I SHALL not inquire who is the Author of the Piece on which I am going to remark. Your Opinions, and your Arguments, are all that I shall consider. Whether you are, or ever have been ^† pensioned and employed, whether you are merely a private Man, or a Person distinguished in Rank and Fortune, you are to me, and to the Public, on this Occasion, only the Author of the Letter to Two Great Men; and you will give me Leave to address you in that, and in no other Light. It is indeed a Light in which you cannot be viewed to your Disadvantage; your Piece is animated with the Spirit of true Patriotism; it discovers political and historical Knowledge; and is written through­out with Fire and Energy.

But, Sir, that Animation of Language and Sen­timent, which is allowed to the Orator in political Conflicts in pulvere et in sole, has no Place in a sober Discussion. I write not to the Ear or to the Pas­sions; [Page 6] I aim at no Seduction of Judgment; and I ask for no Approbation but what a Calm Reflection and unprejudiced Reason may afford me. My End is, rather to examine the Justness of your Plan, than to enforce any Plan of my own▪ and I shall not af­fect the Flow, nor the Pomp, nor the high-colour­ing of parliamentary Declamation. If I can deliver a plain Argument in plain Language, it is all I aim at: For this I shall make no Apology; that Free­dom with which you warn the Ministry against fall­ing into Mistakes in the ensuing Treaty of Peace, will justify me to you, and to the World, if I should attempt to point out some of those Mistakes, into which I imagine you are yourself fallen.

You cannot be ignorant in what Manner Success operates upon the Minds of Men; with what a blind and haughty Confidence it inspires them; and in the insolent Elation of Victory, how little they attend to Reason or Justice, and often to their own most important Interests. People of all Nations imagine, that when they are worsted, Success gives their E­nemy very little Right to prescribe severe Terms; and conceive when they are themselves successful, that there are no Bounds to their own Pretensions. If this Disposition should happen at this Time to prevail amongst us, it may be attended with very pernicious Consequences. It may raise such extra­vagant Expectations, or excite such wrong-placed Desires, as will render a Negotiation for Peace a Work of infinite Difficulty. A virtuous and able Ministry may, in some Sort, find their Virtue and Ability brought to act against themselves; they may find that their Victories and Successes have excited so much Arrogance in those who had [no Share in acquiring them, as to destroy all their Effects; they may find their Virtue and Moderation over­ruled by the Madness of the People, and be thus [Page 7] disabled from availing themselves of a successful War, in the Attainment of an advantageous Peace.

I am afraid, Sir, that your Letter tends to in­crease and inflame this improper Disposition. You are not to be blamed for delivering your Sentiments openly. The Liberty of an Englishman, and your own Abilities, give you a Right to do so. What I blame is your excessive Attachment to certain Ob­jects, so excessive, that if they should not be insisted upon by the Ministry, with a Warmth equal to your own, you hesitate not to declare to the People, ^† that we shall have a treacherous and delusive Peace. This, Sir, is surely a most unjustifiable Method of proceed­ing; it is to sow the Seeds of general Discontent in Favour of your particular Opinions; Opinions, which, if they are not ill founded, are at least very problematical: I cannot help observing, that your Resentment against the Perfidy of the Enemy, has made you seem much more intent upon affronting France, than providing deliberately for the Interests of Britain.

You set forth, with great Strength of Fact and Reason, the Treachery of France, and her frequent Violations of the most solemn Treaties. You insist particularly on the Case of Dunkirk: and I admit that you could not have chosen a more proper In­stance. But I am sorry to see that you are even here guided more by old Prejudices than by the true Na­ture of Things; and that you have proposed such a Manner of acting, that, whilst we are in Reality only demanding our honest and unquestionable Rights, we may have all the Appearance of acting with the most wanton Insolence, with the most hate­ful Oppression.

You propose to the Two great Men, that, [Page 8] ‘ ^† before they enter upon any new Treaty, or listen to any plausible Proposal whatever, they ought to insist that Justice may be done with Regard to for­mer Treaties; shew France the solemn Engagements she entered into at Utrecht, to demolish Dunkirk. Demand’ say you, ‘immediate Justice on that Article, as a preliminary Proof of her Sincerity in the ensuing Negotiation. Tell them, with the Firmness of wise Conquerors, that the Demolition of Dunkirk is what you are intitled to by Treaties made long ago and violated, and that it shall not be so much as mentioned in the ensuing Negotiation, but complied with before that Negotiation shall com­mence.’

Though this is a Sort of Language hitherto, I believe, unheard in Europe, why you confine it to Dunkirk I cannot imagine. Why would you not have them in the same previous Manner renounce all Right to the disputed Parts of America? You will, I hope, allow, that the French Encroachments there, are as much against the Faith of Treaties, as the Restoration of Dunkirk; and that we have full as good a Right to expect every Reparation of In­terest and Honour with Regard to the one as to the other. But if all Points wherein the Violation of Treaties is charged, ought not, according to your Doctrine, to be so much as mentioned in the ensuing Negotiation, but ought to be settled before that Ne­gotiation shall commence, the Business of the Con­gress will be so very short, and so very easy, as to require no wonderful Share of that Knowledge, that Adroitness, and all that Combination of Talents, and Virtues, which you demand in a Plenipotentia­ry; but which you are almost in Despair of finding among our Nobility. To speak and to act to the Letter of the Instructions which you give him, in­stead [Page 9] of all those Qualifications, he need only assume a decisive and dictatorial Tone; to rail abundantly at those employed by the Enemy to treat with him; to remind them of their amazing Perfidy ^†; to tell them that he owes them a Disgrace ^‡; to tell them that he can have no Dealings with such a People ^‖; and thus to go through the little that is left to be done with as great Airs of Arrogance and Superi­ority as he can possibly assume. These are Accom­plishments indeed not difficult to be found, and which we need not despair to meet with at Arthur's, [...]r on the Turf. ^**

I do not, Sir, mean to insinuate, that the Demo­lition of Dunkirk is not an Object worthy of our Re­gard. It is indeed probably not of quite so much Importance, as you think it, and as formerly it was thought, whilst in the Continental Wars of King William, and Queen Anne, we neglected our Naval Strength, and the due Protection of our Trade. However, as it is still an Object, there is no Doubt but in the ensuing Negotiation our Ministry will at­tend with proper Care to have it demolished, accor­ding to the Tenor of former Treaties. This, Sir, we may say with some Assurance, will be done. But that this be done before we condescend to treat, that it is to be a Preliminary to the Preliminaries of Peace, is an Idea altogether extravagant, and as lit­tle justified by Precedent as by Reason. That those very Matters for which War was declared should not be so much as mentioned in the Ne­gotiation for Peace, is a Principle entirely your own, and to which all the Writers on Politics have to this Day been entirely Strangers. You seem in­deed aware of this, and therefore assert, that such De­mands as you propose ^†† ‘cannot be looked upon [Page 10] as the Insolence of a Conqueror, but as the wise Foresight of a People, whom dear-bought Expe­rience hath taught the proper Way of doing it­self Justice.’ For you observe some few Lines before that we ought ‘ ^* to take every Method in our Power to secure the Observance of those Concessions they may make; and to insist upon their giving us such Proofs of their Sincerity be­fore any Negotiation is entered upon, as may give us some Assurance, that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements.’ The Way you propose, then, of doing ourselves Justice, is to insist upon these Demands, as the Compliance with them by the French is supposed to be a Security for their adhereing to the Treaty.

I should, Sir, most willingly concur with you in recommending any Method which might secure their Adherence to such Concessions as they shall make; which might draw from them any real Proof of their Sincerity, or which would give us some Assu­rance that they mean to be more faithful to their future Engagements: But I have considered your Demand in every Light which I was capable of putting it, and, after all, I am utterly unable to discover, if France should submit to the humiliating Step you propose, what additional Security this will, or can give us, that she will keep the Peace that is to en­sue, whenever she shall find it her Interest to break it. This Step may indeed be a mortifying Confes­sion of her present Weakness, but can be no Sort of Security for her future Faith.

So far from having any such Operation, there is all the Reason in the World to expect that it would produce quite the contrary Effect. A Nation which, through the Necessity of its Affairs, submits to Terms imposed, for no other Purpose than to insult [Page 11] her, seeks the first Opportunity to wipe off the Stain. She will not look upon such Engagements as a Treaty, but as an Oppression; and she will find a Sort of Excuse for the Infidelity of her Conduct in the Insolence of ours. Nations, like Men, often resent an Insult more than an Injury.

Unreasonable as this Demand may be, you how­ever seem fond of it; for you again ask, ‘Can you have any Dealings with a Power, who, if he refuses this, at the very Time that he is treating, affords you such a manifest Proof that his Word is not to be relied upon, and that you cannot trust to the Execution of any Promises ever so solemn­ly made?’ ^* Why not? You may, Sir, un­doubtedly, have Dealings with such a Power, not­withstanding such a Refusal; because he only does what is extremely natural, and extremely reasonable, in refusing to destroy a Place which is of Use to him in War, before his Enemy has condescended to treat for Peace. You do not sure, imagine, that any Nation is so ignorant and sottish as not to know, that the voluntary weakening its Hands before a Nego­tiation for Peace, is not the Way to secure it good Terms in that Negotiation; and that they may well refuse to comply with this ignominious and unsafe Condition, without manifesting any Intention of swerving from their Engagements. If it could be supposed for a Moment, that our Administration would adopt your System, might not France, in her Turn, ask, and very reasonably too, What Security we propose to give, if she should submit to this ex­traordinary previous Preliminary, that we shall, even then, consent, on our Side, to an equitable Peace? Or that this first unreasonable Demand may not be followed by others still more unreasonable, whilst we have any Thing to ask, or she any Thing left to [Page 12] give? to answer, Vae victis, would sound strangely. To answer otherwise, with Consistency, is impossible. And it must be allowed, that so extraordinary a De­mand, previous to a Treaty, would be a very bad Omen of our Moderation in the framing it. A Compliance with it would indeed mortify the E­nemy; but it would add nothing to our real Strength, whilst it would alarm every Nation near us, and as­sist France in exciting that Jealousy of the British naval Power, which she has for a long Time been labouring, with great Industry, and some Success, to infuse into all the Nations of Europe, and parti­cularly into the maritime States. You have very well observed upon the Terror which was excited by the Power of Lewis XIV. and upon the gene­ral Confederacy against him, which was the Conse­quence of this Power: But you have forgot to add, that the insolent Use he made of his Greatness, a­larmed as much, and provoked much more, than that enormous Power itself. It was indeed the true Cause of his Fall. Other Nations also may be thought too powerful; and they will be thought so, whenever they exercise their Power with Haughti­ness. Without having Recourse to a ^* Montesquieu, perhaps, Sir, it may be found, that the Roman, the Spanish, and the French Grandeur, have owed their Declension to the same Cause: They had attained a greater Power than they had Wisdom sufficient to direct: For the Sake of gratifying the Passion of the Day, they lost Sight of their lasting Interest.

The utmost rational Aim of our Ambition ought to be, to possess a just Weight and Consideration in Europe; and that the Power of the Nation should be rather respectable than terrible. To effect this, it must not be employed invidiously: It must ope­rate [Page 13] discreetly and quietly; then it will be happily felt in its Effects, while it is little seen in violent Exertions. The Genius and Disposition of Nations, as well as Men, is best discerned by the Use they make of Power. And therefore, my great Objec­tion to this Part of your Plan, does not arise from the Nature of the Thing which you desire; my Ob­jection is to the Time and Manner in which you in­sist on having it done; which is, as I apprehend, to ourselves of no Kind of Use, and therefore arro­gant and unreasonable towards the Enemy.

After the Proposal concerning Dunkirk, you lay before the two great Men the other Parts of your Plan. And here you recommend it to them to dis­play their Moderation, by giving up Guadaloupe, Se­negal, and Goree; and their Wisdom, by keeping the Possession of every Part of Canada. To keep Canada is the Point you have principally at Heart: " ^* This is the Point," you say, ‘invariably to be adhered to; this is to be the sine qua non of the Peace; and unless it is, we shall have a treacherous and delusive Peace.’

Before I examine the Justness of those Motives that make you so strenuously attached to this Ob­ject, and so indifferent to every other, I shall beg Leave to remark upon the Consequence you deduce from the Possibility that Canada will be given up, ‘that we shall have a treacherous and delusive Peace.’

The Views which every State ought to have at the making of Peace, may be reduced to two.

1 st, To attain those Objects for which she went to War. And,

2 dly, To receive some reasonable Indemnification for the Charges she has incurred in carrying it on. [Page 14] Without openly avowing some ^* Views of Ambition, no Nation can possibly claim more.

This admitted, Sir, I ask, upon the first Head, Whether the Possession of Canada, properly so call­ed, was ever one of those Objects for which we be­gan the War? Was it ever mentioned as such in any of our Memorials or Declarations, or in any national or public Act whatsoever?

The true Cause of the War, our real and indis­putable Right, is well known. Our Claims were large enough for Possession, and for Security too. And will you say, Sir, that if, in the Beginning of these Troubles, France, influenced by a Dread of the Exertion of the British Power, had acknowledged these Claims, had given up Nova Scotia, or Acadia, with its ancient and true Boundaries, had demolish­ed their Fort in the Province of New York, had re­moved themselves from the Ohio, and renounced all Claim to that Territory, and that, on those Con­cessions, the Ministry had then ceased from Hosti­lities, without acquiring, or even claiming Canada, will you say, that we should have had a treacherous and delusive Peace? You will hardly venture to assert, that we should. And is a Peace made after France has felt the Force of Britain, and submitted to that Force, to be more treacherous and delusive than if she had made it from an Apprehension only of the Consequences? Is a Peace to be treacherous and de­lusive, if we do not get, on that Peace, what we ne­ver claimed as our Right before the War? Is a Peace treacherous and delusive, that puts us in Pos­session of a Territory larger than several flourishing [Page 15] Mornachies? Is a Peace delusive and treacherous, only because something is left to the Enemy?

But you do not assert, that we have any original Right to Canada; nor do you say, that the Con­cession of those Boundaries which we have claimed, do not give us a vast Territory, and an advantage­ous Barrier. You go upon another, which is indeed the only Principle which you make Use of, but which you are of Opinion is so strong, ^* ‘as to si­lence the French Plenipotentiaries, and to con­vince all Europe of the Justice of your De­mand.’

‘Ask the French what Security they can give you, if we restore Canada, however restrained in its Boundaries, that they will not again begin to extend them at our Expence?’

The French Plenipotentiaries, Sir, must be very extraordinary Advocates to be silenced, and Europe, as extraordinary a Judge to be convinced by such an Argument. France, Sir, might answer, That she can give no such Security. No Nation, whilst inde­pendent, can give it. And therefore, no such Se­curity should be desired. To desire the Enemy's whole Country, upon no other Principle, but that otherwise you cannot secure your own, is turning the Idea of mere Defence into the most dangerous of all Principles. It is leaving no Medium between Safe­ty and Conquest. It is never to suppose yourself safe, whilst your Neighbour enjoys any Security. Indeed, such a Question, after the Matters disputed in the War have been adjusted, is an Avowal of such an unreasonable Ambition, that I trust you will never be seconded in it by any English Man, or Eng­lish Minister. For it is a Question that extends in­finitely in its Consequences; extends (for any Thing I can see to the contrary), to the utter Destruction [Page 16] of Mankind. For whilst ever we have France, or any other Nation on our Borders, either in Europe or in America, we must, in the Nature of Things, have frequent Disputes and Wars with them; and we must suppose, at least, as often as we are successful, that the Enemy is in Fault; that is, we must sup­pose the Enemy had provoked us to take Arms, by the Violation of some Treaty, or by the Invasion of some undoubted Right. The Business of a Peace is, to adjust and to determine these Disputes: But af­ter the Enemy has agreed to our original Demands, if we go on to demand Security for the Preservation of Peace, what less do we demand, than that they should yield themselves, bound Hand and Foot, up to our Mercy? Let our Borders be ever so extend­ed, as long as we have any Nation near us, we must have the same Disputes, the same Wars, and we must demand, upon your Principle, the same Secu­rity at the Conclusion of a Peace.

There was a Nation indeed, which I am sure we resemble more in Courage than in Ambition and In­justice, which frequently used to demand such a Cau­tion: And such a Caution they actually did require from the Carthaginians, when they intended it as a Preliminary to the utter Destruction of that People, and to the most notorious Breach of Faith upon their own Side. Their Pretence was exactly yours; that the Enemy was a Nation perfidious to a Proverb; a People whom no Treaty could bind. They used the Punica, in the same Manner that you do the Gallica fides. I need not inform you, Sir, what fol­lowed: And indeed it was impossible that such Prin­ciples and Pretensions could end in any Thing but the total Destruction of the vanquished.

I do not see why the Arguments you employ concerning a Security for a peaceable Behaviour in Canada, would not be equally cogent for calling for the same Security in Europe. They are our Neigh­bours, [Page 17] and dangerous ones, here as well as there. The Low Countries, Lorrain, Alsace, shew us that the French Monarchy has been, at least, as intent upon extending its Dominion in Europe, as it can be in America. We know that they have tried all the Methods of War, of Treaty, and of Marriages, to inlarge their dangerous Empire. But still, dreaded as they are in Europe, (and much more to be dread­ed than ever they were in America), if we could be so happy to see, what I fear we never shall see, a Confederacy to reclaim their Usurpations, what would we say to the Insolence of those who, on your Principle, should demand all France as a Security, that they should not make the like Usurpations for the future?

But, Sir, our real Dependence for keeping France, or any other Nation, true to her Engagements, must not be in demanding Securities, which no Nation, whilst independent, can give, but on our own Strength, and our own Vigilance.

To say the Truth, we owe our Losses in America as much to our own Supineness as to the French Per­fidy. Our Ministers have heretofore acted in Re­gard to America, as if they expected, from a Magic in the Contract, that it would perform itself. They took no Steps to enforce it. But from the Wis­dom and Vigour of our present Administration, I should expect another Conduct. As soon as France is happily reduced to cede us such Boundaries as may be thought proper to demand, the same Spirit that has conducted the War, will maintain the Terms of the Peace. Instead of leaving France at li­berty to build Forts at her Discretion, English Forts will be raised at such Passes, as may at once make us respectable to the French, and to the Indian Na­tions. God forbid that we should depend on the Sincerity of our Enemy. Every wise Nation will rely on its own Watchfulness, and on its own [Page 18] Strength, to maintain the Terms they oblige their Enemy to give them; and whoever expects any o­ther Dependence, will find himself the Dupe.

To supply any Defect that may be in your own Authority to persuade this Measure, your favourite Measure of retaining Canada, you call in the Aid of our American Colonies; and tell us, ‘Though Care should be taken to keep all that we have claimed, something more must be done, or our American Colo­nies will tell you, you have done nothing.’ On what Authority this is so positively asserted to be the Language of our American Colonies, you have not told us. I hope and believe that you have been misinformed. But if our American Colonies should be so absurd and ungreatful to tell us, after all the Blood and Treasure expended in their Cause, that we do nothing, if we do not make Conquests for them, they must be taught a Lesson of greater Moderation. If, with a Superiority of at least ten to one, with a vast and advantageous Barrier, with the proper Precautions to strengthen it, under the Protection of a great Naval Power, they cannot think themselves secure, they must blame their own Cowardice or Ignorance, and not the Measures of their Mother Country; who is bound to provide for their Happiness and Security, and not for their vain Ambition, or groundless Fears.

The Idea of securing yourself, only by having no other Nation near you, is, I admit, an Idea of A­merican Extraction. It is the genuine Policy of Sa­vages; and it is owing to this Policy, that England and France are able at this Day to dispute the Sove­reignty of Deserts in America; to which neither of us would otherwise have had any Right.

As we pretend no original Right to Canada, that we can very rationally secure ourselves in North A­merica without the Possession of it, will, I appre­hend, need very few Arguments to demonstrate. [Page 19] I have already observed upon the vast Superiority of Men that we have there; such a Superiority, that I am always astonished when I think on the unaccountable Conduct that has ever made France an Enemy to be apprehended on that Continent. We are in North America not only a greater Naval, but a far greater Continental Power. Our Supe­riority in Point of Situation is no less visible. If, added to these Advantages, we acquire on a Peace all those important Posts and Communications, by which alone Canada became in any Degree dange­rous to us, I cannot see why Canada, weakened, stripped, confined, and I may say, bound down, will not be infinitely in more Danger, in Case of any Rupture between the two Nations, from our Colo­nies, than ours can be from it.

I cannot help observing, that among all your I­deas of Security, and that in particular anxious as you are for the Security of North America, you shew little Regard to that of the West Indies. Our Ca­ribbee Islands must be ever infinitely in greater Dan­ger from Guadaloupe, than our North American Co­lonies can be from Canada circumscribed as it ought, and as it is presumed it will be. The French have a real Superiority in the West Indies, and they have once made it to be severely felt.

If, as it has been shewn, we may, beyond any rational Fear, secure ourselves without the intire Pos­session of Canada, we can desire it in Preference to our other Conquests only on Account of its superior Value. Though you have not at all insisted on this, yet, lest this may be thought one of your Mo­tives to that great Preference, and it is, sure the best Motive you could have had, we will consider the Point somewhat at large, and this will bring us to the second of those leading Ideas, that ought to guide a Nation in a Treaty of Peace; that is, to acquire a proper Indemnification for the Expences of the [Page 20] War. You are not one of the Number of those who think we ought to give up nothing in a Peace. You do not claim Canada on a Principle of Right. We have examined it on the Principle of Security; the only Question that now remains to be disputed between us is, Whether Canada be a better Indemni­fication for the Expences of the War, than all our other Conquests put together? for you give up all the Rest with great Ease, and insist on this only.

Before we enter into a Comparison between the Value of our Acquisitions in the West Indies and those in Canada, I must beg leave to take some Notice of your Reason, your only Reason, for giving up the Island of Guadaloupe ^*, ‘that we have already so many Sugar Islands of our own.’ If any Argu­ment could possibly be drawn from our having A­bundance of Territory, surely its holds much more strongly with Regard to North America, where one of our Provinces alone has more Land than ours, and all the French Sugar Lands put together. If we have in the West Indies Land enough for Sugar, surely we have Land enough in North America for the far less valuable Commodities, which are produ­ced on that vast Continent. On what Grounds you are pleased to think the keeping a great Sugar Island an Acquisition of little Consequence, I am unable to comprehend. You know, surely, that in one of our Islands, the greatest of them, we labour under a Sort of Monopoly, and under other Disadvantages, hard, if not impossible to be remedied. You know that another Island, I mean Barbados, formerly [Page 21] one of our best, is at present much exhausted; so that the Produce, and the Profit made on that Produce, diminishes daily; and that the Rest, except perhaps Antigua, are quite inconsiderable; so in­considerable, that the Islands, which as Dependents on Guadaloupe are scarce mentioned, are much more valuable. It was no sooner found that the King of Denmark was intent on settling the Island of Santa Cruz, than some considerable Planters immediately removed thither, and it is now almost wholly set­tled by the English. Many have actually Interests in Martinico; and Guadaloupe was scarce taken, when our Planters flocked thither, and immediately made conditional ^† Purchases, sensible of the Superiority of this Island, and the Defects of our own.

In Consequence of those Wants, and Disadvanta­ges, our Sugar Islands produce little more than what serves the Home-consumption; and that too at a very advanced Price. From the foreign Market we have, before this War, been almost wholly ex­cluded. France supplied all the Markets of Europe, and supplied them in a great Measure from the Produce of this very Island, which you esteem so lightly. When we consider Things in a commercial Light, it is the foreign Market which ought cer­tainly to have the greatest Influence. Those who supply the Home-consumption purvey to our Lux­ury: Those who supply the foreign Market admi­nister to our Wealth, and to our Power.

To shew you, Sir, how much the Sugar-trade might contribute to the Wealth and Power of any Nation, by what it formerly did contribute to ours, and what for a long Time past it has contributed to [Page 22] that of France, I will lay before you some Facts, which are, Sir, of a Nature infinitely more convin­cing than the warmest Sallies of the most lively Elo­quence. About the Time of the Treaty of Utrecht, we supplied the greatest Part of the Sugar-consump­tion throughout Europe. France, far from contend­ing with us in the foreign Market, took from us a great Part of what they used at home. From the Year 1715 to 1719, we exported, one Year with another, 18,580 Hogsheads of Sugar; but from 1719 to 1722, we fell to less than half; for we sent abroad but 9064 communibus annis. We continued regularly on the Decrease to 1739, in which Year our Sugar-export had fallen to 4078 Hogsheads. Since that Time, it has fallen almost to nothing. Now, let us turn the other Side, and view the Su­gar-trade of France since the same Period, the Trea­ty of Utrecht. At that Time the French exported no Sugars. But mark, Sir, the Revolution in 1740, when the British Trade in that Article was in a Man­ner annihilated: France, after serving her Home-consumption at a very easy Rate, exported no less than 80,000 Hogsheads of Sugar, which, with the Gains of the Commission, &c. was reputed to be worth to France more than a Million Sterling, to employ 40 Ton of Shipping, and 4000 Seamen, solely in bringing from the West Indies to Europe. These, Sir, are Facts to proclaim loudly the Advantage of those Islands to France whilst they were in her Pos­session; and declare no less strongly the Advantages which must accrue to Britain, if she could attain the Possession of one of the very best of them. Facts these that ought not to be passed lightly, until you can shew something like them in Favour of the Plan you so warmly embrace; which cannot, I believe, be done. I therefore, Sir, cannot help thinking, that your Reasons for rejecting Guadaloupe, on the Principle of our having Sugar-land enough, are not [Page 23] near so strong, or the Matter so well weighed, as the Importance of the Question deserves.

But let us see what the Value of this Canada is, in Comparison of which you reject all our other Ac­quisitions.

Unluckily for your Argument, you yourself in­form us ^† at your setting out, that the French set very little Value upon this Possession; and that they have even deliberated, whether it should not be en­tirely abandoned.

If, in the Hands of the French, who have no other Northern Colony, from whence to supply their Islands with Lumber, Corn, and Provision, Cana­da was of so very little Importance, what is it like to prove in ours, who have such immense Tracts so much more conveniently situated for that Trade; and who can easily supply Five Times the Consump­tion of ours, theirs, and all the other West In­dia Islands put together; and that too at a much ea­sier Rate than they can possibly have these Things at from Canada? But I do not insist upon this Ar­gument, though it is strong against you; because I do not believe that France has such a Disregard for this their only considerable Possession in North America. It is a great While since they thought of giving it up; and they are long convinced that it is of some Use to them, independent of their Hopes of incroaching on our Possessions. Ask those, Sir, who lately saw Canada, if it had the Face of a Colo­ny which the Mother-country was weary of hold­ing? I believe, Sir, they will tell you, that the Cultivation of the Lands, the Number and Neat­ness of the Houses, the warm Condition of the In­habitants, by no Means seemed to imply, that they were neglected by France; but evinced rather, that this Colony was the Object of her very tender Concern.

[Page 24]There are, independent of the Opinion or De­signs of France, many Reasons why we should not think Canada a valuable Exchange for our Con­quest in the West Indies. Canada, situated in a cold Climate, produces no Commodity, except Furs and Skins, which she can exchange for the Commodities of Europe; and consequently she can have little Re­turns to make the English Merchant. We know what trifling Returns we have from some of our own very flourishing Colonies in America. The whole Trade of Furs and Skins, which Canada carried on with France, fell short, in its most flourishing State, of 140,000 a-year. The Rest of their Produce, with regard to the Market of Europe, is as nothing. A very great Part of the Value of those Furs was re­turned from France in the Article of Brandy, with­out which, the Trade with the Indians for their Beaver and Deer Skins could not be carried on. But, as an English Plantation, Canada must supply itself, as all the other English Plantations do, with Rum; else they will be obliged entirely to relinquish the Fur and Peltry Trade, which is the only valuable Trade they have. But let it be con­sidered, how they can come to the West-India Mar­ket from the Bottom of the River St. Laurence, with the gross and cheap Article of Lumber and Corn, on a Footing with our Colonies, many of which are not three Weeks Sail from the Leeward Islands. They could neither Trade with Europe, nor with the West Indies, with any tolerable Advantage; not with the West Indies, because they must be undersold in that Market; not with Europe, because, being so undersold, they cannot have the Rum that is neces­sary for the Indian Trade, which keeps up their Commerce with Europe.

Indeed, whilst Canada is in the Hands of France, the Skin-trade may be kept up so as to be an Ob­ject; [Page 25] because the Return for those Commodities, brings back the Brandy with which they are pur­chased: And thus the Trade is kept alive by a con­tinual Circulation. The bulkier Articles of Corn and Lumber may likewise continue a Branch of their Trade; because it is their Interest to support, by eve­ry Method, the Vent of these Articles in their West Indies in Preference to Foreigners. But Canada, in our Hands can have no such Preference; and there­fore, from its Situation, cannot be on an Equality in the West-India Market; and from which Market a­lone it is that they, as a British Possession, can de­rive the Spirits, or those Materials for Spirits, with­out which the Fur and Peltry, their only Trade, must certainly perish. These Principles appear to me so well grounded, that I think it no Presump­tion to prophesy, ‘if that Place should ever be ours, the Fur-trade of Canada must inevitably come to little or nothing in a few Years.’

But let us extend our View a little farther; let us suppose, that if, instead of aiming at the entire Pos­session of North-America, we confine ourselves to those Limits which we have always claimed there; and that Canada is restored to France, curtailed in such a Manner as to secure the Ohio Country, and the Communication of the Lakes. The Coun­try to the Southward of Lake Erie, and near the Ohio, is the greatest Indian hunting Country in North America. If this Territory should remain with us on a Peace, it naturally draws to us all that Trade which depends upon the hunting of Deer and Beaver; and if this Country should be further secured to us, by the Possession of Niagara, which is a Post of in­finite Importance, and entirely commands the great Lakes of Erie and Ontario, I cannot see how it is possible to keep the far greater Part of the Com­merce of North America out of our Hands. The Indians must every where be intercepted before they [Page 26] can arrive at the French Colony, even supposing (what can never be) that the French could entice them thither by selling cheaper than our Dealers.

Thus, without aiming at the total Possession of Canada, by establishing proper Limits, and by secur­ing them properly, we may draw to ourselves a great Part of that Trade which must give Canada it­self any Value, in the Eyes of a commercial Nation.

So that the Question, Sir, is not, Whether Ca­nada extended to the Ocean, by a Possession of the River St. John, and a great Part of Nova Scotia, in­croaching upon, and menacing New-York and New England, commanding exclusively all the Lakes and Rivers, whether such a Country ought to be kept in Preference to Guadaloupe, and our other Conquest? but, Whether Canada, stripped of these Advantages, and confined to its proper Bounds, confined to the Northward of those Lakes and Rivers, be a better Acquisition than our rich Conquest in the West Indies?

If we compare the Value of the Returns of Canada, even whilst it flourished most by its Incroachments upon us, with those of Guadaloupe, we shall find them in no Degree of Competition. The Fur­trade, whose Value is before mentioned, is its whole Trade to Europe. But Guadaloupe, besides the great Quantities of Sugars, Cotton, Indigo, Coffee, and Ginger, which it sends to Market, carries on a Trade with the Carraccas and other Parts of the Spanish Main, which is a Trade wholly in the Manufactures of Europe, and the Returns for which, are almost wholly in ready Money. Without estimating the Land, the Houses, the Works, and the Goods in the Island, the Slaves, at the lowest Valuation, are worth upwards of one Million two hundred and fif­ty thousand Pounds Sterling. It is a known Fact, that they make more Sugar in Guadaloupe, than in any of our Islands, except Jamaica. This Branch a­lone, [Page 27] besides the Employment of so much Shipping, and so many Seamen, will produce clear 300,000 per Annum to our Merchants. For, having sufficient from our own Islands, to supply our Home-con­sumption, the whole Sugar-produce of Guadaloupe will be exported; and will consequently be so much clear Money to Great Britain. And, Sir, the whole Produce of Canada, though it were all exported from England, and exported compleatly manufactured, would not amount to the Value of that single Article unmanufactured; nor would it employ the one twen­tieth Part of the Shipping, and the Seamen. But this, though the largest, is not the only Produce of Guadaloupe; Coffee, which in our Islands is none, or a very inconsiderable Object, is there a very great one. They raise besides, great Quantities of Indigo and Cotton, which supply Materials for our best and most valuable Manufactures, and which employ ma­ny more Hands than the Increase of the Hat-trade, proposed by the keeping Canada, can do. This island is capable, in our Hands, of being improved to dou­ble its present Value; whereas Canada, in our Hands, would not probably yield half what it did to France.

There is, Sir, one Argument I would use parti­cularly to you, who are so strongly sensible of the Inconvenience Dunkirk is to us from its Situation. Surely there is not a single Word you say, in Respect to Dunkirk, that does not hold as strongly in Regard to Guadaloupe, situated in the very Heart of our Leeward Islands, and there infesting one of the most advantageous Branches of the British Commerce. It is not to be denied but that the English Coaster and the London Trader has suffered by the Dunkirk Privateers; but their Losses this War have not been near so considerable as that of the West Indies, and above all of the North American Traders, whose In­terest, I believe, you will not dispute to be of some Importance. Ask, Sir, the North American Tra­ders, [Page 28] ask the People of the Leeward Islands, what a vast Security they thought it to their Trade, that Guadaloupe should be in our Hands? Our Islands were so annoyed from thence, that they scarce con­sidered it in any other Light than as a Nest of Pri­vateers: They were surprised on going there, to find a People richer than in any of our own Islands; and Land so much better than their own, that many of our rich Planters have already made ^† conditional Purchases there.

Not to confine our Views solely to a commercial Point, give me Leave to mention one great Advan­tage that, in a political Light, may arise from our Possession of Guadaloupe. It is very well known, that the Hand of Government is heavy on the Protestants of France; many of these People are already esta­blished in this Island, and they have Connections of every Kind with those of their own Persuasion at home; and may we not hope and expect that this may be an Inducement to many others to make this their Retreat, and that the Colony may be enriched by them?

In short, Sir, in whatever Light you view the Island of Guadaloupe, you will find it a most valuable and a most desirable Object. Do you ask to de­prive your Enemy of an advantageous Post, from whence he might materially molest your Trade in Time of War? Do you wish to extend your Trade in Time of Peace, and to have a new Market for all your Manufactures? From being scarce able to supply the Home-Consumption with Sugar, do you desire to be foremost at the foreign Market? This Island, Sir, of Guadaloupe, that you esteem so little, will answer all these Ends; Ends so material, that I [Page 29] trust, Sir, that the Stone you have rejected, will be made the Corner Stone in the Temple of Peace.

Therefore, Sir, I must repeat it, that I am not a little surprised that you should pass over, in a Manner so careless, and with such extreme Superficiality, a Point so very material and interesting as this, to tell us, that ^‖ ‘ the Possession of Guadaloupe, an ad­ditional Sugar Island, when we have so many of our own, ought not to be so strenuously insisted upon, as to make it a necessary Condition of the Peace.’ Had you taken the Pains to inform yourself of the Facts necessary for making a Judgment on this Matter, or had you duly attended to them, you could not pos­sibly have said, that it was not to be insisted upon, and in the same Breath assert, that, without Canada, we should have a treacherous and delusive Peace.

You say a great Deal, and with Reason, upon the Value of our ^‡ North-American Colonies, and the great Increase of our Trade has had from that Quarter. But you pass by, with very little Notice, how much both the Trade of England, and the Trade of these very North-American Colonies, owes to the Islands.

You look upon these Islands only as an inferior dependent Part of the British Plantations, which you scarce think worth While to mention: But, be­cause I think you are under some Mistake in this Point, in addition to those Reasons which have been given to shew the Preference of Guadaloupe in parti­cular to Canada, there are some Facts which I beg Leave to submit to your Observation, concerning [Page 30] Settlements on the Continent of North America and Plantations in the West Indian Islands. Though it may be a new Idea, I shall not hesitate to say, that an Island Colony is always more advantageous than a continental one, for the Mother-country.

The Inhabitants of the West-Indian Islands never consider themselves as at home there: They send their Children to the Mother-country for Education; they themselves make many Trips to the Mother-country to recover their Health, or enjoy their For­tunes. If they have Ambition, it is hither they come to gratify it. I need not, I suppose, observe to you, how many Gentlemen of the West Indies have Seats in the British House of Commons. I might, I be­lieve, venture to say, there are very few who have inherited Plantations in any of our Islands, who have not had an European Education, or at least have not spent some Time in this Kingdom. Many who have Plantations, receive and spend the whole Pro­fits of them here, without ever having even seen the West Indies. If the Commerce with the West-Indian Islands had even been, in some Respects, against us, this Circumstance alone would turn the Balance in our Favour. But this, in Truth, is very far from being the Case. The Trade we carry on with that Part of the World is as happily circumstanced as Imagination could form it. The West-India Islands lie in a Climate different totally from ours. The natural Produce, therefore, interferes, in no Re­spect with that of England. Their Produce is on­ly such as the Taste and Turn of our Manners call for; but demand so strongly, that if we had them not from our own Colonies, we must purchase from Strangers. The Commerce between the Mother-country and a West-Indian Island is natural and easy. It needs, in no Respect, to be forced or managed: They are mutually formed for each other: Neither is there any Sort of Fear, that the Islands in that Part [Page 31] of the World shall ever make this Commerce less easy or less advantageous. The extreme Dearness of Provision will never suffer them, how much soever they may be inclined, to set up any sort of Manu­facture which may interfere with our Fabrics. So that these Colonies, by their very Nature, Situation, and Products, by what they have, and by what they want, are kept necessarily connected with and de­pendent upon England, and must ever be so, as long as we are able to protect them. Let us now exa­mine, Sir, whether the greatest Part of the Plan­tations which we possess or desire in North America, can come in Competition with the Islands, either in the Advantages we derive from them, or in the Certainty of holding those Advantages for the Future. With regard to the Estates in North America spent in England, I may affirm, that from Nova Scotia to Ma­ryland and Virginia, there are absolutely none; yet in this Tract are the four Provinces of New England, the great Countries of New York, Pensylvania, and the two Jerseys, Places highly flourishing in Commerce, and abounding with People: Even to the South­ward of this Line, there are few Estates either in Number or Value spent in England.

In North America, the Climate is not in general unfavourable to an European Constitution, and it is such in which Men fond of rural Diversions may pass their Time agreeably. The Truth is, tho' their Estates supply them with Plenty to live at home, they do not furnish Mony enough to send them a­broad. Excepting Proprietaries, I do not remember that this vast Continent supplies our House of Com­mons with one single Member.

To view the Continent of America in a com­mercial Light, the Produce of all the Northern Co­lonies is the same as that of England, Corn, and Cattle; and therefore, except for a few naval Stores, there is very little Trade from thence directly to [Page 32] England. Their own Commodities bear a very low Price; Goods carried from Europe bear a very high Price; and thus they are of necessity driven to set up Manufactures similar to those of England, in which they are favoured by the Plenty and Cheapness of Provisions. In fact, there are Manufactures of ma­ny Kinds in these Northern Colonies, that promise in a short Time to supply their Home-consumption. From New England they begin even to export some things manufactured, as Hats, for instance. In these Provinces they have Colleges and Academies for the Education of their Youth; and as they increase daily in People and in Industry, the Necessity of a Con­nection with England, with which they have no na­tural Intercourse by a Reciprocation of Wants, will continually diminish. But as they recede from the Sea, all these Causes will operate more strongly; they will have nothing to expect, they must live wholly on their own Labour, and in Process of Time will know little, inquire little, and care little about the Mother-country.

If, Sir, the people of our Colonies find no Check from Canada, they will extend themselves, almost without Bounds, into the Inland Parts. They are invited to it by the Pleasantness, the Fertility, and the Plenty of that Country; and they will increase infinitely from all Causes. What the Consequence will be, to have a numerous, hardy, independent People, possessed of a strong Country, communica­ting little, or not at all with England, I leave to your own Reflections. I hope we have not gone to these immense Expences, without any Idea of secu­ring the Fruits of them to Posterity. If we have, I am sure we have acted with little Frugality or Fore­sight. This is indeed a Point that must be the con­stant Object of the Ministers Attention, but is not a fit Subject for a Discussion; I will therefore expatiate no farther on this Topic: I shall only observe, that [Page 33] by eagerly grasping at extensive Territory, we may run the Risque, and that perhaps in no very distant Period, of losing what we now possess. The Pos­session of Canada, far from being necessary to our Safety, may in its Consequence be even danger­ous. A Neighbour that keeps us in some Awe, is not always the worst of Neighbours. So that far from sacrificing Guadaloupe to Canada, perhaps, if we might have Canada without any Sacrifice at all, we ought not to desire it. And, besides the Points to be con­sidered between us and France, there are other Powers who will probably think themselves interested in the Decision of this Affair. There is a Balance of Power in America as well as in Europe, which will not be forgotten; and this is a Point I should have expected would somewhat have engaged your Attention.

With regard to Senegal and Goree, I concur with you in not making them the principal Object of our Negotiations at the Congress ^* for a Peace; but it is upon Principles very different from yours. You de­spise the African Trade, and that consistently enough, because you seem to lay little Weight on that of the West Indies, which is supported by it; but the Reduction of the Price of Slaves, the whole Trade of Gum thrown into our Hands, and the Increase of those of Gold and Ivory, would make even those Places a far better Purchase than Canada, as might, I think, be shewn without much Difficulty. But I do not insist upon it; because I think we ought to be as moderate in the Terms of Peace, as is con­sistent with a reasonable Indemnification, and be­cause too I know, in the Nature of Things, that it [Page 34] is impossible to retain all. In one word, I will not venture, Sir, to say, we have a treacherous and delusive Peace, unless the Peace is made in Confor­mity to my Ideas; for there may be Reasons that neither you, or I, Sir, can possibly be acquainted with, which may make this not proper to be insist­ed upon; but I will take upon me, Sir, to say, that if by this War we gain Guadaloupe, we gain as great an Acquisition as ever this Nation gained by any Treaty or any War; and if it is possible to retain this, we need not ask for more.

At a Congress, Sir, in the Face of that August Assembly, formed by the Representatives of the Christian World, we shall there exhibit ourselves in our real Character, and shew all the Powers of Europe what they are to expect from us, and how far they ought to wish the Continuance and Increase of our Greatness. Therefore any shew of arrogant Superiority, any unmeasurable Claim, any avari­cious Grasping, though they may seem immediately to fall upon France, are in effect Menaces to every other Power. But if Moderation is necessary there, when the War is ended, and when we act as a Na­tion, how much more necessary is it to private Men, whilst the War still continues with that Uncertain­ty, which must always attend the most prosperous Fortune. You cannot forget, in this very Year, what an Aspect our Affairs in Germany wore, before the glorious Battle of Minden; and you cannot be ignorant how much this must have affected in a Negotiation for Peace. Things are not yet decided there; they look indeed favourable, but not favour­able enough, either with Regard to his Majesty's Army, and still less with Regard to the King of Prussia, to entitle you to prescribe Terms in the Stile of a Roman Dictator, even if any Fortune could intitle you to do it. Let us, Sir, use a little Moderation in our happy Hour, that we may at [Page 35] all Events preserve an Uniformity of Conduct, and not act meanly, if, contrary to our Wishes, any reverse of Fortune should oblige us to be moderate. I should indeed think it the more necessary in you to have been so, as you have not, in my humble Opinion, chosen your Objects very properly. France, Sir, though beaten in all Quarters of the World, worsted both by Sea and Land; though the Credit of her Arms and her Finances are impaired, she is not yet totally ruined; nor, as I conceive, brought so low as she was in the War of Queen Anne. Yet, Sir, you will be pleased to remember, that by the haughty Demeanor, the unreasonable Expectations, the arrogant, I may say, ridiculous Demands of the Allies, the happy Hour for making Peace on the most advantageous Concessions was suffered to escape; until Faction had Time to raise its Head in England, the Posture of Affairs to change Abroad, and the Fortune of the War to vary in so many Particulars, that the Result of all our Success and Arrogance was—the Treaty of Utrecht. The M. de Torcy's Memoirs are a lively Picture of this Con­duct and its Consequences.

I have, Sir, attentively, and I hope it will be allowed fairly, examined your principal Arguments. You will give me Leave now to observe a little upon some Things of less Consequence, which lie de­tached from one another here and there in your Performance.

I respect the Zeal which you shew for the Interest of your Country; but I think that Zeal has trans­ported you much too far in your Reflections on the Conduct and Capacities of our Nobility. If the Easiness of their Fortunes hurries many of them in­to a Life of Dissipation and Pleasure, that has al­ways been the Case, because it is the natural Conse­quence of Youth and Affluence. This, if we may [Page 36] trust our Writers, was the Grievance of other Ages and other Countries as well as ours.

This War is principally, with Regard to us at least, it is an American War. When I consider this, I own my Eyes are involuntarily led, as I be­lieve those of most Persons are, to the few who from their Inclinations, their Studies, their Opportunities, and their Talents, are made Perfectly Masters of the State and Interests of our Colonies. There cannot be many; therefore we cannot easily be mistaken. Nor can we, when we cast our Eye on the noble Person to whom we owe the judicious Settlement of that Frontier Colony, whose Capital gratefully bears the Title of its Founder, by any Means de­spair of an able Plenipotentiary at a Congress, where, for the first Time, our own national Interest will be the principal Object of Negotiation.

I admire, Sir, with you, the noble Struggle which that great Prince, our Ally in this War, has made a­gainst such a Combination of great Powers as meant to destroy him. I could wish for his Virtues, and profess I almost expect from his Abilities, that he will still extricate himself from all the Toils that sur­round him.

It must, however, be remembered, that it is not to his Connection with us, that he owes his Di­stress. He has not, like the unhappy Prince of Hesse, lost his Country twice, by adhering firmly to Great Britain, in a Quarrel entirely British. We found him beset with Enemies, our Interests coinci­ded, we made an Alliance, and I am sure he has already found in Great Britain a most useful Ally; and I believe he always will find in her an Ally faithful to her Engagements. But, Sir, there is a Bound to every Thing, ^† Let us, in your own Words, learn for the future to perfer our own Interest to that of others; to proportion our Expences on the Continent [Page 37] to the immediate Expences of our own Country, and never to assist a New Ally without remembering how much we did for our Old one, and what Return we have had. We see plainly, Sir, by the Conduct of Great Britain at this Hour, that the Ministry is not in­clined to let this Prince fall for Want of a due Assist­ance; but, sure, while we assist him so materially in Europe, we are not bound to sacrifice our Interests in other Parts of the World. It may be a popular Doctrine; but I hope, it is not a Doctrine that will be received.

^† Enthusiasm, Sir, is a noble Principle of Ac­tion; but good Sense and Knowledge only must di­rect the sole Business of a Negotiation. The Pro­testant Cause maintained itself before the King of Prussia was considered as its Protector; and I trust it will still be able to support itself independent of him; it will indeed always find a surer Support in the jarring Interest of the several Powers of Eu­rope, which will certainly never cease, than in the Faith of any Prince, which will be always subject to Change.

The Circumstances of that famous ^‡ Opposition in our Parliament, to which you allude, are indeed but little known. It is however, a Period about which no Man is uninquisitive. Your Description [Page 38] of the Medley which composed that Opposition, is spirited, lively, and I doubt not, just: If you were yourself engaged in that Struggle, when you had dri­ven the common Enemy to the Wall, whether you found it convenient at that Time to quit your Friends, or Whether you thought yourself deserted by them, Time enough is now elapsed to have for­gotten political Friendships, and perhaps too, to have worn out Party-resentments; and in an Age so fond of Anecdotes, and so curious in Characters, assuredly nothing will be more acceptable than a true History of that whole Transaction.

It was indeed no undesirable Time to have lived, when a Field was opened for every Man to display his Abilities, and exert his Talents; if we give the Reins to our Ambition, we should, Sir, regret that where so many skillful Champions used formerly to en­gage and struggle for Victory, one Man should at this Day remain single in the Field of Battle. But, alas! Sir, however mortifying this may be to us as Men, surely as Citizens we must rejoice that the great Man, to whose active Spirit we in a great Measure owe all our Glory, our Success, I had almost said our very Safety, can employ his whole Time against the Ene­mies of his Country, without giving a Moment's Care to provide for his own Safety. If we consider it in this Light, Sir, sure it must be a most pleasing Contemplation to think, that ^† ‘the Extinction of factious Opposition, the Unanimity of every Par­ty, and the Acquiescence of every Connection, in whatever Scheme is proposed by his Majesty's Servants,’ suffer the Speaker without the least De­bate or Opposition to take the Chair, only to vote Mil­lions, and levy Thousands; ^‡ but these Millions are voted, and these Thousands are levied, for the De­struction of the Enemies of our Country.

[Page 39]Have a little Patience however; we shall soon, I trust, Sir, have beat all our Enemies, and then we shall perhaps again have Leisure to quarrel among ourselves; we may then see more than one Champi­on in the Field; we may then list under that Banner, which our Interest or our Passions may direct us to.

In the mean time, let us thank Providence for the present happy Situation of our Affairs. Every Man should, as far as he can, endeavour to continue that Acquiescence, to cherish that Concord and Union, which is indeed so advantageous to our Country; and every Head of a Party must in this have a share in our Acknowledgments for their Acquiescence.

But the two great Persons you address, at present engross the public Attention. The noble Lord has great Merit both to his Country and his Prince; his early Zeal cannot be forgotten. His extensive In­fluence, his personal Authority, exerted as they have been, and as I trust they always will be, for the good of his Country, will always challenge the good Opi­nion of his Countrymen. Nor will our Country for­get to do Justice to the active Spirit of that great Man, to whose unwearied Efforts Great Britain is so much indebted for her present Glory; to whom you and I, Sir, owe it, that in a War with such a Power as France, we now debate whether our Country should use Moderation. I mean not, Sir, to make any Comparison, for it is not now a Time to draw the nice Line between the Merits of great Men, or to ascertain exactly where the Merit of the one ends, and the other begins. Comparisons are always invi­dious and might at this time be hurtful, and tend to weaken the Bonds that unite so many in the Service of their Country.

It was no Spirit of Contradiction, Sir, that made me take the pains of answering your Letter; there­fore as I canvass with Freedom those Points which appear to me to be mistaken, so with great Pleasure [Page 40] I join Hands where I think what you say is just and reasonable. I agree with you intirely in your Judg­ment of a place Bill, which would, I believe, be more effectual, if not made too violent in its first O­peration like an Oliverian self-denying Ordinance. Your Judgment on Mediators is surely just and sen­sible; and we may believe the Ministry think so, who have not employed any Mediation, though they have offered Terms to their Enemy.

I might now ask yours and the public Indulgence for any Mistakes. I have not willingly perverted or misrepresented any thing. I do not pretend to the Credit of a Writer, but I have endeavoured to under­stand the Question I write upon, as I think every Man is bound to do who troubles the Public with his O­pinions. If I am mistaken in what I advance, it does not much signify who the Author of wrong Notions may be. If my Opinions are well ground­ed, and my Remarks just, my Country may receive some Benefit from them; and if she receives a Be­nefit, it is of little Concern what Hand administers it.