I Find that Men, who have turn'd their Thoughts to what is now the great Sub­ject, not only of our Parliamentary De­bates, but of our private Conversation, are apt to complain, it is a Matter of such a perplext Nature, and admits of so many Arguments on either Side, that they are rather bewilder'd than instru­cted, by what they have heard in Discourse, or seen in Print, upon this Occasion. But as, I think, this Per­plexity does not arise in Men's Minds from the Nature of the Thing it self, so much as from the way of handling it; I shall endeavour to draw out the whole State of this Af­fair with such Brevity and Method, as may neither tire nor puzzle the Reader; but carry his Thoughts through a Series of Observations and Arguments, that will regu­larly grow out of one another, and set this Matter in its full Light.

1. Those who are thought the best Writers upon Govern­ment, both Ancients and Moderns, have unanimously a­greed in Opinion, that the most perfect and reasonable Form is a mixt Government, in opposition to that of any single Person, or any single Order of Men. For whether the Supreme, that is, the Legislative Power be [Page 2] lodg'd entirely in a Prince, or in an Aristocracy, or in a Democracy, it is still looked upon as Tyrannical, and not properly calculated for the Happiness of the whole Com­munity.

2. It is also establish'd as a Maxim among Political Writers, that the Division of the Supreme or Legislative Power is most perfect, when it is distributed into three Branches. If it all centers in one Man, or in a Body of Men of the same Quality, it is that Form of Govern­ment which is call'd Tyrannical. If it be thrown into two Branches, it wants a casting Power, and is under such a divided Authority as wou'd often draw two different Ways, and produce some time or other such a Discord as wou'd expose the Weaker to that which had most Strength in it, and by degrees end in a single Authority. If it consist of four Branches, it wants likewise a cast­ing Power, and is liable to the same Inconveniences, as when it is composed of Two. And if it be divided into Five, or more Parts, it necessarily runs into Confusion, and will not long retain either the Form, or the Name of Government. For this Reason, three Branches in a Le­gislature have been always fixed upon, as the proper Number; because it affords a casting Power, and may moderate any Heats in any two contending Branches, and overpower the Third in case it should prove unreasonable, or refuse to come into Measures apparently necessary for the Good and Preservation of the Community.

3. The most natural and equitable Division of these Three Branches of the Legislature, is the Regal, the Noble, and the Plebeian: Because the whole Communi­ty is cast under these several Heads, and has not in it a single Member who is without his Representative in the Legislature of such a Consitution.

[Page 3] 4. In the next place it is necessary that these Three Branches should be entirely separate and distinct from each other, so that no one of them may lie too much under the Influence and Controul of either of the col­lateral Branches. For if one part of the Legislature may any ways be invested with a Power to force either of the other Two to concur with it, the Legislative Power is in Reality, whatever it may pretend to, divided into no more than Two Branches.

5. It is the usual Boast of Englishmen, that our Go­vernment is fixed upon this triple Basis, which has been allowed even in Speculation, and that by Persons who could have no Eye to our Constitution, a Form the most accommodated to the Happiness of a Commu­nity, and the most likely to stand secure in its own Strength. But if upon Examination one Branch of its Legislature is liable on any Occasion to be entirely ma­ster'd and control'd by one of the other, it is certain that nothing can be more desirable than such an Improve­ment in our Constitution as may remove out of it this visible Imperfection. If a King has Power, when he plea­ses, to add what Number he shall think fit to a Body of Nobles, who have a Vote in the Legislature, it is plain he may secure his Point in that Branch of the Legislature, and by that Means command two Votes out of Three. This has made many assert, and I wish I could hear a satisfactory Answer to it, that there are not properly more than Two Branches in our Legislature, notwithstanding we flatter our selves that they are Three.

6. In this Case, a precarious Power of Nobles, so far subject to the Regal Power in their Legislative Capacity, might sometimes be more pernicious to the Publick than if the Power of both the Branches were confessedly united [Page 4] in the Soveraign: Because we might well suppose a bad King would scarce venture upon some Things, were the whole Odium of them to turn upon himself; whereas a Body of Peerage, should they only be created in an Emergency to carry any unjustifiable Design, would serve to divert or silence the Murmurs of the Publick.

7. It is a known Saying of a late British King, That if his Friends cou'd gain him a House of Commons, he wou'd throw his Troop of Guards into the House of Lords, rather than miscarry in his Measures. And whe­ther it is impossible for a Court to gain a House of Com­mons of what Complection they please, and what wou'd be the Consequences at some time or other of their Suc­cess in such an Attempt, whilst the Crown is possest of a certain Means, by Vertue of its Prerogative, of filling the House of Lords with its own Creatures, are Points too evident in themselves to be insisted upon.

8. The foregoing Reflections are like first Principles that have scarce been ever called into Dispute, and have not only been the avowed Maxims of those who have been distinguished by the Names of Whigs, but have fur­nished Matter of Complaint to every Party in its Turn. This Power of the Prerogative has always occasion'd Murmurs, when either Side has found it exerted to their Prejudice. We have often wished for a Redress of it, and have now an Opportunity of coming at it, which if we do not lay hold of is not likely to offer it self again so long as we are a People.

9. It is propos'd, to prevent those many Inconveniences which may arise from an Arbitrary Creation of Peers, in what Proportion, and at what Time the Sovereign shall please, to restrain the Peers to a certain Number. It is evi­dent that such a Law wou'd remedy those many Evils that [Page 5] may proceed from such sudden and numerous Additions which have been made to the House of Lords in the most critical Conjunctures. But I find there are Objections made to this Expedient, from the Consequences it wou'd have upon the Crown.

10. It is represented, That it will be the cutting off a Branch from the Prerogative. But if this be only the cut­ting off a Branch which is pernicious to the Publick, it is certainly a very good Argument for doing it, when we can: And that this Power is of such a Nature can scarce admit of a Dispute. Besides, that the Crown, far from be­ing lessen'd by it, will receive a greater Lustre, by par­ting with a Prerogative that has so often given Offence, and may some Time turn to the Destruction of the Subject.

11. The Crown, as a Branch of the Legislature, cannot desire a greater Prerogative than that of a Negative in the passing of a Law; and as it ought not to influence either House in their Debates, what can a good King desire more than the Power of approving or rejecting any such Bill, as cannot pass into a Law without the Royal Assent?

12. The Crown will have still all the Power in it of doing Good to the People, in which the Prerogative of our British Kings will be still unlimited. In short, it nei­ther touches the Executive nor the Legislative Power of the Crown, nor takes away the Prerogative of creating Peers, but only of doing it in such a Manner as seems repugnant to Reason and Justice. The British King will still be the Source of Nobility, and hold in himself the Prin­ciple of Peerage, though it is not to be lavish'd away on Multitudes, or given occasionally to the Detriment of the Publick.

[Page 6] 13. Besides, What do's the Crown do more in parting with a Branch of its Prerogative, than what the two other Parts of the Legislature have frequently done, with Re­gard to their respective Bodies, when they have found a­ny of their Rights or Privileges prejudicial to the Com­munity? All such self-denying Acts are of a popular Na­ture, and have been passed with the Good-liking and Ap­plause of their Fellow-Subjects. Nay the Crown has ne­ver more recommended it self to the Affection of the People, than when it has retrench'd it self in any exorbi­tance of Power that did not seem consistent with their Liberty; as in passing the Bill of Habeas Corpus, and that for establishing Triennial Parliaments.

14. Indeed were this a Point extorted from the Crown in its Necessities, it might be generous at such a Juncture to appear in the Defence of the Prerogative; but this is not our Case, we are only disputing whether we shall ac­cept of a voluntary Concession made by the Sovereign himself, who out of his unparallel'd Goodness has shown, by this Instance, that he places the true Dignity of a Bri­tish Monarch, where it always ought to be plac'd, in the Liberty of his People.

15. Having considered this Alteration proposed to be made in our Constitution with relation to the Crown, let us now consider it with regard first to the House of Com­mons, and in the next place to the whole Body of the English Commonalty; and if we find that it will prove advantageous in its Consequences under both these Views, it is undoubtedly an Alteration very much to be wish'd for.

16. The Number of Peers is in a few Reigns increased from 59 to near 220, and there is no question but that in as few [Page 7] succeeding Reigns their present Number will be doubled; nor will Posterity be able to see an End of them, unless it be timely prevented. Nay, we have all the Reason in the World to apprehend that their Number will hereafter swell in greater Proportions than it has done hitherto. It is a general Remark, that since the Act has passed for Triennial Elections, Commoners of great Estates are more desirous than ever of gaining a Place in the Upper House, which will exempt them from such a constant De­pendance on their Electors, and the frequent Returns of Trouble and Expence in their Elections. At least it is natural to suppose that every King will make such Addi­tions as will give his Friends a Majority; nay, if we may conclude from Experience, every Minister who differs in his Politicks from his Predecessor, will bring to his Assi­stance a sufficient Number to turn the Ballance in his Fa­vour. And it is obvious to every one how quick is the Succession of Ministers in this Country.

17. The first good Consequence therefore of the propo­sed Alteration to the House of Commons will be this, That it will fill that House with Men of the largest For­tunes, and the greatest Abilities; for we may well sup­pose that such Men will set themselves forward to be e­lected into such a Seat, when it is the highest Honour they can have immediately in their View. By this Means, those will be the Representatives of the People, who have the greatest Stake among them. Those will have the giving of Money in their Power, who have the most of it in their Possession. But above all, the Influence of the House of Commons, and consequently of all the Commons of England, will preserve its self in its due Strength; for, of all Maxims, none is more uncontested than that Power follows Property. But what additional Strength wou'd this give the House of Lords, if the rich­est Members of the House of Commons may be draught­ed [Page 8] out of it in such Numbers as the present Frame of our Constitution permits? Nor wou'd the Inconvenience be less with respect to Men of great Parliamentary Abilities, if instead of continuing to add Weight and Authority to the Lower House, they may be called up at any time to employ the same Abilities in aggrandizing the Figure of another House.

18. And as the proposed Alteration will be a proper Means to give a Figure to the House of Commons, so will it likewise be an Expedient to preserve their Inte­grity, as it will take off one Method, and indeed the most effectual Method, of bribing Men of over-grown Fortunes. When a Peerage dangles before the Eyes of the most wealthy Commoner, it may have Charms in it to one, who would have a Contempt for any Offers of a­nother kind. A Man's Ambition is as susceptible of Bribes as his Avarice, and it should be the Care of a Legis­lature to cut off all Temptations to Corruption, in the one as well as the other. It is true, the Alteration pro­posed would not utterly remove the Influence of such a Motive, but it would certainly very much weaken it, and render it infinitely more ineffectual, than what it is at present.

19. If this Method restrains Men of the greatest Figure of the Lower House from making their way so easily to the Upper, it will evidently tend to the bringing a great­er Number of Places of the highest Trust, Honour or Profit into the Hands of the most able and wealthy Com­moners. Men so accomplish'd will have a diffusive Influence both in their own House, and in their respective Coun­tries, and it will be necessary for all Governments to find out proper Rewards and Gratifications for such Men; and Gratifications of this kind no Commoner will envy them, since they enable them to be beneficial to the Body [Page 9] of People whom they Represent, and do not in their Na­ture deprive us of their Strength and Assistance in that Branch of the Legislature to which we belong.

20. However, the proposed Restraint on the Number of Peers, is far from being an Exclusion of such Com­moners, who are recommended by their Fortunes, or their Abilities. According to the Calculation generally receiv'd, there may happen two Extinctions or Va­cancies, taking one Year with another, in the Body of Peers, as fix'd and ascertain'd by the new Scheme, in case it should obtain. And surely the Commons of England will think it sufficient to lose annually two of their most considerable Members, whatever may be the Opinion of particular Persons, who are in haste to leave their Com­pany.

21. A Restraint upon the Number of the Lords will necessarily restrain the Influence of that Body in the E­lection of Members to serve in the Lower House. It is very well known, that few Members of the House of Commons are advanc'd to Peerage, who have not one or more Corporations under their Direction: Nay, that very often, this is one Reason for their Promotion. If, there­fore, this perpetually increasing Body of Lords conti­nues on the Foot it is now, in Proportion as their Num­ber is augmented, their Influence in Elections will grow more general, till at length, as the Upper House are the Creature of the Crown, the Lower House may be in a great Measure the Creature of the Lords: And it is worth while to consider, whether in Process of Time, unless seasonably prevented, the House of Commons may not be filled with the Stewards and Bayliffs of our Peers.

22. In the next Place, let us see what would be the Consequences from such an Alteration, upon the whole [Page 10] Bulk of the English Commonalty, which shou'd always find the first Place in the Thoughts of their Representatives. If they should gain only this single Advantage, I think it is a very considerable One, that it will hinder the Nati­on from being over-run with Lords. We know that in the Sale of an Estate, it is no small Recommendation to the Buyer, that there is no Lord within so many Miles of it, and the Distance of such a Borderer is often look'd upon as an Equivalent to a Year's Purchase. But who can be secure from such a Neighbour, whilst the Species is so apt to increase and multiply? I shall not insist upon paying of Debts, which is look'd upon as a moral Duty among Commoners, who cannot but be sorry to see any Additions to an Order of Men, that are shelter'd by Pri­vileges from the Demands of their honest and industrious Creditors. To which many Considerations of the like Nature might be added, were they not obvious to the private Reflection of every Reader.

23. But the great Point, and which ought to carry the chief Weight with us in this Case is, that the Alteration now proposed will give such a mighty Power to the Bulk of the English Commons, as can be never counter­ballanc'd by the Body of the Nobility. Should we sup­pose 235 Peers possest, one with another, of 5000 l. per Annum, this would amount to no more than 1175000 l. per Annum; and what is such a Property, and the Pow­er arising out of it, compar'd with the Power arising out of the Property of those many Millions possest by the Com­mons? Besides, that the great Accessions of Wealth yearly made in the Body of the Commons, would give it con­tinually an Increase of Property and Power, which wou'd accrue to the Body of the Nobles, in case their Door was always open to Men of overflowing Fortunes, who might find no great Difficulty in procuring an Entrance.

[Page 11] 24. I shall now offer Two fair Questions to any Man, who impartially weighs these Matters.

First, If two Schemes of Government were propos'd to him, in both of which the Legislature shou'd consist of three Branches, whether he wou'd prefer that Scheme, in which one of the Branches might be increas'd at Plea­sure by another of them, or that Scheme in which every Branch should be limited to a certain stated Number: Nay, if the two Schemes were placed in Parallel with one another, and consider'd in their respective Consequences, whether the first would not appear a most wild and indi­gested Project?

In the second Place I wou'd propose this Question; If the Lords had been limited to a certain Number by our Constitution, whether it would not have been thought unpardonable in any one who should have pro­pos'd to have taken off that Limitation, and left it to the Pleasure of the Crown arbitrarily to add to them any Number at any Time?

No body can be at a loss to determine himself in these Questions, who considers this Subject by those plain Lights, which are already exhibited in this Discourse, and which may be strengthen'd by many other Conside­rations.

25. This Subject naturally engages me in one Task more, which is, to examine the Objections that have been started against this Alteration propos'd to be made in the Constitution of the House of Peers. And here I cannot discover any Inconvenience which can be said to follow from such an Alteration, that do's not now subsist, or is not answer'd by some much greater Inconvenience [Page 12] in the present State of the Peerage. But, that I may not follow the Example of those who have appear'd in Print on the other side of this Debate, in putting weak Arguments into the Mouth of their Antagonists, I shall answer such Objections as have been the most ap­proved by those who declare themselves against this Bill, as they are laid together in a Pamphlet, intitled The Plebeian.

26. As for the Introduction, the Digression upon the E­phori, and the concluding Paragraph, they are only Ar­guments ad conflandam invidiam, and such as are not to be answer'd by Reason, but by the same angry Strain in which they are Written, and which wou'd discredit a Cause that is able to support it self without such an As­sistance.

27. At first Sight, says the Plebeian, this Proposal must appear very Shocking. P. 3. It carries with it too great an Alte­ration of the Constitution. This is the first general Ob­jection, and I wish it had been pursued regularly; but because it is dropt and resumed in the following Part of the Discourse, I must be forced to collect those scatter'd Passages on this Head, as I find them in different Parts of the Book. This great Objection will be sufficiently an­swer'd, if this Alteration of the Constitution is from Worse to Better; which I think has been fully proved. As every thing is formed into Perfection by Degrees, the Wisdom of all Legislatures has embraced every Opportunity of making such Changes in their Government, as have been advantageous to those who live under it. This Author him­self gives us an eminent Instance of a great Alteration of our Constitution in the Lower House, under the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, P. 9. when the Crown erected several new Corporations, and relieved several ancient and decayed ones from sending any Members at all. I do not make use of this Increase in the Number of [Page 13] the Commons, as an Argument for an Increase of the Number of the Lords, which the Author produces as the Reasoning of some People who are for the Bill. Such People, if any there are, must talk inconsistently with themselves, since it is the Purport of the Bill to prevent the House of Lords from growing too Numerous. But it is an unanswerable Argument to shew, that there has been as great an Alteration in one Branch of our Legisla­ture, as is now proposed to be made in Another, and that such an Alteration should be introduc'd into our Form of Government, when there are good Reasons for it; on which Account our Author himself justifies the above­mention'd Alteration in the House of Commons. Our Au­thor furnishes us with another very good Argument in this Particular against himself. P. 6. Whiggism, says he, if I under­stand it aright, is a Desire of Liberty, and a Spirit of Op­position to all exorbitant Power in any part of the Con­stitution. Formerly the Danger on this Account was from the Crown; but since the Habeas Corpus Act, and the many Restraints laid upon the Crown in King William 's Time, and the great and numerous Limitations of the Suc­cession Acts, the Prerogative of the Crown is reduced so low, that it is not at all dangerous to the Commons. As we have the Author's Confession in the aforemention'd Instance of an Alteration in the Plebeian, he has here given us an Account of as remarkable Changes in the Re­gal Branch of our Government. The Prerogative was re­trenched in those several Instances, because without such Retrenchment the Power of it appeared exorbitant and dangerous to the Commons. If therefore there still in­heres in the Crown a Power that is exorbitant and dan­gerous to the Commons, there is the same Reason why the Commons should lay hold of the present Opportuni­ty to retrench it. This is the Matter in Debate betwixt us; but be that as it will, the Argument which the Au­thor [Page 14] here makes use of, against the Bill in Question, that it carries in it too great an Alteration of the Constitution, would have been as good an Argument against the Ha­beas Corpus Act, or any other of those above-mentioned. What is further said upon this Subject in P. 14. wou'd make a handsome Sentence in a popular Speech, but will never stand the Test of a strict Examination in a Discourse addrest to the Reasons and not the Passions of Men. In short it has been for our ancient Constitution, says the Au­thor, that we have struggled with so much Vigour for many Years together: 'Tis for that we have pour'd out a River of English Blood, and a Treasure unheard of in a­ny former Age. This Constitution may have its Imper­fections; but faulty as it is, our Ancestors have convey'd down Liberty to us thro' that Channel: And we ought to continue it on, as well as we can, to our Posterity, and not give way to the new-modelling Schemes of every ex­traordinary Genius. This is not Arguing but Declaiming. Our Ancestors remedied several Imperfections from time to time, and we are obliged to them for having convey­ed Liberty down to us through the Channel which they had so often alter'd and reform'd. And will not our Po­sterity be as thankful to us, if we transmit to them their Liberty through the same Channel, when it shall be only alter'd for the better Conveyance of it?

28. Having taken off the Force of this main Objection, I shall follow others as the Author leads me. He tells us that P. 4. the shutting up the Door of the House of Lords in the manner talked of, cannot but prove a great Discou­ragement to virtuous Actions, to Learning and Industry, and very detrimental to the House of Peers it self, by preventing such frequent Supplies from going into it as the Nature of such a Body requires; for want of which, it may in time become corrupt and offensive like a stagna­ted [Page 15] Pool, which hitherto has been preserved wholesome and pure by the fresh Streams that pass continually into it. This Consideration, if it has any Force, cuts down all the other Arguments drawn from the new Accessions of Figure and Power, which he supposes wou'd accrue to the House of Lords by the passing of the Bill so much talked of. Can it be detrimental to the House of Lords, and at the same time throw into their Hands all the Places and Honours that the Crown can conser upon them? Will that Body of Men, which wou'd become mean and despicable and offensive as a stagnated Pool by the Means of this Alteration, be raised by the same Means to be the most formidable, and the most honoured Part in our Constitution? Or could the same Body degenerate into a publick Nuisance, as our Author represents it, and at the same time be able to over-awe both King and Peo­ple? Can two fuch contrary Effects be produced from one and the same Cause? But could we suppose that this Body of Men might thus degenerate; Wou'd they be a­ble, without numerous Recruits of Wealth, Learning and Industry, to oppose any thing for the Good of the Com­munity, in Contradiction to the King and People? But more of this hereafter.

29. Our Author adds, I am not unaware it will be said that the frequent Extinctions of noble Families will salve this Inconvenience, and make room for the rewarding of Merit. But, says he, this Expedient, I fear, is not much to be depended on; for the Ʋncertainty of the Time when the Crown will have any such Power, will make it much the same, as if it were never to have it at all; which is as much as to say, That unless the Crown has Power of making what Number of Lords it pleases, and at what Time it pleases, and to serve what Turn it pleases, it had as good have no Power at all of making Peers, which the Author supposes is the only adequate Power it has of rewarding Merit. Not to [Page 16] ask the Author whether it be generally virtuous Actions, Learning, or Industry, that recommend Commoners to the Peerage, or of what other kind the Merit is, which has been often thus rewarded; I shall only ask him, Whether any Man has so crying a Merit as immediately requires a Peerage for its Reward? Or whether the Ex­tinction of Two Titles in a Year will not leave room e­nough for the Crown to reward those extraordinary Per­sons, whose Merits give them such a Demand upon it? As for another Argument which the Author puts into the Mouth of those whom he calls Patrons of the Bill pro­posed, P. 4. that it will ease the Crown of Importunities, as I think it has no great Weight in it, I am not concerned to urge any thing in its Defence against the Plebeian's Answer to it.

30. We come now to the most considerable Paragraph of the whole Book, which I shall therefore transcribe at length. P. 5 and 6. But another Consequence of a much higher Na­ture, attending the Limitation of the Number of Peers, is the Danger there will be of changing the Constitution by this means into an Aristocracy: And this may at any time in such case be effected by the Confederacy of two or three Great Families, which would form such a Body in the House of Lords, as the Crown would not be able to controul. That this kind of Government is one of the worst Sorts of Knavery, is too well known to be disputed. In a Democracy, a great many different Persons may come to have a Share of Power by several Incidents, but in the other case it is Birth only that intitles to Su­periority: And the Milk such Nobles are nursed up with is Hatred and Contempt for every human Crea­ture, but those of their own imaginary Dignity. The Question to be stated here is, Whether the House of Lords under their present Constitution is not as likely to run into an Aristocracy, as it would be in [Page 17] case their Number should be limited. It appears very plain to me, that a Body of Peers perpetually Increa­sing, and capable of Additions, has in it a natural Ten­dency to an Aristocracy. Supposing that the House of Lords from 60 Members is now swell'd to 200: These, if increased by the same Proportion, wou'd in the same Number of Years amount to 666, to which we may presume there wou'd be still the like proportionable Ad­ditions. By this Means they would in time receive such vast Accessions of Property, as might Encourage them not only to entertain so ambitious a Design, but in a great Measure to render it effectual; especially when any Men could be admitted into their own Order, with their great Abilities in Parliament, or their great Influ­ence among the People, who might be most capable of opposing their Incroachments upon the Commons. I do allow that such Additions would be prejudicial to the Crown; but, this is no Reason, why they would not be made, as it has not prevented the Additions that have been made in our own Memory. For tho' the Crown in general would be a Sufferer by this Method; yet it would naturally have Recourse to it, as it has formerly, when it labours under any present Exigency, that can only be re­moved by such an Expedient. This Danger of an Ari­stocracy, every one must confess would be very much a­bated, and, I think, utterly removed, by the Limitation of the Lords to such a Number, as is now proposed. In such a Case, their Property would be so very inconside­rable, when compared with that of the Commons (as I have before shew'd to a Demonstration) that it would render such a Design in them the most Chimerical, and the most Impracticable. And since it is impossible, that the whole Body of Lords in their United Strength could be able to establish themselves into an Aristocracy, the Author's Imagination vanishes, that P. 5. this may at any Time, in such a Case, be effected by the Confederacy of two or [Page 18] three great Families, which would form such a Body among the Lords, as the Crown would not be able to controul. If the Author means in this Place by the Crown not being able to controul the Lords, that it would be restrained from pouring in such a Number as would al­ways sway them to its Inclinations, it is what ought to be wished for. If he means, that this want of Power in the Crown would enable them to erect an Aristocracy, it is certainly a wrong Consequence: Because not only the Crown, but the People would have a Superior Power in them to the Body of Nobles, and are equally concern'd to preserve their Stations in the Government. The Author after this brings an Argument to prove, that an Aristo­cracy is a bad Form of Government, and that a Demo­cracy is preferable to it, in which I entirely agree with him; but must add, that a mixt Government made out of Aristocracy, Democracy and Monarchy, is better than either of them. The Author subjoins, that P. 6. the Milk which Nobles are nurst up with is Hatred and Contempt of every Humane Creature, but those of their own imagi­nary Dignity. If so, the fewer of them the better. What Commoner wou'd not desire to put a stop to the Increase of them?

31. The next Objection I meet with is from the great Pri­vileges the Lords are already possess'd of, with relation to P. 7. Actions de Scandalis Magnatum, &c. which is likewise a very good Reason why we shou'd hinder the Increase of Persons invested with these Privileges; and as for the Ju­dicial Power, with that of Imprisoning, they are such as subsist in their Body as it is now constituted, and there­fore cannot be objected to the propos'd Alteration, which wou'd only leave them as they are.

32. P. 7. The encreasing the Number of Peers, says the Author, is always to be wish'd for by the Commons: We have seen [Page 19] sufficient Reasons why it shou'd not. Because the greater their Number, the less considerable they become; the con­trary of which has been evidently proved; and the less within the Influence of Court Favours: What! when by this very Power of encreasing them at Will, it can secure any Point among them that it pleases? By which means alone Ministers are kept in awe, and remain in a Situation of being called to Account for their Actions. Were it o­therwise they wou'd be out of the reach of any Accusation: They wou'd know exactly by whom they were to be tried, and their Judges might be their Accomplices. And shou'd this once come to be the Case, what might they not attempt with Impunity? Is this Inconvenience better prevented in a House of Peers on the bottom it now stands? Can any who has been a good Minister be secure, if the Crown shou'd add a sufficient number of his Enemies to those who sit in Judgment upon him? Or is a bad Minister in any Danger, when he may be shelter'd by the Addition of a sufficient number of his Friends?

33. I must not pass over another remarkable Paragraph of the Author upon the same Argument for increasing the Lords at Pleasure. P. 9. The great Advantage, says he, that the Number of their Body cannot be increas'd, is at pre­sent the most valuable Privilege of the House of Commons, and the only thing that makes them considerable. This is indeed a very poor Advantage, to found upon it the Gran­deur of a House of Commons. Is not the Power of gi­ving Money and raising Taxes confin'd to that Body, and which can never fail to give them the greatest Weight in the Legislature? Will not this be always the most valua­ble Privilege of the Commons, and what other Privilege can make them more considerable? He goes on, The Lords are possest of many great Privileges that they will not permit the Commons to share with them; and therefore the Commons wou'd be highly wanting to themselves, if [Page 20] they shou'd add this Advantage likewise to the Lords, which is the only one that they can enjoy distinct from them. Our Author, as it may turn to his Account, sometimes con­siders the Lords in their personal Privileges as they are Individuals, and sometimes as they are a Body of Men in the Legislature. If he here means their Privileges in the former View, I do allow they are very great ones, and therefore certainly every Commoner cannot desire an Encrease of such Individuals. But if he here means their Privileges as a Legislative Body, it is certain that all their Privileges together are not equal to that One, of com­manding the Purse of the Community. So that it is wonderful how he cou'd advance, that the Number of the House of Commons not being subject to an Increase, is the only Advantage that they enjoy distinct from the House of Lords.

34. Our Author next proceeds to speak of the pro­portion of Property between the two Houses of Lords and Commons, which is a Point already so fully dis­cussed, that I shall not trouble the Reader with any Re­petitions; but cannot omit what the Author asserts as an indisputable Point, and which in it self is the greatest Pa­radox I ever heard advanced. His Words are P. 10. indeed if a restraining Bill shou'd pass, I do not doubt but it wou'd be soon follow'd with a Bill to prevent Lords from alie­nating their Estates, for which many plausible Reasons are to be produc'd: And then without all Dispute the Bal­lance of Property will be soon turn'd on the side of their Lordships: Which is as much as to say, in plain English, that the Lords will have as much Wealth amongst 'em as the whole Body of the British Commons, or that one Million will be a Balance against a hundred Millions. Indeed the House of Lords in their present Constitution may be always approaching to a Balance in Property with the Commons, from whence they are continually re­ceiving [Page 21] into their Body such large Supplies; but if their Number be once limited, you cut off their Recruits, and lay them under an Impossibility of ever rivalling the other Branch of the Legislature in this Particular.

35. Our Author's Argument, that a new Power wou'd a­rise to the House of Lords from the Alteration so much talked of, is founded upon a Fact which every one denies at first sight. His Words are these: P. 10, 11. For as to what is commonly said that the Lords wou'd get nothing, no new Power wou'd be added to them by this Means; I beg leave to state this Matter in a proper Light. Suppose the Bal­lance to be now even betwixt the Lords and the Crown, as it certainly is, or else the Constitution wou'd not sub­sist in quiet: Is it not plain to the most common Capacity, that when two Scales are upon an equal Poise, if you take any Weight out of one of them, you give the Advantage to the other without putting any Thing into it. The Au­thor here supposes that the Ballance between these two Parts of the Legislature should be even, and so far I con­cur with him, that being the chief End which this Alte­ration has in view. But I can by no Means suppose with him that they are even, because it is contrary to Matter of Fact. For we plainly see that the Sovereign has it always in his Power to make what Division of Party or Opinion he pleases prevail in that House. As for the Reason of their present supposed Equality, that other­wise they cou'd not subsist in quiet, it has no Force in it, because we see very ill-constituted Governments will subsist in quiet for many Ages, not that they are pre­served by a rightly temper'd Constitution, which wou'd give them the greatest Strength, but by other accidental Causes. The ill Consequences of such an Inequality may be frequently felt and complained of, though they may not shake the Tranquillity of the Publick.

[Page 22] 36. I have now gone through every Thing that carries the Face of an Argument for the Constitution of the House of Lords, as it now stands, or of an Objection against the Alteration proposed to be made, having only avoid­ed saying any thing in this Case as it affects the Scotish Nobility, because I have here consider'd it only as an English Commoner, and because I have Thoughts of pro­secuting the Subject, as it relates to Scotland, in another Pamphlet, being unwilling to swell this to a greater Bulk.

37. Since the writing of the foregoing Discourse, I have perused a Pamphlet, intituled, The Thoughts of a Mem­ber of the Lower House, &c. in which the Author first approves our Constitution as divided into its Three Branches, and through the whole Course of his Book con­tends in Effect, that it shou'd consist of no more than Two; for he supposes the House of Lords instituted only as Guar­dians, and Ornaments to the Throne, and to be augmen­ted by the Crown in such a Proportion, as may strengthen it in Opposition to the House of Commons. The Reader may see his Scheme in the following Words. P. 9. There is not, says this Writer, a more certain Maxim in Politicks, than that a Monarchy must subsist by an Army, or Nobility. The first makes it Despotic, and the latter a free Govern­ment. I presume none of those noble Personages them­selves, who have the Honour to make up that Illustri­ous Body, do believe they are so distinguish'd and advanc'd above their Fellow-Subjects for their own Sakes: They know they are intended the Guardians, as well as Ornaments of the Monarchy, an essential Prerogative of which it must be to add to and augment their Number in such Pro­portion, as to render them a proper Balance against the Democratical Part of our Constitution, without being for­midable to the Monarchy it self, the Support of which is [Page 23] the Reason of their Institution. This is a most extraor­dinary Notion of Government, that one Branch of a Legi­slature shou'd be instituted, only to be subservient to the Strength and Support of another, but it is on this Bottom that he founds his whole Discourse; and as for his Obje­ctions to the proposed Alteration, I find they are such as I have already obviated in the Course of this Pamphlet. If any thing remains in them unanswer'd, it will fall under the last Objection against the Matter in Debate, which I shou'd not take Notice of, did not I find that it makes an Impression upon some People's Minds.

38. Suppose, says the Objection, there should be an inflex­ible Obstinacy in a House of Peers, what Method would there be left to bring them to a Concurrence with the two other Branches of the Legislature, when it will not be in the Power of the King to bring them over to Rea­son, by flinging in sufficient Numbers among them? To this I answer, That if the Lords are obstinate in a Point, that is Reasonable and Beneficial to the Community, it will be happy for their Country that they should be in­vested with the proper Power of a Legislative Branch, not to be over-ruled to wrong Measures. This may some­times be of great Advantage to the Publick, if we can possibly suppose, that the two other Branches may con­cur in any thing that is not consistent with Justice, or the National Interest. If the Peers are thus inflexibly ob­stinate in any Methods that are Dishonourable, Ʋn­just or Pernicions to their Country; can we imagine, they could not be influenced into a Compliance, by the Authority of the two sharing Branches in the Legisla­ture? Or, can we think, they would persist in Measures which would draw upon them the Displeasure of the Crown, and the Resentments of the whole Commons of Great Britain? Every Body of Men takes as much Care as possible to preserve their Credit, and to render [Page 24] themselves Popular; and we cannot think that any Branch of a Legislature would be made up of Madmen, or pur­sue such Measures as must necessarily end in their Infamy, or their Destruction; especially, when they are infinitely weaker than either of the other con­stituent Parts of our Legislature. Could any Person ap­prehend such a Behaviour from them, I am sure the same Person cannot in his Heart apprehend their growing up into an Aristocracy. The Peers are so little a Match for the Crown in Power, or the Commons in Property, much less able to cope with the united Force of Both; that it is Wildness to suppose them Guilty of such an unjust and unreasonable Obstinacy, as they know might en­danger their very Being in the British Constitution. And now, I shall only propose it to every ones Thoughts, whether an Expedient, which will remedy the greatest Inconvenience that may arise to us, from one of the Branches of the Legislature, and of which we have had Experience, as has been already sufficiently explained, should prevail with us to lay it aside, out of a groundless Fear, that it should expose us to an Inconvenience from another Branch of the Legislature, which must suppose 'em destitute of common Sense, void of Honour and E­quity, and regardless of Self-preservation, before it can possibly befall us. To this I shall only add, that whatever Objections are made against this Alteration in the Con­stitution may be made against every Form of Govern­ment, in which the Legislature consists of Three distinct Branches, and that is, against such a Form as has been pronounced the most perfect, by those who have been the most skilful Politicians, and the most famous for their Observations on the Nature of Government.