YOU have in these words some account of the heavy sentence, and bitter ago­nies of Cain, after the commission of a crime the most horrid upon reflection, and most shocking to human nature, the destruction of a fellow-creature—the image of God in one sense—and, the wickedness of his disposition excepted, in every other respect, the ^* image of himself.

[Page 6] WHAT adds something to the terror na­turally conceived upon such an occasion, was the novelty of the offence, it being the first transgression of the kind that we read of in history; and, therefore, not only more affecting to the murderer himself, but also to the beholders, who, from this first outrage upon humanity, must begin to look upon the world as a cursed habitation, having such a spectacle before their eyes as man destroying man—creatures the first in dignity in the visible creation, just re­cent, as it were, from the hands of their Creator, and yet the one defeating the purpose of the other's being, and extin­guishing in his brother, and that brother's posterity, a then considerable part of hu­man race.

WAS the first state of nature then, a state of war? And men in single settlements, and occupations, necessarily in a state of danger and enmity? Could religion do no­thing to prevent bloodshed?—And was the only remedy to be found for these evils the friendly succour of a community, and the additional power derived from association, and a common-wealth?

THIS should seem, by what is here re­lated, to have been the case; and that in those very early times the instinct of na­ture, [Page 7] assisted by the dawnings of reason, pointed out to men, that religion, unless it were genuine, could not of itself be de­pended upon as an instrument of peace and quietness: But that the chief, if not the only public security for their persons, or property, was to be found in the whole­some laws of a good community, it ap­pearing from this history, that religion might be productive of divisions, and con­sequently of disorders. For by what we can gather from hence, it seems in one family to have been distinguished into two kinds, namely the religion of those, who called themselves the sons of God, and the religion of those were styled the sons of men; of one of which sects Abel was sup­posed to have been the head; and of the other Cain; and their opinions in this re­spect most likely opposite: It being very evident from the relation of the fact, that it was some matter of religion, which had made the difference between the two brethern.

THE neutrals therefore (for such a party, there is reason from the context to believe there was) observing, that though religion, when true and genuine, may be a strong and natural obligation upon the wise and good, who see it's foundations, yet as it [Page 8] may be sometimes false in itself, and then attended with superstition, enthusiasm, and persecution; at other times, though good in it's kind, yet assented to only in appear­ance, and then delusive and hypocritical, not operating to good works, in which respect we find, that the religion of Cain, notwithstanding his sacrifice, had been defective, they grew diffident of such a precarious insurance for common honesty, choosing rather to secure themselves by uniting in society, building cities, and establishing rules, and ordinances for the defence of their persons, and properties, and lodging a power in the hands of some public officers for upholding and main­taining the laws, which were to protect them.

FROM the regulations of some of these well ordered societies, who by reason of the growing barbarity, and insecurity of the times, might be very vigilant against a fugitive, Cain seems to have had the great­est apprehension of danger— I shall be a fugitive, says he and a vagabond in the earth, and it shall come to pass that every one, that findeth me, shall slay me.

THIS forlorn and restless condition of a fugitive, driven from place to place like a wild beast from the desert, and constantly [Page 9] denied reception, is no more than the na­tural consequence of committing murder. The whole species are alarmed at the ap­proach of such a monster, they shun him as a lion, that spares no man in his rage, arm themselves against him as a public enemy, that can neither be trusted nor re­claimed; and if they slay him, think that they are doing God service, by removing the common disturber of the peace of man­kind.

CAIN, therefore, to avoid the dangers, which surrounded him in the parts already inhabited, went and dwelt in the land of Nod, perhaps a desert, so called from his wanderings, whose situation at this present time is hard to be exactly determined. All that we are told of it is, that it lay to the east of Eden, and served him for an hiding-place, till by time and recollection he could extricate himself from his present difficulties.

IN order to which, he forms an alliance by marriage, and, as the only place of se­curity, builds a city of his own, and ga­thers his discendants into a community, after the example of the more regular part of the species, who, as they are described in this chapter to have already put them­selves [Page 10] into a posture of defence, seem to have been before-hand with him in this invention.

THUS much then being premised con­cerning the natural history of mankind from their very origin: I shall take occa­sion, from a view of the polities of these early ages to prove.

First. THAT (according to the laws of nature) the only cause or motive for form­ing societies was in order to procure, by mutual assistance, and friendship, a greater degree of comfort, security, and peace, than could be obtained in a solitary, dis­united state.

Secondly. THAT murderers being guilty of opposing and defeating these ends of so­ciety, declare themselves ipso facto to be public enemies; and consequently, that every one, who findeth them has a right to slay them.

Thirdly. THAT a chief magistate, or Go­vernor, refusing to execute that right for the subject, and opposing him at the same time in the use of it, doth thereby dissolve the original compact of the state; loses all title to the obedience of his people; and leaves them, as once, again in a state of nature, to take their own measures, and shift for themselves.

[Page 11] BUT first, I am to prove, that the only cause or motive for forming societies, was in order to procure, by mutual assistance and friendship, a greater degree of comfort, security and peace, than could be obtained in a solitary disunited state.

AND here, as almost all our appetites, pursuits, and faculties, speak some depen­dance on our fellow-creatures, or attach­ment to them, it might be taken for gran­ted, that man must want much of the natu­ral happiness, which God intented for him, and his own being requires, when he is excluded from society.

'MORE things are necessary,' says an excellent Philosopher, ‘to sustain life, or at least to make it in any degree pleasant and desirable, than any one man can make or provide for himself, merely from his own labour and ingenuity. Meat, drink, cloathing and house, and that frugal fur­niture which is absolutely requisite, with a little necessary physick, suppose many arts and trades, many heads and many hands. If he could make a shift in time of health, to live as a wild man under the covering of trees and rocks, feeding upon such fruits, herbs and roots, and other things, as the earth should afford in re­turn for his labour, or happen spontane­ously [Page 12] to present him; yet what could he do in sickness and old age, when he would not be able to stir abroad, to collect the gifts of nature and enjoy her beneficence?’

THIS lonely and helpless condition, plainly shewing, that an union with his fel­low-creatures is extremely necessary to the convenience and comfort of every human creature; I shall lay down two maxims, which may serve as principles to regulate that union, and render it subservient to human happiness.

THE first is, that society without benevo­lence can never preserve this union.

THE second, that society without benevo­lence will make men more unhappy, than if they had never been at all united.

THE first observation is true. For it is not the forming themselves into a body, that can keep men united. A collected number may be called a community, and while they remain together, they have the appearance of such: But if their be want­ing an union of hearts and affections, they want the essence of society. Like the par­ticles in a thread of sand, though they ap­pear to be together, they are really sepa­rate, and but one remove from dissolution.

FOR men must come together either upon [Page 13] good designs to each other, or upon bad: The former not being here supposed, the latter must take their place; and as bad designs can have nothing for their object but hurt or destruction, with either of these society cannot subsist.

FOR if the first formers of human society when herded with savages, removed from amongst them with a view to security and better treatment, and missed of their aim, finding no better accommodation than they left, does not the cause still subsist, why they should remove again? The same savage principles remaining, of unbounded self-interest, and rapine, will produce the same savage actions; defeat the end of the new society, and drive them for ever to other settlements, but never preserve them in any.

BECAUSE such principles must occasion continual struggles and convulsions, and fill the world with acts of violence and in­justice, the strong still oppressing and de­vouring the weak. The consequence of which must be broils, and bloodshed in particular rencounters; or a general civil war; or else a lingering declension of the state, the weakest members decaying first.

NOT that the disease will stop, with the loss of these; the few, who survived the [Page 14] pillage and destruction of their fellow-creatures, through dread and jealousy of each other, must be forced to separate, securing themselves, as they can, against the attacks of that uncharitable cruel tem­per, which lessened their number at the first.

UPON this state of misery and confusion which must necessarily ensue when a com­munity is broken up, by the unnatural conduct of it's members in not pursuing the welfare of the whole, but their private animosities, and private interests, I cannot but make my second observation, in effect to this purpose.

II. THAT the unfortunate people, who were led to compose such a society, are made more unhappy by their conjunction, than if they had never been united.

FOR the real end of society being mu­tual help and assistance, people who come into it, possessed with such a fond and honest notion, are apt to require something more to their subsistance, than a cloath­ing of skins, and the roots, and herbs, of an hermit: Being now consorted, as they think, with reasonable creatures, and not amongst the beasts of the field, they natural­ly expect more from them, than from sa­vages, and have made their happiness de­pend, in great measure, as in societies it [Page 15] necessarily must, upon the good offices they are to receive from others; but the want of charity, stops all interchange of kindness, and reduces them to a worse state than that of the hermit, who being bred to misery, never expected any one's assistance, while these in a just hope of help from their fellow-creatures are lamentably lost, like the Mariner, who perishes in the sight of shore, within the assistance of his friends.

IT is this disappointment of expected help that doubles the sorrowful sighing of the prisoners, that provokes afresh the wi­dow's tears, and orphan's cries, that deep­ens the groans of the miserable, and adds a more piercing accent to all their com­plaints.

IN these, and such like circumstances, when people find all hopes of succour from mankind eluded, and withal receive griev­ous injuries from others, which they could never have received from themselves; it is no wonder that they grew weary of their own species, and prefer solitude to society.

IT is upon these occasions that we read in history of the separation of particular persons, and sometimes of the secession of an whole multitude.

[Page 16] THUS, for instance, Timon, the honest Athenian, whose love of justice and plain dealing had led him into many a snare in his intercourse with a corrupt, deceitful, rotten-hearted people, and whose resent­ment upon that account acquired him the name of the man-hater, after he had been long credulous and benevolent to his own hurt, retired at length from the generation of vipers, and left them to sting each other.

AND thus, in the first period of the Ro­man common-wealth, the commons, op­pressed and wounded to the heart by in­juries, came to a determination to break up the state, and to leave the city; which revolution would certainly have taken place, had they not been soothed by the temper and sagacity of Agrippa, and lured by the promises of better usage.

SUCH passages as these are recorded in history, and where that has been silent, the dens and caves of the earth, the monu­ments of inhumanity in savage countries, are a testimony to the world, that people look upon a state of solitude, however contrary to the proper state of human na­ture, to be yet a better condition than they can expect to find in a bad society.

AND yet it has been observed before, from the situation and pursuits of men, [Page 17] that he is a social creature: Of conse­quence, without some union and inter­course with his fellow-creatures, his life must be very destitute and very miserable. The sum of the matter then is this, that if you take away affection from mankind, let them live how they will, they must live in misery.

II. But what I have hitherto advanced is only a step towards the proof of my se­cond proposition, touching the legality of killing murderers:

FOR if society cannot subsist without common friendship; how much less can it subsist, if it harbour in it common enemies?

THE matters urged in proof of my first proposition plainly shew, that the end and design of forming societies, was for the sake of procuring a greater degree of com­fort, security, and peace:

BUT murderers, being guilty of oppo­sing and defeating all these ends, declare themselves ipso facto, or by the very deed, to be public enemies: Therefore, as every member of a community is interested in the public peace, his own being bound up, and included in that of the public, it fol­lows, that every member of a community has a right to slay a murderer.

[Page 18] AND that the ancient practice supported people in this right, may be plainly ga­thered from the conversation of Cain, and GOD's reply to it, as a thing established—'therefore,' says he, (i. e.) ‘because the thing is so, as you represent it; that, by common custom of the world, every one may kill you, that meets you, I will inter­pose my authority; and, by punishing you in my own way, that is, by setting as a mark, my curse upon you, I will take the execution of vengeance upon myself.’ The vengeance you see was due, and in the common course of things would certainly have been executed in the usual manner, but for the interposition of divine authority.

FOR by the law of nature, no human law­giver or ruler can remit the earthly or tempo­ral punishment due to murder, unless so im­powered by an act of the whole community; or screen an offender of that sort, if any one individual demand his punishment, for the reasons before produced. Because a mur­derer is a public enemy, that is, an enemy to every individual, as well as to the com­munity. To demonstrate this more par­ticularly—It appears from what has been said, that the end and design of society is to procure to mankind, by mutual assistance and friendship, a greater degree of security, [Page 19] peace and comfort, than in a solitary state they could expect to possess.

WHOSOEVER, therefore, by his actions shall declare himself an enemy to those ends, doth at the same time declare himself a public enemy: For he is an enemy to the public tranquility.

THIS character may be justly fixed upon a man, not only when he disturbs a multitude at once; but even when he makes an attack upon a single person; if that attack be such as deprives a person of his being, or even of his well-being. For it makes society no lon­ger a place of security; and therefore it puts every individual into the same state of dan­ger; though real destruction may as yet have affected but few. In this general alarm, then, or appearance of danger, every man has a right to put himself into a state of defence; and as his own security is inclu­ded in that of the public; to oppose and destroy that object, which puts his own secu­rity to the hazard by disturbing the public peace.

HE has a right therefore, to destroy a mur­derder for destroying the public security: Because an attempt of that sort in destroy­ing his own security, as a private man, the case is alarming to every individual, as well as of the body politic: And therefore, be­side [Page 20] the power of acting in conjunction with the community, as in other cases, against a public enemy; he has a right in this case, to oppose the public enemy, as a single man; which is a privilege, which he enjoys by the right of self defence.

To deny, that a man is possessed of such a power as this, is only the doctrine of ty­rants and traitors, whose crime no punish­ment can equal, and who ought to be ex­terminated from the face of the earth.

IT is to assert, says an excellent writer up­on the religion of nature, contrary to truth, that a man either has not the faculties and powers, which he actually has, for his defence, or that the author of nature has given them to him in vain. For to what end does he possess them, if he may not use them? And how may he use them, if not to his own preservation, when he is attacked, and abused, and perhaps in dan­ger of being destroyed?

IF a man has no right to defend him­self against insults, pain, and death; it must be because the aggressor has a right to assail him, and to usurp a power over him, and what is his; but this pretension, where a man is not an offender, is pre­vented by the notion of property; every man has something, which is truly his— [Page 21] His life and limbs for instance, and let us for the present only suppose, that there may be more. And as men in a state of nature, are allowed by all Civilians to have been born equal, no man has a right to hurt another's property, or interrupt his hap­piness; but if a man may not defend himself, it supposes that the other has that right, which includes a great absurdity, namely, a licence to commence an injury, or begin a violence, which is in nature a more unreasonable demand, than only a licence to repel it.

FOR he who begins is the true cause of all that follows, and whatever falls upon him from the opposition made by the de­fending party, is but the effect of his own act: Or the violence, of which he is the author, reflected back upon himself.

AND with regard to society, since he who begins to violate the happiness of another does what is wrong; we may be sure, that he who endeavours to obviate or put a stop to that violence, in that respect does what is right;—right, I say, with respect to the community.

FOR with regard to himself, since every man is obliged to consult his own happiness, there can be no doubt but that he not only may, but even ought to defend it.

[Page 22] OTHERWISE he will fail in his duty to himself, and deny that his happiness is his happiness, or which is the same thing, suf­fer what should be his happiness, by the malice of others, to become his misery.

THIS right of self-defence then may al­ways be exerted upon the apprehension of danger, and therefore the appearance of danger will always give a man just cause to exert it.

I AM not to stay, says an excellent Civilian, till a man shall actually begin to make an attack upon my person; or be­tray my own safety so far, as to suffer him by my negligence to take such advantages, as may effect my own ruin.

WE do not know how soon, a person, who has done a thing once, may do it again, he has declared himself to be a dan­gerous creature, an enemy to man, by kil­ling a man. It is enough then that he awakens our suspicions, in such a manner, as to put us in fear of our lives. When this fear commences, the time of action commences against an adversary. And therefore, when it is reported, that a mur­derer infests society, we may immediately proceed to act against him, if he come in our way.

[Page 23] BECAUSE his is a character, that always raises a suspicion of our being hurt: We are by no means certain, but that he may immediately give fresh proofs of his wick­ed temper, by effecting our own destructi­on; and therefore, at the very moment, that these fears arise, and his approach to our persons makes him dangerous, that very moment, as he has forfeited all pro­tection from civil society, and is as little to be trusted, as a person possessed by canine madness—that very moment he may be destroyed.

AND whenever the laws of any parti­cular country are deficient in this respect and come not in to the aid of the law of nature, in matters of such importance as the immediate danger of losing a life, that country is not fit to be any longer our place of residence; since the laws are not able to protect the subject in the article of personal safety, and self-defence, and, therefore, no longer worthy of his sub­jection or regard.

III. Having thus clearly demonstrated from principles and maxims undeniably true, that every man has by the law of na­ture an unalienable right to slay a mur­derer, because a murderer is a public ene­my, dangerous to the peace and safety of [Page 24] the community, and therefore to his own peace; my last observation touching the concurrence of the laws upon such an oc­casion will lead me to the third thing pro­posed, which was to consider more minute­ly, what aid an individual may expect from the public in support of such a right; where I believe it will appear;

"THAT a Chief-magistrate or Governor refusing to exercise that right, for the sub­ject, and at the same time denying him the privilege of using it for himself, doth there­by dissolve the original compact of the state; loses all title to the obedience of his people; and leaves them, as once, again in a state of nature, to take their own mea­sures, and to shift for themselves."

FOR though, upon entering into society men may, for convenience, (and conveni­ence we see is the end of coming into so­ciety) lodge or deposit this right in the hands of others, yet it is occasionally re­sumable, and only deposited in trust.

"A man (says my Author) may part with some of his natural rights, and put himself under the government of laws, and of those (people) who in their several stations are entrusted with the execution of them, in order to gain their protection, and the privileges of a regular society:—But if the [Page 25] question be asked—what natural rights a man may part with, or how far he may part with them? The general answer, I think, may be this: Some things are es­sential to our being—(and therefore not to be parted with)—and some it is in our power to part with.—From such as these then we may recede, as far as is consistent with the end, for which we do it—and not further."—For instance, suppose our end be safety, we cannot then convey away the means of safety so far as to lose that end. For this would be a contradiction.

EVERY member of a community has a right to safety: He enters into society, with the view to secure that right, and the stipulations and engagements on the part of the magistracy, to fulfil the laws and compacts of the country, are always under­stood, by the very nature of civil compacts, to be a security for the same.

EVERY civil government, therefore, to a subject, who is not a criminal, is supposed to be an Asylum, or place of safety: For otherwise it contradicts the very end and design of civil government. That is, it is a contradiction to itself.

BUT no nation can be a place of safety, where the government avowedly harbours [Page 26] murderers; and in defiance of law and justice persists in the act: Because in this case they are persisting in that, which must destroy all safety. Since murder and safe­ty are directly opposites, the one implying the security of a man, the other his de­struction; and, therefore, they mutually expel each other.

SUCH a government then acts contrary to the ends and purposes of society: And, therefore, if such a government cannot be altered or dissolved it must destroy society: To avoid which consequence, society has a right,—1 st, to alter that government—and if that cannot be effected by fair means—then 2 dly, to dissolve it—and lastly, if that be not in their power—the members have then a right to forsake such a society, and shift for themselves.—

OF these in their order—

AND 1 st. Upon supposition, that a go­vernment should act contrary to the ends and purposes of society, as in the afore­said case of murder, individuals have a right to alter that government.

FOR they have been deceived in the exe­cution of the compact. They entered in­to society in order to have their several properties ascertained, and to be quiet in [Page 27] the possession of them; especially in the possession of that, which is the greatest of all, and the foundation of all other pro­perties, the property which they have in their own lives.

THEY may remonstrate then against a deception of this high nature and conse­quence, as a breach of contract, and de­mand an alteration in the measures of the state.

IF the parties, who form the government refuse to comply with the demand, and persist in the denial, they bring on the se­cond case; and by turning the power of the government against the individual, which should have been for his protection, they give the individual a right to destroy that government.

AND this upon the same principle of self-defence, that authorises him to destroy a single man.

FOR if a man cannot part with his right of self-defence against a single murderer, he cannot ( a fortiori) part with his right of self-defence against a combination of murderers; but a government combining with murderers is a combination of mur­derers; therefore a greater nuisance, an object far more dangerous, as consisting of [Page 28] a greater number, and for that reason, it he can compass it, the more worthy to be destroyed.

"THIS reason is decisive, says profes­sor Barbeyrac, and sufficient to refute the opinion of those, who pretend, as does Grotius for one, (in his Jure Belli et Pacis Lib. II. Cap. 1 §. 9.) that the right of a just defence of one's-self ceases, when the unjust aggressor is a prince, or some other person invested with authority in civil so­ciety. So far from it, that the moment a magistrate, or a superior, let him be what he will, carries himself maliciously, and from deliberate choice, to such an excess of madness, he puts himself in a state of war with those, which he thus attacks: The bonds of subjection are broken, and the subject or inferior, who never pretended, and who never could engage to carry his obedience to this excessive length, re-enters from thenceforth into his natural rights, or the rights of a state of nature."

So that we see, when a man, who is in danger from a bad government, can nei­ther alter it, nor dissolve it, the defect of means to obtain one or the other of these ends, introduces the third and last mention­ed case of necessity, and gives him a right, where a government acts contrary to the [Page 29] purposes and institution of society, to for­sake that government, and to shift for himself.

FOR, where there is no protection, there is no obligation to stay: And, where there is danger, as there must be danger from a combination of murderers, there is great reason to depart. Self-preservation, the primary law of nature, as well as the cement of society, will, in this case, oblige him to abandon his present situation, and seek a place of refuge for himself.

THIS matter is briefly stated, and de­termined in this manner, in the religion of nature delineated, Sect. vii. proposition ix.

"IN respect of those things, (says the Author) which the laws of the place take no cognizance of, or if they do take cog­nizance of them, yet if the benefit of those laws cannot be had, he who is a member of society, in other respects retains his natu­ral liberty—and must endeavour to act ac­cording to truth and his best prudence—For in the first case, where there is no cog­nizance taken, there is nothing to limit him. And in the other, it is the same as nothing; since in effect there is no law, where no effect or benefit from it is to be had,"

[Page 30] How much greater then, will I add, must be his danger, and in proportion how much more precipitant his flight? If the magistrate should not only neglect him in danger, but even become his pursuer, and appear as a murderer, at the head of mur­derers, directing them to do their office.

IN this situation the person stopping or hindering his escape is guilty of the same wrong, as those who persue him to his de­struction; and, therefore, may be treated in just the same manner. For he that would turn me back upon an adversary, that pursues me with an armed force to destroy me, is acting the same part as that adversary: And, therefore, for the same reason, may be destroyed.

UPON this principle is founded the le­gality of sudden emigrations from a dis­ordered state, which the government, when violence has been committed, have no right to withstand, or withstand at their own peril, it being an unjust detention. For, in circumstances pressing and dangerous, long and formal declarations may hazard the lives or defeat the design of the emi­grants. Besides, the rulers of a state have no right at that juncture to expect a re­monstrance. Where the compact is dis­solved, the government is from that time [Page 31] nothing but mere tyranny: And, there­fore, in such a case the departure itself is a legal, though tacit renunciation of all connexion; as the arrival and settlement in a strange land are presumed to be a real, though tacit, subjection to another country.

THIS is generally the expedient where the refugees are dispersed, and in number not sufficient to make a settlement of their own: But if they can collect themselves and form themselves into a colony, that colony has a right to depart. We have examples of this sort in the secessions of the old Romans, which the senate did not at­tempt to withstand: But what is nearest our purposes, our own ancestors have left us a remarkable precedent upon a like oc­casion. In the time of Charles I. when dis­putes ran high between the subject and the Prince, when the public money was squan­dered, and replaced by force when their liberties were gone, and their persons visibly in danger, when no one could speak a favor­able word of the government but those who shared, or expected to share the plunder of the public, by being placemen and pensioners to the court: They preferred a wilderness to a country which was so soon to be the scene of distraction and bloodshed, and sought an asylum in America. To their new set­tlement, [Page 32] as a mark of their descent, and the best means of preserving their memori­al and existence as a people; they gave it their national name, and called it NEW-ENGLAND, since the name of the old was now to give way to that of Great-Britain, and be lost in oblivion for ever. The bad government at home, alarmed by this revolt and foreseeing their own decay in the re­moval of the subjects, ( The want of people is the destruction of the Prince. Proverbs xiv, 28.) prevailed upon the King to issue a a proclamation debarring them access even to those inhospitable deserts. Eight [...] lying in the Thames, and ready to [...], were detained by order of the council, in which were embarked Sir Arthur Hazelrig, John Hampden, and Oliver Cromwell, who, contrary to the law of nature, as well as their own inclinations, were forced back again to a land divided and unsettled, to share in the perils of a civil war, in the beginning of which the great Mr. Hamp­den was slain, but Cromwell survived to be afterwards of the number of those, who took vengeance upon the person of the un­fortunate King; for having suffered his servants, in this and other instances, to make so bad an use of his power.

[Page 33] THESE are the subjects, which, consider­ing the increasing danger of the times, as well as the original melancholy occasion of these discourses, the conscientious dis­charge of my duty would not permit me to pass over in silence. I am required by the law of nature, and by the precepts of that religion, which is here by law establish­ed, by the obligations of civil society, (and which come nearer to the heart of man) by the sympathetic feelings of humanity, to cry aloud and spare not, till the arm of the destroyer shall be withheld.

FOR, notwithstanding the mighty offence, which some people affected to take at the doctrine of my first sermon, tending to shew the supreme and indispensable authority of the laws of God, and the impiety and fatal consequences of screening and abetting murder—the practice has been still conti­nued—out of an high regard, no doubt, to the constitution and the support of magistrates, who, when acting against law, ought not to be supported at all; and when acting according to law—must be very strangely supported! By hiring ruffians to murder the people assembled to choose their repre­sentatives; yet even this, you are told, was to keep the peace.

[Page 34] BUT if their peace be death; you have the more reason, to be all alarmed upon the occasion, and to find, or make im­mediately, some better provision for your defence, than the present cobwebs of your broken laws. Consider, that murderers are public enemies, equally dangerous to the whole community, as sudden and in­sidious in their attacks as Lions and Ty­gers—that such monsters combined are more to be dreaded than when alone—and then most dreadful when they receive authority, or indulgence from the servants of a state.

To be so surrounded is to be all your lifetime, through fear of death, in perpe­tual bondage. Rouse, therefore, and con­cur with your neighbours in seeking the means of your deliverance; and then beg the blessing of GOD upon the use of the means—that so the soul and infernal spirit of tyranny and bloodshed, which hath oc­casioned these disorders, may be speedily driven from this land, and flee before the presence of the Lord of hosts.