A Certain Friendly Address to all reasonable Americans, was just now put into my hands. Some people perhaps have read it, for I am told it was published six days ago; where­fore, after perusing, it seems proper to make a short answer to this performance: not because it is well written, or because there is the least danger any man will become a proselyte to the doctrines con­tained in it; but for the following reasons, which candor obliges me to mention.

FIRST. I answer this pamphlet, for the very purpose which alone the pamphlet itself is likely to effect,—to encourage the paper manufactory.

SECONDLY. I answer it for the sake of the Prin­ter, who must be sadly out of pocket, by publish­ing such woeful performances: And therefore he is [Page 4] hereby requested to print this in a large type, and the like, so as to make the most on't.

THIRDLY. I write, because from the futility of the author's reasoning, no body else may think it worth the trouble. And if so, why then he would very naturally conclude that he had written an excel­lent unanswerable treatise, which conclusion might inflate the poor creature's vanity, in such man­ner as to tempt him into other imprudencies of the same kind. The public thanks therefore will be my due, for removing, or at least preventing a common nusance.

LASTLY. I am prompted to this undertaking out of regard to the fair-sex. For many weak women may be exceedingly frighted by that awful compound of threats, and texts, and homilies.

Now then, gentle reader, having told thee the origin. I shall next acquaint thee with the charac­ter of this new acquaintance, which my Master James hath introduced to thy hand.—I will not, as is too common with controversial people, whether politic, or polemic: I will not, I say, use any acrimonious expressions, against this unhappy author; for whose weaknesses and wanderings, I have the utmost pity and compassion. On the contrary, I shall treat him with the greatest gentleness and re­spect, owing in some measure to my very great reve­rence for the Clergy, one of which he is, as I have been informed. And truly the frequent quotations from scripture, together with the illiberal language contained in his pamphlet, will naturally lead folks to believe so. For it unfortunately happens, that [Page 5] the generality of these Gentlemen, from an ungain habit they acquire by abusing the poor Devil, are too apt to vilify and asperse their neighbours. Some exceptions there are, it must be acknowledged, which may be attributed to this; that a few indivi­duals have kept better company, and seen more of the polite world, than the rest of their order. But alack and alas! I fear me our author is not one of these rare birds, for the household proverbs and tales with which his piece is interlarded, (if I may venture on something like his own language) make the odds at least a pound to a penny against him.

And now reader, if by chance thou art a Presby­terian, or Congregationalist, or other Dissenter from the Episcopalian Church, to which I myself belong; permit me to a pologize for the rude and opprobrious terms made use of against you by our author. These things ought in common charity to be forgiven, in­asmuch as they seem to have proceeded from igno­rance and the want of better language.—And do not, I beseech you, conclude too hastily against his brethren, I have several friends and acquaintance among them, who are really Gentlemen. Where­fore it is my earnest desire, that if in the hurry of composition (for I have but three days to write this in the midst of other affairs) if I say any thing should fall from my pen, which can be construed a reflec­tion on the Clergy, it is my desire that it should be instantly erazed.—I honour them much for their piety, learning, and strictly loyal attachment to our Sovereign.

An old Mathematician (I think they call him Ar­chimedes) had such confidence in his art and ma­chines, [Page 6] as to declare he would move the earth itself if he could get a place to stand on. But please your worships, while he was upon the thing which was to be moved, had he worked his heart out, 'twould not have budged an inch.—In imitation of this ve­nerable screw-driver, may we not lay down the fol­lowing logical maxim. A man may prove impossi­bilities if you will concede his postulata.—Thus, in order to demonstrate that black is white, or in other words, that black and white are the same thing, I ask only this admission; that there is no difference between them.

He who in conversation with half a dozen friends, should in a similar manner begin any argument whatever, by affirming the thing to be proved, would he not raise a laugh at his expence? Now, all Ame­rica contends for rights, which we aver to have been invaded, violated, destroyed, and a certain writer attempts to prove this contest, treasonable and rebellious; what shall we think of a writer, who begins an address on this subject, not to half a dozen, or half a hundred but to all reasonable Americans, with the following proposition? ‘Of all the subjects of Great-Britain, those who reside in the American colonies, are and might still be enjoying the benefits of an equitable and free con­stitution.’ As to his quotation from an "excel­lent writer," it may shew the Gentleman's reading, but can never help his a gument; and therefore I shall pass it over silence, to the examination of those excellencies, which he himself hath fabricated.

If by the term, subjects of Great-Britain, he means subjects to the King of Great-Britain, and [Page 7] subordinate to the Parliament of that Kingdom, it is an inaccuracy, which, considering what follows, may be easily forgiven. But if these words are in­tended to insinuate, that the people of America are subject to laws made by the Parliament of Great-Britain, in all cases whatever, then we shall find, that the first ground this great Archimedes intends to fix his reasoning machine on, is what follows. Americans are subject to the will of a Parliament which they have no vote in choosing, and being so subject, enjoy a free and equitable constitution. To which I have only two small exceptions: first, these are the very points to be proved, and secondly, they involve a flat contradiction. Now then, sup­posing these things admitted, after all, twist them and turn them as you please, still must you come back in a circle to the place from whence you set out; still luckless Philosopher you grovel on the earth.

Shortly after follows another false proposition. America contributes but a small proportion to sup­port the public expences. This for argument sake, I will grant. I will grant what I suppose he meant; namely, that America contributes but little to defray the public expences which other folks support. I am not captious in my temper, nor do I mean to cavil about words, for then I should never have done.

Then comes a page about Moses, thunder, blind­ness, darkness and destruction. As these things are quite out of my way, I shall not meddle with them; but proceed to the next, the scope of which seems to be this, Whether parliament hath been right [Page 8] or wrong, we are bound by the laws of Heaven to obey its mandates. And in quality of good Chri­stians, we must be subject to the Ministers, be they who they will, for conscience sake. Let who will be King, our author is Vicar of Bray. To eluci­date all which doctrines he observes that if the greatest tyrant on earth Nero for instance) should usurp and establish a domination over us, the harshest and most cruel, yet so heinous is the offence of dis­turbing an established government, that a due regard for the rights and liberties of mankind, would prompt us to a peaceable submission. To this submission we are enjoined, it seems, by the Christian religion; and to disturb or threaten such a government, is an unpardonable crime, and has been considered as such, in every age and nation of the world. All which is mighty reasonable. Wherefore it follows clearly, that those persons who within these four or five centuries, contended for, and by degrees esta­blished our glorious constitution. ‘A frame of government, says our author, which has always been the wonder of the world, under the pro­tection of which, the subjects of Great-Britain are the happiest people on earth’ I say, those persons who have rendered these British subjects so happy, and transmitted to them all the rights and privileges they enjoy, those persons, according to the above doctrine, must be damned to all eternity for their pains.—This may be religion, I am sure it is not common sense. But be that matter as it will, I shall not hesitate to declare, in imitation of honest Sir Toby; I had rather trust God Almighty with my soul, than the British Parliament with my estate. Moreover, for the HONOUR of the Church of Eng­land, I do entreat all other Sectaries to believe, that [Page 9] very few of its members hold the same creed with this writer.

However, having introduced Nero, Saint Peter, Saint Paul, and the Grand Turk, in company to­gether; he descends from his pulpit, leaves these dignified personages to shift for themselves, and opens the design of his pamphlet: which he tells us, is not religion, ‘but to consider how far the con­duct of the colonies is to be condemned or justi­fied by the maxims of sound policy and prudence.’ For it seems pretty well settled even in his idea, that notwithstanding that same Christian system he talks of ‘our temporal interest and safety, are considera­tions which all will regard;’ in which opinion I do most heartily concur with him.

After this follows a little more declamation, which you may see if you have the pamphlet, if not, send for it to the Booksellers, and you will find a sort of syllogism to shew; that resentment is unjustifiable, and complaint unreasonable, if our legal rights have not been invaded.—Legal rights,—and why that term, legal rights? Do you mean, my Reverend Sir, that any right (that of taxing ourselves for in­stance, if it be not confirmed by some statute law, is not a legal right; and therefore an invasion of such right, will neither justify resentment, nor authorise complaint? I am afraid you do,—and yet I hope not; for this also is one point to be proved in support of your hypothesis In the name of America I deny it. But if you mean to speak fairly, and if by legal rights you mean what you ought to make your own argument conclusive, namely, those rights which we are entitled to by the eternal laws of right reason; [Page 10] then the remainder of your task will be to shew, that our rights have not been invaded, and if that can be done, then to be sure our complaints are ground­less.

Now then let us see what the Friendly Address says upon this subject. Why the first observation is, that the duty on tea is no tax; for unless we pur­chase it we don't pay the duty, therefore it is quite in our option, whether we will pay it or no. What can be more equitable?—I remember, about twelve years ago, there was a madman in the Philadelphia hospital, who imagined himself monarch of the country thereabouts; and among other wild projects, such as might be expected from a creature in that situation, he had one to tax the air. But may it please your Majesty, will such a tax be right? Air was always common and free, in the time of your Majesty's royal progenitors and predecessors. Will not your subjects think this an arbitrary law, like the poll tax? Arbitrary! cried the prince, enraged; and like the poll tax too! What rebels! Why, un­less they breathe, they don't pay the duty, therefore it is quite in their option whether they will pay it or no. What can be more equitable. I pitied the poor man because he was mad.

But you say tea is a luxury. In some respects it may be so. And how, and where, shall we draw a line, between the luxuries and the conveniences of life? Or by what right can the one be taken away, which will not affect the other? Those who may rightfully deprive us of luxuries, by the same rule may as rightfully deprive us of conveniences too. And if in the plenitude of that power, which our [Page 11] author so apostolically hath conferred, they should deign to leave unto us the necessaries of life, pray by what standard shall we determine these necessaries?

But to return.—Our author next supposes, that he is arguing with some honest American, who should deny the right of Parliament to lay this duty on tea. To obviate this he quotes precedent. The Ameri­can is then supposed to observe, that the precedent itself was wrong, wherefore no right could originate from it; but that together with other similar wrongs, it ought to be done away. So is the argument stated by himself. And he then, upon a supposition that this tea duty is quite distinct from a tax at­tempts to shew, that Parliament had a right to levy it, merely as a regulation of trade. Pray read the eighth and and ninth pages—Have you read them?—Why now your honour, I will undertake to confute every thing contained there. I will undertake to shew, that the author's reasoning does not apply to his purpose or subject, any more than the words Denmark and Russia, which as you see are printed in large Italicks.—But what will it signify to take up so much of your attention; when it is very like you had better be thinking on some other affair. His consequence may be well supported on rational ground; though, to his misfortune, he could not discover it. The right of Great-Britain to regulate the trade of the colonies, shall be admitted. [Page 12] But that the duty on tea is a regulation of trade and not a tax; this is the very matter in controversy.

We are now arrived at the confutation of one of Mr. Locke's arguments; which, says our author, "appears to me weak and sophist cal."—The argu­ment as quoted by himself, stands thus: "If parli­ament has a right to take from us one penny with­out our consent, it has a right to strip us of our whole property." To confute which he observes, "A right to do what is reasonable, implies not a right to do what is unreasonable." And after a short similitude about father and son, he says, ‘Cases may happen, in which it would be reasonable for Par­liament to take from us some small matter, though we were unwilling to part with it; but the case can hardly be supposed, in which it would be rea­sonable to take from us every thing, unless we should have forfeited it.’ And so concludes, "There can be no right to do wrong."—And this is the confutation.—I was some time puzzled to make any thing of it; but by comparing one part with another, we may at least guess that he means what follows: By the words, reasonable to take from us, &c. I presume he intends, a right to take from us. For, reasonable, in the proper sense of the word, will not answer his purpose at all; because if we in­vert the proposition, it will be as reasonable for the Legislature of this province to take from the people of England, a small matter without their consent. But that any such right could exist, the author of the Address would hardly allow. Throughout this admirable confutation therefore, let us substitute right for reasonable, and wrong for unreasonable, and then it will stand thus: A right to do what is [Page 13] right, implies not a right to do what is wrong. To take from us one penny without our consent is right, but to strip us of our whole property is wrong. Therefore, Parliament may have a right to take from us one penny, without our consent, which is right; but this right does not necessarily imply, that Parliament has a right to strip us of our whole property, which is wrong. Therefore Mr. Locke's argument is confuted. And in the same way I will undertake to confute Euclid's Elements, from one end to the other.—Examine this argument, this fine argument. It rests upon the assertion, that in some cases Parliament may have a right to take a small matter from us without our consent, which as­sertion is the very thing denied. And so the Gentle­man's wits and faculties, after prancing and curvet­ing through a whole section, bring him not one inch nearer the end of his journey, than he was when he first set out.

So here again he labours at a distinction between the duty on tea, and a tax. But as to any difference between them, that you know is quite another affair. No matter for the difference, provided there be a distinction. May it please your Reverence, when­ever you are at a loss for matter to vamp up into the shape of another Address; I have a dozen or two such distinctions, which are very heartily at your Reverence's service, very heartily I do assure you.

Ah! what have we here? Another dissertation on the British right of regulating American trade? Yes. Here it is, hip and thigh, import and export, back stroke and fore stroke; blessings on us, I say. What a pity it is, that our author would not content him­self with a simple assertion here, as he has done in [Page 14] those instances, which really required proof. Most unfortunately, in endeavouring to establish what we would readily grant; he lays his foundation on argu­ments, which would overthrow every principle of American liberty. I declare, reader, it is not my intention to cheat you, by re-printing quotations from the Address. But unless you have bought it, I do not know how otherwise to manage matters.

The same want of penetration, which led our author to imagine Mr. Locke's argument weak and sophistical, now bewilders him with a Jack O'Lant­horn, in the shape of the word Englishmen. His drift is to shew, we may be bound by laws we do not consent to, and yet possess all the rights of English-men. For, says he, Englishmen can have no right to be exempted from the authority of an English Parliament. After this he blunders a little about majority and minority, hints at virtual repre­sentation, and says something of English American ground. To answer which at once, those who do not immediately perceive the fallacy, are desired to consider, that the persons who make laws for Eng­land, are to be bound by them when they have done. And that no existence whatever, except Almighty God, can have a natural right to make laws binding on others, which the law-maker is exempt from. True it is such power may be usurped, or through politi­cal necessity conceded. Usurped as the British power of taxing America, conceded as the power of regu­lating trade, which after such concession, becomes a right. Greater rights they cannot have; unless some mode can be invented, to incorporate us into the grand legislature of the empire, on constitutional principles. But let us examine his English argument. [Page 15] The word English above, is printed in Italicks, and separated from the word, men. In reading the sen­tence, leave out English and the argument is gone. Now I do aver, and will maintain, that to consent to laws binding upon us, is one of those rights which we enjoy as men, and not merely as English­men. In quality of rational and free agents, we enjoy it. A right granted by our Creator, when he formed us of the clod. That great charter by which he confirmed it, may be read in the human frame: A charter sealed with the breath of life. To this right every man is and must be entitled; it is annex­ed as an inseperable appendage to our existence, and altho' the English law hath secured it to the English subject, yet a Frenchman or Turk is as much enti­tled to it, by the law of nature. That this title hath not been ratified by political institutions, is his misfortune, and I am sorry for it.

So you see, reader, all this trouble might have been spared, if the poor creature had not most un­luckily laid hold of that said word. English: which indeed from the face of his performance, he does not appear to understand. The last part of the ar­gument we are now upon, arises from a fact I am not inclined to dispute, though I do not believe it. He avers that we have been offered representatives in the Common's House, if we would send them over. Be this as it may, I agree with him that we have done wisely in not accepting the offer if ever it was made. Or in other words, to have accepted it, would have been folly. Now then hear him. "After refusing it, they have no reason to complain." That is to say, because we have not committed folly, we have no right to complain of injustice, Yet this is an Address to all reasonable Americans.

[Page 16] The next attempt of this masterly Address, is to impeach the validity of those compacts, which seve­ral colonies have made with the crown. These com­pacts can be considered in no other light, than as covenants by the King, in consideration of settling the desart; that he would protect the settlers and their dependants, in the enjoyment of their natural rights. If his Majesty chuses to withdraw this pro­tection—be it so. The King can do no wrong. But I wish there had been a lineal warrantee from his ministers. Some of them are of noble descent, and I have so high an opinion of the honour of British Peers, that I believe few of them would infringe such solemn agreements. However, suppose the King should withdraw this protection,—Are our rights therefore annihilated? No. Those rights were conferred by the King of Kings, and no earthly Potentate can take them away.

Not long since I saw a Letter from a Veteran, to the Officers of the Army at Boston: I pray the au­thor to receive my thanks, for the great pleasure enjoyed in the reading of it. I think I could easily perceive in it, the traces of that manly, generous, brave, and free disposition; which mark the charac­ter of the Soldier and the Gentleman.

I am almost afraid to return immediately to the Address, because comparisons are odious. Make none, gentle reader, I beseech thee; but observe out author here insinuates, that he hath shewn, "that in reality no proper right of the colonies is in­fringed [Page 17] by the late act of Parliament." Pray now, how hath he shewn it? Why by three assertions, neither of which is in the least proved, as I took occasion to observe before in treating of them respectively.—The first is, that the duty on tea is no tax. The second, that if a tax, it is a small one, and Parlia­ment hath a right to take from us a small matter without our consent. And the third, that a man may be rightfully bound by laws which he does not, and cannot assent to.

These are the main pillars of this formidable argument; not one of which hath the least solidity: And therefore the provi­dent author, fearful perhaps of their instability, before he ven­tures to charge us with sedition, privy conspiracy and rebellion, to anathematise us for false doctrine, heresy, and schism; or to reproach us for hardness of heart, and contempt of his word and command; reverts to his original considerations, about pru­dence and policy, on what he calls the supposition, and Ameri­cans the fact, that we have been really injured.

But these considerations, do not seem to be well considered; because he takes it for granted in the first instance, that the peo­ple of Boston were criminal in destroying the tea. And the word Boston, some how or other fascinating his imagination, he is hurried away with a torrent of invectives. The destruction of the tea, says he, ‘was a compound of the grossest injury and insult, an act of the highest insolence to government, such as mildness itself cannot overlook or forgive.’ The only fault of all this and some more of the same kind is, that it is rather misplaced; for it would answer tolerably well in a sermon against blasphemy.

Let me intreat the reader's attention to a simple tale: Those who are inclined to doubt it, will find unquestionable evidence in a pamphlet, called, A true State of the Proceedings in the Parliament of Great-Britain, and in the Province of the Massachusetts-Bay, &c.

In the year 1761, 1762, 1763, the duteous conduct of the Massachusetts, was exemplary and acknowledged.—In 1764, the stamp-act was threatened, and a duty imposed for raising a revenue in America. The House of Representatives resolved, that it is unconstitutional, to take their money without their consent. In 1765, the several Assemblies petitioned against the stamp-act; which they had no right to do, because— it was a [Page 18] Money Bill: consequently the petitions were disregarded, and the bill was passed. The Massachusetts then proposed a Congress of Delegates from the several Assemblies; and the Congress petitioned the King: but the Congress was an uncon­stitutional body; wherefore our gracious master (that year) was afflicted with a great deafness. In 1766, the Assembly petitioned against their Governor, one Francis Bernard, for assuming, with his Council, the powers of legislation. This accusation was very just, and therefore to make it was ve­ry impertinent. A Non-importation in America, opened the ears of the Parliament in England; and in 1766, the Stamp Act was repealed. In 1767, another revenue act passed; whereupon the Assembly of that province presented a petition at the foot of the throne; and wrote to the other Assemblies to join in it, which was a piece of great presumption. In 1768, the Assem­bly was ordered to rescind the resolve, by which those letters had been written, on pain of dissolution; which peremptory mandate produced a petition, and also a letter to the secretary of state.—About the same time some seamen were pressed con­trary to an act of parliament; the people of Boston petitioned their governor on this affair; but his Excellency had no business to interfere in the Admiral's department. A vessel also was seized in a manner which irritated the mob, and they were such scoundrels as to resent the insult; consequently they were guil­ty of treason and rebellion, for drubbing the worthy collector. An army was sent there immediately, but then there was an act of parliament against quartering them on the people, there­fore the governor issued his commission, to dispense with the act, for a royal martyr had done so before him. The people then petitioned the governor to call an assembly; this was re­fused, for business could better be done without one. Disap­pointed in this, they appointed a convention, the members whereof irritated by what they called their wrongs, presented another humble petition to the King; wherefore in 1769, the troops, out of a just contempt for their pusilanimity, shot three brace by way of starting the covey. But it was impossible his Majesty's troops could have been the aggressors; therefore there must have been an insurrection of the people. This was clearly the case also from judge Oliver's narration; yet near an hun­dred credible witnesses, had the impudence to swear, that his narration was false. Consequently to repair the breach in his character, it was necessary that he should be appointed Lieute­nant Governor, which happened accordingly. In 1769, the As­sembly presented another petition, against their governor Ber­nard. [Page 19] He prorogued the Assembly, went to England immedi­ately, obtained an order for a hearing on the petition upon the 28th of February, and got the prorogation of the Assembly con­tinued until the 14th of March. Notwithstanding all this, the Assembly never supported their charge with any proof; because the prorogations rendered it impossible; consequently the peti­tion was groundless, vexatious and scandalous, as every body will easily see. In the year 1772, 1773, the Assembly took the liberty to petition again, which was at least forward and ill-bred, wherefore no notice was taken of what they alledged. In De­cember 1773, the dutiable Tea arrived. I have during the course of this story, omitted many things which were thought very grievous by the people of the Massachusetts bay, for the sake of brevity, and because the recital of all their complaints might possibly inflame mens minds at this dangerous juncture; a thing I would wish to avoid, for I have great respect for the clergy.

In December 1773, the dutiable Tea arrived at Boston. It was evident that if this commodity was landed, there would be many purchasers among the governors creatures. Prudence therefore required, that it ought to be sent back. The gover­nor would not permit this, and the necessity was then clear, either that the Tea must be destroyed, or the act submitted to. Wearied out with long oppression, and driven to desperation by repeated insults, a few daring men went disguised to the ship and destroyed the Tea.—Upon this tale I shall make no com­ment, it needs none. But to relieve the reader's attention, I will mention an incident of a more lively complexion:—Two young gentlemen found a cat sitting peaceably in one corner of the parlour: She was a gentle animal, and a good mouser. Young men love fun, so they shut the door and windows, and ferreted her about, till she and they were hear­tily tired: At length, in a violent leap from her persecutors, the cat fell in the midst of an elegant set of china: to lose a China cup and sawcer, by means of a vile cat, was too much to be patiently borne, and poor puss was murdered for not scam­pering up the chimney.

Now after this digression, let us return to the pamphlet, and see what is said about the punishment of this crime, which mildness itself could neither overlook nor forgive. A very mild punishment says he, for it was only shutting up the port. Now [Page 20] shutting up the port, was, as we all know, only destroying the trade; and that is only a trifle, as we shall see by and by. ‘Surely, (cries our author) none who have as high a sense of public guilt as of private, can think this punishment too severe for the crime, considered under all its aggravations. For no people are entitled to the use of any advantage, which they wantonly abuse to the injury of others.’ These observations are calculated to shew the equity of the port bill; let us see then, whether our author hath fortunately stumbled upon sound reason in this instance, after failing so often.—The advantage which the Bostonians are deprived of, is their trade; and there­fore their trade must be the thing which they wantonly abused. Now, by what figure of speech, the destruction of the Tea can be called a matter of trade, or what kind of trade it is, I am at a loss to conceive.—Do not say, that this is a verbal criticism. Such things I reserve for authors of greater perspicuity. The equity of every punishment depends of its relation to the crime. Now allowing, that the destroyers of the Tea, were guilty of a violent outrageous riot; I shall be glad to know, what kind of relation there is in the nature of things, between a riot commit­ted by thirty or forty men, and the ruin of many honest trades­men, by a total supension of that commerce on which they sub­sist. Yet this is a MILD and a JUST punishment. I have can­didly exhibited the delinquencies of this people; were I to give them a name, nothing but that love of peace which sanctifies every means to obtain it, nothing but that should prevent me, from branding their conduct as a tameness under insults which provoke them.

The next attempt of our worthy pamphleteer is to shew, that ‘the punishment of the Bostonians, was not hasty and precipi­tate.’ He reasons thus: In common cases, a criminal ought to be heard; but this is an uncommon case; courts of justice ought not to condemn unheard, but the legislature may. Now let us scrutinize the intrinsic value of these suggestions. A fellow steals a sheep, or a horse, or ravishes your wife, or mur­ders your father. Justice holds up on high her equal scales; she cries out aloud to the human heart, let him be heard in his defence; rather ninety-nine guilty escape, than one innocent perish: but should a man burn the tooth-pick of a court mistress, or prevent the prime minister from pissing in his pocket, or destroy some musty Tea, to save his estate; in such uncommon case, espe­cially if ninety-nine innocent are to suffer, lest one guilty escape; in such uncommon case the maxim is, let them not be heard. Do you ask why? The answer is plain: If suffered to make a defence, [Page 21] they cannot be convicted.—So much for the case: Now for the tribunal.—If a man commits any of the crimes first mentioned against the known laws of the land, subject to a certain penalty, the maxim is, let him be heard. But as to the last sort, punish­able by a new law, in a new mode, both framed after the fact committed, policy is of opinion, that they should not be heard, lest the varlets should except to her mode of proceedings against them. All which is addressed to the reasonable Americans.

But (says he in the next paragraph) to involve the innocent with the guilty, is an inconvenience which always necessarily attends punishments inflicted on a people, whether by God or man. And again, it was politically impossible to select the inno­cent of Boston from the guilty. We all remember the story of Sodom and Gomorrah. It is an excellent lesson to the Princes of the earth. The inhabitants of these cities, infamous by their vices to the last degree, became so obnoxious to the Supreme Being, that in anger, he resolved to destroy them. Yet had there been five men, only five men, who walked uprightly before God; had only five such men dwelt in Sodom and Gomorrah, no fire had descended from Heaven to consume them. But alas! Because among thirty thousand souls in Boston, thirty have offended; in vain shall the multitude plead innocence, as an exemption from ruin. Blush Humanity! This is thy political necessity, which must hereafter justify the laying that defenceless town in ashes, and drenching it in the blood of its inhabitants.

Because thirty have offended, a whole colony is punished. And for what offence? An offence so small, so disproportionately punished, that the general voice of the continent hath declared, that they suffer in the cause of American liberty. Here our au­thor begins to leave the paths of logic, and to enter the alleys of Billingsgate. Beneath his forming hand, American liberty starts forth a monster of licentiousness. And in his idea, to screen our miserable fellow-creatures from that PUBLIC JUSTICE [Page 22] which hath been created for them; is giving shelter to the raving enthusiast, who hath murdered his prince.—Bold metaphors and florid language, are the magnificent trappings of reason and truth; and when falshood or folly is thus arrayed, it pro­vokes at once our indignation and contempt.

But neither bold metaphors, nor yet bold language, serve some causes so well as bold assertions. I have heard of lawyers, who by the assistance of that invincible front which is the pre­scriptive privilege of their profession, frame evidence as they go along, and speak fluently on facts which never existed. In like manner and in humble imitation, to evince the propriety of the act, for new modelling the government of Massachusets; our author scruples not to affirm, that ‘no privileges are curtailed by the act, but such as had been abused and forfeited, over and over, to the great injury and disturbance of that province, as well as to the dishonour and reproach of the nation.’ The institutions of this act, as to their matter I do not object to; for it hath long been my opinion, that the government of that co­lony was in its form and complection, too like a Republic, for the true spirit of our constitution. But as to the manner; even supposing these regulations to be a decree substantially just, and made by a court having proper jurisdiction, still there is mani­fest impropriety.—It is, and while I have existence, it shall be my sentiment; that no man, no body of men, in any cause, before any tribunal, can be legally affected by any determination, where an opportunity is not given, for making a defence. Had this been done in the present instance, perhaps his Majesty's Ministers would not have deemed them so criminal, as they now do. But waving this idea, I am sure the author of the Address at least, after the pointed assertions he has made, ought in com­mon justice to have shewn, how the privileges he speaks of had been abused and forfeited. This, however he thought it prudent to omit.—

That Administration is irritated with Boston, that it hath cause to be irritated, I freely acknowledge: And this is the cause of the anger they feel, and the revenge they have taken. The people of that town, and the colony it belongs to, have been forward and active, in stating and demanding, their rights and liberties; they have addressed, petitioned, and remonstrated to Ministers, Parliament, and King; they have sounded the alarm, when the enemy attacked our privileges; and they have been the grand obstacle to an American tyranny. If to do thus [Page 23] is a forfeiture of privileges; if to do thus is an abuse of them, who would hold such privileges on such tenure? Most readily do I grant, that it was a dishonour and a reproach to the nation, and its rulers too; that they so often made use of their right to petition and to remonstrate. Great was the cause, or such fre­quent complaints would not have been obtruded. For this was their guilt, this was their impertinence;—suffering they com­plained.

We come now to the Quebec Act. On this subject I shall not minutely follow our author, for the substance of what he says, being levelled at the following propositions of the Congress; that the government of Canada is rendered arbitrary, that the people are deprived of trial by jury, and that the Roman Catholick re­ligion is established; if I shall be able to shew that these propo­sitions are true, then what he hath said to the contrary, will be of no avail. And first, what can be more arbitrary than this? A Governor and Council appointed by, and dependent on the Crown, are the legislature of a whole region. They may sit at home, and frame edicts for the extremest parts of that vast pro­vince, without any one check from the people. They may tax the colony as they please, or hand it over to be fleeced by the British Commons. They may invent new crimes, and affix to them such new penalties, and make them cognizable before such new Courts, as they shall think meet at their sovereign will and pleasure, they may seize and imprison any member of the com­munity; or else more certainly and entirely, to ruin and oppress him, they may cause some minion of power to institute an action for his whole substance, and try him and condemn him, by the arbitrary principles, and more arbitrary judges of the civil law. For, in the second place, it is clear to a demonstration, that trials by jury cannot be had there now; and it is equally clear that they never can exist hereafter, unless the Governor and Council chuse to risk and diminish their power, by introducing this free and generous branch of English jurisprudence. How probable it is that they will thus put a curb on their own wantonness, I leave any man in his senses to determine. But thirdly, it is not civil tyranny alone, which is planted in Quebec, to overshadow that immense country. From the same poisonous root, arises the most horrible religious tyranny, that my mind is capable of con­ceiving.—What establishment can any religion have in any country on earth, unless it be a legal provision for the support of its clergy? Look thro' Europe. See if Popery is in any other manner established in any one country, than by payment of [Page 24] tythes, and protection of Priests. Is not this an establishment? Is it not more? Is it not an encouragement? He who would go farther, must resort to fire and sword; the arguments of those barbarous ages and nations, whose annals disgust humanity. But the objection is, that when any man is converted, his Ma­jesty may if he pleases, encourage the Protestant Clergy as he pleases, out of the tythes paid before to the Roman Priest. Allowing this argument to have weight, which indeed it has not; pray what likelihood is there that any man will be con­verted? Protestantism is the tender child of freedom and science: How then can it exist in the bold bosom of ignorant despotism? Without the patronage of one earthly friend. Without a single rag to cover its nakedness. In ancient days the Romish Church was a firm barrier against the incroachments of Royal prerogative. The Clergy dependent on the Pope as their universal head, de­fied the menaces of kingly power. Thus were popular privi­leges in those times frequently protected by popular superstition. Our Ministers by a refinement of modern policy, have adopted the Church of Rome as a twin-sister to the Church of England. Our subtle Ministers have placed the King of England in the same situation with the Roman pontiff Every dignitary of the Church is dependent on him, besides which he hath full power to appoint such Ecclesiastical Courts, with such jurisdictions as he shall think meet. Thus, all the bigotry, all the superstition of a religion abounding in both, beyond any which the world hath be­held; all, all is in his Royal hand to be used at his Royal will and pleasure. To this full supremacy over their souls, are joined the fullest temporal powers, both legislative and judicial; so that like the ancient Patriarchs, he is King, Priest and Prophet. To finish the dreadful system, add all the executive powers of the State, and encircle the whole with a standing army, 'tis then compleat. These are facts? And whenever a wicked monarch in vengeance shall arise; then shall we behold him, the civil and religious tyrant, of a province which extends over half the Continent of America. Such is the tendency of the Canada Bill. View it, consider it, ponder upon it, in the coolest, most temporate disposition; behold its consequences, and the mild eye of reason will be clouded with a tear.

The next part of the Address is to shew, that the other Colo­nies need not trouble their heads about Boston or Quebec. As to what he says about Quebec. I believe with him, that there is no intention of introducing Popery into the other colonies. Our Ministers, or rather Masters, have more understanding than [Page 25] to entertain so wild an opinion. Nor would I perswade man­kind to become Knights Errant, and wantonly undertake the quarrels, and fight the battles of other people. But I will leave it to any man, nay, I would almost appeal to the author of the address himself, to determine; whether a country has not great reason to fear the loss of its liberties, when surrounded by a mul­titude of slaves; especially when those slaves are inbued with principles inimical to it, and united together in one common interest, profession and faith, under one common head, and sup­ported by all the weight of a large empire. Does not experi­ence give additional force to every solicitous apprehension?

His ideas about Boston amount to this: that we should act like wise foxes, for fear of being docked: or, in plain English, view with unconcern the destruction of that capital, without daring to interpose for its preservation. I beg pardon for re­peating a vulgar story: A Scotchman upon his arrival at an inn filled with travellers, crept into bed between an Englishman and an Irishman: towards the morning the Englishman was awaked by an inundation from his new bed-fellow, ‘zounds, says he, what are you about?’ Hoot, hoot, mon, cried the politic Scot, ‘lye down quiet; I have done worse to him be­hind me.’

But the author of the address tells us: the dispute with Great-Britain is de lana caprina. I learnt a little Latin at school, so with the help of my scholarship, and from what follows, I con­jecture that this means goats wool:—That this to say, all the grievances America has laboured under for a dozen years past, amount to a meer trifle; which is so shockingly absurd, that it would be ridiculous to honour it with the ceremony of a con­futation.

As to the thought of establishing a republic in America, breaking off our connexion with Great-Britain, and becoming independent: I consider it as the most vain, empty, shallow, and ridiculous project, that could possibly enter into the heart of man. I do not believe there are five hundred on the conti­nent, who have the least pretensions to common sense, and who would not risque their dearest blood, to prevent such measures: This supposition, therefore, and what relates to it, I consider meerly as an introduction to his censures on the Congress. These censures seem to be the main business and intention of the pam­phlet. If therefore in the avowed purpose of it (a consideration [Page 26] of the opposition in America on principles of prudence and po­licy) I shall be able to shew; that the author is much mistaken in condemning those measures which the Congress hath adopted; then all his declamation upon that subject, will be as the idle wind, which passeth away and is heard no more.

The first reflections he casts on this respectable body, are far adopting the Suffolk resolves. The asperity and bitterness which appears in this part of the pamphlet, are to be attributed to the great warmth of the reverend composer. Reproaches from an angry man are easily forgiven; and that meekness of dispo­sition which attends the ministers of peace, will I hope mode­rate the unchristian transports of our authors zeal, as soon as his mistakes are discovered. By a member of the Congress, whose honor and veracity stand unimpeached, I am authorized to de­clare, that the Congress did not adopt the Suffolk resolves. That these resolves were never so much as read for debate; and that upon the common reading, the sense of that body was, that it was proper to recommend moderate and pacific conduct, sup­ported by firmness and resolution. The language of the Con­gress, in consequence of this determination▪ is as follows:

Resolved unanimously,

That we thoroughly approve the wisdom and fortitude, with which opposition has been hitherto conducted; and earnestly re­commend a perseverance in the same firm and temperate conduct, as expressed in the resolution &c. Now then I appeal to the world, whether this is the cordial approbation of an independent government. Whether it is a transport of joy on the news of revolt. Whether it is a league with the worst enemies of A­merica, surely it is not. The fair reputation of those Gentle­men who composed the Congress, render such imputations almost unpardonable. It is a duty therefore incumbent on the author of the Address, to make some public acknowledgement; many did indeed expect that some constitution would have been pointed out, to secure and establish the freedom of America, and the sovereignty of that supreme legislature, which ought certainly to govern the whole empire. This is a consummation devoutly to be wished for, but it is not the work of a moment. Besides, it might have been thought presumptuous in them to undertake what is properly the business of the British Parlia­ment, and the respective legislatures of the Continent. Why [Page 27] then are those persons, who have generously devoted their ser­vices to the Public, why are they to be censured, for a sin of omission; which at any rate is pardonable on the score of human infirmity?

Much paper is consumed in the Address, to paint those horrors which await on civil war. To this I have no objection. For there is not a creature living, to whom such a prospect is more terrible than myself. And I dare say, a candid description of my own feelings on the subject, would convey as genuine marks of detestation for that horrible catastrophe, as the laboured pe­riods of the author before us. But I see no reasons for such appre­hensions. Neither do I think that man a friend to either coun­try, who speaks of war between them except in the stile of con­tempt. To imagine that America can cope with Great Britain, is the excess of stupidity. And even if we were capable of the contest, were we certain of obtaining victory, I should pray that the hand in which I hold my pen, might wither e'er it drew the sword.—But let not the dread of power, draw off our attention from the pursuit of freedom. Let us in every instance follow that example which our author recommends. In imitation of the inhabitants of Rye; whenever either duty to the mother country, or enthusiasm in the cause of humanity, shall hurry us beyond the true line, of patriotism or obedience, let us take the earliest opportunity to retract our errors, and acknowledge our mistakes.—Resistance against oppression, is the undoubted privilege of mankind; but civil resistance alone, is justifiable in civil society.

I come now to what our author hath said of the non-importa­tion agreement.—This he likens to the cutting off an arm, for a sore on one of the fingers. Similies are very agreeable and proper, where they tend to throw light on the subject.—Now, if a man hath a sore on his finger, he will naturally put a plai­ster to it. If the finger grows worse, and he grows timid, he sends for a surgeon. If the topical applications of the surgeon are inefficacious, and a gangrene ensues, the parts are scarified, and the bone cleansed. If this fails of success, and corruption spreads along the limb, and threatens the vitals, the only hope which remains is from amputation. True it is, the patient may loose much blood by the incision of his arteries, and death it­self may be the consequence. But by undergoing it he has a chance for life, and otherwise his case is desperate. As an en­couragement [Page 28] in such difficult emergencies, the scriptures tell us, if thy member offendeth thee, cut it off, and cast it away.

Now, reader, let me entreat your patience a little while longer. Pray observe. The liberties of this country have been infringed in an article of trade. Common sense informs us, that if one imposition is admitted, another will follow. Petitions and re­monstrances, have been presented in vain. When we refused the dutiable commodity, it was almost forced upon our accept­ance. No hope therefore remains from common efforts. And the question is reduced to this short alternative: Which is most advantageous, commerce or freedom? One or the other, we must forego. The one for a time, or the other forever. I will wave the common observation, which is level to the lowest capa­city, that without freedom trade cannot flourish. But I must beg leave to examine, from reason and experience, Whether a cessation of trade will not procure us relief?

Nothing is more evident, than that the trade between Britain and the northern colonies, brings yearly very large sums of money to the latter. That the balance of all the other trade she enjoys, is on the whole against her. And that her annual expences amount to an enormous sum, great part whereof is paid into foreign countries, as interest for the national debt Is it not then equally evident, that a suspension of her commerce with us, must greatly distress her? And to heighten this distress, what can be more effectual than to embarrass her trade with the islands? Every good heart would wish to avoid this, and it is not our smallest misfortune, that to make men reason, we must make them feel. Happy would it be if the authors of our mi­sery, were the only sufferers. To effect this desirable purpose we had but one way, which was to injure the revenue, in such manner as to hold them up to the resentment of the nation; and this has been done.—The wisest measures may fail, but these at least promise success.—Great-Britain may indeed very easily put an entire step to all our commerce. But this (if we may believe the Address) is a mild punishment on Boston. And if so, why cannot we all undergo it? No, says he, inflicted on all of us, it would be very severe. It would so, but I trust not lasting. Will a stoppage of our trade, pay the debts we owe in England? Will shutting up our ports, breed sailors for the navy of Britain? Millions in Europe are fed by the American plough; while bread can be purchased on this continent will they starve? Will the Monarchs of France and Spain see their [Page 29] subjects perish, that Americans may be reduced to slavery? All these things may happen, and after all, this country is capable of supporting its inhabitants.

Great are the difficulties we labour under, and many are the obstacles we must surmount. For the road to freedom and virtue, is not strewed with flowers, but sprinkled with thorns. Perhaps our fortitude is not equal to the task, if so, we deserve the consequences. But remember, that the mother-country must suffer with her colonies: Remember, that a Non-Impor­tation has once procured a redress of our grievances. Remember that Concord is the parent of success. Remember, that the worst which can possibly befal us, even at the last, is that very slavery which we must now resist or submit to. O AMERICANS! these considerations are submitted to you. Attend, and way the God of wisdom, who foreknoweth all human events, so di­rect you, as is most comformable to the mysterious intentions of his Divine Providence. For the good of his creatures, must be the will of him who is infinite goodness.