NO Man can be presumed ig­norant of the Discourses which are spread abroad in all places almost of France, about the right of Successi­on in these Provinces, after the death of Philip the Fourth the Catho­lick King; nor of the private Consultations secretly held with some Lawyers of the Low Countries upon the same subject; and particularly about the devolution of the Dutchy of Brabant, and the breach of the conditions of Marriage, for the non-pay­ment of the Dowry promised to the French Queen. All these might have been neg­lected, while they were the discourse of the common people only: But lest a popular errour should make some bad impressions in the minds of more understanding persons, it was thought convenient to lay open the folly of these questions so commonly dis­cours'd [Page 2]of among the common people, and point out their errours, and destroy the foundations upon which the vulgar disputes and deceits were built.

They endeavour to no purpose therefore by overthrowing the agreement made upon the Marriage, to open a Title to the Dutchy of Brabant for the Daughter by the first Marriage, and exclude the Son by the second; as if those clauses of Renunciati­on in the said agreement being taken away, the Municipal Laws of the Country must of necessity take place, by which the first Marriage dissolv'd, the inheritance of the surviving Parent descends to the issue of the first Marriage, and not to that of the se­cond.

For there is nothing more certain, set­ting aside the Renunciation, then that the Daughter can pretend no Title to succeed, so long as there is an Heir Male living: neither was the Renunciation made with such a prospect, nor in its self was any ne­cessary to be made; neither had that which was in the agreement of Marriage in general terms any respect to this, an Heir Male surviving the Father, but in regard of some other remote accidents of collateral succession.

The Son by his own right did enjoy this prerogative to be preferr'd before the Daughters: but in case the whole masculine line of the King should fail, then a Renun­ciation was in its self necessary, that the elder Daughter should be excluded by the younger, or the next Heir of France by the more remote of Spain.

If we enquire into the first Laws of suc­cession to the Dutchy of Brabant, we shall find none more ancient or more firm then that which Philip King of the Romans esta­blished in the year 1204. in the solemn Convention of Estates at Coblens, in these words: Insuper Regiâ nostrâ autoritate statu­imus, & memorato Duci concedimus, ut Fi­liae suae, si masculum haeredem non habuerit, in feudis suis liberè ei tanquam masculi suc­cedant. Moreover we ordain by our Royal Authority, and grant to the aforesaid Duke of Brabant, that his Daughters, for want of Heir Male, shall succeed him in his inheri­tance, as if they were Heirs Males.

The tenour of which words contain two things; First, that till then the Daughters were incapable of succeeding in the Dutchy of Brabant, seeing that by a new privi­ledge it is granted to them. The second, That the Daughters are not simply and ab­solutely [Page 4]made capable of the succession, but with this limitation, if the Duke leaves no Heir Male; and therefore if he hath one, the ancient and former Laws of the Fe­males incapacity remains entire and firm.

But if Brabant had no proper Laws of succession, without doubt the Government ought to be disposed of according to the Universal Law of all Nations, wherein all that treat of Polity agree, and unanimously declare, that Kingdoms, Principalities, and Dignities, have observ'd this order of succession from their very first beginnings; that where the Female Sex is not wholly excluded from succeeding in the Govern­ment, they are notwithstanding only ad­mitted, when no Heir Male remains to suc­ceed in the Government. Arniseus in his Politicks, Cap. 2. Sect. 4. N. 11. speaks full in this particular: Jus in omnibus gentibus usque à primordiis Regnorum invaluit, ut quantumvis successionis jure utantur, ad fili­as tamen Reipublicae gubernacula non devol­vantur, quamdiu mares supersunt. There hath been a Law established among all Na­tions, from the beginning of their Go­vernment, That though they admit the right of succession, notwithstanding the Government of the Republick never de­scends [Page 5]to the Daughters, as long as there are Sons living. And Sect. 12. N. 57. and 67. He proceeds: Foemina, etiam major natu, in successione indivisibili excluditur à masculo, & existente masculo, redigitur ad instar se­cundi gradus. The Son excludes the Daughter in all indivisible succession; and if there be a Son, the eldest Daughter is considered as in the second degree. And though in private inheritances another Law should prevail, that the Females were per­mitted to have equal Portions with the Males, from thence therefore is it to be ex­tended to the succession of Princes? and is the Publick to be regulated according to the rules of private persons?

From whence it is clear, that the Argu­ment hath no force which is taken from the custom of Brabant, as to the Estates of private men, according to which the Chil­dren by the first Marriage go away with the whole inheritance of their Father; the Children of the same Father by a second Marriage being excluded, and this is called Jus devolutionis, the right of devolution: As if the publick succession of the said Dutchy ought to follow and be regulated by the same Laws that are in force among its Subjects. This not being a right way [Page 6]of arguing from private Successions to pub­lick, as all Authors in Polity do acknow­ledge and affirm.

There is an irreconcileable difference in Reason between these two successions; for it is of much more import for a woman to take upon her the Government of a Republick, and in this to be preferred before the Males, than to admit her to the private possession of a particular Estate, the extent of Justice can­not reach from one Species to another where the Inequality of Reason occurs. It must needs be therefore against the known and common Rules of Justice, to wrest and di­stort the Law, so as to make it equally bind­ing to publick and private Successions. But if that were granted, which yet to every common Reason must appear contradictory, and repugnant to the very Essence and Fun­damentals of Empire, however this Pretence cannot touch or impeach that Right of Suc­cession, whereby his Catholick Majesty hath so long possest the Countries now in questi­on. For the Dutchy of Brabam hath received from the aforesaid King Philip, proper and peculiar Laws, distinct from the Municipal, as we shewed before; since whatsoever is enacted by a peculiar Law, must be under­stood exempted from the general.

But if we should grant a devolution in the publick Succession of the Dutchy, without doubt it were to be understood of persons qualified and capable to succeed; but it is evident by what hath been said, that Wo­men are uncapable to succeed, unless all the Males of the Duke of Brabant fail. If any be remaining, then the ancient Law of Bra­bant doth continue in force: the same Argu­ment ought to hold, that the Children by the first Marriage should exclude others, so that they be fit and qualified to succeed.

No Example can be produced in any Age of so irregular a Succession in Brabant, that a Woman hath been preferred before a man, in the same degree, in the publick Govern­ment: but on the contrary, there are not wanting Examples, where the Right of De­volution hath been neglected in the Successi­on of the same Dukedom.

Charles the Fifth, after the death of his first Wife Elizabeth, Daughter of Portugal, by whom Philip was born (which Philip by Mary a Daughter also of Portugal, had Issue Charles) after the death of the said Mary, in the year 1554. did freely dispose of the Low Countries in Marriage to Philip the se­cond with Mary Queen of England, under this condition, that the Children to be born [Page 8]in that Marriage, should succeed in all the Belgick Provinces, Charles the Son of Philip, then living, being utterly excluded, which lawfully could not have been done, if by the Right of Devolution he had lost the propri­ety of Brabant, Geldres, &c. which had been devolved to Prince Charles, as the Law of private Devolutions is, that if the Grand­father and Father do both become Wid­dowers, the Right of Succession doth im­mediately rest in the Grand-child.

In the same manner Philip the second, be­ing a Widower by the death of his third Wife Elizabeth of France, did in the year 1598. freely dispose of the said Provinces, to his Daughter Isabel, upon her Marriage with Arch-Duke Albert, which he then confined to certain Conditions of returning again to the Family of Spain, and some other Re­strictions; which certainly he would never have done, if he had thought himself tied by the Right of Devolution, or that by vertue of any Municipal Law, he had been deprived of the Propriety, or power of disposing of the principal Dutchy. For if the Right of Devolution have any place in the Supream Titles of these Provinces, that Right was al­ready setled in her, and by consequence he could neither have given them to his Daugh­ter, [Page 9]nor have imposed any condition upon her. So that by these Examples it is evi­dent, that there never was any Right of De­volution in respect of these Provinces, ac­knowledged by the Princes of them, nor did it ever produce any effect, since even those persons that had most reason to pretend, re­mained satisfied.

Now if there had been any doubt of this Right, this Argument had never been omit­ted by the House of Savoy, in the year 1633. after the death of the Infanta Isabella, Sister to Catherine, when all possible search was made, to prove that the Succession of these Provinces did of right belong to the Princess Catherine.

For if the Right of Devolution, which is in force among private persons, had the same Priviledge as to publick Successions, it were not to be maintained, but that by vertue of that Right the Provinces of the Dutchy of Brabant would after the death of Philip sub­ordinately, and by the Right of degree have belonged to the said Catherine, and she dying in the year 1597. and Isabella in the year 1633. if there had been no other impe­diment, the Heirs of Catherine would have had the Right of Succession. But they who by their Disputes in Print undertook to de­fend [Page 10]the Right of the House of Savoy, and by all possible Reasons to maintain its Title, de­spaired to find any support from the Right of Devolution, and therefore they wholly omitted it.

There cannot be a more convincing Ar­gument that the Right of Devolution was never of force in the Succession of these Pro­vinces, not only in the sence and opinion of their Princes, but even of the whole Belgick Provinces, than that Decree establisht by the Emperor Charles the Fifth, in the year 1549. where it was enacted, That the Belgick Pro­vinces should never be separated the one from the other, by any Divisions of the Suc­cession, but should always continue in the Possession of one Prince, in these words: Desirans sur toutes choses Pourveoir au bien, repos, & tranquillité de nos Pays de par de ça, & conserver iceux en une masse, & qu' elles soyent inseparablement pessedces par un seul Prince. Desiring above all things to provide for the Good, Repose, and Tranquillity of our Coun­tries on this side, and that they may remain en­tire and inseparable under the Obedience of one Prince. To effect which Design, the Em­peror took away all difference of Succession, as the only thing that opposed it; and in the Provinces, introduced Jus Representationis, [Page 11]the Right of Representation; by vertue of which Children entred into the place, and represented the person of their immediate Ancestors; a thing not then in use in some of the said Provinces, and whence was fear­ed the division of that Belgick Body.

Which new Constitution was not only re­ceived, and approved by the Estates of every Province, as necessary for their publick Peace, and Union, but also desired; as ap­pears by their Publick Acts, and afterwards subscribed by all their Governors, in these words; Mesmes les dits Estats ont fait in­stance devers nous, que voulussions introduire la dite loy, &c. Statuons & Decretons qu' en tous nos dits Pays, Representation aura lieu, en ce qui touche la Succession de Prince, ou Princesse, estans capables à Succeder. The aforesaid Estates having been earnest Petition­ers, that we would introduce the said Law, &c. We enact, and decree, that in all our aforesaid Countries, the Right of Representati­on shall be in force, so far as concerns the Suc­cession of the Prince or Princess, being capable to succeed. And after which follows a Cata­logue of Names, not only of the Princes, and Nobility, but also of the principal Per­sons of the Gown, as the President, the Chancellor, &c.

Now if some of the Provinces should still be subject to the Right of Devolution, and others exempt, the care and diligence used upon this occasion, would be rendred of no effect: For how could the Conjunction have possibly continued firm, if some of the Pro­vinces by Right of Devolution should descend to the Issue of the first Venter, and others to those of the second? Certainly that most wise and excellent Prince, through Ignorance of the Laws of his own Provinces, had there failed in his Design: which Conceit is not imaginable, nor would any man of the least insight into publick Affairs, have the confidence to say it: especially when he con­siders that all the Estates, and most Learned Counsellors of the Low Countries, were concerned in the enacting of that Law. So that to believe that an Assembly of men so Learned should be ignorant of the Law they themselves live under, and so conversant in, is beyond all probability.

That which hath been said of the Dutchy of Brabant, ought to be applied not only to that of Limbourg, (which all men know is unseparably annexed to it) but also to the Dutchy of Gelders: For the same Law which Philip King of the Romans prescribed in the year 1204. for regulating the succes­sion [Page 13]of the Durchy of Brabant, the Emperor Charles the Fifth in the year 1549. at the in­stance of the Estates of that Province, esta­blisht for the Dutchy of Gelders, by which Women, in defect of Heirs Males, are ad­mitted to the Succession of that Dutchy, in these words; Authoritate nostrâ, & de ple­nitudine Potestatis, decernimus, & declara­mus, hoc nostro Caesareo Edicto perpetuo, quod in nostro Ducatu Geldriae, & Zutphaniae Comitatu, uti in caeteris nostris Provinciis Pa­trimonialibus, & haereditariis, deinceps omni & quocunque tempore, foeminae, non extantibus masculis haeredibus, succedere pessint & debe­ant, &c. By our Authority and absolute power, we do decree, and declare, by this our Impe­rial Edict, that in our Dutchy of Gelders, and County of Zutphen, as in all other our Pa­trimonial and hereditary Dominions, hereaf­ter, and at all times, Women may, and ought to succeed, when there are no heirs Males ex­tant, &c. By which Edict the same Argu­ments which were used for the Dutchy of Brabant, are in force, not only for the Dut­chy of Gelders, but also for all other Pro­vinces, seeing nothing can be more manifest than the words, Ʋti in caeteris Provinciis Pa­trimonialibus & haereditariis. As in all other our Patrimonial and hereditary Provinces.

For the County of Namur, it was not necessary to say any thing, because it is known to all men, that in the year 1418. it was by the consent of the Estates sold by John the last Duke thereof, to Philip le Bon Duke of Burgundy, and deliver'd on this condition, that it should perpetually, and inseparably be annex'd to the County of Flanders; with which therefore it ought to be subject to the same Law of succession: which not being regulated by this par­ticular Law of Devolution, so neither can the County of Namur, though among par­ticular persons the said Law continue in force.

But if it were granted that there was neither Law nor Contract, it is most cer­tain that the County of Namur was held as a Member of Henaut, and should in rea­son be therefore bound to follow in succes­sion the Laws of the Superior, among which without question, this was one; that the Son of the second Wife in a lineal suc­cession, should be prefer'd before the Daugh­ters of the first Wife, either in publick or private successions.

But that they might leave nothing un­attempted, they say as to the succession of Henault, that in the fourth Article of [Page 15]the Customs of the said Province under the Title of des Alleus. Statuitur, Allodia pa­trimonialia pertinere ad liberos primi ma­trimonii, sive Filium, sive Filiam, & quam­diu hi supersunt, locum non dari prolibus se­quentis Connubii. It is decreed, that inhe­ritances belong to the issue of the first Wife, whether Male or Female, and as long as they live, the issue of the second Wife is utterly excluded. Within which constitution, they would by all means include the County it self, as free and independent, and by con­sequence to be accounted free from the te­nure of a Superior Signiory: But the weaknesse of the objection does sufficiently appear by a following clause in the same Article, which ordains, that if these goods come by a collateral succession, they shall be divided among the Children of both Wives; which division certainly can in no wise concern the County it self, seeing that according to the common use of Nations, this Principality goes alwaies entire to the eldest Son, as the Annals and Publick Re­cords of all successions evince by innumera­ble examples.

Of the same nature is another of their arguments drawn from the same Customs. Cap. 91. Art. 3. Whereby Estates acquired [Page 16]during the Marriage, are descendable to the issue of that Marriage: For as they ac­count these Provinces as purchased and ac­quired by his Catholick Majesty, because by the death of the most Serene Infanta Isabella, which happen'd in the year 1633. they reverted to his Majesty of Spain, by vertue of an agreement annexed to a con­tract of Marriage, in the year 1598. But besides what hath been so often said, the custom of inheriting among Subjects, can­not give Law to a publick succession, which hath alwaies had its rules apart by its self, differing from that of private E­states: And that custom which so advances Children to the inheritance, ought still to admit this restriction, If they be capable to succeed; which Women except for defect of Heir Male in the same degree, cannot be said to be in the case of Dominion and Government: And though the custom of Henault were in force as to such a succes­sion, it must however be understood, with this exception; Ʋnless a Male should sur­vive together.

Which appears so clear, that there can be nothing more requisite to be spoken as to that particular; but if it were, yet it might easily be evinced from the writings [Page 17]of the French Authors themselves, that what­soever either by the Right of Inheritance, Succession of Nations, or by an Agreement upon the Marriage of any Ancestor, descends upon the Husband during the Marriage, can­not be adjudged an acquisition or purchase of the Husband by the marriage; which the President of Britany Argentré (whom all other Authors readily follow) allows for an undeniable interpretation of all such Cu­stoms, in his Commentary upon the 418th. Article of the Customs of the said Pro­vinces.

It were a thing meerly superfluous, to dis­course particularly of all the Provinces; since the Emperor Charles the fifth hath declared in so few words, That Women shall then only be admitted to the Succession of them, Masculis non extantibus; when there are no Heirs Males in being. Which doth abso­lutely take away all Objections.

These things being so, it might seem to little purpose, further to dispute the Vali­dity of the Renunciation made by the Infan­ta of Spain, now Queen of France, at her Contract of Marriage; since it already ap­pears (setting the Renunciation aside) that the Heir Male, though by the second Venter, ought to succeed before the Female by the first.

But if there should possibly any Contro­versie arise about a collateral Succession, and the Infanta of Spain, as in nearest degree should demand it, however she must neces­sarily be excluded by the exceptions of the Renunciation made by her self: For that in the most ample and expressive terms that could be, by her Oath, she declared her self excluded, from ever claiming any of the Dominions of the Catholick King her Father, and this upon the conclusion of the Marriage, for the establishing the universal peace of Europe, in the presence and with the Applause of the whole Christian world, the Kings themselves, with the Princes of the Bloud, and the Chief Nobility of both Kingdoms being present, and assisting, than which nothing could have been more Sacred or Solemn.

In such publick and solemn Treaties, the Subtleties of Lawyers ought not to be per­mitted, which are too often intruding into private Transactions, as about the Daugh­ters Renunciation, being then an Infant; of the non-payment of the Portion-Money at the day limited; and others of the same na­ture: which Niceties and Cavils are no where more exploded, than by the Lawyers of France; whose Opinions those of their [Page 19]own Nation cannot justly decline. In the number of which learned men, may be ac­counted Anaeus, Robert, Chopin, Molinaeus, Cujacius, Papone, Charond, Maynard, Fa­ber, and many other Authors of great esteem; among whom, the most eminent Collector of Arrets, Lowet, and his Commentator, Brodeaux, who, among the rest of the Re­solutions of the Supream Courts of Judica­ture, report such Renunciation of Daugh­ters, without any respect had to their Mino­rity, or illegal compulsion, to be esteemed valid, and good in Law, especially those which tend to the preservation of Noble Fa­milies. The Words of Brodeaux, Lit. R. n. 17. are these; C'est chose certaine, & re­gleé p [...]r les Arrests, que telles Renonciations aux Successions futures, directes, & collate­rales, par un Contract de Marriage, du quel les clauses contenantes les renonciations sont accessoires, & par coherence, prennent la mesme nature; soit entre nobles, ou roturiers; & que les Filles n' en peuvent estre relevees, pour quelque cause & pretexte que ce soit, de Mino­rité, Crainte, [...]u Lesion enorme. 'Tis a case certain and resolved by the Courts of Parlia­ment, that such Renunciations of future Suc­cessions, either lineal, or collateral, made upon Contract of Marriage, such Clauses of Renun­ciation [Page 20]being coherent and agreeable to the said Contract, become of the same nature; whether between Princes, or others; And that such Daughters cannot be relieved, either by al­ledging Minority, Fear, Violence, or any other pretence whatever.

But the strongest Objection made by the other side, is a Clause inserted in the Con­tract of Marriage; which in French runs thus: Que moyennant le payement effectif fait à sa Majesté tres Christienne, des dicts Cinq cents mille escus, aux termes qu'il a esté cy-devant dit, la dite Serenissime Infante se tiendra pour contente, &c. That by the true and just payment, to be made to her most Chri­stian Majesty, of the said five hundred thousand Crowns, at the time aforesaid, the most Serene Infanta shall remain fully satisfied and content, &c.

And if the Money be not paid nor tendred (say they) at the time appointed, then the Consideration and Cause of the Renunciati­on ceaseth, and consequently the Renuncia­tion it self. But the Equity of Law, cor­rects the severity of such proceedings, and admits the Party to take off his default, and save the breach of the Condition, as the Law appears to be. L. 37. ff. de verb. oblig. Nam Promiss [...]r post moram offerendo, purgat [Page 21]moram. A Tender after the day, saves the Forfeiture. However if things should be ta­ken in the greatest extremity, yet the effect of the non-payment is not that thereby the Contract should be dissolved, but that the damage which ensues thereupon be repair­ed. So it is also if a Purchaser fail in the payment of his Purchase-Money at the day, yet his Purchase remains absolute, and shall never be defeated, if he pays the Interest, and makes satisfaction for the damage ensued upon his delay. Those great Lawyers of France before mentioned, and commended, in this very kind of Renunciation upon the Marriage, insisting upon the common Law, admit of no avoiding of the Renunciation for defect of payment of the Dowry; because as Molinaeus the Chief Practiser in France holds: Filia non per numerationem Dotis, sed per conventionem excluditur. The Daughter is excluded by the Agreement, and not by the payment of her Portion. And those who by a more indulgent and favourable Law do grant that the Paternal Estate may revert to the Daughter, allow it, but with this restri­ction, that before the Daughter be admitted for non-payment of her Dowry, to the In­heritance, she her self renounced, a further day of Payment be first assigned, before [Page 22]which she is not to be admitted to the pos­session, as Brodeaux, Lit. R. Num. 18. af­firms upon the Judgment of the rest of the Counsellors of France.

To conclude, the Renunciation of the Daughter is defective (as they say) in this particular, that she did not only renounce a future and uncertain Succession, but also a Right gained by Devolution; and the Pro­priety of the Paternal Goods, acquired by the dissolution of Marriage, which the Au­thority of the Law doth not permit to those that are under Age: seeing that such Renun­ciations of Daughters, are not admitted up­on any other consideration, but in regard that for the incertitude of the future Suc­cession, and the dubious event of profit or damage, no prejudice can be conceived yet; which contrariwise is apparent, when they do not only renounce a succession which may fall to them, but which is already fal­len.

But over and above what hath been said, whereby it is clear that the Right of Devo­lution is rejected in publick Successions, it is apparent, that this way of arguing, and deceit, proceeds from the Ignorance of the Nature of the said Right of Devolution, see­ing that it is decreed and established by the [Page 23]constant authority of causes already deter­mined by the Law, which have the force of a custom, that the right of Devolution cannot be esteemed for a species of Successi­on, which doth give unto the Children of the first venter the propriety of the Fathers goods, he being yet alive; for it is certain, Viventis non esse haereditatem: That there is no inheritance of the living: and that all that the right of Devolution doth effect, is to put a certain tye upon the Fathers goods, in be­half of the Children, that he may not ali­enate them, and that they may succeed after the death of their Parents; which seeing also may fail, when the Children dye before their Father; here therefore cannot be imagined any certitude of acquisition, which the Daughter may no [...] Renounce: Neither can it be said that the propriety doth be­long to the Children immediately after the Dissolution of the Marriage; and this is the genuine sense of this customary Law of the Low Countries, which the Practi­tioners and Lawyers of France, being strangers, were till now ignorant of: But they may learn, if they please, to peruse the Writings of the Lawyers of the Belgick Provinces: Among the rest some 80 years since, Joannes Wamesius was very eminent; [Page 24]who Cent. 6. Cons. 58. writes after this manner: Consuetudinaria Devolutio propri­etatis non est successio, sed vinculum tantum quod superstiti injicitur, & quo bona etiam afficiuntur, ne liberâ voluntate superstitis ali­enari vel pignorari possint, quo vinculo pro­prie dici non potest quod superstes desinat esse Proprietarius eorundem bonorum; cujus in­dicium est, quod liberis primi matrimonii, quorum favore hoc vinculum injectum est, de­cedentibus ante Conjugem superstitem, veluti praedicto vinculo dissoluto, superstes liberum arbitrium disponendi de iisdem bonis recupe­ret suo Jure, non ut haeres liberorum, &c. A customary Devolution of propriety is not a Succession, but is only an obligation which is cast upon the Survivor; and wherewith the goods also are affected, that they cannot by the free will of the Survivor be alienated, or mortgag'd; by which tye it cannot properly be said that the Survivor ceaseth to be the pro­prietor of the said goods; which is evident, because the Children of the first venter, in whose favour this tye is put, coming to dye before the Father or Mother, the surviving Parent is freed from the aforesaid tye, and may at his pleasure dispose of the aforesaid goods, having recover'd his right, not as Heir to his Children.

Seeing therefore that the right of Devo­lution ought to be plac'd among uncertain cases, so the Renunciation which is made, ought to subsist in regard of this, as in re­spect of other events.

But these things which are here alledged concerning this particular and special Law of descent, and the Renunciation which was made of it, is more then the necessity of the question requires; since 'tis well enough known to all persons conversant in publick affairs, that there is no such law as to the publick succession in the Government of Brabant, Gelderland, Limburg, Namur, nor of any other Province or Country, in all the Catholick Kings Dominions.

Notwithstanding if through the variety or obscurity of particular customs any thing of doubt should yet remain, it would be clearly removed by that especial Covenant, comprised in the Treaty of Marriage, agreed upon and confirm'd by both Kings, which had no relation to the Dowry, but was made to keep both Crowns in perpetual equality: And to prevent all occasions that might happen of uniting two so great King­doms. Placuit utrique Regi pactione instar legis semper valiturâ sancire, ne unquam se­renissima Infans Theresa, aut posteri ejus ulli, [Page 26]ad seros usque Nepetes, quocunque gradu sint, admittantur ad successionem ullam, sive Reg­norum, sive Principatuum, Provinciarum, Ditionum, Dominiorum quorumcunque Regis Catholici, non obstante lege ulla, consuetudine aut alio Jure in contrarium, cui utriusque Regis authoritate plenissimè derogatur, con­templatione dictae aequalitatis, & publicae utilitatis quae inde emanatura speratur. It was consented to by both their Majesties, and by them confirm'd, that neither the most Se­rene Infanta Theresa, nor any of her Issue or Posterity, in what degree soever, be admitted to succeed in any of the Kingdoms, Duke­doms, Provinces, or Dominions of his Catho­lick Majesty, any other Custom, Constitu­tion, or Law to the contrary notwithstanding: So that if any such Custom or Constitution were, it was by authority of both Kings absolutely annull'd and destroyed. And this only to ad­just the Dominion of both Crowns, so as each of them might receive an equal benefit by it. The very words of which clause most evi­dently prove, that how far soever such a custom might prevail as to private Inheri­tances, yet a [...] to the publick it was wholly restrained. The Article in the French is this. Estant les deux Couronnes si grandes, & si puissantes, qu'elles ne puissent estre reunies en [Page 27]une seule, & afin que dez à present on previ­enne les occasions d'une pareille jonction, &c. Donques attendües les susdites Justes raisons, & notamment de l'egalité qui se doit conser­ver, leurs Majestez accordent & arrestent par Contract, & Pacte conventionnel entre elles, qui aura lieu, force, & vigueur de la loy ferme, & stable à tout jamais, que la Sere­nissime Infante d'Espagne, ni ses Enfans, & leurs Descendants, en quel degré ils se puissent trouver, voire à tout jamais, ne puissent suc­ceder és Royaumes, Estats, Seigneuries, & Dominations, &c. qui appartiennent, & ap­partiendront à sa Majesté Catholique, tant dedans que dehors le Royaume d'Espagne, non­obstant toutes loix, ou coutumes, &c. aux quelles leurs Majestez derogent, &c. The two Crowns being so great and so puissant, that they cannot be united into one Kingdom, and that to the end that from this present, all oc­casions of such a conjunction may be avoided: Therefore upon due consideration had of the aforesaid reasons, especially that of equality, which ought to be preserv'd: It is accorded be­tween both their Majesties, and by mutual Covenant and Contract ordained, which shall continue in the full force and vigour of a Law for ever, that the most Serene Infanta of Spain, her Children, nor descendants in what degree [Page 28]soever, shall never succeed in the Kingdoms, Signiories, or Dominions, which do or shall belong to his Catholick Majesty, as well with­in as without the Kingdom of Spain, notwith­standing any Law, or Custom, which hereby their Majesties do abolish.

Which clause is so express and clear, as no person can possibly deny himself satisfied with it; unless such a one, that esteems all Agreements to be something or nothing, as his will and interest direct him.