§ 1. THE buisy and restless Soul of Man which in all Ages has been Fruitful in Many Inventions, as it has been greatly Disserviceable to the Good and Comfort of Humane Life by the Discovery of things Pre­judicial to it; so at the same time may we not say, has made some Compensation by the Invention of others of a Proportionable Advantage and Benefit. It were easy by a detail of some of the many Use­ful Arts found out by Man to give Evidence of this, but it must Suffice at Present, to Instance in one only, viz. That Art of Writing, or Expressing all Sounds, and Consequently the Conceptions of our Minds, by a Few Letters Variously Disposed or Plac'd, the Commodity or Profit of which to Man­kin'd is so Various & Extensive as not to be easily accounted for. This Art is stiled by One ^* Admi­ [...]andar [...] Omnium inventionum humanarum Signaculum. i. e. The Wonder or Master-piece of all Humane [Page ii]Inventions: And how deservedly is it so, whether we Speak with Reference to the Strangeness or the Benefit of it [...]? How Strange is it that by the Vari­ous Disposition of so Few Letters as Our Alphabet contains, all Sounds should be express'd, and there­by all the Conceptions or Ideas of our Minds! And as for the Commodity of it; not to mention others, from hence it comes to pass that we are Furnish'd with so much Useful History, which bringing into our View both Persons and Things most distant from us in time and place, does greatly delight and entertain us, and at the same time Instruct or Teach and Furnish us with a main part of our most useful Knowledge.

§ 2 In the Early Ages of the World, before this most certain way of Communicating the Knowlege of things was found out; other Medi­ums were made use of for that end, the Principa of which seems to have been Representative Symbol, or Hieroglyphicks, which way or Method of Communication every one knows still Obtains among many Ʋnletter'd Nations in the World. But this as its very uncertain on the Account of that great Variety of Interpretations such Symbols are liable to, and as the Misconstruction o [...] them, its reasonable to think, has been none of the least Prolisick Fountains of the Heathen Mthology, by which the Antient & True Tradition of the First Ages of the World has been so much Corrupted [Page iii]and Alter'd, so is now out of use with such Na­tions, as among whom the Use of Letters has been Introduced. I said above that to this we are Debtors for the useful History we are Furnish'd with: and I must observe on this Occasion that there are two ways in which those who have Oblig'd us with it, according to their different Genius and Humours, have Improv'd this Noble Invention in Composing the Historys they have put into our Hands; that some therein have Confin'd them­selves to Poetical Numbers and Measures, others not so restricting themselves, have Written in Prose, which last in latter Ages has been the more common way. That a considerable part, especial­ly of our more Ancient History, is delivered to us in the former of these ways, is known to most that are not Strangers to Books, a considerable part of the Writings both of the Latin and Greek Poets what are they but Poemata Historica? Among the former, Ovid assures us his Bo [...]k METAMOR­PHOSEON, in part, at least is no other; when in the beginning of it he Invokes the Gods in these Words, viz.

And whoever has read it with understanding can't but see its so.

§ 3. I cannot forbear Observing here with what Pleasure I have taken notice of the great Harmony or Agreement there is in the Account he there gives of the most Antient Things with that of the Sacred History: And that we have in that Com­posure of his a Lively Specimen of the Truth of what the Learned Observe concerning the Writings of the Heathen, viz That they frequently give in Testimony to the Truth of the Sacred History, par­ticularly in its Account of the Eldest Times. With what Accuracy has he given us the History of the Creatson? It looks rather like the Narrative of a Learned Jew or Christian than an Heathen; for be­sides the Philosophy of it, it so well Harmonises with that of Moses, that one would be Tempted to think that either he had Convers'd with his Writings, or had the Knowlege of it convey'd to him by some Secret Cabbala, as its Affirm'd by some of Pythaegoras and Plato; or which is more probable [Page v]that the general Tradition of it Preserv'd in the World, tho' in many Places it was grosly dis­guis'd and corrupted, yet in others retain'd much of its Primitive Purity. For not so much as men­tioning the Absurd Hypothesis of the Aristotelian & Epicurean Philosophers concerning the Origine of the World, like the Inspired Historian, he Ascribes it to the Divine Efficiency. Having spoken of the Chaos (differing from him in Words, not in sense) wherein the contrary, jarring Principles of all Bodies lay without Form or Order, He thus goes on—

Thus rendred by the forementioned Author,

And further, Having shewed what places the several parts of matter in that Confus'd Mass, on their Separation took, according to their respective Gravitations, as also how the terrene and more [Page vi]gross parts of it were formed into a Globe, furnished with Bays, Fountains, Pools, Lakes, Rivers, Valleys, Mountains, and various sorts of Living Creatures; as if the Inspired History had been before him.

He goes on;

Thus rendred

The like Agreement with the Sacred History, I might remark in the Account he gives us of the State of Innocence, stil'd by him the Golden Age, the Flood, &c How well does his Character of the for­mer agree with that Idea of it Divine Revelation [Page vii]has Imprinted on our Minds? And the latter he Ascribes to a Concurrence & Co-operation of the same causes in Nature that Moses does. Its true he Writer in the Strain and Manner of others of his Tribe, who are wont generally to mingle a great deal of Mythology with the Truth; yet notwith­standing how easy is it for every Intelligent Reader to trace in him the Footsteps of the Sacred Histo­ry, particularly in its accounts of the most Early Times?

§ 4. And may we not with equal Truth say the same of Virgils Aeneids? which seem to be no other than a Mythological History of the Affairs of Aeneas, or the Various Occurrences of his Life; to which Homer his [...]ads with others from the Greeks might be added. Its Observed by some Learned Men, that this was the most Antient way of Writing, and that Prose is only an Imitation of Poetry, and that the Grecians in particular at their first delivery from Barbarism, had all their Phy­losophy and Instruction from the Peets, such as Orpheus, Hesiod, Parmenides, Xenophanes, &c. — which seems to have Occasion'd those Lines of Horace, Cap. de Arte Poetica

The sum of which is this, viz.

That in Old Time Poets were the Lights and Instructors of the World, and gave Laws to Men for their Conduct in their several Relations and Affairs of Life.

And Finally, To this seems to agree that of Cato in his Distichs,

§ 5. I have premis'd this in way of Apology for the manner in which this Worthy Person has given us the Ensuing History, in Composing which he has Diverted s [...]me of his Leisure Hours. And from hence tis evident he has for a Precedent some of the most Antient History, and has trod in the steps of many of the most Eminent Sages and earliest Writers History gives us any Knowlege of, who have taken that same way to raise up Monuments to, and eternize the Names and Actions of their Admired Heroes.

§ 6. Its undoubtedly true that as the Minds of Men have a very different Cast, Disposition or Genius leading to & accomplishing for very differing Im­provements, so generally speaking, those are the most Accomplished to make a Judgment on any [Page ix]Performance that have by Nature a Genius Lead­ing to and Accomplishing for the same: And it being so, and withal there being none among the whole number of Mortals less furnish'd for a Perfor­mance of this Nature than my self, I may well be excus'd in Omitting the part of a Censor or Judge upon it, further than to say that the Intelligent Reader will herein discern an uncommon Vigour of Mind, considerable Reading, and see reason to say, that herein we have a Specimen what good parts cultivated with a laudable Ambition to Improve in Knowlege will do, tho' not Assisted with those Advantages of Education which some are favoured withal.

§ 7. Some there are that have remark't, That the Accomplish'd Poet and the Great Man are [...] seldom meeting together in one Person, Or that its rare those Powers of Mind that make the one, are found United with those that Constitute the other. And perhaps it may be a Truth which for the main holds true. For whereas what is properly call'd Wit, (which is no other than a ready Assemblage of Ideas, or a putting those together with quickness & variety wherein there can be found any Congruity or Resemblance; or to speak more plain, an aptness at Metaphor and Allusion) is what, as I take it, makes the Accomplish'd Poet; exactness of Judg­ment, or Clearness of reason (which we commonly and truly say makes the Great Man) on the other hand lies in an Ability of Mind nicely to distinguish [Page x]its Ideas the one from the other, where there is but the least difference thereby avoiding being misled by Similitude, and by Affinity to take one thing from another. And the process of the Mind in these two things being so contrary the one to the other, tis not strange if they are Powers not ever United in the same Subject, yet this notwithstand­ing, all must say, this is not a Remark that uni­versally and without exception will hold true; but that how contrary and inconsistent soever the pro­cess of the mind in the exercise of these two Powers may seem to be, yet there are Instances wherein they are U [...] in a Wonderful Measure: And many Men in whom we find a great deal of Pleasantry or Wit, are notwithstanding very Judici­ous and Rational. And tho' Modesty forbids me to say this of the Author, yet this I shall venture to say, viz. That whatever may be said in Commen­dation of this Performance by the Accomplished for a Judgment upon it; yet that there will not that Honour be done him thereby, as I conceive may with a great deal of Truth and Justice other­wise.

But however it be as to that, and whatever the Sentiments of the Judicious in affairs of this Nature, may be of this Composure, yet I presume all will approve of the design of it, which (as to the main of it at least,) being no other than to pay a just debt to the Memory & procure due Regards to the Family of one, who not only being view'd [Page xi]in his own Personal Accomplishments was a Person of distinguishing Worth, but many ways Highly Deserv'd of the Publick, every one must Confess is Laudable, it being very Consonant to the Natural Notice of what is Good and Excellent Engraven on the Minds of all Men, as appears by the Honours done, even by [...] Nations to their admir'd Heroes, be [...] every one not Insensible of our Valuable [...] so far forth continu'd & secur'd to us under the Present Constitution Obtain'd by the Agency and Influence of this Noble Person whose Name and Praise are here Celebrated, as they will [...]y he was a Publick Benefactor, highly Deserv'd of [...], and tho' Dead justly Challenges a better Regard to his Surviving Posterity than by some at least, has been pay'd to them, and that his Name is not to be mention'd without a Blessing on his Memory, so that this is but a just Tribute to it.

§ 8. For my own part whatever Opinion some may have of me as to my Principles in Politicks, and tho' perhaps our Present Frame or Model of Government is not the best that might be, but capa­ble of a change in some points to the better, yet can freely confess that I look upon it as an Indulgence & Favour of Heaven, a just ground of Gratitude; & that as its a Constitution capable of rendring us a People more Happy than we are, so that the Infelicities we Labour under in the Present Day, which truly are not few or small, are rather owing to the want of [Page xii]a due Ʋse, or rather an Abuse of it, than the Con­stitution it self.

§ 9. I am no Admirer of those Despotick Forms of Government which as they Obtain in some places, so are not without their Advocates in others, where the Blessings they enjoy under the good & gentle Administrations of better Forms might convince them of their Folly and Teach them better. I firmly Believe that the Law of Nature knows no difference or Subordination among Men besides those of Children to their Parents and Wives to their Husbands, and that these Relations only excepted, all Men are otherwise Equal, Free & Independent & remain so till by Contracts, Provisions and Laws of their own they divest themselves of those Preroga­tives: Nor is it I conceive in the Power of any Person or Persons to transfer or vest that Despotick Arbitrary Power in any other Person or Persons, which some in Authority Exercise over the Lives and Fortunes of their Subjects: for no Person can Transfer to another more Power than he has in himself, and such an ARBITRARY Power over himself or any other to Destroy his own or the Life and Property of another, is what none on Earth can lay Claim to. Worthy to be Inserted here are the Words of that Great Man Mr. Lock, who well understood the true Origine of all Law­ful Authority, and what Powers over themselves or others, Persons by the Law of Nature & Antecedent [Page xiii]to their Entring into Society are Vested with; ‘ This i e Arbitrary, Despotick Power, says he, is a Power which neither Nature gives (for it has made no such distinction between one man and another) nor Compact can convey: For man not having such an Ar­bitrary Power over his own Life, cannot give to another such a Power over it, but its the effect of Forfeiture only, which the Aggressor makes of his own life when he puts himself into a state of War with another.’ — And a little after, ‘ And thus, says he, Captives taken in a Just and Lawful War, and such only, are subject to a despotick power which as it arises not from compact, so neither is it capable of any, but is the state of War continued.’ Thus that man of deep Tho'ts Pag. 320, 321. And tis not to be doubted but that whatever some men (may I not say foolishly eno') have advanced for the support of the Absolute power of Supreme Rulers (taking their Notions of Civil Power probably from some mistaken texts of Scripture, & general Speculations founded on some Equivocal terms, such as King, Sovereign, Supream, &c Yet the true Measures of all lawful Authority, be it Supream or Subordinate, are to be taken from the nature of that Compact or Contract that is the true Origine of it, & Vests it in those that wear it [...]: Nor is this Doctrine I think in the least Inconsistent with that that asserts the Jus Divinum of Civil Power; or that the Powers that be are Ordained of God, & therefore Challenges Obedience to them not for Wrath meerly, but for Conscience sake.

§ 10. I presume there are not many in this Popular, Levelling Day who will not readily Sub­scribe this Doctrine, and more than that, who will not say that in Lawful Governments that are found­ed in Compact, the more general Error is that too much Power is given up by the Community, and Vested in their Rulers; I am very sure among us at least, there are not many, who (Pardon me if what I say be amiss) generally speaking are a People Trained up, but too much, in Principles of Rebellion and Opposition to Government; and who as to the Constitution Obtaining among us, as Popular as it is, yet think it Defective by Error on the other Ex­tream? Yet all this notwithstanding, certain it is Despotick Forms are not the only that are Preju­dicial to the ends of Government, but those Erring on the other Extream are perhaps as Inconsistent with them, and of this, besides their but too often Exemplifying the Condition of Ephesus at a certain time when Paul was there, Act. 19. We need not go far from Home for Evidence. Our English Constitution at Home seems to be an Happy mean between these two Extreams, Wisely contriv'd to secure from the ill Consequents of either of them. A Constitution it is wherein as one says, Tho' the Executive Power be Lodg'd solely in the King, yet the Legislative is divided between him and his People, by which as the King has Bounds set to his Prerogative, so the People have their Privileges which Assert their Liberty. Such a Constitution it [Page xv]is as allows enough to a King of no Tyrannical Temper, and what is Sufficient to secure the Ends of Government, and enough to the People to Pre­serve them from Slavery. There is Monarchy without Slavery, a Great King, and yet a Free People; such a Monarchy as has the main Advantages of an Aristocracy in the Lords, and of a Democracy in the Commons, without the Inconveniences of either. In a Word, a Model of Government so Perfect and well Adapted to the Ends of Government does it seem to be, that as the things wherein other Con­stitutions, (and in particular Ours in this Colony) Harmonizes with it, seem to be its great Per­fects, and those wherein it differs its great Imper­fections, though by many Cry'd up for our Glorious Privileges.

§ 11. Perhaps what I have already Written, may have given some Exercise to the Patience of the Reader, however having put Pen to Paper, I shall Presume to detain him a little longer on a matter which as it has been the Occasion of much Debate and Contention as well as many other Evils among us, so my Tho'ts are here led to it by some Pas­sages in the Ensuing Muse. Tis the matter of Native Right as its commonly called, or the Right the Aborigines of this Country (all or any of them) had or have to Lands in it. An Interest this is which every one knows has not wanted many Advocates among us, especially of late Years, who have en­deavour'd [Page xvi]to Advance or set it up as our only Va­luable Title to whatever Lands are in the Country, some perhaps Acting in what they have done with a real Perswasion of this, but far the most no doubt on other Considerations.

§ 12. For my own part, I have ever thought this a matter more Talk'd of than Ʋnderstood, and am ready to think of those who are of the above­mention'd Opinion in this matter, that they have Drank in this Article of their Faith as perhaps they have many of the rest, without due Examination or Search into the matter.

§ 13. I Presume we are generally Agreed there is such a thing as Native Right, to speak in the Vulgar Phraise; or a Right which the Aborigines of any Country and Consequently of this, (or some of them at least) have or had to Lands in it, I mean to particular Tract, or Parcels of it: I suppose there are few that in this Point bring them down to a Level with the Bruital Race, how Barbarous or Uncultivated soever they were: And sure I am that none will Deny it that considers that as there never was any among Mankind, even the most Barbarous but what were Capable of Impropriating Lands as well as other things, so that among the Aborigines of this Country there was that found that was Sufficient for that end. Yet notwithstanding to Assert their Right in that Extent that many do, [Page xvii]and suppose it, without excepting any, to extend to all Lands in the Country, whether Cultivated by them or not; is what I never could, nor yet can see any Sufficient reason for. And though I know to countenance and give a currency to this Opinion the Authority of those Truly Worthy Men that were the first Settlers of English Colonys here, as well as that of the several Governments in the Country from the begining to this Day, is wont frequently to be alledged in Discourse by our Bigots to this Principle, who would bear us in Hand they were one and all of the same Perswasion, and accordingly accounted no Lands in the Coun­try their own till Obtain'd of the Natives by Com­pact or otherwise, yet for my own part I could never think so Dimunitively of them, or at least many of them as to Believe they Acted on this Principle in the Regard they shewed the Natives & their Pretended Claim to the Country, by entring into Treaties with and allowing them Gratuities for the Lands, but rather that they Acted on Pru­dential Considerations taken from their own & the Natives Circumstances.

§ 14. And as it is an undoubted Truth, that the Aborigines of this Country, some or all of them had Right to Lands in it, so is it equally certain that of what Extent soever it was it arose from one of these Two Things, viz. Either the Law of Nature, or Positive Laws or Constitutions of their [Page xviii]own (Tacit or Express) Regulating or Determining the matter of Property, one or other of these must give them what they had. And by Consequence nothing with any certainty can be Determin'd upon the extent of the Claims or Properties of any Single Person or Number of them, i [...] first it be determin'd what their Condition was, whether they were a Peo­ple in the State of Nature, and so had only what the Law of Nature gave them, or had q [...]t [...]ed that State, entred into Communities, and by Compact one with another, and Positive Constitutions of their own (Tacit or Express) had fixed the Bounds of each Community respectively and Settled or Determin'd the matter of Property in Land within themselves severally: and in case this last be found, viz. that they had entred into Communities and Perform'd those Consequent Acts, further it must be Deter­termin'd where the Bounds of each Community re­spectively were, and what Disposition or Settlement the Laws of each Society or Community made of the Lands within their Limits severally. These are things which perhaps few of those who have appear'd with such Heat and Zeal for the fore­mention'd Principle, ever thought of, yet I am well assur'd there is no Intelligent Person but will readily grant that till these things are Determin'd nothing with any certainty can be Known or Re­solv'd upon the extent of the Claim or Property of any among them, whether Single Person or Com­munity.

[Page xix] And because diverse Persons are of Different Sentiments in this matter, viz. What the Condition of the Persons I am now speaking of was as to this, at the time of the first Access of the English to the Country when such Large Tracts of Land are suppos'd by some to be Obtain'd of them; some being of Opinion they were a People in the State of Nature, others that they had quitted that State, entred into Communities and put on some Form of Civil Policy, &c — and because as I said nothing can be Deter­min'd as to the extent of the Right or Property of any of them without a Determination of this mat­ter, Altho' I shall not Presume upon an Umpirage of it, yet [...]all examine each of these Hypothesis and on a Supposition of the Truth of both of them severally, shall shew what can be Determin'd upon the extent of the Rights or Properties of any of them: Which when I have done I am prone to think, that those who with such Confidence, and to the no small Harm and Injury of their Country have Appear'd on the side of the forementioned Extravagant Principle, will see they have not such Evidence of the Truth of it, as perhaps now they think they have.

§ 15. I take it for granted & think it needs no Proof, that as all men are and ever were Born Free, Equal and Independent as to Civil Subjection or Sub­ordination, so there was a time when the State of Nature obtained in the World. As there is a wide [Page xx]difference between Paternal Authority or Power and Civil or Political, so tho' the first has been from the Beginning and is as old as the Relation between Father and Son; yet the other is not so: But as in the beginning of the World men were few in Num­ber, wanted not Room, having the wide World be­fore them, had not the like Temptations to Con­tention and Strife, nor were exposed & in danger of Enemies, as since [...] so did not presently find a necessity of entring into Society, but continued for some time in that Free Equal, Independent State wherein they were Born, having no other Law than that of Nature, & not knowing what Political Power or Authority was. And this is what is Intend­ed by the state of Nature. How long it was in the Beginning that men continu'd in this state, before there were any instances of their Embodying into any form of Civil Policy is uncertain; Nor is it strange we are left so much in the dark, & Histo­ry is so silent in this matter, since the time was so long before the use of Letters obtained in any parts of the World: yet that such a state as this did precede that of Civil Society as the Sacred History it self seems to intimate to us in those words of Cain (Gen. 4.12. And it shall come to pass that every one that findeth me shall s [...]y me Which seem evidently to imply this state of Nature then obtaining, and that every man then look'd on himself as having in himself right to punish the Transgressi [...]ns of the Law of Nature) so I presume is not doubted of [Page xxi]by many in this day, wherein I suppose it is gene­rally received for good Doctrine, that Compact is the Origine of Government, at least as far forth, or wheresoever it was begun in Peace. Yea if we may believe Josephus [...]costa, and I know no reason why we may not, even these latter Ages of the World have afforded instances of this nature, I mean of persons in the state of nature, or without any form of Civil Policy among them. His words are these, viz. ‘ There are great & apparent Conjectures that these men, speaking of the Aborigines of Peru, for a long time had neither Kings nor Common Wealths, but liv'd in Troops as they do this day in Florida, the Che­riq [...]anaes, those of Brasil & many other Nations, which have no certain Kings, but as Occasion is offered in Peace or War, they chuse their Captains as they Please.’ Lib 1. Cap 25: Nor is it unlikely there may be Multitudes in the World, who even to this day remain in this state as perhaps may appear more probable by and by, when something further has been added Descriptive of it; which that so I may be the better understood in what follows, I shall do in this place.

§ 16. This State of Nature then is a state where­in men not having any Common, Establish'd, Positive Law (Tacit or Express) or Judicature to appeal to, with Authority to decide Controversies between them, and punish Offenders, Every man is Judge for himself, and Executioner.

[Page xxii] ‘ Those says that Worthy Person ^* before men­tioned, who are United into one Body, and have a Common, Establish'd Law and Judicature to Appeal to, with Authority to Decide Controversies arising between them, and Punish Offenders, are in Civil Society one with another, but those w [...]o have no such Common Appeal, I mean on Earth, are still in the State of Nature, each being (where there is no other) Judge for Himself and Executioner.’

Treatise of Government, p. 247. and afterward p. 280. accounting for the Defects of this State, he says,

1 ‘ There Wants in it an Establish'd Settled, known Law Receiv'd and Allow'd by common Consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong, and the common Measure to Decide all Controversies arising between Men. For though the Law of Nature be Plain and Intelligible to all Rational Creatures, yet Men being byas'd by their Interest, as well as Ignorant for want of Study of it, are not apt to allow of it as a Law bind­ing to them in the Application of it to their particu­lar Cases.’

2. ‘ In the State of Nature there wants a Known, In­different Judge with Authority to Determine all Dif­ferences according to the Establish'd Law, for every one in that State being both Judge and Executioner of the Law of Nature, Men being partial to them­selves, Passion and Revenge are very apt to carry [Page xxiii]them too far, and with too much Heat in their own Cases, as well as Negligence, and Ʋnconcernedness to make them too Remiss in other Mens.’

3. ‘ [...]n the State of Nature there often wants Power to Back and Support the Sentence when Right; and to give it due Execution, they who by any Injustice Offen'd will seldom fail where they are Able, by Force to m [...]e good their Injustice. And such Resistance man times makes the Punishment Dangerous, and Frequently Destructive to those who Attempt it.’

Thus that great Man

In a Word, In this State as Men have no other Law than that of Nature or Reason to be the Mea­sure or Standard of Right and Wrong, and are with­out any Common Superior on Earth, with Authority to decide Controversi [...]s and a Force or Power to Execute his Sentences, to whom they might Ap­peal when Disputes arise, so every Man has right in himself both to Judge of the Transgressions of that Law, and Punish them as far as he is Able. And from this short account of this State 'tis easie to see both what it is, and wherein it differs from a State of Civil Society, for whereas in this State men have no other Law than that of Nature, & every man has in himself right to Judge of & Punish the Transgressions of that Law; in that of Civil Society there are other Laws for a Measure or Standard of Right and Wrong, and this Right of Judging and Executing, is given up by every Individual into the hands of the Community: For which reason in this State [Page xxiv]all Private Judgment in any matters ceases, and the Community is Ʋmpire, and by settled stand­ing Laws made by themselves, indifferent and the same to all Parties, and by men having Authority from the Community to Execute those Laws, de­cides all Differences that happen between any par­ticular Members, concerning any matter of Right, and punishes all Offences with such Penalties as the Law has Established.

§ 17. Now on the Supposition that the Aborigines of this Country, before and at the time of the First Discovery & Planting of it by the English, were in this State, and not to be considered as having put on any Form of Civil Policy, let us enquire what can be Determin'd concerning the Extent of their Rights to Lands in it: And here it must be consider'd that during the continuance of this State with any Per­sons, though all have a Right or Claim to the Earth, as well as all other things made for the Use and Comfort of Man, by Vertue of the Grant of the most High, the Great Proprietor of the World, whereby as the Psalmist says, He has Given the Earth to the Children of Men; Yet as by that they are made but Commoners in them, and can Claim only as such, so there is I suppose but one way whereby any particular Person can begin a Property in any thing, be it Land or any thing else, exclusive of the rest of Mankind, and this is by adding to it some­thing which is his own, for Instance his Labour, [Page xxv]which is his alone, and no one else has any Right to. Thus in this State the Law of Nature or Reason to which alone Men are Subject, and which gives them what ever they have, this Law I say makes and allows the Land a Man Tills & Subdues to be his Peculiar Property: by his Labour, which is h [...]s own, (and no m [...]n else has any Right to) be­stow'd upon it, he does as it were Inclose it from the Common; and that Deer, or Hare, or Fruit a Man spends his [...]me and Strength in the Chase and Gathering of, it allows to be his Property: he does the by take them out of that Common State whe [...] in Nature had made them. [...] Worthy to be Inserted here are the Words of that great Man ^* before mention'd, ‘ Thus says he, this Law of Reason makes the Deer the Indians who has Kill'd it, tis allow'd to be his Goods, who has bestow'd [...]is Labour upon it, though before it was the Common Right of every one — He adds, And amongst those who are Counted the Civiliz'd Part of Mankind, who have Made and Multiply'd Pos [...]ive Laws to Determine properly, this Original Law of Nature for the begining of Property in what was before Com­mon still takes place, and by Virtue thereof, what Fish any one Catches in the Ocean, (that great and still remaining Common of Mankind) or what Ambergrease any one takes up here, is by the Labour that removes it out of the Common State Nature lest it in made his Property who takes that Pains about it.’ Thus he,—

[Page xxvi] Indeed after any Portion of the Earth, or any thing else is by this means taken out of the Com­mon State it was in before, and a Property is begun in it, this State of Nature seems to Admit of other ways of fixing a Property in the same thing or things by others; Thus in this State, that Land or other thing I began a Property in by my Labour, may become the Property of another Man, b [...] Gift or Purchase as well as in a State of Civil Society: but Labour only seems to be the thing that begins Property, and first takes things out of their Com­mon State. As in the begining before Men entred into Society, this was the begining of it ( Cain & Abel had their Right of Property, the one in the Lands he Cultivated, the other in the Flocks he kept; from their Labour spent on them) so 'tis ever since where the same State of Nature Obtains, nor can it be begun that I can see otherwise.

§ 18. And to this voice of the Law of Nature, viz. that Labour in this State shall be the beginning of Property, seems well to agree the voice of God Himself in the Gift or Grant he made of the Earth, the Creatures & Productions of it to Man­kind, Gen. 1.28.—Where we find that Cultivating and Subduing the Earth, and having Dominion are joyned together: Thereby assuring us that as in that Gift he then made of it in common to men, he did not design it should serve to their benefit & comfort only by its Spontaneous Productions, but that [Page xxvii]it was his will that by Art and Industry in Subduing and Cultivating of it they should draw still more from it, so that this should be their Title to it at least during the continuance of that State of Nature, & till by positive Constitutions of their own, the mat­ter of property should be otherwise Determined and Settled.

§ 19. And if this be true, as I think it is, viz. That in the beginning of the World before men entred into Society, [...] in all Ages and Places since where the State of Nature obtains, and there are no Positive Constitutions ( [...]acit or Express) Regulating the matter of Property, this is the only Way of begin­ning a Property in things, be it Land or what else you please, it seems no way Difficult to Determine upon the extent of mens Properties during the con­tinuance of this state of things among them, for this being the Cause and Original of all Property, must be the Measure of it too, whatever ways of fixing a Property in things thus firstly impropria­ted, may be consequent upon it: As far as Labour extends, and things by that are taken out of the common state Nature left them in, so far the Right of Property must extend and no further, what is beyond this must remain still in the same Common State it was made in. And further, at the same time Reason forces us to conclude that as to a Right of Property in Land particularly, it can't be of great Extent during mens continuance in this State, [Page xxviii]at least so long as they continue their Simple, Mean, Inartful way of Living, are mainly fed and cloth'd with Roots, Fish, Fowl, Deer, Skins, &c. The Sponta­neous productions of Nature, & have those provisi­ons of it in such plenty that want does not oblige them to Cultivate or Till the Earth. While things continue thus among them, what Temptation can they have to Impropriate much, especially if at the some time the necessary Utensils, such as Ploughs, Hoes, Axes, &c. are wanting, as we all know was the case with the Aborigines of this Country before the arrival of the English to it.

§ 20. And now from what I have thus said concerning the way of Original or Primary Impropri­ation in the state of Nature, it can't be difficult to determine of the Extent of the properties of the Aborigines of this Country, or any of them in I and at the time of the Access of the English to it, on the Supposition of their being in this State; Inas­much as it assures us their Labour or Improvement was the measure of it. And to instance in the Moheags in particular, or any of them, concerning whose Pretended Claims there has been so much Noise and Strife in the Country, which even to this Day is not ended, what has been said assures us that on the Supposition of their being in this state at that time, instead of such large Territories they have been ignorantly (as well as knavishly enough no doubt) tho't by some to have, they had really good [Page xxix]Right or Title, but to here and there a few spots of it, viz only to so much as by the means abovemen­tioned they had separated and inclosed from the rest of the Country I shall not presume upon an Ʋmpirage in this matter, by saying they were doubt­less at that time in the State of nature. I Remember what the Judicious Mr. Hooker in his Learned treatise of Ecclesiastical Policy, Lib. 1. Sect. 10. Sug­gests concerning the defects of Polities civil in their beginnings in the more early Ages of the World, and perhaps it is a difficult thing to fix the bounds between the State of Nature and that of Civil Policy, or say how far the Rights of the Law of Nature must be given up or Retained by persons in order to their belonging to the one or the other: yet thus far I shall venture to say, viz. That if what has been said Descriptive of this State of Nature be true, as I think it is, and if withal we may make a Judgment of the Customs and Way of Living of the Persons I am now speaking of, at that time, by the Customs & Manners of the more Unciviliz'd part of their Survivors at this day, who [...]m g [...]ne may reasonably be thought the Liveliest Images of their Ancestors, and most to retain their Customs; if we may do so I say, the Probability seems to lie on the Affirmative side, viz. That they were with their Brethren in Peru, Florida, Brasil, &c. before mention'd from Ac [...]sta, to be rank't with those in a State of Nature.

[Page xxx] § 21. Who that is not a Stranger to them will say the forementioned Essentials of a state of Civil Policy are to be found among them? that they have any Established, Setled, common Law received and al­lowed so much as by a Tacit Consent to be the Standard of Right and Wrong and the Common Measure to decide Controversies arising among them? And herewith a known, Indifferent Judge with Authority to determine differences according to this Established Received Law? Who knows not that an Attempt to find these things among them is like a search for the Living among the Dead? And that when Controversies arise among them, without a reference of the matter to the decisi­on of any Common Ʋmpire or Judge every one looks on himself as Vested with the Rights of the Law of Nature, and accordingly is Judge for himself and Executioner! This every one knows is the common, uninterrupted Practice of those of whom I am now speaking of, and what is accounted Reputable and Laudable among them in all Disputes where the Contending Parties are capable of it, and in such as issue in the Death of either of them, consonant to the same Law the nearest Relative or Relatives of the Slain, look on themselves as the Persons con­cerned to do Justice on the Murderer, and accord­ingly fail not to watch all opportunities, till at length by Surprize or Violence they compass it, and by the Gun, Hatchet or Knise, end the Contro­versy.

[Page xxxi] § 22. I think I am not Injurious in this Account of the Present State of things among those of Our Natives as we call them, I am now speaking of, nor can I so much as Suspect a Censure for it, since it is no more than what most that are not Strangers to them know. The Tragical end of Mahomet Eldest Son, as I take it, to Owaneco, with the like Tragi­cal Occasion of it, is yet Fresh in our Memories, and its needless for me to Relate: and who knows not that That was but one Instance of that Justice, which is as Frequent among them as there is the like Occasion? This every one I think must say looks very much like the State of Nature, (if the forementioned Account of it be true) and if it be not an Evidence of its Obtaining among a People, is at least an Evidence of such an Imperfect State of Civil Policy as borders very near upon it. And if it be so with these now, we have I believe reason to Conclude the Condition of their Ancestors Living at the Time of the Access of the English to the Country, and before, was not better; for who can think that these their Present Survivors are more de­generate and farther removed from a State of Civil Policy than they were? For my own part, I have ever tho't on the other hand that even the main of that Shadow of it which is now among them is of later Da [...]e, [...]ff [...]med by them partly from an Humour of Conformity to us their New Neighbours, and partly for other Reasons and nor a continuance of Ancient, Immemorial Customs among them.

[Page xxxii] § 23. Nor is it as I conceive any Conclusive Evi­dence of the contrary that they Liv'd in some sort of Society or Neighbourhood and had their Chiefs or Superiors among them, whether they were such as were so by Nature and Age, or by Election: Since the State of Nature, tho' it Banish or Implys an Ab­sence of all Inequality among Men as to Civil Autho­rity or Jurisdiction, yet does not exclude all Inequal­lity whatsoever. The State of Nature is a State of Subjection to the Dictates and Direction of the Law of Nature, which Law is so far from Banishing all Inequality or Subordination among Men, that it Or­dains it in diverse Instances of it, particularly in the Relations of Parents & Children, Husband & Wise, Captain & Souldiers, right reason which is this Law says there shall be Subjection & Subordination. These Inequalities therefore are no ways Inconsistent with this State, nor of themselves Evidences it does not obtain among any. And these I think it not Im­probable, were the only Inequalities or Subordinations among the Persons I am now speaking of at this time and perhaps ever before. Their Chiefs or Superiors seem to have been either such as were so by Nature or Age, Ancient Fathers, or Military Heads chosen by them to lead them out against their Ene­mies. Thus where Families among them happened to be Numerous, continued entire together, and tho't themselves Sufficient to Subsist by themselves without Uniting with others, (as was oft the case no doubt, in that Day when there was no want of Land, all [Page xxxiii]the Country, excepting here and there a Spot, was an Uncultivated Wilderness, all Provisions of Na­ture Accommodate to their Plain, Mean, Inartful Way of Living were in great Plenty, and nothing found to give Price to them farther than this did, and Consequently Temptations and Occasions of Strife or Contention among them were few and rare, during this Day or Time I say) the Fathers of such Families in Succession seem to have been their only Superiors or Chiefs, and by the exercise of their Paternal Authority, (to which such Families had been Accustomed) maintained the little Order was among them: They seem to have been their Cap­tains or Leaders too when Occasion requir'd, unless by reason of some Defect of Body or Mind they were Incapable of it. But when the case happened to be otherwise, as no doubt it often did, and diverse Families saw a necessity of Uniting together for their better Security against Foreign Force, their Su­periors or Chiefs were by Election, and seem to have been chosen by them for no other end than to be Generals of their Armies, as among their Bre­thren in Peru, &c. before mention'd. Nor do they seem to have had but little, if any Dominion at Home in times of Peace. In this Respect they seem (if the Comparison may be allow'd) to be like the Judges in Israel of Old, who certainly were little, if any thing, more than Generals of their Armies.

[Page xxxiv] § 24. These I am much inclin'd to think were the only Superiors or Chiefs they had among them, and which perhaps by an Abuse or Misapplication of the Term, Sachem (which probably in its Original sense intends no more than a Chief Father or Captain) have in later times gone by the N [...]me of Kings or Civil H [...]ads. And tho' perhaps s [...]me will say this is all but Conjecture or Chimaera, and as such only to be regarded; yet I must tell them I can't but much incline to this Opinion, and think I shall do so till I can see some further evidence of the Essentials of Kings in them than ever yet I did, and can believe that there is so much of Spell in that Title or Epithet that the bare Application of it to a Person is Sufficient without any thing else, to make him in fact so. But whatever may be the Truth as to this, and on which side soever those who are Judicious, & more Learned in these things than I, may resolve the matter, yet supposing what I have Discover'd as my Prevailing Opinion in the case, to be Truth and that after all the Honours done their Chiefs by the Glorious Titles of Kings, Emperors, Allies, &c. they were but Chief Fathers or Captains and really in the State of Nature with the rest of their Brethren, I think its pretty clear the Proper­ties of any or all of them in Lands were of no greater extent than has been above expressed, and Consequently vastly short of what by many want­ing Probity and Sense we have been born in hand they were.

[Page xxxv] § 25. I come now to consider the Second Hy­pothesis, viz. That how Defective or Wanting soever their State might be as to the foremention'd re­quisites of a State of Civil Society, and though Judg­ing by what was generally Practiced among them, (every one retaining in his own Hands the Rights of the Law of Nature) they seem to have been in that State, Yet that they had really quitted it, en­tred into Communities, and by Compact, and at least Tacit Constitutions of their own, settled the matter of Property, both with their Neighbours respectively, & severally among themselves; and that these foremen­tion'd Customs, with others of the like Nature ar­guing the State of Nature obtaining among them, were rather from a Defect in Establishing proper Methods for the Execution of their Laws, than Evidences that they had none.

§ 26. I have already expressed my Sentiment in this matter, which whether it be right or wrong, matters not as to what is now before me, which is to Consider this Opinion and see what (upon a Supposition of the truth of it) can be determined upon the Claims or Pretensions of any of them to Lands in the Country. And I am pretty well assured this Opinion, (how fond so ever our Bigots to Native Right are of it, yet will less serve that Interest, at least in the Present Day, than the former; in as much as on a Supposition of it; tho' it must be allow'd they had a Common Property [Page xxxvi]considered as Communities or Politick Bodies, and besides this that some or all the Members of each Community respectively had severally particular Properties of their own Exclusive of the rest of Mankind, yet) all becomes so Perplex'd and in the Dark, and so many Difficulties inextricable, at least in the Present Day, unavoidably attend all, that nothing certain can be determin'd upon the Properties of any of them, whether Communities or Particular Persons; I shall give some Evidence of this, when I have Premised this, viz.

§ 27. That allowing it to be true that they had quitted the state of Nature, and put on some Form of civil Policy, yet it does not from thence necessarily follow that Lands were brought under the Regu­lation of Compact, or any Positive Constitutions of their own, (tacit or express:) O [...] that they were held by them any otherwise than as in the State and by the Law of Nature. Certain it is there is no necessary Connexion between those things, the For [...]ner does not infer the Latter; A People may put on some Form of Policy without any Deter­mination of the matter of Property in Lands whether by [...]ompact with Neighbouring Polities or any Posi­tive Constitutions of their own. And for my own part I never yet saw any sufficient Reason to conclude there was any thing of this nature done by them before the Arrival of the English here: Nor do I think it will seem probable there was, to any [Page xxxvii]that considers their poor, mean, barbarous way of Living, the [...]rear Plenty of all the Provisions of Nature that req [...]r'd, the very little use they made of the Earth further than to walk upon it, together with their want not only of that Communication with other parts of the World, but of any thing among themselves that might g [...]ve a Value to the Provisions of Nature over and above what their own Necessities did. Their way of Living the Poet well describes when accounting for the Golden Age, he tells us of Men then,

Certain 'tis Nature [...] the main Materials of their Subsistence without any Art or Labour of theirs; they had but little more to do than to Catch or Gather what [...]ey had provided for them. And during this Sta [...] of things among any So­cieties of Men, of wh [...] Consideration or Value can Land be to them, especially when these spon­tan [...]s Provisions of Nature in all Places are in [Page xxxviii]such Abundance that there is no danger of Want, and all means of Communication or Trade with other parts of the World, together with the Ʋse of Money, among themselves, (which things might impair their Stock of Provisions and give a Value to them over and above what their own Necessities did) are wholly wanting, as we all know was the case with the [...]borigines of the Country? Surely it could not be of such Value to them as to put them upon a Partage or Impropriation of it farther than was done before by the Law of Nature. Let us sup­pose an Island so Separated from the rest of the World as to be under an utter Impossibility of any Commerce with it; wherein there were In­habitants embodied together in Civil Societies, yet Living almost entirely on what Nature prepared to their Hands, and so disproportioned in number to the quantity of their Provisions that after their Consumption of what was needful for them, there remained enough for perhaps Ten times the Number, and at the same time nothing in the Island either because of its Commonnes [...] or Perishableness fi [...] to supply the place of Money; what Inducement could such Societies have by any Compact either with one another, or among themselves re­spectively, to fix a Property in Lands, beyond what was done in the way before mentioned by the Law of Nature, for my own part I can't Excogitate any. And who knows not that this was the very Case with the Persons I am speaking of, before [Page xxxix]the Arrival of the English here. For this reason I think it highly Probable, yea next to a Certainty that such Lands only as their Poor way of Living rendred their Tillage of necessary (and how small a part was this compared with the rest of the Coun­try?) they put any Value upon: the rest they looked upon as of no more Price, nor Advantage to be Impropriated than the Air they Breathed in: and therefore like other things of the like Nature in all Communities) lay Neglected in that Com­mon State wherein Nature left it [...] Nor let this be thought strange, since from Divine Revelation itself we have pretty good assurance that it is no more than was Common in the more Early Times of the World: There we find that in those Days men did not always immediately upon their Entring into Society, set out the Bounds of their distinct Territo­ries, and by Laws within themselves respectively Settle the matter of Property; but suffered a great, may I not say the greatest part of the Land? to lie in the same Common State it was in before. Even in Abraham's time we find men wandred up & down with their Flocks & Herds freely and without Mo­lestation, seeking Pasture where they liked best; and that Abraham himself did this in a Country where he was a Stranger, and there were many Kingdoms or Communitie [...] of Men, and they not newly formed neither. Which to me seems a pretty good Evidence that at least a great part, yea Probably the greatest part of the Land lay in Com­mon, [Page xl]that the Inhabitants Valued it not, at least so far as to think it worth their while to come to a Partage of it, and fix their respective Properties in it: The reasons of which no doubt were their Rude, Mean, Inartful Way of Living, Feeding and Clothing themselves mainly with what Nature Prepar'd, in which Preparations as they were in great Plenty, so Probably they had no Money or any Equivalent of it that might give a Value to any thing above what their way of Living did.

§ 28. I make no doubt there are those who will not Scruple to say the contrary to this is Evident in the Aborigines of this Country, and that in Fact they had by Compact and Constitutions Positive (Tac [...] or Express,) Settled the matter of Property in Lands, each Society with its Neighbours, and among themselves severally: But be it so, I think its Probable, if not more than so, from what I have said, that they had not, and though I suppose I know the reasons on which they may so assert, as well as they, yet as I think they will scarcely weigh in the Ballance with the Evidence to the contrary given above, so desire to see some further and better reason for it before I believe it. Its very true that when after the Arrival of the English here, by Conversation and Co [...]erce with them they were made Sensible of the Value of the Money they brought with them and made tender of for Land, they could not then but see that [Page xli]the Lands beyond, what they Improved, and so held by the Law of Nature, might be very Pro­fitable to them, and on this I doubt not they were full enough in their Assertions of this Na­ture, viz. that by Compact and Constitutions of their own, they were entituled to such and such Limits respectively; but this I think can carry with it little Evidence of the thing to one who knows what they were, and withal considers what is universally observable in their Posterity at this Day, when such a Temptation is laid before them. To all which I may add what I sup­pose comes pretty near a Demonstration in the case, viz their Palpable Contradictions one of the other in their Pretensions, or the Accounts they gave, on this Occasion, of their Respective Claims or Properties, One Sachem or Community often Claiming what another did. This who knows not to be fact as to Lands in this part of the Country, where the Claims of Hiums, Uncass, and Sannup are found to interfere, the Con­sequence of which has been that Persons Claiming under them, have endeavoured each one to set up his Title in Opposition to the other, to the no small Expence of Time and Money, as well as Hurt of the Publick.

§ 29 Now supposing this to be so, 'tis Evident the Hypothesis or Opinion o [...] their having quitted the State of Nature & put on some Form of Policy, meerly, [Page xlii]does no Service to the Interest the Zealous As­sertors of it endeavour to Advance by it, does not extend Native Right one Inch farther than the former Opinion did: for the Unavoidable Conse­quence of it is this, viz that as no Societies of them had any common Right or Property, as such, [...] neither any Particular Member of those Societies, any by virtue of any Positive Constitutions or otherwise than by the Law of Nature: and that setting aside here and there a Spot this or the other Person or Persons Improved and so Impropriated and Held by the Law of Nature, all the rest of the Country Remained in the same Common State wherein it was made, as much the Property of the Kings of the Indies on the Opposite side of the Globe as Theirs. Now, in order to the rendring this Opinion of any Service to the end for which its so Zealously Avouch'd and Advanc'd by Many, its not enough to assert, yea & make evident too that Our Aborigines had quitted the State of Nature and put on some form of Policy, but further, as I before observed, that they had by Compact one with another, & Positive Constitutions (Tacit or Express) Determined and Settled their Bounds and the terms of each Community respectively, and after this is done it will be of no advantage still to the pretensions of any Particular Community, or any Member or Members of it, till we are assured what bounds by Compact with its Neighbours it had, and what Settlement its Constitutions made of the Lands [Page xliii]within it: which I conjecture none can do without the help of Divination.

§ 30. Which brings me to what I proposed, which was to shew that on a Supposition of the Truth of this ( viz. that Our Aborigines were to be considered as in a State of Society Civil, and had by these consequent Acts Determined and Regulated the matter of Property) all their Rights or Properties instantly become so Perplext and in the Dark that nothing can be Known or Determin'd upon them, and consequently no good Title possibly founded on them. And in pursuance of this, and at the same time to convince the bold Avouchers of this O­pinion, I would Demand of them in a few things;

1. On a Supposition of the truth of this, Who can account for the true extent of the common Properties of their Respective Communities, or any one of them? If I have not been Misinformed some pains was formerly taken both in this and some Neighbouring Governments for a Resolution in this point: and for that end Persons were Deputed to Enquire & Obtain the best light they coul [...] of the Natives. What success attended these endeavours in Other Govern­ments I know not, but in this I suppose none at all. Its true the Gentlemen [...]eputed by this Govern­ment to enquire into th [...] Claim of the Moheags made return of somethin [...] to the Assembly which they call'd an Account or description of their [Page xliv]Claim by certain Abutments, and which the As­sembly so far had regard to as, it I mistake not; to allow of its Entry on record. But yet can any of those who would perswade us to think that Native Right is our only Valuable Title, Acquiesce in this or think it of any value, when at the same time their Neighbours, the Pequots, Quinebaugs, Nahanticks, (all of them as worthy of Credit as the Moheags,) give another Account, some of them claiming all the Lands within those Limits, saying the Moheags had none, & others of them claiming at least Large Tracts within them. I suppose none will deny this to be Fact, or if there be that shall do so, that the Claimers under Hiums and Sannup will stand by me in it. Now if Native Right be our only Valuable Title what shall be done in this case to know where or in whom this Right to these Lands is? Certain it is if they were Com­munities, or Bodies Politick properly so Called, they had a Federative Power, and if in the Exercise of it, they made a Partage of the Lands, in this part of the Country among them, their Title Respectively was good, & as good in one Community as another; and what shall be done in this Case? how shall we be satisfied which of them speaks Truth, & consequently where the Right is and of whom to be obtained? Nor can it satisfy any but Fools to be able in this case to say, they have Purchased of the Natives. Nor is there any thing I know of can help in this case but a Supposal of the False­ness [Page xlv]of all their Pretensions to a Partage or Impropri­ation of the Lands to any Limits: and that what­ever Compacts they made Determining their Bounds respectively, they had therein a Sole Reference to the Hunt or Game, and Designed only an Impro­priation of that; at the same time not having the least Regard to the Lands, nor caring, ex­cepting as above, who had it, it being a thing of no Price to them. And this as it is Undoubtedly the Truth of the matter, so reduces the Right or Property of such Lands to some Certainty, lets us know where or in whom it is, and to whom w [...] must Ap­ply for the fixing a Property in them. But sup­posing this Difficulty attending this Opinion were removed and the common Right of each Community, set out by Monuments. Yet

2. Who could tell us what Disp [...]sition or Settlement the Constitutions (Tacit or Express,) of each Society made of the Lands within their Limits respective­ly? The Resolution of this is as necessary as the other in Order to a Determination upon the ex­tent of the Properties of any or all of them. I take it for Granted and think it needs no Proof, that as all Men by V [...]ue of the Grant of the Most High before men [...]ned, are not only Com­moners of the Earth, but [...]ually so, none having a Right by that to Claim [...] more or larger Portions of it than others, so that when any numbers of them enter into Society, and by Compact with Neigh­bouring [Page xlvi]Societies Settle their Limits, the Lands within such Limits are the common Right of the Community, and equally so; and that the several Members remain Commoners in an equallity, till by Constitutions of their own they make another Settlement of them; And because this is supposed (by such as assert the Politick State of the Na­tives) to have been done by them long before the Arrival of the English here, I therefore De­mand what Disposition or Settlement did their Con­st [...]tutions make of the Lands within their respective Limits? When they came to a Partage or Im­propriation, did they Impropriate in an Equallity, or if not, what other Settlement did they make of them? Or if this be thought an Unreasona­ble Demand, because of the generality of it, I Demand what Settlement did the Constitutions of any one Community (to Instance in the Moheags Our Neighbours) make of the Lands within their Limits? To be more particular here,

(1.) Where or in whom did they place the Lands? I Observed but now they were Originally or First­ly in the Community, and equally so, and must re­main so till by Acts of their own they make [...] Disposition of them into another Hand or Hands [...] and reason will tell every Man it must be so [...] Now if by Acts or L [...]s of their own they Al­ter'd the Original or Primary State of the Lands, I Demand what was the Alteration? Where o [...] [Page xlvii]in whom did they Place or Settle them? Did they Settle them in any One single Person or Re­lation, or in a Certain Number of Men of any cer­tain Order or Character? On the Supp [...] [...] of the Truth of the Opinion I am now co [...] ing, nothing can be Determin'd of the Extent, no nor the Reallity neither of the Property of any of them till this be Resolved. I know very well Our Bigots say here, that their Constitutions vested all the Lands in their Kings, or in the Crown, (to Use our English Phrase,) but besides that that is spoken without any Proof, or any Possibility of it as I imagine, besides this I say, allowing it be Truth, yet it brings not the State of the Lands in any particular Community to any Certainty, nor Resolves us in whom the Property of all or any Part of them is till we are also Resolved in the following Particulars also, viz.

(1) What they intend by Sachems or Kings in whom their Constitutions vested the Lands. Whether such as were so de jure or de facto, i. e. whether such as were Rightfully or by the Laws & Constitutions of the Society so, or in Fact only. And in order to this we must be Resolved of the particular Form of Policy agreed upon in the several Societies, viz. Whether in case it was Monarchial, that they were Hereditary or Elective M [...]archies, and not only so, but moreover whether Ʋncass, Sasacus, Ara­mamet or any other Chief among them, of whom we [Page xlviii]would obtain Lands, be King or Monarch according to the Fundamental Laws or Constitutions of the Society yea or not. For if not (the Lawful Kings Right of Property being meerly & altogether from the Concession or Grant of the Community) they can't have any pretence to it; nor possibly make out a Good Title to any other.

(2.) We must be resolved how or in what sense they vested the Lands in them: Whether so as to make them their Inalienable Right or Property, as the case seems to be with Land in some Constitutions: Or Alienable: And if in this last sense, whether they were so Absolutely put into their hands, that they had Right of Disposal where & to whom they saw cause, or in Trust only for the Use and Benefit of the Societies Respectively? In which sense, as I understand it, all Lands in our English Dominions are by Our Constitution vested in the King or Crown [...] and Lands in this Government are by the Charter Vested in the Corporation, and for that Reason are Alienable from it, and may become the Property of others. If their Constitutions Vested the Lands in their Kings in the first sense, by what Right or Authority did they Alienate or Dispose of them to others? All Alienations made by them must be ipso facto Void: For if the Communities in Vesting the Lands in them ga [...] them no power of Alie­nation they could have none. If it be said they were Vested in them in the second sense, viz. [Page xlix]With an Ʋnlimited Power of making Alienations of them to whom they saw cause; I say this is Incredible; For if Lands were of such Value with them that they saw it worth their while to bring them under the Regulation of Positive Constitutions, its unreasonable to think they should in this sense put them into the Hands of any Person or Persons whatever: and by Consequence (supposing the Hypothesis I am now examining be true, and that Lands by their Constitutions (Tacit or Express) were Vested in their Kings) it can't be imagined they had Right or [...]ower to make a Partage or Division of their Dominions among their own Children, to the Exclusion of the rest of the Community. For which reason I have ever tho't Allawanhoods, alias Joshua's Right nothing worth, even upon the very Principles of the Advocates or Assertors of it. And if the last sense be asserted (which indeed carries with it the greatest Pro­bability if any thing of this Nature was done among them) then I Demand again by what Right or Authority did they Divide their Dominions a­mong their Children, [...] an instance of which was but now given) or make Conveyances of them to the English? Such Alienations must be as Void as on the Supposition, of the Truth of the first sense.

(3.) And in case their Constitutions Vested the Lands in their Kings in this last sense, viz. In [Page l]Trust, &c. before we can be Resolved of the State of the Lands in any Society, and of the reallity and extent of the Right or Property of any particular Member or Member of them, we must be resolved also whether any Alienations were made by their Kings to their Subjects, and what they were, to­gether with the Tenures in or by which they were to be holden of the Grantees.

§ 31. Its possible in what I have now said, I may not have expressed my self in the most Proper Terms: It requires perhaps more Know­lege of the Law for a Person to be Able in an Affair of this Nature, to do [...], than I may pre­tend to. However I hope what I have said is Intelligible, and being so may Suffice as to what I Scope at in it: which is to shew what little Service this Hypothesis concerning the Aborigines of this Country does to the Interest many endeavour to Advance and Serve by it: and that a Sup­position of its Truth Inevitably Involves their Rights or Claims in so many Inextricable Difficul­ties and renders them all [...] Uncertain, Perplex't and in the Dark that nothing Certain can be Known or Determined upon them. And though perhaps some may think what I have here Ad­vanc'd as necessary on this Hypothesis to be Re­solved, in Order to a Determination upon their Rights, Absurd, Yet I can [...] but think all those that think of things, not with the Multitude, [Page ll](who generally Speaking have too much Rubbish in their Brains to think of any thing with dis­tinctness) but as they are in themselves, will say that without a Resolution of them nothing can be Determined with any certainty upon this Mat­ter.

To Conclude; The sum of what has been said is this, viz. Either they were a People in the State of Nature or they were [...]; this I suppose all must allow, there being no Third State wherein any Persons either now [...] at any time heretofore were. If they were in the State of Nature, they had then Right of Property only in such Lands as they Impropriated (and held) by the Law of Nature, which as we all know was only here and there a small spot in the Country. If it be said they had Quitted that State and put on some form of Policy, then I say either they had by Compact and Positive Constitutions of their own (Tacit or Express) Set­tled the matter of Property, or they had not: If it be said they had not, then it follows that the State of the Lands in the Country was not altered from what it was before; but they all (excepting only what was Impropriated by the Law of Nature) re­mained in the same Common State and Equally the Right of every Man, a [...] they were before, while the State of Nature continue [...]: Nor was the Prince or the Peasant distinguished as to Right of Property in them otherwise than [...] in the State of Nature. For [Page lii]as Property in Lands is not included in the notion of a King, or the want of it in that of a Subject; so the making one Person a King, and another a Subject simply in it self, will not make a Right of Property, and give it to the One, or Banish it from the Other, without some other Act or Acts con­current with it. If it be said they had brought the Lands in the Country under the regulation of Com­pact & Constitutions of their own, then it will follow that they had given up their Title by the Law of Nature, that what was before by the Law of Nature the Title of any of them to [...]ds, was not, at least, qua such, their Title now; but that what Right or Title any or all of them had now was by their Constitutions Positive the inevitable consequence of which must be that till those Constitutions are de­clared, and we assured what they Determined upon this matter of Property, nothing can be known or determined upon the Rights of any of them, we can't say where or in whom Right or Property was, whether in the Prince or People, some or all of them. And this having never b [...]th done, 'tis beyond me to see o [...] what Advantage this Hypothesis can be to the End for which i [...] so Zealously Asserted by some.

But its time to haste [...] to an End, and from the whole that has been said, I can't but think the following must be all [...]ed to have Considerable [Page liii]Evidence of Truth in them, how contrary soever to Vulgar Sentiments in the Present Day, viz.

1. That such Lands only as any of our Aborigines Subdued and Improved, they had a good Right or Title to. For altho' we are sure they had the Law of Nature giving them a Right of Property by their La­bour, in what before lay in Common and was E­qually the Right of every Man, yet we are not sure (nor indeed have we so much Evidence as amounts to a Probabil [...]) of their having any other Law to Entitle th [...] to Lands or any thing else, on any Conditions whatsoever.

2. That Supposing their Chiefs to be Kings or Civil Heads Properly so called, yet there is more Reason to suspect a Right of Property in them, than in any of their Subjects. Yea the more reason to suspect it because of their Dignity. Nothing ever did or can ap­pear Evidencing so much as a Probability of such a Right in them by the Positive Constitutions of their Communities; an [...] [...]as for Acquiring it by La­bour in Subduing and Cultivating, its reasonable to think their Exaltation [...]dered that too great a Stoop for them.

3. That supposing the English to be the first (of Civiliz'd Nations) in t [...] Discovery of the Coun­try, they had (the Roy [...] Allowance and Favour Concurring) an Ʋnda [...]ed Right to Enter upon and [Page liv]Impropriate all such parts of it as lay Wast or Un­improved by the Natives and this without any con­sideration or allowance made to them for it. What­ever ties Prudential Considerations might lay them under to Acknowlege them, and present them with their Gratuities under the Notion of their being a Price for Lands; yet all such Lands be­ing like the Ocean it self, Publici vel Communis juris, they could be under no Obligation from the Head of Justice. We have as much Assu­rance of this as we have that Lands were held by the Natives only by [...] Law of Nature, and of that I think pretty go [...] Evidence has been given in what has been said on this Argument. And by Consequence it follows also,

4. That a [...] that Darling Principle of many, viz. That Native Right is the only Valuable Title to any Lands in the Country is Absurd and Foolish and may with Reason be look's upon as one of our Vulgar Er­rors; So that the Endeavours of any, whether in more early or later Time [...] to Maintain and Pro­pagate it, (to the Prejudice of New Settlements, and not only to the Disturbance of Honest Men in their Possessions and Improvements, but Eject­ment out of them, as well [...] the Hurt of the Pub­lick, as they have been without any Justifying reasons, so) must be loo [...] upon as very Culpable. Its well known that not only in the more Early Days of the Country, but [...] later Times there have [Page lv]been those, and they not of the Plebs only, who with a great deal of Zeal and Application have laid out themselves in this Affair: A Zeal and Application which, without a Crime I think, I may say, would have been more Decorous in them had it been otherwise Employ'd. Native Right they have told us is our only Title, if we have not this, we have Nothing. Its not an easy thing to Account for the Train of Evils that have ensued hereupon, not [...]y to Particular Planta­tions and Persons, but [...] the Publick in the great Delay and Embarasm [...] of Business in Our As­sembly's, as well as [...] Multiplication of Suits in the Law beyond Account▪ But how unjustify­able must these things be when in all, the Per­sons I am speaking of, have endeavoured to im­pose upon us but a meer Chimara or Fiction? I can't forbear mentioning here that among other Methods improved by them in the ma­nagement of their Design, One is, They have Indeavoured rather to work on Our Passions than Our Reason, or [...] Fright us into a Belief of this Doctrine and [...] Resolution to stand by it, than to gain us over to it by any Evidence of its Truth. For whereas they have been very sparing of Demonstration they have been as liberal in Assurances (or rather Asseverations) that 'tis the Only Security of Our Interests against the Claim of One beyond the [...]as; and that if Native Right will not Invalidate the Duke's Pretensions, [Page lvi]we have nothing else that will. Such Nonsense as this were it found only in some of our Homun­culi, might be Easily Overlook'd; but when Men of Education and Character shall Talk at this rate its scarcely to be forgiven. Nor is this the worst neither, but what deserves still a more severe Cen­sure is their want of Truth and Honesty in all, or that whereas in all they have acted under the specious umbrage of serving the Publick, tis notorious that Nothing less than t [...] is has been in design with them; but that on the other hand they have been under the Governing Influence of those Corrupt Views which (Supposing or Allowing there were Sufficient Reasons in the Nature of the thing, for what they have done) could do no other than render them very Guilty therein. I think I am not too severe in this Censure, nor in the least break in upon Charity by it, since they themselves have given and daily give that E­vidence of its Truth, which (as the Blindest Eye can't see, so) Amounts to a Demon­stration in the Case.