IN the Contestation between Regall and Parliamentary authority, finding by the fre­quent Declarations of the two Honourable Houses made unto the People, (like so many Appeales of the Body representative, to the Body at large,) that the Soveraign judge­ment of all things is (upon the matter) brought unto the People, I see not, but that it is both lawfull, and even the necessary duty of every private man, that hath any understanding of the things in que­stion, to publish his particular judgement & apprehension of them; That from the most free and universall agitation of the truth, some judgement from that vast body may be rendered to the appealors satisfaction. And so, having conceived that the Author of the Ob­servations upon His Majesties late Answers, hath upon this subject broached divers State-doctrines, neither agreeable to our Lawes, nor yet to true Christian Religion: and that yet, (to the prejudice of the Truth,) they have, as truths, got a strong prepossession of men [...] mindes; I have thought fit to offer such notions upon the summe of them, as I conceive ought to bring them to a more serious re-exami­nation. Saving therefore to His Majesty His Right of Animadver­sion into the particular falsities, insolences, and seditious calumnies in the severall passages of that booke; I only apply my selfe to the summe and scope thereof, and that I find to be to this purpose.

First, That God is no more Author of Regall power then of Ari­stocraticall, and as much Author of usurped Dominion as of Heredi­tary. That Power is originally inherent in the People, and but de­rivative [Page 2] in Kings. That the People are the efficient and finall cause of Kings. That the name of King is not greater then of People. That though the King be singulis major, yet He is universis minor. That He is not to be accounted a God, a King, a Lord, a Father &c. to the People conjunctim, but divisim only. That Treason (so farre as it concernes the Prince) is not so horrid in nature, as oppression in a Prince, &c.

In the better examining of these, we finde; That God creating man single, left him not other meanes of multiplying, then only by propagation, and in propagating, he gave the Rule and Soveraignty of the issues propagated, to the Father of whom they were propaga­ted; and in defailance of the Father, He gave the Rule of all the younger (and consequently of their descendants too) unto the first­borne, Gen. 4.7. (as we may see where God tells Caine; Thy Brother shall be subject to thee, and thou shalt beare rule over him. So that all men in the beginning were born Subjects, either to him that naturally was their Father, or to him that by right of primogeniture was repre­sentatively the Father. After the Flood, the then common Father of the world, having a family of three Sonnes of differing condition, and they (for the plantation of the then unpeopled world) by Gods determinate fore-councell dispersed into three distant parts of it, the elder Brothers right of Soveraignty over those younger, (through distance of place, and want of occasion and meanes to ex­ercise it.) became wholy neglected, as upon like severance and search of new places of Plantation, it, in other places, often after be­came. But every Planter becomming so by himselfe a Father, soon became a Family, and from a Family grew into a Citty, so into di­verse Cities, and at length into a Kingdome. And though we first heare of the irregular Kingdome of the descendant of Cham, yet find we also, that Shem the eldest and blessed Sonne of those three, was grown into the Soveraignty of a Kingdome, and was the first King that ever was in the world: for by the judgement and com­putation of the Learned, Melchisedeck the King of Salem, could be no other then very Shem himselfe. Neither had the tenne Tribes of Israell, (when revolting from the sonne of David, they said, they had no part in David, nor Portion in the sonne of Iesse,) any other meaning then only to inferre; That David being neither their Fa­ther by nature, nor in primogeniture by representation, they were [Page 3] free from that naturall subjection unto his sonne, which otherwise (they implied) they were bound to be subject to. And indeed, (if there had not been an especiall ordinance of God in the case) it had truly followed; that being neither descended of Jesse, nor Iesse the first borne of their common Father; the rule of subiection which followed nature, had not tyed them to obey his sonne. The fifth Commandement it selfe proveth this naturall bond of subiection, when (as all Churches expound it) it commands Obedience to Go­vernours, under the name of Parents only. And that (according to Gods saying unto Caine) Soveraignty did rightfully follow primo­geniture, we may see it in this; that as God promised Iacob the So­veraignty, so he procured him the Birth-right, formally transacted by Esaus sale of it. Therefore a King being no other then a common Father, by either naturall or legall Right; neither the People, nor any other Power then only God (the Father of nature it selfe) can properly be said to be the author of the being of Kings.

Next, God hath not authorized Kingly Power in nature only; but by his expresse promises before the law, and by his ordinances con­cerning it, in the law, even before ever the people of Israell sought a King: also by setling over his People the government of a King: by sacrating that office with annointing: by his own assuming of the name of King: and by setting forth our Saviours Dominion over his Church, by that name and office. In all which if God hath done the like for authorizing aristocraticall or vsurped Dominion; then is the Observour in those assertions to be justified: but if not, then is he in them an Author of lyes. Yea, God is more Author of what he or­daines and directs, then of what he only permits; and therefore more Author of good, then of evill. Wherefore to say vsurped Domini­on referres as much to God as author thereof, as lawfull hereditary Dominion doth, is not only false but also blasphemous.

As for Power inherent in the People, how should one imagine such a thing? unlesse also he would imagine People to be juvenes aquilone creati, men like grashoppers and locusts bred of the winde, or like Cadmus his men sprung out of the earth; where none deri­ving from any pre-existent Parents, had all of them equall originall and power, and therefore subject to no civill Power but what by agreement they themselves ordained? But where man is borne of a Father, to whom, by the law of God and nature he is subject, he is [Page 4] so farr from having inherent Power originally in him, as that he hath not his own originall being but only in subjection; either to his im­mediate Father, if his Father were absolute, or to him and his com­mon Father, if his Father were a Subject. Now if man, in his parti­cular and naturall capacity, hath not originall Power of himselfe in­herent in him, he cannot have originall inherent Power, by any civill capacity whatsoever.

And though, upon the overthrow and breaking up of Kingdomes, instance may perhaps be given; that People have made themselves a King, yet does not that prove, the People to be the originall of Kingly Power; no more th [...]n going upon crutches, after losse of a legg, proves crutches the originall and naturall way of going: for people being by misfortune deprived of their naturall common Fa­ther and Soveraign, must of necessity entertaine such supply of their losse, as their fortune can best afford them. And even in that case too, their making of a King, was no other, then the choosing of one to beare the known Office of the true and naturall common Father. For we must note, they never made Kings by giving them power constitutive, to doe so; and so; (as they must have done, if Kings had had nothing but commissionary authority from the people,) but they made Kings, only by choosing one to beare the office and person of the same Governour, that the law of nature had before described and authorized to command and governe.

Though therefore the ten Tribes of Israell rebelled against Re­hoboam, for refusing to releive their greivance, made Ieroboam King, and God forbad Rehoboam to warre against them for it, yet this proves not, That people have power of making Kingdoms or Kings. For God himselfe had first declared, that he would rend ten Tribes from the Kingdome of Iudah, and that Ieroboam should be King over them. And had Jeroboam and the people attended Gods will and pleasure in it, (as David after his annointing did) he had beene a King and they a Kingdome not of their own making but of Gods. But to shew how quickly the by-affections of the people pervert the right work of God, when they looke not as well unto the way, as unto the end: we may see, that for all this, new Kingdome & King were of Gods appointing, yet when the people would in a way of their owne, take upon them the Crowning of the man appointed, God disclaimes the authorizing of what they did. They set up a [Page 5] King (saith God) but not by me. Hosea. 8.4. and in recording the fact (both in the first of Kings, and againe in the second of Chronicles) the Scrip­ture directly telleth us, that they rebelled. That therefore God forbad Rehoboam to fight against them, did not approve what the people had done, for God tells the reason why he forbad them; not because the people had done well, but because the thing was of God, which if God had not revealed, Rehoboam might, and ought to have reduced them to their obedience: and howsoever the thing it selfe was of God, yet to teach us, that the people have not autho­rity to doe the thing that he hath ordained, without his espceiall ap­pointment, we see that when Abijah, (Rehoboams sonne) with foure hundred thousand, against eight hundred thousand, pitched a battle upon the right of that Kingdome, and committed the cause to God, though Ieroboam had entrapped him in an ambush, God gave such a sentence against Ieroboam and his people, that after an overthrow and slaughter of five hundred thousand of them, they were disabled from ever recovering strength in all Abijahs dayes. And that Sub­jects for luck sake may take heed of making new Kingdomes, or Kings: this King (the only instance of peoples King-making, and yet in making of whom the people did only anticipate Gods pur­posed work) became the instrumentall efficient of their finall de­struction, & (setting up the Idolatry which the people themselves had first affected) his sinne through all his successours so adhered to them, as that it never left them, untill it had extirpated them from their own, and transferred them captives into another Country. To conclude this point, when we heare God himselfe stiling him­selfe a King, a great King of Kings, and telling us that the Kingdome is the Lords, &c: who without reluctance of conscience and even horrour of it, can yeild the power of Kings to be derivative, and the People to be the originall of it? for then, God by setting him­selfe forth in the name of a King, does instead of presenting him­selfe, in a notion of magnificence and Soveraignty, present himselfe under the notion of an inferiour and of a derivative, from a more Soveraigne and originall Power: whereas we see God never ex­presses his Power by the name of an Elder, or of a Magistrate, or any subordinate Authority how good or honourable soever. Yea to be King of Kings, is then no more, then to be the derivative and crea­ture of Kings.

As for the Peoples being the efficient and finall cause of the King. If one knew in what sence the Observour would be understood, he were soone answered. For if he would be understood according to the propriety of his wordes, (as indeed that which he would main­taine does need he should,) Then is that position not only false, but an impious falshood, even full blasphemy: for properly God, and none but God, is the efficient and finall cause of all things: there being no difference betweene the efficient cause and the Creatour. But if the Observour means, that the people be the instrumentall cause of Kings; the instrumentall cause and mediate end, are termes of so extreame and notorious difference, and consequence, from effi­cient and finall cause, as it is by no meanes to be pardoned him that he should meane the one, and say the other. Besides, to understand him so, does overthrow all that he drives at: for if the People be but the instrumentall cause of Kings, then can they not be the end of Kings, no more then the instrument of any worke can be the end for which the work was made, but contrarily the work is the end of the instrument, and therefore greater then the instrument. As for the people, they are so farre from being the finall end of Kings, as that they are not any way the end of them. For government is the end of Kings (of which the People are but the Subject) and God alone is both the efficient cause and finall end, both of the Govern­ment, Governour, and Subject to be governed.

As for that which he affirmes, That though Kings be singulis ma­jores yet are they vniversis minores, and that wherein soever they be to be accounted. Gods, Lords, Fathers, Heads, unto the People; they are not so to be understood, otherwise then as to the particular persons of men, considered singly not jointly, what an impudent in­solence is it that one that has use of reason, should so wickedly belye the principles of it, to so infinite a consequent of absurdities. For if Princes be Kings, Lords, Fathers, Heads, &c: to the single persons of the Subject only, and not to the universality of them, then is eve­ry single Subject by himselfe alone a body politique, whereof the King, as King, is Head, and so hath as many Kingdomes as Subjects: & every one being distinct in relation one from the other, have not, nor can have any civill communion among them; neither can any of them have to doe with the civill Affaires one of another. And fur­ther, (which is not only false, but destructive to the publique weale [Page 7] and safety of all Kingdomes) If Kings be not Heades of the pub­lique community of their People, as well as of the private particu­lars of them, then is the publique community out of the Kings Pro­tection, and Kings are discharged of all care of the publique. For the mutuality of relation betwixt Protection and Subjection, suffers not the one to move, but within the limits of the other, and if the uni­versality must be under the Kings Protection, it must be also under His Subjection, for which cause the ancient and constant wisedome of our Peers and Commons sitting in Parliament as the Body repre­sentative of the whole Subject of the Kingdome, doe in the Pream­ble of their Acts, in that quality, to this day, recite themselves His Majesties loyall and faithfull Subjects. So that in this point the Ob­servour insolently controules the Wisedome and Iudgement of the representative of the whole Kingdome, as well as contradicts the principles of reason.

Lastly, whereas he saith that Treason so farre as it concernes the Prince, is not so horrid in nature as oppression in a Prince. Without excusing any way or diminishing the faults of Princes, in any the least act of oppression, let every one but aske his owne conscience, whether is more horrid in nature, Superiors to wrong Inferiours, or Inferiours their Superiours: Maisters their Servants, or Servants their Masters: Husbands their Wives, or Wives their Husbands: Fathers their children, or children their Fathers: and he will soon find the impiety of this assertion. And whereas now the Observor professeth his good will and affection to Monarchy. You may by these grounds which he hath laid, and by his propounding to us for a patterne to our Kings, the condition of the Prince of Orange, and for our Kingdome, the patterne of the Common-wealth of Venice, know how false a meaning he hath, and what his designe is; even to loosen the sacred tye of Obedience toward our Liege Soveraigne, and with it the firme and setled stability of the Kingdome, and to prepare mens hearts and perswasions, to the receiving of some new forme of Government, according to the fancy of the common People.

Having therefore with false principles endeavoured to found the originall of all Soveraignty in the People, as hoping thereby to find meanes to pluck it out of the Kings hands: he then proceeds to perswade, that not only naturall reason, but even the frame of the [Page 8] Kingdome, and the positive lawes thereof, doe all concurr to main­taine the highest Soveraignty to be in the People. But when he should make that apparent by the manifest Iudgement and Acts of our Law; not being able to doe that, he seekes by sly insinuations, to have that admitted and swallowed, which to prove he knowes were impossible. Therefore pretending to shew the originall, the progresse, and changes of soveraigne government, all from, and by the authority of the People, even from the fall of Adam to the pre­sent. when it should be expected he should shew the Soveraignty of this Kingdome to be deriued from them, he runnes himselfe into a puzle, and then breakes off and tells us what he thinks, and he thinks, that when most Countries have found out an Art and peaceable order for publique Assemblies, whereby the people may assume its own power, to doe it selfe right, without disturbance to it selfe, or injury to Princes; he were unjust that would oppose that art and order. That Princes may not be beyond all limits of Law, nor tryed upon them by private parties, the whole Community in its underived Majesty, shall convene to doe Iustice, &c: and so he goes on insinuating, that our Parliaments are such publique Assemblies, wherein the Commu­nity in underived Majesty convenes to doe justice upon the King.

Truly I am not so well affected to arbitrary Government, as to admit the judgement (much lesse the thought of one man) to be proof of Law and Government, We shall therefore by Gods helpe examine how well this new conceipt agreeth with our Lawes and auncient setled frame of Government. But this is obvious a fore­hand, that it is so farre from being true that most Countries, have found the art and order of Assemblies wherein the People may as­sume the power of doing themselves right. As that unlesse you will call the Assembly of some meere popular Republique, such an assembly: there is not the ordinance of any such assembly to be found in all the world. and the reducing of our Parliaments to such Assem­blies, will suit as well, as the shaping of our Kingdome to the frame of the common-wealth of the Venetians, or of the Hollanders.

That we may know therefore that our Parliaments are no such imaginary Assemblies, in which the people in underived Majesty convene to assume any Power supposed to be theirs originally, and with that Power to doe themselves right. Even the Observour himselfe hath assured us, when in his fast and loose play, he unawares [Page 9] confesseth that the composition of our Parliaments are so equall and geometricall, and all parts so orderly contribute their office, as that no part can have any extreame predominance over other. This is most true that he confesseth. God grant that no endeavour to the contrary may ever deprive the Kingdome of the right benefit of this happy and well composed Ordinance. But now then if our Parlia­ments be ordained Assemblies, composed of three necessary different parts, one Soveraigne, the others Subject, some appearing for their own interests, others representatively for them that sent them, and all ballanced in such a geometricall equality, as is proper for the conservation of their severall rights and interests from any extream predominance of one of the parts above the other. Then can they not be assemblies of resumption of the peoples supposed power, for in such imaginary assemblies, there must be a dissolution of all consti­tute orders, degrees, and qualities of the parts, and all the members must be reduced to a naturall coequality undistinguished by any dif­ference, of quality, degree or priviledges whatsoever: so as there must be neither King, nor Peers, nor any office or power of the for­mer State remaining, but all resolved into a meere Chaos, till all be new framed by the deity of the people. So farre therefore are our Parliaments from the nature of such assemblies, as that the endea­vour of introducing of such Assemblies is most seditious, traiterous, and destructive, not only to the person and dignity of the King, to the Crowne Imperiall and to the Kingdome it selfe (whose well ballanced rights have (beside other tyes) beene so often, so so­lemnely, and by so many of us, even by our whole representative body sworne to be defended) but even to the rights, priviledges, and being, of the blessed Ordinance of our Peace and well-fare our very Parliaments themselves.

For we must know, that our law (taking notice, that in every State, there are three parties capable of just or unjust Soveraignty; that is to say, some Prince; the Nobles; and the People) judged no government so safe and assured, as where every of the three parties capable of Soveraignty, were in some sort admitted to a participati­on of it, but so admitted, as that still the Soveraignty should cleerly remaine to Him that ought to be the Soveraigne. And to this end, our law (having first through the piety of our law-giving Princes obtained a just & regular course of government; the stability where­of [Page 10] it found to be more concerned in the power of making lawes, then in any other power belonging to the Soveraigne) did for pre­venting innovations that might subvert that setled regularity: in such a sort establish the frame of State and government, as that the Prince should have his hands bound up from using the legislative power without the concurrence of the Peers and Commons. But then, to the end that they (whose consent was brought in only to prevent the evill which absolute power might worke against the setled frame of the State) might not themselves become that evill, which they were called to prevent: The Law gave to them no more interest in the legislative power then it had still left in the hands of the Prince, to wit, to every of the three parties, the King, the Peers, and the Commons, an equall power of assent or dissent in making of new Law. And so by opposing the single power of eve­ry one of them, to the votes of every other two; made so secure a ballancing of their powers one against another; as that no practice of any two of them can doe any thing to the prejudice or diminution of the third, without that third party it selfe doe give consēt unto it.

Nor did the providence of the Law here rest. But considering that in the power of making Lawes it had now opposed the pow­ers of two numerous bodies, against the power of the single Sove­raigne. It foresaw, and feared that by the Soveraignes consenting to Lawes for the ease and benefit of the Subject, things might passe to the prejudice and diminution of the soveraignty, if the single per­son of the soveraigne (surcharged with the care of the manifold af­faires of the Kingdome) should be left all alone to advise and dis­pute His Right against all the wisedome and sollicitation of the nu­merous body of the Subject. To prevent that: it ordained, that the King should at His owne discretion sweare unto Himselfe a body of Councell, to advise Him in the concernements of His Soveraigne Rights, and safety (which is His Privy-Councell) and a body of Councell at law, to advise Him that He may neither doe, nor suffer contrary to the rule of Law. And through this even Counter-poise & ballance of all the three States of Parliament (as through a meanes wherewith God hath especially blessed us above other Lands) doe we enjoy the assurance of a regular freedome, under the govern­ment of a just and legitimate soveraignty. In which, if without the free concurrence of every of the three ordained parties, there shall [Page 11] be any invasion and exercise of the legislative power; then shall the well ballanced frame of legitimate law-making be overthrowne, and with it, the rightfull being and use of Parliaments destroyed.

But the Observor having not ascribed such underived Majesty to Assemblies of the Community, to the end to maintaine the rights of Parliaments, but to innovate Parliaments to the destruction of their true being, and to the transformation of the State and government. Howsoever that fol. 15. he tells us only of some defects in Parlia­ment that might receive amendment: yet let's he slip, that those Defects, are Divisions betweene the two Houses, and betweene the King and them. Now Division being almost inevitable, and power of dissenting necessary for ballancing the three differing parts of Parliament, to prevent this power of dissenting, were to destroy the ballance and being of Parliaments, and to make them Courts of popularity, where they that please the People should absolutely car­ry all things. Though therefore he here discovers his designe, yet being assured not to bring it about, but by misleading the most faith­full and well-affected both to true established Religion & Govern­ment, He covertly pursues His purpose altogether under the shew of vindicating the Rights, Priviledges, & being of Parliaments.

So, whereas our Parliaments are assemblies wherein the whole State in three distinct formall parts convenes in Councell, & where­in every of those three parts have free power of allowing or disal­lowing of any thing propounded for a law, and wherein the law ta­keth notice of no vote, nor act, for any generall law, save what doth passe with concurrence of all the three parts of the Assembly, The Observor tells us, that for the King to say, that without the Kings concurrence and consent, Parliaments are without all power, this at one blow confounds all Parliaments, and subjects us to as unbounded a Regiment of the Kings will, as any Nation under Heaven ever suffered under. And his reason is, If Kings may so frustrate Parlia­ments, He may by the same meanes frustrate all inferiour Courts, & then farewell Law, Right, Liberty, and all things. O impudence! does His Majesty in this claime more, then either the House of Peers to it selfe, or the House of Commons to it selfe challengeth? Nay, claimes His Majesty more then He acknowledgeth due by the Law to each of the two Houses, as well as to Himselfe, freely to as­sent or disassent to what is propounded for a Law, and doe not, and [Page 12] have not, both they and His Majesty and both their Predecessours ever practised that power? so as we have had scarce one Parliament wherein either King or Peers, or Commons (or perhaps every one of them) have not severally dissented from the votes each of other two and tye their dissent frustrated the votes of the other two, and yet (God be praised) our Parliaments doe, and (we hope) still shall continue, notwithstanding such undermining foxes would bring that three fold Cord of our State, into the singlestring of a popular As­sembly, and all things so into confusion?

And how false is the consequence that if the King by dissenting may make voyd, the sentence of the two Houses of Parliament He may also voyd the sentence of any inferiour Court of Iustice? When in Parliament, the law hath appointed the King Himselfe to give His owne Vote and consent, personally if He will, or by His Let­ters under His great Seale, if He will. But in inferiour Courts hath appointed none to give sentence or Iudgement but only those Iud­ges who in a definite and formall way are ordained to be the only Ministers and Deliverers of the Kings Iustice and Iudgement in that behalfe, so as no personall or instrumentall assent or dissent of the Kings, can alter or frustrate the sentence or judgement of any infe­riour Court, because that though the Iudges there give the Kings Iudgement, and not their owne; yet the Law having authorized none but them to be the givers of the Kings Iudgement there, it taketh no notice of any other judgement in those Courts, then only of the sworne Iudges themselves, and though the King, the Peers, and Commons in Parliament have every one the power, by any one of their votes to frustrate the votes of two of them, from be­comming the Iudgement of the whole Court: yet cannot the Vote of either the King, the Peers, or Commons alone, or of any two of them, frustrate or change the Iudgement of any inferiour Court. And it is further to be observed that in those Courts the Iudges judge as strangers of matters that concernes others only and not themselves and therefore render Iudgement in invitum, against the will of one of the parties at least, in which case because expedit rei publica ut finis sit litium, if all the Iudges agree not, yet Iudgement shall be given according to the Iudgement of the Major part.

But now (contrary to the use of inferiour Courts) The parties in Parliament in (those things that concerne the publique) meddle [Page 13] not as meere Iudges, but as Parties interessed, with things that concerne every of their owne Rights, in which case it is neither Law nor reason, that some of the Parties should determine of that that concernes all their mutuall interests, invitâ altera parte, against the will of any one of the Parties. But that all Parties concurre, or else their mutuall interest to remaine in the same condition it was before, For Parties cannot meddle with Iudging in invitum, but per consensum, and therefore no major part of the three Parties in Parliament, but the consent of all three, must make the judgement of that Court, otherwise two of the three Parties, may totally or in part oppresse the third, and then one of those two, oppresse the other, and be a sole arbitrary Tyrant. The King and Peers may op­presse the Commons; the King and Commons, may oppresse the Peers, the Peers and Commons may oppresse the King: and then the Peers being easily suppressed by the Commons, what shall hin­der but that some Appian decemvirate (that under shew of zeale of reforming Church and Common-wealth, may carry the sound and well-affected Subject with them) After they shall have not only possessed mens mindes with the lawfulnes of their authority, but possessed themselves of the Militia & all the Power of the King­dome, and two or three yeare kept all that power in their hands, pretending they cannot sooner perfect their Lawes of Reformati­on (though indeed they doe but time it out, till they secure all unto their private ends) (as Appius in all things did) what then (I say) shall hinder, but that by meanes of some such decemvirate among the Commons, some Appius may invade an absolute Soveraignty over us, or missing that, resolve yet all our setled State, into an un­sure troublesome Aristocracy? or Republique?

The better to prepare the way to some such upshot. The Ob­servor findes a defect in the frame of our State, he cannot see how Parliaments can have sufficient power, to restraine Tyranny, if they can doe no Act without the Kings consent. And he findes, that if Princes in matters that concerne the publique, be admitted to preferre weake opinions (as he calls them) before Parliamen­tary motives, then Parliaments are vaine, Princes unlimitable, and Subjects miserable.

The Observer will be more wise and faithfull then the Law it selfe, and looking only one way, tells us of insufficient provision [Page 14] for restraint of regall power, without some coercive superinten­dant be placed over it. But the law that lookes every way, tells us, that the erecting of such a superintending power, would unso­veraigne our King, and make that superintending power Soveraign and when it were made, the exercise of it would be subject to more dangerous extravagances then regall power is, and yet lesse capable of regulation then it. Therefore the law (knowing that there is none but God, qui custodiat ipsos custodes, that can restraine su­pream Governours, and knowing that nothing in this world can be reduced to so absolute a perfection of setlednesse, but that in the last meanes it must meerly depend upon the providence of God) after a full consideration of the weaknesse and imperfection of every se­verall forme of Government, concludes, that the Soveraignty was better placed in the hands of a sole Prince, then in a popular, or Ari­stocraticall hand, and that a positive knowne law, without any coer­cive superintendant, was a sufficient and the best boundary of regall power, against any irregularity whatsoever, especially when the law (being backed with a Parliament of all the orders of the King­dome) shall thereby find meanes of discovery and manifestation, both of the truth of the law it selfe, and likewise of the violation of it. For the law, and the transgression of the law, being both at once made manifest and notorious, that will so sufficient a security of the future observance of the law, as Princes will not further en­dure to violate it; because (as the Poet saies)

Infamous acts will not endure to be committed in the sight of all the world.

Therefore to say truth the Observor's conceipt of having some superiour power to enforce the law that should regulate the power of the Soveraigne Prince, is a meere false conception, of an heart as traiterous to God as to his Prince, who would have absolute securi­ty by an arme of flesh, when no such can be given to it. For, to re­gulate his Prince, he would not only have a law, but a superiour power to enforce that law; and such a superiour power being once erected, that must also be either boundlesse, or must be circumscri­bed with a law: if circumscribed with a law, then also must that law have a superiour coercive power, to enforce it, and so must we [Page 15] have superiour Power, over superiour Power, us (que) ad infinitum, and yet at last, leave the most superiour power, in that liberty which the Observour calleth boundlesse, arbitrary, and tyrannicall. And how absurd a thing is it to imagine, That when the Law hath trusted the soveraigne Power in the hands of the King, it should again distrust Him and unsoveraigne Him, and place in another the soveraignty of the same soveraign Trust? and with a second absurdity leave in the Kings hand the Power of calling together and dissolving the power whereby He himselfe should be constrained? and (to make up all) should by authority of that power, constrain all the Heads of the peo­ple, and even the representative body of that power, by solemne oath, to declare that the King is not only Supream Governour, but that He is the only Supream Governour, when (such a superiour power admitted) he can be neither only, nor at all, Supream.

But the Observour aiming more to subvert what is established, then to reduce things unto their first establishment, quarrels still with the Regall power; and he reasons, that whether or no the Law gives the single Person of the Prince as full and free a Vote to assent or not assent, as it doth to either the House of Peers or House of Commons, yet is not the Prince to use the liberty of His Vote licentiously, but advisedly and by Councell, and what Councell can He have more wise, faithfull and impartiall, then theirs that represent the whole Kingdom, who cannot be supposed to have private ends as Courti­ers, Cavaliers, and private men may have?

Truly that Princes ought with great respect to hearken to the ad­vice and information of the great Councell of the body of their peo­ple, who can so much as make a question of it? But why should these things be objected to His Majesty? For what Prince of all his Pre­decessors hath so much harkened & condescended to his great Coun­cell, as His Majesty at once hath done unto this present Parliament? Not any one; Nay, not the whole succession of His predecessors since the granting of the great Charter hath done the like. Witnesse the condescending to the Earle of Staffords attainder, the damning of Ship-mony, and of all Monopolies, the Star-Chamber, and high Com­mission Court, the taking away of the Votes of Bishops & of Popish Lords, the parting with the long used power of imposing upon mer­chandize, bounding of Forrests, and yeelding to the regulation of whatsoever further greivance should be found in the common­wealth. [Page 16] And (for a seale of observance of all) the granting of a Tri­enniall Parliament, and the perpetuating of this present Parliament. With what dispensation of the violating of Christianity can a Subject (through all these presumptions to the contrary) charge his Sove­raigne with aversnes to publique counsell, and inclination to private whi perers? O that being at once possest of so many not long since unhoped for satisfactions, we might not want hearts to enjoy them and acknowledge them.

But the two Houses thought the Kingdome in imminent danger, and desired it should be put in a posture of defence, and His Majesty by evill Counsell refused and deserted them. Truly the Observour neither doth nor can shew, that His Majesty, upon the Parliaments apprehension of danger, refused to take order for the defence of the Kingdom; for the contrary thereof is true. And in His seeking to se­cure it by a military posture, He so farre condescended to the satis­faction of His Parliament, as that He offered to change the persons, that in any County had the charge of the Militia, if His Parliament made any just exception to any of them. And for His Maiesties com­ming to the Parliament to Westminster, even in that also He so farre hearkned to them as that he offered, that if, to secure future seditions, they would make some exemplar punishment of the Actors in the late seditious Tumults there, He would even come thither. And be­ing refused in that: He notwithstanding, offered them to come to any other indifferent place. As for the place where they now sit, who (that hath vowed His Faith to the Lawes of the Land, and to the Priviledge of Parliament) can in such conscience as He will an­swer God withall, hold that a place of indifference and of freedom to vote in, where the people in Tumult demanded of the House of Commons to know who were the Lords that refused to vote with them, and where some of the Peers were assaulted by the multitude for having differed in their votes from them, and yet none of those Tumulters were punished or ever questioned for it?

But ere we leave this point of hearkning to the advice of Parlia­met, we must cōsider too, that though we grant it behoovefull for the King to hearken to His Parliament, we must not understand it so be­hoovefull, as that there should be inevitable necessity laid upon Him, that He must follow whatsoever they advise, for then at one blow we overthrow the fundamentall Law & frame of Parliaments. [Page 17] If from any of the three formall parts of the Parliament we take a­way the freedome of voting, to assent or dissent, we breake the threefold cord of the State, we cast away the ballance of it, & even dissolve the very frame it selfe. If when for necessity of State, the Head assembles the whole body in Counsell, (where the Law gives the Head one vote of three, and allowes Him a Body of Privy Coun­cell to maintain the proper Rights of the Head) the Head may not use that Power which the Law giveth it, no not in case the two other partes contest & claime part of the Right belonging to the Head, & where (by Law) the Vote of the Head is opposed in ballance, to the moderation of those two powers; as well as their powers are oppo­sed in ballance to the power of the head; but that the Head must do all things according to the advice & counsell of the two parts, which are the body of the Subject. Then all that solemne forme of Law, that calleth the Head, Soveraign: that authoriseth the Head to swear a body of Privy Councell; to convoke the Nobles and Commons in publique Counsell; to call to that Counsell whom He thinker good: to take homage of the Peers, and Oath of Supreamacy of the Commons: and having used their Counsell, at His Iudge­ment to dissolve it. All this (I say) is then a meer misleading for­mality of the law, The Soveraignty (against all our Oathes and ex­pressions to the contrary) is not in the King but in the people; the King is the only Subject, and but a common vouchee, whose concur­rence is unavoidably implyed; His will, his understanding, and his power (though he be acknowledged Head, Soveraigne, and chief residence of authority) is all subjected to the body of the very Subject that in Parliament doth sweare subjection to Him. The tripartite frame of a Parliament of three Estates, is a vanishing ap­parition: there is really nothing but a meer popular assembly, not of Subjects but Soveraignes. The Crowne Imperiall and King­dome it selfe, (though asserted by our solemnest Acts of Recogniti­on and oathes of the body representative,) are meer non entia, we are but a Republique, and the chief Head of the Kingdome hath not (beside the name) more of a King, then the Duke of Venice, or the Prince of Orange. And this being hid ever since the first beginning of the Kingdome; the whole generation of the Subject ever since, hath by the injury of our Lawes, been most impiously mis-worne in their allegiance; and the errour hath never been discovered till the [Page 18] whole Kingdome (having now solemnly sworne to stand to, and defend the Lawes) cannot receade from their wrong-sworn obedi­ence, but with the guilt of universall perjury, and under the burthen of that guilt, expose an old grown Kingdom, to the hazards of a new framed Common-wealth. All this does necessarily follow, if we take away the freedome of the Kings assent and dissent in Parlia­ment; or barre Him of the use of His Counsells advice therein.

I should little need to say any thing concerning that which the Observour so much pretends that Communities, and universalities of men, are voyd of corrupt affections and of private ends, and that therefore their desires are alwayes lust, and their councell faithfull and impartiall. But when in the fallacy of this perswasion there lyes (I fear) a great part of the sinne, for which Gods anger now so publiquely doth shew it selfe upon us, I would be loath to passe it over without any touch at all. I feare we are too diffident to rest upon the ordinance of God: I feare we are too confident of our selves, as if our owne naturall providence (if we were left unto it) were beyond any other meanes of safety, although it were the ordi­nance of God unto us. A word or two shall not therefore be unne­cessary concerning the corruptions & errors that even communities themselves are often subject to.

That Communities are lesse subject to private ends and affections then particular men are, is true: but it is also true, that they are not absolutely free from them, and when they fall into them, they are more fatally violent and dangerous. And though one would think it repugnant, that an universality (which conteines the whole pub­lique) should have private ends; or that that should any way be coun­ted private, which they that conteine the publique doe pursue: yet seeing it is not the number of agents, but the capacity in which they act, the quality of their acting, and the coherence or incoherence of what they pursue, with the publiques end and weale; that makes the actions of men publique or private: it must needs follow, that if without authority, or out of the way of the publique ordinance, men pursue any thing (though the whole community concurre in the pursuit) yet is all of the nature of a private action, done to a corrupt and private end, for though the thing intended be to the present good of the publique, yet being beside the ordinance and way, it is in consequence against the good and weale of the publique, & so against [Page 19] the very ends of the publique. And as in the body naturall a very few members (that is none but the eyes) have the sense of seeing, but all the members have the sense of feeling. so in Communities all have the sence of enjoying good, or suffering evill: but very few the faculty of discerning the cause and means of either. Yet the ma­jor part of the Community (more carried by sense then true dis­cerning) oft makes the judgement of the whole Community, and brings it to act that, that agreeth not with the intended weale of the Comity. By this means (at the best) the whole universality of the Israelites (contrary to their own finall good and prosperity) forced their Priest to set them up golden Calves. By this meanes the uni­versality of them againe revolted from David (their King by Gods immediate Ordination) to Absolom an usurper. By this means the universality of the tenne Tribes, for redresse of their grievances, rebelled against Davids Grand-child, and set up Jeroboam, who re­viving their own affected false religion, authorized that sinne which pursued them in their extirpation. It is therefore an untruth, to say that Communities can have no private ends, and a belying of the Law and Truth to say (as fol. 22.) that ever there was such a Maxime.

But it will be said, that though in Communities the body at large (in which the vulgar is the greatest part) may be subject to corrupt affections and ends; yet the body representative, which is the Choice of the Community, is to be presumed free from corrupt ends and affections, and therefore most wise, faithfull, and assured.

Truly we pray, that since in this knot lye many scruples that wring the consciences of thousands in our Israel, we may with mo­dest freedom, reason the things that tend to clearing the honour and observance due to representatives. To whom we acknowledge the highest honour and observance that can be given to the body repre­sented. But the honour and authority of the representative will al­waies depend upon two things, that is, the quality and condition of the body represented, and the quality of the representation it selfe: for as that is more or lesse proper and lively, so will it derive more or lesse authority and reputation. If therefore the body at large be an absolute free soveraigne (as is the Community of a right Re­publique) the true representative of that body is then to be obser­ved with all soveraigne honour and due subjection: but if the body [Page 20] at large be it selfe a Subject, the honour and authority of the repre­sentative cannot exceed the honour and authority of a Subject: for none can make their image more then they themselves are. Next then, (besides that all representations how plenarily soever autho­rized, must ever be subject to the condition of the body represen­ted) The repute and authority of representatives, will also follow the soundnesse or weaknesse, exactnesse or imperfection of the re­presentation it selfe. For if throughout an whole Community the representers be equally and proportionably ordained according to the true relative interest, that each part which sendeth them hath to the whole publique (as in the united Provinces they are) there will be all full acknowledgement of authority to the representa­tive, that possibly can be to the body at large: and there will also be some presumption that the representers are authorized, to deter­mine soveraignly of those things that concerne the publique. But if (on the other side) there be no equality, in making representers, observed: but that some parts send as many as others that are an hun­dred times greater and more considerable, both in power and sup­port of burthen in the Commonwealth and if for some of the parts none are admitted to choose the representers, but substantiall legall Freeholders, and for other parts all are admitted of what condition soever. And if the number of those that are unproportionably and promiscuously chosen, doe three or foure fold, exceed the number of them that are strictly chosen for the most principall part of the Community. And lastly, if it lye in the power of some other autho­rity to give to some particular Townes the power of sending repre­senters, equall in number to the greatest Provinces of the Community. These circumstances will not only detract from the repute and au­thority that a more exact representative of the Community might have, but vehemently demonstrate that the institution and end of such a representative is rather to minister information of the state and condition of every of those particular places and advice, and as­sistance to some other soveraigne, and to consent with him, then to determine soveraignly it selfe.

To come then to the Objection of the assurednesse of Represen­tatives in their judgement and fidelity. If in Kingdoms, we by the representative body of the Community meane a perfect represen­tation of the whole body Politique, so as that the head as well as [Page 21] the other parts doe freely cooperate and concurre (as in our Acts of Parliament it ever doth) then can we presume no other Coun­saile more assuredly wise, faithfull, or safe for the publique, then is the counsaile of the universall representative in that sense. But if by the representative, we mean the representation of the grosse of the body without the head, (that is, the representative of the body of the Subject only) then is the assertion false, for the Law presumes not in the representative of the Subject, so assured judgement and fidelity for government, as it doth in the soveraigne head alone, for then it would not have placed the soveraignty in the head, but in the representative of the grosse of the body. But the Law knowing both Communities themselves, subject to dangerous inclinations from private incitements, and their representatives likewise subject to misleadings, factions and ambitions of private men, hath (as in the most assured place, placed the soveraignty in the head, and the head so having the ordinance, both for judgement and for government, where the ordinance is, there is the blessing and there the best as­surance.

We need not seek examples how representative bodies of Sub­jects moving without consent of their head have been misled: there is not one imitable example to be found that ever the representa­tive of the Subject, moved to act soveraignly without the consent of the head. But we have examples of soveraigne representatives, in Republiques themselves, notoriously misled by private men; was there ever a more reverend representative then the Roman Senate, yet did not Appius and his Faction, under the Colour of a Dec [...]mvi­rate (or Comittee of reformation) so blind that Senate, as to work them to conferre all the power of the Commonwealth into his, and his Factious hands, to the subversion of the common liberty? so as that if by accident he had not been taken away, he had made himselfe Prince? And was not that soveraigne representative, ano­ther time wholly swayed and caried by Marius and Sulpitius? Sure as nothing is more wholsome for the publique, then that the Sove­raigne of a Kingdom should often have the advice of the body repre­sentative of the Community, so is it most dangerous for the publique to have the advice of the Community enforced on the Soveraigne. Least so that that should be for Our good, be unto us an occasion of falling.

But the Observour insists not so much, that the representative bo­dy is the great Councell of the King and Kingdom: as that it is the supream judge and the most soveraigne power. If the Prince (saith he) be seduced, some Court must judge of the seducement, and some power enforce that judgement , and that must be the Parlia­ment (meaning the two houses of Parliament.)

We have already shewed the absurdity of a superior power to enforce the Soveraigne: but farther to dissolve all difficulties in this false assertion, we must know that in Parliament there are diverse kinds of judgements. And that the meer representative body, that is, the house of Commons solely, hath not any judicatory power by it selfe, unlesse it be in particular cases concerning their own house and members. But they are as the great Inquest of the Kingdom to enquire, discover, impeach, &c. The house of Peeres hath general­ly in all things judgement preparatory in order to judgement of Parliament, as to give Oath, to take recognisance, to fine, to impri­son &c. In matters that come before them bywrit of Error, it hath judgement decisive to determine and adjudge Law. But this judge­ment it hath not as it is part of the representative body: for the re­presentative body hath not therein any part with it. But the house of Peeres alone hath this superior judgement, as great Court of the Kings Barons of the Kingdom, which being assisted with the Iudges of all the Benches, is by formall Ordinance of Law in all matters so coming before it, the proper and immediat superior Iudge of Law. But it is not absolute supreme Iudge of Law in all things: and there­fore it cannot revoke the judgement which it selfe hath given. Nei­ther can the House of Commons, nor the two houses together re­voke, or anull any judgement given in the House of Peeres, or else­where; therefore also the two Houses are not supream judges or de­clarers of Law. The Observer (fol. 44.) tells you the reason, To be supream judge or declarer of Law is all one as to be supream maker of Law, and that you know the two Houses are not. But in the whole three Estates of Parliament, that is, in the King, the Peeres and Commons, there and there only are all powers ingredient, for they upon Bill are not only judges of the last resort, to reverse the judgement of the House of Peeres and of inferior Courts, but they can repeale and restore, and repeale againe in infinitum their own Iudgements and Acts. And they can not only declare the Law but [Page 23] they can make the law, and none but they. They alone are they that cannot be bound by precedents or Acts of Parliament, they alone are they that have the Legislative Power: and therefore they, and only they that have the absolute Supream Iudgement of the Law.

But (saith the Observer) The King deserts His Parliament, imply­ing that then the two houses must be Supream judges; though other­wise they were not. As well may he imply, that if the King come not to Parliament then are the two Houses no more Subiects, but So­veraign's, yea Soveraign's in the highest exaltation. Let us see what this deserting is, that shall so easily create Soveraignty in Subiects. We know that by the law, the Kings personal presence is of no abso­lute necessity to the proceedings of Parliament, and that by the law (declared and confirmed 33. Hen: 8.21.) the Kings presence is not necessary at His giving consents to Acts passed, but He may give consent in His absence by His great Seale. If then the Law count His personall absence no deserting: and as to deserting for want of iust and reasonable consent to their demands, His Maiesty be so little faulty toward this Parliament, as that he hath given His Consent be­yond the example of His Predecessours. Where then shall a sincere Conscience in any deserting the King hath made, finde warrant e­nough to desert this Soveraign, and acknowledge another Superiour? but to return.

Diversity of Powers and authorities exercised in the severall parts of Parliament, necessarily causes a diversity of respect and observance to be rendred to them. And though the iudgement of the represen­tative of the Subiect (that is of the Peers and Commons) in those things wherein it is properly exercised, ought to have esteem and credit before any other iudgement of the Subiect. Yet is it not to be opposed to the iudgement of the Soveraigne, in those things which the law hath entrusted to the iudgment of the Soveraign for the law trusteth none but whom it iudgeth to have judgment, fidelity, & pro­vision of all necessary incidents sufficient for that trust and then it preferrs both the Acts and iudgement, of the party trusted, before any other iudgement whatsoever. Not is the iudgment of the whole Kingdome any whit slighted thereby, no more then if in particular Sciences (as Divinity, Philosophy, Physick, Mathematique, &c.) the iudgement of the professors of those Sciences should be preferred before the iudgement of the whole body representative, for Ʋni­cuique [Page 24] in sua arte credendum: Matters of State and secrets of govern­ment are not only unfit and dangerous to be publiquely managed, by so numerous a body as our representative is, but the greater part are so little experienced or able to manage them as that in Edw. the thirds time, the House of Commons themselves (as the Observour (fol. 6. tell us) desired they might be spared from giving advice in those matters, de queuxals nont pas cognizance, of which they had not the Cognisans. The Iudgement of the body representative it selfe, did not at that time beleive, but that aswell the Iudgement, as the care of the Ardua Regni, did cheifly belong to the King. To whom alone, the Law having committed the Soveraign Govern­ment, ordained him withall, a body of sworn privy Councell to ad­vise with therein, and a sworne Counsell at Law to advise Him of the Rights and Priviledges, that belong unto Him as supream Go­vernour, and first of the three States of Parliament.

If any of these sworn Counsailers shall Counsaill the King against the known Law, or any by their counsaill, act any thing against it: after legall proceeding and conviction, it will soon be out of questi­on what shall become of them. But if without legall proof of par­ticulars, such Counsailers shall by generall vote of the Subject, be cē ­sured private whisperers and seducers of the King, and to be wholly removed from Him: then shall the King at once be dangerously de­prived of the constant meanes which the Law hath especially or­dayned Him, for support of His Right against the other two oppo­sed powers, and for the good discharge of His Kingly office. Be­sides if men shall so be condemned and made guilty, more by Sove­raignty and uncontroulablenes of Iudgement ascribed to the con­demners, then by clearnesse of evidence and legall proof of any fact then is the birth-right of the Subiect, in the highest concernment of Life and fortunes taken from Him, and He muststand and fall by the vote of the people, that (like a Iudgement infallible) shall sup­ply the office of both witnes, Peers, and Iudge.

While I pursue the examination of those things which the Ob­servour would have received for reason, I may not let slip the ob­serving of his slye unfaithfulnes and deceipt, to passe over that point which most of all concernes the soules and bodyes, lives and for­tunes of the whole Kingdome, and all because his want of proof in that point, does (if noted) overthrow all that he contends for. For [Page 25] though he argues the lawfulnes of Subjects taking up Armes and re­sisting the Authority and Commands of the King, under the warrant of a generall rule to this effect, That in extream perill and failance of ordinary meanes, any extraordinary meanes may be taken for the safety of the People: yet finding an impossibility of proving the State in such extream danger (for indeed such a danger must be so visible to all men as not to need any proving) and finding it also not possible to prove a necessity of the Subjects arming himselfe for want of other meanes, when His Maiesty, (in whom the naturall ordinary meanes of protection is placed) readily offered, and yet offers, to performe that regall office of protecting; The Observour passes over the matter without proving either danger or want of other meanes, and presses only the lawfulnes of selfe-defence in extreame danger, as if (if that were granted) all men might take up Armes whether there were danger or no, and whether there were other ordinary meanes of defence or no, and so securely doe we pursue this errour, as that we with it swallow any thing, and because that in ordinary providing for danger before it threaten; the ordinary courses of put­ting the Kingdom in a posture of defence by Commissions of Liev­tenancy and of Array, are voted illegall; therefore we not only ad­mit them to be so, but we admit also that the King (to whom it pro­perly belongs to take order for the safety of the Kingdome) may not in extreamity of danger, by any meanes that he can use, raise Armes, and put the Kingdome in a posture of defence, but the Subject (to whom it is Treason (by the Law) to raise Forces without autho­rity from the King) he may (against the ordinary rule of Law) raise Armes in the very same forme that is unlawfull for the King to doe, and all because of the extream necessity and danger. Yet the very same necessity and danger shall not make it lawfull to the Right and proper Authority of the King to doe the very same thing. Oh, what shall we say, when at once, extreame necessity is pretended, all wonted formes of defence (without shewing a lawfull forme) are declared unlawfull, and the course which Law abhorres, and the Conscience of every Law-sworne Christian trembles at, is set on foot, without the warrant of the lawfull Soveraign, when yet he is ready to supply that office in the Iust and lawfull way?

I cannot also but note, that though levying of Armes and put­ting the Kingdom in a posture of defence is a right so clearly belong­ing [Page 26] to the King, as that we know His Majesty, & all His Predecessors have ever been possessed of it as a right and authority inseperably an­nexed to the Crown, w ^ch nere any have lawfully exercised, but they. And though the representative body of the Kingdom, and (in them) every one of the body represented have, according to the positive law, sworn allegiance to the King and sworn to assist and defend &c. all Priviledges, preheminences, and authorities belonging to his high­nesse, His heirs and successors, or annexed to the Imperiall Crown of the Realm &c. Yet is not the observer afraid to say that the Oath of Su­premacy is not endangered by such taking of Armes. Nor is he affraid to say that next to renouncing of God, nothing under Heaven can be more perfidious then peoples withdrawing themselves frō their re­presentations. As if Subjects, by giving authority to some of their fel­lowes to represent them, & to advise, & consent for them, gave them a power so much above the condition of Subjects, yea so much above the condition of their Soveraign, as that neither breach of faith, nor Oath, nor any other duty unto him, were comparable to their with­drawing frō the vote or act of their own representers: as if the right of the King, the Crown, & Kingdom; & the concurrence of the three Estates in Parliament, did not so concern the Commons of the Land but that, (against all) they stood soly bound in allegiance to their re­presenters as to the only Soveraignes of their obedience. Of that it may please the two honourable Houses to take into a serious consi­deration; how repugnant these positions are to the loyalty of a true Christian: how hard it is for a pious conscience to perswade is selfe, that they that broach such Doctrines intend nothing but the defence of the King, of the lawes of the Land, and of the true Protestant Re­ligion: how much the name and Maiesty of God himselfe is blas­phemed, when in a Christian Kingdom that boastes it selfe of the knowledge and true profession of his word; such Doctrines so dero­gatory to Christianity should so audatiously be maintained: And last­ly, how much it must needs reflect upon their own honour, in poynt of jealousie and distrust (as if some ill-affected factious persons had too great an influence and power over their votes) when such impi­ous assertions, so desperatly misleading the soules and consciences of men, are so licentiously divulged without any condemnation check, or discountenances, from them though earnestly desired by His Ma­jesty at their hands.

I suppose there remaines not in the observations any thing mate­riall, that is not already answered. As for the design of changing Religion into Popery, which the observer perhaps glances at in speaking of Popish Prelaticall and Military Courtiers. If a Christi­an can in his conscience find any other ground for such beleife then only the opinion of a judgement, that would be beleived rather for authorities sake, then for any thing prooved or discovered, he then may well listen to it. But if instead of presumptions that way, he findes presumptions of intended change to the contrary Corruption of Religion, a good Conscience will not be so Popishly affected, as for the infallibility of any judgement, to beleive contrary to what his heart telleth him the most apparent presumption must incline him. For besides that it is easier to bring in a corruption in extremi­ty contrary to an old exploded corruption, then to recover that, that hath been once exploded, (as Popery hath been and is.) We have His Majesties often solemne attestation of God, imprecating the prosperity of Him and His, if he do not maintain the true Protestant Religion established in the Church of England against all Popery. We have not the like on the other part, against Schismaticall innovati­ons. Yet our Schismatiques are thrice as many as our Papists; and whereas our Papists are (God be thanked) disarmed, awed, and in feare, our Schismatiques are bold, armed, and in authority, and therefore licentious, and tumulting in every place.

God will require an account of our Oathes, and Protestations for defence of the true Protestant Religion, aswell against Schismati­call corruptions, as against Popish. And an account of our solemn Oathes of Supremacy, and of observance of the Law, as well against popular insolences, and invasions of Soveraigne power, as against regall Tyranny. Let us take heed, that when because of Oathes the Land already mournes; we through an universall breach of Oathes make it not for perjury mourn more greivously. Least when with our solemn Oathes, we have brought the animadversion of our ob­servance of Law, of right, and of Religion, before the presence of God, as Iudge and Revenger of it; and with out own hands kind­led a fire for the triall of it: we our selves be found guilty of a breach, or of halting in it. Let us weigh well the cause, the ground, the way, and the end of our taking Armes, that the horror of unjust and causelesse blood-shedding may not lye upon us; let us see what [Page 28] it is that we would have, which we may not already have without it.

May we not after some provision made for forbearance of such Ceremonies, as by the Iudgement of the Church shall be thought fit to be spared, have the authorized service of the Church established? And after purgation and regulation of some enormities in Church government, have the discipline of the Church of England in a good condition setled, with severe penall provision against connivers and Innovators in the one or in the other? Hath not His Majesty de­clared himselfe ready and willing to consent thereto? Againe, to make sure the abolishing of all grievances already supprest, and to regulate Armes, and some other extravagances in government not yet provided for, may we not have fit provisionary lawes, with severe and penall damning of all practices to the contrary? Doth not His Majesty to that also freely offer His consent? what can be wan­ting to the setling of as sound and well a governed Church and State, as any Nation under Heaven hath ever lived in? For if by a severe Law the persons of them that shall attempt any thing prejudiciall to the setled practice of Religion or to the declared liberty of the Sub­ject be exposed to exemplary punishment, no feare of Innovation to the prejudice of either can remaine. Nor can we feare His Maje­sties tolerating of offenders when besides his imprecating in that case himselfe and His, he has (in case he so violates the Law) with His owne mouth dispenced with His Subjects obedience. As for Our Parliaments, it can no way be in the power of the King to take away the least Right, much lesse the being of Parliaments; for what­soever a King can doe to the prejudice of Parliaments, and how so­ever averse He may be from them, yet alwayes the necessity of State will at last enforce the calling of a Parliament, and when it is called, it is presently repossessed, and re-invested of all the Rights and Priviledges that doe belong unto it. For nothing but a Parlia­ment it selfe, or so much of a Parliament, as in the peoples opinion shall have the authority of a whole Parliament, can any way destroy the being of Parliaments, or deprive them of the least right or pri­viledge belonging to them.

To conclude therefore, if they that devised and broached the new State principles & doctrines published in the Book of Observations, have in them dealt truely and faithfully with the Subject. Then let [Page 29] the Author of those Doctrines reioyce in them that receive and maintaine them; and let the maintainers of them reioyce in them that were the authors. But if they have dealt unfaithfully and de­ceiptfully with the soules of the Subiect to cause the blinde (that cannot Iudge) to erre, thereby to bring to passe their own designed innovations. Then let it please the just, and all-seeing Supream Iudge of Iudges in mercy to so many thousand soules in this our Jsra­ell, who in the darknesse of these difficulties know not the right hand from the left, to send (as once he did at Jothams instance) Iud 9.16. a fire from the malitious authors of them, to bring to confusion and shame the malignant maintainers and defenders of them; and a fire from them to bring to confusion the malitious authors. And let the Throne of our Soveraigne Lord the King, (with us the only supream Vice-gerent of the great and Supream Iudge) be in righteousnesse, in Iudgement, to true Religion, and in Peace for ever established over us.