I HAVE nothing in special Com­mand from his Majesty to lay before you at this Time; I have general Instructions to re­commend to you, at all Times, such Measures as may tend to pro­mote that Peace and Order upon which your own Happiness and Prosperity as well as his Majesty's Service very much depend. That the Govern­ment is at present in a distu [...]bed and disordered State is a Truth too evident to be denied. The Cause of this Disorder appears to me equally evi­dent. I wish I may be able to make it appear so to you, for then I may not doubt that you will [Page 4] agree with me in the proper Measures for the Removal of it. I have pleased myself, for seve­ral Years past, with Hopes that the Cause would cease of itself and the Effect with it, but I am dis­appointed, and I may not any longer, consistent with my Duty to the King and my Regard to the Interest of the Province, delay communicating my Sentiments to you upon a Matter of so great Im­portance. I shall be explicit and treat the Sub­ject without Reserve. I hope you will receive what I have to say upon it with Candor, and, if you shall not agree in Sentiments with me, I promise you, with Candor likewise, to receive and consi­der what you may offer in Answer.

When our Predecessors first took Possession of this Plantation or Colony, under a Grant and Charter from the Crown of England, it was their Sense, and it was the Sense of the Kingdom, that they were to remain subject to the supreme Au­thority of Parliament. This appears from the Charter itself and from other irresistable Evidence. This supreme Authority has, from Time to Time, been exercised by Parliament and submit­ted to by the Colony, and hath been, in the most express Terms, acknowledged by the Legislature and, except about the Time of the Anarchy and Confusion in England which preceeded the Res­toration of King Charles the Second, I have not discovered that it has been called in Question even by private or particular Persons until within seven or eight Years last past. Our Provincial or Lo­cal Laws have, in numerous Instances, had Rela­tion to Acts of Parliament made to respect the Plantations in general and this Colony in particu­lar, [Page 5] and in our Executive Courts both Juries and Judges have; to all Intents and Purposes, consi­dered such Acts as Part of our Rule of Law. Such a Constitution, in a Plantation, is not peculiar to England but agrees with the Principles of the most celebrated Writers upon the Law of Nations that when a Nation takes Possession of a distant Country and settles there, that Country, though separated from the principal Establishment or Mother Country, naturally becomes a Part of the State equally with its ancient Possessions.

So much however of the Spirit of Liberty breathes thro' all Parts of the English Constitu­tion, that although from the Nature of Govern­ment there must be one supreme Authority over the whole▪ yet this Constitution will admit of sub­ordinate Powers with legislative and executive Authority, greater or less according to local and other Circumstances. Thus we see a Variety of Corporations formed within the Kingdom with Powers to make and execute such Bylaws as are for their immediate Use and Benefit, [...]he Mem­bers of such Corporations still remaining subject to the general Laws of the Kingdom. We see also Governments established in the Plantations which, from their separate and remote Situation, require more general and extensive Powers of Legislation within themselves than those formed within the Kingdom, but subject nevertheless, to all such Laws of the Kingdom as immediately res­pect them or are designed to extend to them, and accordingly we in this Province have, from the first Settlement of it, been left to the Exercise of our legislative and executive Powers, Parliament [Page 6] occasionally though rarely, interposing as in its Wisdom has been judged necessary.

Under this Constitution, for more than One Hundred Years, the Laws both of the supreme and subordinate Authority were in general, duly executed, Offenders against them have been brought to condign Punishment, Peace and Order have been maintained and the People of this Pro­vince have experienced as largely the Advantages of Government, as, perhaps, any People upon the Globe, and they have from Time to Time in the most public Manner expressed their Sense of it and, once in every Year, have offered up their united Thanksgivings to God for the Enjoyment of these Privileges and, as often, their united Prayers for the Continuance of them.

At Length the Constitution has been called in Question and the Authority of the Parliament of Great-Britain to make and establish Laws for the Inhabitants of this Province has been, by ma­ny, denied. What was, at first, whispered with Caution, was soon after openly asserted in Print and, of late, a Number of Inhabitants in several of the principal Towns in the Province, have as­sembled together in their respective Towns and, having assumed the Name of legal Town Meet­ings, have passed Resolves which they have or­dered to be placed upon their Town Records, and caused to be printed & published in Pamphlets and News-Papers. I am sorry that it is thus become impossible to conceal what I could wish had never been made public. I will not particularize these Resolves or Votes and shall only observe to you, [Page 7] in general, that some of them deny the supreme Authority of Parliament, and so are repugnant to the Principles of the Constitution, and that others speak of this supreme Authority, of which the King is a constituent Part and to every Act of which his Assent is necessary, in such Terms as have a direct Tendency to alienate the Affections of the People from their Sovereign who has ever been most tender of their Rights, and whose Per­son, Crown and Dignity we are under every pos­sible Obligation to defend and support. In con­sequence of these Resolves, Committees of Cor­respondence are formed, in several of those Towns, to maintain the Principles upon which they are founded.

I know of no Arguments, founded in Reason, which will be sufficient to support these Principles or to justify the Measures taken in Consequence of them. It has been urged, that the sole Power of making Laws is granted by Charter to a Le­gislature established in the Province, consisting of the King by his Representative the Governor, the Council and the House of Representatives—that by this Charter there are likewise granted or assured to the Inhabitants of the Province all the Liberties and Immunities of free and natural Sub­jects, to all Intents Constructions and Purposes whatsoever, as if they had been born within the Realm of England—that it is Part of the Liberties of English Subjects, which has its Foundation in Nature, to be governed by Laws made by their Consent in Person or by their Representative—that the Subjects in this Province are not and can­not be Represented in the Parliament of Great-Britain [Page 8] and, consequently, the Acts of Parliament cannot be binding upon them.

I do not find, Gentlemen, in the Charter such an Expression as sole Power or any Words which import it. The General Court has, by Charter, full Power to make such Laws as are not repug­nant to the Laws of England. A favourable Con­struction has been put upon this Clause when i [...] has been allowed to intend such Laws of Eng­land only as are expresly declared to respect us. Surely then this is by Charter a Reserve of Pow­er and Authority to Parliament to bind us by such Laws, at least, as are made expresly to re­fer to us and consequently, is a Limitation of the Power given to the General Court. Nor can it be contended that by the Liberties of free and natural Subjects is to be understood an Ex­emption from Acts of Parliament because not re­presented there, seeing it is provided, by the same Charter, that such Acts shall be in Force; and if they that make the Objection to such Acts will read the Charter with Attention, they must be convinced that this Grant of Liberties and Im­munities is nothing more than a Declaration and Assurance on the Part of the Crown that the Place to which their Predecessors were about to remove was and would be considered as Part of the Do­minions of the Crown of England, and therefore that the Subjects of the Crown so removing, and those born there or in their Passage thither or in their Passage from thence, would not become Aliens but would throughout all Parts of the English Dominions, wherever they might happen to be, as well as within the [Page 9] Colony, retain the Liberties and Immunities of free and natural Subjects, their Removal from or [...] being born within the Realm notwithstand­ing. If the Plantations be Part of the Domini­ons of the Crown, this Clause in the Charter does not confer or reserve any Liberties but what would have been enjoyed without it and what the Inhabitants of every other Colony do enjoy where they are without a Charter. If the Plantations are not the Dominions of the Crown will not all that are born here be considered as born out of the Ligeance of the King of England, and when­ever they go into any Part of the Dominions will they not be deemed Aliens to all Intents and Purposes, this Grant in the Charter notwith­standing?

They who claim Exemption from Acts of Par­liament by Virtue of their Rights as Englishmen, should consider that it is impossible the Rights of English Subjects should be the same, in every Re­spect, in all Parts of the Dominions. It is one of their Rights as English Subjects to be governed by Laws made by Persons in whose Election they have, from Time to Time, a Voice—They re­move from the Kingdom where, perhaps, they were in the full Exercise of this Right to the Plantations where it cannot be exercised or where the Exercise of it would be of no Benefit to them. Does it follow that the Government, by their Removal from one Part of the Dominions to another, loses it's Authority over that Part to which they remove, and that they are freed from the Subjection they were under before; or do they expect that Government should relinquish [Page 10] its Authority because they cannot enjoy this par­ticular Right? Will it not rather be said that, by this their voluntary Removal, they have re­linquished for a Time at least, one of the Rights of an English Subject which they might if they pleased have continued to enjoy and may again enjoy whensoever they will return to the Place where it can be exercised?

They who claim Exemption, as Part of their Rights by Nature, should consider that every Restraint which Men are laid under by a State of Government is a Privation of Part of their natural Rights, and of all the different Forms of Government which exist, there can be no two of them in which the Departure from Natural Rights is exactly the same. Even in Case of Representation by Election, do they not give up Part of their natural Rights when they consent to be represented by such Person as shall be cho­sen by the Majority of the Electors, although their own Voices may be for some other Person? And is it not contrary to their natural Rights to be obliged to submit to a Representative for se­ven Years, or even one Year, after they are dis­satisfied with his Conduct, although they gave their Voices for him when he was elected? This must therefore be considered as an Objection against a State of Government rather than against any particular Form.

If what I have said shall not be sufficient to satisfy such as object to the Supreme Authority of Parliament over the Plantations, there may something further be added to induce them to an [Page 11] Acknowledgment of it which I think will well deserve their Consideration. I know of no Line that can be drawn between the supreme Autho­rity of Parliament and the total Independence of the Colonies: It is impossible there should be two independent Legislatures in one and the same State, for although there may be but one Head, the King, yet the two Legislative Bodies will make two Governments as distinct as the King­doms of England and Scotland before the Union. If we might be suffered to be altogether inde­pendent of Great-Bri [...]in, could we have any Claim to the Protection of that Government of which we are no longer a Part? Without this Protection should we not become the Prey of one or the other Powers of Europe, such as should first seize upon us? Is there any Thing which we have more Reason to dread than Independence? I hope it will never be our Misfortune to know by Experience the Difference between the Liber­ties of an English Colonist and those of the Spa­nish, French or Dutch.

If then the Supremacy of Parliament over the whole British Dominions shall no longer be de­nied, it will follow that the meer Exercise of its Authority can be no Matter of Grievance. If it has been or shall be exercised in such Way and Manner as shall appear to be grievous, still this cannot be sufficient Grounds for immediately denying or renouncing the Authority or refusing to submit to it. The Acts and Doings of Autho­rity in the most perfect Form of Government will not always be thought just and equitable by all the Parts of which it consists, but it is the greatest [Page 12] Absurdity to admit the several Parts to be at Li­berty to obey or disobey according as the Acts of such Authority may be approved or disapproved of by them, for this necessarily works a Dissolu­tion of the Government. The Manner then of obtaining Redress must be by Representations and Endeavours, in such Ways and Forms as the es­tablished Rules of the Constitution prescribe or allow in order to make any Matters alledged to be Grievances appear to be really such; but I conceive it is rather the meer Exercise of this Au­thority which is complained of as a Grievance, than any heavy Burdens which have been bro't upon the People by Means of it.

As Contentment and Order were the happy Effects of a Constitution strengthened by univer­sal Assent and Approbation, so Discontent and Dis­order are now the deplorable Effects of a Con­stitution enfeebled by Contest and Opposition. Besides Divisions and Animositics which dis­turb the Peace of Towns and Families, the Law in some important Cases cannot have its Course,—Offenders ordered by Advice of His Majesty's Council to be prosecuted, escape with Impunity and are supported and encouraged to go on of­fending,—the Authority of Government is bro't into Contempt, and there are but small Remains of that Subordination which was once very con­spicuous in this Colony, and which is essential to a well-regulated State.

When the Bands of Government are thus weak­ened, it certainly behoves those with whom the Powers of Government are intrusted to omit no­thing which may tend to strengthen them.

[Page 13] I have disclosed my Sentiments to you without Reserve. Let me intreat you to consider them calmly and not to be too sudden in your Deter­mination. If my Principles of Government are right let us adhere to them. With the same Prin­ciples our Ancestors were easy and happy for a long Course of Years together, and I know of no Reason to doubt of your being equally easy & hap­py. The People, influenced by you will forsake their unconstitutional Principles and desist from their Irregularities which are the Consequence of them, they will be convinced that every Thing which is valuable to them depend upon their Con­nexion with their Parent State, that this Connex­ion cannot be continued in any other Way than such as will also continue their Dependance upon the supreme Authority of the British Dominions, and that, notwithstanding this Dependance, they will enjoy as great a Proportion of those Rights to which they have a Claim by Nature or as Eng­lishmen as can be enjoyed by a Plantation or Co­lony.

If I am wrong in my Principles of Govern­ment or in the Inferences which I have drawn from them, I wish to be convinced of my Error. Independence I may not allow myself to think that you can possibly have in Contemplation. If you can conceive of any other constitutional De­pendance than what I have mentioned, if you are of Opinion that upon any other Principles our Connexion with the State from which we sprang can be continued, communicate your Sentiments to me with the same Freedom and Unreserved­ness as I have communicated mine to you.

[Page 14] I have no Desire, Gentlemen, by any Thing I have said to preclude you from seeking Relief, in a constitutional Way, in any Cases in which you have heretofore or may hereafter suppose that you are aggrieved and, although I should not concur with you in Sentiment, I will, notwith­standing, do nothing to lessen the Weight which your Representations may deserve. I have laid before you what I think are the Principles of your Constitution: If you do not agree with me I wish to know your Objections: They may be convincing to me, or I may be able to satisfy you of the Insufficiency of them: In either Case I hope, we shall put an End to those Irregularities, which ever will be the Portion of a Government where the Supreme Authority is controverted, and introduce that Tranquility which seems to have taken Place in most of the Colonies upon the Continent.

The ordinary Business of the Session I will not now particularly point out to you. To the enacting of any new Laws which may be neces­sary for the more equal and effectual Distribution of Justice, or for giving further Encouragement to our Merchandize, Fishery, and Agriculture, which through the Divine Favour are already in a very flourishing State, or for promoting any Mea­sures which may conduce to the general Good of the Province I will readily give my Assent or Concurrence.

THE Board have considered your Excellen­cy's Speech to both Houses with the At­tention due to the Subject of it; and we hope with the Candour you are pleased to recommend to them.

We thank you for the Promise, that "if we shall not agree with you in Sentiments, you will with Candour likewise, receive and consider what we may offer in Answer."

Your Speech informs the two Houses that this Government is at present in a disturbed and dis­ordered State; that the Cause of this Disorder is the unconstitutional Principles adopted by the People in questioning the Supreme Authority of Parliament; and that the proper Measure for removing the Disorder must be the substituting contrary Principles.

Our Opinion on these Heads, as well as on some others proper to be noticed, will be obvious in the Course of the following Observations.

[Page 16] With regard to the present disordered State of the Government, it can have no Reference to Tumults or Riots: from which this Govern­ment is as free as any other whatever. If your Excellency meant only that the Province is dis­contented, and in a State of Uneasiness, we should intirely agree with you; but you will permit us to say we are not so well agreed in the Cause of it. The Uneasiness, which was a general one through­out the Colonies, began when you inform us the Authority of Parliament was first called in Ques­tion, viz. about seven or eight Years ago. Your mentioning that particular Time might have sug­gested to your Excellency the true Cause of the Origin and Continuance of that Uneasiness.

At that Time the Stamp-Act, then lately made, began to operate: Which with some pr [...]ceeding and succeeding Acts of Parliament, subjecting the Colonies to Taxes without their Consent, was the original Cause of all the Uneasiness that has hap­pened since; and has occasioned also an Enquiry into the Nature and Extent of the Authority by which they were made. The late Town-Meet­ings in several Towns are Instances of both. These are mentioned by your Excellency in Proof of a disordered State: But tho' we do not approve some of their Resolves, we think they had a clear Right to instruct their Representatives on any Sub­ject they apprehended to be of sufficient Impor­tance to require it: which necessarily implies a previous Consideration of, and Expression of their Minds on, that Subject: however mistaken they may be concerning it.

[Page 17] When a Community, great or small, think their Rights and Privileges infringed, they will express their Uneasiness in a Variety of Ways: some of which may be highly improper, and criminal. So far as any of an a [...]trocious Nature have taken Place, we would express our Abhorrence of them: and as we have always done hitherto, we shall continue to do, every Thing in our Power to dis­courage and suppress them. But it is in vain to hope that this can be done effectually so long as the Cause of the Uneasiness, which occasioned them, exists.

Your Excellency will perceive that the Cause you assign is by us supposed to be an Effect deri­ved from the original Cause abovementioned: the Removal of which will remove its Effects.

To obtain this Removal, we agree with you in the Method pointed out in your Speech, where you say, "the Manner of obtaining Redress must be by Representations and Endeavours in such Ways and Forms as the Constitution allows, in order to make any Matters alledged to be Grie­vances appear to be really such." This Method has been pursued repeatedly. Petitions to Par­liament have gone from the Colonies, and from this Colony in particular; but without Success. Some of them, in a former Ministry, were previ­ously shewn to the Minister, who (as we have been informed) advised the Agents to postpone presenting them to the House of Commons 'till the first reading of the Bill they refer'd to: when being presented, a Rule of the House against receiving Petitions on Money Bills was urged for [Page 18] the rejecting of them, and they were rejected ac­cordingly: And other Petitions for want of For­mality, or whatever was the Reason, have had the same Fate. This we mention, not by Way of Censure on that honourable House, but in some Measure to account for the Conduct of those Persons, who despairing of Redress in a constitu­tional Way, have denied the just Authority of Parliament: concerning which we shall now give our own Sentiments, intermixt with Observations on those of your Excellency.

You are pleased to observe, that "when our Predecessors first took Possession of this Colony, under a Grant and Charter from the Crown of England, it was their Sense, and it was the Sense of the Kingdom, that they were to remain Subject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament." And to prove that Subjection the greater Part of your Speech is employed.

In order to a right Conception of this Matter, it is necessary to guard against any improper Idea of the term Supreme Authority. In your Idea of it your Excellency seems to include unlimited Authority: for you are pleased to say, you "know of no Line that can be drawn between the Supreme Authority of Parliament and the total Independence of the Colonies:" But if no such Line can be drawn a Denial of that Authority in any Instance whatever implies and amounts to a Declaration of total Independence. But if Su­preme Authority includes unlimited Authority, the Subjects of it are emphatically Slaves: and equally so whether residing in the Colonies or [Page 19] Great-Britain. And indeed in this Respect all the Nations on Earth, among whom Govern­ment exists in any of its Forms, would be alike conditioned: excepting so far as the mere Grace and Favor of their Governors might make a Dif­ference; "for from the Nature of Government there must be, as your Excellency has observed, one Supreme Authority over the whole."

We cannot think, "that when our Predecessors first took Possession of this Colony it was their Sense, or the Sense of the Kingdom, that they were to remain Subject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament" if this Idea of it. Nor can we find that this appears from the Charter; or that such Authority has ever been exercised by Parlia­ment, submitted to by the Colony, or acknow­ledged by the Legislature.

Supreme or unlimited Authority can with Fit­ness belong only to the Sovereign of the Universe: And that Fitness is derived from the Perfection of his Nature.—To such Authority, directed by infi­nite Wisdom & infinite Goodness, is due both active and passive Obedience: Which, as it constitutes the Happiness of rational Creatures, should with Chearfulness and from Choice be unlimitedly paid by them.—But with Truth this can be said of no other Authority whatever. If then from the Na­ture and End of Government, the supreme Au­thority of every Government is limited, the Su­preme Authority of Parliament must be limited; and the Enquiry will be what are the Limits of that Authority with Regard to this Colony?—To fix them with Precision, to determine the exact [Page 20] Lines of Right and Wrong in this Case, as in some others, is difficult; and we have not the Presump­tion to attempt it. But we humbly hope, that as we are personally and relatively, in our private and public Capacities, for ourselves, for the whole Province, and for all Posterity, so deeply inte­rested in this important Subject, it will not be deemed Arrogance to give some general Senti­ments upon it, especially as your Excellency's Speech has made it absolutely necessary.

For this Purpose we shall recur to those Re­cords that contain the main Principles on which the English Constitution is founded; and from them make such Extracts as are pertinent to the Subject.

Magna Charta declares, "that no Aid shall be imposed in the Kingdom, unless by the Com­mon Council of the Kingdom, except to redeem the King's Person, &c". And that "all Cities, Boroughs, Towns and Ports shall have their Li­berties and free Customs; and shall have the Common Council of the Kingdom concerning the Assessment of their Aids, except in the Cases aforesaid."

The Statute of the 34th of Edward I, de tal­lagio non concedendo, declares, "that no T [...]l­lage or Aid should be laid or levied by the King or his Heirs in the Realm, without the Good Will and Assent of the Arch Bishops, Bishops, Earls Barons, Knights, Burgesses, and other the Free­men of the Commonalty of this Realm."

[Page 21] A Statute of the 25 Ed. 3, enacts "that from thenceforth no Person shall be compelled to make any Loans, to the King against his Will, because such Loans were against Reason and the Franchise of the Land."

The Petition of Rights in the 3d of Charles 1st, in which are cited the two foregoing Statutes, declares that by those "Statutes, and other good Laws and Statutes of the Realm, his Majesty's Subjects inherited this Freedom, that they should not be compelled to contribute to any Tax, Tallage, Aid, or other like Charge, not sett by common Consent of Parliament." And the Statute of the I. of William 3d, for declaring the Rights and Liberties of the Subject and setling the Succession of the Crown declares, "That the levying of Money for or to the Use of the Crown, by Pretence of Prerogative without Grant of Par­liament, for longer Time, or in any other Manner than the same is or shall be granted, is illegal."

From these Authorities it appears an essential Part of the English Constitution, that no Tallage or Aid or Tax shall be laid or levied "without the Good Will and Assent of the Freemen of the Commonalty of the Realm." If this could be done without their Assent, their Property would be in the highest Degree precarious: or rather they could not with Fitness be said to have any Property at all. At best they would be only the Holders of it for the Use of the Crown; and the Crown be in Fact the real Proprietor. This would be Vassallage in the extreme; from which the generous Nature of Englishmen has been so [Page 22] abhorrent, that they have bled with Freedom in the Defence of this Part of their Constitution, which has preserved them from it: and influen­ced by the same Generosity, they can never view with Disapprobation any lawful Measures taken by us for the Defence of our Constitution, which intitles us to the same Rights and Privileges with themselves.

These were derived to us from Common Law, which is the Inheritance of all his Majesty's Sub­jects; have been recognized by Acts of Parlia­ment; and confirmed by the Province Charter, which established its Constitution; and which Charter has been recognized by Act of Parliament also. This Act was made in the second Year of his late Majesty GEO. II, for the better Preserva­tion of his Majesty's Woods in America: in which is recited the Clause of the said Charter reserving for the Use of the Royal Navy all Trees suita­ble for Masts: and on this Charter is grounded the succeeding enacting Clause of the Act. And thus is the Charter implicitly confirmed by Act of Parliament.

From all which it appears, that the Inhabitants of this Colony are clearly intitled to All the Rights and Privileges of free and natural Sub­jects: which certainly must include that most es­sential one, that no Aid or Taxes be levied on them without their own Consent, signified by their Representatives. But from the Clause in the Charter relative to the Power granted to the Ge­neral Court to make Laws, not repugnant to the Laws of England, your Excellency draws this [Page 23] Inference, that "surely this is by Charter a Re­serve of Power and Authority to Parliament to bind us by such Laws, at least, as are made ex­pressly to refer to us, and consequently is a Li­mitation of the Power given to the General Court."—If it be allowed that by that, Clause there was a Reserve of Power to Parliament to bind the Province, it was only by such Laws as were in Being at the Time the Charter was grant­ed: for by the Charter there is nothing appears to make it refer to any Parliamentary Laws, that should be afterwards made, and therefore it will not support your Excellency's Inference.

The Grant of Power to the General Court to make Laws runs thus,—"full Power and Autho­rity, from Time to Time, to make, ordain and establish all Manner of wholesome and reasonable Orders, Laws, Statutes and Ordinances, Direc­tions and Instructions, either with Penalties or without (so as the fame be not repugnant or con­trary to the Laws of this our Realm of England) as they shall judge to be for the Good and Wel­fare of our said Province." &c.—We humbly think an Inference very different from your Ex­cellency's, and a very just one too, may be drawn from this Clause, if Attention be given to the De­scription of the Orders and Laws that were to be made.—They were to be wholesome, reasonable and for the Good and Welfare of the Province, and in order that they might be so, it is provid­ed that they be "not repugnant or contrary to the Laws of the Realm," that were then in be­ing: by which Proviso, all the Liberties and Im­munities of free and natural Subjects within the [Page 24] Realm were more effectually secured to the Inha­bitants of the Province agreeable to another Clause in the Charter, whereby those Liberties and Im­munities are expressly granted to them: and ac­cordingly the Power of the General Court is so far limited, that they shall not make Orders and Laws to take away or diminish those Liberties and Immunities.

This Construction appears to us a just one, and perhaps may appear so to your Excellency if you will please to consider, that by another Part of the Charter effectual Care was taken for prevent­ing the General Assembly passing of Orders and Laws repugnant to, or that in any Way might mi­litate with Acts of Parliament then or since made; or that might-be exceptionable in any other Res­pect whatever: for the Charter reserves to his Majesty the Appointment of the Governor, whose Assent is necessary in the passing of all Orders and Laws: after which they are to be sent to Eng­land for the Royal Approbation or Disallowance: by which double Controul effectual Care is taken to prevent the Establishment of any improper Or­ders or Laws whatever.—Besides, your Excel­lency is sensible that "Letters Patent must be construed one Part with another, and all the Parts of them together, so as to make the whole har­monize and agree. But your Excellency's Con­struction of the Paragraph impowering the Gene­ral Court to make Orders and Laws, does by no means harmonize and agree with the Paragraph granting Liberties and Immunities; and therefore we humbly conceive is not to be admitted: Whereas on the other Construction there is a per­fect [Page 25] Harmony and Agreement between them. But supposing your Excellency's Inference just, that by the said former Paragraph (considered by itself) are reserved to Parliament Power and Au­thority to bind us by Laws made expressly to re­fer to us. Does it consist with Justice and Equity that it should be considered apart, and urged a­gainst the People of this Province with all its Force and without Limitation, and at the same Time the other Paragraph which they thought secured to them the essential Rights and Privile­ges of free and natural Subjects be rendered of no Validity? If the former Paragraph (in this sup­posed case) be binding on this People, the latter must be binding on the Crown, which thereby became Guarantee of those Rights and Privile­ges. Or it must be supposed that one Party is held by a Compact, and the other not: Which Supposition is against Reason and against Law; and therefore destroys the Foundation of the Infer­ence. However, supposing it well founded, it would not from thence follow, that the Charter intended such Laws as should subject the Inhabi­tants of the Province to Taxes without their Consent: For (as appears above) it grants to them all the Rights and Liberties of free and natural Subjects: Of which one of the most essential is a Freedom from all Taxes not consented to by themselves.—Nor could the Parties, either Grantor or Grantees, intend such Laws. The Royal Grantor could not, because his Grant con­tradicts such Intention; and because it is incon­sistent with every Idea of Royalty and royal Wis­dom, to grant what it does not intend to grant. And it will be readily allowed that the Grantees [Page 26] could not intend such Laws, not only on account of their Inconsistency with the Grant, but because their Acceptance of a Charter, subjecting them to such Laws, would be voluntary Slavery.

Your Excellenny next observes, "that it can­not be contended that by the Liberties of free and natural Subjects is to be understood an Exemption from Acts of Parliament, because not represented there, seeing it is provided by the same Charter, that such Acts shall be in Force."—If the Ob­servations we have made above, and our Reasoning on them be Just, it will appear that no such Pro­vision is made in the Charter, and therefore that the Deductions and Inferences derived from the Supposition of such Provision, are not well found­ed. And with Respect to Representation in Par­liament, as it is one of the essential Liberties of free and natural Subjects, and properly makes those who enjoy it liable to Parliamentary Acts, so in Reference to the Inhabitants of this Province, who are intitled to all the Liberties of such Sub­jects, the Impossibility of their being duely re­presented in Parliament, does clearly exempt them from all such Acts at least, as have been or shall be made by Parliament to Tax them: Represen­tation and Taxation being in our Opinion consti­tutionally inseperable.

"This Grant of Liberties and Immunities, your Excellency informs us, is nothing more than a Declaration and Assurance on the Part of the Crown, that the Place to which our Predecessors were about to remove, was and would be consi­dered as Part of the Dominions of the Crown, [Page 27] and therefore that the Subjects so removing would not become Aliens, but would, both without and within the Colony retain the Liberties and Im­munities of free and natural Subjects."

The Dominion of the Crown over this Coun­try before the Arrival of our Predecessors was meerly ideal. Their Removal hither realized that Dominion, and has made the Country valu­able both to the Crown and Nation, without any Cost to either of them from that Time to this. Even in the most distressed State of our Prede­cessors, when they expected to be destroyed by a general Conspiracy and Incursion of the Indian Natives, they had no Assistance from them. This Grant then of Liberties, which is the only Con­sideration they received from the Crown for so valuable an Acquisition to it, instead of being vio­lated by military Power, or explained away by nice Inferences and Distinctions, ought in Justice, and with a generous Openness and Freedom, to be acknowledged by every Minister of the Crown, and preserved sacred from every Species of Vio­lation.

"If the Plantation be Part of the Dominions of the Crown this Clause in the Charter (grant­ing Liberties and Immunities) does not, your Ex­cellency observes, confer or reserve any Liberties but what would have been enjoyed without it; and what the Inhabitants of every other Colony do enjoy, where they are without a Charter."—Although the Colonies considered as Part of the Dominions of the Crown are intitled to equal Liberties, the Inhabitants of this Colony think it [Page 28] a Happiness, that those Liberties are confirmed and secured to them by a Charter; whereby the Honour and Faith of the Crown are pledged, that those Liberties shall not be violated. And for Protection in them we humbly look up to his present Majesty, our rightful and lawful Sovereign, as Children to a Father, able and disposed to assist and relieve them; humbly imploring his Majesty, that his Subjects of this Province, ever faithful and loyal, and ever accounted such till [...]he Stamp-Act existed, and who in the late War, and upon all other Occasions, have demonstrated that Faith­fulness and Loyalty by their vigorous and unex­ampled Exertions in his Service, may have their Grievances redressed, and be restored to their just Rights.

Your Excellency next observes "that it is im­possible the Rights of English Subjects should be the same in every Respect, in all Parts of the Dominions," and Instances in the Right of being "governed by Laws made by Persons, in whose Election they have a Voice." When "they re­move from the Kingdom to the Plantations where it cannot be enjoyed," you ask, "will it not be said, that by this their voluntary Removal, they have relinquished, for a Time at least, one of the Rights of an English Subject, which they might if they pleased, have continued to enjoy, and may again enjoy whensoever they will return to the Place where it can be exercised."

When English Subjects remove from the King­dom to the Plantations with their Properties, they not only relinquish that Right de facto, but it [Page 29] ought to cease in the Kingdom de jure. But it does not from thence follow, that they relinquish that Right, in Reference to the Plantation or Colony to which they remove. On the contrary, being become Inhabitants of that Colony, and qualified according to the Laws of it, they can exercise that Right equally with the other Inha­bitants of it. And this Right, on like Conditi­ons, will travel with them through all the Colo­nies, wherein a Legislature, similar to that of the Kingdom, is established. And therefore in this Respect, and we suppose in all other essential Respects, it is not impossible the Rights of English Subjects should be the same in all Parts of the Dominions" under a like Form of Legislature.

This Right of Representation is so essential and indispensible in Regard of all Laws for levy­ing Taxes, that a People under any Form of Go­vernment destitute of it, is destitute of Freedom—of that Degree of Freedom, for the Preserva­tion of which, Government was instituted; and without which, Government degenerates to Des­potism. It cannot therefore be given up, or taken away, without making a Breach on the essential Rights of Nature.

But your Excellency is pleased to say▪ that they "who claim Exemption as Part of their Rights by Nature, should consider that every Restraint which Men are laid under by a State of Govern­ment, is a Privation of Part of their natural Rights. Even in Case of Representation by Election, do they not give up Part of their natural Rights, when they consent to be represented by such [Page 30] Persons as shall be chosen by the Majority of the Electors, although their own Voices may be for some other Person? And is it not contrary to their natural Rights to be obliged to submit to a Representative for seven Years, or even one Year, [...]fter they are dissatisfied with his Conduct, al­though they gave their Voices for him, when he was elected? This must therefore be considered as an Objection against a State of Government rather than against any particular Form."

Your Excellency's Premisses are true, but we do not think your Conclusion follows from them. It is true, that every Restraint of Government is a Privation of natural Right: and the two Cases you have been pleased to mention, may be In­stances of that Privation. But as they aris [...] from the Nature of Society and Government; and as Government is necessary to secure other natural Rights infinitely more valuable, they cannot therefore be considered as an Objection either "against a State of Government" or "against any particular Form of it."

Life, Liberty, Property, and the Disposal of that Property with our own Consent, are natural Rights. Will any one put the other in Compe­tition with these, or infer that because those other must be given up in a State of Government, these must be given up also? The Preservation of these Rights is the great End of Government: but is it probable they will be effectually secured by a Governor, which the Proprietors of them have no Part in the Direction of, and over which they have no Power or Influence whatever? [Page 31] Hence is deducible, Representation: which being necessary to preserve these invaluable Rights of Nature, is itself, for that Reason, a natural Right, coinciding with, and running into, that great Law of Nature, Self-Preservation.

Thus have we considered the most material Parts of your Speech, and agreeable to your De­sire disclosed to you our Sentiments on the Sub­ject of it.

"Independence, as your Excellency rightly judged, we have not in Contemplation." We cannot however adopt "your Principles of Go­vernment," or acqu [...]esce in all the Inferences you have drawn from them.

We have the highest Respect for that august Body the Parliament, and do not presume to prescribe the exact Limits of its Authority, yet with the Deference that is due to it, we are humbly of Opinion, that as all human Authority in the Nature of it, is and ought to be limited, it cannot constitutionally extend, for the Reasons we have above suggested, to the levying of Taxes in any Form, on his Majesty's Subjects of this Province.

In such Principles as these "our Predecessors were easy and happy:" and in the due Operation of such, their Descendants [...]e present Inhabi­tants of this Province have been easy and happy: but they are not so now. Their Uneasiness and Unhappiness are derived from Acts of Parliament, and Regulations of Government, that lately and [Page 32] within a few Years past have been made. And this Uneasiness and Unhappiness, both in the Cause and Effects of them, though your Excellency seems and can only seem, to be of a different Opinion, have extended and continue to extend to all the Colonies throughout the Continent.

It would give us the highest Satisfaction to see Happiness and Tranquility restored to the Colonies; and especially to see between Great-Britain and them an Union established on such an equitable Basis as neither of them shall ever wish to destroy. We humbly supplicate the So­vereign Arbiter and Superintendent of human Affairs for these happy Events.

YOUR Excellency's Speech to the General Assembly at the Opening of this Session, has been read with great Attention in this House.

We fully agree with your Excellency, that our own Happiness as well as his Majesty's Service, very much depends upon Peace and Order; and we shall at all Times take such Measures as are consistent with our Constitution and the Rights of the People to promote and maintain them. That the Government at present is in a very disturbed State is apparent! But we cannot ascribe it to the People's having adopted unconstitutional Princi­ples, which seems to be the Cause assigned for it by your Excellency. It appears to us to have been occasioned rather, by the British House of Commons assuming and exercising a Power incon­sistent with the Freedom of the Constitution, to give and grant the Property of the Colonists, and appropriate the same without their Consent.

It is needless for us to enquire what were the Principles that induced the Councils of the Nation to so new and unprecedented a Measure. But when the Parliament by an Act of their own ex­presly [Page 34] declared, that the King, Lords and Com­mons of the Nation "have, ever had, and of Right ought to have full Power and Authority to make Laws and Statutes of sufficient Force and Validity to bind the Colonies and People of America, Sub­jects of the Crown of Great-Britain, in all Cases whatever," and in Consequence hereof another Revenue Act was made, the Minds of the People were filled with Anxiety, and they were justly alarmed with Apprehensions of the total Extinc­tion of their Liberties.

The Result of the free Enquiries of many Persons into the Right of the Parliament to ex­ercise such a Power over the Colonies, seems in your Excellency's Opinion, to be the Cause of what you are pleased to call the present "dis­turbed State of the Government;" upon which you "may not any longer consistent with your Duty to the King, and your Regard to the Interest of the Province, delay communicating your Sen­timents." But that the Principles adopted in Con­sequence hereof, are unconstitutional, is a Subject of Enquiry. We know of no such Disorders arising therefrom as are mentioned by your Ex­cellency. If Grand Jurors have not on their Oaths found such Offences, as your Excellency with the Advice of his Majesty's Council have ordered to be prosecuted, it is to be presumed they have followed the Dictates of good Consci­ence. They are the constitutional Judges of these Matters; and it is not to be supposed, that moved from corrupt Principles, they have suffered Offenders to escape a Prosecution, and thus sup­ported and encouraged them to go on offending. [Page 35] If any Part of Authority, shall in an unconsti­tutional Manner, interpose in any Matter, it will be no wonder if it be brought into Contempt; to the lessening or confounding of that Subordi­nation which is necessary to a well regulated State. Your Excellency's Representation that the Bands of Government are weakened, we humbly conceive to be without good Grounds; though we must own the heavy Burthens uncon­stitutionally brought upon the People have been and still are universally and very justly com­plained of as a Grievance.

You are pleased to say, that "when our Prede­cessors first took Possession of this Plantation or Colony, under a Grant and Charter from the Crown of England, it was their Sense, and it was the Sense of the Kingdom, that they were to re­main subject to the Supreme Authority of Par­liament;" whereby we understand your Excel­lency to mean in the Sense of the Declaratory Act of Parliament aforementioned, in all Cases whatever. And indeed it is difficult, if possible, to draw a Line of Distinction between the uni­versal Authority of Parliament over the Colonies, and no Authority at all. It is therefore necessa­ry for us to enquire how it appears, for your Ex­cellency has not shown it to us, that when or at the Time that our Predecessors took Possession of this Plantation or Colony, under a Grant and Charter from the Crown of England, it was their Sense, and the Sense of the Kingdom, that they were to remain subject to the Supreme Authority of Par­liament. In making this Enquiry, we shall, ac­cording to your Excellency's Recommendation, [Page 36] treat the Subject with Calmness and Candor, and also with a due Regard to Truth.

Previous to a direct Consideration of the Char­ter granted to this Province or Colony, and the better to elucidate the true Sense and Meaning of it, we would take a View of the State of the En­glish North American Continent at the Time when and after Possession was first taken of any Part of it, by the Europeans. It was then pos­sessed by Heathen and Barbarous People, who had nevertheless all that Right to the Soil and Sovereignty in and over the Lands they possessed, which God had originally given to Man. Whe­ther their being Heathen, inferred any Right or Authority to Christian Princes, a Right which had long been assumed by the Pope, to dispose of their Lands to others, we will leave to your Ex­cellency or any one of Understanding and impar­tial Judgment to consider. It is certain they had in no other Sense forfeited them to any Power in Europe. Should the Doctrine be admitted that Discovery of Lands owned and possessed by Pagan People, gives to any Christian Prince a Right and Title to the Dominion and Property, still it is vested in the Crown alone. It was an Acquisi­tion of Foreign Territory, not annexed to the Realm of England, and therefore at the absolute Disposal of the Crown. For we take it to be a settled Point, that the King has a constitutional Prerogative to dispose of and alienate any Part of his Territories not annexed to the Realm. In the Exercise of this Prerogative, Queen Elizabeth granted the first American Charter; and claiming a Right by Virtue of Discovery, then supposed [Page 37] to be valid, to the Lands which are now possessed by the Colony of Virginia, she conveyed to Sir Walter Rawleigh, the Property, Dominion and Sovereignty thereof, to be held of the Crown by Homage, and a certain Render, without any Reservation to herself of any Share in the Legi­slative and Executive Authority. After the At­tainder of Sir Walter, King James the First cre­ated two Virginia Companies, to be governed each by Laws transmitted to them by his Majesty, and not by the Parliament, with Power to establish and cause to be made a Coin to pass current a­mong them; and vested with all Liberties, Fran­chises and Immunities within any of his other Dominions, to all Intents and Purposes, as if they had been abiding, and born within the Realm. A Declaration similar to this is contained in the first Charter of this Colony, and in those of other American Colonies; which shows that the Colonies were not intended or considered to be within the Realm of England, though within the Allegiance of the English Crown. After this, another Charter was granted by the same King James, to the Treasurer and Company of Vir­ginia, vesting them with full Power and Authority, to make, ordain and establish all Manner of Or­ders, Laws, Directions, Instructions, Forms and Ceremonies of Government and Magistracy, fit and necessary, and the same to abrogate, &c. without any Reservation for securing their Subjection to the Parliament and future Laws of England. A third Charter was afterwards granted by the same King to the Treasurer and Company of Virginia, vesting them with Power and Authority to make Laws, with an Addition of this Clause, "so al­ways [Page 38] that the same be not contrary to the Laws and Statutes of this our Realm of England." The same Clause was afterwards copied into the Charter of this and other Colonies, with certain Variations, such as that these Laws should be "consonant to Reason," "not repugnant to the Laws of England," "as nearly as conveniently may be to the Laws, Statutes and Rights of Eng­land." &c. These Modes of Expression convey the same Meaning, and serve to show an Intention that the Laws of the Colonies should be as much as possible, conformant in the Spirit of them to the Principles and fundamental Laws of the Eng­lish Constitution▪ its Rights and Statutes then in Being; and by no Means to bind the Colonies to a Subjection to the Supreme Authority of the English Parliament. And that this is the true Intention, we think it further evident from this Consideration, that no Acts of any Colony Legi­slative, are ever brought into Parliament for In­spection there, though the Laws made in some of them, like the Acts of the British Parliament are laid before the King for his Assent or Disallow­ance.

We have brought the first American Charters into View, and the State of the Country when they were granted, to show that the Right of dis­posing of the Lands was in the Opinion of those Times vested solely in the Crown—that the seve­ral Charters conveyed to the Grantees, who should settle upon the Territories therein granted, all the Powers necessary to constitute them free and distinct States—and that the fundamental Laws of the English Constitution should be the certain [Page 39] and established Rule of Legislation, to which the Laws to be made in the several Colonies were to be as nearly as conveniently might be, conforma­ble or similar; which was the true Intent and Im­port of the Words, "not repugnant to the Laws of England," "consonant to Reason," and other variant Expressions in the different Charters. And we would add, that the King in some of the Charters reserves the Right to judge of the Con­sonance and Similarity of their Laws with the English Constitution to himself, and not to the Parliament; and in Consequence thereof to affirm, or within a limited Time, disallow them.

These Charters, as well as that afterwards granted to Lord Baltimore, and other Charters, are repugnant to the Idea of Parliamentary Au­thority: And to suppose a Parliamentary Autho­rity over the Colonies under such Charters, would necessarily induce that Solecism in Politics Impe­rium in Imperio. And the King's repeatedly ex­ercising the Prerogative of disposing of the Ame­rican Territory by such Charters, together with the Silence of the Nation thereupon, is an Evi­dence that it was an acknowledged Prerogative.

But further to show the Sense of the English Crown and Nation that the American Colonists and our Predecessors in particular, when they first took Possession of this Country by a Grant and Charter from the Crown, did not remain subject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament, we beg Leave to observe; that when a Bill was offered by the two Houses of Parliament to King Charles the First, granting to the Subjects of England the [Page 40] free Liberty of Fishing on the Coast of America, he refused his Royal Assent, declaring as a Rea­son, that "the Colonies were without the Realm and Jurisdiction of Parliament."

In like Manner, his Predecessor James the First, had before declared upon a similar Occasion, that America was not annexed to the Realm, and it was not fitting that Parliament should make Laws for those Countries." This Reason was, not secret­ly, but openly declared in Parliament. If then the Colonies were not annexed to the Realm, at the Time when their Charters were granted, they never could be afterwards, without their own special Consent, which has never since been had, or even asked. If they are not now annexed to the Realm, they are not a Part of the Kingdom, and consequently not subject to the Legislative Authority of the Kingdom. For no Country, by the Common Law was subject to the Laws or to the Parliament, but the Realm of England.

We would if your Excellency pleases, subjoin an Instance of Conduct in King Charles the Se­cond, singular indeed, but important to our Pur­pose; who, in 1679, framed an Act for a perma­nent Revenue for the Support of Virginia, and sent it there by Lord Colpepper, the Governor of that Colony; which was afterwards passed into a Law, and "Enacted by the King's most excellent Majesty, by and with the Consent of the General Assembly of Virginia." If the King had judged that Colony to be a Part of the Realm, he would not, nor could he consistently with Magna Char­ta, have placed himself at the Head of, and joined [Page 41] with any Legislative Body in making a Law to Tax the People there, other than the Lords and Commons of England.

Having taken a View of the several Charters of the first Colony in America, if we look into the old Charter of this Colony, we shall find it to be grounded on the same Principle: That the Right of disposing the Territory granted therein was vested in the Crown, as being that Christian Sovereign who first discovered it, when in the Possession of Heathen; and that it was considered as being not within the Realm, but only within the Fee and Seignory of the King. As therefore it was without the Realm of England, must not the King, if he had designed [...]hat the Parliament should have had any Authority over it, have made a special Reservation for that Purpose? which was not done.

Your Excellency says, it appears from the Charter itself, to have been the Sense of our Predecessors who first took Possession of this Plan­tation or Colony, that they were to remain sub­ject to the Authority of Parliament. You have not been pleased to point out to us how this ap­pears from the Charter, unless it be in the Obser­vation you make on the above-mentioned Clause, viz. "That a favourable Construction has been put upon this Clause, when it has been allowed to intend such Laws of England only as are expresly made to respect us," which you say "is by Charter a Reserve of Power and Authority to Par­liament to bind us by such Laws at least as are made expresly to refer to us, and consequently is [Page 42] a Limitation of the Power given to the General Court." But we would still recur to the Char­ter itself, and ask your Excellency, How this ap­pears from thence to have been the Sense of our Predecessors? Is any Reservation of Power and Authority to Parliament thus to bind us, express­ed or implied in the Charter? It is evident, that King Charles the first, the very Prince who granted it, as well as his Predecessor, had no such Idea of the supreme Authority of Parliament over the Colony▪ from their Declarations before recited. Your Excellency will then allow us further to ask, by what Authority in Reason or Equity the Parliament can enforce a Construction so unfa­vourable to us. Quod ab initi [...] injustum est, nul­lum potest habere juris effectum, said Gr [...]tius. Which with Submission to your Excellency may be rendered thus, Whatever is originally in its Nature wrong, can never be satisfied or made right by Reputation and Use.

In solemn Agreements subsequent Restrictions ought never to be allowed. The celebrated Au­thor whom your Excellency has quoted, tells us that "neither the one or the other of the inter­ested or contracting Powers hath a right to inter­pret at Pleasure." This we mention to show, even upon a Supposition that the Parliament had been a Party to the Contract, the Invalidity of any of its subsequent Acts, to explain any Clause in the Charter; more especially to restrict or make void any Clause granted therein to the Ge­neral Court. An Agreement ought to be inter­preted "in such a Manner as that it may have its Effect:" But if your Excellency's Interpreta­tion [Page 43] of this Clause is just, "that it is a Reserve of Power and Authority to Parliament to bind us by such Laws as are made expresly to refer to us," it is not only "a Limitation of the Power given to the General Court" to Legislate, but it may whenever the Parliament shall think [...]it, render it of no Effect; for it puts it in the Power of Par­liament to bind us by as many Laws as they please, and even to restrain us from making any Laws at all. If your Excellency's Assertions in this and the next succeeding Part of your Speech were well grounded, the Conclusion would be un­deniable, that the Charter even in this Clause, "does not confer or reserve any Liberties" worth enjoying, "but what would have been enjoyed without it;" saving that within any of his Ma­jesty's Dominions we are to be considered barely as not Aliens. You are pleased to say, it cannot "be contended that by the Liberties of free and natural Subjects" (which are expresly granted in the Charter to all Intents, Purposes, and Con­structions whatever) "is to understood an Exemp­tion from Acts of Parliament because not repre­sented there; seeing it is provided by the same Charter that such Acts shall be in Force." If, says an eminent Lawyer, "the King grants to the Town of D. the same Liberties which London has, this shall be intended the like Liberties." A Grant of the Liberties of free and natural Sub­jects is equivalent to a Grant of the same Liber­ties. And the King in the first Charter to this Colony expressly grants that it shall be construed, reputed and adjudged in all Cases most favourably on the Behalf and for the Benefit and Behoof of the said Governor and Company and their Suc­cessors— [Page 44] any Matter, Cause or Thing whatsoever to the contrary notwithstanding." It is one of the Liberties of free and natural Subjects, born and abiding within the Realm, to be governed as your Excellency observes, "by Laws made by Persons in whose Elections they from Time to Time have a Voice." This is an essential Right. For nothing is more evident, than that any Peo­ple who are subject to the unlimited Power of a­nother, must be in a State of abject Slavery. It was easily and plainly foreseen that the Right of Representation in the English Parliament could not be exercised by the People of this Colony. It would be impracticable, if consistent with the English Constitution. And for this Reason, that this Colony might have and enjoy all the Liber­ties and Immunities of free and natural Subjects within the Realm, as stipulated in the Charter, it was necessary, and a Legislative was accordingly constituted within the Colony; one Branch of which consists of Representatives chosen by the People, to make all Laws, Statutes, Ordinances, &c. for the well ordering and governing the same, not repugnant to the Laws of England, or, as nearly as conveniently might be, agreeable to the fundamental Laws of the English Constitu­tion. We are therefore still at a Loss to conceive where your Excellency finds it " provided in the same Charter, that such Acts," viz. Acts of Par­liament made expressly to refer to us, "shall be in Force" in this Province. There is nothing to this Purpose expressed in the Charter, or in our Opinion even implied in it. And surely it would be very absurd, that a Charter, which is evidently formed upon a Supposition and Intention, that a [Page 45] Colony is and should be considered as not with­in the Realm; and declared by the very Prince who granted it, to be not within the Jurisdiction of Parliament, should yet provide, that the Laws which the same Parliament should make expresly to refer to that Colony, should be in Force there­in. Your Excellency is pleased to ask▪ "Does it follow that the Government by their (our An­cestors) Removal from one Part of the Dominions to another, loses its Authority over that Part to which they remove: And that they were freed from the Subjection they were under before?" We answer, if that Part of the King's Dominions to which they removed was not then a Part of the Realm, and was never annexed to it, the Par­liament lost no Authority over it, having never had such Authority; and the Emigrants were consequently freed from the Subjection they were under before their Removal: The Power and Authority of Parliament being constitutionally confined within the Limits of the Realm and the Nation collectively, of which alone it is the Representing and Legislative Assembly. Your Excellency further asks, "Will it not rather be said, that by this their voluntary Removal, they have relinquished for a Time at least, one of the Rights of an English Subject, which they might if they pleased have continued to enjoy, and may again enjoy, whenever they return to the Place where it can be exercised?" To which we answer; They never did relinquish the Right to be governed by Laws made by Persons in whose Election they had a Voice The King stipulated with them that they should have and enjoy all the Liberties of free and natural Subjects born with­in [Page 46] the Realm, to all Intents, Purposes and Con­structions whatsoever; that is, that they should be as free as those who were to abide within the Realm: Consequently he stipulated with them that they should enjoy and exercise this most es­sential Right, which discriminates Freemen from Vassals, uninterruptedly in its full Sense and Meaning; and they did and ought still to exercise it, without the Necessity of returning, for the Sake of exercising it, to the Nation or State of England.

We cannot help observing, that your Excel­lency's Manner of Reasoning on this Point, seems to us to render the most valuable Clauses in our Charter unintelligible: As if Persons going from the Realm of England to inhabit in America, should hold and exercise there a certain Right of English Subjects; but in Order to exercise it in such Manner as to be of any Benefit to them, they must not inhabit there, but return to the Place where alone it can be exercised. By such Construction, the Words of the Charter can have no Sense or Meaning. We forbear remarking upon the Absurdity of a Grant to Persons born within the Realm, of the same Liberties which would have belonged to them if they had been born within the Realm.

Your Excellency is disposed to compare this Government to the Variety of Corporations form­ed within the Kingdom, with Power to make and execute By-Laws, &c. And because they remain subject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament, to infer that this Colony is also subject to the same [Page 47] Authority: This Reasoning appears to us not just. The Members of those Corporations are Resiant within the Kingdom; and Residence sub­jects them to the Authority of Parliament, in which they are also represented: Whereas the People of this Colony are not Resident within the Realm. The Charter was granted with the express Purpose to induce them to reside with­out the Realm; consequently they are not repre­sented in Parliament there. But we would ask your Excellency; Are any of the Corporations formed within the Kingdom, vested with the Power of erecting other subordinate Corporations? Of enacting and determining what Crimes shall be Capital? And constituting Courts of Common Law with all their Officers, for the hearing, try­ing and punishing capital Offenders with Death? These and many other Powers vested in this Go­vernment, plainly show that it is to be consider­ed as a Corporation in no other Light, than as every State is a Corporation. Besides, Appeals from the Courts of Law here, are not brought before the House of Lords; which shows that the Peers of the Re [...]m are not the Peers of America: But all such Appeals are brought be­fore the King in Council, which is a further Evi­dence that we are not within the Realm.

We conceive enough has been said to convince your Excellency, that "when our Predecessors first took Possession of this Plantation or Colony by a Grant and Charter from the Crown of England, it was not and never had been the Sense of the Kingdom, that they were to remain subject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament. We will now [Page 48] with your Excellency's Leave, enquire what was the Sense of our Ancestors of this very important Matter.

And as your Excellency has been pleased to tell us, you have not discovered that the Supreme Authority of Parliament has been called in Ques­tion even by private and particular Persons, un­til within seven or eight Years past; except a­bout the Time of the Anarchy and Confusion in England, which preceeded the Restoration of King Charles the Second; we beg leave to remind your Excellency of some Parts of your own His­tory of Massachusetts-Bay. Therein we are in­formed of the Sentiments of "Persons of Influ­ence" after the Restoration, from which the His­torian tells us, some Parts of their Conduct, that is of the General Assembly, "may be pretty well accounted for." By the History it appears to have been the Opinion of those Persons of Influ­ence, "that the Subjects of any Prince or State had a natural Right to remove to any other State or to another Quarter of the World, unless the State was weakened or exposed by such Remove; and even in that Case, if they were deprived of the Right of all Mankind, Liberty of Conscience, it would justify a Separation, and upon their Re­moval their Subjection determined and ceased." That "the Country to which they had removed, was claimed and possessed by independent Princes, whose Right to the Lordship and Sovereignty thereof had been acknowledged by the Kings of England," an Instance of which is quoted in the Margin; "That the [...] themselves had actu­ally purchased for valuable Consideration, not [Page 49] only the Soil, but the Dominion, the Lordship and Sovereignty of those Princes;" without which Purchase, "in the Sight of God and Men, they had no Right or Title to what they possessed. That they had received a Charter of Incorpora­tion from the King, from whence arose a new Kind of Subjection, namely, "a voluntary, civil Subjection;" and by this Compact "they were to be governed by Laws made by themselves." Thus it appears to have been the Sentiments of private Persons, though Persons by whose Senti­ments the public Conduct was influenced, that their Removal was a justifiable Separation from the Mother State, upon which their Subjection to that State determined and ceased. The Su­preme Authority of Parliament, if it had then ever been asserted, must surely have been called in Question, by Men who had advanced such Principles as these.

The first Act of Parliament made expresly to refer to the Colonies, was after the Restoration. In the Reign of King Charles the Second, seve­ral such Acts passed. And the same History in­forms us there was a Difficulty in conforming to them; and the Reason of this Difficulty is ex­plained in a Letter of the General Assembly to their Agent, quoted in the following Words, "They apprehended them to be an Invasion of the Rights Liberties and Properties of the Subjects of his Majesty in the Colony, they not being re­presented in Parliament, and according to the usual Sayings of the Learned in the Law, the Laws of England were bounded within the four Seas, and did not reach America: However as [Page 50] his Majesty had signified his Pleasure that those Acts should be observed in the Massachusetts, they had made Provision by a Law of the Colony that they should be strictly attended." Which Pro­vision by a Law of their own would have been superfluous, if they had admitted the Supreme Authority of Parliament. In short, by the same History it appears that those Acts of Parliament as such were disregarded; and the following Reason is given for it; "It seems to have been a general Opinion that Acts of Parliament had no other Force, than what they derived from Acts made by the General Court to establish and con­firm them."

But still further to show the Sense of our An­cestors respecting this Matter, we beg leave to recite some Parts of a Narrative presented to the Lords of Privy Council by Edward Randolph, in the Year 1676, which we find in your Excel­lency's Collection of Papers lately published. Therein it is declared to be the Sense of the Co­lony, "that no Law is in Force or Esteem there, but such as are made by the General Court; and therefore it is accounted a Breach of their Privi­leges, and a Betraying of the Liberties of their Common-wealth, to urge the Observation of the Laws of England." And further, "That no Oath shall be urged or required to be taken by any Person, but such Oath as the General Court hath considered, allowed and required." And further, "there is no notice taken of the Act of Navigation, Plantation or any other Laws made in England for the Regulation of Trade." "That the Government would make the World believe [Page 51] they are a free State, and do act in all Matters ac­cordingly." Again, "These Magistrates ever reserve to themselves a Power to alter, evade and disannul any Law or Command, not agreeing with their Humour o [...] the absolute Authority of their Government, acknowledging no Superior." And further, "He the (Governor) freely declared to me, that the Laws [...]de by your Majesty and your Parliament, obligeth them in nothing, but what consists with the Interests of that Colony, that the Legislative Power and Authority is and abides in them solely." And in the same Mr. Randolph's Letter to the Bishop of London, Ju­ly 14, 1682, he says, "This Independency in Government, claimed and daily practised." And your Excellency being then sensible that this was the Sense of our Ancestors, in a Marginal Note in the same Collection of Papers, observes, that "this, viz. the Provision made for observing the Acts of Trade, "is very extraordinary, for this Provision was an Act of the Colony declaring the Acts of Trade shall be in Force there." Although Mr. Randolph was very unfriendly to the Colony, yet as his Declarations are concur­rent with those recited from your Excellency's History, we think they may be admitted for the Purpose for which they are now brought.

Thus we see, from your Excellency's History and Publications, the Sense our Ancestors had of the Jurisdiction of Parliament under the first Char­ter. Very different from that which your Ex­cellency in your Speech apprehends it to have been.

[Page 52] It appears by Mr. Neal's History of New-England, that the Agents who had been employed by the Colony to transacts it Affairs in England at the Time when the present Charter was gran­ted, among [...]ther Reasons gave the following for their Acceptance of it, viz. "The General Court has with the King's Approbation as much Power in New-England, as the King and Parliament have in England; they have all English Privile­ges, and can be touched by no Law, and by no Tax but of their own making." This is the earliest Testimony that can be given of the Sense our Predecessors had of the Supreme Authority of Parliament under the present Charter. And it plainly shows, that they, who having been free­ly conversant with those who framed the Charter, must have well understood the Design and Mean­ing of it, supposed that the Terms in our Charter "full Power and Authority," intended and were considered as a sole and exclusive Power, and that there was no "Reserve in the Charter to the Authority of Parliament, to bind the Colony" by any Acts whatever.

Soon after the Arrival of the Charter, viz. in 1692, your Excellency's History informs us, "the first Act" of this Legislative was a Sort of Magna Charta, asserting and setting forth their general Privileges, and this Clause was among the rest, "No Aid, Tax, Tallage, Assessment, Custom, Loan, Benevolence or Imposition what­ever, shall be laid, assess'd, impos'd or levied on any of their Majesty's Subjects, or their Estates, on any Pretence whatever, but by the Act and Consent of the Governor, Council and Represen­tatives [Page 53] of the People assembled in General Court." And though this Act was disallowed, it serves to show the Sense which the General Assembly con­temporary with the granting the Charter had of their sole and exclusive Right to Legislate for the Colony. The History says, "the other Parts of the Act were copied from Magna Char­ta;" by which we may conclude that the Assem­bly then construed the Words "not repugnant to the Laws," to mean, conformable to the fun­damental Principles of the English Constitution. And it is observable that the Lords of Privy Council, so lately as in the Reign of Queen Anne, when several Laws enacted by the General As­sembly, were laid before her Majesty for her Al­lowance, interpreted the Words in this Charter, "not repugnant to the Laws of England," by the Words "as nearly as conveniently [...] be agreeable to the Laws and Statutes of England." And her Majesty was pleased to disallow those Acts, not because they were repugnant to any Law or Statute of England, made expresly to re­fer to the Colony; but because divers Persons, by Virtue thereof, were punished without being tried by their Peers in the ordinary "Courts of Law," and "by the ordinary Rules and known Methods of Justice;" contrary to the express Terms of Magna Charta, which was a Statute in Force at the Time of granting the Charter, and declaratory of the Rights and Li­berties of the Subjects within the Realm.

You are pleased to say, that "our Provincial or Local Laws have in numerous Instances had Relation to Acts of Parliament made to respect [Page 54] the Plantations and this Colony in particular." The Authority of the Legislature, says the same Author who is quoted by your Excellency, "does not extend so far as the Fundamentals of the Constitution." "They ought to consider the Fundamental Laws as sacred, if the Nation has not in very express Terms, given them the Power to change them. For the Constitution of the State ought to be fixed: And since that was first established by the Nation, which afterwards trust­ed certain Persons with the Legislative Power, the fundamental Laws are excepted from their Commission." Now the Fundamentals of the Constitution of this Province are stipulated in the Charter; the Reasoning therefore in this Case holds equally good. Much less then ought any Acts or Doings of the General Assembly, how­ever numerous, to neither of which your Excel­lency has pointed us, which barely relate to Acts of Parliament made to respect the Plantations in general, or this Colony in particular, to be taken as an Acknowledgment of this People, or even of the Assembly, which inadvertently passed those Acts, that we are subject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament. And with still less Reason are the Decisions in the Executive Courts to deter­mine this Point. If they have adopted that "as Part of the Rule of Law," which in Fact is not, it must be imputed to Inattention or Error in Judgment, and cannot justly be urged as an Alte­ration or Restriction of the Legislative Authority of the Province.

Before we leave this Part of your Excellency's Speech, we would observe, that the great Design [Page 55] of our Ancestors, in leaving the Kingdom of England, was to be freed from a Subjection to its spiritual Laws and Courts, and to worship God according to the Dictates of their Consciences. Your Excellency in your History observes, that their Design was "to obtain for themselves and their Posterity the Liberty of worshipping God in such Manner as appeared to them most agreeable to the sacred Scriptures." And the General Court themselves declared in 1651, that "seeing just Cause to fear the Persecution of the then Bishop, and High Commission for not conforming to the Ceremonies of those under their Power, they thought it their safest Course, to get to this Outside of the World, out of their View and beyond their Reach." But if it had been their Sense, that they were still to be subject to the Supreme Authority of Parliament, they must have known that their Design might and probably would be frustrated; that the Parliament, espe­cially considering the Temper of those Times, might make what ecclesiastical Laws they pleas­ed, expressly to refer to them, and place them in the same Circumstances with Respect to religi­ous Matters, to be relieved from which was the Design of their Removal. And we would add▪ that if your Excellency's Construction of the Clause in our present Charter is just, another Clause therein, which provides for Liberty of Conscience for all Christians except Papists, may be rendered void by an Act of Parliament made to refer to us, requiring a Conformity to the Rites and Mode of Worship in the Church of England, or any other.

[Page 56] Thus we have endeavoured to shew the Sense of the People of this Colony under both Char­ters; and if there have been in any late Instances a Submission to Acts of Parliament, it has been in our Opinion, rather from Inconsideration or a Reluctance at the Idea of contending with the Parent State, than from a Conviction or Acknow­ledgement of the Supreme Legislative Authority of Parliament.

Your Excllency tells us, "you know of no Line that can be drawn between the Supreme Au­thority of Parliament and the total Independence of the Colonies." If there be no such Line, the Consequence is, either that the Colonies are the Vassals of the Parliament, or, that they are to­tally Independent. As it cannot be supposed to have been the Intention of the Parties in the Compact, that we should be reduced to a State of Vassallage, the Conclusion is, that it was their Sense, that we were thus Independent. "It is Im­possible, your Excellency says, that there should be two independent Legislatures in one and the same State." May we not then further conclude, that it was their Sense that the Colonies were by their Charters made distinct States from the Mo­ther Country? Your Excellency adds, For although there may be but one Head, the King, yet the two Legislative Bodies will make two Governments as distinct as the Kingdoms of England and Scotland before the Union. Very true, may it please your Excellency; and if they interfere not with each other, what hinders but that being united in one Head and common So­vereign, they may live happily in that Connection, [Page 57] and mutually support and protect each other? Notwithstanding all the Terrors which your Ex­cellency has pictured to us as the Affects of a to­tal Independence, there is more Reason to dread the Consequences of absolute uncontrouled Su­preme Power, whether of a Nation or a Monarch, than those of a total Independence. It would be a Misfortune "to know by Experience, the Dif­ference between the Liberties of an English Co­lonist and those of the Spanish, French and Dutch: And since the British Parliament has passed an Act which is executed even with Rigour, though not voluntarily submitted to, for raising a Reve­nue, and appropriating the same without the Con­sent of the People who pay it, and have claimed a Power making such Laws as they please to or­der and govern us, your Excellency will excuse us in asking, whether you do not think we alrea­dy experience too much of such a Difference, and have not Reason to fear we shall soon be re­duced to a worse Situation than that of the Colo­nies of France, Spain or Holland?

If your Excellency expects to have the Line of Distinction between the Supreme Authority of Parliament, and the total Independence of the Colonies drawn by us, we would say it would be an arduous Undertaking; and of very great Im­portance to all the other Colonies: And there­fore, could we conceive of such a Line, we should be unwilling to propose it, without their Consent in Congress.

[Page 58] To conclude, These are great and profound Questions. It is the Grief of this House, that by the ill Policy of a late injudicious Administra­tion, America has been driven into the Contem­plation of them. And we cannot but express our Concern, that your Excellency by your Speech has reduced us to the unhappy Alterna­tive, either of appearing by our Silence to ac­quiesce in your Excellency's Sentiments, or of thus freely discussing this Point.

After all that we have said, we would be far from being understood to have in the least abated that just Sense of Allegiance which we owe to the King of Great-Britain, our rightful Sove­reign: And should the People of this Province be left to the free and full Exercise of all the Liberties and Immunities granted to the [...] by Charter, there would be no Da [...]ger of an Inde­pendance on the Crown. Our Charters reserve great Power to the Crown in its Representative, fully sufficient to balance, analagous to the Eng­lish Constitution, all the Liberties and Privileges granted to the People. All this your Excellen­cy knows full well—And whoever considers the Power and Influence, in all their Branches, re­served by our Charter to the Crown, will be far from thinking that the Commons of this Province are too Independent.

THE Proceedings of such of the Inhabitants of the Town of Boston as assembled together and passed and published their Resolves or Votes as the Act of the Town at a legal Town-Meeting, denying in the most express Terms the Supremacy of Parliament, and invit­ing every other Town and District in the Province to a [...]opt the same Principle and to establish Com­mittees of Correspondence to consult upon pro­per Measures to maintain it, and the Proceedings of divers other Towns, in Consequence of this Invitation, appeared to me to be so unwarranta­ble and of such a dangerous Nature and Ten­dency, that I thought myself bound to call upon you in my Speech at Opening the Session, to join with me in discountenancing and bearing a pro­per Testimony against such Irregularities and Innovations.

I stated to you fairly and truly, as I conceiv­ed, the Constitution of the Kingdom and of the Province so far as relates [...]o the Dependance of the latter upon the former; and I desired [...], if you differed from me in Sentiments, to shew me with Candour my own Errors, and to g [...]ve [Page 60] your Reasons in support of your Opinions, so far as you might differ from me. I hoped that you would have considered my Speech by your joint Committees, and have given me a joint An­swer; but, as the House of Representatives have declined that Mode of Proceeding, and as your Principles in Government are very different, I am obliged to make separate and distinct replies.

I shall first apply myself to you,

AS a small Part only of your Excellency's last Speech to both Houses is addressed to the Board, there are but a few Clauses on which we shall Remark.

With Regard to the Disorders that have arisen, your Excellency and the Board have assigned different Causes. The Cause you are pleased to assign, together with the Disorders themselves, we suppose to be Effects arising from the Stamp-Act, and certain other Acts of Parliament. If we were not mistaken in this, which you do not assert, it so far seems to invalidate what is said in your Speech on that Head.

We have taken Notice of this, only because it stands connected with another Matter, on which we would make a few further Observations. What we refer to is the general Nature of Su­preme Authority. We have already offered Reasons, in which your Excellency seems to ac­quiesce, to shew that, though the Term Supreme sometimes carries with it the Idea of unlimitted Authority, it cannot, in that Sense, be applied to that which is human. What is usually denomi­nated [Page 86] the Supreme Authority of a Nation must nevertheless be limitted in it's Acts to the Objects that are properly or c [...]nstitutionally cognizable by it. To illustrate our Meaning, we beg Leave to quote a Passage from your Speech, at the Open­ing of this Session, where your Excellency says, "so much of the Spirit of Liberty breathes through all Parts of the English Constitution, that although from the Nature of Government there must be one Supreme Authority over the whole, yet this Constitution will admit of Subordinate Powers with Legislative and Executive Authoriy, greater or less, according to Local and other Cir­cumstances."—This is very true, and implies, that the Legislative and Executive Authority granted to the Subordinate Powers should extend and operate as far as the Grant allows; and that, if it does not exceed the Limits prescribed to it, and no Forfeiture be incurred, the Supreme Power has no rightful Authority to take away or diminish it, or to substitute its own Acts of Cases wherein the Acts of the Subordinate Power can, according to its Constitution, operate. To suppose the contrary is to suppose, that it has no Property in the Privileges granted to it, for if it holds them at the Will of the Supreme Power, which it must do by the above Supposition, it can have no Property in them: upon which Principle, which involves the Contradiction, that what is granted is in Reality not granted, no Subordinate Power can exist. But as in Fact the two Powers are not incompatible, and do sub [...]st together, each restraining its Acts to their Constitutional Objects, can we not from hence see how the Supreme Power may supervise, regulate, and make general [Page 87] Laws for the Kingdom, without interfering with the Privileges of the Subordinate Powers within it? And also see how it may extend its Care and Protection to its Colonies, without injuring their Constitutional Rights?—What has been here said concerning Supreme Authority has no Reference to the Manner in which it has been in Fact ex­ercised, but is wholly confined to its general Nature; and if it conveys any just Idea of it, the Inferences that have been at any Time de­duced from it, injurious to the Rights of the Co­lonists, are not well founded; and have proba­bly arisen from a Misconception of the Nature of that Authority.

Your Excellency represents us as introducing a Number of Authorities merely to shew, that "all Taxes upon English Subjects must be levi­ed by Virtue of the Act, not of the King alone, but in Conjunction with the Lords and Com­mons." and are pleased to add, that "you should very readily have allowed it; and you should as readily have allowed, that all other Acts of Legislation must be passed by the same joint Authority, and not by the King alone."—Your Excellency "would have saved us the Trouble of all those Authorities:" and on our Part we should have been as willing to have sav­ed your Excellency the Trouble of dismember­ing our Argument, and from thence taking Oc­casion to represent it in a disadvantageous Light, or rather totally destroying it.

In Justice to ourselves it is necessary to Reca­pitulate that Argument adduced to prove, that [Page 88] the Inhabitants of this Province are not constitu­tionally subject to Parliamentary Taxation. In order thereto we recurred to Magna Charta and other Authorities. And the Argument abridged stands thus—That from those Authorities it ap­pears an Essential Part of the English Constitution, "that no Tallage, or Aid, or Tax, shall be laid or levied, without the Good-will and Assent of the Freemen of the Commonalty of the Realm." That from Common Law, and the Province Charter, the Inhabitants of this Province are clearly intitled to all the Rights of free and na­tural Subjects within the Realm: That among those Rights must be included the essential one just mentioned concerning Aids and Taxes; and therefore that no Aids or Taxes can be levied on us constitutionally without our own Consent signified by our Representatives. From whence the Conclusion is clear, that therefore the Inha­bitants of this Province are not constitutionally subject to Parliamentary Taxation.

We did not bring those Authorities to shew that Tax Acts, or any other Acts of Parliament, in order to their Validity, must have the Con­currence of the King, Lords, and Commons; but to shew, that it has been, at least from the Time of Magna Charta, an essential Right of free Subjects within the Realm, to be free from all Taxes but such as were laid with their own Consent. And it was proper to shew this, as the Rights and Liberties, granted by the Province Charter, were to be equally extensive, to all In­tents and Purposes, with those enjoyed by free and natural Subjects within the Realm. There­fore [Page 89] to shew our own Rights in Relation to Taxes, it was necessary to shew the Rights of Freemen within the Realm, in Relation to them: and for this Purpose those Authorities were brought, and not impertinently, as we humbly apprehend. Nor have we seen Reason to change our Sen­timents with Respect to this Matter or any other contained in our Answer to your Excellency's Speech.

In the last Clause of your Speech, your Ex­cellency informs the two Houses, "you are Au­thorized to say, that his Majesty will most gra­ciously approve of every Constitutional Measure, that may contribute to the Peace, the Happiness and Prosperity of his Colony of Massachusetts-Bay."—We have the highest Sense of his Ma­jesty's Goodness in his gracious Disposition to ap­prove of such Measures, which, as it includes his Approbation of the Constitutional Rights of his Subjects of this Colony, manifests his Inclination to protect them in those Rights; and to remove the Incroachments that have been made upon them. Of this Act of Royal Goodness they are not wholly unworthy, as in Regard to Loyalty, Duty and Affection to his Majesty, they stand among the foremost of his faithful Subjects.

IN your Speech at the Opening of the pre­sent Session, your Excellency express'd your Displeasure at some late Proceedings of the Town of Boston, and other principal Towns in the Province. And in another Speech to both Houses we have your repeated Exceptions at the same Proceedings as being "unwarrantable," and of a dangerous Nature and Tendency; "against which you thought yourself bound to call upon us to join with you in bearing a proper Testimony." This House have not discovered any Principles advanced by the Town of Boston, that are unwarrantable by the Constitution; nor does it appear to us that they have "invited every other Town and District in the Province to adopt their Principles." We are fully con­vinced that it is our Duty to bear our Testimony against "Innovations of a dangerous Nature and Tendency:" But is clearly our Opinion, that it is the indisputable Right of all or any of his Majesty's Subjects in this Province, regularly and orderly to meet together to state the Grie­vances they labor under; and to propose and [Page 91] unite in such constitutional Measures as they shall judge necessary or proper to obtain Redress. This Right has been frequently exercised by his Majesty's Subjects within the Realm; and we do not recollect an Instance, since the happy Revo­lution, when the two Houses of Parliament have been called upon to discountenance or bear their Testimony against it, in a Speech from the Throne.

Your Excellency is pleased to take Notice of some things which we "alledge" in our Answer to your first Speech; and the Observation you make, we must confess, is as natural and as un­deniably true, as any one that could have been made, that "if our Foundation shall fail us in e­very Part of it, the Fabrick we have rais'd upon it, must certainly fall." You think, this Foun­dation will fail us; but we wish your Excellency has condesended to a Consideration of what we have "a [...]duced in Support of our Principles." We might then perhaps have had some things offered for our Conviction, more than bare Af­firmations; which, we must beg to be excused if we say, are far from being sufficient, though they came with your Excellency's Authority, for which however we have a due Regard.

Your Excellency says that "as English Subjects and agreeable to the Doctrine of the Feudal Tenure all our Lands are held mediately or immediately of the Crown." We trust your Excellency does not mean to introduce the Feudal System in it's Per­fection; which to use the Words of one of our greatest Historians, was "a State of perpetual [Page 92] War, Anarchy and Confusion; calculated solely for Defence against the Assaults of any foreign Power, but in it's Provision for the interior Order and Tranquility of Society extremely defective." "A Constitution so contradictory to all the Prin­ciples that govern Mankind, could never be brought about but by foreign Conquest or na­tive Usurpation:" And a very celebrated Writer calls it "that most iniquitous and absurd Form of Government by which human Nature was so shamefully degraded." This System of Ini­quity by a strange Kind of Fatality, "though originally form'd for an Encampment and for Military Purposes only, spread over a great Part of Europe:" and to serve the Purposes of Op­pression and Tyranny "was adopted by Princes and wrought into their Civil Constitutions;" and aided by the Canon Law, calculated by the Ro­man Pontiff, to exalt himself above all that is called God, it prevailed to the almost utter Ex­tinction of Knowledge, Virtue, Religion and Li­berty from that Part of the Earth. But from the Time of the Reformation, in Proportion as Knowledge, which then darted its Rays upon the benighted World, increas'd and spread among the People, they grew impatient under this heavy Yoke: And the most virtuous and sensible a­mong them, to whose Stedfastness we in this dis­tant Age and Climate are greatly indebted, were determined to get rid of it: And tho' they have in a great Measure subdued it's Power and Influ­ence in England, they have never yet totally eradicated its Principles.

[Page 93] Upon these Principles the King claimed an absolute Right to and a perfect Estate in all the Lands within his Dominions; but how he came by this absolute Right and perfect Estate is a Mystery which we have never seen unravelled, nor [...] our Business or Design at present to en­quire. [...]e granted Parts of Parcels of it to his Friends the Great Men, and they granted lesser Parcels to their Tenants: All therefore derived their Right and held their Lands, upon these Principles, mediately or immediately of the King; which Mr. Blackstone however calls "in Reality a meey Fiction of our English Tenures."

By what Right in Nature and Reason the Christian Princes in Europe claimed the Lands of Heathen People, upon a Discovery made by any of their Subjects, is equally mysterious: Such however was the Doctrine universally prevailing when the Lands in America were discovered; but as the People of England upon those Prin­ciples held all the Lands they possessed by Grants from the King, and the King had never granted the Lands in America to them, it is certain they could have no Sort of Claim to them: Upon the Principles advanced, the Lordship and Dominion like that of the Lands in England, was in the King solely: and a Right from thence accrued to him of disposing such Territories under such Tenure and for such Servies to be performed, as the King or Lord thought proper. But how the Grantees became Subjects of England, that is the Supreme Authority of the Parliament, your Excellency has not explained to us. We con­ceive that upon the Feudal Principles all Power [Page 94] is in the King; they afford us no Idea of Parlia­ment. "The Lord was in early Times the Le­gislator and Judge over all his Feudatories," says Judge Blackstone. By the Struggles for Liberty in England from the Days of King John to the last happy Revolution, the Constitution has been gradually changing for the better; and upon the more rational Principles that all Men by Nature are in a State of Equality in Respect of Jurisdic­tion and Dominion, Power in England has been more equally divided. And thus also in America, though we hold our Lands agreeably to the Feu­dal Principles of the King; yet our Predecessors wisely took care to enter into Compact with the King that Power here should also be equally divi­ded agreeable to the original fundamental Princi­ples of the English Constitution, declared in Magna Charter, and other Laws and Statutes of England, made to confirm them.

Your Excellency says, "you can by no Means concede to us that it is now or was when the Plantations were first granted the Prerogative of the Kings of England to constitute a Number of new Governments altogether independent of the Sovereign Authority of the English Empire." By the Feudal Principles upon which you say "all the Grants which have been made of Ame­rica are founded" "the Constitutions of the Emperor have the Force of Law." If our Go­vernment be considered as merely Feudatory, we are subject to the King's absolute Will, and there is no Room for the Authority of Parliament, as the Sovereign Authority of the British Em­pire. Upon these Principles, what could hinder [Page 95] the King's constituting a Number of independent Governments in America? That King Charles the First did actually set up a Government in this Colony▪ conceding to it Powers of making and executing Laws, without any Reservation to the English Parliament, of Authority to make future Laws binding therein, is a Fact which your Excellency has not disproved if you have denied it. Nor have you shewn that the Par­liament or Nation objected to it, from whence we have inferred that it was an acknowledged Right. And we cannot conceive, why the King has not the same Right to alienate and dis­pose of Countries acquired by the Discovery of his Subjects, as he has to "restore upon a Treaty of Peace Countries which have been acquired in War," carried on at the Charge of the Nation; or to "sell and deliver up any Part of his Do­minions to a foreign Prince or State, against the General Sense of the Nation" which is "an Act of Power" or Prerogative which your Excellency allows. You tell us that "when any New Coun­tries are discovered by English Subjects, accord­ing to the general Law and Usage of Nations, they become Part of the State." The Law of Nations is or ought to be founded on the Law or Reason. It was the Saying of Sir Edwin Sandis, in the great Case of the Union of the Realm of Scotland with England, which is applicable to our present Purpose, that "there being no Precedent for this Case in the Law, the Law is deficient; and the Law being deficient, Recourse is to be had to Custom; and Custom being insufficient, we must recur to natural Reason," the greatest of all Authorities, which he adds "is the Law [Page 96] of Nations." The Opinions therefore, and De­terminations of the greatest Sages and Judges of the Law in the Exchequer Chamber ought not to be considered as decisive or binding in our pre­sent Controversy with your Excellency, any further than they are consonant to natural Reason. If however we were to recur to such Opinions and Determinations we should find very great Authorities in our Favour, to show that the Sta­tutes of England are not binding on those who are not represented in Parliament there. The Opinion of Lord Coke that Ireland was bound by Statutes of England wherein they were named, if compared with his other Writings, appears manifestly to be grounded upon a Supposition, that Ireland had by an Act of their own, in the Reign of King John, consented to be thus bound, and upon any other Supposition this Opinion would be against Reason; for Consent only gives human Laws their Force. We beg Leave, upon what your Excellency has observed of the Colo­ny becoming a Part of the State, to subjoin the Opinions of several learned Civilians, as quoted by a very able Lawyer in this Country; "Colo­nies, says Puffendorf, are settled in different Methods. For either the Colony continues a Part of the Common Wealth it was set out from; or else is obliged to pay a dutiful Regard to the Mother Common Wealth, and to be in Readiness to defend and vindicate its Honor, and so is united by a Sort of unequal Confederacy; or lastly, is erected into a seperate Common Wealth and assumes the same Rights, with the State it descended from." And King Tullius, as quoted by the same learned Author [Page 97] from Grotius, says "We look upon it to be neither Truth nor Justice that Mother Cities ought of Necessity and by the Law of Nature to rule over the Colonies."

Your Excellency has misinterpreted what we have said, "that no Country by the Common Law, was subject to the Laws or the Parliament but the Realm of England," and are pleased to tell us that we have expressed ourselves "Incautiously." We beg Leave to recite the Words of the Judges of Eng­land in the before mentioned Case to our Purpose. "If a King go out of England with a Company of his Servants, Allegiance remain [...]th among his Subjects and Servants, altho' he be out of his Realm whereto his Laws are confined," We did not mean to say, as your Excellency would sup­pose, that "the Common Law prescribes Limits to the Extent of the Legislative Power," though we shall always affirm it to be true of the Law of Reason and natural Equity. Your Excellency thinks you have made it appear, that the Colony of Massachusetts-Bay is holden as feudatory of the Imperial Crown of England;" and therefore you say, "to use the Words of a very great Au­thority in a Case in some Respects analogous to it," being feudatory it necessarily follows, that it is under the Government of the King's Laws." Your Excellency has not named this Authority: but we conceive his Meaning must be, that be­ing Feudatory, it is under the Government of the King's Law [...] absolutely; for as we have before said the Feudal System admits of no Idea of the Authority of Parliament, and this would have [Page 98] been the Case of the Colony but for the Com­pact with the King in the Charter.

Your Excellency says, that "Persons thus hold­ing under the Crown of England remain or be­come Subjects of England;" by which we sup­pose your Excellency to mean, subject to the Su­preme Authority of Parliament "to all Intents and Purposes as fully as if any of the Royal Ma­nors, &c. within the Realm had been Granted to them upon the like Tenure." We apprehend with Submission, your Excellency is Mistaken in supposing that our Allegiance is due to the Crown of England. Every Man swears Allegiance for himself to his own King in his Natural Person. "Every Subject is presumed by Law to be Sworn to the King, which is to his Natural Person," says Lord Coke. Rep. on Calvins Case. "The Allegiance is due to his Natural Body." And he says "in the Reign of Edward II. the Spen­cers, the Father and the Son, to cover the Trea­son hatched in their Hearts, invented this dam­nable and damned Opinion, that Homage and Oath of Allegiance was more by Reason of the King's Crown, that is of his politick Capacity, than by Reason of the Person of the King; upon which Opinion they infer'd execrable and detestable Consequents." The Judges of Eng­land, all but one, in the Case of the Union be­tween Scotland and England, declared that "Allegiance fol [...]oweth the natural Person not the politick;" and "to prove the Allegiance to be tied to the Body natural of the King, and not to the Body politick, the Lord Coke cited the Phrases of diverse Statutes, mentioning our [Page 99] natural liege Sovereign."—If then the Homage and Allegiance is not to the Body politick of the King, then it is not to him as the Head or any Part of that Legislative Authority, which your Excellency says "is equally extensive with the Authority of the Crown throughout every Part of the Dominion;" and your Excellency's Observations thereupon must fail. The same Judges mention the Allegiance of a Subject to the Kings of England who is out of the Reach and Extent of the Laws of England; which is perfectly reconcil [...]able with the Principles of our Ancestors quoted before from your Excellency's History, but upon your Excellency's Principles appears to us to be an Absurdity. The Judges, speaking of a Subject, say, "although his Birth was out of the Bounds of the Kingdom of Eng­land, and out of the Reach and Extent of the Laws of England, yet if it were within the Allegiance of the King of England, &c. Nor­mandy, Acquitain, Gascoign, and other Places within the Limits of France, and consequently out of the Realm or Bounds of the Kingdom of England, were in Subjection to the Kings of England. And the Judges say, " Rex et Reg­num be not so Relatives, as a King can be King but of one Kingdom, which clearly hold [...]th not but that his Kingly Power extending to divers Nations and Kingdoms, all owe him equal Sub­jection and are equally born to the Benefit of his Protection, and altho' he is to govern them by their distinct Laws, yet any one of the People coming into the other is to have the Benefit of the Laws wheresoever he cometh." So they are not to be deemed Aliens, as your Excellen­cy [Page 100] in your Speech supposes in any of the Do­minions; all which accords with the Principles our Ancestors held. "And he is to bea [...] the Burden of Taxes of the Place where he cometh, but living in one or for his Livelihood in one, he is not to be taxed in the other, because Laws ordain Taxes, Impositions and Charges as a Dis­cipline of Subjection particularized to every par­ticular Nation;" Nothing we think can be more clear to our Purpose than this Decision, of Judges, perhaps as learned as ever adorned the English Nation; or in Favor of America in her present Controversy with the Mother State.

Your Excellency says, that by our not [...]istin­guishing between the Crown of England and the Kings and Queens of England in their personal of natural Capacities, we have been led into a fun­damental Error." Upon this very Distinction we have availed ourselves. We have said that our Ancestors considered the Land which they took Possession of in America as out of the Bounds of the Kingdom of England, and out of the Reach and Extent of the Laws of England; and that the King also even in the Act of grant­ing the Charter, considered the [...]errit [...]ry as not within the Realm; that the King had an abso­lute Right in himself to dispose of the Lands, and that this was not disputed by the Nation; nor could the Lands on any solid Grounds be claimed by the Nation, and therefore our An­cestors received the Lands by Grant from the King▪ and at the same Time compacted with him and promised him Homage and Allegiance, not in his publick or politick but natural [Page 101] Capacity only.—If it be difficult for us to show how the King acquired a Title to this Country in his natural Capacity, or separate from his Relation to his Subjects, which we confess, yet we conceive it will be equally difficult for your Excellency to show how the Body Politick and Nation of England acquired it. Our Ance­stors supposed it was acquired by neither; and therefore they declared, as we have before quo­ted from your History, that saving their actual Purchase from the Natives, of the Soil, the Do­minion, the Lordship, and Sovereignty, they had in the Sight of God and Man, no Right and Title to what they poss [...]ssed. How much clear­er [...]hen in natural Reason and Equity must our Title be, who hold Estates dearly p [...]chased at the Expence of our own as well as our Ancestors Labour, and defended by them with [...]reasure and Blood.

Your Excellency has been pleased to co [...]firm, rather than deny or confute a Piece of History which you say we took from an anonimous Pam­phlet, and by which you " [...]ear we have been too easily m [...]sled." It may be gathered from your own Declaration and other Authorities be­sides the [...] Pamphlet, that the House of Commons took Exception, not at the King's having made an absolute Grant of the Territory▪ but at the Claim of an exclusive Right to the Fishery on the Banks and Sea Coast, by Virtue of the Patent. At this you say "the [...]ouse of Commons was ala [...]med, and a B [...]ll was brought in for allo [...]ing a free Fishery." And upon this Occasion [...]our Excellency allows, that "one of [Page 102] the Secretaries of State declared that the Plan­tations were not annexed to the Crown, and so were not within the Jurisdiction of Parliament." If we should concede to what your Excellency supposes might possibly or "perhaps" be the Case, that the Secretary made this Declaration "as his own Opinion," the Event showed that it was the Opinion of the King too; for it is not to be accounted for upon any other Principle, that he would have denied his Royal Assent to a Bill formed for no other Purpose, but to grant his Subjects in England the Privilege of Fishing on the Sea Coasts in America. The Account published by Sir Ferdinando Gorges himself, of the Proceedings of Parliament on this Occasion, your Excellency thinks will remove all Doubt of the Sense of the Nation and of the Patentees of this Patent or Charter in 1620. "This Nar­rative, you say, has all the Appearance of Truth and Sincerity," which we do not deny: And to us it carries this Conviction with it, that "what was objected" in Parliament was, the exclusive Claim of Fishing only. His imagining that he had satisfied the House after divers Attendances, that the Planting a Colony was of much more Consequence than a simple disorderly Course of Fishing, is sufficient for our Conviction. We know that the Nation was at that Time alarmed with Apprehensions of Monopolies; and if the Patent of New-England was presented by the two Houses as a Grievance, it did not show▪ as your Excellency supposes, "the Sense they then had of their Authority over this new-acquired Ter­ritory," but only their Sense of the Grievance of a Monopoly of the Sea.

[Page 103] We are happy to hear your Excellency say, that "our Remarks upon and Construction of the Words not repugnant to the Laws of England, are much the same with those of the Council." It serves to confirm us in our Opinion, in what we take to be the most important Matter of Difference between your Excellency and the two Houses. After saying, that the Statute of 7th and 8th of William and Mary favors the Construction of the Words as intending such Laws of England as are made more immediately to respect us, you tell us, that "the Province Agent Mr. Dummer in his much applauded Defence, says that then a Law of the Plantations may be said to be repug­nant to a Law made in Great-Britain, when it flatly contradicts it so far as the Law made there mentions and relates to the Plantations." This is plain and obvious to common Sense, and there­fore cannot be denied. But if your Excellency will read a Page or two further in that excellent Defence, you will see that he mentions this as the Sense of the Phrase, as taken from an Act of Parliament, rather than as the Sense he would chuse himself to put upon it; and he expresly designs to shew, in Vindication of the Charter, that in that Sense of the Words, there never was a Law made in the Plantations repugnant to the Laws of Great-Britain. He gives another Con­struction much more likely to be the true Intent of the Words; namely, "that the Patentees shall not presume under Colour of their particular Char­ters to make any Laws inconsistent with the Great Charter and other Laws of England, by which the Lives, Liberties, and Properties of English­men are secure [...]." This is the Sense in which [Page 104] our Ancestors understood the Words; and there­fore they were unwilling to conform to the Acts of Trade, and disregarded them till they made Provision to give them Force in the Colony by a Law of their own; saying, that "the Laws of England did not reach America: And those Acts were an Invasion of their Rights, Liberties and Properties," because they were not "represented in Parliament." The Right of being governed only by Laws which were made by Persons in whose Election they had a Voice, they looked up­on as the Foundation of English Liberties. By the Compact with the King in the Charter, they were to be as free in America, as they would have been if they had remained within the Realm; and therefore they freely asserted that they "were to be governed by Laws made by themselves and by Officers chosen by themselves." Mr. Dummer says, "It seems reasonable enough to think that the Crown," and he might have added our An­cestors, "intended by this Injunction to provide for all its Subjects, that they might not be op­pressed by Arbitrary Power—but—being still Subjects, they should be protected by the same mild Laws and enjoy the same happy Govern­ment as if they continued within the Realm." And considering the Words of the Charter in this Light, he looks upon them as designed to be a Fence against Oppression and despotic Power. But the Construction which your Excellency puts upon the Words, reduces us to a State of Vassal­lage, and exposes us to Oppression and despotic Power, whenever a Parliament shall see fit to make Laws for that Purpose and put them in Ex­ecution.

[Page 105] We flatter ourselves that from the large Ex­tracts we have made from your Excellency's Hi­story of the Colony, it appears evidently, that under both Charters it hath been the Sense of the People and of the Government that they were not under the Jurisdiction of Parliament. We pray you again to recur to those Quotations and our Observations upon them: And we wish to have your Excellency's judicious Remarks. When we adduced that History to prove that the Sentiments of private Persons of Influence, four or five Years after the Restoration, were very different from what your Excellency apprehend­ed them to be when you delivered your Speech, you seem to concede to it by [...]elling us "it was, as you take it, from the Principles imbibed in those Times of Anarchy (preceeding the Resto­ration) that they disputed the Authority of Par­liament;" but you add, "the Government would not venture to dispute it." We find in the same History [...] Quotation from a Letter of Mr. Stoughton, dated 17 Years after the Resto­ration, mentioning "the Country's not taking Notice of the Acts of Navigation to observe them." And it was, as we take it, after that Time, that the Government declared in a Letter to their Agents, that they had not submitted to them; and they ventured to "dispute" the Jurisdiction, asserting that they apprehended the Acts to be an Invasion of the Rights, Liberties and Properties of the Subjects of his Majesty in the Colony, they not being represented in Parliament; and that "the Laws of England did not reach America." It very little avails in Proof that they conceded to the Supreme Authority of Parliament, their [Page 106] telling the Commissioners "that the Act of Na­vigation had for some Years before been observ­ed here, that they knew not of its being greatly violated, and that such Laws as appeared to be against it were repealed." It may as truly be said now, that the Revenue Acts are observed by some of the People of this Province; but it can­not be said that the Government and People of this Province have conceded that the Parliament had Authority to make such Acts to be observed here. Neither does their Declarations to the Commissioners that such Laws as appeared to be against the Act of Navigation were repealed, prove their Concession of the Authority of Parliament, by any means so much as their making Provision for giving Force to an Act of Parliament within this Province, by a deliberate and solemn Act or Law of their own, proves the contrary.

You tell us, that "the Government four or five Years before the Charter was vacated more explicitly," that is than by a Conversation with the Commissioners, "acknowledged the Autho­rity of Parliament, and voted that their Gover­nor should take the Oath required of him faith­fully to do and perform all Matters and Things enjoined him by the Acts of Trade." But does this, may it please your Excellency, show their explicit Acknowledgment of the Authority of Parliament? Does it not rather show directly the contrary: For, what need could there be for their Vote or Authority to require him to take the Oath already required of him by the [...]ct of Parliament, unless both he and they judged that an Act of Parliament was not of Force sufficient [Page 107] to bind him to take such Oath? We do not de­ny, but on the contrary are fully persuaded that your Excellency's Principles in Government are still of the same with what they appear to be in the History; for you there say, that "the pass­ing this Law plainly shows the wrong Sense they had of the Relation they stood in to England." But we are from hence convinced that your Ex­cellency when you wrote the History was of our Mind in this Respect, that our Ancestors in passing the Law discovered their Opinion that they were without the Jurisdiction of Parliament: For it was upon this Principle alone that they shewed the wrong Sense they had in your Excel­lency's Opinion, of the Relation they stood in to England.

Your Excellency in your second Speech con­descends to point out to us the Acts and Doings of the General Assembly which relates to Acts of Parliament, which you think "demonstrates that they have been acknowledged by the Assem­bly or submitted to by the People:" Neither of which in our Opinion shows that it was the Sense of the Nation, and our Predecessors when they first took Possession of this Plantation or Colony by a Grant and Charter from the Crown, that they were to remain subject to the supreme Au­thority of the English Parliament.

Your Excellency seems chiefly to rely upon our Ancestors▪ after the Revolution "proclaiming King William and Queen Mary in the Room o [...] King James," and taking the Oaths to them, "the Alteration of the Form of Oaths from [Page 108] Time to Time," and finally "the Ebablishment of the Form which every one of us has complied with, as the Charter in express Terms requires and makes our Duty." We do not know that it has ever been a Point in Dispute whether the Kings of England were ipso facto Kings in and over this Colony or Province. The Compact was made between King Charles the First, his Heirs and Successors, and the Governor and Company, their Heirs and Successors. It is easy upon this Principle to account for the Acknow­ledgment of and Submission to King William and Queen Mary as Successors of Charles the First, in the Room of King James: Besides it is to be considered, that the People in the Colony as well as in England had suffered under the TYRANT James, by which he had alike for­feited his Right to reign over both. There had been a Revolution here as well as in England. The Eyes of the People here were upon William and Mary, and the News of their being pro­claimed in England was as your Excellency's History tells us, "the most joyful News ever received in New-England." And if they were not ploclaimed here "by virtue of an Act of the Colony," it was, as we think may be con­cluded from the Tenor of your History; with the general or universal Consent of the People as apparently as if "such Act had passed." It is Consent alone, that makes any human Laws bind­ing; and as a learned Author observes, a purely voluntary Submission to an Act, because it is highly in our Favor and for our Benefit, is in all Equity and Justice to be [...] as not at all proceeding from the Right we include in the [Page 109] Legislators, that they thereby obtain an Authority over us, and that ever hereafter we must obey them of Duty. We would observe that one of the first Acts of the General Assembly of this Province since the presen [...] Charter, was an Act requiring the taking the Oaths mentioned in an Act of Parliament, to which you refer us: For what Purpose was this Act of the Assembly passed, if it was the Sense of the Legislators that the Act of Parliament was in Force in the Province. And at the same Time another Act was made for the Establishment of other Oaths necessary to be taken; both which Acts have the Royal Sanction, and are now in Force. Your Excellency says, that when the Colony applied to King William for a second Charter, they knew the Oath the King had taken, which was to govern them ac­cording to the Statutes in Parliament, and (which your Excellency here omits) the Laws and Customs of the same. By the Laws and Customs of Parliament, the People of England freely debate and consent to such Statutes as are made by themselves or their chosen Represen [...]a­tives. This is a Law or Custom which all Man­kind may justly challenge as their inherent Right. According to this Law the King has an undoubted Right to govern us. Your Excellency upon Recollection surely will not infer from hence, that it was the Sense of our Predecessors that there was to remain a Supremacy in the English Parliament, or a full Power and Authority to mak [...] Laws binding upon us in all Cases whatever, in that Parliament where we cannot debate and deliberate ▪upon the Necessity or Expediency of any Law, and consequently without our Consent, [Page 110] and as it may probably happen destructive of the first Law of Society, the Good of the Whole. You tell us that "after the Assumption of all the Powers of Government, by Virtue of the new Charter, an Act passed for the reviving for a limited Time all the local Laws of the Massa­chusetts-Bay and New-Plymouth respectively, not repugnant to the Laws of England. And at the same Session an Act passed establishing Naval Officers, that all undue Trading contrary to an Act of Parliament—may be prevented." Among the Acts that were then revived we may reason­ably suppose was that whereby Provision was made to give Force to this Act of Parliament in the Province. The Establishment thereof of the Naval Officers w [...]s to aid the Execution of an Act of Parliament for the Observance of which within the Colony the Assembly had before made P [...]vision after free Debates with their own Con­sent and by their own Act.

The Act of Parliament passed in 1741, for putting [...] to several unwarrantable Schemes, mentioned [...]y your Excellency was designed for the [...]eral Good, and if the Validity of it was not disputed, it cannot be urged as a Concession of the supreme Authority, to make Laws binding on us in all Ca [...]es whatever: But if the Design of it was for the general Benefit of the Province, it was in one Respect at least greatly complained of by the Persons more immedia [...]ely affected by it▪ and to remedy the Inconvenience, the Le­gislative of this Province pass'd an Act, directly [...] with it. Which is the strongest evi­dence, that altho' they may have submitted sub [Page 111] si [...]entio to some [...]cts of Parliament that they con­ceived might operate for their Benefit, they did not conceive themselves bound by any of its Acts which they judged would operate to the Injury even of Individuals.

Your Excellency has not thought proper to attempt to confute the Reasoning of a learned Writer on the Laws of Nature and Nations, quo­ted by us on this Occasion, to shew that the Au­thority of the Legislature does not extend so far as the Fundamentals of the Constitution. We are unhappy in not having your Remarks upon the Reasoning of that great Man; and until it is confuted, we shall remain of the Opinion, that the Fundamentals of the Constitution being ex­cepted from the Commission of the Legislators, none of the Acts or Doings of the General As­sembly, however deliberate and solemn, could avail to change them, if the People have not in very express Terms given them the Power to do it; and that much less ought their Acts and Do­ings however numerous, which barely refer to Acts of Parliament made expresly to relate to us, to be taken as an Acknowledgment that we are subject to the Supreme Authority of Parlia­ment.

We shall sum up our own sentiments in the Words of that learned Writer Mr. Hooker, in his Ecclesiastical Policy, as quoted by Mr. Locke, "The lawful Power of making Laws to com­mand whole political Societies of Men, belong­ing so properly to the same intire Societies, that for any Prince or Potentate of what Kind soever, [Page 112] to exercise the same of himself, and not from express Commission immediately and personally received from God, is no better than mere Tyranny. Laws therefore they are not which publick [...]p­probation hath not made so, for "Laws human of what Kind soever are available by Consent." "Since Men naturally have no full and perfect Power to command whole politick Multitudes of Men, therefore, utterly without our Consent we could in such Sort be at no Man's Command­ment living. And to be commanded we do not consent, when that Society whereof we be a Part, hath at any Time before consented." We think your Excellency has not proved, either that the Colony is a Part of the politick Society of Eng­land, or that it has ever consented that the Par­liament of England or Great Britain should make Laws binding upon us in all Cases whatever, whether made expresly to refer to us or not.

We cannot help before we conclude, expressing our great Concern, that your Excellency has thus repeatedly, in a Manner insisted upon our free Sentiments on Matters of so delicate a Na­ture, and weighty Importance. The Question appears to us to be no other, than Whether we are the Subjects of absolute unlimitted Power, or of a free Government formed on the Principles of the English Constitution. If your Excellen­cy's Doctrine be true the People of this Province hold their Lands of the Crown and People of England, and their Lives, Liberties and Proper­ties are at their Disposal▪ and that even by Compact and their own Consent. They are sub­ject to the King as the Head alterius Populi of [Page 113] another People, in whose Legislative they have no Voice or Interest. They are indeed said to have a Constitution and a Legislative of their own, but your Excellency has explained it into a mere Phantom; limitted, controuled, super­ceded and nullified at the Will of another. Is this the Constitution which so charmed our An­cestors, that as your Excellency has informed us, they kept a Day of solemn Thanksgiving to Al­mighty God when they received it? And were they Men of so little Discernment, such Children in Understanding, as to please themselves with the Imagination that they were blessed with the same Rights and Liberties which natural born Subjects in England enjoyed, when at the same Time they had fully consented to be ruled and ordered by a Legislative a Thousand Leagues distant from them, which cannot be supposed to be sufficiently acquainted with their Circumstan­ces, if concerned for their Interest, and in which they cannot be in any Sense represented.

I THINK it incumbent on me to make some Observations, before I put an End to the Session, upon your last Messages to me on the Subject of your Constitutional Dependance upon the Supreme Authority of the British Dominions. As the Council admit a partial Dependence, and suppose it to be consistent with the Principles and Nature of Government, I shall only endeavour very briefly to shew the contrary.

In your first Message, Gentlemen of the Coun­cil, you made some Strictures upon the Nature of the Supreme Authority in Government, both divine and human, the latter of which you deter­mined could not be absolute and unlimitted. I thought the Di [...]inction between divine and human Power not pertinent, and in Answer to you, I only remarked, that I had given you no Reason to suppose I in [...]ended a more absolute Power in Parliament than what is founded in the Nature of Government, and this, in your second Message, you construe an Acquiescence in your Reasons, which it certainly was not. You go on however to explain your Meaning by asserting, that "what is usually denominated the Supre [...]e Authority of a Nation must be limited in its Acts to the Ob­jects [Page 115] that are properly or constitutionally Cogni­zable by it."

Before you thus defined the Nature of Supreme Authority, I wish you had considered more fully what Objects there can be in a Government which are not cognizable by such Authority. You instance in a subordinate Power in Government which, whilst it keeps within its Limits, is not subject to the Controul of the supreme Power. Is there no Inconsistency in supposing a subordi­nate Power without a Power superior to it? Must it not so far as it is without Controul be, itself, Supreme?

It is essential to the Being of Government that a Power should always exist which no other Power within such Government can have Right to withstand or controul: Therefore, when the word Power relates to the Supreme Authority of Government it must be understood absolute and unlimited.

If we cannot agree in these Principles which no sensible Writer upon Government has before denied, and if you are still of Opinion that two Jurisdictions, each of them having a Share in the Supreme Power, are compatible in the same State, it can be to no Purpose to Reason or Argue upon the other Parts of your Message. Its enough to observe that this Disagreement in our Principles will have its Influence upon all the Deductions which are made from them.

[Page 116] I will also consider the last Message from you, Gentlemen of the House of Representatives, upon the same Subject, in as few words as the Importance of it will admit.

You say you have not discovered that the Prin­ciples advanced by the Town of Boston are un­warrantable by the Constitution. Whether they are or are not▪ will depend upon the Determina­tion of the Point which you are now controvert­ing. Your not having discover'd that the other Towns and Districts in the Province, were in­vited by the Town of Boston to adopt their Prin­ciples, must proceed from Inattention. Have not the Doings of that Town been sent through the Province, accompanied with a circular Letter, "desiring a free Communication of Sentiments," and, among other Expressions of the like Ten­dency, lamenting the Extinction of Ardor for civil and religious Liberty if it should be the ge­neral Voice of the Province, that the Rights as stated do not belong to them, and trusting that this cannot be the Cas [...]. If this is not inviting to adopt their Principles. I have mistaken their Sense and Meaning. The consequent Doings of so many other Towns shew that they under­stood them as I have done. I am s [...]re I have no Disposition to represent unfavourably the Do­ings of any Town in the Province.

You assert "that it is the indisputable Right of all or any of His Majesty's Subjects in this Province regularly and orderly to meet together to sta [...]e the Grievances th [...]y labour under." &c. I never [...] it. Does it follow that it is re­gular [Page 117] and orderly for the Inhabitants of Towns, in their Corporate Cap [...]ity, to meet and deter­mine upon Points which the Law gives them no Power to act upon? You have not asserted that it is, but you have no declared that it is not, as I thought a Regard to the Peace and Order of the Province made our Duty.

If the Fundamentals of our Government were not disputed, these Irregularities would appear to you in a very strong Light and you would join in discountenancing them.

To support your Principle that you hold your Lands and d [...]rive your Authority of Government from the Kings of England and not from the Crown of England you have very largely handled the Doctrine of Feudal Tenures. I observed to you in my last Speech that you had been misled by the Authority of an anonimous Pamphlet. I am now obliged to observe that you are again misled by having a general View of this Doctrine brought before you, as it respects States or Go­vernments under absolute Monarchs, and not as it is connected with or grafted upon the English Constitution▪ I shall not therefore spend Time in examining the Principles of your System, it being immaterial to the Point between us whether they are just or not. Instead thereof I wil [...] in as brief and clear Terms as I can, lay this Doc­trine before you as it relates to the Government o [...] England.

Let me then observe to you▪ that from the Na­ture [...] Government a Suprem [...] Legislative Power [Page 118] must always exist over all the Parts and all the Affairs of every Dominion—that in absolute Mo­narchies the Legislative and executive Powers are united in the Prince or Monarch—that in the English Constitution there is, and always has been, a Legislative Power distinct from the regal or executive Power—that the Feudal System, in your View of it and without correcting, could not be introduced into the English Government without changing the Constitution from a mixed to an absolute monarchical Government—that this System nevertheless has been introduced, the Constitution of a mixed Government still re­maining, and consequently the System has been corrected or altered. What this Alteration has been will appear from Historical Facts. Before the Reign of William the First the Traces of Feudal Tenure are faint, the Evidence of a Le­gislative Power, an Assembly or Council of Wise Men, distinct from the Regal Power is strong and sufficient. After William had obtained the Crown, the other Nations of Europe being under this System, & particularly his Dominions in Normandy, and Wars being more frequent & Commerce small, and the Means of furnishing Money, the Sinews of War, difficult if not impracticable, meerly for the Defence of the Kingdom this Polity was so for established as that all the Landholders were made to contribute, by Military or other Services, to the Defence of the State, and for this Purpose, and by a Faction only, the Lands were in Form acknowledged to have been originally in the King and held of him by his Subjects, and by this Form subjected to a supposed just Proportion of the De­fence and Support of the Kingdom. This [...]sta­blishment [Page 119] appears to have been made, not by an Act of Regal Power alone but by the Authority of the great Council of the Nation or Assembly of the Realm, and the Legislative Authority still remained, according to its Nature, paramount and above all other Powers in the Dominion, and ac­cordingly from Time to Time the Abuses of the Feudal Power either in the Sovereign or in such as held under him were corrected by the Supreme Legislative, and Magna Charta itself was framed and agreed upon, principally if not altogether for this Purpose. In succeeding Ages, as Commerce and M [...]ney increased and the Means of support­ing War became more easy, these Military Ser­vices were gradually taken away, either, by Pur­chase or commuting for other Services or certain Rents, so that at the Period when America was first granted, the Remains were inconsiderable and the Lands of the Kingdom were held, generally, by what is called Socage Tenure or, in other Words, an Acknowledgment of Fidelity to the Sovereign, and a certain Rent which was in Name only, or of Value so inconsiderable as not to be demanded. The original Claim in the Sovereign, whether at first a Fiction or not, so far remained as that all Forfeitures, all Escheats▪ all new discovered Lands accrued to him▪ unless the Supreme Legis­lative should limit the Right to them, or otherwise dispose of them. This was the State of Feudal Tenure in England at the Time when the first Cha [...]r was granted, and the Difference between your System and mine will appear by this fami­liar Instance: Louis the 13. of France, I think the same Year the Massachusetts Patentees obtained the Grant of that Colony, by a Royal [Page 120] Edict granted to one Hundred Associates the Country of Canada, with Powers of Government and all the Privileges of natural born Subjects of France to all who should go and Inhabit or be Born there, with other very great Powers and Privileges. This, then, appears to be the diffe­rent State of the People of the two Colonies. Louis, being an absolute Monarch, the Regal and Legislative Power were united in him. The Inhabitants of Canada therefore were subject to him and to every succeeding King of France as their Supreme Lord who, by Virtue of his uncon­troulable Power, might at any Time revoke the Royal Edict at Pleasure, or dissolve any Charter whatsoever even though like the famous Edict of Nantes it had been declared irrevocable. Charles, having in him the regal Power only, could Grant no more than was in him, and the Legislative Power which was in the Parliament must still remain there, and consequently the Sub­jects of England continued when in the Colony still subject to the regal constitutional Power of Charles and the supreme Legislative Power of Parliament. And, I think, nothing is more cer­tain than that the constitutional Restraint of the regal Power in Charles prevented the Charter from being revoked and annulled in less than Ten Years after the Date of it.

If this brief Account of Feudal Tenure, as it is Part of the English Constitution, be just, as I shall think it is until I have better Authority than any I have yet seen to the contrary, the Fabrick which you have raised will still fail of Support, for it wholly depends upon very different Principles, [Page 121] and upon what you hope I do not mean to intro­duce, viz. the Feudal System in its Perfection. If this Support fails, there is but little Occasion for me to remark upon the other Parts of your Mes­sage, and I shall pass them over, except such as may tend to make wrong Impressions upon any unwary Readers.

You cannot conceive "why the King has not the same Right to alienate and dispose of Coun­tries acquired by the Discovery of his Subjects as he has to restore upon a Treaty of Peace Coun­tries acquired in War carried on at the Charge of the Nation, or to sell and deliver up any Part of his Dominions against the general Sense of the Nation." I will venture to conjecture a Reason. By the English Constitution the sole Power of making War and Peace is in the King. It often happens that the restoring and ceding Acquisitions made in War is absolutely necessary to the Re­establishment of Peace, and if the King was [...]e­strained from such Restorations or Cessions an un­successful War might be perpetuated to the De­struction of the Kingdom. This Power there­fore seems necessarily to result from this Prero­gative of the Crown. And for selling any Part of the Dominions against the general Sense of the Nation I never supposed it to be a Part of the Prerogative, but have called it an Act of Power, by which I thought no candid Reader would un­derstand any Thing but meer Power.

Your Attempt to shew that new discovered Countries do not become Part of the State, from the Authority of Pu [...]endorff, &c. will fail, be­cause [Page 122] the Instance given by him of a Colony erected into a separate Common Wealth plainly appears by the Context to be by the Leave or [...]nsent of the Parent State, and it does not ap­pear that the other Cases were not so.

Your Remark upon the Authority I bring to shew that the Colony, being feudatory, is under the Government of the King's Laws, is very sin­gular. You suppose it must mean the King's Laws absolutely, or as you explain it, not the Laws of Parliament. Do any of you remem­ber ever to have seen the Expression, the King's Laws, meaning the King of England, used in any other Sense than the Laws of the Realm? You say I have not named the Authority. The Case I refer to is the King against Crowle, in the 2d. Vol Burrow's Reports, and for the Autho­rity, which you will find mentioned there, I am not able to name a greater.

I would pass over in Silence your Attempt to shew that Allegiance is due to the natural Per­son and not to the Body Politick of the King, if I had not been well informed that the artificial Reasoning of Lord Chief Justice Coke upon the Doctrine of Allegiance, in the noted Case of Cal­vin▪ as you have recited it, had great Weight with some of the Members of the House. But have you recited this Case truly? After all the Re­finements on this Subject does it appear that they can amount to any Thing more than that Alle­giance is not due to the Politick Capacity only? And is it not expresly said that the natural Person of the King is ever accompanied with the Politick [Page 123] Capacity, and the Politick Capacity as it were ap­propriated to the Natural Capacity? Or have you any clear Idea of Allegiance to a King in his natural Capacity without any Relation to his political Capacity? From this Authority misun­derstood you infer that I am mistaken in suppo­sing your Allegiance to be due to the Crown of England. Without any Refinements, it is plain that it was one Condition, on the Performance whereof the first Charter depended, that Allegi­ance should be borne to King Charles his Heirs and Successors. Wherever therefore the Succes­sion to the Crown shall go there Allegiance is to follow. The Condition in the second Charter is the same, and this is enough for my Purpose, which was to shew that in whatever Person the Regal Authority shall be, there your Allegiance is due. I wish you had omitted all you have said upon this Subject, for neither the Reasoning of Lord Coke, nor the Declarations of the Jud­ges, in any Measure tend to the Purpose for which you produce them.

Your Assertion that Parliament, in regulating the Fishery, had nothing in View but to prevent a Monopoly of the Sea, and claimed no Authority over the Plantations or Lands in America, has only your own Authority to support it. It appears from the Debates in Parliament, that it was the Refusal of the Patentees to suffer Fish to be dried upon the Land within their Patent, by any Person who had not Licence from them, which was complained of as a Grievance, and the Bill was brought in to remove this Grievance: The King might very well refuse his Assent, not be­cause [Page 124] Parliament had no Jurisdiction, but because he did not think fit to join with the Lords and Commons in an Act which invalidated or abridg­ed those Privileges in a Patent of Lands which by his Royal Prerogative he had a Right to grant.

I will make no particular Remarks upon those Parts of your Message which relate to the Sense the People have had of their Constitution, as there can be no End to Disputes upon Facts which by small Deviations from the true State of them may be made to serve one Side or the other.

It is evident that the first Settlers of this Colony left▪ England with a just Sense of their Depen­dance—that the Sense continued until the Prin­ciples of Anarchy in England spread in America, and it is conceded that these Principles were avowed by many of the Inhabitants here for near twenty Years after they were exploded in Eng­land. It is equally certain, that at the Time of the Revolution the People returned to a just Sense of the Supremacy of Parliament, and I think I may very sa [...]ely say that the oldest Person in the Province has never heard the Supremacy called in Question until within a few Years past.

You again express your Concern that I should thus repeatedly insist upon your giving your free Sentiments on so delicate a Subject as the Autho­rity of Parliament. In the Beginning of your Message you [...] the Town of Boston & the other Towns in the P [...]vince, which have met to­gether and [...] upon the same Subject, and [...] their P [...]dings Matter of R [...]cord [Page 125] and published them in News-Papers; and yet in the Close of it you ass [...]rt that the Subject is too delicate and of too great Importance for you to consider. Certain [...]y then it must have been ex­tremely irregular in the Towns to take upon them separ [...]e [...]y to determine Points which they had no Authority to determine, and in this Way to influence if not determine the Acts and Doings of their Representatives in General Assembly, who cannot have the same Freedom of thinking and acting, [...] their Constituents have deter­mined and resolved, as they had before.

Gentlemen of the Council and House of Representatives,

I am sensible that nice Distinctions of civil Rights and legal Constitutions are far above the Reach of the Bulk of Mankind to comprehend. There are, however, a few plain fundamental Principles of Government which carry within themselves such Evidence as cannot be resisted, and are no sooner proposed than assented to—Such as these—That in every Government there must be somewhere a supreme uncontroulable Power, an absolute Authority to decide and de­termine—That two such Powers cannot coexist, but necessarily will make two distinct States—That in a State of Society we give up Part of our natural Lib [...]rty in order to [...]cure that legal Freedom which it is the great End of Govern­ment to maintain and preserve—That a Right in Individuals or Parts of a Government to judge of the Decisions of the Supreme Authority and [Page 126] to submit or not submit as they think proper, can­not consist with a State of Government and must work the Dissolution of it. Whilst these Princi­ples had their due Influence we enjoyed all that Freedom and all those other Blessings which a State of Government will admit of. Our Con­nection with our Parent State secured these Bles­sings to us, and by Means of a nominal Depen­dence we possessed as great a Share of real Free­dom as the Parent State itself upon which we are said to depend.

I have laid before you, Gentlemen, what ap­peared to me to be the true Constitution of the Province, and recommended an Adherence to it because I believed it would restore us to and continue us in that happy State in which we flou­rished so long a Course of Years.

Certainly it is of the utmost Importance to you that these Points should be settled, for I know of no Maxim in the Law of greater Truth than this. Where the Constitution is contested and the Laws are vague and uncertain, there, will be the greatest Slavery.