THE Name of Philoso­pher, how simple and modest soever it be, seemed heretofore so glorious and lovely to the Learned of ancient Times, that they preferr'd it to the most splendid and lofty Titles. That love of Wisdom and study of Vertue, whereof they made Profession, raised them to such Authority over the minds of men, that their Example served for instruction, and their Maxims were re­ceived [Page 2]as Oracles by the publick. Great men asked them Counsel in the Af­fairs of weightiest importance: Cities and Provinces submitted to their con­duct; and Kings themselves reckoned it their glory to be their Disciples. It is true Philosophy taught Pythago­ras the integrity of manners and au­sterity of life, which gained him so many Followers. It was Philosophy that made Empedocles refuse a Crown, and prefer a private and quiet life to all the magnificence of Grandeur. By Philosophy Democritus was raised to the contemplation of Nature, and re­nounced bodily pleasures, that he might more peaceably enjoy the de­lights of the Soul. Philosophy taught Socrates to dye without haughtiness or weakness: and though in the death of Cato, who affected too much the Philo­sopher, there appeared less modesty and tranquillity; yet therein are also to be seen the lineaments of a greatness of mind, which made him despise life. So that there being hardly any action of constancy and stedfastness in Paganism, [Page 3]which was not animated by Philoso­phy: It may be said, that it was in some manner the principle and source of the purest vertue of Heathens.

II.

The Egyptians, who were the first Philosophers in the world, gave so my­sterious a garb to their Philosophy, that they made it pass with the People for a part of their Religion: Nor did any thing advance it more in authority with the publick, or give it greater credit among the Learned. But their Priests had no other end in shrowding their Observations of Nature, under the Veil of their Hieroglyphicks, but to keep them from the knowledge of the people, and thereby to distinguish themselves from the vulgar. As they propagated their Philosophy only by Tradition, and did not willingly com­municate their knowledge to other people; so (as Strabo observes) there is but little known of their true Doctrine. The truth is, all that is said of Philo­sophy, before it became to be known in Greece, hath so little foundation; [Page 4]and all the discourses that are found of it in the Fragments of Sotion, Hermippus and Hermodorus, whereof Diogenes Laertius makes mention, aswell as in the Dialogue of Lucian's Fugitives, are so fabulous, that I intend only, as to what concerns the beginning thereof, to adhere to that which is to be found in History, that I may give a more cer­tain account of the same. Besides, that mysterious Philosophy of the E­gyptians, is so little different from that of Pythagoras, that the method and principles of both are almost the same; as appears by what Plutarch tells us in several of his works, Jamblicus in the life of Pythagoras, Selden, and some others who have treated on that sub­ject.

III.

The Grecians, who shewed greater passion for the discovery of truth, than other Nations, gave themselves so ear­nestly to the observation of Nature, that from Thales to Plato there were more Truths concerning Natural Phi­losophy discovered, than in the Ages [Page 5]following. It must be acknowledged likewise, that Philosophy in its infan­cy began to produce so great wits, and that it shewed so much reason in its primitive famblings, that its first rudiments served for principles, and even for models to the following Ages. By long and constant study men ob­served the motion of the Heavens, di­stinguished their revolutions, framed the first Ideas of a Coelestial Systeme, discovered the obliquity of the Zodi­ack, unfolded the most hidden things of Nature, and drew that Curtain wherewith Providence had hid the greatest part of its secrets, to present them to men as a matter of meditati­on and enquiry. And amongst those that laboured in the search of these Ve­rities, Thales, Anaximander, Anaxa­goras, Heraclitus, Hippocrates, Demo­critus, Empedocles, and Archelaus, ob­tained the greatest reputation. Plu­tarch, who in the second Tome of his Works gives the History of their Opi­nions, does indeed show the contradicti­ons and absurdities whereinto for most [Page 6]part they fell: Nevertheless they still deserve the praise to have been the first that ventured upon that so difficult an attempt, and by unknown Paths traced the way to those that followed them, rendring themselves conside­rable to Posterity, by the founda­tion they laid to Sciences. Justin in his History observes, that whilst study and meditation made Philosophers in Greece, Nature alone without any as­sistance made the like amongst the Bar­barians in the middle of Scythia; as appears in Abaris and Anacarsis, of whom Apuleius speaks, who without precepts and discipline attained to Wisdom.

IV.

To speak then properly, Thales and Pythagoras were the two Founders of the ancient Philosophy; the one in Greece, and the other in Italy. There appeared in the School of Pythagoras somewhat more regular and better established, than in that of Thales and his Successors. As in the Do­ctrine of Pythagoras every thing was [Page 7]made mysterious; so submission was its principal Character: that religious silence which with so much rigour he made his Disciples observe, was an art to procure himself a more respect­ful attention. The life of that Philo­sopher, as well as his Doctrine, is at this day still a great subject of contro­versie: he was indeed a man of a deep reach, a quick and penetrating appre­hension, and of indefatigable industry and application. His usual way of teaching, was by Geometry and Num­bers: he explained material and sensi­ble things by Geometry, and intelle­ctual by Musick and Numbers. He was of too solid a judgment, to imagine any reality in Numbers, which are but only intentional Beings, as Aristotle proves in his Metaphysicks. It is true he found so great a facility in explaining the perfection of every thing by har­mony and proportion, after the man­ner of the Egyptians, that he expressed himself no other way: and that he made use of Numbers as of Symbols and Signs to teach with: and all that [Page 8]Science of Numbers, which was so fa­miliar to Pythagoras, is to this day still a kind of mystery, whereof the secret is not very well known. Jamblicus in the life of that Philosopher says, that he invented a musick proper for the cure and quieting of the Passions. In his Moral Philosophy there is nothing regular; only fair Maxims without Principles: his Natural Philosophy is the same almost with that of the Pla­tonists. His Doctrine of two Princi­ples, the one of good and the other of evil, on which the Manichees built their belief, is false; for of real Beings there is but one real Principle. Pytha­goras in Plutarch boasts, that the great­est fruit which he had reaped from Phi­losophy was, not to wonder at any thing: because that Philosophy disco­vered to him the cause of every thing, as Horace expresses it to Numicius, ‘Nil admirari prope res est una Numici.’ In fine, Pythagoras had so extraordi­nary a genius for Philosophy, that all [Page 9]the other Philosophers have gloried to stick to his sentiments: Socrates and Plato have hardly any thing that is good but from him. And if we con­sider more narrowly, we shall even find, that amongst all other Sects almost, there is somewhat of the Spirit of Py­thagoras that bears rule.

V. SOCRATES.

Socrates was the first that began to reduce into method the confused Ideas of those that went before him, by ranking the Observations which he had made of Nature, in a more regular order, that he might shape them into Arts and Sciences. Though he had all the charms of wit, which flow from a pregnant genius and happy dispositi­on, yet he wanted not depth, and all imaginable solidity. And that height of knowledge and understanding was accompanied with the true simplicity of a Child: When he applyed himself to every thing, he seemed not employ­ed in any thing: He handled obscurest [Page 10]matters in a pleasing strain; and his most serious meditations deprived him not of his good humour. As he ne­ver affected to talk like a wit, but as a vertuous man, so his ordinary jests were noble. He was capable of every thing, and proud of nothing. His no­tices, that gave instruction to others, and made them of Scholars become learned men, served only to puzle and entangle himself, by the doubts and uncertainties which they raised in him: And for all he was so rational, yet he too much distrusted his Reason. The fertility of his wit so choaked his discerning, that his different views led him into irresolution. By his ingenui­ty in declaring on all occasions, that he knew nothing, he rendred the other Philosophers of his time ridiculous, who brag'd that they knew every thing: And the ignorance he made profession of, acquired him greater re­putation than all his knowledge. He suffered those that disputed with him to take all the advantage over him they pleased, that he might refute [Page 11]them with so much the more authority, as he took the less. He procured an abso­lute power over their sentiments, by the deference that he yielded to them: it was only by hiding his Opinion, that he forced others to follow it: And the Empire that he exercised over mens minds, was but an effect of the skill he had not to usurp any, by the indif­ferency which he made appear for his own sentiments: as Cicero says, Socra­tes ipse sibi detrahens, in disputatione plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. But as he was the head of all the Sects that followed him; so was he also in some manner the Founder of all the doubts that arose amongst them. For his Reasonings tended commonly to the baffling of Reason: And as he esta­blished Sciences, so he left occasion to overthrow them; because he taught his Scholars not so much to know, as to doubt of things. Not, but that for all this he much contributed to give Philosophy the Form it hath taken since: For he it was that drew the first draught of Logick and Moral Philo­sophy, [Page 12]and gave Principles to Natu­ral Philosophy: But by prying into this, according to the quality of his wit, with too much quaintness, he re­fined every thing so much, that he handled these matters with less solidity than his Successors. Not, but that his judgment is also of great authority, when he affirms any thing; but his Sentiments are rather Principles than Decisions: and all things rightly con­sidered, his Philosophy is more proper to overthrow than establish. He had moreover with his simplicity a great Soul; for Lysias having read to him in his Prison a Discourse that he had made in his defence, he chose rather to dye than make use of it; because it de­fended him not with dignity enough: and so he dyed sedately and in cold blood, which amazed his Judges.

VI. PLATO.

Plato has the smoothest tongue of Antiquity, and takes pleasure to make men hear him attentively, though [Page 13]he is not much concerned whether they believe him or not: he is always florid, but not always solid. The false relish that was then in vogue, through the credit of the Sophists, obliged him to that flourish of expression which he used. He is witty, quick, and elegant, and as ingenious as man can be; and with little coherence and method, he observes in his discourse a secret oeco­nomy which fails not to hit the mark. And seeing he teaches only by way of Dialogue, that he may follow a free and disengaged stile, which has the air of Conversation; he is rich in Prefa­ces, and magnificent in his entry on Discourses; but he decides but little, no more than Socrates, and establishes almost nothing at all. However what he says is so naturally exprest, that no­thing can be imagined more taking. The slight matters which he mingles with great in his discourses, and the trifles wherewith he circumstantiates what is essential and weighty in the subjects he treats of, render him allu­ring; and it is by that way alone that he [Page 14]amuses. But through the great desire he hath to be pleasing, he is too much for telling of wonders: most part of his discourses are nothing else but Fa­bles, Metaphors, and continual Alle­gories; he affects often to be mysterious in what he says, that he may keep him­self the more within the verge of his Character; and it is commonly by ly­ing that he undertakes to perswade truth. Rhodiginus pretends that his sense is more to be minded than his words, which are often allegorical. Moreover he was too much a Politici­an for a Philosopher: For in one of his Letters to Dionysius of Siracusa he ac­knowledges, that he published none of his Maxims, but under the name of Socrates, that he might not be account­able for his own Doctrine, in a time when the nicety of the People of Athens was offended at every thing. The condemnation of Socrates made him so cautious, that to be in good terms with the Publick, and to dispos­sess the People of the opinion, that he was addicted to the Sentiments of his [Page 15]Master, he turned Pythagorean. Though he was a man of vast capacity, (for, what did he not know, says Quinti­lian?) and had a wonderful Ge­nius for Sciences, whereof he speaks always better than others did; yet it must be acknowledged, that he gave greater reputation to Philosophy, by the conduct of his Life and Vertue, than by his Doctrine: For he it was that first taught, that true Philosophy consisted more in Fidelity, Constancy, Justice, Sincerity, and in the love of ones Duty, than in a great Capacity. After his death his Disciples so altered his Doctrine, and filled his School with such rigid Opinions, that scarcely could there be known amongst them the least print of the true Doctrine of Plato: which was divided into so ma­ny Sects, as there started up Philoso­phers in the Ages following.

VII. ARISTOTLE.

Aristotle is a Wit so far above others, that few know him: For by an unpa­rallel'd [Page 16]reach of understanding he soars above the highest: He is an Eagle that mounts so high, that men easily lose sight of him; and there is so much force in his thoughts, so great eleva­tion in his sentiments, that he cannot be followed. He it was who first col­lected the several parts of Philosophy, that he might unite them into one bo­dy, and reduce them to a compleat Sy­steme. No man had ever so great a discerning of truth and falshood, as that Philosopher; for he not only di­ved into Reason, that he might disco­ver it, under what cloud soever it hid it self; but upon discovery thereof, had the art to make it even perceptible to others in all its force, and intelligi­ble in its full extent: so happy and pe­netrating was his genius. By that qua­lity of mind he became so exact an ob­server of the Works of Nature, that Plato called him, the Genius of Nature, as if Nature had made use of his Spi­rit as an instrument to discover her Se­crets. In all his sentiments there spar­kles a sage and judicious Character, [Page 17]which always satisfies the mind; so regular and solid he is: and there is hardly ever any thing said reasonably in Philosophy, which bears not some signature and impression of the spirit of Aristotle. So that all the Judg­ments that have been made on his Do­ctrine in succeeding Ages, have only differed according to the greatness and mediocrity of light and knowledge, that have swayed them: For in a word, none have given greater weight to hu­mane Reason, nor carried it farther than Aristotle. His method is more so­lid than that of all others, because his principles are better founded on Rea­son, and his Reason more grounded on Experience. But when he speaks, one cannot tell whether it be to hide his doubts, or to make himself reve­renced, that he is obscure. It seems he writes only that he may not be un­derstood; and that his Works are not so much to instruct his own Age, as to give exercise to the following: There­fore it is, that Diogenes Laertius com­pares him to that Fish that troubles the [Page 18]Water for fear of being taken. But there is some Justice due to Aristotle, as to that reproach which is cast up­on him: His obscurity is not so much the defect of his understanding, as of his subject matter; and in the manner how he fathoms things, it is not very easie to pierce the darkest clouds of Nature, to unfold her most hidden se­crets, to dig into nothing but abysses, to walk only on precipices, not to pur­sue truth but by ways unknown to all other heads, and to be intelligible to all men: And that is the reason that the discourses of Aristotle have always more politeness and force than perspi­cuity; because he confines himself to a short and concise stile, the constraint whereof will not allow but a perplex­ed elocution: And that is also the rea­son that he writes in a manner more apt to amaze than perswade his Rea­ders. One must have heard him, says Psellus, to be able to comprehend his Doctrine. He masked sometimes with an affected obscurity, what Pythagor as disguised under Symbols, and Plato [Page 19]under Allegories. But in fine, there is so great a depth of judgment to be found in all that Aristotle said, when one can penetrate into it, that he is not to be found fault with, if he have not always the art to make himself be understood. It is in vain therefore, that a brood of stinted spirits have let flye against the reputation of that great man, under the conduct of Telesius, Patricius, Bacon, Campanella, and some others, to discredit his Doctrine in these last Ages; who by censuring Aristotle have pretended to be wiser than all the Ages and Nations that have esteem­ed him.

VIII.

Philosophy did shortly after degene­rate from the Nobility of its Extracti­on, there being none in the following Ages that came near the knowledge of those great men who were its Foun­ders; and that purity which it preser­ved in its beginning, was quickly sul­lied by the multitude of Sects that sprang up since. Then began Philoso­phy to put on all the shapes and figures [Page 20]which the passions of men gave it, ac­cording to the different inclinations and various interests that prevailed in succeeding Ages. For besides that the School of Zeno was full of counterfeit Vertues, and that of Epicurus stuffed with real Vices, Philosophy became impious under Diagoras, impudent un­der Diogenes, selfish under Demochares, censorious under Lyco, voluptuous un­der Metrodorus, fantastical under Cra­tes, licentious under Pyrrho, litigious under Cleantes, turbulent under Arce­silas, and took the humour of a Buf­foon under Menippus, and spirit of contradiction under Lacydes: In a word, it was abandoned to all the ramblings that the mind of man is capable of. The Philosophers themselves became jealous, envious, fickle, rash, unjust, passionate, and subject to the infirmi­ties of the rest of Mankind. Then be­gan men only to reason with reference to their humours, ambition, and in­trigues: and in a short time, there was no foppery nor extravagancy, says Cicero, which had not some Philoso­pher [Page 21]for Author and Patron. Men fol­lowed no more Reason but Passion; and made it their business more to maintain their Opinions with heats, than to defend the Truth with sinceri­ty. The different interests of Sects who at that time laboured to over­throw one another, by the opposition that was amongst their Ring-leaders, did not a little contribute to that dis­order. The ancient School of Plato degenerated by the Sentiments of the new, into the Sect of Scepticks and Pyrrhonists, who doubted of every thing. And after the death of Theo­phrastus, the School of the Peripate­ticks remitted much of their applica­tion to Natural Philosophy, that they might study Eloquence. And this was the revolution in Philosophy, which followed that of Greece: for since that it lost its liberty, under the Successors of Alexander, there arose but a few heads fit for the study of Nature, un­der the Reign of the Ptolomies, who called the Learned to Alexandria, and obliged them to leave Greece. Nei­ther [Page 22]was there almost any other Philo­sopher of note in any other part of the world, except some followers of Plato, Aristotle, Zeno, and Epicurus, who were in some vogue at Athens. The Learn­ed that got greatest name elsewhere, were Athenodorus Keeper of the Libra­ry of the Kings of Pergamus, who cor­rected the Books of Zeno; Strato the Preceptor of Ptolomy Philadelphus; Ari­steas that was sent by Ptolomy the Son of Lagus to Eleazar High Priest of Je­rusalem; Zoilus, who made himself fa­mous by his Criticismes on the Poems of Homer; Nicander the Physician of young Attalus, whose capacity Quin­tilian admires; Eratosthenes, whose Fragments are cited by Plutarch, Athe­naeus, Diogenes Laertius, and Clement of Alexandria; Apollonius of Rhodes, Li­brary-Keeper to Ptolomy Evergetes; Ze­nodotus who flourished under Ptolomy Soter, and some others. The jealousie it self which arose between the Kings of Alexandria and Pergamus, upon the fansie they took of raising Libraries, served only to discredit the Philosophy [Page 23]of Aristotle; for the foolish emulation that these Princes had to make great Collections of Books, made them with­out distinction give considerable re­wards to all who brought them in the Books of Aristotle, as Galen assures us; and upon that account, such was the industry of Booksellers, that forty Vo­lumes of Analyticks bearing the name of Aristotle were collected, though he never composed but four: And that confusion was the cause that the inter­preters of that Philosopher were so puzled about the true distinction of his Books.

IX.

Philosophy was not known at Rome, till Civility had polished it. The three first Ages of that state were spent in the Conquest of Italy. Philosophy was then lookt upon as the Mother of lazi­ness, which became odious in a Re­publick where every one was usefully employed, as appears in a Fragment of Pacuvius. The love of Letters came to Rome by the Commerce which they had with the Grecians. Then it was [Page 24]that the Romans became the Scholars of those whose Masters they were. For the Study of Philosophy was revived again even in Greece, by the persecu­tion of one of the Ptolomy's, who ba­nished from Alexandria the Philoso­phers whom his Predeccssors had call­ed thither: The greatest part of whom returned to Athens, where the con­course of the Learned gave new heat to Studies by a flight of Wits that there signalized their Capacitie: Amongst whom the chief were Panetius the Tu­tor of Lelius and Scipio, Polybius, Car­neades, Clitomachus, Apollonius Molo Preceptor to Julius Caesar and Cicero, who by the noise of their fame drew to Athens the most flourishing Youth of Rome, for the study of Philosophy; and they occasioned even emulation among the Romans, who began to ap­ply themselves thereto with earnest­ness. Lucretius was the first that wrote there of Philosophy, as he himself af­firms. Quintilian makes mention of one Varro of Gallia Narbonensis, that wrote on that subject. Terentius Varro, [Page 25]whom Salust calls the learnedest of the Romans, was a great Philosopher. Vir­gil was also one of the first that was delighted with the study of the works of Nature. But no man in that time exprest so great love for Philosophy as Cicero; for he wrote several Treatises thereon, he explained to Terentius Var­ro the Doctrine of Plato and other Phi­losophers in his Academicks: he wrote of the Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks and Epicureans to Brutus: he made a Discourse to Hortensius to excite him to the love of Philosophy, whereof St. Augustine makes mention. He wrote to Trebatius the Book of Topicks, which is a kind of Logick. In fine, the troubles of the Republick encrea­sing daily, and Tyranny beginning to take rooting there, he retired into the Country, where he applyed himself so strenuously to the study of Philosophy, that in the opinion of Plutarch, he was prouder of being a Philosopher, than an Orator. Brutus likewise in imitation of Cicero wrote some Trea­tises of Philosophy, which are lost: [Page 26]And in this state was Philosophy at that time in Rome.

X.

Furthermore the Romans, who made appear great solidity of wit in what they undertook, adhered to the Philo­sophy of the Grecians, and attempted not the invention of any new one; probably also, because their genius inclined them to Eloquence. How­ever it be no partiality divided their minds into different Opinions: Gravity, which was the Character of their Nation, allowed not the weaknes­ses which spring from dispute and pas­sion. Old Cato who naturally despised every thing that was not truly Roman, could not endure that they should learn any thing from the Grecians: That made him give his vote, that with all possible diligence the three Grecian Phi­losophers, Carneades, Diogenes, and Critolaus, deputed from Greece to the Senate, should be sent back again, for fear that the Roman Wits might be in­fected with their Opinions. And it is to this also, that the Oracle in the sixth [Page 27]Book of the Aeneides has a reference; which says, that the Grecians were to be greater Orators and Philosophers than the Romans:

As if Philosophy had not been altoge­ther worthy of the Majesty of the Em­pire. This also Horace insinuates after his manner, by the biting raillery which he jeers all the Sects with in his Satyrs: And by the Character of Offellus, in whom he represents the mark of a Ro­man Philosopher, by praising in his person that grave, austere, and solid wisdom, which was perfected without any dependence on the Rules and Pre­cepts which the Grecians so much e­steemed.

The Grecians were indeed more polish­ed [Page 28]and formal in all their ways of car­riage than the Romans: but their man­ners were not altogether so pure. This is the Idea that Quintilian formed of both. Cicero who understood the Opi­nions of all the Philosophers, addict­ed not himself to any. Young Cato was a Stoick meerly by Constitution. Caesar was a great Dialectician, eager in the pursuit of the knowledge of Nature, as he is represented by Lucan; but Epicurean as to his Morals, aswell as Pomponius Atticus. Horace was one of the Libertines in Philosophy, who agreed with all Sects, and was of none, That was commonly his Sect which suted best with his Affairs: For he changed and altered them as men change their humour: And so much he professed himself.

XI.

That smack of Philosophy, which common sense and sound judgment that then reigned seasoned Rome with, continued still under Augustus, a Prince of an even and solid wit. He had able Masters, as Suetonius saith; and by [Page 29]his Philosophy he reigned with tran­quillity enough, considering the vio­lent Revolution that the Empire suf­fered at that time. There was hatch­ed at Rome during his Reign a new Sect of Philosophers, whereof Potamon of Alexandria was the Founder. That Phi­losopher picked out all that was ratio­nal in the Doctrine of the other Philo­sophers, that he might compile it in­to a Systeme; and therefore he called his Sect, the Sect of Eclecticks. It had scarcely any followers but amongst the Christians, as Clemens Alexandri­nus assures us. The Tyranny that un­der Tiberius and his Successors, began to domineer even over the minds and sentiments of men, changed the coun­tenance of Philosophy, aswell as of the Government and Affairs. Most part of the persons of Quality became Stoicks, that they might have a Cha­racter of stedfastness against the vio­lences of Tiberius. So that bad for­tune and disgrace made more Philoso­phers, than the School or Closet; and men by being unfortunate became wise. [Page 30] Caligula, Nero, and Domitian banish­ed the Philosophers from Rome: and Nero by a fantastical appetite to Philo­sophy, sent for Magician Philosophers from Arabia, to refine what he had learnt from Seneca. Seneca himself was a better Courtier than Philoso­pher; his Morality was severe, but his Doctrine not very exact, as Quintilian observes. The truth is, Philosophy was in no great esteem in that time, wherein all things went by favour and complaisance; mens care was only how to please and flatter the Empe­rours, and true merit being shut up in secret and in silence stirred not a­broad. Philosophers were not now distinguished by Vertue and Doctrine, but by Habit and Grimaces; which were made use of to impose on the Publick, by disguising their real Con­duct. In fine, men became Philoso­phers by the Beard, when they left off to be so by Manners. As it appears by the accident that some time after hap­pened to Herodes Atticus; A thing like a man wrapped up in a Cloak, with a [Page 31]long Beard, presented it self to him: What ar't, said he? A Philosopher, re­ply'd arrogantly the Fellow. I see, (said Herodes) the Cloak and Beard of a Phi­losopher; but the Philosopher I see not yet.

XII.

The Study of Philosophy, which was grown contemptible under the first Emperours, through intrigue and policy which the Revolution of the State, and the weakness of new Go­vernment produced, began to reflou­rish under the Emperour Adrian, and his Successors, in such a manner, that these Princes themselves were proud of being Philosophers; and were pleased when they were flattered to be com­plemented with that new Title. As it happened to Marcus Aurelius and Com­modus, when Athenagoras and St. Ju­stin, who were deputed by the Grecian Churches, to inform them of the Chri­stian Religion, made their Harangues to them. Trajan who by his wit and inclination was already become favou­rable to Learning; the Natural History [Page 32]of Pliny, which was published in the time of Vespasian, and the Discourses of Dion Chrisostom, who composed Treatises of Moral and Natural Philo­sophy, contributed to the reviving of that Spirit; which Plutarch, one of the wisest and most judicious Philosophers that ever was, inspired into the Em­perour Adrian, whose Preceptor he was, as he had before done to Trajan; and his Works which were at the same time so favourably received of the pub­lick, renewed in men a relish of Phi­losophy: Wherein he was well second­ed by Favorinus, Secretary to the Em­perour, who by his Writings gave his Master jealousie; of whom Diogenes Laertius speaks so often, with an ho­nourable Character. That love of Phi­losophy which Adrian re-established at Alexandria, by the Learned whom he sent thither, continued under his Suc­cessors, by the cares of Epictetus; who having withdrawn from Rome, for the horrour which he conceived of Domi­tian's Reign, returned again in the time of Antonine, to whom he was Pre­ceptor; [Page 33]by the Writings of Arrianus his Scholar, Preceptor to Antoninus Pius; by the Works of Galen, Physi­cian to the Emperours, and the finest Wit of those times; by those of Dio­genes Laertius, Herodes Atticus the Di­sciple of Favorinus, Pausanias, Aulus Gellius, Ptolomy that famous Astrono­mer, Maximus of Tyre, one of the Preceptors of Marcus Aurelius, and of many other Learned men that followed them; as of Taurus of Berytus, Athe­naeus, Alexander Aphrodiseus, Philostra­tus, Plotinus, Apuleius and Porphyrius; who being encouraged by the Exam­ple of Emperours, in these and the fol­lowing Ages, revived the love of Phi­losophy by their learned Works. In fine, it seems that the study of Truth began to be more valuable in a time, when the Oracles themselves began to lye. And Philosophy was so much in fashion in the time of Lucian, that he undertook in several parts of his Works to render Philosophers ridiculous, and chiefly in the Dialogues of the Battel of the Lapithes, the Sycophant —, [Page 34]Icaromenippus, the Cynick and Fugi­tives; the nipping Jests that he puts upon them on all occasions in imitation of Cratinus and Aristophanes, who play upon Pythagoras and Socrates, do suf­ficiently evidence, that the opinion wherein they were held at that time, gave ground to raillery. The truth is, there was so counterfeit an outside in that Profession, and the name of Phi­losopher was so horribly abused, that that Author who set up for the publick Censurer of the Manners of his time, had reason to make it one of the prin­cipal subjects of his Satyr.

XIII.

But that Divine Philosophy which descended from Heaven, by the birth of JESUS CHRIST, being spread abroad in the world by the Doctrine and exemplary life of Christians, Pa­gan Philosophy began to appear to men very frivolous; especially when they came to understand what was that Supreme Good, about which men had for so many Ages disputed in vain: and after that all-coelestial Mora­lity [Page 35]of the Gospel, wherein all the Wis­dom of God appeared to be com­prised, had been published in the world, it filled the minds of the Pagans with jealousie. For S. Paul having been desirous to speak before the Areopage of the Immortality of the Soul, and the resurrection of the Body, as of an indubitable truth, he was treated there with scorn and contempt, by the Philosophers who were then at Athens, who endeavoured to make him pass for a Babler. The spirit of Vani­ty and Pride, which reigned most in the Heathen Philosophy, obliged that A­postle to discredit it, by the advice he gave the Colossians, to take heed lest they should be misled by the vain rea­sonings of Philosophers. Emulation encreased still more in succeeding times: For S. Austin, Clemens Alexandrinus, Tertullian, and Eusebius employed all the force of their Eloquence, and all the ardour of their Zeal, to decry the foolish wisdom of Paganism: As the Heathens on the other hand began to declaim against our Religion, whereof [Page 36] Lucian had the impudence to call the Author a Sophist, and Christians ig­norant People; and Octavian in Mi­nutius Felix reproached them for being wholly destitute of Learning. S. Au­gustine in one of his Works refutes these Calumnies with all the vehe­mence he could. But because at that time the Miracles wrought by Christi­ans did much authorise their Doctrine, the Pagans had their recourse to Ma­gick and Enchantments, to keep up their credit by such wicked Practices, when the usual ways failed them. That abominable fancy to Magick, had be­fore that its beginning in those who made profession of Philosophy, under the first Emperours, by means of Anaxilaus and Nigidius Figulus, both Pythagoreans, whom Augustus banish­ed, and of the Magician Philosophers whom Nero sent for from Arabia. It redoubled under Domitian by the im­postures of Apollonius Thyanaeus, of whom Hierocles composed a Book, comparing his Miracles to the Miracles of JESUS CHRIST; and whose [Page 37]Life Philostratus wrote on the same de­sign; as Eunapius wrote the Lives of the Sophists, who were almost all Ma­gicians, that he might oppose them to the life of Christians; because they gained the admiration of people, by their Vertue and Miracles which they wrought. The fancy to so detestable a Philosophy was encreased by the Do­ctrine of Pythagoras, which was at that time in fashion, and whereof the followers became Necromancers, as appears by the reproach that Lucian casts on them in one of his Dialogues. But nothing gave so great a current to so idle a Philosophy, as the freakishness of the Emperour Julian, who giving his mind to all the horrid absurdities which the extravagance of his curiosi­ty suggested to him, made an execra­ble mixture of what was holy in our Religion with the impieties of Paga­nism, that he might shape to himself an abominable Philosophy. And most part of the Philosophers of that time were Magicians, to please the Empe­rour: Which appeared since in Apu­leius [Page 38]a Platonick Philosopher, who be­ing accused of Magick by the Magi­strates, defended himself no otherwise, than by a pretended connexion, which he alledged, of Philosophy with natural Magick. That abomination, which continued in the study of Philosophy until the time of Boetius, and whereof he purges himself, gave ground to the first beginnings of Cabalistick Philo­sophy and Chymistry, as Delrio as­sures us.

XIV.

By how much the Heathen Philoso­phy fell into extravagancy, by all these excesses; so much that of Christians continued to advance to perfection in the search of Truth, aswell by the pu­rity of its Doctrine, as the integrity of their Manners. It is reported, that Solon travelling in Egypt found there a Philosopher of the Country, who told him with a certain air of Authority, The Grecians, Solon, are but Children. Which happened to be but too true, in regard of the Heathens, when Chri­stian Philosophy began to spread abroad [Page 39]its light into the world: because hu­mane Reason appeared in all its weak­ness, before the beams of that divine brightness of Faith. But they who brought Philosophy in greatest vogue among the Christians, whether by their works, or the publick profession they made thereof, were Aristides, one of the most learned of those that flourish­ed at Alexandria under the Emperour Adrian, Justin Martyr, Tatian, Athe­nagoras, Bardesanes, Athenogenes, Apol­linaris Bishop of Hieropolis, Melito Bi­shop of Sardis, S. Irenaeus whom Ter­tullian calls a man versed in all Sciences; Tertullian himself, who was obliged to study Philosophy to de­fend Religion, which in the minds of the Pagans passed for a Sect of Philo­sophy; Panthenus, who explained the Catechism to Christians in the School of Alexandria; Clement his Scholar, who having, through Greece and Egypt, in vain sought the wisdom of this world, learnt the wisdom of Heaven, in the School of blessed Panthenus; to whose place he succeeded in that fa­mous [Page 40]Chair of the Christian Schools; Origen, who succeeded to Clement, and who, that he might refute the Philoso­pher Celsus, learned all the Opinions that were taught at that time; Lactan­tius, who was ignorant of nothing of all the Sects of Philosophers; Arno­bius, who with so great judgment wrote against the Gentiles; S. Gregory Nazi­anzen, of whom Eusebius speaks with so many Elogies; Ammonius, who was esteemed by the Pagan Philosophers, and who was the first that taught Christians the Philosophy of Aristotle. To these great men, may be added S. Basil, who was the greatest Dialecti­cian of his time, in the opinion of Gre­gory Thaumaturgus; S. Chrysostom, who became as great a Philosopher as he was an Orator; S. Augustine, who, be­sides the three Books he wrote against the Platonicks, made a Treatise of Dia­lectick, which is to be found in the first Volume of his Works. I could name a great many more, who adorn­ed that time with the lustre of their knowledge, authorising the Religion [Page 41]which they preached by the purity of their lives; and making the dryest Thorns of Philosophy fructifie by the sacred streams of their Doctrine.

XV.

From this Sun-shine of Philosophy which at that time appeared, by the emulation of the Christians and Pa­gans, men fell since into a gross air of barbarity and ignorance, which can­not be sufficiently lamented. It was in those wretched times, when the Huns, Vandals, Goths, and Longobards broke in upon Italy. That disorder began by the burning of the Biblio­theck of the Emperours, which hap­pened at Constantinople, under the Em­pire of Zeno; wherein Philosophy and the other Sciences were much concern­ed, by the loss of more than sixscore thousand Volumes. The Arabians ha­ving rendred themselves Masters of the world, by their Conquests in the fol­lowing Ages, made a kind of revolu­tion in Learning aswell as in the Em­pire. The nature of their genius, which was subtil, plodding, and profound, [Page 42]and tied them too literally to the Text of Aristotle, made them follow a kind of abstract reasoning, which did somewhat deviate from the solidity of the Greeks and Latines; and though there ap­peared much subtilty in that way, yet it must be acknowledged, that that new strain of Reason seemed false, by the mistakes whereinto Avicenna, Al­kindus, Algazel, Averroes, Alpharabius, Albohasen, and some others fell, of whom Possevin in the third Book of his Bibliotheck relates the Errours to an enormous number. Ludovicus Vives speaking of the Metaphysicks of Avi­cenna, and the Philosophy of Aver­roes, pretends that both look like the raveries of a wandring imagination, and the Visions of the Alcoran. And Thomas Aquinas in one of his Opuscles says, that Averroes was not so much a follower of Aristotle, which he pro­fesses, as a corrupter of his Doctrine. But besides that, under the Arabians Philosophy became nice and full of quirks, by these precisions and ab­stracted Notions which it introduced [Page 43]into the Schools: It became also whol­ly barbarous in its expressions; Rea­son, if I may so say, having unlearned to shew it self under rational terms. It must be granted however, that the Arabians, by the quality of their geni­us, and through the leisure which the prosperity of their Arms and Plenty afforded them, did so apply themselves to the study of the Mathematicks and Philosophy, that they became in that time the learnedest men in the world. And Averroes by the depth of his plodding genius, and the study of A­ristotle, deserved to be called his Com­mentator, and founded a Sect of Phi­losophers under his own name; who opposed themselves to Aphrodiseus, Philoponus, and the rest of the Greci­ans. Nevertheless as Averroes under­stood not Aristotle but by a Translation not very exact, he fell himself into so horrible perversions of his sense, that Bagolinus a Philosopher of Verona, Zi­mara, and Mantinus in vain assayed to correct him. For Vives sayes, that he read only a base Latin Translation of [Page 44]the Text of Aristotle, whereof he made another into Arabick still worse. The truth is, that besides the unfaithful Co­pies, which the Arabians had of Aristo­tle's Text, as Vives and Possevin assures us; it is thought, that the Genius of the Arabian Language is so different from the Greek Tongue, that the one can hardly exhaust the sense of the other, to make a Faithful Translation: for with some proportion it may be said of all the rest of the Arabians, what Caelius Rhodiginus sayes of Avicenna, Avicenna linguae graecae ignarus cum li­bros Aristotelis mutilos perversos{que} lege­ret, autorem eminentissimum minus con­sequi potuit. Picus Mirandula sayes, that Averroes stuck to the study of A­ristotle, and Avicenna to Plato, which ocasioned the Opposition of Opini­ons that are to be found betwixt them. After all, they were both great Men, and of extraordinary esteem amongst the Learned.

XVI.

The School-men, who all addicted themselves to the Doctrine of Aristotle, [Page 45]and formed their minds by the study of the Arabiaus, from whom they took that subtile and nice Spirit, which since slipt into the Schools, made the last Sect of Philosophers, which hath been in any reputation. Thomas A­quinas is pretended to have been the founder of that Sect, for having read Aristotle in a Translation of Averroes made by a Spaniard, he took from it the Method, which Lanfranc Arch­bishop of Canterbury, Gilbert Porre­tain Bishop of Poictiers, Abelard, and Peter Lombard, had already rough­hewn upon the Idea that Damascenus had framed thereof: and whereof Peter Comestor composed the first Ele­ments, for they were great Dialectici­ans. Danaeus in his Prolegomena upon the first of the Sentences, hath written the beginnings of the Scholastick Phi­losophy, which may be said to have had three different periods, as is report­ed of the School of Plato; the an­cient, the middle and the new Scho­lastick. The first, which had it's be­ginning under the Archbishop of Can­terbury, [Page 46]or to say better, under Pet [...] Lombard, lasted almost two hundre [...] years, and ended under Albertus Mag [...] nus. Lombard soiled much the purity [...] Theology, by many unprofitable que­stions, wherewith he perplexed it Alexander Alesius was the most consi­derable of these first School-men. Th [...] second began with Albertus Magnus Bishop of Ratisbonne, the vastest Geni [...] of these Ages, in the Judgment o [...] Trithemus, and continued until Du­randus: and during that space of a­bout an hundred years, the Doctrine of Aristotle was raised to the highest pitch of its reputation, by the vogue that Thomas Aquinas and John Duns a Scotish-man gave it. These were the two Spirits of greatest capacity for Phi­losophy in these last Ages. No Man ever reasonned with more justness and exactness than Thomas Aquinas: Soli­dity was his chief character, as sub­tility that of Scotus. They both made themselves so famous by their learning, that they became the heads of two the most celebrated Sects that ever were; [Page 47]and had it not been for the misery of their times, wherein barbarity reigned, they would have been comparable to the greatest Philosophers of Antiqui­ty. The third Age of School-Philoso­phy began with Durandus, who to get reputation, did rise against Thomas A­quinas, but with little success, and lasted till Gabriel Biel a German, the compiler of other Philosophers, who expressed ill, what he conceived indiffe­rently well; for there is a dulness in his expression, that renders him dry and harsh. Then did the Wits subti­lize more and more by an emulation of being Nominalists or Realists. Ocham was the chief of the Nominalists, who taught that Beings Universal were but words, and Scotus leader of the Rea­lists, who taught that the same Uni­versal beings were real things. And as that age was infected with that naughty air which corrupted the Schools; so the animosity of these two Sects hurried mens minds into such ex­tremities, as cannot be paralell'd in an­tiquity; for in Germany they waged [Page 48]such War together, as broke some­times out into extravagancy an [...] rage. It was no more disputing in th [...] Universities, but downright fighting and opinions were only defended by violence. Then it was that Philo­sophy was wholly taken up about th [...] operations of the mind, conceptions and precisions: the wits drained thei [...] reasons with frivolous questions: Me [...] fell into heats for bare and pure forma­lities, raised to themselves Phantasms, and Disputations; Reason became li­tigious and trickish to maintain it self, and truth was almost nothing else but the price of the dispute. This was called Wit, but was it so? In this me­thod were composed heaps of idle Books and Opinions, which stifled all that remained of a good relish for Let­ters. Nevertheless, that Scholastick Air, how dry soever it was, appeared most solid and proper to overthrow falshood: error and imposture could not endure its splendour; and the sharpness, animositie, and passion, which was then to be found in disputes, [Page 49]was not so much the fault of the Schools, as of those that abused them.

XVII.

There were notwithstanding in these Ages three Philosophers, who by a spirit of novelty took their flight out of the Schools, and devised a method quite different from what was in use: these were Reymund Lully, Cardan, and Paracelsus, who with very different Notions were all three of a Character not much different. Reymund Lully by the commerce which he entertained with the Arabians, became very skil­ful in Medicine, Natural Philosophy and Astronomy: And of these three Sciences he made a fourth, the Art of Chymistry, whereof in Spain and Italy he was the Restorer. He endeavoured to overturn the order established in the Schools, by reducing Philosophy and other Sciences to a method, that has nothing of solidity, and which is so far from making men learned, that it could never make one reasonable. Car­dan is a vast and irregular head that offers at all without distinction; and [Page 50]fixes on nothing: What he says him­self of his familiar spirit, which he be­lieves to be made up of Saturn and Mercury is so foolish, that one cannot read him in cold blood without laugh­ter: And what he adds elsewhere, that that spirit did not communicate it self to him but in dreams, is still more ex­travagant. It is he who hath in these last Ages revived all that secret Philo­sophy of the Cabal and Cabalists which fills the world with spirits, to which he pretends that men may be­come like, purifying themselves by Philosophy. But Paracelsus who had the air more of an Operator than Phi­losopher, is the most extravagant of all: For he fancied to himself to make a new Philosophy, a new art of Medi­cine, and a new Religion; of his own head making himself, by a ridiculous neutrality, the Mediator between the Pope and Luther, that he might bring them both to his Maxims. Gohory was his first Follower in France, a very su­perficial Naturalist, but a great Distil­ler. Paracelsus had a deep wit, a dull [Page 51]and obscure expression; all his words were Riddles, and his discourses Myste­ries. Rullandus a German Physician made a Dictionary of his terms, with which one cannot yet understand him. Paracelsus re-established Chymistry in Germany: The Emperour Charles the Fifth heard him; but upon the propo­sition that he made to enrich him by Chymistry, called him an Enthusiast. To these three Philosophers may be ad­ded Cornelius Agrippa, Arnoldus de villa nova, Peter of Apono, Bacon, and some other Cabalists, of whom Agrip­pa himself speaks in his Epistle to the Abbot Trithemius. But all that Philo­sophy can serve for no other end, but to lead men into extravagancy and il­lusion; because it seems to disguise un­der the veil of Natural Knowledge, what is most black and horrid in Ma­gick. About that time Reuchlin en­deavoured to revive in Germany the Philosophy of Pythagoras, as Marcil­ius Ficinus had in Italy re-established the Doctrine of Plato. These were the Distempers of those Ages: Of [Page 52]which the different tasts for Philoso­phy, the diversity of sentiments, and the instability of spirits that is to be seen at that time, shews sufficiently the weakness.

XVIII.

In fine, seeing the love of Learning, and especially of Philosophy, became confined to Europe, the different Nati­ons thereof applyed themselves vari­ously to it, according to the diversity of their genius's and inclinations. The Spaniards according to the Character of their Wits, cut out for Dialectick and Reflexions, became subtle in their Reasonings, Formalists and Metaphy­sicians. The Italians took a more a­greeable air, they grew for most part curious in lovely Ideas; the Works of Triphus one of the learned of the last Ages, inspired into them love for the Philosophy of Aristotle; and the Books of Cardinal Bessarion and Marcilius Fi­cinus gave them an inclination for the Philosophy of Plato, to which they accommodated themselves better than other Nations, by the quality of their [Page 53]fine genius, naturally quick but lazie. The French, who found themselves ca­pable of all Sciences, embraced all; and by that Character of Capacity and Curiosity, copied what they found good amongst other Nations, and suc­ceeded in every thing. The English, by that depth of Wit which is com­mon to their Nation, loved the Me­thods that were profound, abstruse, and far-sought; and by a head-strong application to labour, set themselves to the observation of Nature more than other Nations: as appears by the Works which they have published. The Germans, by the necessity which the Climat imposed upon them to keep themselves by the fire, and by the conveniency of their Stoves, addicted themselves to Chymistry; as did other Northern people: So that the Southern Countries contributed to make Philo­sophy profound and subtle, and the Northern to render it labourious and mechanical. And of all the modern Philosophers, those that have made greatest noise, are Galilaeus an Italian, [Page 54]Bacon, Hobbes, and Boile English, Gas­sendus and Descartes French, and Van­helmont Dutch-man. Galileus seems to be the most ingenious of all; and he I think may be called the Father of Modern Philosophy. His Method re­sembles much that of the Platonists, his Stile is pleasant; and by his man­ner of Writing he conceals many de­fects: though he hath copied many things from the Primitive Philosophers, yet all seems to be his own, and he is taken for the original in several places, where he is but the transcriber. Bacon has a ranging wit which dives not deep into any thing; his too great reach hinders him from being exact, the most part of his sentiments are ra­ther Overtures for meditation, than Maxims to be followed: His Opinions are somewhat subtile and sparkling; and if they be rightly considered, they resemble more sparks of fire, than an entire and natural light. Hobbes is ob­scure without delight, singular in his Notions, learned, but not very solid, and inconstant in his Doctrine; for [Page 55]he is sometimes Epicurean, sometimes Peripatetick. Boile is exact in his Ob­servations; no man in Europe hath en­riched Philosophy with so many Expe­riments as he; he reasons upon his Ex­periments with indifferent good con­sequence, which after all are not al­ways unquestionable; because his prin­ciples are not always certain: he is in a word, an able Philosopher and great Naturalist. Gassendus, who desired on­ly to pass for the Restorer of the Phi­losophy of Democritus and Epicurus, speaks little of his own head; there is nothing almost in him but the beauty of stile, that may give him the credit of an admirable Author: To refute his Natural Philosophy there needs no more but the Arguments of Aristotle against Democritus and his Disciples. Descartes is one of the most extraordi­nary genius's that hath appeared in these last times; one of a fertile wit and profound meditation: the conca­tenation of his Doctrine reaches his point, the order of it is well devised according to his principles; and his [Page 56]Systeme, though made up of the an­cient and modern, is well digested. The truth is, he teaches men too much to doubt, and that is no good model for spirits naturally incredulous: but in fine, he is more original than o­thers. Vanhelmont, through the know­ledge which he had of Nature after hi [...] way, performed such prodigious things by his Remedies, that he was put in­to the Inquisition, upon suspicion that what he did was above the power o [...] Nature. In a word, Galileus is the most agreeable of the Moderns, Bacon the most subtle, Gassendus the most learned, Hobbes the most plodding and thoughtful, Boile the most curious, Descartes the most ingenious, and Van­helmont the greatest Naturalist, but too much wedded to Paracelsus. The most universal method of his Philo­sophy, is the sympathy and antipathy of Simples and mixt Bodies, which he well understood.

XIX.

Upon the retail of all these notions of Ancient and Modern Philosophy, and [Page 57]upon the different character of both, this comparison may be made. The Ancient Philosophy is more founded on authority, and the Modern on expe­rience; the Ancient is simple and na­tural, the Modern artificial and elabo­rate; the former is more modest and grave, the latter more imperious and pedantick. The ancient is peaceable and calm; for it was so far from dis­puting, that it would have the minds of Youth prepared by the Mathema­ticks, that they might be accustomed to submit to demonstration without hesitation: the modern is of a strain of disputing of every thing, and of train­ing up Youth to noise and the tumult of the School. The Ancient inquires only into truth out of a sincere desire to find it: the Modern takes pleasure to dispute it, even when it is discover­ed. The one advances more securely in its method, because it hath alwayes the Metaphysicks for a guide: the o­ther is unsure in its steps when it is once deprived of that conduct. Con­stancy, Fidelity, sound Judgment, and [Page 58]Stedfastness, was that which men called Philosophy in the dayes of Plato. And the dislike of business, peevishness, the renouncing of pleasures when the use of them is lost through the extinction of passions, I know not what Autho­rity that is derived from the Gray­beard, counterfeit audacity, phleg­matick sullenness, moderation, and all that Wisdom which springs from the weakness of Age and Constitution, is the Philosophy of a great many now-a-dayes. The Ancient is universally more learned, it aims at all: and the Modern confines it self to the sole con­sideration of nature, resting satisfied to be a mere Naturalist. In fine, the Ancient is more addicted to study, more laborious and indefatigable in what it undertakes; for the Primitive Philosophers spent their lives in study: the Modern is less constant in its ap­plication, more superficial in its pains, and more precipitate in its studies. And this precipitation accustomes it by little and little to ground too easily, reason­ings not very exact, upon uncertain [Page 59]rumours, testimonies of little credit, and upon experiments not well agreed upon. It pronounces boldly upon doubts and uncertainties, to satisfie in some manner the eagerness that it some­times hath to vent its imaginations, and to give vogue to novelties: so that to make a decision between both, I am of the Opinion of that intelligent Philosopher of these last Ages, who all things being well considered was of the mind to stick to the Ancients, and leave the Moderns to themselves: for the plain common sense of the Primi­tive Philosophers, is preferable to all the art and quaintness of the new. But let us conclude without prejudice, that as from what Cloud soever the day breaks out, it should be accounted pleasant; so from what part soever truth comes, it ought to be esteemed. Let us no more distinguish ancient rea­son from new, because on what side soever we behold it, and what colour soever we give it, it is alwayes the same. And let us make this reflexion, that if there be some Opinions better received [Page 60]by the publick than others, it is b [...] sometimes because their Cabals hav [...] been more powerful, or their Stars mor [...] favourable.

XX.

There are therefore two extremities to be avoided, in the course that is to to be held between the Ancient and Modern Philosophers. The first is o [...] those who out of a good Opinion which they have of themselves, find nothing comparable to their own Age: the Zeal which they have to free themselves from the Tyranny, which the Authority of the Ancients have u­surped over mens minds, is a false Zeal: that is the way to impose new Laws on Reason, under pretext of giv­ing it liberty. And all these fair pre­cepts which men give us to shake off the prejudices of Education, Custome, Authority, and to cure our selves of po­pular anticipations, are but Snares laid for our credulity: they speak to us only of liberty, to impose upon us a new Yoke. It is only to give to the Moderns, what Men would take [Page 61]from the Ancients; and to destroy the credit of Aristotle to set up the reputa­tion of Descartes: but is it just to de­spise those whom all antiquity have re­spected? Tradition alone and the U­niversal Consent of all people, might oblige us to do Justice to those great Men, who have been the Founders of Sciences; for the World is a great As­sembly, wherein every Age has its Vote; and to know who is preferable in the Judgment we pass on men, we must look on those who have deser­ved from the Publick the most Univer­versal Approbation. None but super­ficial minds can be pleased with Novel­ties. He that is solidly wise, is not surprised at the lustre of Noveltie; he adheres only to what is established by the suffrage of the Ancients, as the Prophet hath it. Is it possible that so many Ages, so many Great-Wits, so much Application, and so many Works, have been able to produce no­thing that is tolerable, saith Cicero? So that if we compare our selves with the great men of the first Ages, let us [Page 62]not decide rashly in our own favour we are partial Judges, it is the part posterity to give their verdict there [...] Let us but cast our eyes on the ag [...] past, and that will teach us modest These great Men, besides the extraor [...] ­nary genius they had for Sciences, spe [...] their lives in continual pains, with [...] docility of Spirit without exampl [...] Pythagoras was a Schollar fifty yea [...] under the greatest Masters of the world Eusebius sayes that Democritus studie [...] fourscore years. Parmenides hid him­self eighteen years in a Cave, there t [...] meditate on Logick. Plato was th [...] Disciple of Socrates, Archytas and Eurytus, above forty years. Aristotle studied under Plato more than twenty years. And shall we, forsooth, after two years slight study, under very ordinary Masters, pretend to compare with these great men!

XXI.

The other extremity to be avoided is the pertinacious adhering to the An­tients sometimes without Reason: Men make an Idol of their Authority by a [Page 63]blind prejudicated perswasion of their merit. Such was the head-strongness of george of Trabisond, who made a Book to prove the conformity of A­ristotle with the holy Scriptures: and of Marcilius Ficinus who pretends that Plato knew the mystery of the Trinity. For which Medina a Spanish Divine condemns him of boldness in­jurious to the purity of our Religion, which contains nothing but what is su­pernatural. Hermolaus Barbarus was yet more whimsical in his cleaving to the Doctrine of Aristotle: that learned man by an horrible Catastrophe of his Wits raised the Devil, that he might learn the true sense of Aristotle, about a Term which that Philosopher used, and whereof the signification seemed to him ambiguous. But the most fan­tastical of all, was the Emperour Ju­lian; who, as Ammianus Marcellinus saith, debased the Grandeur of his Vertues, by playing the Philosopher: he was chaste, sober, just and vigi­lant; but by a ridiculous devotion to the Authority of the Ancient Philoso­phers, [Page 64]he preferred the Doctrine of Plato to that which St. Paul taught the Athenians; and by a fearful rambling, he gave himself over to all the curiosi­ties of an unsettled mind. The haugh­ty wisdom of Paganism hindred him from submitting his reason to the wise follie of the Mistery of the Cross, which appeared to be beneath that Philosophy wherein he gloried: and because he made that Philosophy his Religion, so soon as he was Master of his Opinions, by becoming Master of the World, he renounced the Doctrine of JESUS CHRIST, that he might embrace that of Pythagoras and Socrates, whereby he laboured to gain an extra­vagant reputation among the Philoso­phers of his time; and by an abomina­ble vanity, would acknowledge no Gods, but such as owed their Divini­ty to his grant: so much was his mind debauched by his stubborn adherence to the Ancients. There is therefore a mean to be observed between the An­cients and Moderns; these are to be respected without vilifying of those. [Page 65]So let us endeavour to discover new Truths, and not neglect the Ancient. Let us not overthrow things establish­ed, to establish things that are uncer­tain: let us preserve our liberty, and let us not lose the use of our reason, by a blind adoration of the sentiments either of the Ancients or Moderns: let us do Justice to both; and let us value merit wherever it be, without minding whether it be old or new.

XXII.

But though a man may have his mind sufficiently armed against the prejudices which arise from the Au­thority of the Ancients, and the incli­nation which he may have to the Mo­dern, yet hath he hardly ever the pow­er to strip himself wholly of the natu­ral love which he hath for his own o­pinions. That is one of the great in­firmities of the mind of man; because self-love believes nothing to be so much its own as its Opinion: men look upon that as a Creature of their own, and renounce all other interests to maintain this. Men are even some­times [Page 66]so opinionative and obstinate in defending their own conceits, that they run upon strange extremities. The Disciples of Plato gave themselves to be burnt for the Doctrine of their Ma­ster; and the Followers of Hegesias suf­fered themselves to dye of hunger, by sticking too closely to the Maxims of their School. Socrates, for all his wis­dom, in cold blood gave his life to preserve his Opinion. And even in these last Ages there have been men so foolish, as to become the Martyrs of their Doctrine: For Errour hath its Votaries, stricter than those that Truth it self hath. Men have even some­times a secret vanity to authorise by their suffrage, what is not warranted by Reason; and blindly embrace Prin­ciples which they understand not, and whereof they are only fond, because they are hard to be understood. These are the most common illusions of self-love, which how ridiculous soever it be in its other passions, yet is never so much, as in its obstinacy to maintain its Notions. And as nothing is more [Page 67]unreasonable than what it wills; so nothing is less maintainable than what it thinks. But the worst of extrava­gancies is, to be obdured against the torrent of publickly-received Opini­ons; and to admit of no other senti­ments upon the subjects that are in hand, but a mans own private opinion: such men take pity to see others contra­ry to themselves in judgment, because they abound so much in their own sense, that they ackowledge no other: this is the Character of stinted minds. For in fine, the more merit there is stedfastly to maintain true Reason, when once it is known; the more there is of Vertue to forsake the wrong, when men are perswaded of its fals­hood. That is a magnanimous inge­nuity, saith Aristotle: And it is a great­ness of Soul to retain its full liberty, by maintaining of truth and renoun­cing falshood, according to the diffe­rent views that one hath of both. Thus did Hippocrates acknowledge that he had been by false Principles sometime mistaken in his Reasonings. So great [Page 68]modesty could not proceed but from a great capacity: and it is always a mark of judgment, to doubt of its own suf­ficiency.

XXIII.

It is great knowledge to judge of things, according to the different degrees of certainty that they may have, to clear the truth of appearan­ces; to take that for Opinion, which is only but Opinion, and so to distin­guish Judgments as one may give sound Judgment of every thing. For the disorders which slip into the mind, by the various sentiments that pass in publick, spring from this confusion of discerning. For example, Copernicus shuts himself up in his Closet, that he may frame a new Systeme of the World: he revives the Opinion of that Nicetas of Syracusa, who taught that there was nothing in nature at rest, but the Sun. He beats his brains to frame a new Opinion according to his fancy, and there is nothing better de­vised than that Hypothesis: however, would it be reasonable to make the O­pinion [Page 69]of that great man pass for a de­monstration? and without consulting the Universal consent of so many Ages, who have gone before us, and who are of a contrary Opinion. Would it be just to oblige all the World to be go­verned according to the imagination of Copernicus, and to make a private mans sentiment a Law to all the rest of man­kind? Descartes erects a new natural Philosophy, upon principles that are not altogether new. He calls his own Systeme himself a Chimera; for in that manner he discoursed with his con­fidents, naming his Philosophy a Ro­mance: and men would have me es­pouse the Opinions, that he laughs at; is that reasonable? I confess, I admire his Ideas, but am not so submissive as to think them unquestionable: and so I return to my principle, which ought to be the rule of all the reasonings in Philosophy, that one must be frugal of his belief, that he may employ it, ac­cording to the different degrees of cer­tainty which he finds in the matters he examines; to the end that he may take nothing for a truth but what is true, [Page 70]and think that only probable which is probable. In that consists all the pru­dence of the Wise-man, saith Epicurus in Cicero: and it is a bad Character to act in an other manner; for things are often otherwayes than they appear, by the Opinion and Notion that men frame of them.

XXIV.

They are but false measures and de­ceitful notices, that make men deviate from the common ways of Philosophy, to search out extraordinary paths: and it is always a sign of a depraved taste in Sciences not to love what is com­monly received by all the World: one is subject to wander, when he follows by-ways. It is even convenient in the conduct of life, to adhere only to com­mon Opinions: otherways a man ex­poses himself to great absurdities. A­lexander for all his valour, having fail­ed in this principle, became worthy of contempt: He wept, says Plutarch, because following the Opinion of De­mocritus, who made many Worlds, he had not as yet conquered the half of [Page 71]one. That greatness of soul which he makes appear by so noble a sentiment becomes ridiculous, saith Elianus; for it is grounded on a false Foundation. So would a Magistrate, whose Life ought to serve as a Model in a well-or­ordered State, be of little Judgment in the mind of Cicero, if in his conduct he followed the Opinion of Epicurus: and if instead of being severe, he made appear easiness in his sentiments; for all the Counsels of a publick person ought to be austere, to hold every one to his duty. To what purpose is it to prescribe rules to others to live in or­der, if he himself be irregular? If we did follow, sayes that Orator, in our O­rations these singular Opinions of the Stoicks, who eye Glory and Ignominy after another manner than other people doe; because they are not affected with either of the two: and if we would pro­pose to the publick the opinion which the Porch teacheth of Vertue and Vice, Good and Evil, no body would listen to us. And there is nothing more absurd, than the way that Cicero brings in Tor­quatus [Page 72]speaking in the Senate, upon the principles of Epicurus, whose Do­ctrine he followed. There is in that di­scourse some quaint and delicate touch­es of Raillery: that Orator seems de­lighted to declame against all other Phi­losophies, but that which was in use, judging nothing more opposite than that to true eloquence. It was that likewise which hindred Demosthenes from embrace any Party, amidst the ma­ny Sects which in his time sprung up at Athens; that he might not wander from the usual sentiments and common ways, which are fittest to perswade. And for all that Julius Caesar was so ambitious to be a great Philosopher, yet he made it his only business to be­come popular, that he might the bet­ter gain upon the minds of the people. In fine, what-ever men say, one can hardly retain the Character of a wise­man, in deviating from the common opinions, nor of a publick spirit by embracing private sentiments. And to extend this to all Professions, how should a Poet be laughed at, who, fol­lowing the opinion of Copernicus, [Page 73]would make the Earth turn round the Sun: or who, according to the System of Descartes, should never speak of Stars or Constellations, without speaking of whirlings and of subtile matter? how ridiculous should one be, what wit so­ever he might have, with so dainty principles!

XXV.

Nevertheless there is nothing now­adays more in use with Philosophers, and nothing bears greater rule than that kind of humour: For men seek only to set off their parts by new and extraordinary sentiments, and leave the way of common sense because it is too much beaten. When one has got a more working brain than others, he falls on a fansie of speaking that which other men never said. This whimsi­calness, as Cicero says, made Arcesilas be taken for a seditious person, who overthrew the old Academy, to erect a new one. And Ramus, by that humour in these last Ages, was like to have de­stroyed the University of Paris: For, that he might confute the false Peripa­teticks, [Page 75]he attacked the true; and to restore the Schools to peace, he be­came their disturber: He was a learn­ed man, bold to decide; but natural­ly troublesome: he only imitated Lau­rentius Valla and Ludovicus Vives, two great Criticks in the former Age, that he might set up for an Innovator. In fine, men often dispute thus, only that by a fansie of innovation they may o­verthrow what is best established. When men have not the power to make new Opinions, they find a way to give a new garb to the ancient; and that they may pass for Authors at any rate, begin the change of senti­ments by the change of language: Men give new names, as Zeno did heretofore, to Opinions which are not new: and what do they not to speak in a different strain from others, and to gain reputation at any rate whatso­ever? But seeing the libertinage of sen­timents proceeds from the licentious­ness of manners, the mind stands in need of barriers to keep it within bounds. Religion, Laws, Custom, [Page 74]Education, Punishments and Rewards, ought to serve it for a Bridle when it begins to ramble; yet sometimes it re­volts against all these: and when it hath once cast off the yoke, and runs out beyond the common Opinions, there is no kind of extravagancy that comes amiss to it. This makes Laws necessary: For Civil Authority ought to have a hand in regulating the senti­ments of men whose minds are natu­rally extravagant.

XXVI.

There are some minds naturally free in their sentiments, and others born slaves: The one sway the others by an ascendant of birth, and the others suf­fer themselves to be governed through a weakness of wit; they are so depen­dent through the quality of their ge­nius, that they are only fit to receive the impressions that are given them, and to follow the motions that others inspire into them. From this defect and weakness have sprung the different Sects of Philosophers: For as there are some so bold as to raise themselves a­bove [Page 76]others, there are likewise ma [...] so timorous and dependent, as to su [...] |mit to them, and to entertain no op [...] |nion nor sentiment, but with a depe [...] |dance on their Masters. There are a [...] so some minds so light and credulou [...] and who so freely resign themselves that the raveries of other men guid [...] their reason and conduct: the spirit [...] bondage extends it self even to the [...] hearts and thoughts, because they ar [...] too weak to retain the liberty of chus­ing sentiments of their own. But what is more strange, there are some­times obscure and sullen spirits, whose notions are naturally perplexed and confused, and yet are listened to like Oracles; and who gain a kind of Em­pire over mens minds, and no body can tell wherefore; unless it be that they are bolder and more positive in their decisions than others: and such blades procure authority only by pre­sumption and boldness. This was the way that Paracelsus got into vogue in the last Age: his affected obscurity made him considerable: his credit was [Page 77]built particularly on this, that he spake not like other men, and that no body understood him: his confidence in playing the Master without Reason, won him disciples, and by that means his Doctrine received a mysterious air, which raised him Followers. It is partly by that way also that Descartes has got reputation: the entangled an­swers which he makes to the difficul­ties that he forms to himself, are al­ways new difficulties which busie the Reader: men take pleasure to see them­selves led from obscurity to obscurity, without knowing whither they are go­ing. Yet that Author does please by that art, because it is thereby that he seems oraculous. His Interpreter that endeavoured to render him more intelligible, by a new explication of his Natural Philosophy which he publish­ed lately, hath robbed it of part of its beauty, by putting it in a plainer dress. Nothing seems to give so great satis­faction in that admirable piece, as the trouble there is to understand it. That obscure stile has somewhat more my­sterious: [Page 78]the quality of being inco [...] prehensible is a great charm to his D [...] |sciples, who admire him more for that than for any thing besides. And tha [...] obscurity is an art which some me [...] employ, and wherewith our blockis [...] |ness is satisfied.

XXVII.

Subtile and quick wits are not al­ways fittest for Philosophy. It were better to condense the imagination by something that is gross, than to suffer it to evaporate in too quaint speculati­ons. The plain common sense of So­crates triumphed over all the arts and quirks of the Sophists. Philosophy be­comes only abstracted, when it leaves off to be solid: men addict themselves to formalities, when they have nothing that is real to say; and never think of betaking themselves to subtilty, but when they are out of hopes to make Reason prevail by simplicity. That same Protagoras who was the first that devised captious Reasonings, took that subtle way, because his mind was stuf­fed with nothing but false Notions. [Page 79]He was no true Philosopher, sayes Aulus Gellius, because having rendered himself redoubtable by his arguments he became the greatest jangler of the Sophists. All was spoilt, saith Seneca, by striving too much to refine every thing. For to make a vain ostentation of wit men left the essential part of Sciences, began to weaken the truth of things by the artifice of words, and made use of Sophisms when they wanted solid reasons. By this new art Nausiphanes and Parmenides turned all things topsie turvie. By this, Cle­antes, Chrysippus, and the rest of the Stoicks made their wise King an Effigy, whom they furnished with Titles of Nobility and Treasures, that consisted only in fair words and magnificent ex­pressions, as Cicero pleasantly upbraides them. So the Simplicity of reason was corrupted by the artifice of dis­course: and men played with truth in­stead of using it with respect. This was the fault of the Spaniards of the last age: they did with Philosophy, as with policy, by the quality of their [Page 80]Spirits born to reflexions, they drew them both out into unconceivable sub­tilities; and there was not any Scho­lar who did not refine his Master. From whence happened a disorder like to that whereof Seneca complained heretofore: disputation became all the fruit of Philosophy, and it was more made use of to try the wit than to cure the mind. Let us be satisfied with the common wisdom that is in use, and with the reason that we find in the Commerce of the World, with­out keeping such a stir and making so much ado: one runs a hazard of turn­ing Fool, when he would be otherwise; and there is nothing more unprofitable in the common conduct of life, than those two exquisite Opinions which are made use of to subtilize in Scien­ces.

XXVIII.

Philosophy taken the wrong way hath spoiled a great many men, and that study of wisdom ill understood hath made a good many fools. Empe­docles had a lofty and high genius; [Page 81] Lucretius compares him to the greatest of the Ancients; but the vapours of Melancholy meeting with an over­strained Application, and a too head­strong study, so sullied his imagination and altered his brain, that he became mad; and in the fit of his rage threw himself into Mount Aetna, where he was devoured by flames. Horace pre­tends that he endeavoured to render himself immortal by such a fair piece of boldness. Henry Cornelius Agrippa in these last Ages so weakened his Spi­rit by reading of Plato, and by the Doctrine of the Platonists, that he fell into extravagancy, as he himself con­fesses. Peter D'Apono a Physician of Padua, who flourished under Clement the Seventh, so marred his imaginati­on by reading of the Arabian Philoso­phers, and by too frequent meditation on the Astrology of Alfraganus, that he was put into the Inquisition, as having been suspected of Magick. Pom­ponatius and Cremoninus, the one Pro­fessor of Philosophy at Padua, and the other at Bolonia, became impious by [Page 82]too immoderate study of Philosophy, and left to posterity the marks of their Extravagancy. They were Philoso­phers who did injury to reason, by by making so bad an use of it. It may be said also, that Libertinage was the most usual effect which Philosophy produced in most part of the Wits of that Age, and which rendred it odious. For by the wicked use that men made of it, they spoiled their Judgment, endeavouring to improve their reason. But to be short, if the most regular wis­dom of man is subject to straying, what is to be expected from the false glimpses of an inordinate Philosophy, joyned to the weakness and extravagances of a brain-sick head?

XXIX.

It is no small progress in Philosophy, to have learnt how much obscurity and uncertainty is mingled with our exact­est knowledge, and to be satisfied to be ignorant of that which cannot be known. That is it which makes the knowing man speak with trembling; his great capacity makes him the more [Page 83]timorous, because the light of his un­derstanding discovers to him more of the darkness of his mind: the greater his penetration is, the more it lets him see his own weakness, and obliges him to distrust his strength. That made Aristotle say, that old men are more jealous and incredulous than others; because the experience which they have of the uncertainty of things, ren­ders them more cautious and circum­spect. Socrates could not conceive why the Oracle had called him the wisest of men: he examined himself, and found nothing worthy of that elogy; unless perhaps that he was wise, because he did not believe him­self to be so: his knowledge served to make him the better understand his ignorance, which he frankly confes­sed. Epicurus was naturally wise, for he was a Philosopher even in his pleasures: He was so sharp-sighted, that his Brother Niocles says, in Plu­tarch, that Nature had assembled all the Atoms of knowledge and wisdom, to compose his person; whilst he him­self [Page 84]says that he knows nothing. His Friends stun him with acclamations and praises, and he minds them not. But besides that modesty which is the vertue of great men, there is a sage and discreet ignorance, that in the con­duct of life can doubt of things, whereof no certainty can be had, and is willing not to know such things, whereof no knowledge is to be attain­ed, unless men would dive into that which is inscrutable. For Nature ha­ving reserved to her self some certain secrets that are above our reach, it is great wisdom to shut our eyes, and not to pry into such Mysteries. There is no truth but may appear false, nor falshood which may not seem true: and on this uncertainty is grounded the doubtfulness which the learned man shows in his judgments. It is also to be acknowledged, that this circum­spection is one of the great fruits that may be reaped from Philosophy. So that the opinion of those Philosophers is to be esteemed, who place the su­preme knowledge of man and his true [Page 85]reason, in acknowledging the weak­ness of his wit, and the uncertainty of his judgment: but when they deprive the senses of all credit, because they may may be deceived, and doubt of every thing, because they have ground to doubt of some things, they are not to be listned to. These are extremi­ties far contrary to true Philosophy, which only enjoyns moderation.

XXX.

But how much there is of folly to doubt of nothing, and to doubt of e­very thing: so much there is of im­prudence to approve all, and to ap­prove nothing. To preserve the en­tire liberty of ones judgment, with­out being prepossessed with false Rea­son, or pretended authority, is a strength of mind whereof few are ca­pable. The proud man approves of nothing, for fear he submit himself by approving of somewhat; the light and superficial person approves every thing, that he may spare himself the pains of examining what is proposed to him. To close with every thing, [Page 86]and to close with nothing, are other extremities to be avoided by a wise man. The design of that Proconful of Greece, who called together to his house all the Philosophers of different Sects that were then in vogue at A­thens, that he might bring them to a­greement, appeared ridiculous to Pom­ponius Atticus: but the design of that Arabian Philosopher, who undertook to refute the opinions of all the other Philosophers, and to overthrow their Doctrine, by a Book written to that purpose, which he called The Destru­ction of Philosophy, seems to me more ridiculous. Averroes wrote a Confu­tation of that Book, which he calls, The Destruction of the Destruction, and which is one of the best of his pieces. For I look upon it to be the utmost point of extravagancy, considering the way that men live in the world, for one to suspend his judgment amongst so many truths, and so many falshoods universally acknowledged, and to ap­ply himself to no side. There is like­wise weakness to follow only the sen­timents [Page 87]of others, and to become a slave to all their opinions: but it is a far more dangerous condition, to be hardened by a spirit of pride, against that inclination which man naturally hath to be perswaded by reason and truth, so as to believe nothing, and to doubt of every thing. I like not that blind submission of the Disci­ples of Pythagoras, who reasoned no more after that he had spoken: his au­thority served them for reason. Those imperious ways, which force men to yield, are fitter to overturn the mind, than to instruct it. For, if we speak properly, all the liberty that man hath, is his right to judge of things as he pleases; and there is nothing that de­pends on himself but the use which he makes of his opinion. All these ex­cesses are blame-worthy in a Philoso­pher, who ought to mind nothing, but to hear reason, and find out truth. It is true there are some spirits, who stand in need of exercise and nourish­ment that they may be employed: all goes well with them, even false Noti­ons, [Page 88]empty Imaginations, chimerical Designs, and rather than have nothing to think on, they amuse themselves with the Visions of others, their own heads having nothing to present them with for entertainment. From this Character men stumble on another more pernicious, which is a levity in believing every thing. Let us avoid these extremities; let us examine what is doubtful, but let us give our assent to what is true: let us never be impo­sed upon by conjectures, but let us not resist evidence; and let us above all things consult reason and common sense, which are the surest means to attain to the knowledge of the truth.

XXXI.

When we seriously examine the mo­tives that incline most part of Philoso­phers to espouse a Party in the Opini­ons which are publickly professed, we find in their conduct nothing less than Philosophy: For it is often without deliberation, without choice, before maturity of age, by chance, and even sometimes without thinking on it, that [Page 89]they cleave to an Opinion. As it com­monly happens to those who come to be of a Sentiment, by the Cloaths they wear, by the Country they belong to, by the company they keep, by the in­terest of the course of life they follow, by the Cabal that wheadles them, by the Croud that draws them along, by the Torrent that hurries them, and al­ways by any other Consideration than that of Reason and Prudence. Where­in they are like those Philosophers, of whom Cicero speaks drollingly; ad quamcun{que} disciplinam quasi tempestate delati, ad eam tanquam ad saxum ad­haerescunt: who stick to an Opinion, as men tossed in a storm cleave to the Rock on which the tempest has cast them. By this means men submit themselves to the tyranny of prepos­session, because they want strength of discerning to set them above preju­dices: they forsake their own judg­ment, to be led by the fancies of ano­ther: they defend with heat, what they have undertaken without Rea­son; and maintain rashly what they [Page 90]have embraced inconsiderately. And when one is prepossessed by a senti­ment, he makes it a senseless point of honour to maintain a foolish opinion. It happens even sometimes, that the animosity of Parties puts a spirit into those that have none; and that many times they have no other talent, nor other reason, but the bitterness where­by they are animated. To conclude, these rash and fortuitous embracings of the sentiments of others, look so ridiculously, that it were far better not at all to be a Philosopher, than to be one of that stamp. The choice that is to be made in these occasions, is to make none at all. For a Philosophy so little founded on reason is but a mere debauchery of Wit, and real weak­ness.

XXXII.

Truth is now-a-dayes so persecuted by all the disguises of the Age, that men have not ingenuity enough to speak candidly, or courage to be sincere. He must be resolute that would be a Philo­sopher in good earnest. It is a great­ness [Page 91]of soul to speak as one thinks, and think as one speaks; as that Roman did, of whom Quintilian speaks, Scias eum sentire quae dicit; You may be assured he speaks what he thinks. A Moral Philosophy from the hand of so candid a man would have been of great force, and the loss of the Trea­tise of Vertue which he composed is great: for never man spake with great­er freedom than he. He imitated that strain of Socrates, who could not dis­guise his sentiments. Men are never subject to speak against their Conscien­ces but when they are weak: interest, passion, head-strongness, prejudice, the torrent of custome, dependance, are the most usual obstacles to sincerity, and the purity of our judgments. Such kinds of weaknesses only make men forsake their own sentiments, to em­brace the Opinions of others: And it is but a lowness of Spirit, and a base complaisance that make men square their Opinions, by the judgment of those they depend on, and whom they desire to please. The truth is the most [Page 92]lovely of all Philosophies, is to know how to live; that is, to accommodate ones self to persons, affairs, and sea­sons, as reason requires it: Yet that is to be done freely and without constraint; that we may not imitate those weak souls, whose sentiments on every thing are borrowed, and who a­base themselves to condescend to Opi­nions, to which they can hardly submit, because they want courage to retain their entire liberty. So servile a kind of Philosophy is but a counterfeit wisdom. Such was that of the Senators, who lived under Tiberius and Nero, of whom Tacitus speaks; who having prostituted themselves to the most in­famous kind of flattery, put on the Mask of Philosophy to save them from persecution, wanting courage to be true Philosophers, and truly to speak their Judgments in the Senate.

XXXIII.

Disputation is an Art set in vogue by the Schooles to rouse Youth, and to exercise their Wits: it serves to incul­cate reason to these that understand it [Page 93]not, and to impose silence on bablers; but it serves likewise to feed animosity, to give a fair colour to all sorts of passi­on, and to maintain opinionativeness, in despight of Truth and sound Judg­ment. There is no Philosopher who becomes not by this fine Art, a man for progress, and clearing of doubts. For every disputant may undertake to perswade others of his Opinion by noise, when Reason fails him. In fine, disputation, as all things else, has its good and evil: so that without pre­tending to condemn it, let us imploy it to those uses wherein it may do good. But let us open the eyes of rational men, that we may not abuse them; for most-times men only dispute, because they understand not one another. Thales has vacuity in horrour, De­mocritus bogles not at it; let them but mutually explain themselves, and they are good friends. Epicurus believes his senses too much, Empedocles be­lieves them not at all: they shall dis­pute no more, when they have once agreed upon it what the errour is, [Page 94]which hinders the belief that should be given them. Let us make a Cartesia [...] understand, what sense and sensation is, and he shall easily allow that a Horse is a Beast, though now he be­lieves it not. Men have disputed al­most three hundred years about Liber­ty, because as yet they are not agreed what it is: Let us make appear to Phi­losophers and Divines, who have spo­ken of it so differently, wherein it con­sists, and they shall speak in the same Language. For in fine, when men have reason, and are agreed about principles, there is no more disputing. That great Diversity of Opinions which reign in the World, proceeds only from the different manner that Men think and speak of them. This made Aristotle say, that when two ra­tional men are of a different sentiment, it is commonly because they speak dif­ferently; and all disputation is more a­bout words than things.

XXXIV.

Though the Philosophy which is taught in the Schools at present, with [Page 95]that method of disputation introduced there, hath been much censured by Ramus, a Professor of the University of Paris, about the end of the last Age, by Gassendus in the beginning of the present, and generally by all the mo­dern Natural Philosophers of any repu­tation; because it hath suffered much of the purity of the Doctrine of Aristotle to be corrupted by its Professors, who profess themselves to be his greatest Followers: yet for all that I still think it the most convenient, in regard of the way that men live in at present, yea and the most proper for Youth, at the age that they apply themselves to it; because that after all that hath been said, it stamps on the mind an impres­sion of order, to make men speak ex­actly, and with method of every thing: it teaches us to reduce unto certain principles the matters we treat of, that we may methodically deliver our opi­nions: it exercises the spirits of youth by the subtleties of Logick and Meta­physick, in the only way that they are capable of: it gives them but an [Page 96]abridgment of Moral Philosophy, whilst their understanding is not ripe enough to support a long deduction of Con­clusions, which are entertainments too serious and calm for the heat and edge of youth; which is an age of too lit­tle experience, to delight in the con­templation of the Works of Nature by a serious study of Natural Philosophy, and of too narrow a capacity to compre­hend the vast extent of humane Affairs. It were however to be wished, that that part of Philosophy were handled more methodically in the Schools, and that the most important Experiments and Observations of Nature were more par­ticularly discussed: But it often comes to pass that Masters affect to teach use­less things, to make it be thought that they will not forget the necessary. However, the method that is at pre­sent in use, might be brought to grea­ter perfection: but that perfection is only to be expected from the genius and candour of the Professors, who can wave things indifferent, and in­sist on what is essential, according to [Page 97]the measure of knowledge that expe­rience may furnish them with. For matters being in the state they are, there is no great reason to expect as to that a well-adjusted Reformation. To conclude, it is probable that the Laws, which suffer no innovation in the use of things universally established, will not countenance any other method, but what is now at present followed in the Universities; that they may not allow too great a freedom to the passi­on that men have naturally for new Opinions, the tendency whereof is of dangerous consequence in a well-order­ed state; especially considering that Philosophy is one of the instruments whereof Religion makes use in explain­ing its decisions, as we shall see at the end of this Treatise. These are the Re­flexions which we have made on Philo­sophy in general: Let us now proceed to these which are to be made on the parts of Philosophy severally.

I.

LOGICK may be said to be the first ray of Evidence, and the first draught of Method, that is displayed on Sciences: because its busi­ness is to form the judgment, which is the usual instrument that the mind employs in reasoning truly, and in discerning truth and falshood exactly, by distinguishing what is simple from what is compound, and what is con­tingent from what is necessary. And seeing this Art is the source from whence flows certainty, there is but [Page 99]little security in all the Reasonings of men without its assistance. So that its chief office is to discover truth, and make Reason palpable. But that Art became counterfeit by the character of the spirits of those that first made use of it: That ray, though pure and in­corruptible in it self, was corrupted; and humane Reason, which submitted it self to that conduct, fell into Errour, by the bad use it made of that Science. Insomuch that Logick, which was on­ly invented to imprint a Character of justness on the mind, did help to mis­lead it: and the first Precepts of Dia­lectick which were given to men for a Rule, served as snares laid for them, to make them fall into Errour. For as there is nothing so secret as the thoughts, so men found the art to dis­guise them into a thousand shapes; as may be seen in the History and Revo­lutions of this Science.

II.

The first Philosophers who made more use of reason than reasoning, ad­dicted themselves so much to the study [Page 100]of Natural Philosophy, that they mind­ed Logick but little: they reasoned in their observations, without knowing the Art of reasoning. There was no Logick in use in the School of Pythago­ras, but his sole Authority; his Di­sciples were silent when he had spoken. It is true, Apuleius pretends that Plan took his first Notions of Logick from the Pythagoreans. But Aristotle as­sures us, that though there be exact e­nough Definitions to be found in their writings, yet they knew not Dialectick, whereof the Art was not then disco­vered, nor the Rules established. Zeno Eleates — a man of a quick and subtile Spirit, was the first that found in dis­course that natural connexion of prin­ciples and consequences, which he re­duced into an Art, as Plato testifies and Proclus confirms. From whence it appears that the Logick of Zeno con­sisted in observing the dependance which propositions have one on ano­ther, and upon that observation to rank them in their natural order. That was his Method; he explained nothing [Page 101]but by way of Dialogue, and brought in two or three Persons, who by que­stions and answers made a Methodical Reasoning on every thing: and from this Art, he was the first that called that Science Dialectick; whereby the way of handling Philosophy in verse which was used before, ceased. For in Dialogue Men found the means to retain an agreeable air, without losing Solidity: and that way Plato follow­ed, as the most proper for instruction. The custome was to interrogate him whom they taught, and to make him answer according to his Cpacity. Zeno who was subtle, mingled a quaint and captious air with his Method, whereby he puzled the mind. Prota­goras, the Disciple of Zeno, who had likewise Democritus for Master, refined that Method, and made it still more nice by his Sophisms; for wanting so­lidity he endeavoured to be subtile, and coming short of a Philosopher, he set up for a Sophist. Aristotle sayes that he framed common-places of que­stions and answers, whereof he made [Page 102]an Art to surprize and perplex the mind [...] Simon that famous Artist of Athens, of whom Socrates speaks so much, and Crito his friend, were likewise the Disciples of Zeno and great Dialecti­cians, as Diogenes Laertius assures us.

III.

Euclide of Megara subtilized more all the subtility of Dialectick; and ad­ded to it a brisker way of disputing by giving more heat to his discourse: he drove that even to excess, which gave occasion to Timon to reproach him, for having inspired into those of Mega­ra, [...], a rage of disputation, by that Captious and Sophistick Logick that he taught them, which Socrates approved not, because there was no Sincerity in that way. It was Euclide and his Scholar Eubulides, who invent­ed the Sophisms, which became since so famous in the Schools, whereof Dio­genes Laertius makes mention; which after all have nothing real but their subtility, as the Dilemma, the Horned Argument, the Sorites, these so fa­mous Megarick interrogations, of [Page 103]which Plutarch speaks; and all the Pettifoggings of that kind, which made Dialectick so contemptible at Athens, Socrates was obliged to render it ridicu­lous in his discourses against the Sophists, to the end he might undeceive mens minds in the Opinion thereof. From Euclide Demosthenes learnt the Art of the Dilemma, and these pressing ways that rendered him so vehement in that manner of Eloquence which he follow­ed. The Logick of Plato, which is the same with that of Socrates, con­sists more in Examples than Precepts; it hath nothing that is particular for reasoning, because Socrates valued not that part of Philosophy. Though both of them placed the first discerning of Truth and Falshood in the senses; yet they pretended that the mind ought to judge thereof, and that Men should only refer themselves to that Judgment: because that without sticking on the surface of things, it penetrated into the eternal and immutable principle of them, which they called the Idea, and which alone they established as the rule [Page 104]of the distinction which should be made in the Judgment of things. But see­ing the Soul of Man was but a small spark of the Universal Soul of the World, and according to them, a Beam of the Divinity; they thought that that particle united to its principle was ig­norant of nothing; but that entring into the Body, by that alliance it con­tracted Ignorance and Impiety, from which Logick served to purify it. Alcinous who explains exactly enough the Dialectick of Plato, says, That that Philosopher made use of Divisi­on, Definition, and Induction, to re­mount to the Fountain-head of first Truth, from whence he drew his prin­ciples, to the end he might think and speak wisely of every thing; and that that was his most usual Method. Division was as a ladder, whereby to a­scend from sensible things to things in­tellectual. Definition was a way to lead from things demonstrated, to those that were not: and Induction the means to find the truth by the principle of suppo­sitions. For by Division he came to De­finition, and by Definition to Induction [Page 105]and Demonstration. And Diogenes Laer­tius assures us, that that was the most general way which Plato made use of in making his Demonstrations. Cicero and Quintilian are of the same Opini­nion. However, it must be granted, that Socrates in his manner of reason­ing addicted himself more to Interro­gations than Answers; because the Character of his Mind was fitter to raise, than to resolve difficulties. More­over, it appears by the Principles of the Logick of Socrates and Plato, which allowed no truth but in the Ideas, that all their School made Pro­fession of knowing nothing; because that Men cannot judge of single and Individual beings, but by the senses which are fallacious: So that the Di­sciples of Plato placed all their Logick in not believing any thing too slightly, and in retaining the entire Liberty of Judgment, among the uncertainties which are found almost in every thing. And in fine, upon that great maxime of a general Incomprehensibility of all things, was the Academy reformed under Lacydes and Arcesilas, and the [Page 106]Sect of the Scepticks and Pyrrhonists rais­ed, who doubted of things that were most certain. The Academicks under­stood very well, that nothing could be understood; the Pyrrhonists did not so much as understand that. And so far the Principles of the Logick of Plato trained on the minds of men.

IV.

There appeared nothing before A­ristotle, regulated and setled in Logick. That sublime and intelligent genius so sounded the Abyss of the mind of Man, that he discovered all its movements, by the exact distinction that he made of the operations thereof. Men had not as yet launched out into the Ocean, nor known the depth of the thoughts of man. Aristotle was the first that discovered that new way of attaining to Science by the evidence of Demon­stration, and of proceeding geometri­ally to demonstration by the infallibili­ty of Syllogism, the most accomplished work and the greatest attempt of the Wit of Man. Thus you have an abridg­ment of the Art and Method of the Lo­gick of Aristotle, which is so sure, that [Page 107]without it, one can have no perfect assu­rance in reasoning, and which is a rule to make men just and exact in conceiving what is to be conceved. But what Road hath he taken to attain to that, and what Art hath he employed to fix the mind of man naturally volatile, and to render it inexpugnable in what it knows? It behoved him first to re­move all ambiguity and equivocation from expression, make a perfect De­monstration of Humane Reasoning, which has no better Foundation than Words and Thoughts cloathed with all their imperfections, and to give the greatest solidity of Science to the most uncertain and undetermined matter that can be imagined. He marches in the pursuit of that design by ways then unknown to Reason, and whereof before him there was hardly any tract: he removes from the thoughts all the defects whereby expression is able to impose upon any man, and disperses all the mists wherewith the imagination may offuscate the mind. For that end in the Book of Interpretation which is [Page 108]a kind of rational Grammar, he exa­mines the vertue and signification of words; in the Categories he forms the true notions of terms, to prepare them for Division and Definition, by reduc­ing them to their natural sense; in his Books of Analyticks, he lays down the rules of the Modal Conversion of all sorts of propositions, and of the dif­ferent Figures of Syllogism, whereof he setles the principal grounds on three Axioms of his Logick: and all that con­structure is purely a work of his own. He demonstrates nothing in his Book of Categories, which are but disposi­tions to Demonstration: he demon­strates nothing in his Book of Interpre­tation, but the principle of contradicto­ry propositions: but in the Books of Analyticks his conceptions are almost so many demonstrations, and his de­monstrations so many principles. The Topicks are but common places of dia­lectick or probable Arguments. The Elenchs are all the Sophisms imaginable in their source. The two rules which he establishes for the perfect composi­tion [Page 109]of a Syllogism, are, That there ought to be nothing false in the matter, nor nothing faulty in the form. His manner of writing has nothing of the faintness of the discourse of Plato, nor of the diffused stile of his Age; all is vigorous and close. In fine, that pure Geometrical Method of Demonstrati­on, which he followed, hath appear­ed always so exact, that it hath been used by the learned in all Sci­ences, as the most solid, and most con­sonant to the usual manner of reason­ing: and that construction of Syllo­gism, which is the true Logick of A­ristotle, is so perfect in its kind, that no­thing can have since been added to it, or diminished from it, without cor­rupting the same. Men of sound Judg­ment can admit of no other man­ner, nor no other principles of reason­ing, but those of Aristotle. And see­ing in all Ages men have disputed a­gainst reason, because it is Opinion commonly that swayes the World; the Learned Ages have been only distin­guished from others, by the esteem [Page 110]they have had of the Logick of Aristo­tle. For, to speak the truth, what he hath done for the rectifying of reason, by cutting off equivocation from terms, and confusion from conceptions, is one of the greatest Master-pieces of Humane Reason; it must notwith­standing be acknowledged, that the principal scope of that Logick is not so much to teach man the Art of rea­soning, which he knows naturally, as to give rules for examining false rea­sonings, that they may be well distin­guished from the true, and to guard one against the Sophisms of Zeno and Parmenides. For there was forged in his time a false method of reasoning, which the Sophists put in vogue, and which he endeavours to overthrow by making it known. Upon this Idea all the design of his Logick does move, that he may form the Laws of an Art which gives Laws to all others.

V.

The School of Zeno exercised them­selves so much in Dialectick, that the Sect of the Stoicks subtilized more up­on [Page 111]it, than all the other Sects besides. It was perhaps the difficulty they had to maintain their imaginary Morality, which obliged them to supply by their subtlety what was wanting in soli­dity to their Doctrine. So they ad­ded to the Artifices of Zeno Eleates, to the wranglings of Euclid of Megara, and to the quaintness of Socrates, all the artifice of Cleantes and Chrysippus, the greatest Dialecticians that ever were, that they might make to them­selves a new Logick. To that it was properly that they bent all their wit, says Cicero, that they might make to themselves an artificial Reason, having but little real to maintain the false wis­dom of their Philosophy: it may be said that they bristled their wit with all the prickles of Dialectick, to arm them­selves against their Adversaries, and that they became the most redoubtable Pettifoggers of the School, that they might safely be the greatest amplifiers, in the notion that they forged to them­selves of their wise-man. Nor did any thing give greater reputation to [Page 112]their opinion, than the art that they employed to defend it. They altered nothing of the grounds of the Diale­ctick of Aristotle; except that they added to the Syllogism, which was of common use amongst them, a more animated air of disputation, by quick, short, and pressing Interrogatories, which gave great vigour to their rea­sonings. That knacky and nice hu­mour which held them commonly, made them turn all their Dialectick into perverse sophistication, that they might invent new modes of Syllogism less natural, but more captious than those of Aristotle. It is pretended, that Chrysippus was so much addicted to that Science, that he alone wrote of it a­bove three hundred Volumes: but he weakened the strength of it, says Se­neca, by too much refining. It was he and his Successors who first brought in vogue the formalities and virtual distinctions: it is true, that by the vi­vacity of their wit they gave too great authority to the imagination, which makes things always greater [Page 113]than they are, by giving too much vertue to expressions, and too great a power to terms. There was nothing but words and their signification dispu­ted of in their Schools. And thereby they became the first Authors of that Philosophy, which was revived by the Nominalists in these last Ages: at least they have much resembled one ano­ther in their way of subtilizing too much on the terms they made use of. But that Dialectick which consisted al­most altogether in words, made the Stoicks somewhat superficial; and pla­ced all their Philosophy on their lips. Yet seeing the Logick of Aristotle was long unknown, because his Writings were so; the Logick of Zeno passed current in the following Ages more than any other; it was even the first that was taught at Rome. And it is on these subtleties of Logick, that Plau­tus plays in several places of his Co­medies, as Cicero did afterwards in many parts of his Works. For the Stoicks by reason of their subtlety were decryed at Rome.

VI.

Epicurus fell upon a method of rea­soning less artificious, but more deli­cate than that of Zeno. What Cicero objects to him that he despised Diale­ctick, is not true but in respect of that of the Stoicks, which he approved not, because he found it to be puncti­lious. Epicurus took a plainer way. That analytical method of division and argumentation introduced by Aristotle was unknown to him, which rendred him weak in dispute. He sought truth only by the senses, which he called the first natural light of man; and that was his first Rule, as reflexion on the judg­ment of the senses was his second. And as he did acknowledge two kinds of truth, the one Natural and the o­ther Moral; so he would have the sen­ses distinguish what is real, and the ap­petite, which is the way by which the heart declares it self, pursue what is good and convenient for its state: and that is it which he calls Moral Truth. This is in general the ground of his Doctrine; and these are its Principles. [Page 115]1. That sense cannot be deceived; be­cause the impression that it receives from the object is always true, being wrought by a sensible species: but that the reasoning which the Soul makes up­on that impression may be false. 2. That the opinion which is drawn from the sensation may be true or false. 3. That it is true when the judgment of the senses is made in form, without let, and with such evidence as Reason can­not resist; and that it may be false, when it wants that evidence. These are the principal Maxims of the Lo­gick of Epicurus: upon which he grounds the different reasonings of the Soul that are made in the mind, ac­cording to the sympathy that there is between the Spirit and the Senses. It is only, says he, upon the ideas and notices which the Soul receives by the Senses, that are formed the doubt or opinion, the obscurity or evidence, whereof it re­ceives the impression. Moreover that way of anticipated knowledge, which he calls [...], presumption, is in his Doctrine a kind of Idea of things in­dividual [Page 116]re-united in a general con­ception: from whence he forms the rule of Definition, which he takes to be the only way of attaining to know­ledge. By all these Principles he foun­ded a more natural way of reasoning than the other Philosophers did. It is true that he grounded a part of the simplicity of his Logick upon the per­spicuity of terms, being perswaded that all disputes did commonly proceed but from the ambiguity of Propositi­ons. He answered all Sophisms by the sole explication of the words. For when men understand themselves, and are no more Beasts, there is no more disputing. But he was careful to re­ctifie the defect of that Principle in all his Reasonings, by great circumspe­ction. And Lucretius, who in his Poem explains the Doctrine of Epi­curus, proposes to himself more than fourteen Objections which are made against the judgment of the Senses, to which he answers so clearly in his fourth Book, that he leaves not a word to be said more. In fine, plain com­mon [Page 117]sense, maintained by some natu­ral reflexions, was all the art of Epicu­rus: he made not so much ado about it, as the Stoicks did, who placed a part of their wit in the magnificence of their expressions, whereby they be­came ridiculous to the Epicureans.

VII.

After that the Writings of Aristotle, which were so long concealed, were discovered, and that his method was known, men addicted themselves to it in succeeding times, as to the so­lidest and surest of all: the art of think­ing and discoursing appearing in it, in its highest perfection, by the inventi­on of Syllogism; to which all the me­ditation and reflexions of Philosophers can adde nothing. Galen himself who had entertained other Notions on Lo­gick, and who had composed a new Dialectick, which is lost, followed at last that of Aristotle, and gave it even applause and reputation: and that new Figure of Syllogism, which he invent­ed, passed only for an indirect method of demonstration. Alexander Aphro­diseus, [Page 118]Simplicius, Ammonius, Philopo­nus, amongst the Greeks; Apuleius, S. Augustine, Boetius, Thomas Aquinas, and many others amongst the Latines aswell as the Arabians, laboured on the Logick of Aristotle, as on the best of all others. It is even true that there hath been nothing said rationally since on that Science, which Aristotle had not thought on before: and it may be affirmed, that there has not any new thing almost been discovered, in the universal oeconomy of the operations of the mind, since that Philosopher hath written on it. Upon that admirable Mo­del also was framed the Sect of the Scho­lasticks or Schoolmen, who reigned so long in the Schools, and with so much authority. It is true that there happened therein a Schism between the Nomi­nalists and Realists: but both of them in their disputes reasoned only on the Principles of Aristotle. I shall say no­thing of the Logick of Raymund Lully, which is but the meer gibrish of the Cabal, and a ranking up of words in an order that is but arbitrary, and [Page 119]which hath nothing of reality: it is an art of speaking of all things with­out judgment, and of discoursing at random as much as men please. In fine, it is a very extravagant Notion of Lo­gick, which Peter Montuus pretends to have been copied from head to tail, from an Arabian Philosopher called Abezebron, proper to puzzle Antichrist when he comes into the world. Upon this fair original Raymund Lully formed the Idea of his Logick, which could never as yet make men any thing but Enthusiasts or Ignorant. About two hundred years ago Laurentius Valla un­dertook to reform the Logick of Ari­stotle, by reducing the ten Categories into three, and cutting off the third Fi­gure of Syllogism. He succeeded not in that boldness, for he had no Fol­lowers. Ludovicus Vives undertook another Reformation, which concern­ed the Schoolmen more than Aristotle; but likewise without success. Ramus had no better luck in his design of o­verthrowing the credit of Aristotle, up­on the Memoires of Valla and Vives. [Page 120]For the Idea that he conceived of his new Dialectick contains nothing ratio­nal, but what he hath borrowed from the Dialectick of Aristotle, which he hath corrupted by endeavouring to re­form it. Cardan composed a Logick, upon the Logick of Aristotle, of Hip­pocrates, of Euclide, of Ptolomy, and of Galen; but that Work hath no­thing in it that is good, but what he hath taken from the geometrical me­thod of Aristotle, which he brings in­to it.

VIII.

We shall now tell you our thoughts of the late Dialecticians. The Organ of Bacon is not methodical; it is made up of curious conceits, which pro­ceed only from an excessive passion that that Author hath to signalize himself by new sentiments, and to say what o­thers have not said. There is nothing less solid than the four Idols, which he makes the Principles of all things. Every thing there is metaphorical, and hardly any thing proper: that geome­trical way of reasoning in use among [Page 121]the Schoolmen is unknown to him. But the Spaniards, who are the Ma­sters of other people in the matter of Reflexions, refined Logick so much in the last Age, that they corrupted the Purity of Natural Reason, by the sub­tilty of their Reasonings; falling into empty and abstracted speculations, which had nothing of reality. These Philosophers found an Art of enjoying Reason in spight of common-sense; and of giving a colour, and I know not what specious paint, to the most un­reasonable matters. It was not now, as heretofore, the refining the know­ledge of things that they endeavoured, but Conceptions and Terms. And Dis­putation became thereby so full of wrangling and animosity, that it was good for nothing else but to heat the Choler, and blacken the Blood of Phi­losophers. Smiglesius a Polonian Jesuit, was one of the first that wrote at the same time both most subtilly and most solidly on the Logick of Aristotle. He hath by the Sagacity of his Wit dived into the depth of that Science, with a [Page 122]perspicuity and exactness, that is hard­ly to be found elsewhere. His Logick is a lovely piece. The other Modern Philosophers are more addicted to Na­tural Philosophy than Logick: but there is nothing more extravagant, than the Treatise which Van Helmont hath written on Logick, by his unrea­sonable overthrowing all the Principles of Aristotle. Descartes began a Logick which is not compleated: Some Frag­ments thereof have remained in the hands of one of his Scholars, under the Title of Erudition. There are some Lineaments of Dialectick in his Me­thod, where he sayeth that the mind of man being limited, it must at first be busied about simple Objects; then accustomed by little and little to the knowledge of compound Objects, and to distinguish the one from the o­ther. He would have men to disen­gage themselves from prejudices, en­ter into a thought of doubting of every thing, that they may be able to distin­guish what is true from what is false. His first Principle, I think, therefore I am, [Page 123]which he proposes as the first evident and sensible truth, if it be narrowly ex­amined, hath in it somewhat defective: for the Proposition, I think, being to be reduced to this, I am thinking; that is to say, I am, therefore I am, makes a frivolous sense. But nevertheless, as he hath raved the best of any of the Moderns, so what he hath said, for all its Noveltie is not ill devised: And there is found in it a depth of Meditati­on, which is peculiar to himself; yet there is nothing less Methodical than his Discourse concerning Method. It is a hodge-podge of Morality, Natural Philosophy, and Metaphysicks, which establishes hardly any thing. Howe­ver there is to be found in it some draughts of Sincerity, which show the true intention of his mind; especially when he most ingeniously says, That Men gain nothing by Philosophy but the means to speak probably of every thing, and to make themselves be admired by the less knowing. The Dialectick of Campanella is confused and perplexed, being built upon the Platforme of [Page 124]the Averroists, whereof he framed to himself too abstracted a Notion. But to conclude this point; it may be said, that the compleatest Modern piece of Logick in all its parts, is that which Peter Mounyer, a Phisician of Grenoble, hath published on the Writings of Fa­ther Fabri a Jesuit. There is nothing more Original than what he hath writ­ten, chiefly on the Art of Syllogism, and Consequence. No man hath hitherto carried that Science farther, nor hath more exhausted that matter by the al­most Infinite Enumeration of all the modes, and of all the imaginable con­nexion of terms which constitute a Syllogism. But let us proceed to Mo­ral Philosophy, which is somewhat less obscure and more real.

I.

MORAL Philosophy teaches the way of liv­ing, as Logick the man­ner of speaking and rea­soning; the one regu­lates the thoughts, and the other the desires of the Soul. De­mocritus was the first of Philosophers that thought it strange, that Man who was ignorant of himself, amused him­self about the study of the Heavens. For that was the exercise of the Philo­sophers before Socrates, who began first to mind the ordering of his Manners. [Page 126]He had the first notion of it from Py­thagoras, who applyed himself to Mo­rality whilst he observed Nature. That Science which he learnt from the Ae­gyptians, by the correspondence that he had with their Priests, was not his greatest delight; though it was not al­together indifferent to him. The de­sign of that Moral Philosophy of his aimed at the purifying of the mind, from the impurities of the body and the mists of imagination, by the stu­dy of Philosophy, which he called a meditation on death; it was also the most pure and religious, but the least exact of all Moral Philosophies. For it contained only bare Maxims, with­out order and connexion: and his Maxims were only a plain interpreta­tion of the Worship of the Gods, of the care that is to be had of Parents and Friends, of natural honesty, of modesty, probity, publick interest, and other duties of life. And by the Pre­cepts of so sound Doctrine he formed the manners and minds of the people that heard him. St. Jerome saith, that [Page 127]all the Morality of Pythagoras is com­prehended in his Poem, which is not so much to be attributed to him as to his Scholars: we have an abridgment of it in the Commentary of Hierocles on that Poem. This Hierocles was Go­vernour of Alexandria under Dioclesi­an. There is to be found in Longinus a hint of the Morality of Pythagoras, which gives a great Idea of his Do­ctrine, ‘Do always good: and never lye.’

And though Aristotle affirms, that that Philosopher speaks not so well of vertues as Socrates did: yet it must be granted, says Cicero, that there appear­ed a certain Character of Wisdom in the followers of Pythagoras, which so distinguished them from other Philoso­phers, that at Rome under the first Consuls, a man past for a Pythagorean when he had a composed meen; and what Athenaeus reports of the Sobriety of these Philosophers, hath given An­tiquity a great admiration for so austere a Morality.

II.

Socrates gave Principles to the Mo­ral Philosophy, which Pythagoras brought from Egypt, and began to re­duce it into Method, by the distincti­on which he made of Virtues, and by their Definitions. The other Philoso­phers that went before him, studied nature. Socrates studied himself, by the care he had of cultivating his Soul more than his Reason, and of improv­ing his Manners rather than his Wit. He had a wonderful disposition to ver­tue, for with a profound Capacity, he had a Modesty and Simplicity that ren­dred him amiable to all men. That familiar Spirit, which Apuleius calls the God of Socrates, hath given occasion of much discourse concerning the Mo­rality of that Philosopher. Plato pre­tended that it was a kind of invisible genius that guided him: Tertullian and Lactantius say it was a real demon: Plutarch assures us that it was a way of sneezing to the right or left, which served Socrates for a good or bad Omen in any thing he undertook. Maximus [Page 129]of Tyre thinks it was a secret instinct of his Conscience, which inclined him to good, and averted him from evil. Pomponatius judges that it was only the Planet which ruled in his Nativity. And Montanus will have it to have been a sudden inclination of his Will, and a kind of inspiration, which serv­ed for foresight to that Philosopher in surprises, an intimation in doubts, and a guide in dangers. But without so much ado, it is probable that that pre­tended Spirit of Socrates, which served him for a Conductor in his actions, was nothing else but the Prudence which he had acquired by his Experience in things, and the Reflexions he made on their Events; wherein he was seldom mistaken. Insomuch that it hath been believed of him, what Homer would have us believe of the great men, of whom he speaks in his Poems; to whom he assigned Deities for Guides, in the dangers to which their Valour exposed them. For in fine, the Mo­rality of Socrates was his Demon: and all his Art consisted in his Prudence. [Page 130]He was unjustly condemned to death, for want of Religion. His ruine, saith Plutarch, was an effect of his Piety; and he became only suspected of irre­ligion, because he would render the Philosophy of Pythagoras purer, by cutting off the Fables and Superstitions that had slipt into it, and which ren­dred it ridiculous to his disciples, that he might leave nothing in it but what was reasonable. In effect Socrates had so great a veneration for the Gods, says Cicero, that Xenophon having consult­ed him, if he should follow Cyrus: Mans counsel, said he, is uncertain, you must advise with God. In fine, the Do­ctrine of Socrates was a continual Les­son to Vertue, whereof the most part of other Philosophers speak only for ostentation, or policy: that drolling way he made use of, was but a me­thod to procure attention. Morality which in its natural austerity would have been apt to have disgusted peo­ple, invited them under an agreeable appearance: the seasoning which that Philosopher gave to the dryness of his [Page 131]Maxims, made them be much more favourably received of the Publick; yea and thereby he avoided that stile of authority and arrogance, which was then in use among the Sophists, as an odious yoke to Reason: and he handled with so little seriousness the most serious matters, that he made it one of his Maxims to do so, knowing very well that the surest way to per­swade was to please.

III.

Plato brought Moral Philosophy still to greater perfection, upon the Model that Socrates had left him: For by his Ideas, which he gave to every thing, as the Universal Principle of Philoso­phy, he raised all Vertues to their highest perfection. In his Phedrus he explains the nature of Moral Philoso­phy, the end whereof is to purifie the mind from the errours of imagination, by the reflexions that Philosophy sug­gests to him. However the greatest part of his Dialogues are but good discourses without principles, but which fail not to hit the mark, and [Page 132]to instruct in their way; for the Morals of that Philosopher are full of instru­ctions, which tend always either to countenance Vertue, or to discourage Vice: and that Morality is spread in all his discourses, though there be nothing in it extraordinary singular. Some pre­tend that the Metamorphosis of Apu­leius his Golden Ass, is an Allegory of the Moral Philosophy of Plato; the end whereof is to teach that Philoso­phy serves to purifie the mind, and to purge it from passions, and those gros­ser sentiments which make men resem­ble beasts. For my part I believe no such thing: the notions of it are too impure. There reigned in the time of Plato at Athens a false wit, introduced by the Sophists, which struck at Man­ners aswell as Reason. Protagoras was a Sophist in Discourse, and Diogenes in Manners: all his Morality was coun­terfeit, there was nothing but arro­gance in his probity, and ostentation in his modesty: he acted the severe for envy of Plato, whose delicateness he endeavoured to censure, by an affecta­tion [Page 133]of austerity. It was only against Vertue and Grandure that he played the Philosopher: he pitied the King of Persia because he was too rich: Alexander the Great seemed to him un­happy, because he was too powerful: and merit and good fortune put him out of humour. So that the Morality of Diogenes must needs have been extra­vagant, having had no other founda­tion but a clownish surliness: he was a great Hypocrite, and in reality more a Bragadochio than Philosopher. So that Plato by the solidity of his Doctrine and Vertue, had no great difficulty to overthrow the erroneous Morality of Diogenes, and of the Cynicks, who were the Disciples of Antisthenes, and of all Philosophers the most open E­nemies of modesty and civility. Plato was the first that rectified the opinion of the Immortality of the Soul, which Socrates learnt of Pythagoras, Pythago­ras of the Egyptians, and the Egypti­ans of the Hebrews, by the means of Abraham whilst he sojourned in Egypt. He made it likewise the most impor­tant [Page 134]principle of Pagan Morality, to oblige men to be vertuous by the hope of reward, and the fear of punish­ment. But the Doctrine of Plato had a tendency to that of the Stoicks; as appears by the example of Antiochus of Ascalon, who having been bred in the Academy turned Stoick. Cicero remarks the reason of it, when he says, that the most part of the Maxims of Zeno were drawn from the Do­ctrine of Socrates. Stoicorum mirabi­lia Socratica sunt pleraque.

IV.

Though in the judgment of Cicero the Moral Philosophy of Aristotle hath the same grounds, the same principles, and the same oeconomy as that of Pla­to hath, and that there is no essential difference betwixt them; yet it is to be granted, that Aristotle erects a far more methodical Scheme of Doctrine: not only by the notion that he gives of a publick and a private vertue, in di­stinguishing the prudence of a Sove­raign in the conduct of his State, from that of the Master of a Family in the [Page 135]ordering of his Houshold; but also by establishing in his Books to Nicoma­chus the two most essential points in Moral Philosophy, a last End, and the Means to attain it: and in the last Book he teaches, that that Beatitude consists in the noblest action of man in refe­rence to the most excellent Object. This is all the Moral Philosophy of A­ristotle: the most exact, the most regu­lar and compleat of all other Morali­ties. Every thing therein is ranked in so good a method, that the chief ground of the design, and the parts of it have so natural a relation to one ano­ther, and tend all in so streight a line to their end, that it is one of the most accomplished Works of Antiquity. For every thing therein is digested in that admirable method of Analysis, very fa­miliar to that Author, who by that art reduces the End to the Means, in the same manner that the parts are refer­red to the whole, and the effects to the cause. And though in the third Book of his Morals he affirms, that an exact method cannot be observed in such a [Page 136]matter, by reason of its natural insta­bility, seeing it hath for object the actions of men, which are in them­selves so mutable: yet he hath observ­ed a regularity therein, beyond what can be imagined; and nothing war­rants more the Morality of Aristotle, than the universal policy of the world. For there is not at this day any well setled form of Government which is not founded on that Moral Philosophy. And that is also the Reason that Ma­chiavel, who teaches Magistrates to rule by crime, cannot endure it, be­cause it is too vertuous. But after all that hath been said, that Moral Philo­sophy of Aristotle, aswell as that of Socrates and Plato, can make men on­ly Philosophers, and are too weak to make them throughly good. For they can only teach man his duty, but not make him in love with it. Neither is it in these fair Maxims (though men brag so much) that patience in affli­ctions, and fortitude against adversity is to be found. And when a man has no more but the vertue of a Philoso­pher, he has none at all.

V.

The great Principle of the Morality of Zeno, head of the Stoicks, was to live in conformity to Nature; foun­ded on that pretended maxim of the School of Plato, Nulla in re, nisi in natura, quaerendum summum bonum: That the chief good is no-where to be sought but in Nature. But seeing that maxim favoured sensuality too much, and even agreed with the Doctrine of Antisthenes, and the Cynicks, who in their sentiments were naturally impu­dent, it offended the most part of Phi­losophers, and made them revolt and fall off from Zeno. That Philosopher, that he might not displease the Pub­lick, put his opinion in a cleaner dress, by explaining that conformity to Na­ture, by a conformity to right Reason. The Masters explanation was variously interpreted by his Scholars. Cleanthes would have it, to live conformably to that ray which Heaven had imprint­ed on the mind of man. Chrysippus pretended, that it was to live accord­ing to the light of Vertue: but both [Page 138]of them grounded themselves on that principle of Zeno, that Vertue and Rea­son were circumscribed by as narrow bounds as Truth: and as whatsoever is contrary to Truth, is alike false; so whatever is contrary to Reason, and Vertue, is equally absurd and vicious. Every thing moved on that axis in the School of Zeno: but the consequences of so extravagant a principle were dis­liked by all men: nothing appeared more ridiculous than that equality of sins, which made all men alike crimi­nal; and nothing seemed falser than that Tranquillity which they founded on an indifferency for external goods and evils. These Maxims begot admira­tion, when they were only considered on the outside; but they occasioned laughter, when men pryed more deep­ly into them. That Kingdom of the wise-man, whereof Zeno speaks, which rendred the Stoick Master of the world, so soon as he became a Philosopher, was but chimerical; and that calm of mind which he affected by his insensi­bility to all things, was but a dream. [Page 139]How much agitation might be seen through that apparent Serenity? what servitude appeared in that imaginary Soveraignty? and how frivolous are all the reasonings that Seneca makes in his Books of Tranquillity and Constancy to Serenus? For to be short, there was nothing natural nor sincere in that Phi­losophy. All that Vertue had no other principle but Vanity: That external grimace of wisdom which was taught in the Porch, was but a false represen­tation of the Soul; it made a man but a machine of Philosophy: and they preached a height of sentiments that was somewhat savage, and bore no proportion to humane infirmity. These fair maxims of constancy, moderation, equality, greatness of Soul, undaunt­edness, and the like, were but great names, whereby these Ape-Sages dis­guised their pride. It was rather an hy­pocritical arrogancy, than true honour, that swayed their conduct. That Sto­ick who fills the Books of Seneca and Epictetus, was a wise-man in fansie, whereof there hath never been seen [Page 140]any example: and Plutarch in one of his Treatises against Zeno, proves that the Morality of that Philosopher is e­ven more fabulous than the poetical Fictions. Under Tiberius men became Stoicks, only that they might put on a stedfastness in disgrace, and all they got by it was some sentiments hoisted above Reason and Humanity, which made them look demure, and dye with a better meen. That Senatour, of whom Tacitus speaks, may be an in­stance of this truth, who turned Sto­ick upon no other account, but that he might become seditious and an incen­diary; for which that Sect was very fit: and an unmasked Stoick was an inconsiderable thing. Wherefore Lip­sius, in my opinion, had no reason to have so much extolled that Morality, and to have found it so consonant to our Religion: I think there is nothing more opposite to it, because it inspires into men pride and independence: for a Stoick is only humble in his words, that he may be fierce and haughty in his thoughts. That Morality is, in [Page 141]truth, more splendid than any other, because it is full of lofty expressions and solemn maxims: but there is no­thing more superficial than the Vertues it professeth: and in a Stoick every thing, even Modesty it self, is vain.

VI.

There is nothing more honest in ap­pearance, than the Morality of Epicu­rus: it proposes only for its end the pure pleasure of mind, and has no o­ther design but to guide man unto per­fect liberty, by curing his infirmities, and delivering him from his passions, that it may make him wise. Epicurus himself was a very able man, who fetched great compasses to come to his point, and to disguise appearances: he knew that that soft and voluptuous Doctrine, which Aristippus taught, and which abridged not man of his plea­sures, was highly censured by Plato, Xenophon, and all those who stood much upon discipline and probity. He him­self affected severity in his manners, that he might be the more favourably heard: and he concealed his real sen­timents, [Page 142]under so frugal a way of liv­ing, and so prudent a conduct, that Cicero, who in many things finds fault with him, could not forbear to praise him for that. Gassendus makes a great Apology for the opinion of that Philosopher, pretending that the pleasure wherein he made his happi­ness consist, was no more but a sove­raign tranquillity of the Soul, accom­panied with a perfect constitution of body. But Cicero, Horace, Plutarch, and almost all the Fathers of the Church, speak otherwise of it. The truth is, that pleasure, wherein Epicu­rus placed his chief good, is a great Problem in his Philosophy. And Ci­cero says that the Epicureans were wont to complain, that men were always mistaken in the pleasure that they speak of, and that they were not right­ly understood: and that divided the opinion of the Learned, as to the truth of their Doctrine; which by the dif­ferent ways that Epicurus explained himself in, had two faces; one lovely and agreeable, and the other severe [Page 143]and rude. Epicurus spake sometimes like a Philosopher in a grave strain, declaiming against voluptuousness; and by and by in a softer dialect, and like a sage Debauchee: he was a vo­luptuous Politician, who would please the delicate, without offending the se­vere. There were secrets in that School which were not indifferently revealed to every body. Epicurus when he spake in publick, mentioned nothing but the pure pleasure of the mind; but when he entertained his Confidents at pri­viledged times, he altered his stile. And here you have all the mystery of that admirable Doctrine; whereof the expressions were innocent, and the opi­nions criminal: it was a lewd inside under a fair outside, civility in words and impudence in actions. These Phi­losophers cloaked under an apparent strictness an indulgence for themselves, and all the art of their Morality tended only to hide their irregularity. For they lived ill, though they spoke well: and to justifie their own conduct, they never found fault with other men; [Page 144]wherein they were very ingenious. So polished a Morality gave ground to the different sentiments that Antiquity entertained of them; they passed both for vertuous and for debauched. But they who undertake to justifie Epicu­rus, are too strongly out-voted, not to be ashamed to favour him. For not to speak of the primitive Stoicks, who have always declaimed against him, there was never any Doctrine more de­cryed by the Fathers of the Church than his. It is true Epicurus had ma­ny great vertues, that his Disciples were discreet, faithful, commodious and kind to their friends, and that he himself was sober: but in reality that sobriety was but a regimen; the weak­ness of his constitution obliged him to that circumspection for his healths sake, and the most important hours of his life were the hours of digestion. He had besides a modest air, and that he might purge himself of the arro­gance of a Philosopher, he voted of­ten for ignorance against the Learned. Yet in the most austere heads of his [Page 145]Morality, there appeared some Linea­ments of Humanity, that discovered the real Sentiments of his Heart. In a Word, howsoever men may colour this Doctrine, by the pleasure which Reason and Honesty may allow to the most speculative Philosophers; yet there is so great enormity in the bold­ness that it takes to baffle Religion, that a good and vertuous man cannot main­tain it. And not to rip up any more the injustice of Epicurus, proved by Aristodemus in Plutarch, of depriving God of Providence; the discourse of Theon in the same place, to prove that the Pleasures of the Body are presera­ble to the Pleasures of the Mind; what Diogenes Laertius reports of his Gallantries, his Mistresses, his Nicety in his Pleasures, and of the Effeminacy of his Sentiments, are sufficient Rea­sons to render that Doctrine suspected to a true Philosopher. And Plutarch pretends that Epicurus by taking Man off from Religion, deprives him of a greater pleasure, than all the other de­lights he leaves him. It is no calumny [Page 146]then to say, that that Philosopher was not over innocent.

VII.

The noise that the Morality of Zeno and Epicurus made at Athens, where they were much in vogue, excited the Wits to employ themselves in that part of Philosophy more than in any other: that study grew so much in fashion there, that Natural Philosophy was neglected; and men busied themselves so much in finding out the Chief Good that they slighted all the rest. But as every one reasoned according to his Principles, so every one likewise shap­ed to himself a Beatitude according to his Humour. Herillus who loved stu­dy, placed the chief good in Know­ledge: Calliphon and Dinomachus plac­ed it in honest and lawful Pleasure; Diodorus in the Absence of pain: Theo­phrastus who loved a commodious and easie life, thought that Vertue without Fortune would not make a Man happy. Some added to that Health, others In­dolency, Beauty, and a good Consti­tution: severals placed Happiness in [Page 147]Honour, Credit, Authority, Reputa­tion, and in the other qualities which might contribute to the satisfaction of Body and Mind. It was from that ea­gerness which men had then to form to themselves a Model of Felicity, wherein every one fancied to himself an interest above all other concerns, the notions of it multiplyed so vastly by the multitude of different Spirits who applyed themselves thereto, that Varro reckons up two hundred and fourscore different Opinions upon the sole question of the Chief Good; as St. Augustin in his Book De civitate Dei assures us; every one pursuing the ob­ject to which his humour drew him, that he might make to himself a Bea­titude according to his own mind. But the Spirit of man is so weak in all the Reasonings that he makes of the Chief Good of his own head, that he can­not conceive but an imperfect notion thereof: for he wanders after the sha­dow, instead of the truth which he pursues. It is true, that that Idol of Glo­ry, and Honesty, which the Pagan [Page 148]Morality proposed for an Object, how frivolous soever it was, did notwith­standing stir men up to Vertue, and was the firmest Foundation it had. That is all that man by the light of na­ture found reasonable. From that prin­ciple Panetius deduced the most essenti­al parts of the duties of life, for the in­struction of men. For since Zeno and Epicurus there hath appeared no new model of Morality, whereof any thing remains. The Characters of Theo­phrastus, the Comedies of Menander, Plautus, and Terence, are indeed fair Lessons for manners but without Prin­ciples. And of all the Moral Philoso­phies of Paganism, that of Cicero con­tained in his Offices is the most exact; for its maxims are grounded on auster­est vertue. The Morality of Seneca is not altogether so pure; for though his Maxims be most lovely, yet they are not always maintained by the same Reason. Plutarch is more real, he teaches vertue in a plainer way, by re­lating the actions of the vertuous. Pliny, for all he was so great a Liber­tine, [Page 149]hath some draughts of Morality in the Prefaces to his Natural History, which are of great weight. He speaks always magisterially, with that lofti­ness of expression, that is natural to him. His sole design is to reform manners by his vehement declamations against Luxury, Debauchery, and the other Disorders of his Age; his in­tention is always good, in praising sin­cerely what is laudable, and condemn­ing what is otherways. Of all the Stoicks Epictetus is the most rational; for he is the most sincere, and least head-strong of all. The rest of Phi­losophers who wrote on manners, fol­lowed either the Principles of Aristotle, as Panetius, Cicero and Plutarch, or wrote to little purpose.

VIII.

But nothing more discomposed the Heathenish Morality, than the Lives of the Primitive Christians. That Do­ctrine which the Apostles and their Successors published, teaching men to be humble in greatness and modest in success, and that Probity whereof Chri­stianity [Page 150]made Profession, appeared so wonderful to them; that in making attempts to imitate the Christians, they fell into extravagancy, by stepping beyond their Character, and the bounds of that worldly wisdom, whereof they followed the maxims. Their vertue degenerated into ostentation, and they became Braggadochioes, when they could be no longer Sages; and as it is often weakness that makes men bold, so it was only vanity that made the Pa­gans become vertuous. The life of Appollonius so full of Prodigies, was only written by Philostratus, that he might oppose it to the miraculous life of JESUS CHRIST: So likewise the lives of the Sophists were published by Eunapius, who lived under Theodo­sius the great; that he might compare them to the lives of the Primitive Be­lievers, and overthrow the belief that men had in their Doctrine. Vopiscus in imitation of Eunapius undertook the same: and long before them Epictetus, who had remitted much of that haugh­tiness which he learned from Zeno, [Page 151]by the Conversation he had with the Christians, gave occasion to that spirit of emulation, which made the Morality of the Stoicks reflourish un­der the Empire of the Antonines: For at that time most part of Philosophers became Stoicks, as Sextus Empiricus affirms, that they might counterfeit the severity of Christianity by that sur­ly gravity which the Porch inspired in­to them, and which was good for no­thing but to puff man up. But how­ever, all other moral Philosophy ap­peared very defective in comparison of Christian morality; which only at length became commendable, by the profession it made of modesty, disin­terestedness, and sincerity. For there is none but the Christian Doctrine, that teaches man to appear to be what he is, and to be what he appears; be­cause to a Christian whose Glory is his Infirmity, it is no shame to discover his Imperfections. He is that true Hero, who has always courage enough to be sincere, and is never so weak as to disguise himself. All the Pagan Mo­rality [Page 152]was overthrown by the first word that JESUS CHRIST uttered in pub­lick; when in his Sermon on the Mount he pronounced, Happy the poor and humble in spirit: because all the Pagan Morality is but Pride, and the Christian, Submission. The one teaches man to be vain, and the other to be modest. And seeing purity of manners and sincerity is only to be found among Christians, it may be affirmed, that there is no real Probity out of Christianity. For the greatest Probity that can be, if it be attacked by an interest as prevalent as is the motive to the vertue whereof it makes Profession, may succumb. It is on­ly to be found in our Religion, wherein the interest of an Eternity, which surpas­ses all other concerns, can render impreg­nable the principles that support it. So that out of Christianity there is no true Morality, because there is no real vertue: and every Morality else, besides that of a Christian, is commonly but a kind of policy, and piece of cunning.

IX.

The truth is, Pagan Morality began [Page 153]of it self to appear so weak for sup­porting the infirmity of man, that it fell altogether into contempt, amongst those who aspired to a good life: for besides that the indifference for pleasure or pain, for riches or poverty, for glory or ignominy, which Zeno taught, is not to be found real but in the Chri­stian Religion; and that that Feli­city which Philosophy endeavoured to find in sufferings, was only to be found in our Doctrine, all the Vertue of Pa­gans appeared to those that examined it, but an Art to hide Vices, and a Lesson of Ignorance; because it teach­es man only to fill his mind with false Notions of Constancy and Stedfastness, whilst Christian Philosophy discovers to him his infirmities; and that the one teaches him to follow his desires, and the other to repress them. By the help of that light, and by the know­ledge of these admirable truths the new Morality of the Gospel was esta­blished, which made the wise change their maxims, and all the earth its coun­tenance: because that Heavenly Do­ctrine [Page 154]of the Law of Grace, wherein God had included the depth of his Wisdom, having taught man what it behoved him to hate, and what he ought to love; humiliation and po­verty became preferable to greatness and riches; and the Christian measur­ed no more his esteem and inclinations, but by the Eternity which God pro­posed to him for a recompense. That was the Morality which the Apostles preached, which the Martyrs sealed with their Blood, which Virgins san­ctified by the Purity of Life, which the Laws authorised, and which, in fine, was setled in the World by Probity and Reason. Amongst the Fathers who best explained that Divine Morality to men, S. Basil, S. Chrysostome, S. Jerome, S. Ambrose, S. Augustin, S. Gregory, S. Bernard and Thomas Aquinas, ob­tained greatest reputation. S. Basil did it as a Spiritual Father, in his asce­tick discourses; S. Chrysostome as a preacher in his Sermons, and in his Meditations on the Epistles of S. Paul, where he hath left us one of the per­fectest [Page 455]Ideas of Morality, which we have in our Religion; and a pattern likewise of preaching, which ought to be proposed to those who are called to that holy Ministry: S. Jerome, S. Ambrose, and S. Augustin have done it as Interpreters of the Scripture, and Doctors of the Church; S. Gregory as a Philosopher by his Allegories; S. Ber­nard as a Contemplative, and Thomas Aquinas as a Theologue. His secunda secundae is the most rational, the best digested, and most accurate Morality that hath ever been written. It is in­deed the Morality of Aristotle reduced into the perfectest method that it can be. Javellus a theologue of the same order with Thomas Aquinas, hath writ­ten the best after him on that part of Philosophy. The work of Petrarch upon the divers accidents of life, is a kind of Moral Philosophy: but seeing it is made up but of curious reflexions on Fortune, it is of no use for mans conduct. It is true that it is fer­tile in thoughts, but very barren in Reason and Discourse. There is more [Page 156]ingeniousness in the Morality of Bacon, than in his other works. Every thing therein is well excogitated; but I know not if all be true. The wisdom of Car­dan teaches nothing less than manners, his notions are empty, which prescribe no real course for the conduct of life; and that knowledge of the World which he promises, is but a Morality of often­tation and no-ways of practice. Des­cartes in his method hath but one or two principles of Morality; Natural Philosophy was his predominant passi­on. I wave an infinite number of o­ther Authors, who have succeeded in this kind of writing, especially the Italians and Spaniards, who are pleased to moralize more than other people, as appears by their spiritual Fathers, who are the most famous.

X.

To conclude, we have seen in these last Ages Moralities, whose maxims were admirable, and their principles notwithstanding horrid. Men suffer themselves to be misled by these fair appearances, because they examine not [Page 157]the grounds of them; and blindly fol­low those maxims, without informing themselves of the principles thereof. The purest Morality cannot be true, if it be not founded on a sound and Ortho­dox Faith; such as is that of the Univer­sal Church, to which men should adhere, and firmly relye on. But it is a matter much to be lamented, That that Mora­lity, which might be so ready a relief to Christians in their afflictions, becomes to them almost useless when they stand in need of it, through the Igno­rance in which they live, of the Holy Instructions of so saving a Philosophy; That so necessary a remedy turns fruit­less through the levity of our minds, which in vain seek after Humane Con­solations; and through a Natural Cu­riosity which puts out the heavenly light within us, and fills our souls with extreme darkness. Happy is that Christian who being perswaded of his Religion, knows no other Philoso­phy but the fear of the Lord, which is the beginning of true Wisdom. But that once for all we may undeceive our [Page 158]selves of the Vanity of all Humane Knowledge: let us labour to conceive how cold are all the consolations of Pa­gan Morality to a man abandoned of all the World, after that he hath been adored therein, such as we have seen in this Age; and how comfortable to a man in affliction is the Morality of our Religion, though it should only serve to redouble his Faith in the Agony of Tribulation, by teaching him that af­fliction is a favour, and that temporal pain is the assurance of a Joy and Re­ward that shall never have an end. In this it is properly that the Chief Good, which Pagan Philosophy in vain sought after, does consist, which can only be the fruit of the pure and holy Christian Religion: but nothing denotes so much the weakness of man, as to know that Chief Good, and not to love it; to have reason and want strength to follow it; and to be always endeavouring to per­swade, but never able to convince him­self.

I.

I Very well conceive that man may frame to himself principles of Lo­gick and Moral Philosophy, be­cause reasoning, and manners, which are the object of these two Sci­ences, are the work of man: but I can­not conceive how he dares form prin­ciples of Natural Philosophy, where­of Nature is the object, and that the Work of God. In effect what means have we to know the design of the Creator, who many times have not understanding enough to know the designs of the Creature? Did God [Page 160]advise with you, when he suspended in the air the Foundations of the Earth, to frame an Universe? And which of the Philosophers hath sounded that e­ternal wisdom, which was before all things, that he might discover the depth of his thoughts. St. Augustin saith, that the World is a great Theatre, where the Art of him that made it shines forth on all hands: But is it not rather a great Riddle which the Philo­sophers have essayed to explain with­out being able to succeed in it. It is true there have been minds sufficiently qualified, to know the effects of na­ture by examining their causes: But never was there any as yet capable, to see into the intentions of the Creatour, and to discover the hidden secrets of his art, by knowing the principles of this great work. For if the smallest Creatures that are within the reach of our senses, and which we have so long studied, have something that is incom­prehensible: If the smallest Herbs of the Fields have qualities unknown to man: Shall we be so vain as to pretend to [Page 161]know the vertue of those great Ma­chins which compose the World, and to ascend to the source of all the Won­ders that we admire therein. Let us not deceive our selves: Nature hath her mysteries; she attains her ends by wayes that we are ignorant of: And since men have applied themselves to the knowledge of her Secrets, there hath been so little of certainty disco­vered, that one would think nothing should more bring down the pride of man, than the study of Natural Phi­losophy. It is an abstruse and profound Science, wherein there is little agreed upon amongst men: those that have spoken of it best, have as yet said no­thing to the purpose: So therefore let us not beat our Brains to imagine new Systemes. That matter hath already passed through so many heads, that if there had been any better than what we know, it would have been found out: And indeed, after so much think­ing on it, it is even wisdom to mind it no more; and to content our selves by an humble acknowledgment of [Page 162]our own ignorance, to admire the depth of the knowledge of God. It is true, there is nothing so capable, fully to satisfie the mind of man, as the con­sideration of Nature, and Natural Be­ings; no other Science tickles so much our curiosity. Happy is he that can know any thing thereof; but Nature shows her self to us only by her out-side. The knowledge that we have of her is but superficial, and God Almighty to punish our Pride, takes pleasure to a­bandon us to our curiosity, as to a cha­stisement; because by inspiring into us a desire to know all things, he re­duces us to the pass of being ignorant of all, and even of our selves.

II.

But by how much that Science is vain through the obscurity and uncertainty of the matters it treats of, by so much it is frivolous through the Diversity of Opinions, that are to be found in the sentiments of the greatest men who studied it; for all the Ancient Philoso­phy hath hardly as yet been able to e­stablish any Principle that is agreed [Page 163]upon. Thales makes Water the prin­ciple of all things. Heraclitus pre­tends that it is Fire; Anaximenes will have it to be the Air; Pythagoras maintains they are numbers; Democri­tus Atomes, Musaeus Unity, Parmeni­des Infinitum, or Infinitude. And in so profound an obscurity of Natural Be­ings, and among so many different sentiments one cannot be sure of any thing. Protagoras thinks that what appears true to every one severally, is true in effect. Aristippus will have nothing true but what one perceives by an internal perswasion of mind. Chrysippus says, that the senses are con­tinual impostours. Lucretius assures us that they never are. Picus Miran­dola in the examination that he hath made of the Doctrine of the Pagans, Ludovicus Vives in his Book of the Corruption of Arts, Possevin in the third Book of his Bibliotheck, are elo­quent upon the uncertainty of the Judgments of Men: in effect there is nothing more certain than that, nor freer from dispute. It is not, that one [Page 164]ought to doubt of every thing; but we should not at least too easily believe these Philosophers, who propose to us daily new principles of Natural Philo­sophy. Let us examine them before we believe them: let us distinguish what is probable in their Doctrine from what is true, and not suffer our selves to be surprized by their Conjectures. Let us admit of no Systemes, but upon the terms that Ptolomy proposed his, which he desired should pass for an Opinion, without pretending that men should believe it on his Authority, before that he proved his Reasons. And in truth one is very ridiculous, when he speaks not modestly on this matter, whereof there is scarcely any thing known. Lu­cretius for all he is so presumptious in the Judgments that he makes on Na­ture, confesses that he knows not the Principles thereof. It may be said then in general, that the Primitive Philoso­phers by giving their principles, have only pretended to give their con­jectures; for Nature shews her self hard­ly to any man. It is true, the Invisible [Page 165]Power of its Vertue may be known by the visible effects of its Operations. But what Eye is so sharp as to pene­trate to the source of its Intentions, and to unfold the Designs thereof? Let us therefore only consider the Principles which Naturalists propose to us, as Explications which may be made on what passes in Nature, and not as Laws that they impose upon her. Let us look upon the Numbers of Pythagoras, the Atoms of Democritus, the Pleni­tude and Vacuity of Leucippus, the Ideas of Plato, the Matter and Form of Aristotle, the Vortices and Corpuscles of Descartes, which these great men propose for the Principles of their Na­tural Philosophy, as Conjectures to be examined, and not as Rules to be fol­lowed. Let us even listen more favou­rably to those who give the best Rea­son for every thing, because they have had the wit to rank their Imaginations in better order: But let us not think them such Fools, as to have been wil­ling to vent for Science, what is but Opinion, and to make current for [Page 166]Truth, what is but Probability. It is a Caution that one cannot take too much to make him walk discreetly in so obscure a Path as that of Natural Philosophy, the ways whereof are un­certain. For as a false Rule makes a whole Building irregular; so in the same manner a false Principle renders the whole Platform of Natural Philo­sophy defective.

III.

What course is then to be taken in so great an uncertainty, and what guide may one follow in so difficult a way? Plutarch in the second Volume of his Opuscles, reckons up the diffe­rent Opinions of the ancient Philoso­phers concerning Natural Philosophy, to a pretty considerable number, as Cicero had done before in his A­cademicks: and both adhere to the sentiment of Aristotle, which after exa­mination of all they prefer to the rest: wherein they were followed by Galen, and all the solid wits that have been since. So that ye have at first great Suffrages for Aristotle: For what can [Page 167]be more advantageous for that Philo­sopher, than the testimony of these great men; who have been all three particularly considerable, for the soli­dity of their judgment, and the accu­rateness of their Criticks. That judg­ment which they made of Aristotle, hath been followed by all those who in the following Ages applyed themselves to the discerning of the capacity of that profound Genius. S. Jerom saith that the mind of that Philosopher hath been a kind of Prodigie of Nature, who knew all that man is naturally ca­pable to know. And Medina a Spanish Divine, pretends that the capacity of the Spirit of man cannot dive into the knowledge of Nature, as Aristotle did, without the particular assistance of a good or bad Angel. It is true, that besides that that Philosopher hath re­ported all that hath been said in Natu­ral Philosophy before himself, to ap­prove or to refute it; there is nothing almost since to be found in that Science which is rational, that hath not pas­sed the tryal of his thoughts, and [Page 168]whereof he hath not conceived the Principles. But seeing men never al­most study him by themselves, or that he is not well understood by them; there are a kind of good people, who take sometimes that which he refutes, for the thing he approves; and that which he approves for what he refutes. This occasions contradictions in his Followers, who to warrant themselves by his authority, make him incline to their side, whether he will or not: and so it is no wonder if themselves be lost, when they have put their Guide out of the way.

IV.

But let us not be dazled with the lu­stre of the high reputation of that Phi­losopher; let us neither listen to the Voice of all Ages, nor to the Votes of all the Learned that have spoken in his favour; let us trye Aristotle by him­self, let us see in what manner he hath handled that Science of Natural Philo­sophy, which is the most common Rock on which all Philosophers split: and that we may not be surprized, let [Page 169]us begin to judge of his Doctrine by his Principles, that we may be the more equitable in our sentence. As he had a Wit beyond the common rate of men, so he followed extraordinary methods. He begins by a kind of History of the Opinions of all the Philosophers that went before him; and that he might furnish his thoughts with matter, and say nothing but what he himself was fully informed of, he is willing to know all that others have said on the same subject. And instead of going into forraign Countreys to converse with the Learned, as Plato did into E­gypt, Persia and Italy, there to study their sentiments: Aristotle shut himself up in his Closet, that he might exa­mine in private all that was written on Natural Philosophy, and upon that examination establish his Opinion, re­jecting what made against him, and making use of what he found for his turn. This was his first method. He affirms nothing but what he was sure of, by the perfect knowledge he had [Page 170]of the Opinions of their Philosophers. His Physicks are an abridgment of the Natural Philosophy of Pythagoras, O­cellus, Timaeus, Leucippus, Parmenides, Hippocrates, Melissus, Democritus, and of others that went before him. The most part of Philosophers speak at ran­dom what they think fit; Aristotle alone dives into his matter, prepares it by overthrowing that which choaks his Opinion, and lays down nothing, till he hath first refuted that which is con­trary to his Doctrine, and therein con­sisted his chief Talent. That is the method which he takes to establish his Principles. For having overthrown the Opinion of Parmenides and Me­lissus, who established an immoveable and infinite being for the Principle of all things; having made appear the ab­surdity of the sentiment of Democritus, Empedocles, Anaxagoras, and the o­ther Philosophers; he lays down his Opinion of three Principles, Matter Form and Privation, as the most proper method to illustrate the altera­tion [Page 171]which happens in Generation; wherein men always conceive some­thing that receives, and something which is received, that is to say, a sub­ject common to the Form which comes a-new, and to that which goes away: and that is so true, that without it a new production cannot be conceived. Plato, who admits the same Principles as Aristotle doth, distinguishes not Pri­vation from Matter as he doth, who is the Author of that distinction, and brags of it as his own Invention. That made him say in the last Chapter of his first Book of Physicks, that most part of the errours of Ancient Philosophy proceeded from this, that the first Phi­losophers had not framed a distinct e­nough Idea of Matter and Privation: and that which he calls Form, is no­thing else but the principle of the dis­positions, qualities and operations of every compound being; and which constitutes every thing in its essence making it to be what it is: so that taking these three Principles of Aristo­tle as a proper method to give a Notion [Page 172]of what occurs in all the mutations that happen in Nature, and to facilitate the knowledge which men ought to have thereof, they are preferable to the principles of all the other Philosophers. And this is an abridgment of his general Physicks.

V.

In the first Book, he lays down the method that he proposes to himself in his design; and seeing the knowledge of Nature is in it self obscure, he pre­tends that men should raise themselves as by steps to clear and evident notions, from such as are not so; and that in that Science we must descend from ge­nerals to particulars. He adds that in that manner all things become clear in becoming sensible by their particular accidents and circumstances. Having established that method, in the rest of that Book he refutes the principles of other Philosophers to confirm his own. In the second Book he examines what Nature is, and inquires into the proper signification of that terme. In the se­cond, third, fourth and fifth Books he [Page 173]treats of Causes, of Motion, and of Place, which are the attributes of a Na­tural Body. In the sixth Book he ex­plains Quantity, whereof he makes an exact Treatise; he begins to give an Idea of the first Mover in the seventh Book: and in the eighth he speaks of Time which is the natural measure of Motion. In the first and second Books of the Heavens he describes the Stars, the matter whereof they are formed, their Qualities, Motion, Scituation, Figure, and all that concerns the con­struction of the World: and in the third and fourth he treats of the Gra­vity and Levity of Celestial Bodies, and of the different Opinions that the Ancients entertained thereof: and there he discourses likewise of the Elements and their Qualities. In the first Book of the Meteors he explains all that happens in the Air: in the third and fourth, what occurs in the Earth and Sea; where he likewise treats of Winds, Thunder, Lightning, Exha­lations, Thunder-bolts, the Rain-bow, False-suns or Parelies: and in the fourth [Page 174]he speaks of Heat and Cold, of Siecity and Humidity, of Putrefaction, of Salts, of the different qualities of mixt bodi­es, of their mixture and temperament. In the three Books of the Soul, he ex­plains its nature, and the operations thereof, aswell by the external senses, as by the internal faculties. In the Books of his little natural questions he observes particularly all that concerns sensation, memory, reminiscence, sleep­ing, waking, dreams, the prognostick of dreams, the motion of Animals, their progression, the length and shortness of life, old age, youth, respiration, sick­ness and health. The History of Ani­mals is his Masterpiece, and the com­pleatest of his Physicks; in the four first he hath included the different kinds of Animals, and in the five last he hath hinted at their divers manners of mul­tiplication: he hath enriched that work with an infinite number of Experi­ments, and curious Questions, where one may find, if he narrowly observe, the first hints of the most part of the new discoveries, whereof modern Phi­losophy [Page 175]boasts. I wave his Book of Co­lours, his Treatise of Physiognomy, his mechanical Questions, his Problems, the two Books of Generation and Cor­ruption, the Book of the World, which he composed for Alexander, and many other Subjects which he hath handled, wherein he rendred a Reason of every thing from the greatest to the least, as Diogenes Laertius observes. This makes me say for Conclusion, that his Natu­ral Philosophy is the most ample that ever was; and that there has nothing escaped that vast mind, whose profound capacity and comprehensive genius hath fathomed all things.

VI.

And so much may be said in favour of Aristotle: Let us now see what may be found amiss in him. There is a great deal of confusion in that Treatise of his eight Books of Physicks: The connexion is no-ways natural; there is nothing harder to be understood than the first Matter, and the eduction of Forms out of that Matter: the whole treatise of Motion is abstracted; the e­ternity [Page 176]of Motion which in his eighth Book he pretends to prove by circula­tion is incomprehensible, and all that Book is too metaphysical. The Trea­tise of Time and Place is not purely physical, seeing it can quadrate to Spi­rits. What he says of Time is borrow­ed from Archytas, as that which he speaks of Motion is taken from Ocellus, and what he says of Vacuity from Ti­maeus, as Patricius has observed. What he affirms in the two first Books of the Heavens, in the Treatises of Comets, the Rain-bow, and of some other Me­teors, is not found to be true in all its Circumstances: Yet the fourth Book of Meteors is to be excepted, which seem­eth to be more exact than the rest. The Scituation, which in the third Book of the Heavens he hath given to the sphere of Elementary Fire, conform to the Opinion of Leucippus and Democri­tus, has not any Foundation: Pytha­goras was not of that opinion. In his second Book of Meteors he pretends that the Earth under the Equinoctial cannot be inhabited: which Experience [Page 177]proves to be false. But what he teaches of the eternity of the World, how fals­ly soever, is still more pardonable than the rest. He could not conceive the Creator but in the way that we con­ceive the Sun, which produces light at the very instant that it begins to be: and from thence there may be even great advantage drawn against the Ar­rians, who could not comprehend the Word but with some kind of posterio­rity to his Principle. So that the Er­rour of Aristotle might have furnished Reasons to rectifie the Arrians, who perhaps would not have lost their way, if they had listned to the Argument of that Pagan, although he was out of the way himself. Patricius a Philosopher of Venice, in his Book of the Discussi­ons of the Doctrine of Aristotle; Ra­mus in his Physical Schools, Gassendus in his Observations against the Peripa­teticks, relate a great many things in Natural Philosophy, wherein that Phi­losopher has been mistaken, especially in the order and construction of Cele­stial Bodies, in the History of Animals, [Page 178]in the Anatomy of the Body of man, and in some other matters. I grant the modern Natural Philosophy is so im­proved by Experiments, and by the help of new Instruments, whereof it makes use, that it hath surpassed the Physicks of Aristotle in some things, which have been more clearly disco­vered in the progress of time: and that the most part of the Opinions of anci­ent Philosophers, contained in the se­cond Tome of the Works of Plutarch, concerning the Heavens and Stars, are found false by Instruments proper for Celestial Observations, that have been invented in these last Ages. In fine, I grant that Aristotle is less demonstra­tive in his Physicks, than in the other parts of his Philosophy, that his me­thod is not so exact, nor his principles so sure. But that defect is more to be imputed to the matter, than to the ca­pacity of the Workman, which shows it self always equally vigorous in all his Reasonings and Reflexions. Reason it self for all it is so universal, yet is limited in some Subjects: and one cannot trans­gress [Page 179]those limits, but that he goes too far.

VII.

This is the judgment that may be made of all the Philosophers, whether ancient or modern, who have written on Natural Philosophy. The Egypti­ans have left nothing on this Science, whereof there remains any trace, but their Observations on the Heavens and Celestial Bodies; which they under­stood better than other people, because the quality of their spirits born to Prog­nosticks, inclined them more to it. Sim­plicius says that Calisthenes, at the desire of Aristotle his Kinsman, sent into Greece Observations on the Heavens, made by the Chaldeans, for above two thou­sand years before Alexander. Porphyrie assures us, that he saw these Observa­tions. What the Phenicians and Aethio­pians wrote on Natural Philosophy is lost, by the loss of the Books of Dio­dorus the Sicilian, from the fifth to the eleventh. However the Grecians, who have been the Masters in all others Scien­ces, have been likewise in this, whereon [Page 180]they have written better than other people, and have been the first obser­vers of Nature. For Plutarch in the Life of Nicias saith, that Anaxagoras and the other Philosophers of Ionia of that time were only Naturalists. To speak properly, the Assyrians under­stood no more but the first Elements of Astronomy, by the unexact Observa­tions which they made without Instru­ments; having no other way to mea­sure the motions of the Stars but by water-Glasses. Amongst the Grecian Philosophers Pythagoras, and Ocellus, Architas, Timaeus, who were his Disci­ples, Hippocrates, Leucippus, and Demo­critus studied Nature, and wrote there­on more learnedly than others. Demo­critus is one of the greatest Naturalists that ever was; to whom Aulus Gellius gives many Elogies. Empedocles com­posed a Natural Philosophy in Verse, according to the Principles of Pythago­ras, of which Lucretius speaks as of a miracle, and whereof Aristotle and Dio­genes Laertius make mention. Plato hath written hardly any thing on this [Page 181]part, which he hath not taken from the Pythagoreans. The Opinion of Demo­critus, which had many Followers be­fore and after Aristotle, and which is revived by most part of the modern Natural Philosophers of note, is some­what more real and sensible by the Do­ctrine of Atoms, than the Opinion of Aristotle of Matter, Form, and Priva­tion: but besides that it establishes a Matter, without establishing a Work­man, that is to say, an Art without an Artist; that Doctrine which is much the same with that of Leucippus, falls into so great absurdities when it is exa­mined to the bottom, that one hath much ado not to reject it. Socrates who found that the Sophists had abused that part of Philosophy by their false argumentations, took another way and applyed himself to Morality. So that what Plato brings him in saying of Na­tural Things, is none of his, as Xeno­phon alledges. The Book of Theophra­stus on Plants, is in the judgment of Julius Scaliger, who hath comment­ed on it, one of the loveliest pieces of [Page 182]Natural Philosophy, that is to be found in all Antiquity. Zeno the head of the Stoicks hath nothing particular in his Physicks, but that he explains not him­self as others do; though his senti­ments be the same. He establishes two Principles, God and Matter: He assigns to the World a Soul so diffused in all the parts thereof, that he makes it a great Animal. Lipsius hath abridged the Phy­sicks of this Philosopher, as he hath his Morals. Epicurus is uncertain in his Physicks: he takes a singular way of his own in all things. Cicero thinks that this Philosopher, having addicted himself to Democritus, hath spoiled his Opinion by what he hath changed in it: he taught Natural Philosophy only to secure himself against the fears which Religion occasions. Vacuity and Atoms are the principles of his Physicks. The Epicureans little understood the nature of Motion, because they no ways un­derstood the nature of Time and Place, whereof the explication belongs to the Metaphysicks. Notwithstanding of that, Lucretius hath preferred Epicurus [Page 183]to all the other Philosophers, and hath set him off for the greatest man that ever was: as appears by the Elogies which he makes of him in divers pla­ces of his Poem; and especially in the beginning of his third Book, where he speaks of him in a strain, wherein never man was spoken of. Amafanius, of whom Cicero makes mention, main­tains nothing different from Epicurus, whose Doctrine he describes. Plutarch cites a Book of Nature and Natural Be­ings, composed by Chrysippus, which Favorinus praiseth much. What remains of the Works of Natural Philosophy written by the Greeks, is to be found by shreds in the Fragments of Diogenes Laertius. We are promised from Flo­rence a Work, whose Author named Rucelai, hath collected all that the An­cients have written on that Science; and which he reduced to six and thirty different Systems of Natural Philosophy: But seeing that Work which he hath written in Italian, and which contains twelve Volumes, could not come to light before his death, it is to be feared [Page 184]that it will not yet appear so soon, by rea­son of the loss that Learning hath sustain­ed by the death of Cardinal de Medicis, who alone might have hastened the im­pression.

VIII.

Though the Romans have not much applyed themselves to Natural Philo­sophy, the honour of which they ought wholly to yield to the Greeks; yet there are to be found amongst them learned Works on that subject. There hath been nothing written in Latine, in a more polished and purer stile, than the Poem of Lucretius on the Philoso­phy of Epicurus; which for the puri­ty of diction Lambinus prefers to Vir­gil: but there is no piece more dange­rous for Morality. Cicero, who under­stood the Philosophy of the Grecians, and wrote of it the best of all the Ro­mans, speaks thereof in such a man­ner, that one cannot tell what opinion he was of: when we take him upright, we find that he addicts himself to no­thing, and that he diverts himself with every thing: but in fine, it is known [Page 185]that Plato and Aristotle please him bet­ter than the rest. Seneca, it seems, hath not well observed a Didactick way in his Books of Natural Questi­ons; he makes too subtle Reflexions, where natural simplicity is only neces­sary; he affects too much to be moral, where he should only be natural. No man hath written more in Latine on Natural Philosophy, nor with greater elegancy, than Pliny: the sole Idea of his Work is the vastest design that e­ver entred into the mind of man. He is the universal Historian of Nature, who hath given his opinion of every thing, and well; he hath pickt up a thousand things, that without him would have been lost. But if we con­sult the sentiment of Salmasius in his Observations on Pliny, we shall find that that Author hath many times suf­fered himself to be deceived by those who furnished him with the Memori­als of his History; that he hath some­times lost the way himself, by assaying to go too far; that he hath been too credulous in following the Opinions of [Page 186]others, and too hasty to follow his own; that in his Relations he takes sometimes greater care of the beauty of words, than the verity of things; and that the necessity that he found himself in of relying on the credit of others, makes his own to be question­ed. Not but that he hath had Patrons in these last Ages, who pretend that most part of the matters which he pub­lished, and whereof men heretofore doubted, are found after strict exami­nation to be true. Yet I think we ought to trust more to Salmasius than to those others, who hath written more learnedly on Pliny than all that have gone before him; and it must be ac­knowledged, that the work of Pliny is too large to be very exact. Howe­ver his History is one of the most ad­mirable works of antiquity. Plutarch, Dioscorides, Elianus and Solinus, eve­ry one of them in their own way have by their Books likewise much enriched Natural Philosophy: Plutarch is more a Moralist than Naturalist, Dioscorides more Physitian than Philosopher, E­lianus [Page 187]a better Historian than Natura­list, and Solinus a greater Geographer than observer of Nature. Galen hath built upon the Natural Philosophy of Hippocrates whom he followed exactly, and hath taken many things from Pli­ny, whose Natural History he studied much. All the other learned of the following ages have divided them­selves according to the inclination they have had for Plato, or for Aristotle; as Avicenna and Averroes have done: and that was likewise the party which the Schoolmen embraced in the Ages wherein their Sect hath flourished most. But most of them have stuck to Ari­stotle, notwithstanding of the Animo­sity and Jealousies that set them toge­ther by the Ears. The Schools with all the Arrogance which they inspired into their Disciples, have not been so bold for the space of three hundred years, as to teach any thing in Natural Philosophy, which was not conform to the sentiments of Aristotle.

IX.

The Modern Natural Philosophy [Page 188]began not to be formed, until the last age. Galileus a Florentine Philo­sopher was the first that conceived such a design, upon the notion that he had of the Principles of Leucippus. He was a man of solid wit, who by the perfect knowledge he had of Astrono­my and Geometry, hath reasoned bet­ter on the nature of Motion, than those that went before him or followed after. He was the first that found out the proportion of the vibrations of sus­pended weights, and of the accelera­tion of the motion of heavy bodies in falling, whereof he took the princi­ples from Aristotle. He was more a Peripatetick than his Successors: but in reforming the Ancients he hath ta­ken too modern an Air. For he fol­lows the Opinion of Copernicus in the Systeme of the World, which he hath reformed: and by the use of the Teles­cope, he discovered many new Stars, he observed spots in the Sun, he found Mountains and Vallies in the Moon, he observed waxings and waneings in the Planet Venus, he shewed great [Page 189]strength in his reasonings, and acquired singular Reputation in Italy, where he was in a manner the founder of Mo­dern Philosophy. Thus did Bacon a­waken the love of Philosophy in his Country. He had a vast genius for Natural Philosophy, but hath in no part which he treated of it, better succeeded, than in his History of Winds: though he hath been a little too credu­lous as to the memorials which were furnished him on that subject. The rest of his Natural Philosophy is not of the same force; though the Cha­racter of his Wit appear therein in all its features: and what he hath written on Nature hath not contributed a little to excite the minds of his Country-men to the love of that Science, and to the study of natural beings, which of late has reflourished in England; where he hath found many imitators of the passion he had for Philosophy. The Physicks of Campanella, wherein he gives sensation to the most insensible things of nature, whereof he proves all the parts to be animated, is a Vision [Page 191]to which he was subject. Telesius is of his opinion in his treatise against Galen. He is too bold in his decisions, he treats Aristotle often very highly, but with­out reason. Gilbertus hath explained the Experiments of the Loadstone bet­ter than any other. Harvey has reason­ed the best on the progress of the gene­ration of Animals, and the circulation of the Blood, as Fromond hath writ­ten the best of Meteors, Savot of Co­lours, Mersennus of Sounds and Har­mony, Willis of the Brain and its parts, Grew of the Anatomy of Plants. Floid hath little sound Reason: and he might pass for the Paracelsus of Philosophers, as Paracelsus for the Floid of Physicians; for they are two Spirits much like one another. Gassendus hath written well against the Natural Philosophy of Floid. Borellus is a good Geometrician, and no bad Naturalist, but without any prin­ciple of Metaphysick, which makes him not very sure in his Propositions. Tho­mas Hobbes hath shewed a great depth of wit in his Physicks; but as he is one of the boldest Epicureans of these [Page 190]last Ages, and follows in every thing the principles of Epicurus, with­out any reserve; so hath he reasoned ill about the Mind and its chief Opera­tions, the principle of which he attri­butes to Phantasms, and the Imagina­tion. Boile is a rational person, who hath applyed himself to the enriching of Natural Philosophy by his Experi­ments and Reflexions, which have al­ways an air of solidity. Gassendus is but the Restorer of the Physicks of Epicurus; which he hath handled by Galileus his principles of Motion, wherein he is altogether Galileist; and for the rest an Epicurean mitigated by a principle of Conscience: for he ac­knowledges the creation of Atoms, which Epicurus denys; he will have God to give them the Motion, Extensi­on and Figure, which Epicurus ascribes to themselves: he admits of Provi­dence, which that Philosopher allow­ed not. In fine, he makes Epicurus an honest man, because he is so himself: but never man hath treated Aristotle worse, whom he calls ignorant, fool, [Page 192]and fancyful, for all he was himself so moderate. As to Vanhelmont, who can find nothing rational in Aristotle's Phy­sicks, it must be acknowledged his judg­ment is not great: the truth is Paracel­sus had infected his Wit.

X.

Now after all, that we may do ju­stice to our Nation, and to the Me­morie of Descartes, we must acknow­ledge that his Natural Philosophy is one of the most learned and accomplish­ed pieces of Modern Physicks: In it there are curious Idea's, and quaint Imaginations: and if one mind it well, there is to be found therein a more re­gular Doctrine, than in Galilaeus or the English; and even more novelty and invention than in Gassendus himself. In a word, it is a Work whereof the or­der is well excogitated: his Method is altogether Geometrical, which leads from principles to principles, and from propositions to propositions. However this is to be found fault with in him; That he settles for the principle of a Natural Body, motion, figure and ex­tension, [Page 193]which are much the same with the Principles of Democritus and Epicurus: Whereupon it is said, That Father Mersenne, who was his Resident at Paris, having one day given out in an Assembly of the Learned, That Mon­sieur Descartes, who had gained Repu­tation by his Geometrie, was project­ing a method of Natural Philosophy, wherein he admitted Vacuity; that project was hissed at by Robertval and some others, who from thenceforwards thought it would prove no great at­chievement. Father Mersenne wrote to him that Vacuity was not then a-la­mode at Paris: which obliged Des­cartes to devise measures to keep in good terms with the new Naturalists, whose suffrage he courted, and to ad­mit the plenitude of Leucippus: So through policy the exclusion of Vacuity became one of his Principles. This made Gassendus start new difficulties to him; showing him, that if there were no Vacuity, motion, which was one of his Principles, would be impossible: because nothing moves if there be no [Page 194]void for it Descartes to salve that in­convenience, invented his thin subtile matter, whereof he made a kind of engine which he applied to many things; and thereby he reconciled the opinion of Plenitude and Vacuity, ac­cording as he stood in need of either. But as Plenitude, and that thin subtile matter got place in the Systeme of Des­cartes, meerly out of complaisance to the relish of the Age, and as an after­game; so his Philosophy seemed weak in the matter of motion, which is one of his Principles. For that Philoso­pher taught that all motion was cre­ated with the World, that there was no new motion produced, and that it did no more but shift from one Body to another: That the thin subtile matter by its impulse, caused all the gravity or levity of Bodies: That the alteration of heavy Bodies in their motion towards the center, proceeded from the same impulse: That heat was nothing but the agitation of the particles of the Air put in motion by the subtile matter, which in his [Page 195]Doctrine was a kind of a Spring fit for all things. That the Vegetation of Plants, and Generation of Animals is performed only by a fortuitous mo­tion of his little Bodies, as a Palace might be erected by a heap of Stones moved by chance: That there is no sensation in Animals: That these De­monstrations of Joy, Sadness, Amity, and Aversion, these impressions of pain and pleasure, that appear in them, are but the effects of a kind of Spring and Engine, that plays according as the matter is disposed: That heat is not in the Fire, hardness in the Marble, humidity in the Water; that these things are only in the Soul, which finds Fire hot, Marble hard, and Water hu­mid, by its thought, and not at all by these qualities, which are but Chy­mera's. In fine, Descartes, who would have us begin, by doubting of every thing, to lay aside all our notices, strip our selves of our Sentiments, of Cu­stom, Education, Opinion, of our very Senses, and all other impressions, that we may but learn some small inconsi­derable [Page 196]matter, demands more than he promises. And when, to give the rea­son of things, he says, they happen by a certain Figure, Motion, or Extension, he hath said all; for he dives into no­thing, and for all he pretends to be so great a Democritist, he understands not the true Doctrine of Democritus. His System of the Loadstone with these little hooked bodies, these hol­lowed and spiral parts, is without foundation. His opinion of the Flux and Reflux of the Sea, by the impression of the Atmosphere of the Moon, is found false by experience; for the parts of Water that are under the Moon, swell instead of sinking, as he saith. The explication which he gives to all the motions of the Soul in its passions by the Conjunction of Nerves and Fi­bres which are inserted in the (glandula pinealis) is a Dream, for there are no Nerves which terminate at that glan­dule: he says nothing rational con­cerning sounds. In fine, it may be said, that he is very like those Pythago­reans of whom Aristotle speaks, who [Page 197]did not so much endeavour to give a reason of the things they explained, as to reduce every thing to their own Principles and System. However, as he made it his business rather to show his Wit, than to discover the truth; so when one is so rational as to be satis­fied with probabilities, he may find e­nough to satisfie himself in that Na­tural Philosophy: yet that haughtiness of his Disciples, who call all other Phi­losophers ignorants, is not to be appro­ved of: their minds are dazled with a new kind of Language, and there­fore they make a noise, as all novel­ties do. The obscurity of his expres­sion encreased the number of his fol­lowers; for in matter of Doctrine that is often found to be the best which is least understood.

XI.

The Natural Philosophy of the Chy­mists with their three principles, Salt, Sulphur, and Mercury, hath no Solidi­ty: they are narrow-spirited Philoso­phers, who being unable to compre­hend Universal Philosophy, have stint­ed [Page 198]themselves to limited Subjects, and thereto stinted their own Genius. They may be reduced to three orders. The first is, of those that pretend to the knowledge of Nature in general: the second, of those who prepare Reme­dies: and the third, of those who ap­ply themselves to the finding out of the Art of changing of Metals, by gi­ving them either new Figures, new Colours, or new Consistence. The first and second may be rational, as Albertus Magnus, Van Helmont, and the Distillers are. The third are Ex­travagant: for to pretend to make new Creatures, is to invade the right of the Creator. As for the Cabalists and Judicial Astrologers, there is no­thing more frivolous than their Natu­ral Philosophy: neither shall I speak of the Physicks of Cardan, which are all contained in his Books of Subtilitie. But I cannot forbear to take notice, that the Royal Society of England; the Academy of Philosophers lately established at Paris, by Order of the King; the Cares of the late Cardi­nal [Page 199] de Medicis, to encourage the Learn­ed by his example, and the new piece of Experiments which he caused with­in these few years to be Printed at Flo­rence; have so effectually revived the love of Natural Philosophy in the Age we live in, that nothing seems at pre­sent more in Vogue amongst the Learned of Europe, than that study which now-a-days reigns there Uni­versally. And Men have advanced in it with so much success, that it may be said, that within the space of three­score years, there have been made more new discoveries in Nature, by Experiments, Observations, and the Invention of new Instruments of A­stronomy, than had been made for a­bove a thousand years before. For there is found out an Art of observing all the different affections of the Air by the Thermometer: there are new De­scriptions made of the Moon by a Map, which represents all its Monthly Appearances, and the Variety of the Phoenomena which the Shadow makes by Eminencies and Concavities like [Page 200]to Mountains and Valleys: there is found an Art to observe the Course of the Stars, with as great exactness as the Motion of a Watch, or their shadow on a Sun-Dial: and it was in our Age, or but a little before, that Men began to find out Irregularites in the Motion of the Heavens, and Celestial Bodies: that is to say, in the most regular works of Nature that God hath made. In fine, it seems that by that virtuous emulation, which hath been of late rai­sed amongst the Naturalists of En­gland, France, Italy, and Holland, the World hath begun to change its Face, the Heavens to move on other princi­ples, and by other Systems, the Air to be more cleared by the knowledge of Meteors, the Sea to become more easie for Commerce by the Science of Na­vigation, the Earth to be better known by the perfect knowledge of Simples, mixt Bodies, Salts, and Minerals, and all Arts to be enobled by new discove­ries: at present there is nothing studied but the finding out of new lights in Sciences, which have been darkned by [Page 201]the negligence of preceding Ages; and the study of Experiments is raised to a greater height than ever. What shall I say of the wonderful Springs of motion in the Heart, the Circulation of the Blood, the Construction of the Brain, the Universal Oeconomie of the Body of Man, wherein there are so ma­ny new secrets found out; of all the rare and late discoveries in Flies and and other Insects, whereof the English have composed a great Volume full of Observations, which hitherto have been almost unknown? If with the same ardour they persist in the Study of Nature, by the Observations which they have begun to make in all parts of the World, where their Commerce gives them entrance, they may be able short­ly to publish a second Volume of Na­tural History worthy to be subjoyned to that of Pliny. If I pretended to enter into the retail of all that is found out in Nature by study and the appli­cation of Modern Philosophy, I should never make an end. But I cannot for­get how much that Science is enriched [Page 202]by the Works of Monsieur de la Cham­bre, chief Physician in Ordinary to the King, who adhering to the Doctrine of Aristotle hath written on Physicks, more solidly than others, and in a more florid stile. In so dry and barren matters, there was never so much grace and beauty: and yet his politeness lessens not the force of his reasons, nor does the flourish of his expression take any thing off from the Gravity of his matter. It may be said that he is the politest and most solid of all Modern Philoso­phers, and that if Nature her self would explain her self, she would use no other terms.

XII.

It remains now to be observed, that we may put an end to the Reflexions on Natural Philosophy, what it is that may contribute to the perfection of that Art, whereof men are so fond of late, and what may hurt the progress which it so justly makes in the minds of men. As honour and emulation are chiefly the Soul of Arts and Sciences; so they who have a Genius for Natural Philo­sophy, [Page 203]whereof the knowledge is so important for Society, cannot be too much esteemed. Yet they cannot be sufficiently warned to have a care of be­ing surprised by new Opinions, with­out strict examination of them, and of espousing the sentiments of others by a Spirit of Cabal and partiality; they should cast off that Character, as one of the greatest hindrances to the know­ledge and discerning of Truth. Let us exhort them to guard themselves by the Use and Experience of Things, that they may prevent pleasant Errours, and lay aside the natural prepossession that men have for their own Opinions: but let us likewise advise them never to be too curious, without some lit­tle docility, nor to be too docile, with­out somewhat of curiosity. For curio­sity without submission leads men out of the way; and too great submission without curiosity guides men into igno­rance. Let them know that Reason and Experience are the two only ways whereby that Science is acquired: but that Reason without Experience hath [Page 204]no solidity, as Experience without Rea­son has no exactness. Let them not a­muse themselves to satisfie too much the publick curiosity by Novelties: for it is a vanity of the new Philosophers to make it more their business to say things that are agreeable, than use­ful. These maxims are to be insinu­ated to the modern Philosophers, to imprint on their minds that Character of solidity, without which that Science cannot be well handled, wherein there is nothing more to be avoided, than il­lusion and uncertainty. Moreover, though there be hardly any thing more to be added to the general Physicks, to enrich them with new Principles and Methods, because they consist in a li­mited perfection: yet it may be said that the special Physicks are of so vast an extent, that there may be always found new ways to raise them to grea­ter perfection. And for all the new Stars that are discovered, there will re­main still more to be found out. For that is a Stock, which, though it be so much already drained by the Studies of [Page 205]so many Learned, and by the series of so many Ages, yet will still prove in­exhaustible.

XIII.

The last Reflexion which we have to make on this Science, regards the pro­cedure of Naturalists, who in their Reasonings refer all things toNature, giving it greater vertue than it ought to have, and stretching its power beyond the bounds that the Creator hath pre­scribed to it. As Alcindus, that Ara­bian Philosopher, did heretofore, whom Averroes ranks among the greatest wits that ever were; in effect he knew ma­ny things: but he made a Treatise wherein he imputed to Nature, what is commonly attributed to Spirits, which are above Nature, that is to say, to An­gels and Demons. So did Peter of A­pono and Pomponatius, both great stick­lers for Nature, pretend that all that happened in sublunary things, was but an effect of Celestial impressions. And as Galen referred every thing to the Qualities of Temperament, Albertus Magnus to the Specifick Form, Marci­lius [Page 206]Ficinus to Planets; so Peter of Apo­no referred every thing to the Vertue of Celestial Bodies, and acknowledged no other Miracles but the changes of Sea­sons, as Du Loyer assures us. This gave occasion to Baptista of Mantua to call him, Virum magnae sed nimium audacis sapientiae; a great Philosopher, but of too great boldness. That is the common infirmity of stinted Spirits, that believe nothing but what they comprehend. Montanus seems to be a Philosopher of this Character: he is often incredulous, through a desire of being too much a Naturalist; and he is the more dange­rous for Religion, the more he affects not to appear so. For by the ingenuity of plain common sense, and of too civil a Philosopher, he works greater effects on mens minds, with his negligent way of saying what he says. The Natural Phi­losophy of Descartes raises not the Mind above the Senses: by Bodies alone he explains the most spiritual operations of the Soul: and an Englishman of late hath made appear, that in all the Rea­sonings of that Philosopher there is a [Page 207]mechanical air that reduces every thing to the method of Art; for which he thinks it dangerous to Religion. But speaking generally, Natural Philoso­phy, Medicine, Astrology, and Chymi­stry, stick too much to Nature, to raise men to him who is the Author thereof: they allow too much to the Senses, to make men able to get above Senfe; and they harden the heart against the be­lief of God, by accustoming men to consider things by too low a view. Un­happy are the Philosophers of that Ge­nius, who subtilize on the Knowledge of the Creature, and stick at the belief of the Creator. That was not the Cha­racter of the ancient Philosophers, who had not only higher thoughts than we, but raised themselves above themselves, that they might acknowledge a Sove­raign Reason, which they made the Rule of all their Reasonings, and to which they submitted their minds. In fine, that we may make an end, let us observe our selves in the judgments we make of Nature, and judge of it with reverence, let us not decide too [Page 208]boldly on its operations, whereof Man ought never to judge but with trembling. For to be short, to censure Nature is to censure God whose work it is, and to submit the greatness of his Power to our Criticks. Wherein that Prince seemed Extravagant, that would have reformed the Fabrick of the World by a false Gusto of Philosophy, which he had learnt from the Arabians. True Philosophy, when it hath attain­ed to its highest pitch of perfection, judges of every thing with fear; it shakes when it comes to decide, because it knows its own incapacity, by know­ing the weakness of the mind of man. But when it considers the Works of God, it imposes silence on its Reason, and bends downwards all its know­ledge, as the Cherubims of the Pro­phet fold their Wings, and humble themselves before God, that by their own humiliation they may reverence the greatness of his Majesty.

I.

NAtural Philosophy is the knowledge of natural and sensible things: and Metaphysicks is the Science of things pure­ly intellectual. All other Sciences have a dependance on this; for it serves them for Foundation and Method, and without it there is no­thing known but imperfectly. That is perhaps the Reason which obliged Aristotle to call that Science the true beginning of Philosophy, and the no­blest of Sciences. As it is taken up only about the thoughts, by a view [Page 210]abstracted from corporeal and incorpo­real beings, so it raises it self above sense and matter: it leaves the quantity of Bodies to the consideration of Geome­try, and their other qualities to Natural Philosophy; that it may imploy it self only about being separated from their Individual Singularity, such as are Sub­stances, Accidents, Relations, Oppo­sitions, and all that can be conceived by an abstraction from Matter: and that it may only consider beings that are purely spiritual, such as, the Soul, Spirits, Angels, and even God him­self: wherein it hath something of Di­vinity. It is for that Reason also that Aristotle calls it Divinity or Natural Theology. The end of this Science is the finding out of pure and abstract­ed Verity: thereby it perceives things in their original, that it may know them to the full: it enters into the retail of all particular Species, which it redu­ces to their principles; and that retail is almost infinite: this is the Reason that without it all the knowledges of man are but superficial and imperfect, [Page 211]because there is not almost any true de­monstration without its Principles.

II.

The design of Aristotle in his Meta­physicks is to give Principles to other Sciences, which they cannot have of themselves; and to establish a princi­pal vertue, which might serve for a Rule to all other Verities. That Phi­losopher hath written twelve Books of Metaphysicks, whereof the three first are preliminary to that Science. In the first Book he teaches, that Memory is formed from Sense, Experience from Memory, and Art and Science toge­ther from Experience. He shews that Sapience being a perfect knowledge of the first Principles, is preferable to Sci­ence; that nothing is known as it should be but by the causes; and that the ancient Philosophers have some­times said well, without knowing the reason why, because they were not methodical in their Science. He teaches that the impressions receiv'd from Edu­cation and Custom are great hinderan­ces to the knowledge of Truth; and [Page 212]that to know a-right, we must seek out the method most convenient for the Science we inquire into. He de­clares in his third Book, That to begin to know we must begin to doubt: and that to know Truth a-right, we must know Falsity and Untruth: There he refutes those that explain Nature by Fables, designing thereby Pythagoras and Plato. In the same Book he exa­mines if one Science may propose all other Sciences for its object. He ends with the Notion that he gives of Sub­stance; and enquires if there be any other Substances besides what fall un­der our Senses, such as Ideas and first Matter. Having made this preparati­on of Questions necessary to his de­sign, he treats in the fourth Book of the Principle object of Metaphysicks, which is Being, abstracted from Mat­ter, in so much as it is Being. In the fifth Book he explains the various At­tributes of Being, and gives a general notion of the terms of Metaphysicks. The sixth Book is another Preliminary to the following Books. In the seventh [Page 213]Book he explains the Nature of Sub­stance, which is the first of Beings, what is essential to it, and wherein it differs from an Accident: In the eighth Book he distinguishes it into Substance material and Substance immaterial. There it is that he speaks of the Sub­stantial Form, of the Numbers of Py­thagoras, and the Ideas of Plato, which he pretends to be no-ways substantial. The ninth Book is an Explication of the different kinds of Being, of the Being actual and the Being possible, of the Act and the Power, Actus and Po­tentia, of the notion and difference thereof; and ends the Book by a Dis­course of True and False. In the tenth Book he tells what Unity is, which is the first property of a Being, he shews the opposition between Plurality and Unity, he explains how and how many ways one thing is contrary to another, and all the Doctrine of Contraries, which is the ground of the most part of the Principles of Metaphysicks. In the eleventh Book he repeats a great many things already laid down in [Page 214]the third and fourth Books, and a­mongst others, the Method of right doubting, to attain to right knowing: for he that doubts hath a greater dispo­sition to know Truth, than he that doubteth not: because he grounds not the assurance of his judgement, but up­on the clearing of his uncertainties. Having proved Substantial Forms, he teaches in the twelfth Book that there are Substances separate from Bodies, and that there are Spirits. All that Dis­course tends to the demonstration of a first Mover, and to the establishment of a Deity. The two following Books were not come to light in the time of Thomas Aquinas. Possevin in the third Book of his Bibliotheck pretends that they are none of Aristotle's: but seeing there is to be found in them the same Character, the same Wit and the same reasoning, all the Learned are of a con­trary opinion. It is true, that in his thirteenth Book there are repetitions about the Numbers of Pythagoras, and the Idea's of Plato: But the fourteenth Book is a Collection of Axioms, Prin­ciples, [Page 215]Divisions and admirable Defi­nitions, which he hath gather'd out of the former Books. And though his Metaphysicks be rank'd in no very exact order, and that in many places thereof there be several repetitions; it is notwithstanding a fountain fertile in Notices, Reasonings, Maxims, and Veri­ties, which are rare overtures for other Sciences: and there is nothing more necessary for a Philosopher, who would know things intimately, than the Me­taphysicks of Aristotle.

III.

What is more to be wondered at in this Work, Aristotle is the first Founder of that manner of Reasoning by way of abstraction, and of speaking of Imma­terial Beings, of Spirits, and of God himself. For the Philosophers that went before him, spake of such things with little solidity. It is true Pythagor as learnt from the Hebrews, by the com­merce that he had with the Egyptians, the Unity of one God, and taught it the Grecians. But as the Egyptians were naturally mysterious and visionists; [Page 216] Pythagoras took from them the most part of their Visions, concerning Spi­rits and Intelligences, to which the Egyptians assigned little subtile Bodies, wherewith they filled the World. And Pythagoras was the first who by that imagination gave occasion to all the ex­travagancies of the Cabalists about Spi­rits, and to all these Fables, whereof the Author of the Cabalis hath endeavour­ed to renew the Notion in these last times. Plato, who seems to lay down that Doctrine in his Dialogues of Epi­nomis and Cratilus, took it from Py­thagoras, and Zeno the Stoick had it from Plato, as Lipsius relates at length. Apuleius pretends that Plato of all the Ancient Philosophers, hath discoursed best of God, of Providence, of divine matters, and of Spirits. It must be granted that he appears more know­ing in that kind of Science than any of the rest; but seeing he learnt of Pytha­goras most part of what he delivers on that subject, it is not sure to follow him. Tertullian says, That the Plato­nists assign'd even a Body to God, as [Page 217]well as the Stoicks. Aristotle, who had more reality in his thoughts, speaks in another strain. He had the Art to purge the Verities that he learnt in the School of Pythagoras from the raveries of the Pythagoreans. As for Epicurus he makes Gods of so ridiculous a shape, that by owning of them he overthrows them. Zeno makes his Wise-man so indepen­dant of Providence, and so equal to the Gods, that thereby he renders them contemptible: For he leaves Men to think of them what-ever they please. Chrysippus wrote some Treatises of the Gods and a Deity; whereof Plutarch speaks in his Morals; but they are lost: It is probable he speaks no otherways of them, but in the sentiments of Zeno. There is nothing in all Antiquity so ra­tionally written on that subject, as the Books of Cicero concerning the Nature of the Gods. His sentiments are as right, and his doctrine as sound, as the Doctrine of a Pagan can be. But that which makes him speak better than o­thers is, because he followed the Do­ctrine of Aristotle, and made use of his [Page 218]arguments, to prove a Providence. Se­neca speaks of a Deity but like a half-knowing man; the Idea that he gives of God, as an universal Spirit that ani­mates the World, is not exact: but it seems reasonable what he says, that the same injury is done to the Gods, not at all to believe them, as to believe them to be other than what they are, and what they should be. All that hath been written since by the later Platon­ists under the Emperours carries no so­lid character. The most part of the Greek Fathers, who were all almost Pla­tonists, are not exact in what they say of Angels and Spirits, by reason of the false notions that they learn'd in the School of Plato. Since the establishment of Christianity, the Existence of God, the Immortality of the Soul, its state of Separation from the Body, good and bad Angels, and the other most essential truths of our Religion are so illustrated, that none can now doubt thereof with­out impiety. Pomponatius in the last Age, wrote a Treatise of the Soul in a strain that drew upon him the censures [Page 219]of Rome. Agrippa speaks like an ex­travagant in all the discourse which he made of God, Religion, and Intelligen­ces, in the third Book of his Secret Phi­losophy. Ramus exceedingly slighted the Metaphysicks, wherein he seems not very judicious. He would have joyn'd to the Body of Philosophy, the knowledge of the Liberal Arts, that he might more securely cut off the Meta­physicks. But amongst that fearful multitude of Writings hatch'd in the dust of the Schools of these last A­ges, there hath been nothing compo­sed with greater penetration and capa­city, than the Metaphysicks of Suarez the Jesuit. That piece, which con­tains all the subtility and force of the Schools, is one of the wonderful pro­ductions of these last times. It cannot be too much recommended to young Divines, who by a false appetite to a new method forsake the Scholastick way in their disputes, that they may become Historians: because it is less trouble to them to make an ostentation of their memory, than to give proofs [Page 220]of their judgement. There hath been in these last times a croud of Commen­tatours, who in a profound stile have written on the Metaphysicks of Ari­stotle: amongst others Fonseca a Portu­guese Jesuit. Sir Kenelm Digby is too abstract in his Treatise of the Immorta­lity of the Soul. The Metaphysical Me­ditations of Descartes have been held in reputation; for he hath dived into these matters more than others. In his first Meditation he teaches man to doubt well, that he may know a-right: he proves in the second, that the Thought is more sensible and better known than the Body. The third is a Demonstration of the Existence of God. The fourth, a Method of di­scerning of Truth and Falshood. The fifth treats of the Essence of material Beings. The sixth explains their Exi­stence: and the Conclusion is a real Di­stinction betwixt the Body and the Thoughts, for the establishing that great Principle, I think, therefore I am; to which may be added his Answers to the Objections of Gassendus, which [Page 221]have the same force as the rest of his Works. Willis an English Physician hath written rationally of Separated Forms. There are not many Works composed in these last times of such a nature: wherein the Speculations of Natural Philosophy take up the minds of men, more than those of Metaphy­sicks. It were to be wished that men would employ them in subjects that are capable thereof: but the Idea and De­sign of some Speculatives is not to be approved, who mingle too much Me­taphysicks with Religion: which ought to be handled more plainly, and in a less abstracted manner than other sub­jects; because there is nothing more real, nor more simple.

IV.

Though this Science be so much en­quired into already by the Works I have been speaking of, yet it might still be more improved by Reflexions that might be made on the Principles and Reasonings of Aristotle, because what consists in Conceptions and I­deas cannot be limited: but there is [Page 222]need of a disposition proper for Re­flexion and reasoning in such an essay: for that Science reasons, and reflects on its reasonings more than others. Yet it meets likewise with great Obsta­cles in its procedure; whereof the first is, that it marches (to use the word) by ways not much frequented, and by unknown paths, having no­thing sufficiently established; for it hath hardly any true Definition, or exact and compleat Division: and see­ing it gives occasion to many doubt­ings, it furnishes Matter of Dispute, there being none of the Principles thereof that can be universally agreed upon. The second obstacle is the na­tural timidity of the mind of man, which looks upon Metaphysicks, being abstracted from Matter and Sense, to be above its strength: whereby it be­comes like to those timorous and ill-assured Travellers, who go by ways that they know not. The third Ob­stacle is, a great number of hard and barbarous Terms, obscure and perplex­ed Definitions, thousands of Concep­tions [Page 223]and Reasonings hatched in the Dust of the Schools, which render that Science destitute of the usual Charms of other Sciences. The fourth is a stock of wrangling, and a heap of thorny and displeasing Questions, fitter to confound than instruct the mind. The last Obstacle is, the rarity of Spi­rits fit for that Science. Spirits that are either too profound or too superficial are not proper for it. By the too great pro­foundness of meditation men are apt to fall into a black and melancholick Phi­losophy: as it happened to Agrippa in his Metaphysicks. And by the vivacity of an aiery and superficial wit, they are apt to evaporate in empty and spongie imaginations: as it befel Cardan, who wandered among the Visions of the most chymerical Philosophy in the World; and as it happens daily to wits that have no foundation. There hath lately come abroad a Treatise of Meta­physicks, printed at London, and com­posed by Henry More, which overturns all the Reasons that Descartes makes use of to prove the existence of God, and [Page 224]which overthrows the most part of his Meditations. That were no great mat­ter, if that English Philosopher did not wound Descartes in his Religion, when he declaims against his Natural Philo­sophy, which he would have pass for Libertinism, as well as that of Mr. Hobbes. The Cartesians, who are jea­lous of the honour of their opinion, have Reason to make their zeal flash out against that Author, by justifying the reputation of their Master. There might be a great many other Reflexions made, if these Metaphysical Ideas were not so obscure. Let us now see, before we end this discourse, what is the use that is to be made of Philosophy in matters of Religion, which ought in­deed to be all the fruit of it. For men are not over tender of Religion, when once they become Philosophers.

I.

THe first Instrument that Re­ligion makes use of to prove its maximes, is Reason; and Reason cannot be rightly employed but by Philosophy, which reduces it into method by giving it principles. It is therefore important [Page 226]that Philosophy it self should be sound, that it may stamp a right Character on the mind, and conduct it securely in a way, which one cannot mistake or lose without Eternal Ruine. And therefore it is that Lactantius says, that Philosophy is of great use to a Man, when he hath once got some Tincture of Religion. But Men may easily a­buse so advantagious a means, by the bad use that the mind of Man may make of it, when it yields to the con­duct of passion, interest, or prejudices. This made Callicles in Plato say, that Philosophy taken the wrong way was able to spoil Religion. There is there­fore great circumspection to be used as to that. Faith is an Heavenly Uncti­on, that will easily corrupt in a mind infected with false Doctrine. And as any Liquor would be soon spoiled in an impure Vessel: so nothing is more ca­pable to alter the purity of Religion, than the impurity of sentiments where­with it is received. It is not that one must needs be a Philosopher, to be a Christian, nor that the Wisdom of the [Page 227]World is a rule to the Wisdom of Hea­ven. But that the reason of Man being submitted to Faith; Faith how Divine soever it be, condescends to make use of Humane Reasoning, to bring Rea­son to its Obedience. So that it can­not be absolutely pure, if Philosophy, which is the Instrument that it makes use of, be not so likewise. This obliged St. Paul to admonish the Primitive Christians to beware, lest any Man should spoil them through Philosophy, and vain Deceit, through the Traditions of Men, according to the Rudiments of the World, and not after Christ.) The World was so infected with the diffe­rent opinions of so many Philosophers, that a Christian needed all his Wits a­bout him to guard himself from that danger. For Tertullian observes, that the Primitive Heresies sprang only from the opinions, wherein those that were the Authours of them had been bred. Philosophy ill understood, saith St. Augustin, made the Egyptians Worship the Sun and Stars. The Va­lentinians, against whom St. Irenaeus [Page 228]writes, came out of the School of Dioge­nes and Epicurus; the Gnosticks out of Plato's; and the Manichees out of that of Pythagoras. Martian became Heretick by the Doctrine of Zeno; and Manes took the principles of his opinion from a Saracen Philosopher, whom St. Epi­phanius mentions. St. Jerome assures us that it was the Morality of the Sto­icks that made the Pelagians fall into errour. But what happened in the Primitive Ages by that manner of de­pendance which Religion hath on Phi­losophy, is come to pass in the last. Possevin observes, that it is incredible how many Libertines and Hereticks the reading of Averroes made in Eu­rope. Alphonsus King of Castile cen­sured the Workman-ship of God, by Criticising on Nature, and grew impi­ous by the study of the Arabian Phi­losophers, and by the pleasure he took in the ravings of a Spanish Jew, who found out the motion of Trepidation in the Firmament. Agrippa spoiled his spirit by the reading of Porphyrie, Pro­clus, and Plessus, that is to say, by the [Page 229]Philosophy of Plato, as he himself confesses. Cervetus a Spaniard, and Socinus an Italian, made only use of Philosophy, to make Innovations in Religion. And it is pretended that the Philosophy of Descartes was at first well received in the North, be­cause it seemed to favour the opinion of Calvin, which is in greatest Vogue there: for the principles of that new Philosophy lead a Man to believe that the Creature in its freest Actions, acts only by the impulse of the Creator, and that it is God alone that wills in the willings of Man. In fine, nothing tends more to the corruption of the Heart, than the corruption of Do­ctrine; and there is nothing that over­throws Religion, so much as the vain Reasonings of a false Philosophy. It is not by the School of Errour and Ly­ing, that one becomes a Disciple of truth: neither was it by the incon­stancy and levity of Humane Opini­ons, that the Apostles became the Pil­lars of Faith. That was also the rea­son that moved the Fathers in some [Page 230]counsels, to order the Professors of Phi­losophie not to teach any Doctrines that were prejudicial to Religion.

II.

It much concerns a Christian then, not to make use indifferently of every kind of Philosophy, seeing the use of it may prove so dangerous: it is even Prudence to make sure in the choice that is to be made amongst so many different opinions, as have passed cur­rent in all Ages. But what assurance is there amidst so many clouds wherein Truth is commonly wrapped up? to which may be added the obscurity of Natural things; the weakness of the Spirit of Man; the erroneousness of the Judgement of the Senses naturally Im­postrous: in a word, Opinion and Passi­on, which are perpetual hindrances to Natural evidences; as well as all these idle and curious Speculations, to which Philosophers are subject, & which serve more for oftentation and the Pomp of Science, than the conduct of the Mind, and edification of manners. Whence appears how empty and vain Humane [Page 231]Wisdom is, whereof all the Light can only serve to seduce and lead Men out of the way: Because, saith St. Augustin, God hath concealed Truth from Man, as well for the punishment of his crime, as to instruct him of his misery. Where­fore that we may not mistake our selves, let us begin to study what is to be believed, before we set our selves on Reasoning. Let us regulate the use of our Faith, that we may regulate the use of our Reason: let us be Christians before we be Philosophers: let our first Wisdom and our chief Philosophy be our Religion. Men learn to reason by Phi­losophy; but they learn to submit their minds to Reason and eternal Verity, by Christianity. Let us know the duties thereof by the study of the Law, which is, says St. Chrysostom, the rule of Know­ledge and Truth: That we may learn that method of Reasoning which may be most sutable to it, let us apply our selves to the Doctrine of the Go­spel, which the pride of Pagan Philo­sophers could never comprehend, and our Reason will settle it self upon so [Page 232]solid a foundation: because there is nothing but Faith, that can give bounds to the mind of Man, stay the incon­stancy of his Reason, and fix it on its object. Let us not expose our selves to the agitation of our vain Reason­ings, which are apt to carry us fur­ther than we should go. Happy is he, who admidst the waves of this Sea, which is always tossed with the er­rours and opinions in Religion that reign in the World, hath taken the course to stick close to the immoveable foundation of the Word of God.

III.

Religion is then the first Principle according to which Humane Wisedom is to take its measures: so that all the different methods of ancient or modern Philosophy, all the new Systems of Na­tural, and all the new Maxims of Mo­ral Philosophy, may be good, if they be not contrary to it. For the Gospel ought to be the rule of our sentiments. What is not conform to that Rule, leads to disorder. The Doctrine of Plato or Aristotle, Gassendus or Descartes, is not to be esteem'd, but in so much [Page 233]as it favours Religion; which should be the first of all Philosophies. Let us forsake all the rest, for all other Scien­ces are but illusion, and every other Light but a transitory flash, fitter to a­muse our curiosity than to satisfie our mind. To speak properly, we know things but as in dream, and are igno­rant of them in effect: Yea, and we would pitty our own ignorance, if our vanity kept it not from our Knowledge. The most frivolous Question in the World, divided all the minds of Anti­quity: and after almost three thousand Years of dispute, it is not as yet well decided. Thales and his Disciples un­til Plato, says Plutarch, have denied a Vacuity in Nature, those that follow'd after, to begin with Democritus and Epicurus, and to continue until our new Atomists, have taught it. Men dis­pute thereon still every day, and come to no agreement. That degree of Cer­tainty, which was heretofore with so many Reasonings sought for in the A­cademy, tended only to uncertainty. In fine, the knowledge of Man stag­gers always in doubting and hesitation; [Page 234]and Truth is only come into the World by JESUS CHRIST. Faith alone can teach that Divine Philosophy, which none of the Great Men of the World have been able to know. To open our Eyes to so pure a Light is the way to be illuminated. It was not by the force of Syllogisms and Arguments that Men were convinced of that Phi­losophy; but by the Simplicity and Ig­norance of those that published it in the World: the Greeks and Romans sub­mitted all their pride and haughtiness of mind to the Gospel; whose vertue was so powerful, that it made its First-Disciples its greatest Votaries. It is Faith then, which ought to make all the Wit and Knowledge of man: for he that shall follow his own Understand­ing, will undoubtedly lose himself.

IV.

Faith having undeceived man of the counterfeit glisterings, which shined in the Philosophy of the Heathens, it accustomed him to dispute no more a­bout those things, which God hath not submitted to Reasoning, and taught him [Page 235]that it is better not to know what God hath thought fit to conceal from him, and with a reverent ignorance to adore the Secrets, which he hath not reveal­ed to us, than to undertake to sound that Abyss of knowledge, by the rash­ness of our conjectures, and the faint views of our Reason. To this Divine beam of Faith, the Faithful took plea­sure to sacrifice all these insolent curio­sities, which made them too rashly ex­amine the works of God, by examining of Nature; and to stifle all the pro­spects of that proud Reason, which ad­dict them to the Creature, to make them revolt against the Creatour. It was by the rays of that most Heavenly Light, that the Christian came to un­derstand that it was better to be sub­missive, than to reason in matters of Religion; that the smalness of Wit was somewhat more advantageous to make a man a Believer, than all the force and acuteness of Understanding; and that the simplicity of Faith was preferable to all the lustre and reputation of Sci­ence; because that the works of God, [Page 236]which carry the greatest marks of his Omnipotency and Character, are those which we least understand: so that there is nothing more reasonable than to humble Reason, and to submit it to the direction of Eternal Reason, which is the Rule of all other Reasons; and the rather, seeing that there is no kind of Science, which depends not on submissi­on, that it may settle it self by its Prin­ciples. Is it just that Men should exer­cise a kind of tyranny upon our belief and upon our minds, for things indiffe­rent, such as are Arts and Sciences, and that we should take our freedom as to Religion? We are told things incompre­hensible in the name of Descartes, from which we reap no advantage; we take them on their bare word: And having most credible Mysteries delivered to us in the Name of God, which assures us of Eternal Life, shall we not believe them?

V.

When Reason is once submissive, Phi­losophy which is its rule may be useful to explain it. That is the first use that is to be made of Philosophy in Religion. So it was that Anatolius B. of Laodicea, S. [Page 237] Jerom, S. Augustin, Theodoret, Didymus of Alexandria, Boetius, S. John Damascen, and many others, began first amongst Christians to give vogue to the Philoso­phy of Aristotle: which afterwards was continued by the Fathers and Divines in the Church, to defend the Christian Religion against Paganism and Heresie. And though our Religion be not groun­ded on human Reasoning, but on the simplicity of a pure Faith, which is al­ways opposite to the weak and corrupt mind of Man: yet it is lawful to under­prop that Faith by all the force of Hu­man Reason, when once it hath begun to give law unto Reason. And so does God Almighty, who draws light out of darkness, speak to us by the Mouth of Men, as by the most proportionate instrument to the weakness of our Un­derstandings: and yet that Instrument diminishes nothing of the Dignity of him that employes it. The most pro­fane Creatures are as so many voices which publish the Glory and Holiness of the Creatour; and what is even most stupid and dumb in Nature serves to instruct us in the knowledge of God: [Page 238]and shall not the words, the reason, the terms and expressions of Aristotle, be made use of by us in speaking of Religion, because they are the words and expressions of an Heathen? What reason have we to boggle at them, af­ter that all the Learned and Pious Men, who knew and lived in the purity of Christian Religion as well, if not bet­ter then we, have so employed them; let us stick to a Custom Authorized to us by the example of these Holy Men. And whatever may be objected to us, let us never give cavelling A­theists, and the Enemies of our Re­ligion, the satisfaction to change the Language of the Church, by the use of new Philosophies, which Men would bring in credit; seeing that the Anci­ent Philosophy, besides terms of Ex­plaining, may likewise furnish Re­ligion with a Method of Reason­ing.

VI.

Besides the terms and method which Philosophy may furnish Religi­on with, to serve it as an Instrument in what it thinks and says, it may like­wise afford it reasons, to arm those that defend it, and disarm its Adversaries. It was Philosophy that first began to o­pen the great Book of the World, for an instruction to the Learned, and Un­learned and by the beauty of the Crea­tures, to declare to all the Nations of the World, the Greatness and Power of the Creator. It was she that by her Lessons raised the Spirit of Man from the Knowledge of so many wonders, to the knowledge of their Original, by discovering to him the Cause of these admirable Effects. It was Philosophy which made Man understand that voice of the Heavens and Stars, which declare the Glory of God, that he might come to the knowledge of his greatness. By that marvellous succession of Day and Night, by that constant and uniform revolution of Seasons, by that Order and Harmony of Elements, and of all [Page 240]the parts that compose the Universe; as by the loud sound of a Trumpet, that Science published the Divinity of so great a Master, by exposing to view the lineaments of so perfect a work. It was Philosophy in fine, which taught Pythagoras, Hippocrates, Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, who were the solidest Heads of Antiquity, the Unity of the Godhead; whereof they themselves were convinced by the bare and simple contemplation of this great Theatre of the World. But that which served to instruct these Great Men in so im­portant a truth, served only to puzzle and confound the proud minds of a great many stinted Souls, who, as St. Paul says, became vain in their thoughts, and their foolish heart was full of darkness, and when they profes­sed themselves to be wise, became Fools: because they rendred to the Creature, the Honours that were only due to the Creator; by the wrong use that they made of their Reason and Philosophy. They applied themselves to the study of Nature, without reve­rencing [Page 241]the Authour thereof. Thus it hapned with Epicurus, who pretended that Natural Philosophy was fit for no­thing but to stifle all these kinds of fears which the impressions of Religi­on may cause in the Soul. On the contrary Plato made use of Natural Philosophy only to prove the existence of God, by the existence of the World: as a Workman is known by his Work. And Aristotle reduces al­most all his reasonings about motion, to that admirable demonstration of a first mover, which Avicenna takes to be one of the most evident demon­strations of the Physicks of that Philo­sopher. So true it is, that it is but on­ly an infirmity of mind, that makes Men so uneasily believe what is propo­sed to them by Religion. For when one hath reason, it is no trouble to him to use it, by subjecting the same in such subjects, where it ought to be submissive.

VII.

These are the chief uses that may be made of Philosophy in matters of Re­ligion; wherein it may likewise give weight to the Reasonings that are em­ployed for establishing the maxims thereof: it may serve to unmask Impostures, the errour whereof dis­guises it self under so many different shapes: it may repress that immode­rate liberty, which the Wise of the World take to themselves of inquiring too curiously into matters which ex­ceed their capacity: it teaches Rea­son not to startle at things which seem most incredible, when it hath once been able to make it perceive the Au­thority of God, by reviewing these ad­mirable Idea's of the Virtue of the Gospel; wherewith a small number of Fisher-men by their simplicity triumph over all the Wisdom of Athens and Rome, and by their Patience and Humi­lity render themselves Masters of the Mistress of the World. In this man­ner it was that Origen, who thought himself obliged, as Eusebius assures us, [Page 243]to justifie his conduct in his applicati­on to the study of Pagan Philosophers, as not unbeseeming a Christian, made use of Philosophy, and gave even rules how to use it, by shewing Christians, that Men ought only to be Philosophers, to settle themselves in the Faith, and therein to become impregnable: by the same principle assuring them, that Phi­losophy ought not to be considered, but as an Instrument of Religion. What he explained to them by that judicious re­flexion, was the same that St. Clement of Alexandria had done before him: saying, that it seemed God was pleased to give a pattern of that conduct, by what he in­spired into the Israelites; when he orde­red them to make use of the riches and spoils of Egypt, to adorn the things that concerned Religion and his Worship. For Origen recommended nothing so much to the Christian Philosophers, as the reading of the Holy Scriptures; and to read them with an attention su­table to the Heavenly Truths which so Divine Books contained, that they might attain to the knowledge of Sa­cred [Page 244]Mysteries, by singleness of heart and humility of mind. And instead of disputing about Religion, as Men dispute about indifferent things in the Schools, he would have Men adore with reverence the Majesty of Holy Mysteries, and believe incomprehensi­bility with submission. Thus it was, that that Learned Man made use of prophane Sciences, and Secular Philo­sophy to guide his Disciples to Jesus Christ, and to raise them to Faith, as St. Jerom assures us.

VIII.

These Terms, that Method, and these Reasons, which Philosophy may fur­nish Religion with, would not be suffi­cient, if it did not likewise give it a kind of discretion, to prepare them ind to the Light of Faith, by the Light of Nature, which is the first principle of the operation of the Soul. For it hap­pens that Man is often deceived, and that unhappiness may proceed, saith St. Augustin, from the weakness of his Heart, though it proceeded not from the wickedness and presumption of [Page 245]his mind. And seeing the Philosopher is more subject to that than the simple ignorant, that Holy Father concludes in the same place, that Man should not become a Philosopher, but that he may think on Eternity which is his end. That gave occasion to Thomas Aquinas to begin his Treatise of Religion a­gainst the Gentiles, by this Question, What is the Obligation of the Wise Man, and the chief duty of a Philo­sopher: and he concludes, that it is to search the Verity, which is the Original of all Verities, as he proves by the Testimony of Aristotle. That was likewise the chief study of the Primi­tive Christians, who were Philosophers: and not only made use of their Philo­sophy to find out the Truth of Religi­on: but likewise to teach it to those who were ignorant thereof, and to de­fend it against those that attacked the same. In that manner did St. Justin, Tatian his Disciple, Athenagoras, and Clemens Alexandrinus, who were the first Philosophers of the Christian Re­ligion, employ their Philosophy to [Page 246]maintain their Faith, by justifying their Conduct against the Calumnies of Pa­gans, and overthrowing the false noti­ons that were put into the minds of the people. In that manner Tertullian made his Zeal manifest in that admira­ble Apology, which he made of Reli­gion; where amongst so many other reasons, which so just a cause as that which he handled might furnish him with, the life of Christians was one of the chief; that life so pure, so holy, so far above sense; that fidelity, dis-interested­ness and Charity wherewith all their actions were animated, which made them pray for those that persecuted them. And in fine, their innocence ser­ved him as a living Image of the Holi­ness of the Gospel they preached, to stop the mouth of Errour and Imposture. O­rigen took another Method against Cel­sus, who having been a Jew turned Pa­gan. He proves the Verity of Christiani­ty by the Divinity of Jesus Christ: by making appear, that nothing is objected against Jesus Christ, which may not be objected against Moses. Seeing that Je­sus Christ, cannot be the fulfilling of [Page 247]the Law, as he is, but it must the strongest proof of the Authority of the Law-giver. For, if he be not the Truth, the Law and all the Prophets are but a Lie. St. Hippolitus makes use of another Argument: Ye cannot conceive, says he to Un-believers, the manner how ye are formed, and ye dare pretend to now he Eternal Ge­neration of the Son of God. It is not by curiosity, but by submission that one becomes a Believer. Faith ma­nifests its Light only to him who can blind his reason: and for all its obscu­rity, it deserves adoration even of those who understand it not. Among the other Arguments of Minutius Felix, there is not any stronger than this: The belief of an Infidel leading only to doubting and uncertainty, he should do as does a Traveller, who finds him­self amongst many ways, and knows not the right. If he be wise he stops, not daring to follow any of them in the doubt that he is in, and being una­ble to follow them all: which Libertines do not, who having no other ground [Page 248]for their Libertinism, but their uncer­tainty; yet still pursue the wrong way and persist in their Errour, being un­able to take the resolution, which the sillyest people do in their most ordina­nary affairs, not to act on any doubt; for it is prudence to endeavour to be sure in what one doeth. It is upon the Vanity and Falsity of Idols, and the extravagance of the Pagan Religion, that St. Cyprian, Arnobius, Lactantius his Scholar, Eusebius Bishop of Cesarea, and St. Cyril of Alexandria established the Christian Religion. The Treatise of Theodoret concerning Providence, and St. Augustins Book of the City of God, are most Learned and Solid Apo­logies for our Faith, full of profound Learning and admirable Eloquence. And this was the way that all the Fa­thers almost employed their Science and Philosophy, every one in his own Method to defend Christian Religion, which was attacked by all the violence of the powers of the Earth; by all the Learning of Pagan Philosophers, and by all the wickedness of Hereticks.

IX.

But as the primitive Christians were more taken up to defend their Religion against its Enemies, and to be always ready for Martyrdom by a pure and holy Life, than to unfold the Myste­ries of our Faith: so the most part of the ancient Apologists contented them­selves to justifie their Belief against the calumnies that were raised against it, without explaining the ground of their Religion, that they might not pro­fane holy things, by discovering them to Infidels, It was necessary in the In­fancy of the Church to veil from the World corrupted with Idolatry, the new Spirit of our Faith, whereof the Pagans were not capable. But since our Eyes in these last Ages have been accustomed to the light of the Gospel, it hath been thought more fit to unfold the Sanctity of our August mysteries, than to obscure them under ambiguous terms; and this hath been the course that the later Apologists have follow'd. Thomas Aquinas in his Work against the Gentiles, shews in the first three Books [Page 250]of it, That there is nothing in the Chri­stian Faith but what is conform to the light of Nature: and in the fourth he teaches, that though it be highly eleva­ted above the wit of Man, yet it con­tains nothing contrary to Reason. Sa­vanarola hath gathered all that is solid in the Fathers on that subject: to which he hath added this argument which is properly his own. If our Religion be not true, a Christian is the most mon­strous thing in Nature: he is wise and a fool at the same time; wise in his manners, a fool in his Belief: his mind is erroneous, and his heart upright. His Will is orderly, and his Reason ir­regular; his Understanding is out of the way, though he have innocence and probity for its guides. In fine, he is but a Hodge-podge of Truth and Falshood, of Purity and Corruption. In the same manner, says that Divine, If JESUS CHRIST be not God, he is at the same time the most holy and the most flagitious Person that ever was. For it is the greatest of crimes to desire to be taken for a God, when [Page 251]one is not. How could it be, that so much Vertue should be founded on so great Injustice? that the proudest Man that ever was should be the Master of the most perfect notion of Humility that can be? that so holy a Doctrine as the Gospel should be the Work of an Impostor; and that so perfect a Mora­lity, should be established on so great a Wickedness? The Treatise of the truth of Faith composed by Ludovicus Vives, is an Abridgement of all that the Fathers have written upon Reli­gion, reduced into Method. One of his strongest Arguments, is the accom­plishment of the Prophecy of Hosea concerning the destiny of the Jews, which he handles in his third Book, and whereof Saint Augustin speaks in the eighteen Chapter of the 28. Book of the City of God: but which seems not to be set off to all its advantages by Vives; for there is nothing more con­vincing to a solid mind, than a Pro­phecy delivered near a thousand years before it come to pass, and which is literally verified throughout the whole [Page 252]World, for above these sixteen hun­dred years. The Work of Marcilius Ficinus is nothing almost but a proof of the Divinity of JESUS CHRIST, justified by the Prophets of the old Te­stament, by the Miracles of the New, and by the truth of the Doctrine which ignorant men without passion or inter­est have preached, who never deceived any, nor were ever deceived themselves. I shall wave the Writings of a great many modern Apologists, which are every-where extent, for proof of the ve­rity of Christian Religion; which hav­ing been once settled upon the foun­dation of the Word of God, has stood unshaken amidst the Revolutions of Empires, fortifying it self maugre the tempests raised against it in the World, by no other defence but that of Pati­ence and Modesty. What I have said of others, may suffice to give a Chri­stian Philosopher an Idea of the use he should make of his Philosophy, in imi­tation of those Great men, who have only employ'd it for the establishment and defence of Religion. For all things [Page 253]well considered, that is the only solid and real enjoyment of this Life. The truth is all things else being transitory and perishing, the true Wisdom is to think of Eternity, and to be a good Man is the best of Philosophies.