THAT it is the joint Interest of all the Confederates to use their utmost Efforts for the putting a speedy End to the present War, is plain from hence, That a Delay will probably be more favourable to the French than it will be to us: For wherever there is a War between a Confederate Power on the one side, and an united Absolute one on the other, Time (if there is any proportion of Strength between them) must subject the Confederate to more Contingencies than it can the Single Absolute Power.

The making a very great Effort at Sea, will be more effectual on our part towards the speedy end­ing of the War, than the sending formidable For­ces to Flanders, or any part of the Continent, be­cause at Land we run a greater Risk, and the Gain is not so significant.

The French have more numerous Armies than we; and those Armies are very well disciplin'd; and they have a great many more impregnable [Page 6] Garisons. From which it is evident, that we run a Hazard at Land whether we shall be victorious or not; and if we are, the Gain of several Bat­tels may not conclude the War.

At Sea the case is vastly different, for there we need run little or no risk of the Enemy, un­less we please our selves; this being a thing that is never to be questioned, That if the Dutch and we will make an Effort, we may be Masters of the Sea.

Now this is certain, That if we can continue entirely Masters of the Sea, we must put a spee­dy End to the War; for our entire Command o'er the Seas must ruin our Enemys Commerce, and that utterly. Now Commerce is the only Fountain of Treasure in Countries that have no Mines; and Silver and Gold, are the only Si­news of War; which Sinews, when they hap­pen to be cut off, or to be very much obstructed, the Body Politick becomes of a sudden either Maim'd, Impotent, or Paralytick.

But then this at the same time must be observ'd, That they only are entire Masters of the Sea who can command it absolutely; and they alone can be said to command it absolutely, who make their Maritime Power answer all the Ends for which it was designed; and these are the Defence of their Coasts, the Security of their own Com­merce, and the Ruin of that of their Ene­mies.

From which it is plain, that our present Ma­ritime Forces are insufficient to render us entirely Masters of the Seas; for being unable to protect [Page 7] us from the French Privateers, they cannot secure our Commerce. But that they are unable to protect us from the French Privateers, is evident, not only from Matter of Fact, and the vast num­ber of Vessels that we lost in the late War, not­withstanding that we had above one hundred Men of War equipp'd on our own part, but from the nature of the thing it self: for the French Privateers being so much smaller, and lighter, at least for the generality, than our Ships of War which cruize upon them, are consequently so much swifter; and not drawing half the Quantity of Water which the Cruizers draw, are by that means enabled to escape from them in shole Water, besides that our Fleet of War is obliged for the most part to act united.

But if it is impossible to secure our own Com­merce with our present Maritime Power, it is by consequence impossible to ruin that of the Enemy; for their Robberies upon the Seas are equivalent to them (at least in some measure) to Commerce: For by means of the aforesaid Robberies they import those Commodities into France, for which their Enemies trade for nothing; besides that by this method they supply them­selves with Ships. So that our present Maritime Power being insufficient to ruin the Enemies Commerce utterly, and by that means to ener­vate the Sinews of War, is by consequence in­sufficient to put a speedy End to that War.

But that it is in our Power, with an additional Maritime Force, to secure our Commerce and ruin that of the Enemies, and so to become intirely Masters [Page 8] of the Seas, may (I believe) appear from hence, that having more Ships of every Burden, and more Seamen than the French, we are as able to make an effectual Provision against their Pirats and Robbers, as against their Fleet of War; by which we at once secure our Trade, and ruin that of our Enemies, nay, and ruin it in all the Branches of it; not only cutting off their Cor­respondence between the West-Indies and Europe, but that which they also at present maintain be­tween one part of Europe and another.

To shew how this may brought to pass, is the end of the ensuing Lines: In order to the doing which, I shall treat of the following Points.

• First, I shall shew, what Number of Ships, of what Bigness, and how Armed, must be pro­vided for the compassing this Design.
• Secondly, I shall enquire into the Expence of setting them forth.
• Thirdly, I shall discover a Method to defray that Expence, without taxing the People.
• Fourthly, I shall shew how these Ships are to be used and dispos'd.
• Fifthly, I shall shew the Advantage which may be reap'd from them.
• Sixthly, I shall answer some Objections.

[Page 9] First then, Besides the Grand Royal Fleet, which in conjunction with the Dutch, we suppose to be more than an equal Match for the whole French Royal Navy; not only in the Channel, but in the Straits too, and the West-Indies, ac­cording to the several Squadrons: We next sup­pose a subordinate Fleet to be equipp'd, which for the most part is to act distinctly from the other, and to consist of two hundred Vessels English, and two hundred Dutch, the best Sailers that the Queen and the States can light of, all of them containing one with another two hundred Tuns a Vessel; the whole to be arm'd with ten thousand English, and ten thousand Dutch, who are to be a fifth part Ma­riners, and the rest Marines. The Number of Guns in every Vessel to be proportioned to the bigness of the Vessel, and the Number of the Men. The Captain of every Vessel to have the Queen's and the State's Commissions, by which they are to be authoriz'd to scowr the Seas of Privateers and Pirats: But they who have the Queen's Commissi­ons, are not like the Vessels of the great Fleet to carry the Royal Flag, because in case of a manifest Disadvantage they are to be allowed to run, which the Honour of England will not allow to the Flag.

I come now to say something of the Expence of Equipping this Fleet; and without pretending to an exact Calculation, I shall content my self with coming something near to it. Let us allow then 200000 l. per Annum for the Hire of the Ships for [Page 10] our part of the Expence, and as much for the Dutch; and 300000 l. per annum for us, and as much for the Dutch, for the Wages of the Men, their Provision and Ammunition: and having done that, let us proceed to the Method of defray­ing so considerable a Charge.

Nothing can be more natural than to conclude, that since this additional Expence is originally and immediately employ'd for the defence of the Mer­chants, that they should be oblig'd to defray it, who principally derive their Security from it. 'Tis true, the whole Nation will share in the De­fence which they will receive from it; but the Merchants will have the principal Share in the Gain, of which it is but reasonable that they should contribute a part to support it, especially since they will derive the Security of their Gain from that very Contribution. Let us suppose then, that every one should be oblig'd to ensure at the rate of 5 l. per Cent. Exports, and 10 l. per Cent. Imports, (take one Place with ano­ther) and that this Insurance Mony, according to the value of Imports and Exports, as they have been valued by late Computations, the Imports at between seven and eight Millions, and the Ex­ports at between four and five, will amount to a Million of Sterling Mony. So that 500000 l. be­ing allow'd on our part, and as much on that of the Dutch for the Hire of the Ships, the Wa­ges of the Men, their Ammunition and Provision, there remains 500000 l. to us, and 500000 l. to the Dutch, to make good the Losses.

[Page 11] But now as every Merchant is oblig'd to en­sure, the Queen is suppos'd to become the Gene­ral Ensurer for us, and the States for the Dutch: And this Ensurance Mony is to be paid down at the Custom-House, at the same time with the Cus­toms, to prevent a new Creation of Officers, which may be troublesome and expensive. But one thing I forgot to add, That tho the Queen is suppos'd to be General Ensurer, yet she is always to except the Danger of the Sea it self, for Rea­sons so obvious, that they are needless to be in­sisted on here, and is only to ensure the Mer­chants against all Captures; and that the other En­surance against the Danger of the Seas, may be practis'd by those who undertake it in time of Peace. But then in case it would be more for the Queen's Convenience, that some of the Ensu­rance Mony for the Imports should be paid at the respective Foreign Ports from which the Ships set forth, because this Method in some places, parti­cularly in the Straits, and the West-Indies, may save the Queen the trouble and charge, and delay of Remittances in that case; it may be provided that the Mony be paid to the Queen's Governor, or Consul residing at or near the respective Ports; and that Debentures may be given by the afore­said Governors or Consuls, to the Value of each Receipt.

I come to shew how this subordinate Fleet may be imploy'd and dispos'd for the Service of the Nation.

[Page 12] I suppose then that 30 of them should be always cruising in the Seas between England and Holland; twenty between Ostend and Calais, which takes in Dunkirk; five between Calais and Haver de Grace; five between Haver de Grace and La Hogue; be­fore St. Malo twenty; in the Chops of the Chan­nel and the Irish Seas forty; South West of Ire­land twenty; Bay of Biscay thirty; Coasts of Spain in the Ocean thirty; which Numbers com­puted make two hundred in all. The remain­ing two hundred are to be thus employ'd; An hundred of them are to accompany the Royal Squadron to the Straits, there to separate from, and to act distinctly (unless necessity require o­therwise) and fifty to cruize in the Mediterrane­an; thirty in the Gulf of Venice, and twenty in the Archipelago. The remaining hundred to be thus dispos'd of; Threescore and ten of them to be sent to the West-Indies, fifty of them to act on the Coasts of the Spanish-Indies, in conjunction with the Buccaneers; and the other twenty on the Coasts of New-England and New-York; and the remaining thirty are to be sent to the Coasts of Guinea and Gambo.

Let us now say a word concerning the Ad­vantage which we should receive from employ­ing so numerous a Force in the foremention'd man­ner.

First, We shall by this means effectually se­cure our Commerce; for if during the late War, we did not lose above one Ship in four, in the time of the greatest Mismanagement, [Page 13] it is very probable we shall not lose above one in twenty now.

If there should be no mismanagement in the present War, yet our Grand Fleet would never be able wholly to secure our Commerce; for the French Privateers would be too nimble for our Men of War, and our own Privateers (if we should set out any) would scarce ever attack those of the Enemy; but it would be the main part of the business of this subordinate Fleet to attack the French Privateers, and if it were sup­ported and sustained by our Cruizers, we have no reason to doubt, but that in a very little time it would be able to clear the Seas of them; so that by this Method, in all probability, we should save the Nation those vast Sums, which our Losses would otherwise amount to. Besides, as by this means we should secure our Commerce, we should expedite Trade, and by dispatching it, in some measure double it, because none of our trading Vessels would be oblig'd to stay for Convoys.

Secondly, As by this means we should secure our own Commerce, we should ruin that of the French; and I leave it to any one to judg, Whe­ther fifty of these Ships in the West-Indies, acting in concert with the Buccaneers, and distinctly from our Royal Squadron (unless there should prove at any time a necessity for their acting joint­ly) would not cut off all manner of Intercourse between France, Spain, and the West-Indies, and hinder the Importation of Bullion, and the Pas­sage of their Plate Fleets? by which alone they [Page 14] can pretend to be formidable: And whether it would not prove the most effectual Method for the seizing upon several Places there, which at the end of the War remaining our own by Treaty, would serve to defray the Charges of it? Besides, I leave it to any to consider, whether the Royal Squadron to be sent to the West-Indies, acting (as it might do) upon an Emergency in con­cert with this additional Force, might not seize upon the most important Places which the Spani­ards hold in those Parts?

By the Squadron of these subordinate Ships, which we should have in the Straits (distinctly by our Men of War) the Dutch and We should be enabled to secure the Turky Trade to our selves; we should, as it were, invest the Kingdoms of Naples and Sicily, and be instrumental in redu­cing them to the Emperor's Party; raise the Cre­dit of the Emperor with the Port, and sink the Reputation of the French; prey on both sides the Ecclesiastical State, not only upon the Mediter­ranean Coasts adjacent to Ostia and Civita Vecchia, but likewise upon the Adriatick Shore, adjoining to Cesennate, Pesaro, Ravenna, Ancona, Rimini, &c. encourage the Venetians to declare for the right Side, and be a terrible Awe upon the rest of the Italian Princes. This Squadron cruizing in the Mediterranean, whilst the Royal Squadron observ'd the French, would lamentably harass the Spanish Coasts, and utterly intercept their Trade, while that in the Ocean would hinder the Inter­course between France and Spain, and be a severe Bridle upon the Portuguese.

[Page 15] To come nearer home, the French would have no Correspondence by Sea between one part of France and another. Their Coasters in all likelihood would be a perpetual Prey to us: No­thing could be transported from Dunkirk to Brest, or from Brest to Dunkirk, unless it should be by Land-Carriage, which would put the French King to a prodigious Expence; besides, we should hinder their Traffick to Denmark and Sweden, and Hamborough, and the rest of the Northern Ports, from which they have not only their Naval Stores, but their best Timber.

Besides all this, we should secure our Newcastle Trade, and so provide in some measure for the Relief of the Poor, and defend and support the Fishery both of England and Holland, intercept the Commerce of our Enemies here, and of those in France; interrupt the nightly Traffick of our Owlers, which is so prejudicial to the Woollen Manufacture, and prevent and obstruct all manner of Smugling and running of Goods, and so advance the Customs; sustain the Commerce of our Wes­tern Ports, which in the late War were ruin'd, either for want of Convoys, or by too high an Insurance. All this we might do by this additional Force rightly manag'd, and according to the Ne­cessity of Time and Place supported and back'd by our Cruizers. Besides, these subordinate Ves­sels repairing to our Coasts upon any Necessity, as to Deal, Sandwich, or the like, while Winter constrains our great Ships to keep the Harbour, might prove an admirable Outwork to our Royal Navy, which is the natural Bulwark of England. [Page 16] Moreover, they might be serviceable in trans­porting our Soldiers to any of the Coasts of France, or be made instrumental in bombarding any of their Ports; and the Marines by frequent Descents might continually spoil their Coasts.

To all this I might add, that by employing the Marines designed for this Subordinate Fleet, we should establish a numerous Nursery of Seamen; who as soon as the War is over, may be made use of in recovering the Fishery of Greenland and Newfound land, and restoring the Northern Fishe­ry.

I come now to answer Objections, which are chiefly Five. The

• First is, That the Merchants would think this a hardship upon them.
• The Second, That the Dutch would not com­ply with it.
• The Third, That the French Privateers would out-number, and consequently over-pow'r them.
• The Fourth, That the Mony set apart for the making good the Losses, might prove insuf­ficient, and so bring the Nation more into Debt.
• The Fifth, That this would be a needless Pre­paration, because our own Privateers encou­rag'd, would answer the end.

First, That the Merchants would think this a Hardship upon them. To which I answer, That this way of proceeding would make the Mer­chants Gain more certain, tho it might not make it so great. If the Pressure upon them were to be [Page 17] intolerable, nay very grievous or perpetual, we might be enclin'd to bear with their Complaints, and to indulge the Frailties of Human Nature: But since they are to be but slight, we must beg leave to tell them, that at a time when their Religion, their Liberty, nay the whole of that very Proper­ty, for a trifling part of which they appear so much concern'd, is at stake, they shew themselves unreasonable to set an inconsiderable Overplus of sordid Gain in the Ballance against all this; nay, they proceed contrary to the Maxims by which they are guided even in their own Commerce; for they make nothing of hazarding five hundred Pounds, that they may draw a thousand home from the Indies. How then can they reasonably murmur at the paying a small Sum to the Queen, which will not much burden them, for the Securi­ty of all which they are to trade during the War, and all they inherited or acquired before, especially since this is a Maxim among them, that what is sav'd, is got? But they are but a Part of that great Body, the People, and they ought not to repine at any little Inconvenience, if it tends to the Defence of the Whole; because the whole can never be ruin'd, but the Parts too must be de­stroy'd. If there remain any few among them, who are so unreasonable as not to be satisfy'd with what has been said, they are desir'd to consider, that they are but a Part of the whole Body of the Merchants, and it is unreasonable in them to re­pine at what the State thinks necessary for the De­fence of themselves and their Brethren, and the common Security of Trade. But to make this Unreasonableness [Page 18] appear still greater, I shall consider them in their different Capacity, for all the Mer­chants by the present War are reduced under one of these three Heads; They who are Insurers; They who Insure; Or they who run the Ven­ture.

1. They who are Insurers, will infallibly op­pose this Design, because it will oppose their Gain: But the unreasonableness of these People will appear from hence, that they have a mind to be the only Gainers by what the Publick does for the Security of Trade; for even in the condition in which things are at present, those Ships which will be preserved, must be protected by our Men of War, and therefore I think it very unreasona­ble that the Government should be at the Charge of sending out Convoys to protect the Merchants, and that the Jews (for such in the late War were most of the Insurers) should be paid for it; for I hope no one believes that they can contribute any thing to the Security of any one Ship for which they may underwrite. But their Unreasonableness may appear yet further from this, That these Peo­ple are for hazarding the Publick in hope of their private Gain. In our late War, several of our most considerable Merchants left off their Trade to turn Insurers, I mean, either left it vvholly off, or in a great part; by vvhich there followed two Inconveniences to the Publick: for, first, the Ex­tent of the Trade vvas reduc'd to a narrow com­pass; and, secondly, the King's Customs vvere considerably lessen'd. And will these Men have the face to tell the Government that they ought [Page 19] to reject the present Design, because their im­bracing it would infallibly put these People out of capacity of doing the Publick the same Mischief again?

But now let us come to those who in case of a War are resolv'd to Insure: And for these Gen­tlemen I desire only in short to ask them two or three Questions. First, Whether they had ra­ther the Queen and the Publick should get that Mony which they are resolv'd to part with for their private Security, or a few private Persons who have no relation at all to, and perhaps are mere strangers to them? Secondly, Whether they had rather part with their Mony to those who can secure them, or who cannot? The Government is solvable in case of Loss, whereas private Men often fail; no sort of People in the late War be­ing more known to break, than the Body of In­surers. But supposing they do not, private Men at the best can secure but the prime Cost, suppo­sing the Dealing to be direct and fair between them; nor even the whole prime Cost, because the Insurers pay but seventy five or eighty Pounds for a hundred; whereas the Government not only secures the prime Cost, and the whole prime Cost, but by scowring the Seas, according to the scope of the present Design, secures their Gain too in a very great degree, and by so doing confirms it self, which is a double Security to them: for they would have little cause to boast of their Gain, if after having thriven in their private Capacity, they should be undone at last with the Publick. They ought to consider then, [Page 20] that by Insuring with private Persons, they make no provision at all for the Publick, with which they must stand or fall; and a very invalid one in the mean while for themselves, because pri­vate Persons who appear to be the most considera­ble, are often seen to be utterly undone in a mo­ment. Whereas by paying this Insurance Mony to the Publick, they make an effectual Provision for that, and a valid Security for themselves; be­cause, by proceeding thus, they are certain not to fall, unless the Government falls with them, without which they cannot stand. In short, I de­sire to ask these Gentlemen, Whether since the Loss of every Man, who lives under the Protec­tion of the Government, is a Loss to the Publick, which no private Insurer ever did, or can pretend to make good, it is not very reasonable, nay very natural, that the Publick should be enabled to provide effectually against it?

But now let us come to the Merchant-Adven­turer, who neither underwrites, nor insures, but is resolv'd to run the Risk. He is in a wealthy and sanguine Condition, both his Veins and his Coffers are full, and consequently he is enclined to hope the best; and he is willing to venture, because if he succeeds, his Gain will be more considerable: 'Tis true, but then so will his Loss provided he does not succeed. But Fortune, he says, has been favourable to him hitherto, and why should he doubt of her being so for the future? Why, for that very reason, because she has been favourable hitherto; and the Reason is good, considering her usual Inconstancy. He would be a foolish Gamester [Page 21] that should be confident of his winning in the latter part of the Night, because he had Luck in the former. Well, but if he has a Loss, he is ve­ry well able to bear it; but then he is a great deal better able to bear the Insurance Mony, and there­fore ought the less to repine at it: For since what­ever he loses is so much Loss to the Publick, because every Man's single Property is infallibly part of the National Stock, I believe it will be found but reasonable, that what he gets should likewise be a Gain to the Publick. But that he who is able to bear a Loss, is better able to bear the Insurance, is plain from hence, That during the time of the late War, when the Privateers made most havock, there was about one Ship lost in four, so that but three parts in four, both of the Imports and Exports, went and came safe; whereas the Insurance will not amount to above a sixth part of each. Consi­dering that in the present War, our Enemies will be more numerous, and our Ports abroad few­er: we have no reason to believe that our Losses will be fewer, unless we take effectual and timely care, so that our Adventurer may very well lose one Ship in three; and if Fortune should prove severe to him, one in two. Since therefore he can­not foresee the future, is it not a most unreasona­ble thing in him to murmur against a Design which will most probably be advantageous to him, and may possibly save him from ruin? So that being unable to authorize his Complaint by Reason, he has nothing left to justify it but his Fancy: And what a pleasant Person must he be, who sets so sensless a thing as his Humor in ballance against [Page 22] the common Security of Traffick, and the Safety of his Country?

But now I come to the next Objection, which is, That the Dutch will not fall in with a Design which is concerted here. In answer to which I shall only take notice, that the Dutch are as immediately con­cern'd (and perhaps more immediately) to put an end to the present War, than we; for it the War should be protracted 7, or 8, or 10 Years like the last, several destructive Accidents might very well happen in that space, which would not pro­bably happen in 3 Years. The Queen (whom God long preserve) may die, so may the Emperor, so may the King of the Romans; these things in seven or eight, or ten Years, may fall out, considering the common condition of Mortality, and the Machinations of our Enemies: And in that case, considering the present Confusions of Eng­land, and the Distractions of the Empire, what would become of the Liberties of Europe, and of Holland particularly? Well then, the Dutch are concern'd as immediately, or rather more immedi­ately than we to put a speedy end to the War. Now nothing can put a speedy end to the War, but the entirely ruining the Commerce of the Enemy, and the securing our own; and the doing this, in three Years time, would either bring down the French to our own Terms, or reduce them to so poor a condition, that if any of these fatal Ac­cidents should happen, they would not be able to make their Advantage of them, but like an old Greyhound upon too hot a Course, they would [Page 23] be forc'd to lie down, and only pant and blow up­on the Prey, which they would not be able to touch. Whether the Expedient above proposed is sufficient to the compassing this Design, I leave to be determin'd by the Impartial Reader: But if this Expedient is sufficient for the ruining the French Commerce, and the securing our own, why then the Dutch would act most unreasonably, if at a time when we so chearfully contribute, beyond what we are obliged to by antient Treaties, to their Support and Assistance by Land, where their Dan­ger is so much greater, and so much nearer than ours; they should refuse to contribute their part to our common Support at Sea, where our Con­cern is equal.

But if it be objected, that most of the Forces a­board these Subordinate Vessels, being to consist of Landmen, it would be unreasonable to expect that the Dutch should send Land-Forces to Sea, at the very time that they borrow of their Neigh­bours to defend their Frontiers: To that we an­swer, that we may raise Landmen for the Dutch, and the Dutch in return supply us with Seamen.

Supposing then that the Dutch will join with us, I shall proceed to the next Objection, which is, that the French and Spanish Privateers will outnum­ber the foresaid Vessels, and consequently over­pow'r them. In order to the answering this, I de­sire leave to take notice of the most remarkable Differences in the Constitution (if I may so call it) of the French Privateers, and the abovementi­oned Vessels, and then to observe what Influence [Page 24] those Differences must necessarily have on their Action, and on their Conduct.

First then, The Privateers fight only for their own Interest, whereas the foresaid Vessels are sup­pos'd to fight for their Countries Interest and their own.

Secondly, The Privateers fight for the most part upon this Condition, to have no Purchase, no Pay; whereas the others are to be in constant Pay from the Queen.

Thirdly, The Privateers have no other incite­ment, than the hopes of immediate Gain, whereas the others will have that, and the Spur of Honour and Ambition besides; for if they do well in the Queen's Service, they may expect Advancement from Her. From which differences in their Consti­tution, there would follow these considerable ones in their Conduct: The Privateers being govern'd each within it self, and each of them absolutely independent of others, would act for the most part singly; for acting in Concert can hardly answer their End, which is, to enrich themselves; for they can scarce get so many together as to be potent e­nough for a trading Fleet and its Convoy, and they could never find their Account while they were altogether imploy'd in taking of single Ships: But while they act singly, or by two or three in a company, the foremention'd Vessels would act in concert, always within call one of another, as having their General and Subaltern Officers like a Royal Navy; for which reason the Privateers would seldom or never have any Advantage over them, and they would never attack them without [Page 25] such an Advantage, because Gain being their only Incitement, they would hardly be induced to fight when there was a great deal more danger of losing their own Ships, than of taking their Enemies; whereas our Ships acting in concert, and upon oc­casion in considerable numbers, would very often have the advantage of the Privateers; and when they had not, would be oblig'd by honour to at­tack them on the square; and whereas they who did so, would have both Ambition and Interest to sustain them, the others would have only mere pri­vate Interest. 'Tis true indeed, the number of Privateers may be something augmented by the D. of Anjou's accession to the Crown of Spain; but it will not be much, because the Spaniards have nei­ther much Mony, nor many Seamen to spare: And if sometimes our Cruizers alone, during the time of the late War, made such terrible work with the French Privateers, and would have made more if they had not been too nimble and too light for them; What must not so considerable, and so well proportion'd a Force do, back'd by those very Cruizers? How would those Privateers get out of St. Malo, or Dunkirk? or how would they get in again with their Plunder, when those Ports should be block'd up by our foresaid Vessels, sustain'd by our Fourth-rate Cruizers? Or would they not be afraid to venture when the Hazard is so great, and the Gain so uncertain? and when in open Sea, it would be difficult for them to distinguish our trad­ing Ships from the very Vessels that would lie in wait for their Ruin. But if it should be urg'd that the French King in a very little time would be [Page 26] for using the same Method, and send out his Priva­teers on his own account, back'd by some of his Men of War, in Numbers and Strength sufficient to resist ours: To that we answer, that he can ne­ver find Seamen enough to supply both his Navy and those smaller Vessels; and that if he could, this Method would infallibly bring on a Sea-fight, which is the very thing that we chiefly ought to desire.

I come now to answer another Objection, which is, That the Mony set apart for making the Losses good, would be insufficient, and that consequently this Design would bring the Nation more into debt. But by what has been said already, and by what shall be now said, I doubt not of mak­ing it appear, that it would be an infallible Means for the keeping the Nation out of Debt. For, first, we have shewn in the preceding Paragraph, that the French would not be likely to take many of our Ships, and consequently this Method by saving the Ships, would preserve the Customs, and so prove a considerable Support to one of the greatest Branches of the Publick Revenue. But, secondly, since this Method will hinder them from taking our Ships; we must take theirs if they stir, and consequently there would be more Mony coming to the Queen, as well as to the Seamen to encourage them: Besides, that several of the Ships which we take from them might be imploy'd in the room of as many of the hir'd ones, and so les­sen the Charge of the Undertaking. But if on the other side their Ships should not stir out, we [Page 27] should do our Business without taking them, for they cannot subsist without Commerce. Third­ly, The Mony coming in daily at the Custom-houses for Insurance, may save the Government the borrowing of several Sums, and consequently save the Nation a great deal in extravagant Inte­rest. Fourthly, The Mony that may be paid for Importations at the Out-ports, and particularly at Jamaica and Barbadoes, may save the Queen a great deal of Charge, as well as Trouble and Time in Remittances thither. Fifthly, The prosecution of this Method will capacitate us the sooner to make an end of the War, and consequently ena­ble us the sooner to get out of Debt, and so may save us vast Sums in Interest and in Principal.

There remains yet one more Objection, and that is, That this would be a needless Preparation, be­cause our Privateers encourag'd, would answer all the Ends of it. To which I reply, That, first, the whole Number of Privateers would not amount to half the Force. Secondly, That that Number which should be equipp'd of them, would not act in concert. Thirdly, That in Privateers the Seamen would not have half the Incouragement that they will have in this Subordinate Fleet: For we sup­pose, that besides the ordinary Premiums upon Guns, such a Proportion of the Prizes as shall be thought convenient, shall still be allow'd to the Officers and the Seamen. Fourthly, Our ordina­ry Privateers would rarely attack those of the E­nemy. Fifthly, The Gain to the Publick from Privateers would not be so much by a Tenth Part. [Page 28] Sixthly, It would be a hard matter to encourage Privateers, without burdening the Publick, be­cause the French are a People of small Traffick, and others for the most part carry out their Goods for them.

Thus I have laid down the Method which came into my Thoughts for the securing of Commerce, and which the Sense of the Duty that I owe my Country, oblig'd me to propose to the Great Assembly which is chosen to represent it at this im­portant Juncture. Whether the Method that I have propos'd be sufficient to answer the End, I leave to be determin'd by that Illustrious Assembly. If it appears to be effectual, I make no doubt but it will be follow'd; for then, tho we may be victorious without it, yet we may not: but the securing our Commerce will secure our Victory; and the Representatives of a Great and a Wise People will, if they can help it, leave nothing to Fortune. If we can secure our Commerce, we must remain a free Independent People; if we cannot, we may become a conquer'd Province.