EPISTLES PHILOSOPHICAL AND MORAL.
LONDON: Printed for T. WILCOX, opposite the New-Church, in the Strand, M.DCCLIX.
To The First Minister of STATE, for the Time being.
ADVERTISEMENT.
THE ground work of the following Epistles being the fruit of a private correspondence, it was found necessary, in preparing them for the press; to adapt them to more general use and amusement. It may not, therefore, be improper to observe that, whatever theological subjects have fallen in the author's way, he hath purposely avoided taking part with divines of any sect or party: leaving it to the ingenuous, of every persuasion, to determine how far their particular sentiments may be supported by authorities, superior to common-sense and simple demonstration. — As to his poetry; having no reputation to lose, he is little anxious about what he may acquire. Indeed, it must be confess'd that perspicuity and argument have been frequently consulted, at the expence both of the dignity and harmony of his numbers, Elegance, however, would have been more attended [Page xxii] to, had the author's leisure permitted; or, had his design been to distinguish himself as a poet; a character he is much less ambitious of than that of a philosopher. —
- EPISTLE THE FIRST —
Page 5—42
- OF truth in general.
- Its criterion.
- Its relation to opinion.
- The uncertainty of the latter.
- Necessary that both should concur in Science.
- EPISTLE THE SECOND —
page 47—88
- On Science, as our guide to truth.
- The criterion best adapted to the opinion of individuals.
- The absurdity of persecution.
- Our pretensions to divine, and the bounds of human knowledge.
- EPISTLE THE THIRD —
page 93—126
- On the infatuation of mankind, respecting paradox and mysteries.
- The effects and causes of such infatuation.
- The absurdity of supposing ignorance and folly the means to promote the cause of truth; or that the freedom of scientifick inquiry is incompatible with the political welfare of society.
-
[Page xxiv]EPISTLE THE FOURTH —
Page 131—154
- On the weakness of the human understanding
- The abstract existence of the Deity
- The incomprehensibility of the divine nature, and the incongruity of pretended atheism.
- EPISTLE THE FIFTH —
page 159—202
- On happiness.
- The apparent incapacity of mankind for its enjoyment.
- The comparative pain and pleasure of human sensations; and their relation to our physical and moral constitution.
- EPISTLE THE SIXTH —
page 209—256
- On abstract good and evil.
- The physical perfection of the material universe, and the moral harmony observable in the dispensations of Providence.
- EPISTLE THE SEVENTH —
page 263—298
- On moral principles
- The respective influence of reason and the passions
- The immorality of ignorance and the indispensable duty of seeking knowledge.
- EPISTLE THE EIGHTH —
page 303—336
- On the immortality of the soul; and the arments for, and against, a future state.
EPISTLE THE FIRST.
ARGUMENT.
Of truth in general. —Its criterion. —Its relation to opinion. —The uncertainty of the latter. — Necessary that both should concur in Science.
SUMMARY.
UNiversal belief being, in fact, an undisputed criterion of truth, and all mankind necessarily believing those positions which they conceive demonstrable; science, or demonstrative knowledge, is supposed to be the least exceptionable test of what is true or false, in general. —The abstract certitude of the schools is, therefore, exploded. But, as particular opinions are not always the effect of knowledge, nor are systems constantly founded on scientifick principles, it is inquired if there be no other criterion, sufficiently obvious to relieve the doubts and reconcile the opposite sentiments of mankind. —The dispensations of providence, as well as the dictates of revelation, appear inadequate to the purpose; theologists being found too unsucceessful, in clearing up the sacred page, and phisiologists too ignorant of the system of nature, for either to form opinions, equally adapted to the credulity of individuals. —Divines and philosophers are censured, indeed, rather as, mercenary wranglers, or bigots to particular systems, than fair inquirers after, or teachers of, the truth. —A fair and ingenuous inquirer characteriz'd. —Such not frequently to be found; few being capacitated for so arduous a task. —Fortitude and moderation the grand requisites: the scarcity of which in the minds of men, in general, serves to account for their want of success in the attempt; as well as for their promptitude either to embrace [Page 4] skepticism, as an antidote to errour, or conformity, to avoid the trouble of thinking. —Dogmatists and Skepticks censured: The former on account of their absurd dependance on tradition and futile authorities: the latter for superciliously rejecting, on the other hand, all authority and tradition, without distinction. —In our inquiries after truth, however, our belief is to be suspended in regard to points beyond our knowledge. —In scientifick researches, also, the subtilty of metaphysical arguments should be with caution trusted, as insensibly leading us into errour and perplexity.
EPISTLE THE SECOND.
ARGUMENT.
On Science, as our guide to truth—The criterion best adapted to the opinion of individuals— The absurdity of persecution—Our pretensions to divine, and the bounds of human knowledge.
SUMMARY
SCience, though admitted as the rule of faith in matters relating to the investigation of truth, is neither exclusive nor universal, affecting only our opinion in speculative points. For, however refin'd are our credenda, we insensibly join, in our practical notions, with the rest of mankind. —Whatever objection, therefore, scientifick inquirers may make to the systems of others, none can be made to their fixing the criterion of truth on knowledge: the certainty of which is, by implication, admitted in the general pretensions of mankind to common-sense. —This is the privilege of ev'ry mind, without distinction; enabling us equally to draw like conclusions from like premises. —All actual dispute, therefore, arises from some misunderstanding, or different acceptation, of the matter in question: as the most ignorant peasant is equally certain of the proofs he comprehends with the greatest philosopher. —For the same reason, nevertheless, those would be engag'd in a desperate undertaking, who should attempt to reconcile mankind to any one system of opinion; the capacity and credulity of individuals being so very different, in consequence of their diversity of temperament, education and experience. —It is injurious and ridiculous, therefore, to insult others, for thinking in the manner we ourselves should have done, under the same circumstances. —It is still more absurd to reprobate the rest of mankind for not believing what we ourselves do not, nor can possibly [Page 46] be made to, believe: as is the case when we would impose tenets, that either contradict themselves, or are, in fact, downright nonsense—For it is impossible to believe apparent falshood, or to be convinc'd of any thing, by a set of words, that convey no determinate meaning—Mysterious or unintelligible propositions cannot, therefore, be believ'd—If the truth of revelation, in general, be admitted, as what is reveal'd from Heaven must undoubtedly be true, the difficulty of knowing what is particularly so, or who are the truly inspir'd, is yet inexplicably great. —Tho' the power of working miracles also be allow'd a proof of inspiration, in the agent; the fallacy of pretended ones, and the suppos'd inspiration of impostors, are almost invincible obstacles to our discovery of the truth. —The supposition, also, that real miracles are transgressions of the laws of nature is not at all necessary to support their veracity; but argues the contrary; and implies an injurious reflection on the omnipotence and prescience of the Deity. —Whatever reasonable objections, however, we may have against putting implicit faith in either pretended miracles or revelation; yet as the utmost extent of scientifick discovery falls so infinitely short of a perfect knowledge of the designs and operations of Nature; we cannot philosophically deny that God sometimes produces effects, for ends best known to himself, by means wholly unknown to us. —To proceed, nevertheless, in our inquiries on the most certain grounds, the criterion of Science is to be neglected only in points indisputably and intelligibly reveal'd.
EPISTLE THE SECOND.
EPISTLE THE THIRD.
ARGUMENT.
On the infatuation of mankind, respecting paradox and mysteries. —The effects and causes of such infatuation. —The absurdity of supposing ignorance and folly the means to promote the cause of truth; or that the freedom of scientifick enquiry is incompatible with the political welfare of society.
SUMMARY.
IT is remarkable that, notwithstanding the universality of those truths which are founded on common-sense, mankind have ever been so infatuated as to reject this general and obvious criterion, for the more particular dogmas and mysterious paradoxes of pretended revelation. —The moral effects of this infatuation exemplified in our superficial attachment to religion, our indolent security in time of prosperity, and our transitory astonishment and penitence under the immediate weight of misfortune. —An absurd scheme of education the grand cause of that cowardice and imbecility of mind, which render us so ridiculous in speculation and inconsistent in practice. —The misapplication of their talents, therefore, who think by encreasing such weakness to promote the cause of truth, or the interest of religion and morality, is plac'd in a ridiculous light; as the just object of censure. —The supposition, also, that ignorance and implicit subjection to authority are necessary to the well-being of society, or the political happiness of mankind, is exploded; and shown to be exemplarily false and absurd: polity in general, as well as religion and private virtue in particulars, being founded on truth and nature, and not dependant on the chimerical productions of fancy, the low artifices of faction, or the knavish cunning of designing falsehood.
EPISTLE THE THIRD.
EPISTLE THE FOURTH.
ARGUMENT.
On the weakness of the human understanding. —The abstract existence of the Deity. —The incomprehensibility of the divine nature, and the incongruity of pretended atheism.
SUMMARY.
AS it is necessary to our success in scientifick researches that the mind should be divested of its prejudices, in favour of tradition and custom; so, however extensive be the freedom of enquiry, it is equally necessary that the object of investigation be adapted to the limits of the understanding: mankind always falling into errour and confusion, in their attempts to discover the knowledge of things beyond their capacity. However true, therefore, may be many of our discoveries in the system of Nature; God, the authour of that system, is abstracted from it and above our comprehension. — Hence our pretensions to describe, or define, the Deity, are palpably absurd and ridiculous. For, tho' a created Being may ascribe to its creator the most respectable of all known perfections, yet, as all its ideas of perfection are relative to itself, the attributes human beings ascribe to God are necessarily the superior qualities of humanity. —Notwithstanding, however, the Deity is so far removed from our enquiries, and thereby confessedly no object of philosophical knowledge, yet the actual disbelief of the existence of a God is denied: the arguments for and against atheists composing, in fact, a very ridiculous dispute: as the impossibility of denying the being of a first cause is evident; and the rest of the controversy a mere cavil about words, of no determinate meaning.
EPISTLE THE FOURTH.
EPISTLE THE FIFTH.
ARGUMENT.
On happiness. —The apparent incapacity of mankind for its enjoyment. —The comparative pain and pleasure of human sensations; and their relation to our physical and moral constitution.
SUMMARY.
NEXT to the absurdity of puzzling ourselves in the investigation of matters beyond our capacity, and equally an obstacle to our inquiries after truth, is the folly of our constant pursuit, and in spite of as constant disappointments, our expectations of happiness—The term is certainly left vague and ill-defin'd even by those philosophers who, pretending it to be attainable, affect to teach us how happiness may be acquir'd—Its meaning is, nevertheless, obvious; and is determined from the tenour of its acceptation with the generality of mankind. In which sense, it is shown to be hitherto unattain'd; and that, not only from the impossibility of externals to confer happiness, but, from the evident incapacity of human beings to be made happy—It is hence, also, declar'd unattainable; and even the most laudable means whereby it is pursued, as those of knowledge, religion, and virtue are experimentally, and logically, shown to be incapable of conferring happiness. —In fact, ev'ry state, age and condition of life having its several distinct anxieties and consolations, it appears that a continued sense of either happiness or misery is incompatible with our nature; as well as with the very essence of pleasure and pain in general: our sensations of both which are merely comparative and reciprocally necessary to that of each other. Whence happiness and misery are evidently relative to, and dependant on, the constitution of the human frame; with which abstract pain and pleasure are totally inconsistent.
EPISTLE THE FIFTH.
EPISTLE THE SIXTH.
ARGUMENT.
On abstract good and evil—The physical perfection of the material universe, and the moral harmony observable in the dispensations of Providience.
SUMMARY
THE inquiries, of philosophers into the abstract cause of evil have hitherto been attended with little success. Indeed, no such abstract evil exists. For, whatever calamities human life be subject to, their evil depends merely on our own s;ensibility. Even physical evils, which are the least controvertible, are evidently relative to their effects on the sufferings, or enjoyments, of mankind. Whence they must not be accounted abstract evils, or real defects in the general system of things: of which we have at present but a partial view; and therefore cannot tell how far apparent imperfections may conduce to the perfection of the whole. That human life is subject, nevertheless, to palpable evils cannot be denied: but it should be consider'd that, as such evils are but temporary, and are evil but in proportion to the pleasure, or good, by which they are contrasted, we are not sensible of any abstracted evil, unless a state of humanity, on the whole, be attended with a greater portion, of pain than pleasure. This is asserted by many; but is experimentally false. Indeed, on a fair and impartial estimate, our sufferings and enjoyments seem to stand on an equal ballance. Hence, also, if there be no abstract physical evil in the universe, there is as little reason for us to hold [Page 206] the existence of physical good; or to maintain that happiness is the privilege of human life. That "whatever is is right," with respect to the whole, is allow'd; but that it is therefore good is another consideration: goodness being a term relative to the happiness of mankind, and not applicable to that general system. The famous principle of the BEST is therefore futile and frivolous—As to moral good and evil: we owe a sense of them purely to physical: for had mankind felt neither pain nor pleasure, they would never, from the light of nature, have acquir'd the ideas of moral good or ill. Those actions, therefore, are morally good which give rise to more pleasure than pain; and morally bad, vice versa: Innocence being, strictly speaking, neither good nor evil; and indeed inconsistent with a state of action. Moral evil appears, hence, to be, also, merely relative to man; and can by no means be consider'd as a defect in the designs of Providence; unless we can be so absurd as to suppose it in the power of created beings to counterwork the intentions of their supreme creator. On the other hand, moral good is equally relative, and can have no effect on the happiness of the first cause, or plead any abstract merit with the Deity. Moral good and evil, however, in the agent, is necessarily attended with temporary happiness and misery; in the [Page 207] distribution of which, also, agreeable to relative merit, it is not improbable that impartial justice is done, even in this life, in the perfect dispensations of Providence. Our hopes or apprehensions, nevertheless, of a future state are not hereby cut off. On the contrary, this life may only be preparatory to a future; where the virtuous and vicious may be very differently dispos'd of in the scale of existence. But, whatever be our lot hereafter, it rests on the good pleasure of our creator: into whose hands philosophy calmly resigns the hidden concerns of futurity.
EPISTLE THE SIXTH.
EPISTLE THE SEVENTH.
ARGUMENT.
On moral principles—The respective influence of reason and the passions—The immorality of ignorance and the indispensable duty of seeking knowledge.
SUMMARY.
THE doctrine, by which virtue and vice are confessedly limited to this life, will doubtless excite the clamour of those who pride themselves, or ground their expectations of future happiness, on their own merit. It may also be ask'd, "To what purpose is it that mankind should pursue virtue rather than vice, if all our pains and pleasures depend reciprocally on each other, and our bad deeds neither actually offend, nor our good ones have any real merit with, the Deity." It is answer'd, that, as the merits and demerits of virtue and vice are partial and relative, so also must be conceiv'd their respective rewards and punishments. So that, whatever distinction may be made between the virtuous and vicious in a future state, it must be purely owing to the good pleasure of our creator, and not to the influence of our merit over his final determinations. —It must not be conceiv'd, however, that this doctrine countenances immorality. On the contrary, it proves, that (as we are led to vice solely by the motives of pleasure, apparently attending the gratification of our desires) were a conviction always present to the mind, that such pleasure must necessarily be attended with an equal degree of pain, such conviction might prove an antidote to vice, and preserve us, at least, in innocence; the motive to action being thereby remov'd. As to actual virtue, indecd, it is not pretended that any rational [Page 260] conviction whatever is, of itse'f, a sufficient motive to virtue: the use of reason being only to determine what is true or false, just or unjust; and not to excite us to embrace either. This is the business of the passions; which are, however, in themselves, neither good nor evil: those dispositions of mind which are generally term'd virtuous being the frequent occasion of our falling into vices, which opposite ones, tho' generally disapprov'd or detested, would have secur'd us from. Thus compassion, benevolence and candour are the fertile sources of vice; while hardness-of-heart, selfishness, and distrust are as frequently the means of preserving innocence. Nay the fierce, harden'd and turbulent passions enter sometimes into the most virtuous characters; and a heart unaffccted by the present suff'rings of humanity is, not unfrequently, necessary to preserve the rights and liberties of mankind. —In fact we are much deceiv'd, in the motives as well as in the practice of virtue; it being not only necessary that we should mean to do good and take the best way our reason may direct us to effect it; but that we should previously take those measures which are in our power, to acquire the knowledge of the means of doing such good. Wilful ignorance is declar'd therefore intentionally vicious; not having, tho' innocent in fact, the least claim to merit; to which ev'n virtue itself hath but relative pretensions. Indeed, as physical good in the consequence is the measure of moral good in the action, the very appearance of merit in the agent in a great degree vanistes; our power of doing good depending [Page 261] frequently on accident, and, not very seldom on downright knavery. On all which considerations knowledge is laid dow [...] as a fundamental and indispensible moral principle; and, hence, the employment of our leisure hours in inquiries after tru [...] is presum'd to be not merely entertaining but morally virtuous.
EPISTLE THE SEVENTH.
EPISTLE THE EIGHTH.
ARGUMENT.
On the immortality of the soul; and the arguments for, and against, a future state.
SUMMARY.
THE immortality of the soul, or doctrine of a future state, is propos'd as the subject of inquiry. A doctrine, which, however true or false in itself, is both weakly attack'd and lamely supported by the philosophical arguments generally made use of, for, or against, it. Comparisons drawn from the vegetable creation, however striking, are partial and prove nothing. Moral arguments prove as little, unless we could first be made certain that vice and virtue are not duly punish'd and rewarded in this life; or, unless we could entertain adequate ideas of divine justice. With these, the metaphysical refinements, concerning the soul's immateriality, are shown to be equally inconclusive. Our natural desire of existence is expos'd, also, as a weak argument for the justice of our claim to immortality. On the other hand, that intimate connection between body and mind, and their apparent dependance on each other, are shown to afford rather a specious plea in favour of the immortality of the soul, than, as frequently made to do, any argument against it—Setting, however, moral and metaphysical speculations aside, man is consider'd merely in the light of an animal. In which state of humiliation, his pretensions to a future state are, notwithstanding, evidently justified on the plain and reasonable supposition that, the Creator hath given to all animals such pow'rs and faculties as were necessary to the state of being appointed them.—Now the evident pursuits of other animals tend solely to the gratification' of [Page 302] themselves or the mere preservation of their kind. They have no intellectual system that extends beyond the life of the individual; nor doth their experience serve to the improvement of their species. With man it is otherwise: The preservation and gratification of the individual, however powerful their motives, are in him made subservient to more general views: his case, health and life being constantly sacrific'd to pursuits, that are of no use to him merely as an animal; but, on the contrary, serve to promote the intellectual perfection of his species; hence apparently intended for the enjoyment of a state of existence, to which those faculties are adapted. In the powers of imagination and genius may also be trac'd that faint image of the Deity, in which man was confessedly made. So that philosophy alone affords us sufficient reason to believe the certainty of a future state, without our having recourse to contested authorities, the chimerical suppositions of errour, or the absurdities of ignorance.