A SVMME OF MORALL PHILOSOPHY SVCCINCTLY GATHERED, ELE­gantly Composed, and Methodically handled, BY THAT LEARNED SCHOLLER AND WORTHY DIVINE WILLIAM PEMBLE Mr of Arts and late Commoner of Mag. Hall.

Mores honesta verbis, verba Moribus.

[...]

AT OXFORD. Printed by Iohn Lichfield Printer to the Famous Vni­versity, for Edward Forrest. An. Dom. 1632.

To the Reader.

BEhold (vnpartiall and courteous) reader, I pre­sent vnto thee one whom I need not name the whole booke so fully speakes him, it being the character of him, whose name the Frontispice beares: here he yet liues although dead, for the booke breathes that which he once was & when he was, he liued that which the book teacheth, for such was his admirable composure, that his very actions were a morall Lecture, hauing exacty learned that of Minutius, non loqui Mag­na sed viuere. I will not make any elogy of the Author, nor encomium on the booke, when as the one deserues rather the regestring in annales, then the light torch of a rūning pen; for the other vnlesse my guesse fayle me to a Iudici­ous braine, and a well seasoned heart, it will commend it selfe, it having a mixture of learning & delight, where­by it will both instruct and please the reader, and to say truth such was his dexterity, that by rhetoricke he could insinuate to a perswasiō, & by solidity of argumēt evince thee to assent. But if perhaps the booke in all points an­swere not the worth of the Man, or thy expectation, let it not detract from his deserts, or beget a preiudice in thy conceipt, since the worke is Posthumus, and (I am per­swaded) neuer by the author intended for the publique censure; neyther is the Printer much to be blamed, since he is so carefull to preserue any of thy blest reliques (Pemble) yet vnslaine, from the vnhappy fate of the vrne. Lastly since to offend is humanae sortis, whatsoever errors thou mayst find either in Author or Printer, the one thou mayest in thy Iudgement correct; the other in humanity condone. So mayest thou in some sort vindicate the Author, and gratifie the Printer. Farewell.

All discplines are

  • 1 Theoricall
    • 1 Reall
      • 1 Meta­physi­call
        • 1 Inspired as Divinity contained in the Bible.
        • 2 Acquired of which write
          • Aristotle
          • Avicenna
      • 2 Mathema­ticall
        • 1 Arithmeticke.
        • 2 Geometry.
        • 3 Musicke.
        • 4 Astronomy.
      • 3 Physicall concerning
        • Princi­ples
        • Genera­tion
          • Of Na­turall things
    • 2 Rationall
      • 1 Grammer.
      • 2 Rhetoricke.
      • 3 Logicke.
  • 2 Practicall
    • 1 Actiue
      • 1 Oeconomickes.
      • 2 Ethickes.
      • 3 Politickes.
    • 2 Factiue as skill in
      • 1 Nauigation.
      • 2 Hunting.
      • 3 Husbandry.

A SVMME OF Morall Phylosophy.

1. Ethickes.

MOrality is the Art of behauiour, prescribing directions for manners arising out of vse and customary conver­sation.

Manners are either

  • 1 Reall, making a good man [...].
  • 2 Complementall, making a faire con­ditioned man [...].

The Vertues arising out of both [...] Goodnesse is Positiue. Complement varies according to

  • 1 Time.
  • 2 Place.
  • 3 Person.

The one necessary, the other indifferent, if vsed there is a grace and ornament, if not the impeach is not great.

Goodnesse is wrought by actions of Vertue.

Naturall for men to worke: or life tearmed by the Pytha­goreans [...], a fardle of Actions: Beasts are dull and at command, aguntur non agunt: men only are Actiue, as hauing

  • Wit for Iudging.
  • Will for prosecuting.

Actions are to be perfected by

  • Vertue for directions.
  • Fortune for successe.

Vertue is lame without Fortune, and Fortune blinde­heady and headlesse without vertue [Page 2] Our working is either

  • 1 In a state Politicke.
  • 2 In a family Oeconomicke.
  • 3 In private touching our selues only Ethicke.
In Ethicks are foure causes of Actions.
  • 1 The Finall, the vtmost is felicity, the speciall and imme­diate end, any particular good being in shew or substance good.
  • 2 The Formall as
    • Vertues
    • Vices
    making our
    • Bonum
      • Ʋerum.
      • Apparens.
    Actions
    • Good
    • Bad,
  • 3 Materiall, as Passions, whereon our vertues must worke.
  • 4 Efficient as
    • Wit that makes prudence.
    • Will that makes prae election.

This is your Subiect of all Ethicks.

II, Of Particular Ends.

NO Action so suddaine, but proposeth some end: As acti­ons are sundry, so are particular ends: Our appetite af­fects them as either in shew or substance good.Omnia appe­runt Bonum.

Desire naturally is for preservation; Evill as it is evill is an enimie to being: Hence the ayme of all Appetite must bee some good Appetites are either

  • 1 Naturall, as common Inclinations to a gene­nerall good of being: as for the Earth to beare downewards, the fire vpwards,
  • 2 Sensitiue called appetitus sensitivus, whose issues are, to wit
    • Griefe for things to to be avoided.
    • 2 Pleasure for things to be prosecuted.
  • 3 Rationall, partly from the Vnderstanding, that iudges the good: partly from the will that affects it: this is in men only, the other in beasts.

Hence ariseth three sorts of Good, viz.

  • 1 Bonum Entis: The obiect proper to the naturall.
  • 2 Bonum sensus: Whose satisfactiō is delight.
  • 3 Bonum Moris: Whose manager is Reason.

If reason be gouernesse, we apprehend true good.

If lead by Passion, we follow appearances.

Passion sets a colour on Evill, & perswades the good of it.

Hence are all vitious desires.

Our way for such obiects is with Annibal to beare the gilded pillars in Iuno's Temple,Cic. 1. Divin. before we venter to feast on them.

— Ʋerispeciem dignoscere calle
Ne qua sub arato mendosum timeat auro.

Things are desired, ei­ther as

  • 1 Vsefull only to others, not for themselues, so riches in themselues are nothing, but are de­sired for vse only.
  • 2 Vsefull both for others, & desirable in them­selues: so Virtues of themselues are comely, and are as meanes to happinesse.
  • 3 Desirable only for themselues, not for others as felicity the last good, [...], finis fini­um.

That we often fayle of the end intended, is for the want of either

  • 1 Iudgen ent in choice of the right meanes.
  • 2 Ability in not prosecuting that we haue chosen.
  • 3 Constancie in not persevering in what wee haue chosen, and began to prosecute.

The excellency of one end aboue another is knowne,

1 If that end haue the most worthy meanes directing to it

Hence the end of Policy is aboue others as hauing the meanes of other Practick ends subalternate to it.

2 If it comprehend the speciall end intended by actions of lesse worth, as the art of Horse-man-shippe is referred to art Military.

Hence the end of one is more excellent then the other.

Felicity is the best of ends: our soule affecteth it: Vertues [Page 4] worke it: Constancy in goodnesse perfects it: It selfe is the vp-shot of all practicke ends.

III. Of Ʋniversall Ends. Felicity.

FElicity is the proposall of the best good.

We propose our good either as informed by passion or judgement: Passion goes by opinion, an as opinion is stag­gering, so must such proposals be. Hence, to some pleasure, to others wealth, to others honour is Felicity; all are pleasures for the time, but content not.

This Felicity is not true, but forged.

True felicity is from an vprightnesse of judgement.

That we may finde it out, seeke we what in a man can be Of

  • 1 Greatest perfection.
  • 2 Sole sufficiencie.
  • 3 Quietnesse of minde.

1 Perfection is required to all goods, but the height of perfection to the best goods.

2 Sole sufficiency that there be

  • 1 Contentation in what we enioy
  • 2 No want of what wee enioy not

This keeps vs from re­pining.

3 Quiet of mind that there bee

  • 1 Integrity towards God.
  • 2 True dealing with men Body or fortune
  • 3 Not doting on the goods of Body or fortune
  • 4 Stopping extravagancy of passions.

But vsing them al­waies as helps not as ends.

A breach in any of these marres tranquillity.

In a man we consider a double carriage, either as

  • 1 Liuing in this life only Morall.
  • 2 Preparing himselfe for a future life, Christian.

[Page 5] Hence Stoicks and Platonickes held, we were free of two Cit­ties

  • 1 The greater,—Heaven.
  • 2 The lesser, —The World.

This world as it beares the image of the Heauenly, and is the way of our iournying thither: So the actions of the one truely morall, are not in opposition to the Christian Each of these liues haue in their end

  • 1 Greatest perfection.
  • 2 Sole sufficiency.
  • 3 Truest quietnesse of minde.

The felicity of the one is presence of all good, when the soule is separated.

The meanes to get this generall is Religion.

The felicity of the other is presence of all good, whilst we liue.

The meanes to get it, is common honestie, or vniversall justice.

Liuing in this world our worke is either in

  • Soule only.
  • Soule and Body.

The worke of our soule only is immanent.

The perfection of it is contemplation.

The obiect and ayme of it is Truth.

The satisfaction is content and quietnesse of minde.

The meanes to attaine it, is Sapience and Pondering.

That is an habit generally wrought by two particulars

  • 1 Vnderstanding for conceit, and appre­hension of principles.
  • 2 Science for inference of conclusions.

This true fe­licity, sith in it is

  • 1 True perfection,
  • 2 Sole sufficiencie,
  • 3 Quietnesse of mind

is tearmed Felicitas contemplatiua.

Our worke both in Soule and Body is transient, so called because the action of the soule were secret were it not, that the spreading of the body displaied it: The operations of the soule properly are punctuall and indiuisible: As they partake of the body, so they open themselues both to the view, and vse of others: Hence arise actions of practise, their speciall [Page 6] ayme is the good of others,Homo animal politicum. and sith we are not for our selues only, but to be vsefull to others, & society arises out of com­munity of nature our speciall felicity, for vse must bee prac­ticke.

Felicitas Practica.

There are two speciall Felicities then.

As sinne and vice being in all a double misery

  • 1 Darknesse of vnderstanding for discerning truth.
  • 2 Depravation of will for affe­cting goodnesse.

So to remedy these our perfection must be

  • Contemplatiue for the one.
  • Practicke for the other.

These come not of the strength of men, sith the blind can­not iudge of colours, the perverse cannot will goodnesse.

They are giuen of God, if any gift comes from aboue to man, saith Aristotle; [...].

It is most fit it should bee our felicity, [...].

The sterne to manage these must be faith.

Without it

  • Contemplation is curiosity.
  • Good actions but fashion, & vaine-glory

This is the aime of the heathen goodnesse.

With it

  • Contemplation is wisdome.
  • Action is
    • 1 Duty to God.
    • 2 Charity to our neighbour
    • 3 Salvation to our selues.

This a­lone is mans felicity.

IV. Temporall happinesse described.

Felicita [...] est Actio.THe perfection of things is in their operation: Idlenesse, and want of Action proceeding from Impotency: Hence Felicity being the perfection of man is action.

To will and intend suffices not, but doing is requisite,

In masteries the crownes are not given to the likeliest in person, but to the best in performance. Arist. Ethic. 1. c. 8.

Actions is a power common to all; communities com­mend not, sith commendation aymes at a speciall, and pre­ferring before others: Thence Felicity the highest of goods must be a speciall action of man, that proceeds from the soule not as it is vegetatiue,Animi. and sensitiue (so agreeing with Beasts and Plants) but as it is rationall, only proper to man.

In the reasonable Soule we consider two parts, the one

  • Governing.
    Secundum Virtutem.
  • Governed.

The governing part is by

  • Wit,
  • Will regulating our soules actions, and stopping their vnwarrantable excur­rence: This called Recta Ratio, or Virtus.

The part to be gouerned is the seat of Passions.

Though they naturally sprout from the stemme of reason, and are proper to men only, yet in themselues they are wild and vnruly, but strength of reason must order them, Our perfection is not

  • in the latter which must obey.
  • but in the former, which must gouerne.

Reasons in strength and actions of Vertue are nothing,In vita p [...]rfe­cta. vnlesse they are continued: Perfection of good must bee with out Ruptures: The intercedents of an after evill marres the glory of the precedent good actions: Hence felicity must be a worke of honesty to the end of our daies.

This felicity ends with our life, and therefore temporall.

The other beginnes after death, and is eternall.

V. Things required to temporall Happinesse.

HAppinesse is a Vertue common not for our selues only, but for the good of others.

An happy mans imployment must be beneficence: his re­ward esteeme and credit among the people.Tria bono [...]um genera req [...]i­run [...] ad [...]e­licitatem.

That he may be best in perfor­mance, and highest repute, he must haue the goods of

  • Minde.
  • Body.
  • Fortune.

The mind as most inward, so affordeth goods most pro­per to felicity; A man for morall goodnesse is to be iudged for the goods within: Things outward as of the Body and Fortune are often changeable. They are not ouermuch to bee desired, yet if offered they are to be receaued; we take them for continency, not necessity, as vsefull to set forth our Ver­tues both to the good and view of others.

Riches and the goods of Fortune serue for the weale of the body, the body for the soule, the soule for God. [...].

Thus the goods outward are in direction to the goods in­ward: they make not a man happy, but adorne him; they giue his luster, not his being.

The thing that makes happinesse properly and principally is vertue; yet Fortune must grace it; as the Stones & Timber make the house, yet for sight we could wish it pargetted, be­fore we dwell in it: And though a man can foot it well, yet he need not refuse a Coach if offer be made. Seneca.

Vertue without Fortune is like a King that hath a sure Counsell, though his vnderlings be rebellious; Hee is able to keepe him in guard, though abroad there be mutinies; Hee may bee happy in himselfe in despite of Fortune: like as a strong man can beare, if a greater weight should be laid vp­on him, and can suffer cold, though in the interim his teeth chatter.

An happy man vseth ill fortune, as a good Captaine bad armes, though vnframable, yet vsing them according to art military, or as a skilfull craftsman shewing his art on a shooe of bad leather, both may doe well, but better, if their meanes were better.

The goods of the mind are either

  • 1 Wit for iudging.
  • 2 Will for choosing, what we haue iudged.
  • 3 Power for prosecuting what we haue chosen.
  • 4 Ability for ordering our Prosecutions,

Habits are the lowest gifts of the minde.

1 They are gotten by vse and custome, the other art natu­rall.

[Page 9]2 They worke on passions, whose grounds is sense.

The other are with­out sense, sith

  • 1 Prosecution
  • 2 Choice.
  • 3 Iudgement
  • 4 Power
  • 5 Wit.
  • 6 Will.

are inseparate sub­stances.

Habits are only for the corporall.

Their kinds are

  • Intellectuall,
  • Morall.

The intellectuall, some by doctrine, & instinc­tion, and are 5, to wit,

  • 1 Vnderstanding for contēplatiō
  • 2 Science for contēplatiō
  • 3 Sapience. for contēplatiō
  • 4 Prudence. for action,
  • 5 Arte for action,

The morall come by vse, and custome, viz

  • If ruling passion, it is Vertue.
  • If ruled by it, it is Vice.

Their properties are

  • 1 To be begotten by vs.
  • 2 Being gotten long to continue with vs.
Qualitas acquisita difficultèr mobilis.

The difference betwixt the worke of nature, and of man­ners is, Nature first begins with the habit, then comes to the action, as first we haue the power of laughing, before the act: Manners are first in action, then in habit.

The goods of the Body are

  • 1 Health.
  • 2 Strength.
  • 3 Grace of person.

Though Vertue could appeare in deformity, yet it is more honourable in a comely personage; as the Ruby planted in Iron hath his luster, yet it sparkles more in a bed of Gold.

The goods of fortune are

  • 1 Wealth.
  • 2 Worth of birth.
  • 3 Reputation and credit.
  • 4 Friends.
  • 5 Goods of Posterity.

[Page 10]1 Goods either in

  • Money.
  • Goods.
  • Lands.

The vse and end

  • 1 For necessity principall.
  • 2 Then for pleasure
    • 1 Not of pampering.
    • 2 But of recreation.

It is requisite for pourveiance: Poverty and Want are re­pining: necessity of hauing armeth to Importunity and im­pudency in procuring: Thence the beggers life, though most to be pittied for want, yet deserues least favour for their boldnesse. The Pythagoreans would haue an happy man wealthy, but not in abundance: That much prosperity is like over-much light, it quels the eye-sight. That wee must wish for no more prosperity, then may fit vs for action, as the Pi­lot takes not the shippe of most weight, but of most conveni­ence for coasting: That the evills of much prosperity are greater, then they of adversity; as in the body superfluities worke more dangerous diseases, then defects: That as afflicti­on compells our minde; so height of wealth puffes it vp, and empties it: Hence we see the rich often iniurious and in­croaching: A happy man by wisdome prevents these.

2 Worth of birth, this is requisite, that there be no staine of blood. Low birth deiects the minde.

Bastardy is dishonourable, as debarring inheritance to the common rites of a Citizen.

Lewdnesse of parents is a disparagement to the child, as Diogenes seeing a boy wantonly giuen, gaue this the reason of it, that surely his father was drunken, when he begot him: Contrarily it was Diophantes brag, that he could prevaile in any demand with the Athenians, sith his father Themistocles could doe so before him.

3 Reputation is either viz: in

  • Height of place, as preferments.
  • Good opinion of our fellow Cittizens.

1 Preferments are properly due to the best: Lewd gouer­nours come in rather by intention then right: Optimates is an attribute to those, that for the common good so carry thē­selues, [Page 11] that Sud consilia optimo cui{que} debentur: They are defi­ned by Tully, Optimates sunt, qui nec nocentes sunt, Cicero pro Sextio. nec naturâ improbi, nec furiosi, nec malis domesticis impediti: Hence hee ranges even rusticks and trades-men, so they be honest.

The reason may be, the ground of evill society must be re­ligion, and justice; without it can neither bee restraint from injuries, nor punishment of evill doers, nor reward for the well deseruing. Wealth and Power make a Society spracke, and passable, but iustice informes, and acts it: This is as the soule to quicken it, that as the Organe to vent and spread it: Hence the right of gouernance principally is due to the best in life.

2 Good opinion in the minds of others is proper to the Vertuous.

It opens it selfe in

  • Words
  • Works

of ser­vice.

Three things breed in a man credit

  • Wisdome.
  • Honesty.
  • Loue and kindnesse.
    Arist. 2. Rhet.

The speciall of these is Honesty: for a man truely honest hath that wisdome, that he can distinguish the good from the bad; to follow the one and avoid the other: and his loue is such, that he will labour to benefit all, and iniurie none: This repute for good actions common and ordinary opens it selfe into praise for actions extraordinary, into honour, glory and admiring: honour and admiration ascends vpward, and is the title due to the extreame point of goodnesse: We yeeld it to things of most distance, & farthest out of our compasse: Hence all things most admired are most perfect: for the per­sons most admiring are of the lowest condition; therefore Pythagoras boasted he had got his good by Philosophy, that he had learned to wonder at nothing, sith admiration pro­ceeds rather out of the gaze of ignorance, then from a true view of iudgement.

As in Nature there is excesse and defect, as in monsters, so in manners also.

Things honoured and admired are out of the reach of Envy.

In vicina versamur invidiâ, simplicius longe posita miramur

Hence good cannot be envied, since Envy is not at lower perfections: Praise is a title due to vertue, and is the reward of it; we attribute it not simply, but in comparison; nor is a man so much praised for his absolute good, as because in that good he exceeds others, that are in comparison worse then himselfe: Hence praise stands in a proportionate preferring before others: Non vt optimis par sit, sed vt malis melior.

Glory is simply without reference to defects of others: it admits no proportion by reason of distance: praise may bee given and taken of equalls: Glory is for a superiour onely; praise recants downe-wards to conferre with defects, and af­ter conference to extoll the better deserts of the other: Glo­ry admits not of comparing, but is a title absolute.

Hence Felicitas bonum

  • Honorable.
  • Non laudabile.

4 Goods of po­sterity as of

  • Children
  • Kindred

somewhat to be respected of an happy man.

It followes him after death as a complement of his glory, yet so that it nothing detracts from him, if the contrary hap­pen.

5 Friends are requisite to happinesse partly for

  • Vse.
  • Comfort.

1 For vse, sith a man cannot rely vpon the purchase of his owne hands only, but he often requires an helpe: Manage­ment of things are sundry, and sith they must each haue their severall dispatch, they cannot so well be compassed by one.

2 For comfort, sith a man is pliable to vtter himselfe to some one of trust: Troubles are incident to all; and there is ease in revealing them. —Strangulat inclusus dolor. Againe our nature abandoneth solitarinesse: Presence of friends keepes vs from feeding on our owne hearts, like Bellepheron in the wildernesse.

Ipse suum cor edens hominum vestigia vitat.

To friendship three things are required,

  • 1 Virtus, vt pulchrum.
  • 2 Consuetudo, vt iucundum.
  • 3 Ʋsus, vt necessarium.

Vertue the ground, that must b [...]gin it.

Pleasure, and conversation, that continue it.

Vse and helpe, that must shew, vtter and exercise it.

As it is the prop and stay of mans life, and followes imme­diatly from the sociablenesse of his nature, so it relies on three goods

The end of all appetites

  • Bonum honestum.
  • Bonum vtile.
  • Bonum iucundum.

Friends must not be

  • suddenly gotten.
  • many in multitude.

1 Suddaine friends haue but small root of loue.

It was Zeuxis answere when hee was reprehended for sloe painting, that hee must bestowe time in drawing those lines, which he hoped should continue for ever. Observance of their passions and qualities must precede, before we enter to cl [...]se with them.

1 Whether they be agreeable in manners to vs.

2 Whether they incroach not too fast into our acquain­tance, for towardnesse of this is an occasion of suspect: for such a one is either a common friend and so lesse intire, or he comes to you but for advantage and so for advantage will betray you.

2 Multitude of friends empties affection, as the channell must haue many shallowes, that is cut into sundry streames. One bragged to Chilo, that he knewe not many his enimies: he replied that by that he knewe not many was his friends. Friendship is a tenure precise, and proper to one, not to bee enlarged to multitudes: Agesilaus would vse all in courte­sie, but he was familiar and friendly but to few.

The Giant that had 50 bellies, was faine to haue an 100 hands, and had by this no more benefit of sustenance, then they that to one belly haue but two hands. Amicitia tan­tum inter dues.

Men of worth haue many fellowes, few friends.

Friendship is when they follow principally for Vertue.

When they follow for goods outward

  • Countenance.
  • Power.

1 Countenance: It is greatnesse of retinue vsefull to men of place. In pace decus, in bello praesidium.

2 Power: It is faction, and by it they raise themselues, de­presse their adversaries. In gouerment it is good to vse men of one ranke equally: for to countenance some extraordina­rily is to make them insolent, and the rest discontent. In fa­vour it is best to vse men with much difference, and election for it makes the persons preferred more carefull, and the rest more officious.

VI. The Stoicks tenent of Happinesse.

HAppinesse being the perfection of man must bee in things that most honour him, nothing so worthy of him as vertue. It proceeds immediatly from his soule, as perta­king both of wit and will.

Hence as beasts are devoid of both these, so they cannot be styled

  • Vertuous.
  • Happy.

To liue according to vertue, and the prescript of nature is accounted all one. The Reasons are three.

1 Nature is the finger of God in creatures, whose worke is for the best, and vertue is naught but the perfection of God.

2 Man by nature an image of God, as Vertue and Good­nesse flowes immediatly from the one, so ought from the o­ther.

3 Our soule hath will and wit: Wit the apprehender of Truth, and will of Good: the conioyning of both is mans na­ture, which of it selfe must both iudge and affect true good: this only is vertue. Vertue is tearmed by them any speciall action proper to any speciall nature: Heavens, Elements, and dead bodies are by nature actiue, and vertuous: As things [Page 15] are most materiall, so are they lesse quicke: Hence soules are most vertuous, and this vertue is their felicitie.

VII. Of Passions in generall.

PAssions are the matter of Vertue.Materia Vir­tutis.

They are the nailes, that fasten soule and body together.

In them we note their

  • 1 Rising and increase.
  • 2 Issues and consequence.
  • 3 Prevention and stopping.

Their rising partly from

  • 1 The soules nature.
  • 2 The occurrences of obiects.

The soule growes in passion

  • 1 Not by the vnderstanding part.
  • 2 But by the sen­sitiue part, which
    • 1 Iudgeth a Truth.
    • 2 Induceth a colour of Truth.

The sensitiue works for passion

  • Abroad by the fiue outward senses.
  • Within by the imagination or fancy.

The worke of the phantasie is to resume what the memo­ry hath retained, and the common sense iudged, and out of them to make collections of appearances.

These appearances goe mas­ked vnder the habit of

  • Truth.
  • Good.

If of truth, they perswade a weak vnderstanding & so breed, viz.

  • 1 Curiosity
  • 2 Folly
  • 3 Giddines

and hence are

  • 1 Here­ticks.
  • 2 Poets
  • 3 Fond studēts.

these erre in the The­ory.

If of good they perswade a weake will, and breed some passions, which make men vicious and erre in the practike: That which makes a fancy ventrous & resolued in these col­lections, is opinion proceeding naturally from the soule, and as phantasie is a part of it, so opinion must be the issue of it.

Hence arise the tenents against the Stoickes.

1 Passions are a naturall part of the soule.

2 They may be moderated well from their excurrence, but cannot be throughly barred of their existence in vs.

[Page 16]3 They are not in themselues evill, but in their degrees.

4 They are often profitable, and meanes to further vertue, as feare teaches vs to avoid evill, selfe-loue to prosecute our good, Mercy and pitty teaches a King: Clemency and anger wheteth our valour.

5 Their excesse is not positiuely evill, but vpon circumstan­ces, as with my friend I may be angry for his fault, but bee reconciled againe: with my foe I may be more implacable.

6 Though strengthned by opinion, yet not proceeding from without vs, but naturall apprehensions within.

7 In a man two parts

  • Vnderstanding
  • Sense

both in reluctance to the other.

1 Vnderstanding takes the good of most worth for hone­stie.

Hence ariseth conscience, or [...].

2 Sense takes the good of most

  • Pleasure.
  • Profit

hence are passions.

The will hath two inclinations to follow, either

  • Reason, or
  • Sense.

In iudgement we often condemne, what in passion wee prosecute.

—Video meliora, probo{que}.
Deteriora sequor—

obiects that moue our phantasie are

  • Evills to be avoided.
  • Goods to be followed.

The ground that perswades our soule to appehend these obiects, is selfe-loue.

This as it is

  • 1 Ruled by reason is good: and the duty of man.
  • 2 Ruled by Sense is bad: and nurseth passions.

It may be defined,—An inordinate inclination of the affe­cting too much pleasure of the body against the prescript of right Reason.

The issues of passions are

  • Generall.
  • Speciall,

1 The Generall are.

1 Rebellion against reason.

[Page 17]2 Division in themselues.

3 Insatiable in their extent.

4 Importunate for action. Hence they worke headinesse, and suddaine resolution.

5 Desirous of things

  • 1 Foolish.
  • 2 Inconvenient,
  • 3 Impossible.

6 Inconstancy of prosecution.

2 The speciall are.

1 Driuing the body to distemper by

  • 1 Raising the humors.
  • 2 Altering the Complexion.
  • 3 Forecing new motions.

As in feare the blood chilleth, in anger boyles, in griefe the heart closeth, in ioy opens.

2 Blinding the Iudgement; The Reason is,

The Vnderstanding receiues her notice from the fancyes impression: which befriending Passion representeth often to the Iudgement not true and reall, but apparent and concei­ted shapes.

3 Perverting our will.

The will inclines oftner to passion, then Iudgement, be­cause passion is giuen more to choice and liberty.

The Iudgement is precise and setled to one part.

The prevention of passions is to

  • Discouer
  • Temper

them

1 Discouery is had,

1 From the vse of company; as Augustus judged of his two daughters Iulia and Livia, finding one delighted to con­verse with graue men, the other with yongsters; pronoun­ced the one staid, the other light.

2 From the view of complections; as the Cholericke breeds anger; the sanguine pleasure, slegme, sloth; melancho­ly, sadnesse.

3 From the vse of talke, as if it be

  • 1 Suddaine.
  • 2 Often.
  • 3 Personally impeaching.
  • 4 Censuring.

[Page 18]2 To discouer our selues obserue we what our enimies speake of vs. They are ready to seize on what is faulty in vs, when our selues are blinded with selfe-loue.

After the discouery ou [...] Passions must be tempered.

The temper of them must be reason, and wisdome check­ing the sence, and stopping the Excurrence of Phantasie.

Men by reason teach birds to speake, dogs to hunt, hor­ses to curveat, though sense perswade the contrary.

And we discharge our selues of the meat wee haue eaten with pleasure, when we heare it was polluted or forbidden.

The way to temper them is not to roote out but to prune them, as the taming of Horses is not to take away their mo­tion, but their skips: and Lycurgus should not so much cut downe the vines ro barre drunkennesse, as haue planted ce­sterns of water to haue allayed the heat thereof. It was Zeno his saying of musicall instruments, that euen barren wood & dead guts would speake, if strained to their pitch, and ranked in order.

Wisedome must be our Astrolabe to take the height and elevation of our passions, if they ouer-grow.

Our waies to slacke them are,

1 To bend to the other extreame; as if my sight be scatte­red by view of white, I must regather it by viewing a black obiect: And Epamminandas way to stop his surfet on sweet meats, was to close his banquet with a draught of Vineger.

2 Abstinence from things hurtfull, though lawfull.

3 Stop all occasions, that are motiues to set passion on head.

4 Barre selfe conceits, and fancifull apprehensions.

5 Yeeld not to inconstancy and fleeting.

6 Labour to mortifie the Flesh.

If passion be too violent, that we cannot slack it, our la­bour must be,

1 To stay execution; As Archytas professed to his baylife that carelesly kept his ground, that were he not angry, hee would tell him part of his minde: And Plato would not him­selfe [Page 19] beat his man, while he was moued, but gaue him vp to Spensippus to be handled by him.

2 To conceale it in what we may; for it breeds disrespect, if wee open our yeelding to it: this made Plutarch to be vp­braided by his servant, when he could not dissemble his an­ger that it was a shame for him to be angry, sith he had writ­ten a booke to the contrary.

A man (saith Plato) is sometimes his owne lord, when reason rules him; sometimes his owne vassall, when sence and passion.

VIII The division and number of Passions.

THe bent and aime of all passions are either,

  • The gaining of a good:
  • The avoidance of evill.

Good & evill are gained avoided by 2 inclinations of the soule

  • 1 The concupis­cible that affects.
  • 2 The irascible that prosecuts & venters on what we affect.

Both these haue their obiects

  • Good.
  • Evill.

The attainment of the

  • Good breeds pleasure.
  • Evill breeds griefe.

Thence

  • Pleasure
  • Griefe

are the heads of all passion.

The passions aiming at good are either

  • 1 Loue.
  • 2 Desire.
  • 3 Hope.
  • 4 Boldnesse.
  • 5 Pleasure.

The good presented is affected first by

  • Loue
  • Desire

these proceed from the concu­piscible,

Then it is prosecuted for attainment by

  • Hope
  • Boldnesse

these proceede out of the [...]rascible.

Then being attained there resorts pleasure: this only for the good present, the other for the Good absent.

The passions aiming at the avoidance of evell are.

1 Hate opposite to loue.

2 Abomination or detesting, opposite to desire being but the vehemence or high degree of hate, as desire is of Loue,

3 Despaire opposite to hope.

4 Feare to boldnesse.

5 Paine or Griefe the Issue of all, when the evill is in presence.

As

  • Goods
  • Evills

come

  • Nearer or
  • further of

their attainment, so they partake more or lesse

  • Pleasure of
  • Griefe,

These 10 Passions are simple, seeing they partake either of Pleasure alone, or Griefe alone,

There are seauen mixt passions.

These worke either

  • on our selues.
  • or on others.

1 They that worke on our selues are 2.

  • 1 Shamefastnesse
  • 2 Repentance mixt of
    • 1 Feare for infamy.
    • 2 Sorrow for fault.
    • 3 Desire of Amendment

2 They that worke on others, are either

  • for them
  • or against them.

1 For them are 2.

3 Pitty whose obiect is the evill of another, which wee would haue remoued.

Mixt of

  • Griefe for the evills befalling
  • Desire for the removall of them.

4 Zeale, conceaved in the behalfe of one we loue.

Mixt of

  • 1 Griefe for the wrongs done.
  • 2 Anger against the party wronging.
  • 3 Loue to the party wronged.
  • 4 Boldnesse to right him in what we may.

The passions that worke against another either

  • In thought only.
  • Or in deed.

1 In thought, 1.

5 Iealousy or suspition mixt with

  • Griefe.
  • Anger.
  • Feare.
  • Hate.

2 In deed, 2.

6 Anger mixt with either

  • 1 Griefe for wrongs.
  • 2 Hate against the party wronging.
  • 3 Desire of revenge.
  • 4 Boldnesse in venturing.

7 Maligning: this is different from anger, sith anger is moued vpon wrong done: This without that motiue: only because it is well with another.

This containes

  • Envy muttering at anothers good.
  • [...], ioying at others fall.

The former mixt of

  • Hate
  • Griefe.
  • Desire of falling.

The latter of

  • Hate.
  • Ioy for the Evill fallen.

This of Passions in generall.

IX Of loue the first Passion.

Obiectum. THe obiect of Loue is goodnesse; the issue ioy and con­tent.

It is either with or without passion.

1 Without Passion it's in

  • God
  • Angells

both haue wills which are the affectors of good and this affecting is Loue.

1 Gods loue is partly in

  • Reflexe to himselfe.
  • Communicating good to others.
  • viz. the creatures.

[Page 22]1 By reflex into himselfe, he views his owne goodnesse: & goodnesse is the Loadstone of Loue.

2 He communicates to creatures goods of

  • Nature.
  • Grace.

1 Nature is generall to all, & comprehends the Workes of

  • Creation
  • Preservation
  • temporall.

In this is the true Bonum Entis, which God loues.

2 Grace is speciall to some and compre­hends the spiritual acts of his loue as

  • Redemption
  • Satisfaction
  • Glorification

In this is the true Bonum moris, and this is Gods loue.

2 Angells loue is by con­templation of

  • God.
  • the Workes of God.

They see in all perfection of good, the fountaine is God, the streames scatter into each part of the world: things they cannot hate, only sinne they hate, which is as nothing.

This loue hath these tenents.

1 It is in the best natures, and the perfection of them.

2 As the best things are most louely, so they are most in im­parting their loues to others.

3 It is Impotence to bee hating, envying, murmuring, all which are opposite to Loue.

4 It cannot be perfect in man, it is truest in God, & nature; these are not interrupted by Passions.

5 The bond of matrimonie hath not truely this loue, sith it is spiced with lust: we may rather terme it the Vnion of af­fections willed by God for Avoidance of further evill.

6 It workes for the best things with reluctance to sense.

2 Loue with Passion is either

  • Proper
  • Improper.

1 Loue improper is in beasts, [...], the Empresse of Na­ture.

Birds build their neasts, and spare their owne crawes to fill their young ones: the Partridge flags before the Faukner, and ventures the taking, that her young ones may escape. The most timorous creatures grow most resolute in these [Page 23] combats: In the worst natures are some sparkles of loue: As in Gold-mines amongst much earth shines a luster, and in beast are rude lines of mans naturall affection; As in wild figs and oliues are the spices of the sweete, though in harsher man­ner:

2 Loue proper is in men alone.

It is either of

  • our selues.
  • or others.

1 Loue of our selues called [...] either

  • 1 True according to reason, or
  • 2 Fancied according to Sense.

1 True selfe-loue apprehends that which is simply good, both in present and future.

It respects the goods of the soule before those of the Body.

It chooses the lesse good of most durance before the grea­test good of lesse continuance.

It is the Well-head of Charitie.

—Charitas incipit a seipso.

And the spurre of Vertue, sith by it we benefit our selues.

2 The propertyes of it are

  • Wishing
  • Working

the best to our selues.

3 Consent with our owne parts, as of

  • Reason.
  • Passion.

4 Louing to retire into our owne thoughts.

5 Ioying at our owne good, and grieuing at the contrary.

Hence it is the attribute only of good men.

2 The evill follow showes, and opinatiue good, which failing breeds sorrow: the good man aimes at truth, and therein contents himselfe.

2 Conscience suffers not the evill to view their owne thoughts, they are at oddes with themselues; Sense and Rea­son are hard at combate with them: Loue cannot be there, where there is difference.

3 Selfe-loue causeth Ioy; Evill men, though they haue ioy of sense, they haue griefe of Reason, and their ioy is not for durance, but ends in Repentance.

[Page 24]4 Intemperance is the badge of Euill men, whose worke is to breed diseases in

  • Soule.
  • Body.

A good man so loues himselfe, that he will either stop raysing or labour their allaying.

5 As goodnesse is wisdome, so Evill is Folly, which blind­eth vs that wee cannot distinguish the good from the Evill, but choose at randome, and so proue our selues without selfe-loue.

The opposite of selfe loue is either a stupid neglect, or a desperate hate of himselfe, they that mangle themselues, are of this ranke: Selfe-loue fancyed according to sense is the badge of Fooles; It is the seed-plot of Passion, the bathe of Flatterers, the nurse of vices in manners reall, of Phantasticke humors, in manners of Complement.

It ariseth from 3 heads, viz.

  • 1 Blindnesse of vnderstanding.
  • 2 Easynesse of comparing our selues with o­thers.
  • 3 Partiallity in iudging to our owne side.

The Issues of it are 4.

  • 1 Admiration of our selues.
  • 2 Arrogancy of Speech.
  • 3 Easy excusing our owne faults.
  • 4 Despising of others admonition, and counsell.

The waies to restraine it are.

1 Prise the Act of any aboue thine owne particular, as ma­ny eys see more then one, and many hands make better rid­dance.

2 Amplifie others vertues depressing thine owne.

3 Be sparing in Vauntes, seldome in excuses.

This selfe-loue barres the admittance of goodnesse; it comes not, vnlesse it be taught. Sought it cannot be, vnlesse it be acknowledged wanting; Selfe-loue barres this acknow­ledgement.

Multi ad solidam eruditionem pervenissent
Nise se pervenisse iam putassent.

Loue to others is directed either to

  • God. or
  • our Neighbours.

1 Loue to God is only in a sanctified will none can truly hate him but sinners: The reason is because, God is Loue, and sinne is in opposition to God.

2 Loue to our Neighbours is either to

  • Enimyes or
  • Freinds.

1 Loue to our Enimies is one of the cunning'st Poynts of Charit [...], and an imitation of the divine nature.

1 Pardoning them, if they repent, as the Lions doe the beasts, that submit them selues.

2 Pardoning them, though persisting, and being without submission.

3 Not pardoning them only, but working a good for them.

The Necessity of this Loue is,

1 Because God loueth vs being his enimyes, and we must doe, as we would be done vnto.

2 There is none so bad but hath some what excellent in him, and none so harmed vs now, but he may doe vs good here­after; and for this is to be loued.

2 Loue to our freindes is either

  • for publicke respect. or
  • private, and particular.

1 Loue for publicke respect is the loue of our Countrey, that is the duty of all; but it is most splendent in heroickes, who pawne their life for it.

It was questioned, whether this loue was ingrafted by nature, or assumed by custome?Ob Lipsius.

1 If it come by nature, why doth not the poore loue as well as the rich?

2 How comes it, that many for gaine leaue their country, never to returne, sith, where we loue, we loue to converse: Some haue beene Traytors against it, and Neroes to fire it.

We answere, Nature cannot be so stricte, right, and even, [Page 26] but sometime she breeds Monsters: gaine may withdraw mens hearts, and fasten them to forraine Coastes.

The Poore loue their home, but rich men more, because they reape the goodnes of their countrey in a larger man­ner.

Mens loue of countrey is first for themselues, as we feare stormes, least our selues pinch for them, and we quench a fire, least our owne soules be fired by it.

2 Loue for priuate respects is either

  • 1 Ascending to our Superiours.
  • 2 Descending to our inferiours.
  • 3 Betwixt equalls.

1 That in decent is farre more hearty then that in ascent. Hence fathers are more louing to children, then children to fathers:

2 That betwixt Equalls stands vpon more Indifferency of Points; and in the best counterpoyse of either they may fall to Iarringe: Hence Brothers and Sisters fall to Iarring, and freinds haue many distastes.

These Loues are linked either by bonde

  • Naturall, or
  • Civill.

1 The Naturall bonde is threefold,

1 Vnder God to parents, who challenge of vs

  • 1 Honour.
  • 2 Maintenance, if need so require.

It was Solons law, that none should be free from their du­ty, but those that had learned no trade of their fathers.

Parents are either of

  • 1 Blood, that frame vs in body.
  • 2 Manners, that by direction frame vs in Soule; such are teachers.

It was Socrates his tenent, that by nature both these had challenge of Loue: it is also doubted by many, whether A­lexanders debt was not as ample to Aristotle his maister, as to Philip his father.

[Page 27]2 Our bond of na­ture is to

  • Brethren
  • Sisters.

They challenge of vs,

1 Counsell.

2 Liberty of Conference.

3 Pleasure of Conversation.

4 Helpes of Fortune; So we wronge not our selues over­much in furnishing them:

Ʋivet extento Proculeius aevo
Notus in fratres animi paterni.

Brothers loue is

  • 1 Honoured by our freinds.
  • 2 Envied and feared of our enimyes.
  • 3 Vsefull to our selues.
  • 4 Ioyous to our Parents.

King Eumenes his Mother professed her selfe happy in this, that of 4 Sonnes 3 yongest squired the body of the el­dest, and that Eumenes was nothing iealous or mistrustfull of them: Nature hath made them in a family feete to beare vp our body both in equality and proportion; If they exceed, they cause halting, if they trip at one another, they cause fallinge.

A Lady of Persia made it a great dispute, whether they were better to loose her brother, or her sonne; she sayd they could get a new sonne, but a brother, sith her Parents were dead, they could not.

Brothers dislike (it may bee) often admits remedy, but their hate is inreconcileable: As the Ioyntures of Art, though riuen with rents, may be glewed againe, but Natures breach cannot.

The speciall Motiues of their dislike are 2.

1 If we leaue their commerce, and follow strangers as if wee should cut off our flesh and inch in the roome of it a strange peece: And the Arcadian Poet in Homer, when hee had lost his legge, for his best help was to hoppe on a legge of Wood; strangers wilbe distrustfull of vs, sith we leaue our owne.

Can you stile youre freind brother, when you cannot account a brother youre freind: as absurd a thing, as if you mangled his naturall body: but hang'd his Idoll with laces and Garlands.

2 If we are always checking, and thwarting their courses, as Laco sayd by his short wife, of 2 Evills, the least is to bee chosen: So if our brother be bad, rather let him haue his fourth, then demerite his hate.

Though the dog bite and the horse throw vs, yet wee keepe them, and wee suffer Apes, Catts and Lyons, though sometimes harmfull.

Wincking at faults in companie is vsuall, when we would not displease, though it be not so honest, yet for avoydance of further Evills, it may be tolerated.

Wee must bee our Brothers Freind, not his Iudge,

3 Our bond of Nature is to our kinne either of

  • Blood, or
  • Marriage.

both galling offices of loue proper to the familie. as Invitation to

  • Marriage feasts.
  • Funeralls.

2 The civill bond of loue is to

  • 1 Citizens.
  • 2 Countrey-men.
  • 3 Strangers.

As particular re­spects vary, so this order varies.

It is the engaging of man vnto man in heart began by vse and acquaintance: It acteth, as one Soule in 2 Bodyes.

There are 2 branches of it

  • 1 Wishing.
  • 2 Indeauouring the best for another not for his owne but the others sake.

The maine motiues of it are the 3 goods

  • 1 Pleasure.
  • 2 Profit.
  • 3 Honesty.
  • 1 Pleasure are the aymes of Epicures; loues as they are di­verse, and fancifull, so such loues must bee.
  • 2 Profitte are the aymes of Epicures; loues as they are di­verse, and fancifull, so such loues must bee.
  • 3 Honesty makes loue more setled: it appeares not as Al­cibiades [Page 29] changing his coate to the fashion of the Place, but as Socrates keepes his tenor.

This loue gets his growth by 3 knots

  • 1 Affecting.
  • 2 Acquaintance.
  • 3 Trust.

The Twine to wind and fasten it must be a Resemblance of Manners.

Motiues to make me effect one

1 I see him sympathize with my

  • Ioy
  • Greife

befreinding Brutus.

2 He accounts my friends his and my enimies his; So Cicero loued App [...]us Pulcher for Brutus his sake, and by it bound Brutus the more to him.

3 He is pleasant-hearted and iesting; If I iest with him hee takes it not amisse.

4 He reportes well of me behind my backe and rather in se­cret shew his mind then in publike it should be told me.

5 Hee delights in my Company.

6 Hee goes neate, but curious in apparell: this was Demos­thenes and Hortensius his tricke to get them favorites, when they first began pleadinge.

7 He liues peaceably with others, which perswades me, hee will doe so with me too.

These things may moue affecting in me not acquaintance, sith the

  • Flatterer
  • Dissembler

may doe as much

Motiues to moue me to acquaintance.

1 Hee reports well of me before myne Enimies, and if they except, he defends me.

2 I see him honestly given, not giddily.

3 He doth me a good turne, so it be noe preiudice to him­selfe.

4 He is noe busie-medler in my matters.

5 He overthwartes me not in talke, especially being either serious or angrie.

6 He keepes the 7 former motiues without dissimulation.

These moue acquaintance, and I would trust him in mat­ters [Page 30] obvious, and ordinary, but in things secret, and nearly touching me, I may not, vnlesse he had Wisdome ioyned to his Honesty.

Motiues to moue me to trust him.

1 He hath all the 7 former circumstances without dissimu­lation and the 6 latter with wisdome.

2 He is wary, that he be not felt by others to open himselfe by Ignorance.

3 He doth me a good turne though to his owne Preiudice.

4 If I haue wronged him, he will not revenge it, though hauing opportunity.

5 He suffers wrong for my sake.

6 He discloseth to me his hart, opens his faults, sheweth me his hopes and feares.

This makes the vp shot of loue, and the Bond of Freind­ship. As the Diamond engraues the Diamond, and fire en­creases fire: so his loue encreaseth my loue, and makes vp an Vnion betwene vs.

Saris de Amore primâ Passione.

X. Of Desire the 2. Passion.

DEsire is the stoppe, and scale of Loue: it addes vehemen­cy to our assecting.

The obiect of it is some pleasing good; The issue delight.

Goods are made pleasant vnto vs either by

  • Nature or
  • Custome.

1 By nature are such as in them selues haue no Paine.

2 By Custome the hunts-man affectes the cold winters-walkes, and the student loueth his watchings, and they are desirable to him, though in themselues are painfull, but are pleasant for the End.

Desire is partly

  • with Hope.
  • without hope.

1 If a thing desired be within compasse of attainement wee [Page 31] rayse vp our powers within, and watch helpes abroad to gaine it, then desire is ioyned with Hope.

2 If it be not likely to be gained, it leaues hope, and spends it selfe only in wishing.

Thus we desire

  • Mines of Gold
  • Managements of States

though there bee noe hope or expectance of it

About Desire are these Tenents

1 It is a note of want, and Impotency. Thence the covetous are sayd alwayes to bee wanting in their greatest Abun­dance.

2 It is never but with greife, till the thing be obtained, and in the attainement it ceases. Hence it cannot be in God, see­ing in him is noe Want, Greife, or Passibility of Nature.

3 We cannot desire things, we know not.

4 It is limited only by satisfaction; without it growes eager importunity.

5 It is grounded only vpon Sence: Angells properly haue it not nor Plantes.

6 It appeares first in beasts: In a more pregnant manner it is in men, seeing in them the sensible part is more various, as hauing opinion to floate and to cast their desires to infinite resolutions, which beasts want.

Desire is either

  • Proper, or
  • Improper.

1 The Improper is an Inclination to the regaining of a Good; this is called Appetitus naturalis, by which the Earth beareth downeward, the fire vpward, and by it appeares in all Naturall Bodies.

2 The Proper is in men principally.

This is for the bettering either of the

  • Reasonable part, or
  • Sensible part.

1 For the reasonable, there is a desire of knowledge naturally in-grafted in the Soule.

[Page 32]2 For the sensitiue part, the desires are either necessary as of

  • Meates.
  • Drinkes.

Naturall not necessary, as Venery, which though it be ne­cessary to man in Specie, yet is not to this or that man in In­dividuo: Neither naturall, nor necessary, as are all Phantasies, and conceited Appetites.

The 2 former is common to men with beastes.

The last comes by an Opinatiue apprehension of Colou­rable goods it openes it selfe most in Excesse of things: It growes boundles and infinite, for as opinion is infinite, so these desires brooded, and hatched by it must be infinite.

Fancied Desires are either.

  • Extraordinary
  • Ordinary.

1 The Extraordinary are caused by diseases, as the chole­ricke desires hony, the Fever-sicke Wine, others eate chalke, coales &c. or are incident to great bellyes, whose longing proceedes from a raw cold Humour; If they faile of it, they either endanger themselues,Livinus lib. or their infants; it comes especi­ally, when they travell for Wenches. The Low-countrey-wo­men of all others are most giuen to these desires, because of their coldnesse of Temper.

2 The ordinary ariseth from Voluntary Passions.

They bend either to

  • Pleasure.
  • Profit.

1 The desires bending to Pleasures are mainly to sooth the 5. Sences. These are crauing and excessiue all ioyned make vp luxury. Cleopatra in her Voyage to Anthony had all these, odours for her smell, Musicke for her Eares, cakes for her tast, costly hangings and soft-Pillowes for her sight and touch.

The like was noted of Antiochus in his warre against the Romans.

The 2 speciall sences that Luxurie seekes to please are

  • Touching.
  • Tasting.

From th [...]se aryse 2. importunate ones

  • 1 Lust for Venery.
  • 2 Liquo [...]ousenes for
    • Meates.
    • Drinkes.

The Excurrences of both these are a certaine signe of a corrupt, lewd, and intemperate Soule.

1 Lust is in beasts, but exceedes in men.

1 Beasts haue it but at set times, men at their Pleasure, ad Libitum.

2 Beasts haue it lesse violently, men, so, that many haue wrought their deathes for it.

The only way to allay it, and to excell beasts is

  • Right reason.
  • Religion.

Our Caueats against it must be to avoyd wanton

  • 1 Wordes.
  • 2 G [...]stures.
  • 3 Meates.

It neuer admits moderation, and warrantize, but only in the bond of Marriage.

2 Liquorousnes for meates and drinkes aimes not at neces­sity, but pampering: thence it cannot be truely in beasts, who feed not but for hunger.

This Desire is seene in vs either

  • Eating overmuch.
  • Too greedily for the Time.
  • Inseasonably at all times.
  • Feeding rather on delicates, then strong meates.

It is Seneca's saying of the Belly. Parvo contentus est, si des illi quod debes, non quod potes.

2 Desires ayeming at profit are either of

  • Wealth, as Covetousnes.
  • Honour, as Ambition.

1 Covetousnes is for the Purse, it gapes after mony, either to haue it only in possession, this is Parsimony: or to haue it for Vse, and purveyance, not of natures, but of Superfluities: This desire may be termed Vaunting, or ostentation.

Parsimonie is only to haue, not to Vse; It is the truest note of Poverty.

Increase rather feedes, then allayes it: he that still drinkes,Plutarch. and cannot be satisfied, needs rather purging, then filling.

These extort from others not to benefit themselues: but wee rather hate the Viper, that stings only to kill, then the [Page 34] Beare or Lyon, that kill only to eate.

They make others to want: yet themselues are like the Bath-masters Asses, that carry on their backes the Rubbers and the cleansing Towells, yet they themselues are all miry with filth: They neuer profit, but by their death. As a kind of mice feeding in the gold-mines eate the Oare, yet redeliver it not till they be exenterated.

This Desire growes infinite, and ariseth from 3. heads

1 Imitation of them, whom we see to prosper and we wish to be as they are.

2 We make Wealth our End, not our meanes Concupiscen­tia finis solum infinita; meanes to Ends are bounded, sith the end is beyond them.

3 Riches are for Vse; they are not of themselues good; As man cannot be sure of his estate, but he may require helps from them, and as losses are ever imminent, Soe riches are e­ver desired for prevention: Desire of mony for Ostentation aimes wholy at superfluity: if at necessaries, the poore might equall the rich in this Kind: And Diogenes might by this as well vaunt himselfe in his Tubbe, as Alexander in his Throne. One came to Scopa Thessalus, but to beg some of his superfluous stuffe, his answer was that the grace of his Wealth was seene in superfluities rather, then in necessaries. If Ismeni­as at Thebes, and Callias at Athens both the richest of their times bare no greater port, then Epamminondas, or Socrates, we might terme their Wealth blind, and hartles: Therefore Telemachus in Homer passes over Nestors houshold, where all was frugall, nothing superfluous, but amplifies in rich termes the gaudie and costly furniture of Menelaus.

This Desire Ends in Expence, as the former in keeping,

They are opposed as Logicke and Rhetoricke, the one re­sembles the hand in spreading, the other in closeing.

Logicke is for the Couetous to learne to count [...] computo. As Rhetoricke for the Vaunter to Vent, and vtter himselfe: this is the cheife factor for gaines both to antique, and moderne pleaders.

[Page 35]
— Ciceroni nemo ducentos
I am dederit nummos, nisi fulserit annulus ingens, &c.

The way to stop both these golden desires is contentati­on in our present estate: this is called by Socrates the Soules riches.

Brevissima ad divitias per contemptum divitiarum via.
Seneca.

2 Desires of honour ter­med Ambition is either of

  • Low and competent
  • Highest, and best

Honors.

It ariseth from 2. heades.

1 Presumption of our owne worth.

2 Pride over others.

The abates of it are

  • Humility in respect of our selues.
  • Charity in respect of others.

As we may not meerely want this desire, so wee must not let it exceed in vs; The Excesse breedes Enuy in all; the defect is faultie only in those, which haue desert, occasion, and fitte meanes to game their honour.

Men of Worth to extenuate their goodes, and giftes, when necessity requires their tryall, is to bury their goods with them, and to wrong the Weale publicke

This desire in the meane is only allowable.

If it be of lower Honors it is termed Modesty, if it perch to the highest, it is magnanimity, and is only for great hartes, and the best perfections.

Both these are grounded on foure conditions.

1 That we challenge no more honor, then what in the o­pinion of the best we haue deserued.

2 That we get them by lawfull meanes, not by out-strip­ping others.

3 That we rest without seeking more, hauing gotten the former,

Vnlesse they bee

  • Easily offered.
  • Forciblie put on vs.

4 That we keepe our Place, and defend it against all back­biters, and murmurers.

Satis de cupiditate Secundâ Passione.

XI. Of Hope the 3. Passion.

AS Loue and Desire is to affect good, so

  • Hope.
  • Boldnes.

to prosecute it.

The 2. former come from the concupiscible, as a Lord to will.

The 2. latter as a steward to purvey, and proceedes from the Irascible.

Loue is the base, to Desire; so Hope to Boldnesse.

1 It is alwaies the apprehender of Good.

2 The goods must not be in presence, but in future.

3 It must be of a thing not easie, and without search, but hard to compasse.

4 It must not be so hard, but it must apparantly be in possi­bility to attaine.

It hath these Tenents.

1 It is neither without assurance, though not of the thing, yet of perswasion.

2 It makes vs take delight in things painefull.

3 The surer the hope is, the greater is the Ioy, when the thing is attained.

4 It brings securitie, and barreth feare.

5 The Adiunct of it is Expectation; herein is some greife sith we yet want the good, which we would haue in presence.

6 It is a note of imperfection of being: whence it is only for this life, it goes not beyond.

7 It moues our powers of

  • Bodie
  • Soule

for atchiuements.

The Persons giuen to Hope are,

1 They that rather haue deserued, or intend to deserue well of vs.

2 They that haue potencie of friends and best meanes.

3 They that haue hotte, and quicke spirits, which enlarge our harts to attemptes.

Hence young men, and Drunkards are most given this way.

Old men are least hoping

  • 1 For the coldnesse of temper, making them vnfit to attempt.
  • 2 For their experience of many dangers, and stoppages, which contrary, and crosse their hope.

4 They that quickly apprehend the good, but fore cast not the stoppage in the way, that hinders the good: Thence Fooles, and Inconsiderate persons build only vpon Hope.

The kindes of Hope.

Hope is either

  • 1 Naturall.
  • 2 Supernaturall or Theologicall.

1 The Supernaturall is a Vertue only infused by God.

The second Sister to

  • Faith.
  • Charitie.

2 The Naturall is either

  • Improper.
  • Proper.

1 Improperlie it is in beasts: As the Dog springs the Deere within Compasse of attaineing, hopes to take him: So the Hauke the Pattridge.

Object: How should beast haue hope, sith hope comes from the Vnderstanding?

Beastes haue their naturall instinct which proceedes from God, and vnderstanding without them:Sol: by it they Iudge of things future, as the Emmot foresees the cold Winter, Mice leaue the house, when it begins to fall, and Ravens oft fore­tell weather.

2 Hope Proper is in men only.

It is either of things.

  • Necessary that must be.
  • Possible, that may be otherwise.

1 Things necessary are hoped for: as the Iewes calling, the worlds End, the Resurrection, which cannot be otherwise, because God hath appointed it.

Things Possible are attained

  • Partly by ourselues.
  • Partly by others.

Then our Hope relyes much on others helpe.

Motiues to raise hope.

1 Shew the meanes to be strong and pregnant.

2 That the Evills feared are not in proportion to the goodes expected.

3 That to men of religion we must not vrge the generall only but the particular Providence of God.

4 To graue men vse rather few and strong reasons, then many and weake: To the common sort vse probabilities ra­ther of circumstance then realties of substance, because of Ignorance they are ledde most with coniectures.

Satis de Spe 3a. Passione.

XII. Of Boldnes the 4th. Passion.

BOldnes hartens our Hope, as desire doth our loue.

Its obiect is mixt

  • Evils to be remoued
  • Goods to be attained.

It goes vnder the name of Conscience and Courage: It be­gins with reluctance, and strugling, but ends with Victory.

Courage is either

  • Suddaine vpon Sence.
  • Deliberate vpon Reason.

1 That vpon Sence grounds only vpon a presuming hope, Weighes not every occurrence of danger, begins with reso­lution, but seeing dangers arise vnlooked for, slackes and of­ten failes, before it overcome: Thus quicke in the onset, but slow in the Issue.

2 That vpon reason begins slowly, endeth ventrouslie, viewes every circumstance, fore-layes the vttermost of dan­gers: If it happens lesse then his account, it heartens him the more, he resolues to conquere by out-faceing danger.

An example of both is seene in Lucius Paulus, and Teren­tius Ʋarro the 2. Roman Generall at the overthrow of Cannae.

Courage hath his 2, Extreames

  • Heady rashnes.
  • Base cowardize.

The parties most couragious are.

1 Whose temper of Body is such, that they are hot spirit­ted; which happens in three sorts of men,

1 Whose heart is litle, because of combring and closing of spirits, whereas in the larger hartes their diffusion causeth feare.

2 Whose lunges are greatest and fullest of blood: This ar­gues plenty of heate, and much quicknes.

3 Who are heated with much Wine: Thence the Germans vsed it principally in their consultations of Warre: And A­lexanders drinking was thought to adde some-what to his courage.

2 They that haue many and strong helpes, are ventrous.

3 They that be most subiect to choller.

4 They that rely on Gods promises, and cast their hopes vpon him.

Hence it is, That Martyrs are most resolute.

5. They that haue a Conscience of their Innocency: on the contrary they are most fearfull, which haue beene most in­jurious.

6 They that haue oft escaped dangers: hence old Souldiers are more ventrous, then fresh-water-men.

7 They that see not inconveniencies, and stops: Hence the wiser sort are more cautelous, and none so desperate, as he, that fore-sees least.

5. Motiues to make couragious.

1 Shew the Excellence of the Victory: The meanes easy, and present, that must compasse it.

2 If our equalls and inferiors haue overcome: why should not we hope the like? It was Cicero's argument to perswade the sufferance of Evill: If children at Sparta could endure stroakes without groaning, why should not men? And a­mongst men if the barbarous vaunt before their enimies, why should the learned trembl [...].

[Page 40]3 Set them into anger: this makes a boyling of their blood, and by consequence courage: Anger is wrought by laying open their wrongs, and disgraces offered without a cause.

4 Shew the

  • Paucity
  • Weaknes

of their enimies, that they either

  • Will not
  • Dare not

oppose them.

5 That in former combates they haue had successe, and why not in these standing in the same proportion.

Our maine worke must be to

  • Perswade hope.
  • Excell feare
Satis de Fiduciâ 4a. Passione.

XIII Of Pleasure the 5th. Passion.

THis is the aime and vp-shot of the 4. former Passions:

  • Love
  • Desire

are like the qualities of lightnes in fire, which inclineth it to make

  • Hope.
  • Boldnes.

like the motion or Passage of it.

Pleasure resultes as the quietnes and rest of the Soule in her obiect: it is neuer hearty before the goods are in pre­sence.

It is generally in men and beasts; it is tearmed properly pleasure, or delight: As it is in men by Opinion, it is called Ioy, Gaudium.

This in men hath 2.Aquenas. operations, sc:

  • 1 Enlarging the hart: hence proper­ly it is called laetitia, quasi latitia.
  • 2 Forcing outward gestures, and so it is called Exultatio.

The Tenents touching it are,

1 Noe Passion is so vehement: So that many haue dyed of it; the reason is because it opens the hart, and being overmuch passes out the spirits, that keepe in life.

2 The greater Ioy, the greater content, and in men it is the consequent of happines.

[Page 41]3 It is neuer true, and of continuance, but where there is Peace of Conscience.

4 It is the Adjunct of Vertue.

5 It is increased by Variety of objectes.

6 It purifies the Soule, helpes concoction, expelles super­fluities, hence the merry haue

  • Good wittes.
  • Faire complexions.

7 It is for goods present: though we joy for remembrance of things past, or for hope of things future, yet they are ap­prehended by vs in a sort of Presence.

Motiues to rayse delights in a man are,

1 Perswade him to a

  • Loue
  • Desire

of those things, we would haue him delighted in.

2 Marke his inclination, sort, profession, and frame your selfe to the like practises.

3 Amplifie the goodnes of the thing, we would haue him delight in, not by describing it in grosse, but viewing every particular: Thence Poets in their loue-legends describe eve­ry part of their Mrs th [...] more to delight.

4 Shew the continuance of this Ioy, that it breeds not af­ter-repentance Variety c [...]useth delight, and vniformity ray­seth loathing.

Pleasure is

  • Comon to men with beastes
  • Proper to men alone.

1 That in common is the Issue of Sence, and comes from a naturall appetite,

It is

  • Negatiue for the avoydance only of trouble.
  • Positiue for the gaining of some reall good.

This grounded on 2 conditions, viz.

  • 1 The attaineing of a good convenient.
  • 2 The perswasion that we haue attained it.

2 That proper to men is voluntary and hatched by Opi­nion.

It is either of

  • Mind or
  • Body

The Pleasures of the mind are best, yet all [Page 42] not warrantable, as the

  • Prone
  • Malicious

take delight in their passions, yet their minds are corrupt: these begin in hope, but end in shame and Griefe.

The truest delight of the mind without repentance is

  • 1 Meditation on God, and heavenly things.
  • 2 The view of learning.

Eudoxus wished to be burn'd with Phaëton, so he might stand neere the sunne to contemplate the nature of it: And Archimedes left not his drawing of lines, till a sword was drawen through his body.

Pleasures of the body are sensuall, and quickly Exceed Measure.

The Properties of them are

  • 1 Inconstancie and fleeting.
  • 2 Saciety, & cloying like rancke meate.
  • 3 Ending in repentance.
  • 4 They quench the thirst no more then Salt water, that wets the palate, but in­flames the stomacke.

They are perswaded by three Enimyes.

  • 1 World.
  • 2 Flesh.
  • 3 Devill.

The Word­lings take

  • Present
  • Apparent

Ioy for future, and reall payne.

The good had rather suffer here, and play hereafter.

Sensuall pleasures proceed from the diverse affecting of the Sences, as Musicke, and odors affect the Eare and Smell, pictures the Eye, &c. The strongest delight comes from the Sence of touching, The reason is, Delight is caused of Loue: we loue those things, that most besteed vs, of all the Sences touching is most vsefull; without which it is impossible we should liue: And as the goods affected by it are more deare; so the pleasure, when it is attained, must be more moving.

These bodily exercises in their Excesse distract the minds, and hinder the vse of right reason.

XIIII. Of Hate and Detesting.

THese are the 2. opposites of

  • Loue.
  • Desire.

Hate begins the dislike, de­detesting is the vehemen­cy of it.

The obiect of both is evill: It is either of the

  • Thinge.
  • Person.

1 The thing hated principally is Sinne, and for it we dislike of the Person

Sinne is against the law of

  • 1 Nature this breeds the hate of either
    • Moralists.
    • Heathens.
  • 2 Grace, this breeds the hate of Christians.

sith all partake of nature, and are bound to its laws.

2 The Person we may not simply hate. It is proper to Ʋbicun{que} homo est, ibi benificio locus est. Seneca

3 heads of Sin moue [...]ate

  • 1 Irreligion towards God.
  • 2 Injustice towards men.
  • 3 A selfe inclination to evills without outward motiues.

If these heads grow stronger, and are done wilfully, it transcends hate, and mov [...]s detestation.

The principle obiect of it is Atheisme.

1 It is the ground-plot of all other sinnes.

2 It is an evill of Will, not of Vnderstanding; we cannot alledge Ignorance for that, which the creature reveales. It is voluntary presumption.

3 Athists are most vnfit for Society.

Their commerce is either

  • 1 Scoffing.
  • 2 Impudency.
  • 3 Vaine.

of that Constitution, as is most contrary to wisdome, and morall gravity.

These things moue the greatest detestation.

Hate is either

  • In common against states.
  • Particular for private respects.

1 That in com­mon aryses, if

  • Their religion be in oposition to ours.
  • Their lawes be against nature.
  • Their oft iniuries done be without hope of righting.

2 Hate for pri­vate respects, is

  • 1 Against a wronger of many, as
    • 1 Tyrants
    • 2 Extortioners.
  • 2 Against a wronger of himselfe only for the indignity of his person.

This is set downe by its life

  • 1 Towards God.
  • 2 Towards himselfe.
  • 3 Towards his Neighbour.

His entry into the World is shamefull, his stay, and depar­ture hence with misreport, like a snuffe leauing a stincke, when the light is out.

Satis de odio, & detestatione.

XV. Of Despayre a [...]d Feare.

THese 2. are opposite to

  • Hope.
  • Boldnes.

Their speciall Art is in avoyding the future evill, which seeing they cannot master, they yeild.

1 Despaire ariseth from fayle of helpes.

2 Feate from the Imminence of evills.

The tenents of despaire are 3.

1 It deiecteth the minde.

2 It makes venterous to try the vtmost of dangers.

3 It is deepest in them, who before had greatest hopes.

The tenents of feare are 3.

1 It is never moved, but where some spice of hope is, for things without remedy are rather despaire, then feare.

2 The greater the things feared, and of long continuance, [Page 45] the greater is the feare.

3 It prepares Patience, awakes industry whereas despaire is only in suffring.

It ariseth from 3 heads

  • 1 The debility of the person.
  • 1 The greatnes of the danger.
  • 3 The certainety and imminency thereof

Feare is either of a

  • Person.
  • Thinge

1 Of a Person it is either

  • 1 Filiall, which is properly loue.
  • 2 Servile, which is only for escape.

The persons most feared by vs are.

1 Great men offended with vs.

2 Lewd men made powerfull.

3 They who stand in bodily feare of vs.

4 High stomackes wronged by vs.

5 They, who haue our life and credit in their hands

We feare them either

  • 1 As in themselues faithlesse.
  • 2 To be provo­ked [...]y
    • 1 Gaine.
    • 2 Threates.
    • 3 Danger on their part, want of service in our part

Persons not [...]uch to be feared are.

1 They that are soone angry, and soone pleased.

2 They which open themselues too much in menaces and threats.

3 They that disclose their purposes. They close heart con­cocts malice. Vlysses is sayd to dissemble his disslike for the Woers ryot; but revenged them at occasion. Anthony and Dolabella frayd not Coesar, though they conspired against him: Hee answered he feared not those fatte, and open fact Traytors, but two leane ones Brutus and Cassius which pro­ved his deaths-men. Demissos animo, & tacitos vitare memēto.

2 Things feared are evills bringing either

  • 1 Destruction to the whole man, or
  • 2 Baine to any part of him.

Evils are of

  • 1 Sin, malum culpae.
  • 2 Punishment, malum paenae.

[Page 46]1 The former is feared by the best men.

2 The latter is feared by the worst.

The parties most fearfull are,

1 They, whose quantity of heart is such, that it diffuseth the spirits.

2 They, that know their owne weaknes, and others ablenes to hurt.

3 They, that amplifye on the Evills feared.

The parties least fearefull are, The

  • Wise
  • Iust

who count no euill but

  • Sinne
  • Disgrace

which they endea­vour to avoyd.

1 The most couragious.

2 They that preferre honour before their liues.

3 They that haue strength of meanes to backe them.

Satis de desperatione, & metu.

XVI Of Greife.

GReife is the End of the former Passions, and ariseth from the presence of evill.

It is of

  • Body.
  • Minde.

that of the min [...] is more dangerous.

The Tenents of it are;

1 It neuer touches things of absolute perfection, as God, Angells, &c. but is there most frequent, where is most plen­ty of evills, as in hell.

2 It dryeth the Body and ingendereth melancholy by cold blood.

3 It makes one vnfit for Action.

It growes vpon vs by

  • 1 Yeilding too much to pleasures.
  • 2 Entertayning a conceit of evils present.

The Way to resist it in our selues.

1 Propose to your selues examples of Patience, as of Ma­rius. Ita tulit dolorem; vt vir & vt homo maiorem ferre sine causa necessariâ noluit.

[Page 47]2 Resolue to resist evills. As that Souldier, that stands it out, often winnes, when the coward dies by flight. Animi conten­tio Sola officij tanquam custodia.

3 That the euills now are not so great, but the goods ensue­ing counterpoyse them.

The way to allay it in others is comfort

  • Perswasion of a good to come.
  • Removall of an evill present.

In it are 2. things.

1 The time to apply it, when the greife is ripened, not new­ly begun; As Surgeons first let the sore soften, before they be­gin to draw it.

2 The manner of applieing it is

  • Generall.
  • Speciall.

1 The Generall by these places.

1 Shew how greater evills haue happened to others, then we now suffer. It was Socrates his saying, if of all mens evils heaped together all should haue equall share, each would rest content with their present estate.

2 Our evills be ordinary, and do what we can, we shall haue

  • 1 Cares of minde.
  • 2 Diseases of Body,

3 If the thing be [...]eable, shew the meanes of regaining it; if not, yet it is a folly [...] mourne for it:

4 That God sees, wha [...] is better for vs, then we for our selues.

2 The speciall is according to the maine motiues of Griefe.

1 These are

  • Death.
  • Temporall misfortune.

2 Our comfort death is.

1 It is vnavoydable by fate, and all men must, and do tast of it.

2 It is noe Evill, but a passage to a better life.

3 Our life hath many troubles, and anguishes, death is the quiet of them.

4 If we greiue for the dead, then either, because they are not or because they are in torment; If they are not, why greiue we more for their now not-being, then for our children yet [Page 48] vnborne; If they be in torment, it is seene, they were evill, we were the better rid of them.

Of deaths they are most greveous, that are

  • Suddaine.
  • Vntimely.

Against these our comforts are 3.

1 We ever beare Corruption in our flesh, that in a moment may kill vs.

2 Dying yonge makes vs lesse fixt to the world, and fitter for God. [...]. He calles vs hence as from a banquet, lest ouermuch sitting should make vs surfeit.

3 The thing cannot be suddaine, sith we are euer lyable to evill. We ought euer to expect it.

2. Our comfort for temporall misfortunes.

1 They come from Gods decree, and so are necessary to fall on vs.

2 They are profitable vnto vs, and debarre our insolence.

3 They may befall any as well as vs.

4 Shall we greiue euer or leaue at last? If ever, to great a misery we impose on vs: if we will l [...]ue, why resolue we not at first.

The Persons most giuen to [...] [...]fe are 3.

1 Whose temper of Body is Mela [...]cholie.

2 Weomen, because of their easines in yeilding.

3 They, who haue giuen themselues to ouermuch Ioy: This falling must end in depth of Griefe.

Satis de dolore.

XVII. Of Samefacenes.

It is a mixt passion joyned with

  • Feare of infamy.
  • Loue of Honesty.

It ariseth partly

  • before a fault.
  • After a fault.

It is only in good natures, but vnsteddy, soone fayling, and easily revoked by councell: It it commendable in youth, [Page 49] but not in the Aged.

The Effects of it are 2.

1 It moues to vertue; thence termed Purpura virtutis.

2 It calls blood into the face. Reason and Passion moue the heart; the heart, the spirits, the spirits the blood.

Now shame consists of 2 passions

  • 1 Feare, that gathers blood to the hart.
  • 2 Loue, that sends it abroad to the outward parts.

If we feare only disgrace, and haue no loue to good, our blood keepes within: This is the signe of a bad nature, which being convicted of faults lookes not redde; but pale in the Face.

If we feare not only disgrace, but loue and desire amend­ment, our blood spreadeth outward, and causeth blushing. Aristoteles his daughter being asked, what she counted the fayrest colour, answered the ruddy caused by an ingenuous blush.

It is a note of the best natures, and fittest for Counsell.

The reason, why t [...] blood sheweth it selfe most in the face is, because as the blo [...] is moued by the spirits so the spirits are most quicke, [...] animate the organ of sence; and the Organs of sence princi [...]ally are about the face.

The Extreames of shame are

  • [...] [...], an overbashfulnes
  • 2 Impudence, the defect of shame.

Bashfulnes in it selfe is not evill, but may often be a pro­vocation to evill. It is grounded vpon an overlenity of na­ture, and easines of yeilding. The object of it is feare of infamy. The persons whom it may hurt are 5.

1 Young men as leading them to an vnset'led and floating carriage in manners.

2 It makes them easie to suitors, without respect of their choyce.

3 Incontinent persons; It makes them vnable to resist evill-motions, though in the yeilding they greiue at it.

4 It debarreth their courage in punishing faults, and makes them loth to displease.

[Page 50]5 They, which are rich, powerfull, kind-hearted, and haue many helps to further others.

1 It makes the rich

  • Rash lenders.
  • Heady suretys.

2 The kind har­ted by it either

  • 1 Follow the riot of bad company.
  • 2 Beare false witnes for their Ac­quaintance.
  • 3 Soone take paines for others.
  • 4 Ioyne their to vnworthy men.

3 The powerfull haue many suitors, and by it are made easie to yeild to any demand, and profer without election.

The way to barre it is to acquainte our selues with resi­stance to motions, denialls of suits, if they be not honest, and convenient, but hurtfull to the granter.

The Inhabtants of Asia were all slaues, because they could not pronounce this word [...]. And Brutus said.

Impudence passes not feare of Infamy.

The difference betwixt it and bashullnesse is, that the bashfull retaine a loue of vertue; the Impudent doe not.

Perijt, cui perit pudo [...],
Satis de pudore.

XVIII Of Repentance.

REpentance is an act of Conscience arising from the thought of an evill done.What it is

It is either

  • 1 Theologicall, because of offences done against the law of Grace.
  • 2 Morall because of things done against the law of nature, or common Honesty.

1 Repentance theologicall is in Christians alone.

2 Morall is in Heathens.

It is raised by three motiues

  • 1 Infamy.
  • 2 Punishment.
  • 3 Hate of vice.

[Page 51]1 That arising from feare of Infamy, and punishment is slauish, and incident to the most.

2 The best repent for the hate of vice: For as they loue good for the good, not for reward: So they hate evill for the Evills sake, not for the punishment.

The parts of repen­tance are 2.

  • 1 Hate of the evill done.
  • 2 Resolution of amendment.

It is descryed 3. wayes

  • 1 By contrition of the hart.
  • 2 By confession of the mouth.
  • 3 By satisfaction by good workes.

Its propertyes are three.

1 Repentance must be with vehemency of greife, least, while our greife for the fault slackenes, our care for amend­ment slackenes also.

2 It must not be for a time, but for continuance, sith evill is ever to be hated, and good ever to be resolued vpon.

3 It must not be deferred, least delay breed custome of evill, and custome hardnes of hart.

The stops of repentance are 7.

1 Shame to confess [...] our faults, or pride in not acknowledg­ing them.

2 Delighting in our sinnes.

3 Hope of longe life.

4 Despaire of obtaining grace.

5 Presumption of Gods mercy.

6 Longe custome of sinning.

7 Examples of bad men, which haue longe flourished, yet never repented.

The tenents of repentance are 5.

1 Repentance cannot be in a nature meerely good, as God, nor meerely bad, as the Deuill; but in such only as are partly good, and partly bad, as in men.

These are

  • Bad by nature; hence they offend.
  • Good by grace; hence they amend.

2 It is only in things, that we to fall: Beasts haue it not: those actions are not voluntary, but necessary, which cannot [Page 52] be repented off.

3 It ariseth from a knowledge, and tast of sinne committed: thence children haue it not.

4 It groundeth on hope: They that dye desperate haue it not, sith the desperate are swallowed vp with greife: The re­pentant receiue greife for the evill past, but ioy for the future good, and future things more moue then those past.

5 Repentance is ioyned with shame, as Impenitence is ioyned with jmpudence.

XIX. Of Pitty.

Pitty lookes outwardly to the Evills of others, but by re­flexe to our owne.

It is mix­ed with

  • Greife for the Evills fallen.
  • Desire for their remedy.

Evills that raise pitty are 4

  • 1 Greife [...]f minde.
  • 2 Tortu [...] [...]f Body.
  • 3 Dan [...]r of others death.
  • 4 Mis fortune in goods.

The Evills moue most

  • 1 If they are so neare to fall, that we feare them.
  • 2 If so lately fallen, that we freshly remember them.
  • 3 If their then present falling barres our Ex­pectance of contrary profit.

The ground of pitty is our communion of nature.

The extent of it is a Desire to helpe.

This desire hath 2 conditions

  • If we we are able to helpe.
  • If iustice permit.

1 Greiuing for such as lawes, and Iustice will haue banish­ed, is womanish.

2 For those we are not able to remedy, it is fruitlesse.

The Tenents of pitty are 4.

1. The better nature, the more it is inclinable to it.

[Page 53]2 It is meanes to provoke charity.

3 It compares the evill fallen with the desert, and concluds the person vnworthy to suffer it.

4 It brings vs to acknowledg our owne misfortunes.

The parties most pittying are 5.

1 Old men partly

  • As not being so stomackefull, as the yonge.
  • As hauing more experience of Dangers.

2 Weak­lings

  • Weomen
  • Children

they thinke for their infirmity, they may soone suffer the like.

3 Schollers, as being by bookes accquainted with many examples of dangers.

4 They that haue felt former evills, and now are ridde of them.

5 They that haue opinion of anothers worth, they count it below his deserts to be in evills.

The parties least pittying are 5.

1 Who are most giuen to

  • Anger
  • Boldnes

they recount not the evills, that may befall them.

2 Scoffers and they who are readie to wrong others.

3 They that are in ex [...]remitie of distresse: As in Cityes be­seiged parents eate their owne children; whereas otherwise they vsed to pitty them. Their care is for the remedy of their owne harmes, little for others: thence they that feare immi­nent dangers, pitty not others, but care for themselues.

4 They that are in height of fortune not likely to fall. Thence tyrants and rich men pitty least,

5 They that haue prejudice against others behaviour, what befalls them, they count it desert, and doe lesse greiue at it.

The persons, whom we pitty most, are 4.

1 Acquaintance rather then strangers.

2 Our equalls either in

  • 1 Yeares.
  • 2 Manners.
  • 3 Profession.
  • 4 Office.
  • 5 Stocke.

2 They who suffer those evills, which wee our selues feared,

[Page 54]4 Men bearing their harmes with

  • 1 Patience
  • 2 Courage

by it we count them vnwor­thy of them, & so pitty them.

The way to raise pitty for others.

1 Shew the valour, and the worth of the person, that suffers.

2 The greivousnes of the Evills befallen.

3 The like may happen either to them, or their freinds.

Conscience of a mans owne case moues it.

XX. Of Zeale and Iealousie.

1 ZEale is a Passion grounded on loue.

It is

  • 1 Griefe for a fault committed.
  • 2 Desire for a good intended.

It borders on repentance, and is the issue and effect of it.

It is ever with fervency: It is most dangerous, vnlesse it be regulated with knowledge.

It is either for a

  • Good quality.
  • the good of a person.

1 The former is in the best, who [...]re [...]ealous of good for goodnes it selfe.

2 The latter comes from the respect of a person conceiued in the behalfe of one, we loue.

It supposeth

  • Wrong done to our freind
  • Desire of remedy

or griefe for it.

2 Iealousy is a passion conceiting an Evill in another, that perhaps is guiltles of it: it comes only by conjectures.

It proues often injurious.

It breeds trouble in ourselues, and distrust to our freinds.

The way to barre it is, not to skanne the actions of o­thers, but with a favourable interpretation.

XXI. Of Anger.

ANger is a compound of sundry passions: As 1. Pleasure in revenge. 2. Greife in recounting the wrongs. 3. Inso­lence in ouerbearing 4. Envy in repining at the welfare of o­thers: The proper Act of it is desire of hurting.

The tenents of it are 5.

1 A just injury requires as just anger; and it is stupidity not to be moued with it.

2 It is not bent against men in generall, but to some in spe­ciall only. Thence Timon is not sayd to be angry with all but hate all.

3 Noe passion is more indiscreet then it: thence it's ridicu­lous, and to be contemned, none more violent, thence terri­ble, and to be feared.

4 Being moderate it whets Valour; but over-earnest it weakens revenge.

5 To be suddai [...] moved is a signe of weaknes; hence it a­grees more to the sicke, then the sound, to old folkes then to yonge: And to Women.

— Quippe minuti
Semper & infermi est animi exigui{que} voluptas.
Ʋltio continuo; sic collige, Quod vindicta
Nemo magis gaudet quâm faemina.—

Adjuncts of an­ger are these viz.

  • 1 Vexation of mind.
  • 2 Ignorance of his owne strength.
  • 3 Vndecency of gesture.
  • 4 Wrongefull opinion of others.

The causes raising it are

  • Generall.
  • Speciall.

1 The generall disrespect shewed 4 wayes.

  • 1 By derision in words.
  • 2 Injury in deeds, as against.
    • Body.
    • Goods.
    • Name.
  • [Page 56]3 Ingratitude for good turnes
    • 1 Freinds.
    • 2 Inferiours either in
      • 1 Blood.
      • 2 Authority.
      • 3 Wealth.
      • 4 Vertue.
  • 4 Want of due ob­servance from our.

2 The speciall are according to the nature of speciall persons.

1 If we haue too setled a perswasion of those we converse with, if they fayle in the contrary to our expectation, our choller riseth: Hence credulity inflames anger.

2 Curiosity inflames it, if we busie our selues too much in loue, and frivolous matters: Crosses in either of them fret vs.

3 If we delight in one thing more then another, when we should vse either with indifferency: As in an houshold, if our stuffe of this fashion like vs better then that, and we take pleasure in it, the losse or the mislaying of it frettes vs

The waies to allay anger in others.

1 Proue the wronge done vpon

  • Ignorance.
  • Constrainte.
  • Suddaine P [...]ssion.
  • Mischance.

2 That it was done to our owne harme, aswell as his.

3 Shew sorrow for it, for outfacing growes of Impudency, that of disrespect, the nurse of Anger.

4 Be not opposite in talke.

5 Dissemble our Humility, and feare: the angred by this are lesse prone to revenge.

6 Seeme to be serious for his good, and overcome this wronge with other passages of kindnes.

7 Speake not against men of his sort and quality though their persons greiue him not.

8 Scoffe at none whatsoeuer, but be affable to all. Isocrates. ad Daemon.

To beare anger in our selues the waies are 4.

1 Vse noe hart greife but

  • Sports.
  • Games.
  • Merriments

yet bar insolent delights, sith these are ouerbearing, and an­ger others.

[Page 56]2 Resolue to resist choler by not easilie accepting disre­spects.

3 A suddaine feare, or greife vnexspected allayeth ones an­ger.

4 If a wrong be offered, rather contemne the offerer as wanting witte, then thinke our selues disgrased by it.

How to behaue our selues in anger. 3.

1 Bend our selues to a contrary passion; as Socrates with his freind laboured to looke most pleasantly on him.

2 Retire we our selues from Company till the passion hath spent it selfe.

3 Not to revenge before our anger be past.

Persons most giuen to anger. 4.

1 Weaklings, as Children, weomen, sicke men, old folkes.

2 They, that are ambitious, and standing for offices.

3 They, that require much awe and reverence of others.

4 They, that know their deserts well, yet are scorned.

The partyes, with whom we are least angry.

1 They, who reuer [...]nce vs which argues, they doe not dis­respect vs.

2 We cannot be a [...]gry with him, whom we feare; sith an­ger implyes hope of revenge: feare not.

3 Men doing things vpon choller, lesse anger vs.

4 Anger cannot be against those, whom we cannot hurt, as gods, and kings, that are out of our reach.

Satis de Ira.

XXII. Of Maligninge.

THis Passion hath 2 partes

  • 1 Envy greiving at another Good.
  • 2 [...], ioying for anothers evill.

1 It is in the worst-natures, and is opposite to common society.

2 It is principally betwixt equalls, as men of the same sort: hence we envy not those, that are in eminency aboue vs: A [Page 57] common souldier neuer envies Alexander; one of his nearest captaines may.

3 It aymes especially at the goods of

  • Honour.
  • Fortune.

4 It eates vp a mans hart by fretting at others.

5 It ariseth from pride of our owne deserts.

The way to avoyd it in our selues is to thinke that there must not be an equallity of Gifts and goods in all: that as men are diuerse, soe they must haue distinction of place, and if any excell, we ought not to repine.

Great men avoyde the Envy of others 3. waies.

1 Let them shew themselues gentle, and affable to all.

2 Imploy their goods to the vses of others.

3 They must not thinke to be singular in any thing, sith that is envious. Nemo de nobis vnus excellat, This is the law of the Ephesians, who therefore banished Hermadorus.

XXIII The Efficient cause of vertue.

VErtue is effected by 3. things

  • 1 Nature
  • 2 Precept.
  • 3 Practize.

Nature begins the inclination; Precept directs it; Practise perfecteth it.

Nature workes ver­tue either from the

  • Soule only.
  • Temperature of the Body.

In Soule are 2 Partes

  • Vnderstanding.
  • Will.

The vnderstanding is either viz.

  • 1 Speculatiue, working for contemplatiō: the Issue of this is Sapiēce or pondering.
  • [...] Practicke, working for action: The Is­sue of it is Honesty or Morall Vertue.

1 The Actes proper to [...]he practicke Vnderstanding are 3

  • 1 Conscience.
  • 2 Consultation.
  • 3 Prudence.

These judge things to be

  • Good.
  • Evill.

Then the will records them

  • 1 For affecting it if it be good.
  • 2 For avoyding it, if it be evill.

Of practicke vnderstanding.

As the Speculatiue is the discerner of truth from false­hood: So the practicke of good from evill: Both judge from principles, & vndoubted opinions: The practicke judges on­ly of morall principles arising out of the law of nature: Grounds, that Atheists assent vnto in the generall; though they will not follow them in particular.

The principles of these are,

1 Honour God.

2 Loue honesty.

3 Obay

  • Parents.
  • Magistrates.

4 Loue our Country.

5 Hurt no man, but doe, as you would be done by.

6 Yeild every man his owne.

7 Vse all sociably, and in freind­ship, as far as stands with our

  • Credit.
  • Benefit.

8 Execute common malefactors for the common quiet sake.

9 Suffer distinction of Lordships, lands, bounds, mens pri­vate possessions, &c.

These rules all nations assent vnto, and from these institute their common weales, Ius gentium. The breach of these is ac­cusable by nature, and this accusation is termed Conscience.

XXIIII Of Conscience.

COnsciēce is the immediate act of our soule, arisi [...]g from a naturall apprehension of good, and avoydanc [...] of evill: It cannot be totally extinguished in any.

It bring vs

  • To know our faults.
  • To condemne them.
  • To haue will to prosecute the contrary.

It is either of

  • faults past; so it
    • Checkes.
    • Condemnes.
  • future, so it retaines.

It is best in the meane, and most dangerous, when it is to

  • Large.
  • Nice.

1 The former calls evill good, and breeds presumption.

2 The latter counts of the best good as evill, and breeds despaire.

It grounds vpon this Syllogisme.

Noe evill is to be committed:

This particular is evill, Ergo.

Not to be committed.

The Maior is drawne from the practicke vnderstanding out of the rules of Nature. The minor ariseth from view of particulars, which are variable, and may often deceiue; if our apprehension of them bee false, our Conscience must needs erre.

Error of conscience proceeds from these heads.

1 From ignorance, if we know not what is to be

  • Chosen.
  • Refused.

2 Negligence in not fitting our selues, and getting directi­on from others, if we find our owne weake.

3 Pride in not humbling our conceits to others, that are

  • Wiser.
  • Honester

then vs.

4 Singularity in following our owne priuate spirit.

5 Passion, that inclines conscience to follow appetite. Perit omne iudicium, cum res transit in affectum.

6 Pusillanimity in distructing all things, and fearing to ven­ture on any thinge, least we offend: If we doe any thing a­gainst conscience, be it good or bad; the act vtterly is sinfull.

XXV. Of Consultation.

COnsultation is grounded on these rules.

1 It is not touching the End, but of the meanes dire­cting to it.

2 Things past are not to be consulted off, but things future.

3 Not necessary things, but contingent.

4 Things nothing appertaineing to vs are not to be con­sulted off.

Our consultation is either

  • By our selues alone.
  • By others.

1 We consult with our­selues if the matter be

  • 1 Of a great secrecy.
  • 2 Suddainly befallen.
  • 3 If we haue not a freind to im­part it.

2 To consult with others obserue them to bee

  • Honest.
  • Wise.
  • Faithfull.

The question in our consultation is,

1 Whether the thing be convenient for vs,

2 Whether possibly to be compassed.

1 It is iudged con­venient if it be, viz.

  • 1 Safe for vs, not discommodious.
  • 2 Not against the 4. rules of Honesty.
    • Prudence.
    • Iustice.
    • Temperance.
    • Fortitude.

2 Possibility of compassing it found out from view of all these meanes, we must vse in working that end.

The particular wayes of Consultation are.

1 Whether the thinge be profitable, or disprofitable.

2 Whether honest, or dishonest.

3 When 2. profits are proposed, we question, which is greatest,

4 If 2. things be honest, which is most honest.

[Page 61]5 When one part is only honest, the other only profitable, which is rather to be prosecuted.

In morality, the least honesty countervayles the most profit and is to be prefer'd before it: In Politickes or perswa­sion must be according to the auditory, with whom wee deliberate.

Before the Vulgar our consultation must be most inclining to profit, sith they are most addicted that way; before the better sort stand rather for honesty and Honour.

XXVI Of Prudence.

PRudence is a speciall quality of a moralist, being the sole directresse, and gouernesse of all his actions.

It is only in things ambiguous, and borders on Consulta­tion.

It consists in

  • Choyce.
  • Iudgement.
  • Fitnesse of Application.

It longe consulteth, and quickly executeth.

It corrects things past, directs the present, foresees the future.

The speciall rule of it, is silence in revealing our purpose.

The waies to get it are.

1 Industrie in

  • Disputing
  • Reading

matters practicke.

2 Observations of mens carriages.

3 Noting what effects proceed out of what causes.

4 Acquaintance with sundry positiue lawes especially of our owne land.

5 Vsing to invent much of our owne, not to stand strictly on authority of others.

The partes requisite to prudence are.

1 Memory for retaining experiences past.

2 Vnderstanding for judging morall principles.

This gotten by—

  • Hearing.
  • Inventing our selues.

3 That wee may be ready to heare is required docility, our readines to learne.

4 For invention is required, Solertia, a ripenes of finding out meanes.

5 When we haue

  • Learned,
  • Experiēced,
  • Invented,

wee must conferre one thing with another, and discourse of the con­venience of it. Hence to prudence is required reasoning.

Ra [...]io.

6 Out of this discourse arise precepts for action.

These obserue 3. things.

1 Direction for fit meanes to fit Ends. Hence is required Providence.

2 Weighing each circumstance of the busines: Hence Cir­cumspection is required.

3 Avoyding all stopps, and impediments: Hence is required Caution for evill.

XXVII. Of the Will.

THe seate of the Will is the Heart, where passions reside

As the braine is the seate of the Vnderstanding.

The will prosecutes what the vnderstanding judges.

The object of it is Good: Of the vnderstanding Truth.

Will without passion chooseth the true good: with passion the forged and apparent only.

If goods be evident, it affects simply without prayse; if doubted, there is first deliberation.

It hath 2 partes, viz.

  • 1 Approbation, or willing.
  • 2 Refusall, or nilling.

For execution it com­mandes in men

  • Passions.
  • Faculty of motions.

1 The former it rules by perswasion, as by an Aristocracy [Page 63] or state regiment, whereby goverment is not so absolute, but the rest may interpose.

2 The latter it rules by command, as a Lord ouer his ser­vant, without relent in the one, or reluctance in the other.

The tenents of the will are 2.

1 It affectes nothing, but what the vnderstanding hath weighed first and contrarily the Vnderstanding conceits no­thing, but the will perswades; their offices are joynt and mu­tuall.

2 It cannot be constrained being of greatest freedom and liberty: Though we haue not freedome of will, to come from worse to better, in matters of grace, yet in matters ciuill we haue, sith it comes from a common motion of goodnes con­ceiued by the practicke Vnderstanding.

XXVIII. The Former causes of Ʋertue.

TO examine this we enquire what is the

  • 1 Nature.
  • 2 Properties.
  • 3 Seuerall kindes of Vertue.

1 Its nature is to moderate the passionate part of the Soule, It is tearmed by Plutarch, A disposition of the vnderstanding part, according to Reason.

This reason either

  • 1 Rules the passionate parte, so tearmed vertue.
  • 2 Yeilds vnto it: so it nurces vp vice.

Defin. Habitus.Aristotle defines it thus.

1 It is not connaturall, but bred by custom, thence termed Habit.

2 Of Habits some

  • 1 Inforciue as the vnderstanding, that com­pelles vs to assent vnto an evident truth.
  • Praelectivus
    3 On choyce, and praelection, and such a one Vertue is.

In medio consisten.3 Praelection and choyce may be of things vtterly nought, as when 2 evills stand compared, and in competition, but the choyce of vertue must rely on the meane for his Center: [Page 64] whereas evills spread to the extreames, and multiply degrees: Goodnes acknoledges one only point of perfection, The golden mediocrity.

Mediocrity changes according to circum­stance of

  • 1 Time.
  • 2 Place.
  • 3 Person.

if it were set, and defini­tiuely one.

It were vertue for all to vse it alike, but the begger may not be liberall of his purse, though a king may; And Milo the wrastler may eate large meales, when the weakeling taking the same proportion may be termed riotous: The spitle of a man to a man is wholsome, but to a Serpent death: and what is vertuous to one, may proue a vice to a nother. This Medi­ocrity is to bee ruled by Iudgement of each circumstance, which prudence must praescribe.

Directions how we shall attaine the meane.

1 Of the 2. Extreames see which is most opposite to vertue, and avoyd it.

2 Sift out the vice, our nature is most prone to, and labour to avoyd it, by taking the other extreame: As a man being giuen to be prodigall let him labour to be couetous. Ab ex­tremo ad extremum non pervenitur nisi per medium. So wee straighten stickes by bending them as much the contrary way, as they are bent the other way.

3 Resolue to resist bodi [...]y pleasures, and embrace them of the minde. 2 The properties, and notes of vertue.

1 No morrall vertue, but is placed between 2 vices.

  • 1 The Excesse to be depressed:
  • 2 Defect to be raysed.

2 Its ever in action, and the action must be with 3. conditions

  • 1 Knowledge. Scientèr.
  • 2 Perseuerance. Constantèr.
  • 3 Willingnes. Volentèr.

3 Delight in goodnes is a signe of the vertue gotten.

— Sorrow argues, we do it unwillingly.

4 Vertue is conversant espe­cially about the Moderating of sith these are the grounds and ends of all the rest.

  • Greifes.
  • Pleasure.

5 It is exercised about the highest, and hardest imploy­ments.

[Page 65]6 It is amiable to all men, even to strangers, and enimies.

The grounds of vertue 3.

  • 1 Religion towards God.
  • 2 Charity to our neighbours.
  • 3 Cherishing our selues according to reason.

The comprehension of all vertue is vniversall Iustice: by it we yeild our duty to

  • God.
  • Neighbours.
  • our selues.

XXIX. The Seuerall Kindes of vertues.

VErtues are either

  • 1 common to all.
  • 2 Speciall to some persons.

1 The common are requisite to all, though perhaps few haue them.

They are either

  • 1 Proper, or full vertues
  • 2 Improper or halfe vertues.

1 Full Vertues are directed either

  • 1 To our priuate good only.
  • 2 To the good of others.

1 Our priuate good is gotten by the gouernance of 2 passions

  • 1 Desire.
  • 2 Feare.

1 Our desire is of things

  • Naturall.
  • Adv [...]ntitious.

1 Naturall

  • Of nourishment: The vertue that tempers this is Sobriety.
  • Of Venery: the vertue, that allaies this is Chastity,

The conjoyning of both is called Temperance.

2 Goods ad­ventitious, as of

  • Wealth; the Vertue for this is content.
  • Honour; the Vertue for this modesty, or a decent competition, of what we deserue.

3. Our feare is allayed by Fortitude.

2 Vertues directed to the good of others are.

1 Iustice of

  • Exchange.
  • Distribution.

[Page 66]2 Bestowing of guifts for the

  • Greate ones, termed Magnificence.
  • Smaller sort, Liberality.

3 Courtesy, and pleasantnes of Conversation.

2 The halfe and im­perfect vertues are

  • 1 Veracity, or a habit of telling truth
  • 2 Grace of carriage.
  • 3 Aemulation.
  • 4 Continence.
  • 5 Patience.

2 The vertue speciall to some persons is the Heroicall spirit, which cannot be incident to all, but only to the highest, and best perfections.

XXX. Of Temperance.

THis con­taines

  • 1 Sobriety touching
    • Meats
    • Drinks
    both these haue their
    • 1 Propertys.
    • 2 Effects.
  • 2 Chastity, tamer of lustes.

The propertys of Temperance.

1 With moderation to desire absent delights, and to vse them present honestly.

2 To affect only such as are lawfull, and honest.

3 For attaining, or inioying them to doe nothing, that may prejudice

  • 1 Health.
  • 2 Credit.
  • 3 Priuate Estate.

The effects of Temperance

  • 1 Soundnes of body.
  • 2 Strength of vnderstanding.
  • 3 Promptnes of both acquiring, and exer­cising all other vertues.
Excesse. Meane. Defecte.
Intemperance that vnbridles our appetites, and giues the onset to all kind of vice. Temperance Stupidity, the vtter refusall of all naturall necessary de­lights; a fault so seldome, that the Ancients could invent, no name for it.
[Page 67]Aut Deus est, aut Truncus iners, qui nescit amare.
Excesse Sobriety Defect.
In
  • Meates, Glutony.
  • Drinkes, Drunkenesse
 meane. Overmuch abstinence from necessary
  • Meates
  • Drinkes

Castitas

  • 1 Caelibatus
  • 2 Coniugij.

Of Chastity.

Chastity is the containing of bodily lust to the vnmarried moderateing of them to the married.

It is in

  • Mind.
  • Body.

The breach of it is not from the act only, but from the thought and affection of defiling.

The Integrity of mind and body is termed Virginity, the Quee [...]e of Vertues. If we abstaine in body but with relu­ctance of mind, it is termed Containing, A vertue Ciuill, sith law cannot take hold of vs, but not full Morall.

Excesse. Meane Defect.
Vnchastity in
  • 1 Words.
  • 2 Gesture.
  • 3 Actions.
  • 4 Thoughts
 Chastity

1 Defrauding our bo­dys of pleasurs lawful: This is vicious.

2 In none, but the married, which must not defraud one an­other.

It effecteth 3 things

  • 1 Diseases to the body.
  • 2 Deformities.
  • 3 Corruption to the mind.

XXXI. Of Content.

THis vertue moderates the desire of wealth.

There are [...]. parts of it

  • 1 A gratefull acceptance of our present estate
  • 2 Barring desires of more, then benefits our vse.

The propertyes of it are.

1 It breeds quietnes, and Tranquillity of minde.

2 It cannot be incident to fooles, and ambitious men.

3 It is a token of a good nature, and wise discretion to know sufficiency.

4 It is the truest riches; whereas the inioying of the greatest possessions with desire to get more, is the truest Pouerty.

5 It ventures not wealth in rash mispending, but keeps what is gotten with out feare, till occasion, and vse force him to spend.

Excesse Meane Defect
Covetousnes, whose effects are 2.
  • 1 A desire of gaine.
  • 2 It perswades vs to all vice for the attaining it.
 [...]

Neglect of our state tem­porall.

The effects hereof are 2.
  • 1 Idlenes in our Voca­tion.
  • 2 Extremity of Want.

XXXII. Modesty, and Magnanimity.

BOth these are conuersant about honour: The ground of them is desert.

Their proprietys. 3.

1 To sue for honour deserued.

2 To accept it offered.

3 To stand for his place, when his honour is deseruedly yeilded to him.

Their difference.

Modesty is of lower, and lesse honour, as our desert is low­er, and of lesse things.

Magnanimity is for the most generous hart, to desire the best, as his vertue is in supereminency aboue others.

Modesty hath these rules.

1 It argues, that both our selues and others haue fit appro­bation of our vertue.

[Page 69]2 It is resolute against carpers, and wrongfull imputers.

3 It is humble in not acquiring further, then shall benefit vs.

4 It shews it selfe in

  • Words
  • Gestures

either for the

  • Wishing what we de­serue.
  • Refusall of what we deserue not.
Excesse Meane Defect.
Ambition hatched by pre­sumption modesty Ouer-seruilenes cal'd [...]. It a­riseth from Ignorance of our owne worth, not daring to shew our selues in the world.

XXXIII Of Magnanimity.

MAgnanimity is for the highest perfectiō. It aymes at the best honour, so (Whereas Honour is the repute of the Multitude) the perfection of it is greatst, when that repute is most transcendent and generall. Thence the person truely magnanimous must haue the whole fardle of vertues, that he may benefit all, that speake well of him, and hurt none to avoyd Ignominie.

The Adjunct of Magnanimity must be the highest place, and office.

The Rules are. 8.

1 The person haueing it counteth his honour receiued due vnto him both for others good, and his owne desert.

2 He cares not for common censures.

3 He rather giues then takes rewards.

4 He remembers not Injuries.

5 He is plyable to all sorts of persons, with satisfaction to them, and credit to himselfe.

6 He admires not others

  • Words,
  • Deeds,

sith he him­selfe on

  • Pleasure
  • Occasion

is able to doe the like.

7 He is sparing in censuring others, yet liuing.

[Page 70]8 He puts not himselfe vpon voluntary dangers, yet vnder­goes the vtmost, if it be put on him.

Excesse Meane Defect
Pride Magnanimity Pusillanimity, or vnfit, di­jection called [...]

Pride is in

  • 1 Vaunting our owne parts.
  • 2 Suffering others to attribute more to vs then we deserue.

It ariseth from philauty.

It betrayes it selfe in

  • Words.
  • Gesture.
  • Apparell.

It hath these tenents. 5.

1 A proud man admireth none but himselfe.

2 The way to abate him is to let him know, that wee scorne him.

3 He is vniust, as attributing all to himselfe, and derogating from others.

4 It is most inclining, and most dangerous in falling.

5 It is hatefull in all, but detestable in poore folke.

Pusillanimity doth vndervalue our worth.

The rules of it are. 4.

1 It is ingratitude towards God to receiue guifts, and by our reservednes to lessen them.

2 It makes other jealous of our parts, when we our selues distrust them.

3 It is the mother of Idlenes.

4. It defrauds other, that may get by vs.

XXXIIII Of Fortitude.

THe Passions that exer­cise this vertue are

  • 1 Care to be raysed.
  • 2 Boldnes to be repressed.

It is the Indu­rance of Euill for

  • Honour
  • Honesty

sake

Evills are

  • Internall from ourselues, as Vices.
  • Externall, as dangers falling from without vs.

1 The internall the most valiant ought to dread: his feare must be to nothing but sinne.

2 The eter­nall are

  • 1 Extraor­dinary as
    • Prodigies.
    • Strange
      • Lightnings
      • Thunders &c.
      from God
  • 2 Ordinary, and befalling in common.

1 The former none contemne, but

  • Atheists.
  • Fooles.
  • Madmen.

2 The valiant mans vertue is only in contemning the latter.

2. euills ordinarie are

  • 1 Generall to all as, Death &c.
  • 2 Especiall, to some as
    • Exile.
    • Diseases.
    • Misfortūes.

Death is the principall object of fortitude, sith 'tis the most terrible of all other evills.

1 As barring vs from the exercise of all morall vertues: the vpshot of all goods.

2 As bereauing vs of all temporall commodities, the objects of our delights in this world.

All death is not properly the object of fortitude, but the most honourable, as dying in warre.

1 Sith it is with highest honour.

2 With most good to the publicke wealth.

The effects of fortitud are 3.

1 To triumph ouer our enimies.

2 To keepe our owne state quiet from the wrong of o­thers.

3 To assure vs in extremityes.

—Aut cita mors venit, aut victoria laeta.

The Incourages of this vertue are 5.

1 Words of cheering from the honourable, and wiser sort.

2 Examples of others shewing their words by their deeds.

[Page 72]3 Excercise in skirmish.

4 Hope of reward; if not of spoyle, yet of Glory.

5 The Enimies weakenesse, and vnprovision.

The Tenents of Fortitude are 3.

1 The danger that it vndergoes must haue 3. conditions.

  • 1 They must be honourably vndertaken; not on sud­daine passion, or resolution.
  • 2 They must be in shew, that they may be commen­ded by the weale publicke.
  • 3 They must not bee for priuate respects, but for publike.

2 The Valorous must not be stockish but haue some feeling of wounds, yet voluntary he endures them for his ends sake.

3 It is not lawfull for him to kill himselfe, sith he doth it for avoydance of further euill, which is cowardize, nam ‘—Timidi est optare necem, Ovid metam.’

5 sorts of men seeme to haue fortitude, yet haue not.

1 They that vnder­goe dangers only

  • on hope of reward for feare of punishment.
    • As pressed Souldiers.

2 They that warre only, because they haue had experience in the warre, and cannot shew their skill otherwise.

3 They that run to skirmish in hot blood.

4 They that ouercame often, and for hope of like successe venture more,

5 They, that weigh not the extent of the danger, they are soone resolute.

Excesse Meane Defect.
Rashnes of venturing this grounds most on the passion of boldnes. Fortitude Cowardize. This grounds most on the Passion of feare.

XXXV. Of Iustice.

IVstice is the mother, and foundresse of other Vertues: it [...] in every constitution of state

  • Publike.
  • Private,

It is grounded in proportion and valuing.

It is either

  • Vniversall comprehending all vertues.
  • Particular for some especiall
    • State,
    • Person.

1 Vniversall 2. parts

  • Discretion to yeild each his due.
  • Obedience to the law.

The lawes are either

  • Written, [...].
  • Vnwritten, [...].

1 The written are the positiue lawes of the land grounded on the

  • Law of
    • Nature.
    • Nation.
  • Customes of places.

and they are

  • Publicke.
  • Priuate.

1 Publicke

  • Endicted by the whole state, as Statutes.
  • Proceeding from the King alone, as edicts, and Proclamations.

2 Private is for speciall contract; as leases, bonds, deedes, and all which haue force of law.

2 The not-written is the law of

  • Nature.
  • Nations.

The precepts of this Iustice are, viz.

  • 1 Liue honestly.
  • 2 Wronge none.
  • 3 Yeild every man his right.

2 Particular Iustice is.

  • Distributiue designe­ing to each man
    • Office
    • Rewards,
    • Punishments
    accor­ding to desert.
  • 2 Commutatiue in matter of exchange, and bargaine betweene man and man.

The breach of the

  • Former is fauour, an acception of persons, [...].
  • Latter, deceipt.

4 things prevent both kinds of Iustice

  • 1 Loue of mony.
  • 2 Fauour to the person.
  • 3 Feare to displease great ones.
  • 4 Rancor, and malice.

Iustice of distribution considers 2 things.

  • Reward for the person deseruing.
  • Punishment for the person offending.

The objects of it are either

  • Honour to the good.
  • Reward to the good.
  • Chastening to the bad.

Its tenent is.

It is not positiue but varies according to the quality of the person: As in any army all must haue their pay, but the cap­taine more then the common Souldier: And it were injustice to make them equall in reward, that are vnequall in desert. The like in punishments.

Excesse Meane Defect.
Injustice in dispensing to vs aboue our desert Iustice Injustice in yeilding vs lesse then our desert.

Both are tearmed Injury.

The excesse is Injury to others, and robbing them of their due, and bestowing on vs that deserue it not.

The defect is Injurie to our selues sith others can haue, and wee not.

The Rule of Injury is.

1 That it is suffered still with repining and vnwillingnes: thence a man cannot doe himselfe Injury, sith as he receiues the wrong, he is repining, and as he offers it, he is voluntary: And we cannot will and nill at one time the same thinge.

Iustice of Exchange respecteth not the quality of the per­son but the worth of the thinge: It is principally in buying and selling and in all matters of contract.

This differs from the other, for this goes vpon quality (so much for somuch) that not: They are in trades, thus is Mer­chandize, the meane is mony.

In ancient time they vsed to giue wares for wares: after­wards they gaue Metals by weight for them. Now for more Convenience of portage they haue invented mony, to wit, metall in stampe and by it they exchange commodities.

The extreame in generall is vniust exchange.

Excesse Meane Defect,
When we sell for more then its worth Iustice com­mutatiue when wee sell for lesse then it is worth.

In the former we wronge the buyer, and it is the greater fault; In the latter we wrong our selues, and it is more tolera­ble, sith our selues are the cause of it.

The meane rule for this Injustice is.

1 He is more in fault, that doth the wrong, then he that takes it, It was Socrates his saying. Aul. Gell Noct. Att. l. 2. c. 9

XXXVI Of Liberality, and Magnificence.

THe act of this Vertue is releiuing others wants, without prejudice to our owne.

Their dif­ference is

  • Liberality is for lesse guifts.
  • Magnificence is for greater.

The Object of both is mony or mony-worth.

Liberality is of lower abilityes.

In it are considered 2. Conditions

  • End.
  • Manner.

of giuing.

The end only is to benefit others in honest sort.

They that giue

  • 1 To receiue
    • Like
    • Greater
    profit
  • 2 Vpon ostentation.
  • 3 On long importuning and suite.

are not counted liberall

The manner of giving is bounded circumstances

  • 1 Who the
    • giver,
    • receiuer,
    is.
  • 2 The time that the guift ought to come.
  • 3 The place where:
  • 4 The quality of it.
  • 5 The quantity of it.

1 The Person must be

  • Freehearted to any.
  • Wise to bestow on the worthiest.

[Page 76]1 Though the receiuer be lewd, yet, if he be in pouerty, his pouerty makes him worthy of releife.

2 The time must be without pause. Bis dat, qui cito dat.

3 The place must be considered of

  • 1 If we giue only for honesty sake, take a publike place, that others may witnesse it, sith fame is the Trumpet of Vertue.
  • 2 If for pouerty and Almes blow no trumpet; a place of most priuacy makes the guift most acceptable, Vbicun{que} est homo ibi benificio locus est. Seneca.

4 The quality must be such, that it be not to the hurt of the receiuer: it must rather be for profit, then for pleasure.

5 The quantity with modera­tion betweene either

  • Too much.
  • Too litle.

drawne from consideration of the want of the receiuer, pre­sent vse of the giuer, that by giuing he not disfurnisheth him­selfe for his owne imployments.

Excesse Meane Defect.
Prodigality in wasting a mans priuate estate Liberality Avarice, or Niggardize: this is willing to receiue all, giue not.

Avarice is worse then Prodigality.

1 It is further remoued from liberality, whose acte is in giuing, sith the niggard giues nothing and the prodigall giues too much.

2 The niggard defraudes both himselfe and others: The pro­digall harmes himselfe only, and benefits others.

Magnificence is a Vertue only for great ones.

The Magnificent must be high aboue others in

  • 1 Blood,
  • 2 Office,
  • 3 Vertue.
Excesse Meane Defect.

Riotous mispending.

The

  • End of it ostentatiō
  • Cause
    • 1 Folly.
    • 2 Neglect of our private estate.
 Magni­ficence Sordide Parsimony fear­ing to spend when
  • Honour
  • Necessity
require

XXXVII. Of courtesy and Vrbanity.

THis vertue shewes it selfe in

  • Serious
  • Sporting

Conversation.

The acte of it is pleasure, and plyablenes of behauiour.

The End of it to

  • please others.
  • Demerit their good opinion.

It hath 2 parts

  • Easines of Accesse.
  • Slownesse to take offence.

The sterne to guide it is Gravity, least our affability turne to lightnes.

It was sayd of Cato Maior: Erat in illo viro comitate con­dita grauitas.

The rules of it are 3.

1 It is most honourable in high persons.

2 It is Varied according to the circumstance of

  • Time.
  • Place.
  • Person.

3 It intends our

  • Owne Honesty.
  • Anothers profit.

For courtesy in serious matters the extreames are.

Excesse Meane Defect.

1 Popularity in great ones.

2 Soothing in the low­er ranke.

 Comitie Morosity, as seeking neither to please any in honest causes, nor be displeased by any.

Affability in sports is called vrbanity for

  • Taking
  • Giuing

jests.

Excesse Meane Defect.
Securrility for abuse Vrbanity Rusticity making not able to giue, not Willing to take jests.

XXXVIII. Of Grace of Carriage.

THis vertue makes not a man

  • Reall for honesty.
  • But complementall.

Its rules are

  • Generall
  • Speciall

for fashion.

1 Generall. 7.

1 Goe cleanly in apparrell.

2 Keepe our body from loathsomnes.

3 Haue a fit com­posure of

  • Gesture, especially for
    • Head.
    • Hands.
  • Gate, and all with out affectation, and nicenes.

4 Haue conuenience of speech for

  • Fitnes of words.
  • Discretion of reply.
  • Moderation of sound; that it be not.
    • Over-loud.
    • Affected.
    • Harsh.

5 Barre insolent

  • 1 Gesture.
  • 2 Shrickes in [...]ughter; let not that be often, but as occasion is offered: and that not so much ap­prehended by vs, as the company also.

6 Vse due reuerence to our betters, obseruance to strangers, pleasure to our Acquaintance, Courtesy to our inferiors.

7 Take meate and drinke mannerly.

Speciall rules are had from consideration of each

  • Person.
  • Degree.
  • Quality.

Persons differ in

  • 1 Sexe 2 yeares.
  • 3 Manners 4 Fortune.

Towards all our Carriage must be honest and pleasing.

1 Honest pleasure is made by

  • Speech.
  • Gesture.

[Page 79]1 Twixt difference of sexe this be­hauiour is requisite: women must be

  • Little speakers not forward for action.

Men must take vp the talke.

Their talke must be serious of

  • Learning.
  • Not things sorrowfull, but of mirth, and obvious passages.

Their gesture is learned by dancing.

2 Difference of yeares is either in, sc.

  • Youth.
  • Midle Age.
  • Old Age.

Wayes to be gracefull with younge.

1 They are soone angry: Crosse them not in

  • Word
  • Deed

to rayse passion in them

2 Enquire not of his faults: If a friend, tell him in priuate, if a stranger, he scorneth thy rebuke.

3 Tell them of good hopes, and great adventures. Yong men are credulous and confident: and if you perswade them to the hope of a good, they will love you for it.

4 Our speech must rather be of pleasure, then profit.

5 Bee merry and jesting, and seeme to like of their com­pany.

3 To be gracefull with old men 5 wayes.

1 Be not resolute in tenents discoursing with them: they are soone testy, if they be croste, and loue rather a yong man doubtfull in controversies, then ouer-holding; sith they know the hardnes of finding out a truth, and the earnestnes of youth in holding a possible falshood.

2 They are suspicious, wee may not grow in too fast with them, or force into their company.

3 Our speech must rather be of profit, then honesty, since they are generally couetous.

4 Shew reuerence to age, not for fashion, but as spying some sparkes of authority in their persons.

5 They are talkatiue, feed them with speech, but rather se­cond them in their conceits, then to sift them from contradi­ctions, take heed of often replyes, they must rather be forced by Question, then they proceed voluntarily.

To aske them questions, saue only of things necessary, and pertaining to themselues is against good manners.

The midle aged keepe an indifferent tenour betwixt both

  • Yong.
  • Old.

Our way to be gracefull with them is to keepe the middle straine for

  • Honesty, which likes yong men.
  • Profit, which likes old men.

Difference of manners is seene according to the difference of passions and the way to behaue our selues in such a case is from the observance of his

  • Passion.
  • Age.

which haue bin for­merly described.

Difference of fortune is seene in

  • Nobility of birth.
  • Height of office.
  • Riches.

Our beha­viour to these must be

  • Yeilding in word,
  • Submission in body
  • Assigning titles,
    • this is most honest for vs.
    • Pleasing for the [...].

XXXIX. Of Aemulation.

AEMulation stirs vs vp to Vertue and heartens vs to Imitation.

The object of it is a good quality in others and at­taineable by vs.

It is with greife, that others haue out-stript, and with hope of over-taking them.

It differs from Envy; sith that is in the worst; this in the best natures: Licurgus in Sparta commended it to youth, naming it the nurse of Vertues.

In it selfe it is profitable, but in excesse rayses

  • Hate.
  • Envy.

The parties most giuen to it are,

1 Yonge men, sith they are euer in rising.

[Page 81]2 They, who haue equality of

  • Trades.
  • Professions.
  • Abilitys.

as the Roman aemulates the Athenian the scholler, the Carthaginian the Merchant, &c.

3 They, who count themselues of worth, and hope to at­taine to as much perfection as another.

Excesse Meane Defect.
Indignation for anothers ri­sing. Aemulation Abjection of mind, as not weighing, whether wee bee out stript or noe.

XL. Of Continency.

THis is conversant a­bout the restraint of

  • Desires
  • Pleasures

especi­ally of

  • Nourishment.
  • Venery.

The difference betweene a continent and temperate man is: The temperate hath his passion of desire subdued within The continent not without foyle and reluctance; passion dwelling within like a dangerous Citizen: though stopt from rising, yet euer feared.

Hence Continency is not properly a vertue, sith passion is not brought to consent with reason: And incontinence is not properly a Vice, sith it doth that fact, but in Iudgement con­demnes it.

The Intemperate doth it, [...]nd approues i [...], sith his

  • Will is corrupted
  • Iudgment is blinded.

The opposite of Continence is Incontinence:

The Incontinent before the act hath knowl [...]dge of what is right and fit to be done: in the Act he is carried by Passion, which blinds him that hee cannot applye that knowledge: After the Act he remembers the fault; and begins to repent.

He falls into this vice by

  • Heedlesnes, as not willing to forecast his dan­ger,
  • Infirmity, [...]s not able to resist his Passion.

Falls from infirmity are lesse curable, then falls of headines, sith the one comes from a debility of nature; the other but from an heat of Passion.

XLI. Of Patience.

THis differs from Fortitude, as Continence from Tempe­rance: The Act of it is bearing of harmes, but with greife, and trouble of mind.

Hence it is noe perfect Vertue, sith vertue must be

  • with Ioy.
  • Voluntary.
Excesse Meane Defect.
Stockish obduration: The Spartans vsed their children to it in beating them, yet not suffering them to lament. Patience Impatience: A womanish yeild­ing to vnavoyda­ble Evills.

XLII. Of the Heroicall Spirit.

THis riseth a degree of Eminence aboue the rest.

It differs from other vertues as heate from Warmth.

It extends it selfe to a 3 fold eminence

  • Of vnderstanding: so that famous lawgi­vers and speciall sages are Heroicall.
  • Of Grace; so Excellence of faith is Hero­icall. Of Morall behauiour.

It is grounded on a

  • Stronge composure, & temperature of Body.
  • Stronge composure of mind.

It is set forth by 3 helpes

  • Many abilities for Action.
  • Constancy of continuance.
  • Prosperousnes of Successe.

The opposite of it is Sauagenes, A generall falling from all good duty without Iudgement to know, or will to wish the contrary.

These are the Catalogues of vertue. Vertue tempers Passion.

Passion gets his meane from Wit, and Will. And these in­tend for their felicity.

Detur in offensae vitae mihi tangere metam.
Finis. Anno Domini: 1624. 9o Decembri [...]

Jndex.

  • 1 VVHat Ethickes is?
  • 2 Of the particular end of Ethickes.
  • 3 Of vniuersall ends thereof,
  • 4 Temporall happines.
  • 5 Things required to Tempo­rall Happines.
  • 6 Stoickes tenent of Happines.
  • 7 Of Passions in generall.
  • 8 The divisions and number of Passions.
  • 9 Of Loue the first Passion.
  • 10 Of Desire the 2d Passion.
  • 11 Of Hope the 3d Passion.
  • 12 Of Boldnes the 4th Passion.
  • 13 Of Pleasure the 5th Passion.
  • 14 Of Hate and detesting.
  • 15 Of Despaire and Feare.
  • 16 Of Greife.
  • 17 Of Shamefastnesse.
  • 18 Of Repentance.
  • 19 Of Pitty.
  • 20 Of Zeale and Iealousy.
  • 21 Of Anger.
  • 22 Of Maligning:
  • 23 The efficient cause of Vertue
  • 24 Of Conscience,
  • 25 Of Consultation,
  • 26 Of Prudence:
  • 27 Of the Will:
  • 28 The Formall causes of Ver­tue.
  • 29 The Severall kindes of Ver­tue.
  • 30 Of Temperance.
  • 31 Of content,
  • 32 Of Modesty,
  • 33 Of Magnanimity,
  • 34 Of Fortitude,
  • 35 Of Iustice.
  • 36 Of Liberallity and Mag­nificence,
  • 37 Of Courtesy and vrbanity,
  • 38 Of the grace of Carriage,
  • 39 Of Emulation,
  • 40 Of Continency.
  • 41 Of Patience,
  • 42 Of the Heroicall spirit,
FINIS.

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