Britain and Ireland, which, by long experience, has proved to be sufficiently effec­tual. It must be acknowledged, indeed, that an act of Parliament was made in the 6th of George 1. chap. 5. wherein it is laid down, that ‘the King and Parliament of Great-Britain may make laws to bind Ireland.’ ⁽²²⁾ But as it does not appear [Page 15] that the Parliament of Ireland ever acknowledged or gave any formal assent to the said act, the same [Page 16] must necessarily be considered as a mere assertion on one part, at the making of which, the persons most materially concerned on the other part were neither heard nor represented! A defect ⁽²³⁾ the most notorious that can possibly be attributed to any proceeding, either in the enacting or execution of laws! and therefore it is to very little purpose to cite the said act as a precedent for taxing the Ame­rican subjects without their consent; for the privi­leges which the Parliament of Ireland has main­tained and enjoyed, both before and since that time, (clearly distinct and separate from the British Parlia­ment) afford a better and more authentic precedent on the other side of the question ( viz. in behalf of the people's natural rights) than the act itself does against them; for, as the King and the People (in­cluding the Lords and Commons) of Great-Britain constitute the sovereign power (under God) or Le­gislature [Page 17] of Great Britain, so the King and the Peo­ple of Ireland are the natural and constitutional Legislature or State of that kingdom, and actually exercise (both in legislation and taxation) their distinct jurisdiction, to this day, which is the best proof of their right; and, in like manner, accord­ing to this ancient and established legal precedent, the King, together with the People of every distinct province, subject to the imperial Crown of Great-Britain, and detached (as Ireland is) from this island, ought to be and have been esteemed, from the first establishment of our Colonies, the only proper and constitutional Legislature for each province respec­tively ⁽²⁴⁾; because the Representation of the People, in every part of the British empire, is ab­solutely necessary to constitute an effectual Legisla­ture, according to the fundamental principles of the English Constitution; for none of them, separately, can be esteemed a competent Legislature to judge of the other's rights, without the highest injustice and iniquity, which is before demonstrated by some of the first maxims or principles of reason.

[Page 18] And yet, howsoever distinct these several parts or provinces may seem, in point of situation, as well as in the exercise of a separate legislative power for each, (which constitutional right they have en­joyed beyond the memory of man) they are never­theless firmly united by the circle of the British diadem, so as to form one vast empire, which will never be divided, if the safe and honest policy be adopted of maintaining the British constitution inviolate, in all parts of the empire; for it is a sys­tem so natural, so beneficial, and so engaging, to the generality of mankind, that by the same means we might hold the empire of the world, were the laws of natural equity, justice, and liberty, to be strictly observed, and the abomination of domestic ⁽²⁵⁾ as well as political slavery abolished!

On the other hand, it is not only treason against the constitution to attempt to deprive any free Bri­tish subjects of their natural right to a share in the legislature ⁽²⁶⁾, but it is equally derogatory and [Page 19] injurious to the authority of the Crown ⁽²⁷⁾; be­cause a King of England has no legal authority to govern by any other mode than that limited govern­ment called the English Constitution, which he is sworn to maintain; for such is the frailty of human nature, that no man, or body of men whatever, is to be entrusted with the administration of govern­ment, unless they are thus limited by law, and by a due Representation of the people at large, sub­ject to a frequent appeal, by election, to the whole body of constituents, for it is a maxim, ‘that he who is allowed more power, by law, than is fit or equitable, the same will still desire more pow­er than is already lawful;’ ⁽²⁸⁾ so that no power on earth is tolerable without a just limitation, and [Page 20] law, which ought to be supreme ⁽²⁹⁾, cannot sub­sist where will and pleasure are absolute, whether it be the will of one, of a few, or of many ⁽³⁰⁾.

A King, therefore, who presumes to act without the constitutional limitation, destroys the foundation of his own authority, for the most respectable and most ancient writer on the English constitution as­sures us, that "there is no King where Will rules," (or is absolute) "and not law." ⁽³¹⁾ The same doctrine is expressed still more clearly in the old year books, ⁽³²⁾ that, ‘if there was no law, there would be no King, and no inheritance.’

[Page 21] For these plain reasons, whenever the English government ceases to be limited, in any part of the British dominions, it ceases to be lawful!

And therefore the fatal consequences of pro­ceeding to enforce the execution of any acts, or resolutions, for the establishing such unlimited and unlawful ⁽³³⁾ government, is more easily conceived than expressed; because ‘the condition of all sub­jects would be alike, whether under absolute or limited government, if it were not lawful ⁽³⁴⁾ to maintain and preserve those limitations, since will and pleasure, and not law, would be, alike in both, the measure of obedience; for, to have liberties and privileges, unless they may be de­fended, and to have none at all, is the same thing as to be governed by mere will and plea­sure,’ (Lord Sommers, p. 24) and ‘misera est servitus ubi jus est vagum aut incertum.’