THe subject of the ensuing Dis­course is of that excellency and importance, that it deserves our diligence in the enquiring into the nature of it; it is the great Mistery of Friendship which contains in it things wor­thy, weighty and exceeding ne­cessary both for the pleasure of the sensitive and rational appetite: men are tired in the chase of satisfaction from one thing to another, still pur­suing those shadows that cannot be brought nea­rer, and the reason is, that in the humane nature there is an intense and continual desire of plea­sure, without which life it self hath no satisfacti­on; for life consisting in the operations of the soul, either the external of the senses, or the internal of the minde, it is sweetned by those delights that are suitable to them: the subject I am upon [Page 2] bids fairest for a temporal satisfaction; as ha­ving in it self those excellent accomplishments which are the intermedial steps by which we climb and get within reach of it: Philosophers in their vast enquiries into natural things were ne­ver so busie wholly to decline this moral concern, and in the conclusion when they made up their experiments, they never reckoned those they found in the way of friendshp inferior or less considerable then those that were bound up in na­tural causes; for beside the conveniency they finde in this relation for the use and improve­ments of their natural acquirements, they arrive at more true and solid contentment: men in tra­cing effects to their causes, as they finde pleasure, so they finde labour, and many disappointments, their knowledge not seldome proving the fruit of anxious enquiries, which mightily abates their content, and often they take up with little things they finde in their way, while they still remain short of the end they designe; but Friendship, as it hath not such cragged and obscure ways, so it hath more certain and direct ends: men do not in this concern like foolish Chymists, who melt a great part of their estate in vain in expectation of the great Elixir, such have riches and treasures in notion and fancy, little in possession; but it is quite contrary here; Friends have least in notion, most in possession; when they attain this generous state, they finde a reall enjoyment of what they thirsted after; we do not value things only for their intrinsick beauty, but that which raiseth the value, is the accomodation they have in them to [Page 3] our satisfaction, that is the more desirable part: now as there is nothing in all the creation so good as man, so there is nothing so suitable to the na­ture of man, as man himself; and that is the rea­son ingenious men finde so much content among themselves; and this cannot but advance their content exceedingly, the symmetry and propor­tion men have in their natures and dispositions is the greatest content: satisfaction is derived from similitude, if this be wanting, however things may appear, they are really unpleasant and un­grateful; like a garment that is too loose, or too straight, however it may please and humour pride, it will not content the person, because it wants proportion to that part to which it was as­signed. Friends act [...] many parts in this relation, and all tend to profit and the pleasure of each o­ther; sometimes they act high, and then they ad­vance the pleasure of the minde by communicat­ing knowledge and experience superiour and consonant to the intelligent nature, other times they act so as to gratify sences, which is both ne­cessary and convenient, if a due observation and subordination be allowed to the rational facul­ties, and so equal satisfaction according to the several objects is obtained: these and many other inviting properties you will find in this concern, if you please to enter with me into the nature of it. But some persons are averse to all vertue, and consequently to this concern, others through inadvertency wave and neglect the pursuit of it from a supposed incapacity in themselves, or the difficulty that lies in their way to the obtain­ing [Page 4] of it; this proceeds either from ignorance and unacquantance with this concern, or from a care­less and unconcerned temper; the first should ra­ther animate, and quicken then obstruct and im­pede, because nothing is more incident to the na­ture of men, then to prize those things most that are scarce and rare, those of an easie and cheap descent bege [...] contempt: Friendship is not less considerable, because it is like the sun in its clear­ness, which though less approachable is most glorious; others they cannot admit of any diversi­on from their secular affairs, so as to study this concern, they like the notion of it, and will commend it, but it is at a distance, according to the outward lustre not inward beauty, they fancy it, like children that admire the glad­ning rays of the sun that shines in their faces, without the least consideration of the utility and excellency of it; if these would make a true estimate of this material concern, it would swallow up the vanity of those inferiour things in which men take such complacency, and so ele­vate them, that no unworthy or abject end should sway their more noble part, which is the soul, and so enlarge and sublimate their mindes, that nothing repugnant to its more direct dictates should be allowed: would we take a view of this concern, we may inform our selves by look­ing into the superiour schools and Academies, where we see men of all tempers, some masters of their reason, others mastered by sensuality; amongst the first we finde the most perfect friend­ship which seems to be made, not so much for [Page 5] pleasure as utility, profit being first in their eye, that this designe may not be looked upon as spe­culative only, & so be received with suspicion as things not common to vulgar capacities are, till some experiment be made of them: I shall en­deavour in a plain and familiar method to sub­mit the argument I am upon to every mans rea­son and experience: I shall not refer to remote Instances of this kinde, though I am not ignorant they would amplifie and illustrate the concern, but confine my self to my own Observation and Experience: And because a regular proceeding herein will be best understood, I shall cast what I have to say into this Method.

First, shew what Friendship is here meant, and the Import of it.

Secondly, The subjects fit for it both for num­ber and qualities.

Thirdly, What qualifications are necessary.

Fourthly, The great ends aimed at in that relation.

Fifthly, The pleasantness to be found in the state of Friendship.

Sixthly, How Friends are to govern them­selves in this relation of Friendship.

Seventhly, The Conclusion by way of com­mendation.

First, What Friendship is here meant comes first to be considered.

There are Four kindes of Friendship, and these all derive from different causes, and produce different effects.

First, There is a Christian Friendship.

Secondly, A common and universal Friend­ship.

Thirdly, A relative Friendship.

Fourthly, A morral Friendship.

First, Of the Christian Friendship: I shall not say any thing to this, but that it is the most ex­cellent, sweet and durable Friendship, and most to be ambitioned and desired.

Secondly, there is a common Friendship which we have with all the world as our fellow crea­tures, and this is more or less according to our interest in them, or their merit and desert; this is the measure of this Friendship; the rule that we go by is the benefit & advantage we expect, & the accomodation that it hath in it to our safe­ty and tranquillity, and other such like ends; or from charity which we are morally disposed to as rational creatures: Friendship take it how you will, is very desirable; consider it under this consideration as it is expatiated, or in a mo­ral sence where it is confined, in all respects it is eminent: this common Friendship is as gene­ral an advantage as the sun, for as the sun influ­ences and enlightens the world, so Friendship preserves a world for that light and influence: were it not for this binding and regulating con­cern, men like beasts would devour one another, every man naturally ambitioning rule and hating subjection: were it not for this confinement that hath an universal influence upon all persons and transactions, what tyranny would reign in the Courts of Princes? what rebellion among sub­jects? by this binding concern Princes are made [Page 7] almost unlimitable, and subjects most free: it is the undissembled affection of Princes upon which the freedom and happiness of the people are firmly planted: Friendship, is that which secures Families, otherwise all things would be in con­fusion there; Brethren like Cain would rise up one against another, and a mans enemies be them of his own house: besides this, the preju­dice would yer go higher, and all men must stand as in Nehemiahs time, with their weapons in one hand, and work in the other: since the progeny of Adam is encreased to a vast society and numerous issue, all manner of disasters, as Famine, Pestilence, Deluge, Fire, Wilde Beasts, have not been so destructive of man as man himself, which was occasioned by this want of Friendship.

Thlrdly, There is a Friendship among Relati­ons, as that between Father and son, Husband and Wife, and Brethren, these Relations make Friendships, and such as must not give place to any other; and this proceeds from natural prin­ciples, which obliges to duty and Obligations not to be violated; of which I shall speak more in another place.

Fourthly, There is a Frendship that is groun­ded purely upon moral Principles, and for distinction we call it a moral Friendship: here is no Obligation preceeding, as in that of relation, but every man is left to his free choice and electi­on, and is governed by prudential and moral swasion; a Father beside his own inclination is bound to love his son, the law of nature bindes [Page 8] him to it, and a son his Father in like manner; but no man is bound to love any person with a complacential love, nor can he do it, except such an one that he can finde upon prudent considerati­ons agreeable to his reason and fancy, these are the most proper and powerful motives to excite the affections: Friendship is equal in it self to all the world, and hath no difference, but is diffe­renced by accidents, and by the capacities or in­capacities of them that receive it; charity com­mands us not to be enemies to any, and reason and prudence directs us to be most friendly to them that are most useful and deserving: if we have reason to love many, we have much more reason to love some more then others; and if my affection be according to reason, I must love most where I see most reason: this moral friend­ship as it flows from the most generous principles so it produceth the most desirable effects; we may make an estimate of it by its causes and ef­fects, sor its causes it derives either from a na­tive candour and generofity of minde, or from a noble and ingenious education, or something jointly from both▪ these seem as good originals as any thing meerly moral can proceed from; and hence it is that we finde those of great minds and extraction most obliging; whereas those of ab­ject births and spirits are of a quite differing na­ture; ths first are governed by reason which is still the same, and will act equally and consonant to it self, excluding an arbitrary will; for he that doth things this moment because he will, may the next have as weighty arguments to do some [Page 9] contrary, and so spend his whole time in unravel­ling his spiders webs, still lying under the lash of the superiour faculties, which will be constantly following him with grating reflections, who re­sist its more direct admonitions, numerous are the effects that proceed▪ from this cause: I shall point at two or three briefly.

First, men are hereby made so like God, that no­thing can more assimilate man to God, love being a supream attribute of the unchangeable being, & prepares and enables us to a conformiry, to the Divine Law.

Secondly, Friendship calls home our wandring fancy, that haply may range after a thousand va­nities, which may allure the affections, but can never satissie them, and contracts them to objects that are solid and excellent: all men naturally af­pire after happiness, but few finde it, because they either mistake the way or the end; some place it in wisdom, some in honour, others in riches, taking up with something short of the great end; there is more satisfaction to be had in a faithful serious friend then in all sublunary things; nothing can reach our content, but that which can rationally engage the affections, and this cannot be done by riches, humane reason or pleasure: we may adde, the most binding rela­tions and the most powerful obligations that pleasure can invent, not any of these nor all to­gether can do it, and that because there is not worth enough in them to attract the heart and af­fections, nor weight enough in them to satisfie reason, nor power to lay any restraint upon ex­orbitant [Page 10] passions & unlimited fancies, but friend­ship can do all this: there is love to attract, no­thing so attractive as love it self: it comes always attended with the lucre of reward and pleasure: and hcreby it insinuates it self and lays constraints and limitations upon the person insensibly with­out force or violence, and so makes an absolute conquest.

Thirdly, Friendship is exemplary vertue, and carries in its front the clearest conviction of vice: Philosophers were of opinion that no true love could be amongst any but ingenious men: persons that are vicious cannot build their wood, hay and stubble upon so solid a foundati­on as that of friendship, yet this concern harh such credit with the worst of men, that it hath not wanted advocates among its greatest enemies, which though they have been never so vicious and industrious to defame vertue and condemn it as men do the light, because their weak eyes can­not receive the luster of it, yet they judge it most amicable, and they can bestow praises upon ver­tuous men, and commend the radency of that state they employ their utmost power to circumvent and destroy: they can as well hold a Lion in a twine thred as confine their unruly passions, and grasp the air as give check to one lust: these are the unhappy subjects of those skilful Artificers that vitiate men in their persons to corrupt their principles, and when all hopes of vertue is lost, they will easily be perswaded into all the infelici­ty of a contrary state: these are so deeply plun­ged in vice, that they are contented that the last [Page 11] should be raised upon the ruine of the first, and while they catch after the one with impetuous vi­olence, they can tamely endure the other to be vilifyed and despised: whereas virtuous men can view them in their hurry and maze, though with pity to them, with satisfaction to them­selves, while they with serenity and a calm minde can regulate their opinions, and confine a wandring fancy, and reduce things to their just value: and however this loose age, the dreg of times, may contemn things in themselves most deserving, magnifying an arbitrary will, and trampling upon all that oppose it, these look up­on their Trophees as miserable that is built upon vertue and honour; as a clear day befriends us with more distinct prospect of distant objects, so when there is quietness within, then we can look about us, and see what excellencys invite the reason and affection: when vain men as a just re­ward of their sensuality are clouded; and it is not seldom, that melancholy, that black passion overspreads the mind like an Egyptian darkness, admitting no allay, but hurrying men blinde­fold into their own ruine: Let none think this a scheme of discourse, since there is nothing more common then to see men vitiate their principles as well as their duties, and be worse then their nature inclines them to: many evils are commit­ted against the grain, and with violence to con­stitution: if the best sensuality be too trifling to maintain any proportion with vertue and ho­nour, how far wide must they needs be that stand in competition with vertue; those that have such [Page 12] degenerate wills as that they can exchange liber­ty for licentiousness, have lost their freedom, and are contracted to low and base objects: I would gladly vindicate vertue, and make it il­lustrious, it is my designe in this Discourse: there is but one way for the obtaining that end, and that is by making it as radiant as I can, that by the splendour of it mens eyes may be drawn off from worse objects; but some spirits are so dis-ingenious, that the most glorious rewards will not animate them, like brutes they are not concerned in all the happiness to be found above in the region of reason, but would relinquish or resigne any portion there, so they may secure and enjoy husks and draught: these prodigally spend their time and treasure upon such trifles that will reward them with poverty and vexati­on, the certain reward and portion of those that are not capable of more generous resentments; but it is time to take leave of this digression, and come to the point.

The next thing that comes under our conside­ration, is, what a Moral Friendship imports: It im­ports the closest union, the most generous con­tract, thc sweetest communion, the strongest re­solutions between persons that study nothing more then the satisfaction one of another in all things both divine and humane.

I purpose not to speak to every individual part of this Proposition, that would take up more time then I have designed for this undertaking, and swell this little Tract to a volume; as also beeause I shall occasionally take them all in the [Page 13] Discourse that sollows, I shall only at present explain my meaning in a general way, and so proceed: By Union I mean a union of hearts, which is most exeellent as to its original and ef­fects; it hath a higher cause, and derives from the most noble spring, and its consequents are proportionate: It is natural to every producti­on to bear symetry and proportion to that which produceth it; from this heart-union springs the most complacential communion and fellowship: Friendship is love and society mixt together, which make it most delightful in this sociable state; men do not only meet with useful diver­ [...]isements, the want of which is the great spring of mischief, but they finde ingenious advertise­ments consonant to the intelligent nature, toge­ther with an intire affection, which is the ax [...]s upon which this great concern turns, seconded with generosity its most constant and grateful at­tendant; as also a fixed resolution which makes the wheel, though always turning, never uncer­tain: By how much the more free any thing is, by so much the more lasting and durable fixed­ness twists all the other requisites; so that they binde more strongly; and this makes the union so [...]ntire, that friends have the same interest, the same choice, and in a sence they communicate and exchange properties, and there is but one soul between them: Friendship is a tree loaden with precious fruit, well rooted & never decaying, no warmth is at its root; it is not like Jonas's gourd that came up in a night, and perished in a night; Frendship thus fixed is unmoveable to all the ef­fects of contrary motives.

Thirdly, the subjects fit for this moral Friend­ship comes next to be considered, and we mus [...] consider them,

• 1. As to their Numbers.
• 2. Their Acquaintance.
• 3. Their Qualities.
• 4. Their Equality.

First, The number of persons; this must be heedfully regarded: Friendship strictly taken ac­cording to our method, excludes all persons a­bove two, more the Law calls riots, and lov [...] calls Rivals and Competitors, which cannot be allowed in this concern, but with hazard to the foundation, which is built on union & integrity ▪ besides the expectation of friends are so large and vast, that nothing but a full and ample possession is accounted any thing: I cannot divide my af­fection, and the heart remain intire, the hear [...] goes out in them, and necessarily is divided; and that is so diametrically contrary to the nature o [...] Friendship, that it is like the taking away of the Foundation, which draws the whole Fabrick af­ter it, or such a rent as must of necessity destroy the most essential props, after which it must ine­vitably moulder into its first nothing.

Secondly, persons fit for this concern are no [...] strangers, as those are not fit at all that are strangers and unknown, so they are most fit that are best known in their natures and dispositions, an [...] hereby many inconveniencies are avoided; firs [...] disappointments that are always cross but cruel in love: prudence directs us to treat with persons at a distance before we take them into ou [...] [Page 15] bosome, lest our ignorant occasions, our vexa­tion and trouble in case of disappointment, our hasty fixing upon some unequal object, as it in­snares the affection and betrays them, so it puts an undervalue upon the judgment: men that have made an unequal choice how many incon­veniencies do they draw upon themselves, some­times the head is distracted, and this is destru­ctive of their peace and tranquillity: the head is filled with troublesom notions and contrivances, how it may handsomely manage a breath in that friendship that can neither rationally be continu­ed nor credibly broken, that is a grating con­viction that discovers errours in those things to which the heart is nearly united; how to unite that knot that cannot be loosed without many a piece of self-denial is not easily learned, because it cannot be done without grief and trouble: a separation from them we dearly love is very hard, though never so good reason appears for it, passion being violent, wilfull and impetuous, easily seduced in the first choice, afterward hard­ly reclaimed: for as nothing is more easily sur­prised then the fancy, so nothing will be more hardly convinced of its errour.

Secondly, The lower appetite may be preju­diced by precipitancy, for the troubles of the minde hath a mighty influence upon the body, and they often torment one the other: the pains of the body proves no small detriment to the minde; sharp pains in the body so discomposeth the mind, that its made unfit for its high & noble operations, so that it cannot perform its acts with [Page 16] that delight and freedom: Philosophers took a great deal of care speedily to cure all distempers of the body, that no obstruction thereby might impede the pursuit of knowledge: As the calm­ness of the minde mightily prepares for every se­rious action, so perturbation hath a quite contra­ry effect, and so distracts the minde that it proves the greatest prejudice imaginable, because we often lose our reason in that croud which is the only expedient to prevail with us against any thing unnecessary or vexatious: This is a Max­im, that nothing serious can be done in haste; Friendship is a serious thing, and must be well weighed both in its substance and circumstances; These things are very material in order to a well-grounded friendship, that there be excellency in the minde, sweetness and affability in the disposi­tion, and reality in the affection; if we cannot be satisfied in all these, we can expect to arrive at no better end then disappointment; now to acquaint our selves with all these, will require no small diligence and observation, which will employ our most serious thoughts, and take up a considerable time: if a man be a servant to the meanest thing, upon which he placeth an inordi­nate affection, as indeed he is, then this should awaken all our powers to contemplate this con­cern; lest while we aim at pleasure we carelesly inslave our selves: It is not notion but experi­ence that fixeth content, as nothing can destroy our happiness but the experience of evil, so no­thing can establish our satisfaction but the expe­rience of good: there is as much deceit in men as [Page 17] there is in stones, men may insinuate themselves by specious pretences, yet gross deceivers; It is hard for a man that is blinded with pride or passi­on, or any other delusion, to understand himself; he is not seldom betrayed by himself, much less can he be understood by another: there are shin­ing men as well as shining stones, otherwise that proverb had never been, All is not gold that glisters; we know many a stone hath the Dia­mond cut and colour, yet but a counterfeit, and when we think we have a treasure, it proves but a trifle: many men that through rashness and in­consideration fix their affection before experi­ence had of the true value of the object, are plain­ly cheated, prodigally giving away their hearts without any assurance of sutable returns; and hence it comes to pass, that we see some frend­ship broken and shattered, and in a short time moulder and come to nothing; the Materials were deceitful; like a house that is slightly built, it appears strong and fair to the eye, but soon decays; the defect was in the foundation, which though least seen is most dangerous.

Thirdly, our too early fixing, as it insnareth the affection, so it condemns the judgment; ma­ny will think themselves concerned here, especi­ally the most vicious, that are curious in nothing but in praying into and searching after the fail­ings of others; such inquisitions being more na­tural & gratifying extravagant humours, who are most ready to censure what they least understand, and make causless exceptions, which if rightly argued, they cannot answer one of a thousand. Frendship may be envied, it cannot be condem­ned, [Page 18] while it remains pure and entire, yet upon the least failer it is liable to the greatest reproach and scorn: When Hushai Davids friend came to Absalom he was glad to see him, yet how ready doth he upbraid him, saying, Is this thy kindness to thy friend? Absalom was one of the worst of men, and the greatest traitor, but he hated trea­chery notwithstanding: few men so barbarous as to love deceit, hence that Proverb came, that men love the Treason but hate the Traitor.

The greatest ground of condemnation is drawn from this, especially our inconsiderateness in the first choice and election, where we ought to have been most curious and circumspect, and this is aggravated by two ungrateful circumstances: First, this seems to be a fundamental errour, and therefore most dangerous, and then it's obvious to vulgar inspection and observation; and this is a grating aggravation, and comes attended with exclamations, and often enforces a man to dis­semble a kindeness to a person he could never do upon any other account then this, that he might defend his judgement from censure, and the rela­tion of frendship from scorn and contempt; no­thing more contrary to an ingenious man then to own a kindeness for him that once deceived him, especially in so material a concern as that of frendship, where he expected the contrary; yet prudence will not suffer him to deny him pub­lickly: it's in this case as with him that hath bought a Jewell, which he thought most precious, but was cheated, that man will be ashamed to own the deceit, because thereby his ignorance is [Page 19] betrayed; and next to being deceived he hates to be upbraided; reputation is exposed to scandal in this case without remedy, which is equally dear to him as his life; what can he alledge, should he say, I thought my friend was worthy, amiable and sincerely affectionate, but I was mistaken, what a contemptible plea is this? as much as if he should say, I was a novice and knew not how to make a right choice, or I was careless and would not take the pains; if igno­rant, how can he be a compleat Judge? by what rule can he assigne errours on another when for ought he knows the fault is his own: nothing will sooner misleade then ignorance, if negligent worthy to suffer: To prevent this, be well ac­quainted with the person before you make this contract, prevention is better then cure, the more perfect knowledge a man hath of his friend, the greater is his love to his person, if he be wor­thy; then acquaint your self with the law of frendship, love hath law as well as duty, and indispensable obligations, which if thrown off make unhappy breaches: It is necessary that there should be a principle of reason and choice in that person that is governed by this law; first, to consider the reason that enjoyns, Secondly, to descern the import of the concern; Third­ly, how to determine it self out of judgement and choice to accept it as worthy in it self, and advantagious to the receiver: no external force can compel the will to choose any thing but un­der a notion of comparative goodness, as the in­feriour creatures are moved by the secret force of [Page 20] natural inclination, so rational creatures are wrought upon and insensibly drawn by moral en­gagements, as the foresight of rewards or threat­nings annexed invites them: Frendship cannot be without commands; if that be true, that the dispensing of benefits acquire to the giver a right to command, and lays on the receiver an obliga­tion to obey, and these rights and obligations are measured by the nature of the benefit as their just rule: This is a Maxim, that every rational man readily assents to, no commands so pleasing as those of love: no duty so easy; because as the com­mands are easie without restraint, so they are e­qual without violence and oppression, which sweetly obliges to Obedience.

Lastly, That we may be secured in so weighty a matter, and build the material concern upon firm bases, know this, that not only reason but religion is necessary as the most transcendant and pregnant argument to engage the will and affe­ctions, those that are learned in the work of righ­teousness are the most excellently qualified for this concern: I admit a Frendship may be made between persons meerly moral; where there may be equality there may be amity, but it cannot be so sure and safe as the Christian Frendship, one being founded in heaven the other on earth; so that there is as much difference between them as between heaven and earth, and as their originals are unequal, so their objects and operations are unequal; reason cannot bear equal pace with religion, though it may arise high in respect of sence, yet it is very low compared with faith; I [Page 21] grant, that religion connot make Frendship com­pleat except rational accomplishments and natu­ral requisites concur; as reason cannot convey grace, so religion cannot convey reason: many Idiots without question are pious, yet not in any case capable of Frendship, because there must be reason as well as religion to regulate things: that religion is not sufficient of it self to make Frendship, the case of Barnabas and Paul makes undeniable, who through dispute and difference did that which is against the nature of Frendship, they parted and probably never met again; we cannot think they were enemies, but certainly they were less friends; this must be granted, where the restraint in Frendship begins, there begins the imperfection of it; and without any question the moral Frendship was broken, only the Christian Frendship remained intire, we must needs run a mighty hazard in making alliances with persons impious: First, the devil will de­signe a breach, either by planting in us some di­viding principles, and afterward he will be as in­dustrious to draw out these principles into divi­ding practises: sometimes God himself will de­signe a breach, if God intend either party for himself, enmity will soon grow between them, there being a certain antipathy between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent: do not we see God curse the greatest comforts of the carnal men, and blast their fairest hopes, and nip their promising blossoms? but if there be truth in the inward parts, and piety bears the sway, the Frendship will be established: and because the [Page 22] best Frendships may sometimes want pleasure, but never trouble, we had need be careful that we have an interest in him that can turn our wa­ters of affliction into the wine of consolation.

I come now to the Fourth thing, namely, the equality that must be in the persons of friends previous to this concern: and here we shall first examine the perfections of the minde, and then those inferiour though necessary requisites to compleat this equality: the persons must have in them that which will do these things, satisfie reason in a competent measure, ravish and at­tract the affection, and preserve harmony and a­greement in all the transactions that relates to this concern: those that are untainted with prejudice, and by being so have their judgments clear and unbiassed, consider seriously the happiness of this concern: Frendship is not guided by humour and fancy which hath much more sway among the vulgar then judgment and reason, and that makes them so uncertain, they can shuffle passions, and hate next hour, what just now they adored; but it is a grave and deliberate act of the understand­ing and will, whereby we come to a right esti­mate of things; the rational faculties, which are the understanding and will, if rightly guided, are not to be slightly satisfied; outward blan­dishments will not do it, it must be something that is really good, as that which is so fubtilly dis­guised under an appearance of good, that it can­not be discovered: things being thus prefented to the will, it closeth with them by a free and unconstrained choice, and the affections are in­clined [Page 23] insensibly, vertue being the only ingrati­ating quality: for the better directing our inqui­sition, it will be requisite to enquire what those qualities are that are universally and indispensibly necessary, in order to the answering those great ends before-mentioned: I conceive these three things will fully do it. Eirst, worth and excel­lency in the minde, that will satisfie reason as to the choice of the object, that it is not base and abject but valuable: Secondly, courteous and affable conditions and inclinations, this will en­gage the affection: Thirdly, such an equality as will answer in every thing requisite in this mate­rial concern, and this will both create and pre­serve harmony and agreement in all transacti­ons, and is the beauty and comelinesse of Frend­ship; when there is an Uniformity observed in things, how splendidly do they appear? and the more excellent the things are in themselves, the more lovely they appear in uniformity: Frendship is not only to raise and inflame the heart with the love of the object in order to a sensual satisfaction, though that be necessary, because from thence the felicity of the animal life proceeds, but rather to improve the superiour faculties in order to a rational satisfaction, from whence the pleasure of the minde proceeds; now our judgement and reason is abundantly satisfied, when we finde in the object of our affections the habits and acts of reason; for as the princi­ples of reason inhances the value of the person, so the practises benefits others, not only as an exam­ple, though that be much, but as an improvement [Page 24] of our knowledge and experience.

First, we will consider reason in its superlative degree, as a King upon his throne, when reason keeps the throne, the will is right, and its im­pressions just and equal, so that the inferiour fa­culties are easily drawn to a subordination to its dictates and admonitions, and the affections are exercised with proportion to the quality of their objects, and reason is their inviolable rule, and love the supreme affection that gives being to all the rest, to hatred it self; for so much we hate a­ny thing as it stands between and impedes our enjoyment of what we love; the rational facul­ties hath objects that highly excels those of the sensitive, their capacities are more spatious, and their union with the object more close and inti­mate, their perception more clear, and thereby become the greatest instruments of pleasure to the intelligent nature: the highest faculties are the understanding and will, to which the desire of knowledge is most natural, and produceth the noblest and sweetest pleasure; and this according to the perfection and enjoyment of the object, proportionable to the degrees of excellency there is in any object, so much rational satisfaction accrues to the minde by the knowledge of it: Natural things greatly affect an intelligent man in his enquiring into their nature, I mean the works of God and his providential distributions, yet the excellencies they finde there are but dark and faint resemblances of the infinite & unchang­able perfection, the desire of knowledge both natural and moral is marvellous quick and ear­nest [Page 25] and in appearance, most worthy the rational nature, as being exceeding pleasant and delicious to the soul: the retirements of nature are not without those excellencies which invite the search of intelligent men, but the mistery of mo­rallity hath much more perfection in the nature of it, to animate and quicken our enquiries, and that because knowledge is attained here with less labour, more certainty, and with greater delight and pleasure; and the reason is, we get some steps nearer the original of all perfection; the Impressions of God are ingraven upon all his works, but so darkly, that many naturally wise men could hardly finde light enough in their na­tural lamps to discover the true nature and cha­racters of him: now morallity ascends much nea­rer, it is a prospect that makes clearer discove­ries, and hereby we ascend so near perfection, that we may discover much of the nature and ex­cellency of the unchangeable and glorious being, yet this is but a glimmering light, and a low per­fection comparatively, and will never reach hap­piness; there is a strong inclination in men to be happy, this desire is born and bred up with him, and it is the first and universal principle from whence all moral consequences are derived: this is the rule of our desire, and the end of our acti­ons: as in natural things the principle of their production operate according to their quality, so in moral things the end is as powerful to form the soul for its operations in order to it, there­fore as all desire to be happy, so they apply themselves to those means that hath a tendency to [Page 26] it: men frame happiness according to their tem­pers, and the apprehensions of it are proportio­nable to the condition of the persons: for happi­ness is the plesure that derives from the harmony and agreement that there is between the object and the appetite, that we may come to a more perfect knowledge of the supream being, and so consequently be more happy then any man, though never so richly accomplished can be any other way: we must close with religion to this capacity the beams of divine light are extended; it is not my designe so to magnifie humane reason as to neglect that knowledge that is divine, nor is it according to our method wholly to rest there; the great import of Frendship as was pro­mised was to study the happiness one of another in all things both divine and humane; it is true, there is a secret acknowledgment in every mans breast of a superiour power to whom he must give an account, this he hath by the light of na­ture, yet the clearness of the understanding i [...] lost notwithstanding; and that light that remains is eclipsed; those that are guided by this ligh [...] led by sense, fancy, and passion, they have no [...] motives that should raise them to higher things there is yet a clearer discovery to be made o [...] God, and that is the office of faith, which lift men up above the region of Reason, and so enlarges and sublimates the minde that it can ge [...] very near the infinite perfection; as reason i [...] greatly above sense, so faith is infinitely abov [...] reason: if we consider its original acts and ends faith is not the fruit of nature, no such flowe [...] [Page 27] grows in natures garden: it is the immediate gift of God: none of the philosophers could attain this in all their enquiries, and the reason was, they never understood the knowledge of God in Christ, they were not brought to see, that there were higher degrees of excellency in the objects of faith then in those of reason, nor could they discern the infallibility of its rule, by which all actions are measured, if proportionable to the degree of excellency that there is in the object: our happiness is more or less compleat: a Chri­stians happiness must need be superlative that hath God for his object who is beyond all de­grees, and superlative: the satisfaction of reason and that of faith are not the same thing, there is as much difference as between heaven and earth, the different ways they take exactly convinces, that there ends are not only different, but con­trary; the rule or law that Christians are directed by is infallible, and the rule by which all their actions are measured, is the perfect law of God, not the moral law written in every mans heart before the fall, the dark impression whereof re­mains to this day, but I mean the law of faith which is not subject to any dispute or doubt; we need not go so far about as heathens which knew God no otherwise but by the dark impressions they found of him in natural things, but we come to a perfect knowledge of him, by the Gospel and see him face to face: Christians as they have clearer manifestations, so they have more no­ble and excellent means by which they attain those splendid discoveries, & this most clearly de­monstrates [Page 28] the glory & magnificency of their end: men that look at a temporal felicity they level at low ends that which engages a Christian in the pursuit of happiness, is no motive to them, and that is beauty and reward; nothing that is future can be any attractive to a carnal and sensual man, nor can beauty invite him: The vitiousness of his eye hinders him from discerning the beauty: the shortness of his sight is such that he cannot reach things that are future: the most rational Philosophers that were most diligent to improve in knowledge, received with delight truths of lower descent and of infinitely less importance but rejected divine revelation: morality seems to come very near felicity; their professed designe was happiness, yet these because they could not admit a higher principle then natural reason, ut­terly disclaimed Gospel-light, and its more clear revelations; but God who hath commanded light to shine out of darkness, hath shined into the heart of a Christian and hath given the know­ledge of God in the face of Christ; this is the sun that dazeled the eyes of Philosophers, but inligh­tens Christians more and more until the perfect day: men of the most exquisite natural parts and perfections, though there were no future state, bould not be happy while they retain those natu­ral insufficiences that are incident to the best of men that walk by a fallible rule; how frequent­ly are they insnared, allurements may be so sub­tilly and artificially contrived and made, especi­ally when the bait is reward and pleasure, that the rational and the sensitive appetite are at once [Page 29] betrayed; the two principles of action are the understanding and will, there is no particular good but may have the appearance of some evil, or something that is ungrateful annexed to it, for which reason the will may reject it; so every particular evil may be so disguised by the false appearance of goodness annexed to it, that the will may receive it: spacious objects convey themselves through the unwary and unguarded fences to the fancy, and from that to the under­standing, which by neglect not considering the danger, or fondly believing the goodness of the end, will overballance the evil of the means, commends it to the will, and that embraces it, and the senses that should be sentinels to give intelli­gence faithfully & discover dangers vigilantly, & make true reports of things to the minde respect­fully as subordinate to the rational faculties, to hinder all disturbances or disquietness that might assault the minde, they not seldome act contrary, carelefly taking disguised enemies for friends, othertimes by a false alarm affright the lower ap­petite, and cause such confusion that the com­mand of reason cannot be observed; and this is done either by bringing in some amazing trouble or insinuating some inviting pleasure or any o­ther distractions of the minde: thus the senses wound and captivate the minde, so that there is no trusting to reason, sence, or any thing but saith, which can neither deceive nor be deceived; this prospective gives a true sight of things, whe­ther we consider God the supreme object of our happiness or the enjoyment of him which is sub­ordinate: [Page 30] it's true we cannot come to a perfect knowledge of God in this imperfect state, bu [...] we may have our hearts inlarged here to receiv [...] that happiness that is reserved for a more perfect state, and may have happiness in the seed and principles of it; nothing shall alter our conditio [...] there but degrees, and we shall have a portio [...] answerable to the spaciousness of the capacity so then we are not to judge of our selves as t [...] happiness or misery by wisdome and humane reason, but by faith that cannot be mis-guided o [...] controuled: this measure is not humane reaso [...] that may erre, but it is grace, not in our hand but in the hand of omnipotency, where erring an [...] warping is impossible; as saith hath its illumination from him whose understanding is infinite, s [...] it hath its strength from him that is Almighty By this light the understanding is rectifyed, th [...] will is inclined, so that they cannot be inveigle [...] by inferiour objects, and it substitutes such sobriety in the lower appetite, which keeps ou [...] all those intrusions that generally subvert it But I leave this point, and proceed, and shew how knowledge and mental perfection may rea [...] the benefit of others.

Secondly, Men do not love and value perso [...] only for their intrinsick worth though that is valuable and inviting, but for the diffusive quali [...] that is so natural to true excellency, that it ca [...] not be divided, no more then the beams of t [...] sun can be separated from the body: men thi [...] themselves happy in nothing but what comes a [...] tended with reward as well as pleasure, a [...] [Page 31] therefore prize [...] frendship as having in it self most accomodation and proportion thereunto: Love is the most free and generous Passion send­ing forth continually that which is both profitable and greatly delightful, and this is most obli­ging: men are valued as all things else are, for their usesulness; we have a good instance for this in melancholy persons that have as large capaci­ties as others, and are as industrous to acquire noble endowments as any, and attain as great perfection, yet being under the tyranny of that black passion, are not capable of Demonstration, and so they draw themselves under a cloud while they live, by obscuring their perfections; and when they die, their excellencies with them­selves are buried in everlasting oblivion; they live no use, and die without glory; whereas others who like the sun have scattered their light, though short of their excellencies and acquirements, have lived usesully and dyed honorably. It is not no­tion but example that imbalms our dust, and perpetuates renown; men of clear and inturrup­ted reason cannot content themselves with them­selves, I mean no man can be satisfied from him­self, that is Gods prerogative, and therefore are frequently taking in supplys from without; and this they could not do with conveniency, content, and satisfaction, had they not the advan­tage of communication, by which they transplant their precious flowers, as also convey from their divine springs those streams that would overflow all banks, if not carefully turned into convenient channels; neither would their felicity they in­tend [Page 32] be compleat, could they confine their noti­ons and experiences within the narrow territories of their own minds: Now that they may dis­charge themselves of the burthens of their weigh­ty conceptions, which they may do while they retain the worth of them, and finde out a way for their capatious souls to empty themselves: They court all opportunities, among which Frendship presents its self as most suitable and proper, because receptive of all those generous overtures which are propounded, and so the will and affection are immediatly engaged, freely without any force or violence, to close with Frendship, as the most convenient scene upon which they may act those serious contrivances that terminate in vertue and honour: It is in this state and relation men chearfully pursue golden designes, and make use of those excellent expe­riments they have been long gathering, but by some harsh accident and unhappy incapacity have been hid and obscured: Now Frendship mainly intending the improvement of reason and advan­tage, every way both to the giver, and receiver immediatly puts upon that employment, with­out which the most curious searches seems but idle things, and that is communication, where­by men both improve themselves and others; It is true, habitual excellency beautifies the minde, but it must be extended beyond that, else the reputation, which is very considerable among vertuous men will lose much honour; the more general the inffuence, the greater the glory, like the sun whose glory doth not only consist in the [Page 33] body, though that be all light, and the sountain of light, but also in the spreading beams; they being of the most general advantage: But to bring this argument yet nearer our purpose, ob­serve, that wise men in their first attempts, in order to the demonstrating of their parts, are not hasty, rash and precipitate; they will friendly discourse their notions before they will scatter them publickly; this is readily assented to, that the most accomplished men are not secured from mistakes, which will ofttimes attend unavoida­bly the most wary undertaker: men cannot so exactly shape their best thoughts, as that they should appear comely to all, nor can he promise himself an exemption at all times from misap­prehension, passion or some other accident which may intervene between the intention and the action, these are incident to every man, and can be no more divided from the purest constitutions and innocent lives then light from the sun: Again, considerate men are not so taken with their early conceptions as to believe them with­out exceptions or improvement, and none can so freely, innocently and without noise do it, as a faithful and judicious friend, who cannot be suspected of envy or partiality on the other side: who more fit to pay those just acknowledge­ments then he who will as chearfully commend any worthy quality as he would tenderly, pru­dently and carefully detect the contrary; that this act of Frendship is a singular advantage, will further appear upon this enquiry which follows: Examine great Schools and publike communities [Page 34] and Academies, and you will finde they are not only intended for the study of Learning in their several apartments, but also for the benefit of Communion in a sociable conversation, whereby learning is improved and extended in order to the publick benefit of the whole society: We are not without multitude of examples of this kinde, it is by discourse truth is disputed, errour is ex­punged; the true measure of the capacity and incapacities of men lies originally in that rule that the art or science he is about to acquire prescribes, but the use is more extensive, and so the measure is in every mans hand that hath skill to use it; and hereby a man comes to make a right estimate of all things, by applying the rule to them, which is done by discoursing with our selves or others: words are the shaping of the thoughts, and rally them into order and form: thoughts are best discerned in their dress whether they are trivial or weighty; naked thoughts sometimes affright us, we dare not look on them, till by words they are adorned, and so made amiable; othertimes they seem so aiery that we cannot hold them, they slip from us; but when we have shaped them we have greater command of them, and can hold them till we have exami­ned them, and at last we have liberty to keep them or reject them, according to their desert and merit: a mans first conceptions may be o­vervalued or undervalued by accidents, as when melancholy or pride interposeth: Melancholy will not stay so long upon thoughts, being of a roving temper, or till they may be scanned, and [Page 35] pride will examine them overly and slightly, because it thinks it cannot erre: We deal up­rightly and judiciously when we examine things so as that we come to a right understanding of the nature of them, and can give every thing its true value without lessening their lustre, which consists in their nature, uniformity and compo­sition: It was the advice of a Grandee, eminent for Learning, and of an excellent judgment, that men should discourse their thoughts and when opportunities were not to be had of dis­coursing them otherwise, rather then wholly omit this necessary concern, they should direct their discourse to a statue; but he that hath a faithful friend need not put himself upon this conclusion: Familiar converse is always pleasant and often very profitable and seasonable; Two wits are better then one, is a Proverb not to be slighted: I may see an errour in my Friend he may not see in himself, without being over-cu­rious and this may be so argued, that he may be convinced, and his reputation secured from reproach and scandal.

Secondly, there must be that in the object we pitch upon for Frendship, that must ravish the affections, and that seems to be candour and affability in dispositions and conversation, this is as necessary in order to content and the pleasure of this concern, as reason is in order to the pro­fit of it: as reason is necessary, so love and an equal conversation is as necessary, this was that which first created and still supports it; nothing so indearing as civility and courtesie; and this [Page 36] keeps up the reputation of Frendship in spight of all that envy that malicious persons conceive a­gainst it: no cloud can ecclipse the radiancy of this concern, when it is clothed with civility and courtesie, this is the constraining property of kindness, and in this sence objects hath a con­straining force, though properly they have none, but derive their efficacy from the faculties to which they are agreeable: we may understand the excellency of this temper by comparing it with those that are of morose and harsh spirits, such hath crossness so natural to them, being born and bred up with them, that they cannot be o­therwise: what torment are such persons to themselves? every the least contradiction so inflames and so strangely transports them, and that to such amazing passions, that they are not only ungrateful to others but frightful to them­selves; they arrive to such extravagancies that mischievous effects follow upon them: they are justly termed mad, else they would not bring up­on themselves a greater mischief that they may do a less; these persons are not fit for any serious undertaking; but now a calm and affable tem­per reduces passions, and so fortifies themselves against them, that they neither disquiet their own minds, nor others patience: these can pass by the greatest injuries insensibly; how prudent­ly do they interpret all things in the best sence that are meant in the worst they do see, as to pity, but are blinde as to prejudice: these do not practise curiosity and a near inspection into the faults of others, and yet will severely enough de­tect [Page 37] vice, without grating & unbraiding how ami­able is such a disposition, and most incomparably fit for this great concern? this temper hath many excellent properties; I shall hint at some: It is free, pleasant and complasant; Love is noble, and admits the beloved into the heart, and gives him a peculiar interest there, and in all that he hath besides, interest is so great a part of Frend­ship, that we conclude, no Interest no Frend­ship: It is the true measure of Love; as Interest is more or less persect, so is the affection more or less compleat; proportionable to the interest, such is the Frendship: All those accomplish­ments we have been discoursing of, are insignifi­cant to a person without interest, like the Gold in the Indies; only valuable in themselves, but of little value to others which are at a distance: It is interest that inhanceth the worth of any thing, propriety is very indearing and obliging; it puts a beauty upon our enjoyments; how com­mon is it for men to slight that in the possession of another they admire, when the property is al­tered and they can call it their own.

Again, Frendship is plesant without those per­plexities that attend other relations; as the tem­per of friends are more equal, so their commerce and fellowship is more pleasing; equality sweet­ness society: Frendship is compounded of love and society: how pleasant are those harmless diversions that constantly attend those sociable companions? and that which makes it the more sweet, is the utility and necessiity of it for the re­pair of the minde, that may and will be tired in [Page 38] the most beneficial and excellent employments: the most diligent person cannot be always upon the wing, the lower appetite must have content as well as the superiour; for as the disturbances in the fenses much prejudice the operations of the minde, so that it cannot act either profitably or pleasantly for that particular season; so when the minde is too intent, the sences are prejudiced, and so much sometimes, that they cannot enjoy those vacancies that prudence and conveniency assigns them for the repairs of the body and low­er appetite, which may be so: weary in atten­ding upon the rational appetite, that pleasure may seem a burthen because unseasonable, and they may prefer a sleepy stupdity before the most grateful recreation; and the reason seems to be this because sence cannot bear equal pace with reason, the body with the minde; wise men in their most eager pursuit of knowledge had evermore a due respect to the body, which if impaired the minde could not make its returns either so pleasant or beneficial as before: now it is the great designe of friends so to regulate their affairs that a general content shall be given both to sence and reason▪ answerable to their respe­ctive capacity: Society as it is necessary upon a moral account, so it is most natural; God him­self preached this doctrine in paradice, it is not good for man to be alone; Adam was no other way unhappy, Paradise with all its pleasure could not make up this want, his sociable nature was not to be contented without it: Adam was as perfect in his primitive state as any creature [Page 39] could possibly be; look into his understanding and there you will finde perfect light; into his will, and their exact rectitude; his affections all pure, without any dross, his body full of beauty and comeliness: add hereunto his constant communi­on with God who treated him with no other terms but love and kindeness, yet after all this, the Lord as a further demonstration of his favour to Adam, he assigns him a com­panion, the proportionableness of which is signified in that commendation he gives the wo­man, when he presents her to Adam, saying, she was a help-meet for him: all this illustrates the pleasure of society. If Adam in paradise wanted society that was happy in every thing else, how pleasant must Frendship be to us that are happy in nothing else comparatively? what complacen­cy and delight must needs spring from a state so peculiarly free and pleasant, I might speak much of the delight and satisfaction to be found in this regard, but that I shall reserve to another place.

The Fourth and last thing promised by way of preparation to this great concern is this, that there must be so much equality in the person & capacity of Friends which will be commensu­rate and adequate in every thing material, relat­ing to this rclation and state of Frendship: for the better directing our inquisition in this great case, a method will be necessary. I would explain my meaning here with all caution and circumspecti­on, that I might not be mis-understood, because the intricacy of the whole Discourse lies in this particular.

First, I do not mean by this equality such an absolute equality as will admit of no disparity that is almost impossible, and certainly unnecessa­ry: Men cannot meet in this concern as lines in the eenter, no man can perfectly understand the heights and depths of his own minde so as to make a certain estimate of them, and it must needs be without the reach of any other; as the accidents of life in some inferiour things may make a difference as to the outward state, so the perfections of the minde, though not contrary may be unequal, and that because one man may and doth excell another in particular things; and this is so far from causing a disgust, that it pro­miseth singular advantage; for as a worthy man is dissatisfied though he hath treasured up great things while they remain obscure, so he is high­ly contented to part them between himself and his friend, and no less is he delighted to see his own worth outvied by his friend: for whatsoe­ver the one possesseth the other cannot want: no matter where the propriety is when the use is in both: the trade that Friends drive is giving and receiving in order to a mutual satisfaction: be­side were this seeming disparity wanting, friends would miss one of their great ends: no man is loved for himself: It were well if we could love God at that rate: there is a vast expectation of profit and pleasure among Friends, and much of their satisfaction lies in this, exchanging value for value, and hereby they are both gainers, and this upon a double account. First they add each to others treasure by some additional excellency, [Page 41] and then to their content, because its mutual: It is no cause of quarrel that one excels another in worthy qualities, the one never loseth by the others gain; and then there is much more delight in submitting the reason and wills in the volunta­ry intercourses and acts of Frendship, then can be any other way, and that because there is more love expressed in those acts, and the more of love is in any thing, the more sweet, gratifying and contenting it is: But to come to particulars.

And here I shall endeavour to shew what are those inequalities that are absolute, and can ne­ver be otherwise, and then what inequality that is that may be dispensed with and taken up when prudence speaks it necessary: That I may not in stead of explicating intricate this material con­cern, I shall promise these Four things wherein this inequality is to be found, and is so interwo­ven into the composition and condition of the persons that no prudence can take up.

First, The inequality between a Prince and a slave, a wise man and a fool, persons of different perswasions in matters of religion, and in the [...]ast place, that inequality that is in some Rela­tions.

First, A Prince cannot without too base a con­ [...]iscention and diminution of his honour take his [...]ave into his bosome, this is so great a disparity, [...]hat no prudence can ever take up; this is both [...]n unnatural and unreasonable condescention.

Secondly, There can be no equality between [...] wise man and a fool; if a wise man cannot make [...]rendship with a person that is grosly ignorant, [Page 42] because of the disparity that there is between them in respect of their reason, as I shall shew anon, much less with him that is so far from great reason, that he hath none at all: fools can never be so equallized as to comport with men of com­petent reason, much less with wise men; their natures are made up of contradiction: there is that madness, wilfulness and folly in the one that cannot consist with that gravity, wisdom and humility of the other, as one can never be raised to any congruity with the other, so the other can never be so depressed and degenerated as to bea [...] any proportion with him: no such amity can stand with so great an inequality: I need not use any further argument for the confirmation of this assertion; Give me leave to speak a word to the supposition, which is, that men of high parts & sublimated minds cannot be so equalized as to be made fit subjects for a Frendship with the ig­norant: Men eminent in vertue, as they cannot in honour associate themselves with them that are vicious, so they cannot in wisdom make alliance with the ignorant; and this will be yet more clear, if we consider the distance they stand one to the other; a man of raised parts can never be so degenerated as to comport himself with them that are much inferiour; difference in person as to the outward state is much, as appeared in the former instance between a Prince and a slave, but here it's more, because there is all manner of distance both as to the minde and outward state: what pleasure can wise men take in sowing barren ground, or scattering [Page 43] their precious seed in a Common, or at best to sow among thorns, where the seed will never spring up to any satisfaction: Every secular bu­siness shall be admitted to come in and choak it; that in which wise men are most excellent, the other regards not; the more a man understands the more he makes necessary to himself, which those of vicious spirits call madness, and abject and low spirits call needless curiosity; and in­stead of putting that worth upon noble and gene­rous actions they deserve, disparage them by their slights and reflections; and so put an under­value upon the person, who the higher they act, the more prejudicial the least aspersion cast upon them proves to be; as from these so unrea­sonable a condescention cannot be desired, so from the other so great an elevation can­not be expected, that true worth, value and ex­cellency that should greaten their minds, and in­large their capacities: For such alliance is a rid­dle they can never understand, a jewel they would never be at the cost to purchase becaufe they can never be brought to think it necessary, no such enemy to learning as the ignorant, but here comes in an objection; Some will be ready to say, I exclude all persons from Frendship, but those that are stars of the first magnitude, and so consequently most men and all women are ex­empted: To this I answer, that I am not of that opinion, nor can I see any ground for it, I have laid down the rules of Frendship in the strictest sence, as all material points ought to be, not supposing all can reach them; they that comes [Page 44] nearest do best: this must be allowed, that dif­ference in vertues make a great difference in Frendships, as some men are more excellently qualified then others, so their alliances are more esteemable, and fellowships more eminent: men differ in their extractions, natures and moral ac­quirements exceeding much; and then education addes much weight to all the rest, if it be refined by art: it's true, nothing is more excellent then a natural genius when it is rightly directed, it is the ground-work and foundation of all ingenui­ty; but this is not alike in all, nature is more bountiful to some than others; and therefore art is intended to make up the defects of nature, and sometimes it is so successful in that behalf, that a man pollished by it comes to much perfection: we see boys that have been observed to be weak­ly accomodated in respect of natural ability, yet through the help of art, which by much diligence they have acquired, they have proved wise and useful men, though they could never arrive to that perfection that men both naturally wise and learned have done; there is as much difference between them as comparative and superlative.

But to come to the Question, I conceive high parts and titles to be no more of the Essence of Frendship then gay clothes to be of the essence of a man: A man eminent in Titles and glorious­ly arayed, may appear more splendidly then he that is clothed in rags, but there is as much of the nature of a man in the latter as in the former: men not so highly raised in their parts, persons and Estates as the former may make a moral [Page 45] Frendship, they have the capacity of it, and why not the significations of it: a competent reason will serve among equalls: Men that look no higher then their particular calling and com­merce in the world, may have reason as to useful hearts as much united, their conversations as pleasant, their actions as equal as those that stand in a higher sphere: as reason is not so e­minent among these, so they can be happy with­out it, because they have not the same occasion [...]or it that others have, these can as dearly love and as faithfully comport themselves, and may [...]rove as fast and unchangeable friends as any o­ [...]her: It is not above the reach of any that hath [...]ny ingenuity: some have been apt enough to [...]y, that this is a Scheme of Discourse, a kinde [...]f Romance; rather what ingenious men wish [...]ight be, then really what is or can be: If rea­ [...]on may be heard in this case, it would convince [...]s, that we cannot be happy without Frendship, [...]ough in the confluence of all enjoyments, es­ [...]ecially women that have as much reason to im­ [...]rove this argument as any other: but they [...]e excluded some say for want of mental accom­ [...]ishment: these would have women appear as [...]ntemptible to themselves as they have rend­ [...]d them in their invectives: how come women so [...]ort of men in this regard? this question is not [...] easily answered; compare the personal ex­ [...]llency of the sexes, particularly the under­ [...]nding and will, these seem all one, therefore [...] cannot be a natural defect in the one, or per­ [...]tion in the other that must make this diffe­rence: [Page 46] therefore it must be learning and Education that must adde weight to the ballance o [...] the mans side: who can deny that women hav [...] been eminent for learning, valour and other worthy qualities, and why they are not generally so is not so much the defect of nature as evil example, by which they are corrupted, so that th [...] will looseth its freedom, and is contracted to low and base objects, or else this comes to pass from the severe customes they are forced to submit to by which that freedom and improvements the should have, is either so restrained or so limited that let their intrinsick worth be what it will, the never arrive at any eminency: but those tha [...] have stepped over those limitations, and throw [...] away those manacles, have lived usefully an [...] died honorably: Many Instances History affor [...] to strengthen the argument, but I forbear, thi [...] being occasionably, not intensionally hinted at▪ All women can intirely love, they can be faithful and sociable, and why not fit for frendship▪ except their husband make them so: Nothin [...] more evident then the hgih displeasure me [...] take at the Frendship of women, especiall [...] where their wives are concerned, may be the [...] have reason it: I do not censure them, yet I ca [...] not but conclude, that there can hardly be th [...] moral Frendship among married women, who [...] affection, reason and freedom must attend upo [...] and be commanded by their husbands, who n [...] seldom make it their business to cross their wiv [...] though their ends be never so innocent fair; a [...] handsome: I do not say all men are of this u [...] grateful temper.

Secondly, there is inequality that may be ta­ken up and dispensed with, and that is when the distance lies in things not material; I instance in riches and commands: A man may not be so rich as another, this is no inequality, but what pru­dence will finde arguments enough to take up or dispence with; what is riches to reason, a no­ble title to a noble minde; money may elevate abject and sordid spirits, but a generous man would be so far from valluing himself by it, that he would trample upon it, if it stood in compe­tition with vertue and honour; noble minds assend the throne when men of vicious principles and practises are cast down with shame and scorn; witnesse Haman, what a stain remains upon his glory we all know: blinde fortune sel­dome makes a just estimate of things, she distri­butes her favours promiscuously, and men scrab­ble for them, and the strongest and those that least deserves them gets the greatest share: they pride themselves in their unmerited gains and Titles, yet they in their highest elivations are like fools upon a Theatre, attended with re­proach and contempt: men take but a low level at greatnesse that vallue themselves by such in­significant Titles like a great letter in the Alpha­bet, they take up more room and look bigger but signifie no more then the least letter there, like the crackling of thorns under a pot, they make a great noise, and blast, but after a little while this blaze will extinguish; they are more [...]n noise then in notion, more in shew then in sub­stance; but men that derive their Titles from me­rit [Page 48] and desert are so splendid, that no envious cloud, though never so dark can ecclipse their lustre; it's true, men may sooner get a noble Title then a noble minde, there are instances enough of this at hand in this present age, the most unhappy times that vertuous men ever saw, the golden clue hath led many a worthless man into the pallace of Princes, who with the spider carry their poyson thither, serving only by their princi­ples to corrupt, & by their practises to defile the Court: how often have we seen as little things as the change of a besom comparitively, sweep down those cobwebs; those to whom fortune hath given an unexpected and undeserved grandure; are of all others most subject to chan­ges, the interest they first had, presently grows cold and faint, and languishing: as nothing can purchase the treasure of a noble minde, so no­thing can depresse or extinguish the glory of it: Times must be beyond all parrellell barbarous wherein such men shall be degraded, Philoso­phers that were of raised mindes would not part with, nor Exchange one single vertue for all the gold in both the Indies, they vallued time better then to expend it upon such trifles: men pro­portion their care to their value, these are the per­sons that are expert in all vertue, and conse­quently most fit for this generouss state because they are most acquainted with sublimity, and their intendment are beyond all Expceptions.

Secondly, Command and duty most be Exa­mined, and there they seem unequal whereever they are, yet it may somtimes be otherwise: In­stances [Page 49] there are many whose conditions are far wide from servitude, yet they are servants in a proper sence, and must own an inequality be­tween them & their masters, but this disparity in the strictest sence is but a subordination in some things, and for some space of time, or some par­ticular business when the time is expired, and the business finished, the master and servant are both equal, the Inequallity did not consist in the essential but in the circumstantial part, not in per­son and condition, but in the art and science which when taught and learned, the Master and servant are both equal; so that there remains no more distinction of Master and servant; but we will suppose the inequality yet greater, and that there is absolute power in the Master to command without any restriction and proportionable obli­gations on the servant to obey beyond dispute; yet it doth not follow, that these commands and duties are always alike, and that they can never be dispensed with; it is most true, it is not in the power of the inferiour to lessen his own obedi­ence and duty, or extenuate the superiour autho­rity, yet the superiour may abate and lessen his own power, according to his will and pleasure, and so they come to be more equal, though the one cannot shrink the other can stretch; a servant cannot upon any just pretence deny his obedience to his Master, yet his Master when it seems con­venient either for profit or pleasure, or any other way expedient, can abate or lessen his own pro­perty in the servant, without the least injustice, and discharge him from any or all his obligations; [Page 50] and this seems to be the way of princes, and the method that they use in raising persons from a low condition to eminency; sometimes it consists with the sagacity and prudence of a prince as well as his fancy, to advance men of low extra­ction but of noble spirits to places of high trust and honour: some men by the vastness of their natural parts and ability, are most admirably ac­comodated for the most honourable and noble ser­vices, and for emergences of state, may be more useful then those much above them by extraction and titles: these cannot be admitted, though they are qualified for princely receptions, but by the favour of the prince extended toward them: and this doth not diminish nor impair the domini­on of the prince, or lessen the subjects obligation, but rather advance and magnifie them; it brigh­tens the Princes glory and makes it more illustri­ous, it strengthens the Favorites obedience, and makes them more faithful, though not so servile: such condescentions swallows up much of the distance, so that they are not so unequal as be­fore; greatness is neither debased nor diminish­ed by goodness; the sun that glorious and raised body may shine upon a dunghill, yet looses none of its glory, and though there be noisomness in the dunghill, it can contract none of the defile­ment, so princes when they shine upon their Fa­vorites in the beams of their generosity and benig­nity, their honour is not in the least impaired thereby: there is no distance so unequal, but it may be taken up, except that which is so twisted with the compofition of the persons, that no art [Page 51] can loosen, and so natural to the relations, that it would be both impious and impudent to endea­vour it: and that is baseness of spirit, that com­plexive incongruity to vertue and honour; men of low principles can never level at high and ge­nerous actions, nor bear any symetry with those of contrary tempers and affections; but if the minde be right, that beginning that was mean may reach a glorious and magnificent end.

Thirdly, persons of different sexes cannot com­port themselves for friendship according to our method, they must be either men or women, not a man and a woman, and that because as their na­tures are contrary, so is their condition, fancy & business; nor can they rationally design, that e­qual conversation without which Friendship is very imperfect, and but a lame attainment; nor can there be that familiar converse and inti­macy necessary to this concern, without reflecti­ons, if not temptations: should I enter into this argument I might finde enough to say, but I judge it neither grateful nor expedient; Let those that are concerned inform themselves from the incon­veniences that daily accrue upon such adven­tures; they need go no further then common ex­perience and observation to fatisfie their curio­sity.

The fourth inequality to be avoided, is, that of Religion, if there be a confluence of all other requisites, and there be no harmony and agree­ment, here the Friendship will be short lived: no­thing do more unite or divide persons then Reli­gion, if they agree in principles, religion won­derfully [Page 52] strengthens the Frendship, and engages their hearts one towards another; and this must needs be so, for if men agree in things of the greatest consequence, it is likely they may ac­cord in things less considerable: It is observed that no differences are so great as those occasioned by religion, and no spirits so bitter and inexora­ble as such as are by disputes in Religion exaspe­rated: how hardly are small dissentings in Reli­gion, though but in one single point, composed? what difficulty then must there needs be in redu­cing those to compliance that differ in substantial points, in the doctrine as well as in the manner of worship; and if this be not done, the Frend­ship will be uncertain. I grant, there may be some circumstantial dissenting among friends, and no great prejudice thereby, because those may be argued with indifference and moderation, and a reconciliation is not impossible, but very pro­bable, because in this case the best reason carries it, but in substantial points the matter is not so soon done: Matter of Faith seems too sacred to submit to the best reason while conscience re­mains unsatisfied, who though misguided and led by examples and custome that have no foun­dation in the word of God the most infallible rule, yet these shall have such influences upon the seduced conscience, that they will not give place to the most infallible and divine truths, and having made the first impression will pleade their propriety, and oppose it against the commands of divine justice: there is much arguing in this case, little yielding and compliance, when men [Page 53] are tainted with corrupt principles, arguing may beget disgusts and heats, and ingage the passions, and set them all a quarrelling, and winde up the differences to such heights as will admit of no pacifying arguments: this is plainly proved by common experience; witness the Church of Rome, and the Reformed Churches; what vast endeavours has there been for an accomodation, but with no success; the animosity grows higher, and a reconciliation more impossible, as is evi­dent by the vast treasures that have been expen­ded, and effusion of bloud that hath been spilt, and is still shedding: Look a little nearer, even among our selves, where the dissentings are not so universal, and we shall finde much vexati­on and trouble: Is it not observable, that per­sons that have lived and conversed together a great while, have at last parted, and no cause visible appearing; there seems to be a twofold reason for this, First, from the difference in opi­nion which prevails so over the passions, that love the master-affection which for some time hath preserved unity, has now changed its property, and by accident, occasions the greatest quarrel: had men no religion, they would not be so liable to dissentions, there being no cause for dispute; they were equal in such a condition, I had almost said equally unhappy, but it may be supposed, that prudence may do much to compose things, it may keep in the fire a while, but not long, it will at last break out into a flame: nothing more common then for men to be great friends, while neuters in religion, but if either come to be sin­cerely [Page 54] pious, they fall a quarrelling presently, it is not the religion that doth it, but the contra­riety of the one against the Religion of the other; if a man loves his friend, he cannot see him walk­ing in ways of death and not reprove him, and that smartly; and this cannot be born what a­mity can continue: where there can be no argu­ing without quarelling, no reproof without re­torting; now friends begin to treat one the other with suspision and absent themselves from that equal conversation and intimacy which first made the amity and must still preserve it.

Secondly, the efficacy of piety and religion it self insensibly loosens the knot of this alliance, because the one cannot bear the convictions and restraints that will be laid on him by the other, which though not by designe, and intentially, but by example and accidentally, will be very severe and confining to his extravagant temper: I have read a story of a young gallant, who had a pious Father, that had given him many admoni­tions, but he little minding the counsel and ex­ample of his father, became vilely vicious, and when he intended to drink to excess or be any other way debauched in the room where the effiges of his dead father hung, he would first draw a curtain before the picture, saying, he could not be frolick while he saw any thing of his father, who had so often reproved him; such convictions attended him: I shall only add, that in all alliances, religion, if sincere, is the surest tie; nothing we enjoy can be constant and dura­ble without this: this is the fruit of the tree of [Page 55] life, which if we feed on, will make our com­forts not onely long lasting, but our happiness everlasting.

Lastly, the inequality of relations comes to be considered; but before I proceed, give me leave to take notice of an objection which seems ready to assault me at my first entrance into this part of the discourse, and that is, that I have en­deavoured all along to confine friendship, and limit it to a moral capacity and so have excluded relations which in truth, are more capable & re­ceptive of it: there are three relations especial­ly that make this challenge; Father and Son, Husband and Wife, and Brethren: Pray give me leave to leade these Objectors into the na­ture of these relations, and there they will sa­tisfie themselves of the invalidity of this splen­did scruple, which is more in shew then in sub­stance.

To begin with the first, namely, Father and Son, this relation is so far from equality, that it intends and commands the contrary, it is a com­position of disparity, which is so natural to the relation that it can neither have a being nor well­being without it: Instance, the power and au­thority of the Father, which can never be lessen­ed, the fear and duty of the Son, which cannot be excused: a father is much more bound in this relation then any other superiour, for they may sometimes dispence with their propriety in this regard, without prejudice to themselves, and with advantage to the inferiour, but a parent cannot abate any of his just authority, but with [Page 56] injury both to himself and his son; to himself by failing in his duty, which is ever to keep up his power in all lawful things; to his son, in laying before him a temptation to disobedience, by his example, while he omits his duty: Indulgence is the inlet to all other traps and snares: sad Instances we have had of this in our present Age, where all vices are made almost indifferent, but such as disturb the tranquility of the Kingdom: there are many things of the nature of this relati­on that cannot consist with a moral Friendship: Instance, the power and command of the Father, the fear and obedience of the son, these are con­trary to that personal equality, which cannot be exempted from Frendship; it being as natural to the being and well-being of that concern as ine­quality is to this of relations: the properest ex­pressions between Friends is that which a Father and son never do, as constant, familiar converse, equal conversation, wherein they always submit their wills and affections each to other: there are many things in frendship that cannot be ad­mitted where there is a challenge of duty and command: it is no prejudice to a parent, and the duty I owe him, to pay all possible endear­ments to my Friend, because there are many things due to the one, the other cannot challenge: It is not my designe to derogate from any relati­on, that just esteem they ought to have: this must be allowed, that this relation makes great dearness and a most inviolable Frendship, and under such real obligations, as the laws of God and men hath made indispensable, and that be­cause [Page 57] there are duties that obliged them before any other Frendship could be made, and have left such impression as must abide, and will ne­ver give place to any other, because of their propriety which is supreme: There are two things especially I shall point at, wherein this relation differs from a moral Friendship, and that is, first, in their springs from whence they flow, and Secondly, in their ends and de­signes: First, the love and frendship of the relati­on is grounded purely upon natural causes, and therefore called natural affection: there is no need of prudence in this case, no man consults his reason, whether he shall love his son or not, a natural instinct inclines him to that, but if his son be rebellious, then he hath need of prudence to direct him how to regulate his affections, so is his indulgence may not prejudice his son: There are many things binding to persons in [...]his relation, as the law of God; the law of [...]ature, and their love to themselves: parents love [...]heir children because they love themselves [...]hey are perpetuated in their children, posterity [...]eing the instruments of a civil immortality; [...]ikewise the son cannot dispute his obedience to [...]is father, he being bound with his father by the [...]ame laws, and under more obligations then the [...]ather can be. 1. he has his being from his father, [...]y which he is capacitated for al the rest that fol­ [...]ow, as his preservation, education, example, sup­ [...]ly, & all these adde to the sons obligations, but [...]oral frendship has no law or obligation predis­ [...]osing the persons for frendship, but is grounded [Page 58] upon moral principles, and is animated by that profit, reward & pleasure that is annexed to the object: Love in this respect is the effect of an un­constrained choice, and therefore is not subject to those uncertainties that natural affections are; nothing holds the affection stronger and longer then a free choice, we experience this; the love of relations is not much to be trusted in, as the duties so the love of relations is changeable, and much altered by accidents; instance, parents much abate in their affections to their children that once they dearly loved, haply occasioned by some rebellious & unworthy carriage & actions against commands, perswasions, threatnings and intreaties, which aggravate the crimes and make them inexcusable: sometimes cross marriages become a great ground of quarrell, when they are inferiour or unequal: Again, when sons put themselves upon dishonourable designes, and by their extravagances brings a general ruine upon themselves and families, and grow so desparate, that instead of cherishing and supporting their parents against the injuries of others, lay violent hands on them themselves, and imbrew their hands in their bloud, or consent with others, un­naturally designing against them, from whom they have their being: David had such a son in Absalom, all which so alienates the hearts of pa­rents, that they cannot give them a favorable aspect without censure, nor a place in their thoughts, but with reluctancies, and the aggra­vations which second these high provocations are so many and hainous, that natural affection [Page 59] sometimes is thereby quit, and abandoned, and [...]hat upon just and solid grounds: Othertimes pa­ [...]ents fail in their duty to their children, and carry it unnaturally toward them that have deserved [...]etter, nothing more notorious, then for men to forsake the sons of their love, preferring fome Dalilah before them, upon whom they prodigal­ [...]y spend their substance, discouraging and cor­rupting their children together, which they do by their inhumane actions and vicious practises, and this is worthy our consideration, how sepa­ration will alienate the affections of relations, so that there shall not remain in them a powerful in­clination, either to sollicit or endeavour the pro­sperity one of another, but shall prefer a faithful servant before the relation: this hath been so a­mazing to me, that I have thought natural affe­ction one of the greatest uncertainties of humane life, and not to be confided in, because men so strangely degenerate in this respect; that they make themselves inferiour to the brutes.

Secondly, as the original from whence the love of this relation comes is incongruous to that of Frendship, so their ends are contrary: Frendship designes nothing more then the pleasure of socie­ty, whereby by communicating each others joys and hopes, afflictions and disappointments, they come to obtain the proper and most useful effects of Frendship, but parents have no such expectation, they do not aim at a sociable con­tentment in their children, nor children in their parents: how freely do parents and children con­sent to be divided, sometimes into the farthest [Page 60] part of the world, one from another; if their per­sons, estates, or content may be advanced by it▪ and are very well satisfied, to meet once or twice in their whole lives, or to converse together in a few lines, which are uncertainly ventured, and seldom arrive at the desired place, and when they come can do no more but tell them they left a re­lation alive, but how long he hath continued so since is most uncertain: men account themselves rich in relations, when their propriety is so far removed that they serve only for contemplation and generation, both which gives but a general no particular contentment; it is otherwise among friends, they cannot satisfie themselves in con­templation, fruition is that which compleats their felicity: Friends are like the turtles, they never associate themselves with other birds, they never sing and fly abroad for recreation as other birds do, but they have their peculiar notes for each other, and when the one dies, the other droops till he dies; so friends, they need none of those vanities that are remote, they never search after them, the chatting of Friends is to them­selves a most pleasing note; they live in the em­braces of each other, and if one dies how impati­ently doth the other lament after him until he die also: So then it is plain by what has appeared in this argument, that this relation of Father and son hath not in it the capacity of a moral Frend­ship, how then can it have the signification of it?

The Second Relation to be examined is Hus­band and Wife, the former relation was grounded upon natural causes, but this upon [Page 61] justice and reason, pursuant to a solemn league and Covenant, which cannot be violated, but by the worst perfidiousness, and as the love of that relation was natural this is conjugal, and in some respect greater then natural affection, because here are greater obligations and more binding duties annexed to this relation then to any other, and that by a twofold law, the law of God, and the law of man. I must expect to meet with ma­ny persons that will think themselves disobliged by this argument, therefore I must say something to fatisfie them: I must confess, I have less plea­sure in this part of the discourse, then in all the rest; This relation by a groundless supposition has been deemed the best capacity for Frendship, as having in it self all that accomodation necessa­ry: Let us consider the persons, and then the relation, the persons strictly considered, are not fit for this concern, not only because of the diffe­rence in sexes, though that be something, but upon many other material considerations.

First, There is the greatest inequality possible in the persons, and it is constituted by the relati­on it self; persons may be equall before marri­age, they cannot be so afterwards: now what makes the change, only the relation, nothing else could do it; if a King gives his Crown and throne to a slave, it's no wonder if the slave possesses that throne and Crown, and he be degraded, but this is not so great a prejudice, as sometimes hap­pens in marriages, for the slave is but an usur­per, and there is no law to confirm him in that undeserved grandure but those that make a like [Page 62] adventure in this relation; they do not onl [...] throw away their robes, and become equal i [...] subjection to persons of abject spirits, and co [...] ditions, and subservient to such as were slave [...] before, or so inferiour that they would hav [...] thought it preferment enough to have had th [...] meanest imploy about their persons; and tha [...] which aggravates it, is that this bondage canno [...] be thrown off, as in the former instance, but i [...] is confirmed by a Law both civil and moral, whic [...] cannot be violated: there are many things of th [...] nature of Frendship, and such as are most emi­nent, which cannot stand with this relation; in­stance they cannot submit their judgments and wills one to another in all things, this Frendship must do or it cannot be, and this is expected a­mong Frends which are equal, but not among those that cannot be so: for a superiour to submit his judgment and will to an inferiour, is neither just nor convenient, but for the inferiour to submit both to the superiour, is just and necessary: it is true, there is command and duty in Frendship but those that command, and them that obey are equal, and though they may sometimes com­mand different things they have not different wills, but this cannot be, where command and duty is severally in the persons, because where there is an absolute power to command, there follows a proportionable obligation to obey as a just due that cannot be excused or omitted: and because power is not alwaies so regular and just as it ought to be, therefore it is, that there is such difference & jarring among inferiors and superi­ors; [Page 63] and this will ever be so long as men hath any thing of pride, or passion, and so they augment or lessen their authority by these rules, and hereby sometimes the state of marri­age is so imbittered that it becomes harsh and un­grateful, they will pleade the threatning, this desire shall be to thy husband, and he shall rule over thee, and the laws of men are seldom favou­rable in this kinde, but imposeth more upon it, as we finde by the civil law of Nations, which commands the man proving bankrupt and cast into prison, his wife be sold, if she be worth it to redeem her husband; and as if the bondage were not severe enough, the consent of the wife comes in, and twists the cord, and makes it yet stronger; the woman is obliged by no law, till she bindes her self by a voluntary consent, nei­ther law of God nor man doth constrain her to come under these restrictions, but finding her there lays more obligations upon her.

2ly, let us examine the relation it self (some say) that conveys Frendship, we will look into the first marriage, that in Paradise, if a perfect Frendship, can be conveyed by the relation, we shall finde there Adam had as much reason to contract a perfect frendship with Eve as any man ever had, she being made of the body of Adam in a more peculiar maner then any else ever was, and because she was the gift of God immediatly delivered to Adam as a token of special favour, and because there was no creature so suitable to him as she was; and this similitude was some in­ducement from a natural principle that inclines [Page 64] every creature to love its like; yet notwithstand­ing all this, we see that in Adam that seems contrary to Frendship in many things, especially this, that he so readily and upbradingly laid tha [...] blame upon his wife, a true friend would have taken upon himself, so that there seems a want of Frendship in paradise, and this may very well be, paradise was not without its wants, man wanted a wife for generation, and why not a friend for counsel, advice, and conversati­on? had Eve had a faithful friend, who would have encouraged and strengthned her against the insinuations of the serpent, she might have baf­fled his arguments, and repelled his strongest temptations: on the other side, had Adam been so happy to have had a faithful monitor, in the intermi, when the temptation lay before him, he would not have so rashly ventured upon the breach of that primitive and positive command, yet he had a greater advantage then the woman, in that he might have argued the point with the woman (with less surprise) then the woman could with the Serpent; he had the advantage of discourse with her: he might have demanded of her, how she could think to escape the penalty of so peremptory a law, and by what arguments she was invited to the breach of so positive a command, and what advantage she propounded to her self in so bold and criminal an undertak­ing; such arguing might have given some check to the temptation; much arguing there was be­tween the woman and the Serpent: where was Adam then? had there been Frendship Adam [Page 65] could not have been so long from Eve, being in the same garden with her, till the Serpent could accomplish so great a work; this seems to be a work of time: neither is it likely, had there been this amity, that she would have intended, much less have acted any thing, till she had ac­quainted Adam with it, with whom she would have had inclination enough to advise with in such a difficult case, there being always a com­munication of affairs between friends: no won­der the woman was seduced when all the wit and policy of hell was imployed to do it: but Adam without that was betrayed, he hastily ventures without reservation and exception upon the breach of so positive a command.

Again, if this relation could convey the best Frendship, none in that relation could miss it, but experience evinces the contrary: we finde not seldom their open enmity; if the relation could convey it, though there was little love before marriage, there would be no want of it after, but this is clear to common observation, that where persons have ventured into this relation before, the affection and fancy hath been fixed, the rela­tion hath been so far from engaging the affections and uniting the heart, that it hath encreased the enmity, and sometimes to murther and other vi­olent acts; and I might bring many reasons for this, but I do not love to rake in a kennel.

Again, as repeated fruition is the most bind­ing thing among Friends, in this relation it is most loosening; I have heard some say, and seri­ously to, that repeated fruition is a dull thing, [Page 66] & blunts the edge of the greatest affection, Frend­ship in this relation would be arbitrary, and therefore it is that there are such strong com­mands obliging persons to the duties of it, as is e­vident by the laws of God and man: It is obser­vable, that Frendship is most tied, and yet most free; there are no laws confining friends, they have no need of coaction to obedience, love is a law to it self, this shews the natural unfixedness of the one and the stability of the other: some men were they left to their liberty as friends are, they would change their wives as often as they put off their clothes; men are much guided by humour and fancy, small things deludes the fan­cy at one time, and things as contemptible will alter it at another; men hastily catch at a wife, she pleaseth him well, after a little while fancy hath found out some new object, and then we hear them say, they cannot fancy the old, the new is better; but Frendship is ever guided by reason and judgment, and findes more amiableness and loveliness in the object every day: give me leave to adde, that persons in this relation are not capable of those convenient and necessary acts of kindeness that friends are, In­stance in emergences of state or times of war, a frend may be eminently useful in either, but what can a wife do, she can have no vote in Council, nor command in war: The wife of David, though the daughter of Saul, and therefore did not want interest when he left the Court and betook him­self to the wars, signified little to him, but Iona­than his friend was more useful then then ever; [Page 67] and this is most considerable, the advantage frend­ship has beyond relations, for personal kindeness which comes to pass from hence, because they are united in heart though not in person in a legal sense as men and their wives are; and this is no small advantage, hereby they are more useful in times of extremity, where none will assist and help but them alone; many acts of frendship women are not capable of, if a husband be arrested, his wife cannot bail him, but his friend can; if her testimony be never so full and pertinent, it will not be taken for her husband: I might instance in many other things, but I hasten from this un­gratefull argument.

Lastly, If Frendship were made by this relati­on, then no man would seek it elsewhere, but we see those persons who have as much content as the relation can give ambition, this state of frend­ship and they make the firmest and strongest alli­ances in this regard, and the reason they give is this, that they would finde satisfaction most suita­ble to their nature and being, and that (say they) can be no where but among equals, where this only can be found, that the hearts are united and the persons free to all friendly acts and enter­courses, and this cannot be among relations, where the persons are joyned, but too often the hearts are free: I hope none will mistake and think I have no true value for this relation, I have really a great respect for this relation, and highly esteem it where it is in truth rightly managed: They are most happy that meet with least disap­pointments every one will conclude; poverty [Page 68] and sickness what a change do they make, per­sons in this relation aim at many ends, which if they miss they are impatient, and that because there doth not seem efficacy enough in the relati­on to command a submission to any great disap­pointment: And by how much the more evils cannot be foreseen, by so much the more intole­rable they be: I shall point at but one end and that is children, if they fail of this end, as some­times they do, what an alienation doth this make, or rather a separation: I am loth to say, it is plain enough, but friends can miss their ends in many th [...]ngs without distraction, crosses doth not sepa­rate them, but rather unite them: Ionathan and David were never so united as then when afflicti­on seized them, then it was that they renewed their covenant and strengthned their affecti­ons one towards another: Thus I have led you through two relations, the one ground­ed upon the principles of nature, and there­fore binding, the other upon a promise or covenant no less obliging, & to both these friend­ship is due, but not that friendship or love I am treating of; there is natural affection due to the one and a conjugal love due to the other, which must be paid with all care and circumspe­ction.

I shall touch a little briefly upon the third rela­tion, and so come to what I most aim at.

The Third Relation I am to speak to is, that of Brethren; I shall consider the persons and re­lation jointly; brethren having in them all that worthiness that friendship requires, are the fit­test [Page 69] subjects for friendship, but they do not pass into it upon the account of relation, nature pas­ses but little, but as they are disposed and pre­pared for it, either by natural qualities or moral excellencies: We see brothers that live apart, and adopt themselves to Families remote, they have little love: Frendship is nourished by the same matter by which it was first made, it was created by communion and fellowship in an e­qual conversation, and must live by the same: the Wise man observed, that in a time of sepa­ration frendship was of a small signification: Bet­ter (saith he) is a neighbour near then a brother a­far off; and he draws his argument from the in­capacity of the one, and the capacity of the other; for all friendly acts & intercourses, its true frend­ship may last, when by some accident the persons are divided, but not in that vigour it did before: it is a languishing friendship; we may under­stand this by the similitude of the love of the iron the loadstone, which ariseth from a hidden quali­ty, the motion of the iron towards the loadstone is slow while at a distance, but quick when near, and when it doth but touch it, it cleaves so fast, that unless forced, 'twill never part, and when it is parted 'twill at the furthest part of the world retain the vertue of the touch; so Friends while at a distance move slowly, but when together are so united, that they cannot be separated without great force and violence, and their separation is like the dividing the heart from the body: now that there is nothing in the bare relation that can amount to friendship, will be further evident by [Page 70] our daily experience, which furnisheth us with instances of the great animosities among brethren, and such aversions as cannot consist with friend­ship: Look into the family of Adam, and there you see murther; into the Family of Isaac, you would think you should not miss of kindeness there, yet instead thereof we finde Esau consult­ing with himself how he should slay his brother: this is most true, that there may be much indea­red affection between brethren, occasioned by the equalness of their persons and conversation, they having in them all other requisites, ar [...] first to be chosen as the most fit persons for friendship, the relation being something, and when both these meet the relation and frendship, they exemplifie one the other, and shine most illustriously; but some may think, I have pursued this subject too far, I am sure it was with no designe to derogate from the just desert due to any relation, yet I would not have them monopolize our esteem, so as to snuffle out Frendship, which so truly de­serves our value.

I come now to the qualifications which are ne­cessary in order to a well grounded frendship: all that I have said hitherto is previous to what remains: I hope none will expect frendship in an artificial dress, attended with elegant phra­ses, and words well accented, this being both a­bove my ability, and far wide of my designe, which is a general satisfaction in this materi­al concern, in the plainest way that I can; gla [...]ing and gaudy embellishments being trivial accomplishments where truth is concerned, which [Page 71] shines bright enough without them.

The First qualification is this, there must be an intire affection and love among friends, this is the principal hindge upon which this concern turns, this being a philosophical discourse it will be ne­cessary to touch upon love in general. Love in the general nature of it is either rational and su­pream, or sensual and subordinate, in the sirst sence love is the most vigorous, potent, sove­reign, affectionate; it sits as Queen Regent in the will, and governs all the faculties; love is the spring of humane actions, and gives life, being, and motion to them all; the other affections, as desire, hope, joy, fear, anger, all these are but the several forms and shapes os love; for as the object of love is affected with this or that circum­stance, so is love proportionably invested with this or that form; if the object be absent, love goes out to meet it in desire, if present, it so­laceth it self in fruition and delight; if under dan­ger and hazard, love trembleth with fear: if it be impeded or hindred, love waxeth angry and im­patient, when there is any possibility of enjoying the object: love moves nimbly after it if impossi­ble of enjoyment; so that the object be lost, love clothes it self in mourning habit: there is also a kinde of love in the sensual and animal part, but this is more passionate, that in the superiour part more rational; this is more uncertain, that more fixed; this more confused, that more regular and uniform.

There is a threefold love,

First Divine, and that is altogether spiritual [Page 72] and highly rational.

Secondly, there is a natural love, and that may be bruitisn as well as rational.

Thirdly, there is a moral love, and that con­sists in a mean betwixt both, evermore the thing beloved gives the denomination to love; if the object be divine, it is a divine love; if sensual, it is a bruitish love; if moral, it is a moral love.

Love is an affection of union whereby we de­sire and enjoy perpetual union with the thing be­loved, and there are these two effects that imme­diatly flow from this union: First, it is transfor­ming and changing by love▪ we are changed into a thing more noble or more vile; so that we de­base our selves when we love any unworthy and inferiour thing, whatever we love we give a kinde of dominion over us, so that the will lo­seth its dignity when it loves abject things.

Again, Love inlarges and widens the heart, not only for the reception of the bounty and genero­sity of the object, but the object it self is that the heart goes out after when the will is filled with love, it awakens all the powers, and moves all the faculties towards the object, the understand­ing meditates and is enquiring after the excellen­cy of the thing beloved, still musing and plod­ding about it; the will is obstinate and will not be charmed of its object; the thoughts they are still kindling the affections who are in eager pursuit after the thing beloved, but I shall speak more particularly to this matter, and explain my meaning in this particularly. My meaning is, that there must be an intire love not [Page 73] only to the qualities of the minde, though those be most worthy, but this love must reach the su­perficies of the body, if that be ungrateful there cannot be a complacential Frendship; As the in­teriour part must have Analogy to reason, so the external part must be accommodated to the fan­cy: in short, there must not be conceived in the sancy a disgust against the form and condition of the person, all love begins with the person, if that be displeasing and ungrateful, nothing will satisfie, there is that in the person of every man that either obligeth or disobligeth the fancy: in­stance, there may be some personal defects which are so natural, that they cannot be divided from the person, and these may be very displea­sing; or there may be some cross dispositions, & they may be so riveted by custome, that they will hardly (if ever) be cured; Love studies the person in the first place, and it is most necessary, because as there is a kinde of antipathy in some persons to some creatures, so that they cannot be brought to take any pleasure in them, so many times we see an antipathy in men against such particular persons; there is no more reason to be given for the latter then the former, yet the con­trariety is as evident in the one as the other, and this may be occasioned by the mistake of fancy, rather then any real defect in the object; the eye of fancy may be so vitiated, that it may not be able to behold the clearnesse of a splendid object with complacency and delight, a weak eye can­not look with content upon a clear air, much lesse can it behold the sun, there is such a contra­riety [Page 74] in them; so that we often draw a curtain between them as a screen or veil, not that the air or sun are not both excellent in themselves but the reason why they are not desirable, is the eye is not receptive of them, because of its own im­becility and weaknesse: fancy is often surprised in the first choice and election, sometimes it's blinde, and declines objects most worthy, and pursues those that are most base and abject, it seldom consults reason, but often betrays it; spacious objects convey themselves through the fancy to the will; the senses they inveagle the fancy, and the fancy betrays and captivates the will: Fancy othertimes is so idle that it will not take the pains to examine things but is put off with outward gaudiness, it seldome is so cir­cumspect to act by rule, and that is the reason we are so uncertain in our first elections of per­sons and things: Fancy rashly fixeth without the consent of reason, to which it ought to be sub­servient, rather complying with sence, which makes it stray and warp from the exact rule; it is very hard to secure the fancy which lies open to so many temptations; and if it be betrayed and deluded, it is as hard to reclaim it: I have thought that passage in Samuel worth observati­on, when he was sent to anoint David, Eliab the elder brother passed before him, he fancies him presently, because he was a comely person: we experience this among our selves, when we come into a room where we see many strange faces, we take an affection to one more then the rest: Jonathans heart was knit to David, while he was [Page 75] discoursing with Saul, and he loved him as his own foul: there is no reason to be given why a man should pitch upon one person with delight without the least concern for the rest, but this fancy is surprized, and that so strangely some­times, that reason cannot prevail to break those fetters the man is manacled with haply to his great prejudice and utter ruine.

As there are several things that may betray and delude the fancy, so there are things that dis­please it, that may be removed as a supercilious gravity, this is very ungrateful, yet may not be so rivited as never to be taken away, as a harsh and severe aspect, and the like: but those things that cannot be divided from the person must (though never so ungrateful in themselves) be kinde­ly accepted: that which seems deformity to ano­ther which stands at a distance to the object, may appear pleasant to me who am more united, and therefore I may see comeliness where they fancy nothing but the contrary: this being the prudence of friendship to reconcile it self to every thing that at the first view may seem not grateful; if this cannot be done fancy is still uneasy; where there is a latitude, every faculty will endeavour a satisfaction; fancy bears so great a sway in all matters of Love and friendship, that it will be humored and that in the first place, and the rather because it stands nearer then any other faculty to that object about which it is conversant, it is so considerable, that nothing can be done without it. So there are many things very pleasing and ac­ceptable to the fancy, if it be rightly guided, as [Page 76] an humble demonier, a sweet and amiable con­versation: the wise-man observed, that the coun­tenance of a man rejoyceth his friend, if I cannot look upon my friend with delight I cannot love him, looking breeds liking, and proves the in­let to affection: Jonathan embraced the person of David; very pleasant was Jonathan to David, his love passed the love of the most passionate woman.

Secondly, as we must love the person of our friend, so we must love his conditions, we can­not love his person and hate his conditions, this is a paradox, and altogether impossible: I do not say, but we may and must love the persons of our enemies, though we must hate and abomi­nate their conditions, if they be evil; but this is with a love of charity, it cannot be with a complacential love; what felicity can a vertuous man take in a vicious person, he may love him so as to pitty and pardon, and converse with him at distance, but never so as to court his society, and place him in his bosome, it may be my friend is not the most affable courteous and ob­liging, or the patientest, or the best humoured man in the world, yet I may love him; one worthy quality is enough to make friendship, but the more worthy the greater the reason: a friend must endeavour a reconciliation to the condition of his friend as well as his per­son, as far as possible, and throw the mantle of love over those defects that are either acciden­tal, or such as are not so riveted that they cannot by contrary examples and friendly arguments be [Page 77] expunged: instance, a passionate man may see so much sweetness in patience that he may abhor contention, and so much pleasure in a free and equal conversation, that he may hate reserved­ness, and so much grace and beauty in humility, that pride may be cast out as most contemptible: reason will mightily prevail with ingenious per­sons in this regard, and they may easily be con­vinced of these vanities which cannot con­sist with Frendship: love cannot be supported but by that which is substantial, and this must be allowed, that there are some dispositions that cannot comport themselves for Frendship: there are dispositions or rather evil qualities that I could never be reconciled to, and they are espe­cially four, covetousness, and deep melancho­ly, pride and envy; I couple them together as those tyrants which aim at a perfect conquest o­ver the heart, and life, these can never stand with this relation and state of Frendship, be­cause they are diametrically contrary, and the only poyson that corrupt and destroy it,

First, Covetousness ingrosses the whole heart, and will endure nothing in the least contradicto­ry. Covetousness so debases the heart, that no noble quality can inhabite there; it bends and submits all to the mettal it so dearly loves and so highly values, and that is thick clay. Reason, conscience, and affection are all entangled in this golden web, so that they cannot soare aloft ei­ther to fix upon, or contemplate those things that ennable a man, and makes him act like himself according to his moral excellencies and immorta­lity [Page 78] of the soul. A covetous man will lay all things at stake, rather than his mony; his repu­tation, life, soul, any thing shall go; see this in Gehezi and in Demas, the one imbraced a lepro­sie, rather than loose a talent; the other forsook God to imbrace this present world. Have we not instances of this before our eyes every day, when we see men lay their honour in the dust, sa­crifice life, content and every thing to this dumb Idol; that man that loves mony more than him­self, or God, must needs love it better than his friend, and therefore above all persons fit to be excluded.

Secondly, melancholy in the extremity of it comes next to be examined, and this always ac­companies the former; that fills the heart with distracting cares, vehement desires, which if crossed, presently this is ready, as an effect of that cause; as appears in wicked Haman; he co­veted not only riches but honour, as most cove­tous men do; though they never do a generous act to deserve it; and because he could not ob­tain it from Mordecai an inconsiderable person in his esteem, he presently falls into a fit of me­lancholy, and though he had more to boast of then most men in respect of his honour, riches, and favour with the King, yet all this signified nothing, as long as Mordecai stood in the kings gate, who refused that obeisance to Haman, he so eagerly coveted, and so impartiently pined after, and hereupon the devil deludes him, and helps him to hammer out this device in his own shop, (which is melancholy) to hang Mordecai. [Page 79] This was the anvil Haman had been working at before, when he had framed an engine to destroy all the Jews. I cannot find any ill quality exclu­ded from melancholy, as wrath, malice, en­vy, uncharitableness, mis-trust, self-love in the highest degree, and where all these are, we may justly conclude there cannot be frendship: they love nothing but themselves, they indulge them­selves, they admire themselves, as if God had created them for no other purpose, or to any other end; and so extream wilful are they, if they will their own destruction, they will effect it, they are naturally the greatest cowards in the world, and they cannot be otherwise, except carried out by some violent motion, as pride, jealousie, covetousness, or malice; &c. they will lay violent hands upon themselves, and this they call resolution, but it is the cowardlyest act possible to come upon nature when it is na­ked, and destroy it, when by starving or discon­tent nature is brought low, to lay violent hands upon it this cannot be valour. I dread nothing more than this pettish humour and disposition; I could never make friendship with a person who in all respects I might believe would be as prodi­gal of my life, should I trust it with him as of his own. Many Examples we have of this daily, and much blood hath been shed by melancho­ly, that often harbours such discontents, that no­thing but blood can satisfy, and not seldom the blood of those they have most reason to preserve; Judas was such a one, who through covetousnes first betrayed his master, and after through me­lancholy [Page 80] hanged himself.

Secondly, let us consider the other couple pride and envy. A proud man cannot be a true friend because he cannot deny himself, in any respect: He wholy aimes at himself in his thoughs, words, and actions; his honour, plea­sure, ease is all he looks after; he is not sollici­tous how it fares with others: He will be a Dio­trephes and have the preheminence: he cannot give place: himself is his end, and his will is his rule, by which he squares all his actions▪ and the Law he endeavours passionately to bring all others unto subjection to, at least all those that are under his power and jurisdiction: like Haman he will rather lose his life, then abate any thing of his pride, is contentious and clamo­rous and cannot stand with friendship. Iehu-like he carries on all his designes: he is well learn­ed in the art of multiplication and addition▪ but a novice in the rule of substraction, except from others to himself. Pride is an unbecoming garment, let it be never so splendid in shew, it is but a fools coate: a proud man is still build­ing up his own reputation with the ruine of o­thers, he thinks himself always degraded when another is valued; and whatsoever is attributed unto another, though never so just, he thinks it a wrong done to him: he would willingly ingrosse all the applause unto himself, though he ne­ver appear in any generous action to deserve it▪ he cares not who loses, so that he may gain: he will rather rob God himself, as Herod did, then deny applause: he will blaze abroad any thing [Page 81] that hath but the appearance of good, but will seldom or never do any praise▪ worthy act: upon an adress to him, let the complaint be never so just, and the adresse never so humble, and the object never so deprorable, he is no way affected, but like Nabal a man cannot speake to him: he covets to be admired by all, but obliges none: feared he may be, but never loved: this man may promise fair, but he is so uncertain, you cannot trust him: by all which it is clear that a proud man cannot be fit for frendship, that re­quires all the contrary dispositions, and must possefs them, or cannot be at all.

Secondly, Let us consider a little of Envy. So­lomon saith, make no frendship with an angry man, and with the envious thou shalt not go: and here (that I may not be mifunderstood,) we must distinguish of anger. I do not mean by anger here, the boiling of the blood, which comes from a natural cause, this is like a flash of lightning, soon come and soon gone: This is found to be the consequence of the best disposition; but I mean by this anger, that which ariseth from an envious heart, that cannot sleep except they have done mischief. These are like thunderclaps se­cretly wounding to the very heart, and bears down all before it. Solomon observed this, who can stand (saith he) before envy. Such have those things in their hearts, and practises that cannot possibly abide with frendship, but would immediately, like a worm, eat out the substance of it. This anger or rather revenge rests in the bosome of these fools: It is not a wayfaring man [Page 82] that continues for a night, but an inhabitant that is always at home plotting and contriving how to tread down credit, estate, life, and all, if it stand in its way. An envious man hath these qua­lities, he is soon disobliged, never reconciled. He can forgive (he will say) but never forget: he is constant in nothing but vexation: his tongue a persecutor: his heart like the troubled waters, casting up nothing but mire and durt: Such a one was Simei, his revenge to his servant was so great, that he must follow him with the peril of his own life. You know what Simei was, by his railing at David: doubtless he was an en­vious and a malicious man: he that will prefer his passion before his own life, will hardly value the life of his friend. The calm temper is the best accommodated for frendship: how much better is a handful of green herbs, where quietness is, then a stalled oxe with strife. A malitious man cannot be grateful; he is satisfyed with nothing: if a man be good he grudges that; if he be evil he will revile him, though he be worse abundantly himself: he is like the witches, that put on their eyes when they went abroad, but when they came home, they put them in their pockets: if he fan­cies an undervalue, he will hate a man for that, and he will never be serious about the cause of that hatred, but pronounce judgment right or wrong upon the person offending (as he pre­tends,) he will dispence with all manner of justice in this case: he will do as Felix did by Paul, may be, promise a hearing at a more con­venient season, but that season shall never come, [Page 83] he having much more pleasure in aggravating quarrels, then studying peace.

Secondly, The second qualification is sutable­ness in conversation and expression. There must be an agreement here, or else no amity, and herein is most of the sweetness of frendship; can two walk together except they are agreed? walking signifies all manner of familiar converse, and sociable delight, and this is very pleasant: I would rather have a friend that could delight me, than one that could enrich me: there is a vast content in the conversation of friends, especial­ally in their communications, recreations, & ne­gotiations. In conversation we express those en­dearments and affections that feed a real frend­ship; in communicating our joys and griefs, the first is doubled, the last is divided: with how much satisfaction do friends chat away sad times, that otherwise would seem tedious, either by disappointments or actual sufferings; not seldom they discourse themselves out of a pettish hu­mour, changing distracting thoughts and un­grounded resolutions, for a calm and serious temper, and this may be done by solid and seri­ous arguments, wherein there is not only profit but beauty. Solomon says, a word spoken in season how good is it? It is like apples of gold in pictures of silver; friends they have much variety of busi­ness to communicate, as their fears, and doubts, perfections, and imperfections; their hopes, and delights, especially their affections, and cove­nant of frendship which is often renewed. There must be this intercourse between frends to avoid [Page 84] suspition if they will be happy; and this is ex­ceeding necessary, because fear offers violence to nature, takes away mans strength, draws a cloud upon all his comforts, and lies like a ta­lent of lead upon the heart, we are most times more unhappy in what we fear, then in what we feel: How did Belshazars knees smite one against another, and his very joynts were loosed when the hand-writing appeared upon the wall? Is it not ma­ny times so with the best of us, when God writes bitter things against us? a friend in this extremi­ty of affairs comes like the shepherds with tidings of great joy, & declares our peace with God, his good will towards us. These are the heart-cheat­ing arguments, that winds up the heart above those fears, and like the sun dissipates the clouds, and opens a door of hope: fear overwhelms a man, casts him into a swouning fit: a gracious and serious friend revives and restores him to his strength again. Doubts are as inseparable to men in their most serene temper, as motes from the air in the clearest day, or spots from the moon in the brightest night; there is much cause of hesitati­on in men of the purest and most innocent conver­sations, they are not without their entanglements, many a perplexing web they spin; but these may be unravelled by a judicious friend, who happily may be skilful, as Ioseph was to answer those riddles of providence, and resolve those doubts that at present seems intricate, and past finding out. Ioseph was such a friend to the chief butler: men are many times reasoned off their doubts, and inforced to throw them away, be­cause [Page 85] they cannot abide the test and conviction of reason. Ionathan and David the best friends we ever read of, they spent much time in communi­cating their dispondences and trouble. Saith Da­vid, there is but a step betwixt me and death: how affectionately did Ionathan resolve this doubt; who alone was the most likely instrument to se­cure David: which he did, more then promise, in his answer to Davids scruple, where he saith, whatever thy soul desires, I will do it for thee, and so goes on with pregnant arguments of his faith­fulness to David, whereby he cleared the most puzling doubt of all by expressing his care and kindness in a matter that concerned Davids life: the preserving of which must loose Ionathan his crown. Ionathan lying under this temptation, no wonder if David had doubts in such times as these are; friends must renew their covenants, as they did, and acquiesce in the faithfulness of each other.

Again, friends communicate their Joys and hopes; joy will strengthen nature as effectually as fear will impair it: he is no friend that will not be more ready to impart his comforts then his sorrows, which he may do with more freedom & less caution, and may promise himself a mutual satisfaction, which doubles the content. There are many things that cheers the heart, but these being according to the conditions of the person concerned we cannot well define them, but this in the general observe, that whatever is absolute­ly necessary, earnestly expected, justly due, if accomplished is a matter of joy & delight, and [Page 86] cannot faithfully be concealed; whatever my friend takes pleasure in, I must not withhold but rather augment, illustrate and amplify it, always annexing a complacent behaviour, as the sittest temper for that season, when the heart is upon the wing of hope & joy, that will raise the social communication of friends to a high pitch of satis­faction; when the heart is full of pleasure, it is full of love, and resolution; these being as na­tural to joy and hope, as discontent and harshnes is to fear and doubt: a merry heart makes a joy­ful countenance: what is more pleasing then a cheerful aspect? hope is to the soul as the an­chor is to the ship: it keeps it steady among the most perplexing waves: Joy is a passion arising from the apprehension of some good we have in hand or in hope, relating to our selves or others: did I apprehend any thing in my self, in the world or in my friend that could be matter of pleasure unto him, I could be neither kind nor civil to con­ceal it, nor could any thing be matter of joy un­to me if I could not impart it, at best it would be but a half joy.

Lastly, love and delight must be imparted al­so in this equal conversation: love is the hand within the wheel which turns the whole con­cern; as the heart must not be without the habits of an intire affection, so our conversation must not be without the acts in our daily commerce: Love is workful and watchful: this passion is ve­ry industrious, it's never off from action, nor doth it ever want expression: It shrinks at neither ser­vice nor suffering: it is oyl to the wheel of acti­on: [Page 87] It thinks no suffering intolerable so long as it enjoys the help of a true friend, who will take up the heavyest end of the burthen, putting oyle into the wound, and joy into the heart by chee­ring considerations. In afflictions (sayth Job) pitty should be shewed by a friend. This is the discriminating time; a friend is known in adver­sity. If a man can delight in his friend when under a cloud, when his lustre is obscured (this speaks a fast friend) and administers great delight: we do not much value our entertainment in a prospe­rous estate, all will admire the rising sun, but to have an equal respect when declining this is rare, and can proceed from nothing, but an unchang­able affection, which excellently improves all opportunities and seasons to expresse that love and delight which is consonant unto it self: no­thing more sweet then endeared expressions, these leave a tincture upon the heart many days after. How do we [...]owle such expressions in our thoughts as hony under our tongue. Love is full of contemplation and invention, and therefore cannot be wanting in expression.

Suitablenesse in recreation and businesse in the world is also considerable as that which com­pleats the happiness of this concern exceedingly; if friends differ here, much of their society will be lost. Instance, one man affects serious recre­ation, another those that are most sensual; these cannot hold correspondency one with another long, but must certainly one time or another ha­zard a breach, because that their recreations are not only different but diametrically contrary, and [Page 88] consequently will occasion discontent on both sides. A serious man though he may bear while he thinks there is some hopes of reclaiming, yet he cannot alwaies do it because contrary to his reason, affection and humour, nor can he long suspend his censures; on the other side pleasure will so prevail with him that loves it that he will defend it, and contemn reason and re­ligion too, if it stand in opposition to, or in com­petition with it, pleasure being very attractive and prevailing, nothing more.

Let your business as much as possible be the same, at least nor contrary; much of the sweet­ness of Friendship stands in living, walking, wor­king together; there is nothing a man is more impatient of then the absence of his friend: O how he longs for his communion! as the last sweetens and shortens time, so the first imbitters it and makes it tedious; the reason is ready, be­cause there is nothing so harsh as disappoint­ments, especially in those things wherein we expect the highest satisfaction and pleasure; suitable to mens negotiations such are their con­ditions and affections; If a mans businesse carry him far away, so that he stands at a great distance to the object, you will soon see coldnesse in af­fection, carelesnesse and unconcernedeesse will follow immediatly; and as clouds will darken the splendour of Frendship, though it shined ne­ver so bright before, and that because they can­not be capable of those acts of kindenesse which beautifies and maintains Frendship: besides they meet with many diversions and temptations, [Page 89] which like a moth will soon deface the beauty and glory of this concern.

There must be suitablenesse in the expression of our love; we must not observe different me­thods in the expressing of our affections: there is more in this then at the first view doth appear or we think of: the want of this hath occasioned much difference among Friends, and created ma­ny causless suspicions, when their manner of expressions hath been contrary: Instance, some are more open and free, others more close and reserved; the first cannot believe any temper so contrary to generosity, can haveany consisten­cy with Frendship; the latter suspects the former, as altogether appearing in hyperboles, thinking that they rise to high in their expression to be real and so censure and slight it, though it be never so ingenious and certain. But when that method is the same, how confirmed and fixed is the frend­ship; and this is not hard to be brought to passe among prudent persons, which though at the first they seem very different, yet they will soon agree: if they argue the case, and yield on both sides to that which comes nearest the rules of a perfect friendship in that latitude in which it ought to be considered, I think this would be one of the first things I would study, were I to contract a well grounded friendship. I never affected hyperbo­les in friendship; though some say in love they are most comely; because by the same reason I may not believe some, I may question all that is expressed by them. A true expression is most pleasing and insinuating: some truths may be [Page 90] more valued than others; not that there is any defect in truth, but there may be in them that re­ceives it. We value all truths, but especially those we best understand, and is of greatest use unto us. Some truths may be so high that we can­not reach them: others may be so contrary to some tempers that they will not believe them, and hereby truth passes under a notion of falshood, men are hardly brought to believe that in others which they cannot finde in themselves; never in­sisting upon their own incapacity for it, because that were a secret reproof, and a close reflexion, and therefore are more prone to conclude things impossible they cannot possesse, then prize or va­lue them in another. Neither would I be too low in my expressions; this were coming as short as the other was shooting beyond the mark; because high affections are alwaies accompanied with proportionable expressions. Nor could any thing mean be accepted; where there are such vast expectations, as in friendship; but pru­dence may so regulate this affair, that neither demonstration nor expression, confirmation nor affection shall be wanting; as also bend all things to the perfect rule, so as there shall appear so much equality as shall reach and continue a real satisfaction and a right understanding of all things that at first seemed to render this sameness in ex­pression impossible or at least uneasy.

Lastly, above all disparity be careful of this, that there be some proportion in your estates; covet not a person much richer than your self to make a friend of: you may run into more incon­veniences [Page 91] then you are aware of in this respect; sutableness here is as considerable as in any of the former: I would not aim at an advantage here, because as I would not have a friend that could not do me courtesies, so I would not have too great a dependance upon him: it is a more blessed thing to give, than to receive. I would rather take a friend that should share with me, then one that should think my affection a purchase he made by his money. If you fancy a friend that is rich, or rather for his riches, sit down first and consider the charge; this may cost you more than it is worth: we must be very discreet in this case, men cannot long love chargeable things: such persons may expect too much distance, obliga­tion, and service to stand with this relation: you must wisely weigh all circumstances, and not de­pend too much, if you intend to be happy: Mo­ney will beat down the price of friendship and contend for superiority; and will think it very hard to be denyed when the least reason of chal­lenge appears, we know, it is too base to be com­pared with friendship, yet it would be honoured because it has a splendidaspect, it carries its value in its face, & like an usurper endeavours to sub­mit to slavery & contempt, that which is infinitely more valuable; true it is a vertuous man may be outwardly mean and contemptible, yet hath a minde more glorious than the gold that perisheth. I cannot but smile when I see persons valued for their money, and they take very kindely, that which would be a vexation to me, which is, to see my servant honoured above my self. How [Page 92] contemptible would many be, (though they make a great noise in the world, and are cloathed in gorgeous apparel) if their golden servant were gone, that they are adored for: such a man would be despised though he be now like Dives, as Lazarus upon the dunghill, there is no real worth in gold, all is but fancy: there is more worth in a peece of bread, or in a draught of wa­ter then in all the silver and gold in both the In­dies; Heathens could see this.

We read of the Medes that they did not care for silver, and for gold they had no delight in it; It is hardly to be creditted how wise men do adore this dumb Idol, and value themselves by it, stripping themselves of robes and clothing themselves with rags, I mean when they debase their reason which is the crop and glory of man in his moral capacity, and cloathe themselves with thick clay, I could never honor nor esteem a worthlesse man, though I saw him tumble in gold, no more than I could value a puppet be­cause he had glittering attire. I cannot admire persons, as they admire themselves if their great­est excellency be riches, and are only happy that they have what their mony can procure, making a hundred things necessary to themselves, men of real worth could live and be happy without. I will never make a friendship with one that must maintain me: it is ten to one if ever I should be brought to set so high a value upon an estate, as those whose property it is would expect, if all the gold & silver in the world were put into one scale and a vertuous man in the other, the latter would [Page 93] mightily overballance. I will bless God for plen­ty, but abundance I would be afraid of; and e­vermore remember what we are taught in our Litany to pray, which is, in time of our wealth, good Lord deliver us. If money were as little valu­ed as vertue, and a greater price put upon good­ness, we might yet live to see some happy days. There is nothing more contemptible than those that look no higher then money; they cannot be honest, they will make shipwrack of a good con­science to get it, nor are they desirable, because so low in their ends and aims, that they do not think it worth their while to drive any other trade, but their profit: they will not be rational for fear they should not be rich; they cannot look off from their wealth, nor study any other miste­ry: These persons will never be at the charge of frendship: all your endeavour there will be like water spilt upon the ground, that can never be gathered up again, no suitable returns can be expected.

The third qualification, is self-denyall: this is most necessary in frendship: friends must not be wilful; there may be seasons when they cannot deserve that name, if they cannot deny them­selves. Jonathan denied himself eminently for David, they were both obliging, but Ionathan exceeded, because though he knew David would prove a supplanter, yet he consulted how to pre­serve him, hazarding the losse of his crown and kingdom. A man will in some respects do more for his friend than himself, in a way of self-deni­all: many men would be reduced to great [Page 94] straights, rather than court some persons for themselves, yet can cheerfully do it for their friend, I could deny my self estate, habitation, relations, any thing for my friend, but reputa­tion and conscience; to sacrifice the first were to lie under a crime unpardonable aniong men: the violating of the last a sin inexcusable before God: both which would make me too base for this concern; no person fit to be trusted with frend­ship, that can prodigally part with those things so precious, that nothing can repair, or expiate.

The fourth qualification: there must be free­ness and openness of heart; freedom and frend­ship is inseparable; and can no more be divided then the cause from the effect; Reservedness can­not be admitted: It is too late to lock the cabinet when the Jewel is gone: where I can give my heart, I can reserve nothing: true love allows neither reservation nor exception, all is free; their intercourse is without violence. How insi­nuating is affection! how easily it winds it self into the heart? If I cannot live in the heart of my friend, he is no friend to me. And if he be an o­pen-hearted man he is open-handed: he that hath accesse to my heart, hath a key to my cabinet, or else no freedom, and consequently no real frend­ship. A generous man can as freely give as re­ceive, he hates covetousness: If there can be no frendship without exchange of hearts, surely then the heart comprehends all things else inferi­our, and speaks a full possession of all things that are near and dear to a man. There is a reci­procation of affairs between friends: all things [Page 95] are common: there is but one common stock be­tween them it is true, the property may be in one, but the use must be in both: there is no­thing so low as money among friends in their esteem and value: and if they can part with eve­ry thing else, they will never grudge that; nor can any prudence restrain a man who hath vo­luntarily put his friend into possession, and bound himself to maintain it, and can no way be disob­liged but by the worst perfidiousness possible; there is no contending for propriety in this state: if my estate snall not serve my friend, I will ne­ver give him that name.

The fifth qualification is Wisdom: a▪ man of understanding is of an excellent spirit; wis­dom makes the face of man to shine upon his friend with heart-gladning rayes. Solomon is said in respect of his wisdom that he was as an angel of God. And indeed nothing makes a man in his mo­ral estate more divine than wisdome. A man can­not be happy except his friend hath competent wisdom. I grant that there are differences in men: some are not so capable as others: propor­tionable to the wisdom of our friend, so is our wealth in him; that is the greatest treasure be­cause most excellent and useful: there are many intricacies a man winds himself into; sometimes by impudence, othertimes by ignorance; the clue is in the heart & hand of a judicious friend, that may bring him out: If my friend be wise, I can confide in him in the worst of times: many plain-hearted men have been undone for want of this: how oft do we hear them complaining? all [Page 96] this evil is come upon me, because I had no seri­ous, wise, and faithsul friend to advise me in this or the other affair, but now it is too late, I am ruined: If Ioabs wisdom had not interposed, Da­vid had been undone in that case concerning Ab­solon. A wise man can see an evil before it comes, and extenuate it when it is come. A prudent man foresees the evil, and hideth himself and his friend both; they will be together. It was no small advantage to Pharaoh that Ioseph foresaw the evil of famine coming upon the land of Egypt, when it came how easy it was made by the wis­dom of Ioseph, the story will inform us. There are many things to be done before we come to an undoing necessity: a wise man foresees that, and does that now by way of prevention that an imprudent man would wish he had done, when the extremity is upon him. Wisdom is most de­sirable in this regard, because there is no great want, where it is rightly improved: it is the ladder by which men climb up to honour, and is useful in all conditions; in prosperity a wise man will remember that he is in slippery places, and therefore will look well to his steps; in adversity, that he hath many temptations, and therefore must be serious and considerate. Let a wise man be cast into never so much mire, and trampled upon, he sparkles like a diamond still; nothing can deprive him of his worth and excellency. True it is, that wise men are not always rich, nor rich men are not always wise, yet the former may and shall have the preheminency, riches and greatness being both subordinate to wisdom: [Page 97] the poor wise man delivered the city, when the king could not do it by his honour, wealth, and strength: Have we matters of high trust? none more fit to commit them to, then a wise man: In troubles he will support, in straights he will direct, in most perplexing business and puzling doubts he will advise when to be active, when to sit still; none fit for sriendship but these: ma­ny there are that are faithful and affectionate, and would be very active, if they knew how, or in what method, but for want of wisdom; They conclude all their good desires in a few empty wishes, which may satisfy themselves, but ne­ver serve their friends: but wife men are most useful, therefore much to be ambitioned: this is an indifpensable quali [...]y for friendship which must be endeavoured with all possible care.

The Sixth qualification is faithfulnesse: this is the cabinet that contains our most precious jew­el, I mean the secrets of the heart): secrecy in a friend is the most precious part of friendship, and that because there is assigned to that part the highest trust imaginable; a defect here cannot be without the greatest treachery conceivable; be­cause it makes a perfect divorce, and strikes a­gainst the very nature and essence of friendship; Solomon observed that a faithful man conceales the matter. There are many things between friends; that are in no case fit to be revealed, nor cannot be done but with the greatest treachery, because thereby a man betrays the highest trust, which nothing can make a crime more unpardo­nable. The intercourses between friends, can­not [Page 98] be revealed without detriment, because ex­pressions of kindness (though innocent) may by an unfaithful repetition, prove prejudicial and slaunderous. There are these things especially in a faithful man, that challenges our respect and value, and renders him exceeding precious, First, he is true, you may trust him: he doth not wear like Jezabel, a painted outside; or like the gal­lants of our times, that hath the most endeared expressions in their mouthes, their voice is the voice of Jacob, but their hands the hands of Esau. And this is very much to be admired, especially in persons of ingenuity, because men naturally love truth, and value things according to truth, Instance, a picture if it be never so curiously drawn, shall obtain no reputation, if it do not resemble the person it represents. No wonder there is no more love in the world, men cannot trust one another, Joab-like they cry, my brother, and smite deadly. Is not a faithful friend to be valued in such times as these; when there is a lye in the right hand of those that in complement pretend the greatest reallity, if I cannot believe a man, I cannot trust him, nor treat him without suspicion, nor value him; nothing more destru­ctive to friendship, than falshood; nothing more obliging than faithfulness.

As a faithful man is true, so he is honest and just: he is a covenant-keeping man, as well as a covenant-making man; and this is considerable, because in all friendships there must be cove­nants: you see that between David and Jonathan the pattern of friendship: the covenant of God [Page 99] was between them: it is called the covenant of God by way of eminency: for every thing in Scripture that hath the name of God annexed to it, as the city of God, or the mountain of God, or the temple of God, this speaks the eminency of those things. The covenant between friends is not a trivial thing, but weighty, and seriously to be heeded : we ought not to break promise with an enemy, God hath severely fallen upon covenant breakers, and good men have been ve­ry consciencious in making good their cove­nants, as we may see in the case of the Gibeo­nites, Josh. 9. 15. Joshua knew that they were de­ceivers, and that they had sinisterly brought him into league with them, yet the league being made Joshua could be no way discharged by any man­ner of prudence, piety or policy. Many men make [...] covenants, but few keeps them. Cove­nants are very binding to men of honest and just principles [...] bind the conscience, as well as the reputation, a prudent man will not be brought into covenant, when he foresees a breach unavoi­dable; because as a man cannot be wise, rashly to promise, so he cannot be just, if he doth not exactly keep [...] There is nothing next to holy­nesse more valuable than justice, next to believe and be saved that golden rule takes place, do as you would be done unto. A man that is faithful can­not be bribed by profit, nor biassed by pleasure to prejudice hi [...] friend, he cannot be uncertain, you may know where to finde him: he is not a friend to day, and an enemy to morrow; as he never fixed without deliberation, so he can never [Page 100] alter without great provocation. The place where our treasure lyes must be certain, or else the treasure cannot be safe: none can pick this lock. A faithfull man will not only hate unfaithfulness in himself, but he will endea­vour to make others faithfull, with whom his friend is concerned: the concernments, as well as the person of his friend so considerable to him; in all disputable matters he will make the case his own; he will never see his friend con­demned where he ought to be justified: in all actions that concern him his help and assistance is never wanting: he will not say, am I my bro­thers keeper? but will be a wing to cover: a succour in the most uncomfortable times: a faith­ful witness for him, and will have a due respect unto all his concerns.

The Seventh qualification is humility: This is like oyl that makes the wheels of friendship go more smoothly: how amiable is humility? It not only sweetens the conversation of friends, but graces & adorns them more than honour; be­fore honour is humility, saith the wise man; hu­mility is acceptable both to God and man; God ascribes wisdom unto it, with the lowly is wis­dom, and man gives him greatest reverence and respect; an humble man is a self-denying man; he can heighten his friend and undervalue himself, he contentedly will decrease, that his friend may increase: how willingly will he throw of that applause from himself, he would court for his friend. Humility is a garment that becomes the greatest prince in the world: An humble [Page 101] man studies not so much his perfection, as his imperfections: he contentedly passes under a cloud without any noise, and thinks him­self most happy when least observed: can re­treat when there is no reason for it, but his humility: h [...] readily and freely submits rather than make a quarrel whoever doth the injury: he is always on the yielding side; I do not mean a base submission by this compliance, as a trans­ferring that crime, which is properly anothers to my self: this is the picking of a thorn out of another mans foot, and putting it into my own. Religion bids me submit where there is cause, and reason tells me it is baseness and pusillanimi­ty to do it where there is none. I ever abhorred an unworthy detraction and submission, as being against my reason and conscience: it appearing unto me as high a piece of hypocrisie to condemn my self, where I am sure I am innocent, as it would be pride to justify my self where I know I am guilty; besides, hereby I put my self into a necessity to beg that pardon from another, which otherwise he would have seen reason enough to have desired of me: such complements as these I could never fancy, nor rationally approve, be­cause I never saw any other effect proceeding from that cause, but shame and scorn, for men though never so criminal would gladly be thought innocent, yet they will not not be at charge to deserve it: nor will men willingly consult reason against themselves; they will go thus far, and judge by the rule of contraries, if you are guilty, I must be innocent, How irra­tional [Page 102] is it, for a man to brand himself to please another, thereby making himself liable to those reflections that may one time or another prove more prejudiciall to his peace and credit, than any present advantage he could propound unto himself, in so base a piece of self-denyall: I ne­ver thought submission the best way of reconciling quarrels among equals, but rather the most effe­ctual way to augment and heighten them. I would yield very far before I would make a quarrel with them I love, but if there could be no pre­vention of a just quarrel, I would not submit; be­cause if I submit, thereby I make my accuser my judge in his own case, and must stand to his mer­cy, and though he might reprieve and not con­demn me at present, yet still I lie under the lash of his judgment, whenever he pleases to impose it; the fear of which would make me a perpetual slave, and still confirm his jurisdiction over me, which I can never wrest out of his hand, (having voluntarily invested him with it) without ha­zarding a greater quarrel then before; and that because by this act I put an undervalue up­on him, and think him not worthy of that place I had first invested him with by my own voluntary act; which he will now hardly part with, be­cause complyance and submission is so grateful to most persons, that they having once obtained it, they will contend hard for it, rather than make a surrender. The most advisable thing in this case, is, to forget the quarrel, and time will wear off that animosity, and convince that the in­terest of friends is to make peace, rather then [Page 103] improve quarrels, and to be always studying that method that may effect this to a mutual content and the least prejudice. But I return from this digression. In short, humility hath these things to commend it: an humble man will easily admit of all manner of adresses; he is not lordly and state­ly, nor doth he stand at so great a distance, as a proud man doth: this is very insinuating & capti­vates the heart, by this means Absolon stole the hearts of the men of Israel again; an humble man cheerfully receives all complaints, and se­riously studies all manner of satisfaction to the complainants, and willingly complyes to all just and handsom things.

The eighth qualification is resolution; Neither time, place, nor person can make a true friend unfixed: time that wears every thing else, will rather beautify, strengthen, and augment, then impair friendship, because every day heapes up new endearments, by which it is made more com­pleat and confirmed. There is a tye upon friends that is like the marriage-knot, nothing but death can dissolve; and indeed they have need to be re­solved, else they will never stand and fall toge­ther, which they must do, if they are real: cou­rage in a friend is most necessary, especially in time of imminent danger: a friend will not cow­ardly loose the life or reputation of his friend: he will hazard two in this case, rather than loose one. Jonathan was a resolved man, neither ho­nour, life, or any thing could make him unfaith­ful to David: every man is at his liberty before the friendship is made, but not afterward; there­fore [Page 104] must be resolved, There is no wisdom in first resolving and then making inquiries: we must consider the charge of friendship before we begin and be satisfied in this, which is a great truth, that though friendship be most desireable, yet it is not without trouble; no estate nor person with­out exception in this lower land; you will finde disappointments entailed upon the best of per­sons and things, which should quicken our diligence and care, and heighten our resolutions; friends must not be like bowls, that every small rub will put off their byass: they must expect ma­ny apples of strife to be thrown between them by the devil and men of dividing principles: both envying the beauty and comelinesse of that state; friendship always attracts the eye: we see many gazing upon it, but not the heart, because few understand it. They that have a near inspe­ction into the excellency of this state have a high value for it, not so much for its outward beauty, as inward excellency: and these greatly esteem a true and faithful friend though they have not alwaies opportunity to obtain it, others are ut­terly uncapable of ever obtaining it, & they hate the persons in whom they see a capacity for it, meerly for their friendship; like the fallen angels that kept not their first estate, and therefore hates all those, that are not plunged with them in the same unhappy estate. I have seen persons great­ly respected while they carryed it at a distance each to other, but afterwards when they have been observed to unite in their affections, have been hated, vilified, scorned, and scandalized; [Page 105] such is the enmity there is in some persons to this relation: and this may procecd from one of these causes.

First, Satan seems to be concerned in this mat­ter: knowing that the improvement of reason and vertue mightily prepares the heart for grace, the young man in the Gospel in respect of his morality was a great proficient, he is said by the best testimony to be not farr from the kingdome of God. Men in friendship much im­prove, because they are alwayes studying things grateful, comely, and acceptable, and in this united capacity, are not lyable to those various temptations that men of contrary tempers are insnared by, Satan perceiving this, studies all possible means to imbitter this state, and as an ef­fectual means to reach that end, he sets profane men at enmity against those innocent persons; and these are not only enemies to the pleasure and profit of friendship, but are at enmity with the persons, & this proceeds from their ignorance as well as satans malice; they understand nothing of what they censure and revile, fondly con­ceiving, that every attainment they h [...]e no part nor interest in, not worth the having; never con­sidering their own incapacity for it, who are so turbulent in their humors, crosse in their quali­ties, that they can never arrive at so much com­posednes, as will comport with this temper: nor is it altogether ignorance, but envy also will be concerned, which delights in nothing more than to spot this innocent garment. I would never esteem that friend that were not resolved never [Page 106] to decline me upon any account whatsoever. This was a great amplification of Jonathans love unto David, his resolution never to desert him, rather running the hazard of his fathers displea­sure, the losse of his crown and kingdome, and which is more his precious life, then deal falsly in this covenant. I would take my friend, as a man takes his wife, for better for worse, and resolve with Ruth, whither thou goest I will go; where thou lodgest I will lodge, thy people shall be my people, thy God shall be my God, where thou dyest, I will dye, and there will I be bu­ried: resolution is the note and character of a true friendship, and lowdly speaks it neither tottering nor unsound. If Jonathan could have been corrupted in his love to David by any temptations, there was enough to do it; if threat­nings, accusations, or intreaties could have pre­vailed, it would have been done, as the histo­ry will inform us: but Jonathan could not fear the one, nor credit the other against his friend; nor is it every little slip in friendship it self would do it: it must be some capital crime that can ma [...] separation; True it is that a man is not alwayes grateful to himself, and therefore cannot be so to any other, at all times, sometimes friendship comes gloriously arrayed, othertimes is clothed in rags; shall a man decline his friend, because he doth not appear always so splendid as at other times, and say he is no friend? this is as irrational, as to say a man is no man, because he hath not on his best clothes: there are many ac­cidents that may render a man lesse pleasing and [Page 107] acceptable at one time than another: the various tempers of body and minde doth make a great change: these must be considered and allowed: little things will not stick with a resolved friend.

The ninth qualification is compassion and ten­ness of heart: this is the cordial of frendship, and the hand that binds up the breaches in the heart, that which repairs the defects of nature and puts life into a dying person, this is that oyl that sweet­ly runs into the wounds of a perplexed heart and heals it, that hand that wipes tears from the eye, and takes the burthen from the heart: it was not the smallest part of Jobs misery, that he had not compassionate friends in his affli­ctions: In affliction (saith he) pitty should be shewed by a friend, but miserable comforters are you all. If there can be pleasure in affli­ction this is it, that I have a concerned friend: every compassionate friend is a man of bow­els; he is afflicted in all that his friend is af­flicted, and will as freely share with him in his sorrows, as in his comforts; this is matter of great lamentation in affliction that we have none to pitty us, the consideration of that doubles the misery and adds weight to the burden, but this cannot be the case of him that has a true friend: upon a sick bed who makes the bed so easie, as a compassionate friend? no society so pleasant and diverting as he: in pain who is so merciful? in penury who is so bountiful? many will passe by in straights, as the priest and the Levite did by the poor traveller; but a friend will, like the good Samaritan, give oyl for his wounds, and [Page 106] [...] [Page 107] [...] [Page 108] wine for his heart, he will put his soul in his souls stead, and do for him what he would desire for himself, were the present case his own. Here the golden rule shines brightly, do you as you would be done unto. This was the season Jona­than made use of to express his bounty and com­passion unto David. There is nothing more ob­liging in frendship than compassion: a fellow­feeling and sympathy in our friend is very grate­ful, when like the two twins History speaks of, these sociable companions laugh and weep toge­ther; these are like the strings of a viol, touch one and the other trembles. As their sufferings are mutual so are their satisfactions. A man is not seldom more concerned for his friend then for himself. I have experienced this, who have som­times born afflictions with so much the more pa­ence and satisfaction, because it passed by my friend, and kindly took me: the reason is rea­dy, because a great crosse upon the body is more easily born, than that which is smaller upon the minde. It is with the minde as with the body, those distempers that touch the vitals are more dangerous▪ than them that are accompanied with more exquisite pains in the body; so heart afflicti­ons are most vexations: when my friend is under any affliction, my minde is troubled, and I feel that pain in my heart for him, that perhaps he feels far enough from his. I have been more a­mazed and affrighted at the sufferings of my friends, than I could have been at the apprehensi­on of my own death, and would willingly have purchased life to them, by loosing my own.

As compassion is free, so it is pleasant: how cheerfully will a compassionate man look upon his friend in distresse? not that he is not sorry for his affliction, but to shew how pleased he is to help and assist him: God loves a cheerful giver, so doth man. The aspect of a man in giving and re­ceiving doth very often discover the heart of the giver; for men can hardly, handsomly dissemble it here: when favours come [...] ▪ from persons only moved by credit and relation, and not from love, how slowly do they come, the chariot-wheels do move heavily then, but when they come from a compassionate friend, they fly and come insensi­bly, nor is this all; compassion goes farther, to acts of clemency also: that is a true friend, who can heartily forgive, and passe by infirmities, without reflection: he will not make a quarrel upon every slight occasion, he is more proue to pitty then to reprove, he doth not study excepti­ons but complyance: he will ever make the best interpretation possible: and look over the mi­stakes of his friend with allowance, and where he finds a blot he will draw it fair again: he will treat him with all civility and tenderness, reprove kindly and seasonably, excluding all manner of harshness, cloathing himself with all humility, gravity, and civility: and upon the discovery of any error, if it be not very criminal, he will say as Eli did of his sons, this is not a good report I hear of you, friend. Wisdom as well as tender­ness is also necessary in this case: the well ma­nagement of a reproof is a very nice point, few understands it, and as few are acceptable and [Page 110] successeful in this regard. Amiableness in the countenance, sweetness in the expression are the best expedients, and seems to be the most effectu­al means, to convince without leaving the least scar on the reputation, or disquietness in the minde: few persons love a reprover, yet Solo­mon observed, that men of wisdom do, reprove a wise man and he will love thee.

The tenth qualification, there must be com­placency and delight as well as profit in a friend, a man takes more pleasure in his friend, than in all the world beside: all other things are to him at a distance, and we know things remote give no great delight; the more united, the more pleasure: the sun under a cloud is not so desira­ble, because it stands at a greater distance to the visive faculty, as when it shines clearly without any interposition. Solomon observed, that it was a pleasant thing for the eye to behold the sun, in its rayes, when nothing intervened between the fa­culty and the object: here are two things especi­ally to be considered in frendship in order to a compleat delight and complacency; that is, pro­portion and propriety: These seems to be the basis upon which that fabrick stands: proportion not only prepares for it, but greatly supports it; and propriety conveys the pleasure and sweet­ness of frendship to the respective persons, by multiplying endearments, and such expressions which immediately proceed from a well-ground­ed affection: how pleasant is a Romance tha [...] doth but feign frendship? and is not frendly comerce and communion that is reall more consi­derable? [Page 111] can a picture though never so well drawn give the content the person can that it [...]epresents? we finde they oftner draw feares [...]rom our eyes then convey pleasure to the heart, [...]ecause they oftentimes tell us, that our dearest [...]riends are either lost, or at so great a distance, [...]hat we finde more reason to despair then hope, [...]nd this fills our hearts with sighs and cares: pro­ [...]riety in a friend is the surest tye, and the grea­ [...]est obligation: certainly there is a superlative [...]atisfaction there, which appears not more in [...]he communion than in the heart-breaking [...]houghts and languishing desires in case of ab­ [...]ence: and this is most evident by our longing & [...]ighing after that person we have happily fixed [...]oo much upon, ever to be contented without the [...]eal possession and constant enjoyment of; yet so unhappy because of some cruel accident inter­vening, that we cannot enjoy the object; that there [...]s a transcendent content and pleasure in the re­ [...]ation and state of friendship, we cannot want arguments enough to prove, especially this, be­cause we finde there, that which in the highest m [...]asure will gratifie both the rational and sensi­tive appetite: and this is done when by arguing & useful discourses doubts are removed, & fears [...]ly away; how gladly do we welcome that per­son that can inform us of those things that are the causes or consequences of our joys and griefs; reason will command reverence, and comes with that power and efficacy as is irresistable; passions may be reproved, but reason must be honoured; to which persons that are not wholly brutish will [Page 112] easily consent because of the nature of it which is sublime and excellent, and yet easy and ne­cessary: there we finde such depths that the Ele­phant may swim, such sholes that the lamb may wade; no greater pleasure to the senses (which must be satisfied as well as reason) then the de­light of friendship, which is elivated by the plea­santness of the person and the certainty of the interest that he hath in that person: David saith of Jonathan, that his love passed the love of women: proprietie and interest raises the affections and compleats the felicity of this concern: the words of a frend drops like an hony-comb, much more is a solid reason accepted, which is like musick to the ear, light to the eye, and a cordi­al to the heart; strips the person from his fears, and clothes him with serenity and peace; I can never fully speak the excellency of this concern: give me leave to call in the testimony of those that have fully enjoyed it at one time, but unhappily lost it at another: these can more pathetically speak the excellency of that state; we never come seriously to prize things till after we have lost them; and in our mourning habit we are most talkative about the pretiousness of that we can never recall: that which aggravates any loss, is the speciality that is upon it: an only son or an only friend, this is that which imbitters the cross; David sadly resented the death of Jonathan, it was a loss as cruel as death, Davids complaint for Absolon is the complaint of frinds when pro­vidence makes a finall separation, would to God I had died for thee, my friend, my friend: may we [Page 113] not go higher, and with truth affirm, it's like the rending of the soul from the body, it is that one stroke which cuts the nerves and sinews of all our comforts, pleasure and delight: the compla­cense of friendship is beyond the expression of the best reason; therefore I cannot aim at a perfect discovery: I have given you my twilight appre­hensions of it; I proceed to the fourth thing which is the great end aimed at in the relation and state friendship.

First, the advantage and utility of friendship is first in our eye, as I could never fancy any man whose person was ungrateful, so I could not love one whose parts are not desirable: I can love my friend for any worthy quality, and the more worthy the more he hath of my affections: persons may without censure expect profit as well as pleasure in those things they dearly love, and this is neither mercinary nor unreasonable, but most commensurate and equivalent to the greatest end of friendship; their ends in that con­cern are the same that his was spoken of in the parable, that sold all to purchase the field in which the pearl was. It was not the sield but the treasure he aimed at; so a man doth not love any person barely for himself, but as the cabinet that contains the Jewel he values, he doth not love the Jewel because of the cabinet, but the cabinet with the respect to the Jewel: we ratio­nally prize things, when we value them accor­ding to their usefulness: we prize water, the sun, and bread, because these are so necessary, that we cannot live without them; friendship in [Page 114] some respect is as necessary; as our nature can­not subsist without strengthning and nourishment, no more as we are sociable can we be happy with­out society: David was fully satisfied in Jona­than, not more for the pleasure he had in his em­braces, as the benefit and profit of his counsel, advice, and directions, as also his example, which might prove as great an advantage to Da­vid, if not greater than any of the rest: without question that faithfulness and humility of Jona­than was as exemplary to David, as his assistance, and friendship was desireable. A true and faith­ful friend is one of the richest talents God entrus­teth us with: a rich man takes much delight to contemplate his money that lies in such or such a place, it is his only treasure, and where the treasure is there the heart will be, a mans friend is his treasure, and as Solomon observed, money ans­wers all things, that is to say, that money can reach, with as great truth we may say that an ingenious man answers all things that are neces­sary to a sociable happiness.

Secondly, Society is one of the greatest ends of frendship, that alliance was first contrived to promote sociable happiness; man is a sociable creature, and there is nothing more equall and consonant to his being and nature then society, because hereby he is most capable of doing and receiving good in that method and manner which is most suitable to his reason and nature, as also his inclination which is generous and not merce­nary, he doth not wholly aim at himself; but that which amplifies the enjoyment is, that it is mu­tual, [Page 115] and can reach the content both of the sub­ject and the object: an ingenious man would not have a friend that cannot benefit him, because then he could not be useful, nor will he so spend and confine his affection, if he sees a worthy per­son till he knows his reward, or receives earnest by something extraordinary: a true friend doth not study how to inrich himself by his friends bounty, but how to better himself by his virtues, or else by generous acts and obligations: he is e­vermore making suitable returns, nothing more contrary to vertuous persons then to level at low ends; most ends are too low for love that noble affection, yet we cannot erre here, if our scope and aim be at religious principles and rational accomplishments, the last makes us happy as men, the first as Christians.

Thirdly, a mutual satisfaction is aimed at in this relation of Frendship, and that beyond what can possibly be obtained any where else: what relation is there that will so far comply as a true friend? there is none bound to study my humours but by my friend, who must do it, or he can ne­ver deport himself for this relation: there are many paradoxes in frendship, but it is to them that are strangers to the nature of this concern, the misteries of frendship are very deep, and can­not be fathomed by persons that are wholy stran­gers and unacquainted with this concern: the sociable delight and mutual satisfaction between friends, though it be very well understood a­mongst themselves, is very intricate to those at a distance, the conformity of friends are speaking [Page 116] and acting alike, and submitting the reason and will each to other: these are the hidden parts of frendship, and not visible to every eye, the sameness and similitude that is between them is not apprehended by others, yet brings vast con­tentment to the persons concerned, and exceed­ingly strengthens and confirms the alliance: we love those that are like our relations, much more those that are like our selves; how pleasantly can a father look upon his image in his son? and the more suitableness appears in their dispositions, the more rooted and grounded is their affection; we plainly see, there can be no frendship between persons of contrary tempers, but rather antipa­thies, that which we call prudence is not known among them; for if a man hates a person, he dis­likes all things that are about him; so if he loves a person he approves of all things that concern him: when the will of friends are melted, and like lead run into the same mold, then this con­formity and the mutual satisfaction of both per­sons is attained: contrary tempers are like con­trary creatures, still at variance: Pride and hu­mility, patience and passion, folly and ingenuity, pie [...]y and carnal policy, these can never consi [...]t together; con [...]rarieties neither agree in whole nor in part; In short, this conformity is not only excellen [...] [...]t self, but also in its concomitants, and t [...]ey [...]re resolution and contentedness with every thing, especially that which cannot be di­vided but with a fundamental destruction: To be satisfied with the comfort of frendship without submission to the crosses, is a foundation-errour, [Page 117] and will occasion a breach irreparable; in our hu­mane state, natural defects that cannot be cured: these therefore must not be reflected on in a way of discontent; to reprove or impose an im­possibility is alike irrational; it's most unreasona­ble to dispute impossibilities, and unkinde to make grating reflections, because they still turn to scorn and scandal, if they be publick, and to discontent and trouble, though they be never so private: I can look upon the natural defects of my friends with more pleasure then the perfecti­ons of another, because they are parts of what I dearly love, and so much of himself that they cannot possibly be divided, otherwise I would sooner take part of them my self then dislike them in him: In the first choice I had my freedom, & might have declined the whole if I could not be reconciled to every part, but now I cannot make exceptions but at this hazard, the loss of my friend, or at the least a perswasion in him that I cannot love him so intirely as I ought, and the relation justly challenges: Beauty is not much in frendship, a sociable and amicable disposi­tion is much more necessary, if this be wan­ting, it is not like some natural defects in the body that art can mend, nothing can supply; all the art of reason and religion together cannot do it; we see this in angry Jonas, whom God could not please, he thought he did well to be angry with God himself. I have sometimes taken much pleasure in contemplating the satisfaction I have observed among friends, how studious they have been to please each other? how ready [Page 118] to serve? how impatient of any interruption to their social delights? how unsatisfied if they could not in all respects reach a mutual con­tent? If to have the greatest contrivance, how to promote our interest in the world in respect of credit, estate, or life, be a satisfaction, friend­ship is that. If the greatest love, the highest va­lue, the sweetest embraces, the most constant and pleasing communion, care, love, goodness, faithfulness, bounty, ready service be desirable, then friendship is most incomparable. How easy suffering, how pleasant service, and how incon­siderable do life appear, where mutual satisfa­faction is in view; where a man would otherwise indulge himself and sit down and consider the ex­pence of a chargeable and painful undertaking before he will venture upon it; it is very observa­ble where mutual satisfaction is aimed at, espe­cially in great enterprises and high undertakings, let the conclusion be never so good, if death or any cruel accident have divided the friends, the contents is not half what it would have been, had it been mutual: the end aimed at was the satisfa­ction of both, which being ardently desired, but really lost, is constantly lamented, and instead of a gainful possession there remains nothing but a melancholy diversion; this constantly torments the minde, which if unquiet will imbitter the sweetest enjoyments, David could not receive the news of victory with any satisfaction, because Absolon was slain, who probably he intended rather to reduce then destroy: promising himself a mutual benefit by that victory, how eager are [Page 119] friends to promote the pleasure one of another? they remove all impediments and study all expe­dients to that effect. He is no friend that hath not experienced this, that upon any offence g [...]ven as occasioned by him he finds as much trouble in his own heart, as can possibly possess the heart of his friend: grief and anger presently employ­ed; the first that any occasion should be given, or taken to discompose his friend; the last, that he should do any thing to procure it together with thoughts and cares how this breach may be made up again; It is probable every method will not do it. I would bear with any thing rather than consent to a quarrel with a person I dearly loved, but if offences were causelesly taken, I would think it more prudence to dispute it than submit. If I submit I am not only beholding for a pardon, but confess the crime, and become my own judge to condemn my self. I have observed, let the sub­mission be never so ingenious, if the fault be thought great, it will prove but the skinning o­ver the wound, and upon a more muture conside­ration seem but a small satisfaction. If credit and reputation are concerned in the quarrels and un­avoidably sow the seed of suspition in the heart; to prevent this, deliberation seems most advise­able, in which time the present passion and ani­mosity may wear of, and reason may be heard on both sides, and they may be inclined, rather to lose something of their own right, then ap­pear exact or punctual, the law of friendship ab­solutely forbidding all such exactness. I would make any interpretation serve, rather than en­danger [Page 118] [...] [Page 119] [...] [Page 120] a fundamental difference, because I ne­ver yet could be convinced by the observations that I yet could make, that a fundamental breach could be repaired. I mean by this, that which strikes against the nature & essence of friendship. Instance, as the revealing of a secret, a treache­rous blow, revilings, by which my reputation may be impaired for ever: if such as these occa­sion a breach, it is like that of a venice glasse that can never piece again; art may mend it, but no­thing can cement and repair it: there may be rea­sonings pro and con, and the best argument may carry it for the present, but there cannot be a dif­ference occasioned by any wilful disobligation in any case allowed it being a crime unpardonable, and that which I would never ask forgiveness of; nor could I be satisfied in any friendship I fore­saw any thing could intervene destructive to it. I could never love one, I thought, I could possi­bly be induced to hate: such a thought would prove a grief, that would drown my comfort, and fill my heart with those doubts that never could admit of satisfaction. I come now to the fifth thing premised, viz. the pleasure and de­light the ways and friendship is strewed with. Here are many flagrant flowers, we shall gather them as we go.

The first fragrant flower is this; a man hath something secure in the most uncertain times, and that is no small advantage: you know fortune is very uncertain; the wheel is up to day and down to morrow, and what more common, than to see men valued or undervalued according to [Page 121] their present state, in relation to outward things? all admire those that are uppermost, trampling upon every thing beneath them, looking more at the outward varnish, then the inward lustre; pain­ted scpulchres make a gaudy shew, yet have no real pleasure in them, because though they are fair to the eye, they are filled with nothing but rottenness and corruption. Most persons look at the superficial part of a man, wholly judging ac­cording to sense without the least appeal to reason, which ought to be first satisfied in every doubtful case, else we may be byassed, and be­ing in the dark mistake things to our prejudice. I have read a story of a traveller, that came to a painter in a kinde of disguise, and desired to be imployed, being of the same profession, and though a great artist very meanly accoutred, the painter received him, and treated him according to the meanness of his present capacity; bread and cheese was his fare, which this artist thought a diet too course for his fine art; he presently paints his mean food most exquisitely, and goes his way, leaving his new master to lament his ignorance and prejudice in loosing so gainful a fervant, which was aggravated by the circum­stances that attended it; the master returning missed his servant, but found his breakfast (as he supposed,) and though he were an artist, he in­geniously confessed, that the representation see­med as real to his senses, as the true food did to his reason. The hidden parts of friendship are not visible to all the world, persons in the relation doth not like money carry their value in their fa­ces, [Page 122] yet they are not without true worth, a man can prize his friend in rags as well as in robes. Jonathan would rather strip himself for David than despise him, for want of robes he did not a­bate his affection to David though he was thrown out of all his honour and splendour he had in Sauls court, and was hunted up and down as a pattridge upon the mountains; in prosperity a man will be present with his friend, and consult him how to manage that estate with humility and general content; times of prosperity requires the help of a friend as much as adversity. The rich hath many friends, few frue friends. It is much harder to manage a great estate, than that which is meaner. Men of great estates have com­monly greater hearts, and that is the reason they have no more content; in the midst of their suffi­ciencies, they are in straights: they have many flatterers, few real friends, as Rehoboam had: many that are at their table, that eat their bread, insinuate into their secrets, and yet lift up their heel against them. Davids table was not without these, many a good natured man is ruined for want of a faithful friend; we finde that while Iehojada lived, Ioas did well, he was a faithful friend, but when he died, Ioas was soon ruined and undone.

A faithful man is sure in all times, and upon all occasions. Many accidents may rob a man of his estate, nothing but death can take away his friend. A man can suffer the losse of all carthly comforts, and not think himself quite undone, so long as he hath his friend, which may prove [Page 123] strength in weakness, pleasure in perplexity, treasure in poverty, a sympathizer with him in all conditions, and will be with him in all places, nothing but death shall be able to make a final separation; he will stick at nothing; ingenuity is noble and generous; neither prison nor penury shall frighten him: these are the seasons which he rather courts than fears, because he can here best evidence his immutability.

Secondly, the second flower we shall gather in this way of friendship, is a support in the most dreadful afflictions; in prosperity help is near, in adversity it stands at a distance: the rich have many friends, but the poor is hated of his neigh­bour: how seasonable is support in time of extre­mity; at such a time we value kindness at a high rate, that being the proper season for it, because we try our friends then whether they will assist, when others will not or cannot: there are no sea­sons so proper and convenient for this purpose as times of great straits & extremites, when may be the condition of a man must not be known by his dearest relations, nor can be but at a hazard of his life or credit: such was Davids case, when he fled from Saul; and such is many a mans case: instance, in time of great losses and other calami­ties, yet a friend must acquaint himself with these puzling affairs, else he cannot discharge the du­ty and obligation he lies under: he is bound not to desert his friend, and resolves with Peter con­cerning his master; though all forsake, he will never forsake him. I would be more diligent to enquire after the necessities of my friend, than [Page 124] after any other thing that concern him, not that I love trouble and sorrow, but I love my friend, and cannot decline that which is inseparable from him; and if I cannot enjoy him no where else, but in the furnace of affliction, I should not think that too hot, a prison would be sweeter to me were he present than a palace without him, be­cause I accept sufferings more heartily with him then pleasure without him, and this is no paradox, If the serenity of the minde be beyond the ease of the body, and reason more to be indulged then sense: it's true prudence may facilitate troubles if the heart be calm, but nothing can do it if that be unquiet; the heart knows his own bitterness, no person else can, except a friend, because hearts are united in friendship, and there is a sympathy; I will study all methods to support & supply my friend, and when I could do it no lon­ger, I would voluntarily suffer with him rather than forsake him: love that warm affection maks adversity easy, at least not so intollerable.

The third flower we gather in the way of frend­ship, is a counsellor in doubts. Many scruples doth assail and perplex the heart of a man which in credit and conscience he dares not reveal to strangers. This hath proved the ruine of many a man, and hath betrayed them into many sad temptations, as murther, rapine, and all manner of cruelty, not only against their nearest relations, but against their dearest lifes, occasioned either through melancholy, inprudence, rashness, &c. these might have been prevented by a judici­ous frend, by whom they might have been awed, [Page 125] conselled, and prevailed with to avoid those ways and methods that lead to such extremities, and by whom their scruples might have received a rea­dy and satisfactory resolution, whose tenderness would have invited him to use all perswasive and pacifying arguments. I have seen direful effects my self arising from such causes, how happy had some been of my near acquaintance, had they had a faithful friend to have divided their cares, and untye those knots, melancholy was dayly tying to their destruction: how easily might those webs that seemed intricate to them spun by the policy of Satan, and cruel melancholy (that irrational and black companion) have been unravelled, before they could have at­tained those dreadful ends that have been the con­sequences of them, you know that a man sudden­ly unravels that which hath been the work of time: a few well stated arguments hath and may through the blessing of God beat down the batte­ries, that the devil makes against the precious life of man, as mental discontents are most dange­rous: so secrecy in this regard is most pernici­ous, because the greatest policy the devil hath, is to keep this fire within a mans heart: there he kindles a spark which soon blazes to destruction, especially when melancholy blowes the spark; the more secret fire is, the more dangerous; a spark may easily be put out before it comes to a flame, but after it may be impossible: no bodily affliction like heart-trouble, yet these are not to be slighted. Iob and Lazarus, and many men un­der distracting pains, as the gout and [...]one, and [Page 126] other violent distempers, hath found friends very necessary, when by a gentle hand their wounds dressed, their bodies supported, when by hu­mouring and content they receive that pleasure, that is not only useful, but exceedingly necessary in such extremities.

The fourth fragrant flower we find in frend­ship is a companion in solitary and sad times, so­ciety being never more pleasing then in solitari­ness. I do not mean by solitariness, that retired­ness appointed for special duty, and serious contemplation; but such as is the consequence of some cruel confinement, whereby we are deny­ed those innocent recreations and harmless diver­sions, which would repair nature, that is often tired in conflicting with those distractions and cares that constantly attend such a prison-state, were the heart always upon the wing and fit for divine contemplation, a cave that dark habitati­on might be as Goshen, a land of light: other­wise it is hard to improve solitariness to any ad­vantage: as I would with much content enjoy my thoughts, and discourse with my self some­times, so I would as gladly at other times speak my joyes, and sad apprehensions of things to my friend, by which I shall double the first, and may diminish the last; besides I shall have this advantage, if I speak my thoughts I shall see what they are by their dresse, whether trivial or weighty. I cannot always improve my reason a­lone, or be so taken with my own conceptions and apprehension of things as to believe them without exception or passible, unless confirmed [Page 127] by those who are more judicious, or at least more indifferent, then I can be in matters that so nearly concern me, arguments debated between two or more seems to be more clear, because they have a greater testimony, than when there is not that advantage: a single testimony will not be accepted in civil things: men can hardly per­swade singly in a matter of importance: we see our lawyers and doctors though never so learned are hardly creditted except they refer to Au­thors: nor are we without a divine testimony in this case, as the Scriptures, which declare [...] that in the mouth of two or three witnesses every thing shall be established; the great conceit that some men have had of their private notions, which may be, have so tickled and pleased them that they have sate down highly satisfied with the validity of them, hath been that which hath proved their greatest prejudice, and often pro­ved a delusion, that pride hath flattered them in­to making that appear great to themselves that looks throw a multiplying-glass which doubles the species, when indeed if it be rightly conside­red by an impartial reason and looked upon by a single eye will appear little, and if rightly argu­ed and discoursed by a second person, who can impartially weigh both substance and circum­stance, will merit rather shame and conviction, than reputation and satisfaction. I cannot refresh my self with any lawful recreation without a companion, which will sweeten my melancholy walks and shorten the long nights; my meat will not relish well▪ nor my sleep refresh and com­pose [Page 128] me without a sociable companion: my walks will bewearisome, my work will be tedi­ous, my time will be long, my opportunity of doing and receiving good very short: I can nei­ther manage my general nor particular calling with profit and advantage: I fancy I shall live without being desired, and dye without being la­mented.

The fifth flower is a supply in the most unchari­table times: this must come in as a principal part of frendship, which is ever generous and free: a man will deny himself sooner than his friend, and think it the best policy, because his content is more than his money, which he can never enjoy, while he sees his friend in want, how speedily will help come? our Saviour ob­served this, (saith he) if a man come at midnight to his friend, he will arise in all hast to give him what he needs. Men are not at liberty to give, or not to give: So soon as the frendship is made, we presently come under an obligation, and may as well deny all other acts of friendship, as that, I would be ashamed to own that friend, that should not share in my estate, or enjoy any thing in plenty while he is in penury, he that can keep his money, can keep his heart, and therefore not fit to be confided in. I have sometimes thought the love of money hath been the cause why there is so little frendship amongst men: many have bid fair for frendship but could never obtain it, because the cares of the world, and the deceitful­ness of riches have so incumbred the heart, that no place could be found for such an intertain­ment. [Page 129] If your friend be right, there is no doubt of any thing within his power, he will rob him­self rather than decline you, and will without di­spute make his estate if you need it more yours than his own.

The sixth flower in this way is, the protection and safety we have in a true friend: he will ven­ture with us and for us; you need not want a protector if the strength of your friend can do it: he will accompany you in danger, and bring you out of it, if possible, though he lose his life in the service; he will preserve your credit and think no act so honourable as to lose his life for a generous friend. Many instances we have of this in history: a coward is too base for frend­ship: I would not lead my friend unto danger, nor would I impose any trust in him that should leave me there: If any thing can separate friends, they bare only the name, never knew the nature of frendship: it is a mistery still, such knowledg is too excellent for them, they cannot attain it: It is heroick and noble to prefer the life of my friend before my own, though I am as good as he; and hereby I shew my humility as well as frendship, and so add excellency to the action, because humility and charity puts a value upon things, that otherwise would be equal: we are bound to dye in some sense for all Christians, and therefore more obliged to do so for a Christi­an friend, who is to us in this state of imper­fection, the most perfect injoyment, and that which supposeth and includeth all things els that may render us happy.

The seventh and last flower this way of frend­ship is strowed with, (to name no more be­cause I hasten) is this: we have a friend, that will be with us in life, and for us when we are dead. This is a flower of the greatest fragrancy, you need not discompose your minde about your children, what shall become of them when you are gone, in respect of care and provision, since you have left half your self behind: with how much satisfaction doth a man or woman die, be­yond others, that hath a faithful friend, their cares are not about their children, they have left them in a safe hand, they neither fear cheats nor wrongs or any unkindness that can be avoided by the inspection, care, and prudence of a faithful friend. David had a respect to the son of Jonathan & set him at his own table. Duration is that which heightens the value of any thing, things of short continuance are not much desira­ble; though they are sometimes pleasant, they are not so profitable: would you leave a preci­ous Jewel to posteriry when you are gone, make sure of a true friend? would you live when you are dead? would you have a name that should never be blotted out? would you have your ends accomplished concerning your near and dear re­lations? a true friend is most likely to effect these ends, who will extend your vertues, bury all your imperfections, and ingrave that praise and honour upon your tomb, that shall not be rased for ever. posterity are considerable, chil­dren lye near the hearts of parents; yet notwith­standing these, nor any thing else to an ingeni­ous [Page 131] man is so precious next to his soul, as repu­tation whereby he blossomes in the dust, and is had in everlasting remembrance. we come now to the sixth thing promised; namely, how to go­vern our selves in the state of frendship in order to the preserving of it: and we must wisely ponder such things as these, and sincerely practice them, as those that are most grateful.

First, set a value upon your friend above any earthly thing: you must love him as you love your self: think him worthy of the best affecti­ons, and he must have it without reservation, or exception: think no service too hard, no suffe­rings too much: make him equal to your self in your care and thought: let nothing in the world stand in opposition to him, or in competition with him, there are 4. things that raises our value and esteem; intrinsecal worth: usefulness: pro­priety: and a real affection: he must be worthy, else not capable of frendship, (as hath been alrea­dy shewed:) we have seen the qualifications, which speaks him eminently useful: this worth being attended with benefit, our propriety in all which makes him incomparably also desireable, and if real affection be added, that will challenge our highest esteem and value.

Secondly, be not harsh in your reproofs: no friend is so perfect but may need it: but do it tenderly in the spirit of meekness. Saith David, if the righteous reprove me, it shall be baulm that shall not break my head: he doth not say, it shall not break my heart, by a sunlike thaw, but it shall not break my brain (was his mean­ing,) [Page 132] by distracting and perplexing thoughts, and It is more proper for reproof to break the heart then the head: that heing the genuine end aimed at among friends: but here we must be wise: discretion is very necessary in a matter so difficult as the well regulating of reproof, there are se­veral methods of reproof, and you must serious­ly study which of them will suit the present occa­sion, in this lies the excellency of a wise reprover: sometimes words and arguments will do best, and are most expedient: and these seem most proper for men of patience and reason, who will attend and weigh things, in the ballance of a rectified judgement. Solomon speaks of these when he saith, Reprove a wise man and he will love thee. A wise man loves the reproof when it is well managed and seasonably applyed. Some­times a look is sufficient to reprove, our Saviour did but look upon Peter, and this work was done. Sometimes the contrary example will do much. Lastly to reprove in the person of another, seems the most successeful way of reproving, because by this without any noise; or ungrateful reflecti­on, you will seriously and severely enough re­prove. Thus David was reproved by Nathan the prophet: by this means a man is brought secret­ly to condemn himself, and save you the labour; never cast any disgrace upon reputation, that is a tender thing, a man would take it as kindly you should touch his life as his credit: then be sure what you tax him with be true: never go upon fancy and suppositions, this will speak you rash, and it will grieve your friend extreamly to be [Page 133] causelesly impeached by you who is bound by all manner of obligation to make the most favoura­ble construction: charity as well as frendship en­joyns you, never to make an evil interpretation, where you can possibly make a good one: when­ever you are tempted to make exceptions, sus­pect your self, may be you take offence where none is given: look into your heart, and see that you are free from pride & passion, pride will raise a storm in the serenest temper, passion will cast a mist upon the clearest understanding; besides you prejudice your self if you are not deliberate and careful, how abashed is a man when he hath reproved rashly? with how much shame is he forced to detract and submit, and instead of a Judge, as he was in the seat of reproof, now be­comes a suppliant, where he is not always succes­ful, may be the injury was so great that bare sub­mission would not do it; there must be satisfacti­on: the first is shameful, the last chargable; and this, because the offence may be aggravated by circumstances which will admit of no repair, these might easily have been prevented at the first by a solid and religious deliberation: in all things sudden and unexpected we should fus­pend judgment till reason be fully satisfied: we every day experience this, that what we madly resolve with Jonas, we soberly repent with Esau.

Thirdly, whatever you apprehend ungrate­ful in your friend, never reprove at a distance, or by proxy, much prejudice may be conveyed this way, I mean by these messages or written quarrels. These are very dangerous and shake [Page 134] the foundation of frendship: Instance,

First, hereby you impeach your friend, and article against him, and that you cannot do with­out disobliging words, which if by any accident made publick, they may admit of diverse inter­pretations; which interpretations will be accor­ding to the fancies of those persons into whose hands they may unfortunately come, and from hence may arise this prejudice; the hazard or loss of a reputation; you will afterwards but in vain sadly lament: many shoot here in just, but kill in earnest: Reputation is not to be dallied with, because if it be once lost, it is like yester­day, that will never come again.

Again, you can hardly avoid the revealing of some secret, passion is a meer blab, & so inconside­rate that it will never make any reflections back­ward nor forward, as to think, what reason have I for it? or what prejudice may come by it? the disclosing of a secret is always disobliging, and not to be excused, though it be accidentally, not intentionally done. That is a thing that may not be left to hazard: it is like the defiling of the mar­riage-bed, and of all crimes in frendship the most unpardonable, because besides much other pre­judice, it blots and defaces your evidences and assurance of the affection of your friend; whom you have so justly incensed, that much time may passe over before a right understanding will be fixed between you again, if ever: I saw a frend­ship broken by this, that it never peeced again. Nor is it without this inconvenience always at­tending it, that I do not only speak unadvisedly [Page 135] at the present, but leave it upon record, and that may be against me for ever, writings being for duration, as well as for ratification, and by this adventure we not seldom seal a prejudice and witness together against our selves, that may rise up in judgment whenever the keeper plea­ses, and may possibly prove a Lion that may de­vour all our hope and comfort, when we least suspect it.

As I would not write quarrels, so I would not send them by the wisest person I ever yet saw, I fancy I never met with any person prudent e­nough to make up differences between dear and intimate friends; my reasons are these.

First, friends cannot be more friends one to another then to themselves, therefore they de­cline judgment in their own case, and addresse themselves to a third person, not to be con­demned, but to be vindicated, which they both expect: nor can this third person be a competent judge, because he can never be rightly informed if there be any secrecy in the case, because all friends lie under this restriction, they cannot re­veal a secret that would widen the breach, and make it so much the more impossible ever to be mended, and would prove like the stopping of blood in the nose, by wounding the heart.

I argue thus, this third person must be such a person, as must have the command of both, o­therwise he will be over-born, and then he must act as a mediator or a Judge; if as a mediator he must intreat both, can command neither, and then will very hardly reconcile them; they ex­pecting [Page 136] one from the other, what he requires from both, that is compliance and submission: If he act as a [...]udge, he must acquit or condemn, he cannot acquit both; there must be a fault some­where, otherwise there could be no quarrel, nor can be condemn both with any kind of prudence, for then he leaves them, as he found them, dis­satisfied still, if not about their guilt (for possi­bly they may be convinced they were both in a fault) yet about the measure they may dispute; one will say he is not so much guilty as the o­ther: now unless this last which is the guilt can be determined and ascertained, nothing is done, and this cannot be done but by a definitive sen­tence upon one of the two, which will be so far from making peace, that it will promote and as­certain the quarel, because before whateverjudg­ment passed between them upon either was but judging in their own case, and might be con­temned by either without any further breach, but now being condemned by a person mutually chosen, the judgment must stand again [...]t that person convicted, and so the quarrel must rest groundedly on that side, which will hardly be submitted to by the other, so then the result will be this, the quarrel that was only between two before, is now between three. Solomon says, he that meddles with contention, takes a bear by the foot; and may get a snap for his pains, but this is sure he shall never pass without a blot. It is most true, that as differences among friends ought with all prudence to be concealed, so if once they come to be publick, they can hardly [Page 137] remain friends. I would with much more content in this case make a new friendship than repair the old, this being more chargeable and hazardous, that being more easy and certain.

Fourthly, Do not readily accuse your friend, nor hearken to them that doth it: the least coun­tenance in this case as it will incourage an enemy, so you your self may be insnared: with the well advised is wisdom: if you argue wisely you will never accuse rashly, see that there be good ground for an accusation before you receive it, least you fail of your evidence, and retreat with shame and losse: nor must you give an ear to others in this matter because this may convey prejudice into your heart insensibly, and make so deep an im­pression, which though never so false, and un­grounded will never afterwards give place to the greatest truth, having taken the first possession, nor be clearly rased by the best policy, it may disappear sometimes, but like an apparition at other times it will appear again, and possibly prove a constant vaxation either to the fancy as to a mans felf, or by reflexions from others. It seems more prudence to stop the ear against an accusation, then study the most compendious de­fence; because a man is as likely to be corrupted as the accuser is to be convinced, especially if the last can more wittily manage the scandal, then the first can the truth, varnishes will set off much, and men thtough carelesness sometimes consent to what they could not rationally believe, if they would take the pains to consult reason; I think I would set my head and my heart at work rather [Page 138] than by any consent of mine, give satisfaction to persons at enmity with frendship, or with my friend, as to hearken, much lesse give the least credit to their impeachments: I should be very unwilling so much to promote my own disquiet; who can have little peace if such an Achan lay in my bosom, which might secretly cut the knot of frendship, or raise such a storm, that could not easily be allayed.

Fifthly, do not in all companies commend your friend above an ordinary pitch: this may prove his greatest prejudice: he that riseth early in the morning to commend his friend, the wise man saith, it shall be counted to him as a curse: We have a remarkable instance of this in Saul, the women answered ane another as they played, say­ing, Saul hath slain his thousands, and David his ten thousands, and Saul was very wroth, and this saying displeased him, & Saul eyed or envied David from that day forward. Hereby you draw many envious persons nearly to inspect every of his actions, & in case of the least flaw appearing either in life or birth, improve them to his disadvantage: rather contemplate and imitate his perfections then dis­course them, lest you meet with subtle men who are resolved in opposition to you (though may be no way prejudiced against him you pleade for at the present) who will be as industrious to fix a scandal as you are to attribute real worth, and they may haply finde more arguments for that aspertion, though false, then you can for the truth, especially if you undertake the defence of what you cannot unquestionably maintain, and [Page 139] so as your argument falls, the credit of your friend looses, besides you are apt to mistrust and hesitate about that you cannot say more for, then another can say against, and so instead of bringing your friend into reputation with others, he may loose his credit worth you; not because he deserves it, but because you were not rightly informed and prepared to undertake such dis­putes: Let your friends good works commend him in the gates: all his praise-worthy qualities must be private, or publick, or both: if private, not always fit to be proclaimed, they being never so good, are liable to censure by them that like spiders suck poyson where others finde honey: the excellency of frendship may be so interpreted that much prejudice may accidentally insue thereby: some men are prone to censure, what they cannot understand, others willingly shut their eyes, because they cannot look upon that without prejudice in another, which makes them so much more splendid than themselves: It is with them, as with the weak eye which cannot behold the sun in its body, not that there is any defect in the object but the defect is in the visive faculty which should receive the same.

Again, if they be publick, they need no pleader, they will plead for themselves, and force a repu­tation from those that are not wholy barbarous, or (that which is worse) prepossessed with un­grounded prejudice. I never saw high commen­dations, but they were seconded with excepti­ons, the arguing of which have created many a quarrel, and set the end aimed at, at a greater distance.

Sixthly, if you have been free and generous to your friend, never upbraid him with it: this is most base and disingenious, and that which a no­ble spirit would blush to think of: nothing is more disobliging than this, and speaks a man of a lower spirit: hereby he doth not only underva­lue his friend, but he discharges him of an obli­gation he greatly lay under before, and puts him­self out of any expectation of a compensation, let his civilities be what they will; I could never think my self obliged where upbraided, that being a rate too dear for any courtesy: and in this case I may more justly expect satisfacti­on, than give it: I would never bestow my bounty except I saw reason for it; and having given I should think nothing more unreasonable then to repine. Never look after gratuities when you have sent them away, nor call them again by repentance, for nothing will return but a great damage, a just prejudice, and a spot no time nor endeavour will be able to wipe out.

Seventhly, never carry your self so that your friend may fear you, this contrary passion will al­ter the state of that relation, love being changed unto fear will frighten and amaze where it should induce and incline. This is most opposite to love and speaks it imperfect, otherwise it would cast out all manner of slavish fear. I could never love heartily, where I could fear really: where love is turned into fear, equity changed into pow­er, society into obedience, there can never be a perfect friendship: here is too much care for kindness, inequality for amity, obedience for [Page 141] love, and speaks my friend more a master than a fociable companion. Certainly I could never comply here without flattery and vexation, there being a flavery in fear too base for friend­ship.

Eightly, never detract from the credit of your friend, but still acknowledge his just deserts; as it is flattery to raise his value beyond his just me­rits, so it is injustice to diminish his real worth, never believe his praise-worthy qualities your disparagement; if you do, you are not only un­just but envious. I would rejoice as much in the commendation of my friend as my own, beeause I can with freedom expresse my satisfaction in the applause of my friend, and augment it; when I should think it more discreet and civil by a blush­ing silence to receive the same for my self: I do oftner contemplate the goodness of my friend then his errours, because I love pleasure, and fear perplexity: I hate to be like the ungrateful raven, that flyes nimbly over many pleasant things, and pitches with delight on a carcasse. I would rather convince my friend by a contrary example and behaviour than be too officious in searching into his defects, that may be he is as far from justifying, as I am from commending, and he needs no reproof being too ready to con­demn himself, and yet at present cannot assume the title of conqueror; we cannot think we con­tract alliance with angels: in our best frendships mnny a slip must be winkt at, and a friend may challenge so much as this, viz. that we should use all possible means to keep up the credit of [Page 142] him, to whom we are so nearly related: nor can we be kind or just, if we do not improve all to his advantage in this regard.

Ninthly, never manage any dispute with passi­on, this will intangle the web of frendship, de­stroy the peace, and turn your harmony unto jangling: disputes are separating things, Paul and Barnabas lived friendly together, till dispute parted them, pride very often is at the bottom of disputes, and will contend for victory, and men will venture very hard for it: witness those sad dissentions in the Church of God at this day. I would rather consult my books, and learned au­thors, or rational strangers, or any indifferent person then with my friend about matters of dif­ficulty, because I would not run the venture of contention; friends may deliberately argue, and convince one another, and this may augment their profit, and experience, but they must not pro­ceed to a dispute, wherein there is a forcible op­position made on both sides; it will be more pru­dence to leave it to them that are better able to manage it, or to a more eonvenient season. I have observed that those that have seemed unper­swadable while the dispute continued, afterwards upon a more mature consideration by the same arguments have been convinced; and was not this silent and peaceable victory better than that which might have ended in a quarrel, men are not willing to submit their reason, where they think they shall passe under any slight or under­value, yet upon mature consideration and so­lid contemplation afterwards, it appearing ne­cessary [Page 143] reason will force them to submit, which they are willing to do when it may be done si­lently and without noise.

Tenthly, be not curiously inquisitive after any thing you find an averseness in your friend to re­veal, and do not believe it a breach of frendship, if upon such an attempt he denies you: it may be your humour and present capacity cannot bear it, or the season is not fit for it; or should he gra­tify your curiosity, he may be cruel in what you call kindness, confide so much in your friend, as to believe that he will conceal nothing from you, that will do you good to know, and what he doth in this particular is from prudence not perversness. Instance in this one particular; I have committed a fault and have perhaps ingaged my reason and conscience against me, and is not that enough, but I must engage my friend against me also. I ambition nothing more, (next to my interest in God and eternal concernments) then the good opinion of my friend, and shall I not preserve it by all means possible? I will ne­ver betray my self to his censure: I had rather pass under his approbation, than condemnation: the first will confirm the frendship, the last will loosen it: I never thought it civil to presse my friend be­yond a voluntarie complianee, nor passionately to scrue a secret out of him: this were to betray my trust and rob his cabinet because he hath trusted his key with me, which he did not do to hazard his own interest, but to secure mine. It is true a friend must be trusted with secrets, yet it doth not follow that he must be entrust­ed [Page 144] with all se [...]rets. Instance, there are many things that I can neither in prudence, nor conscience re­veal, that may be against the trust imposed in me, which though from an enemy, I must be faithful, & no obligation possible can releaf me: this may be what I cannot disclose without betraying my self into those inconveniences, that nothing in frend­ship can repair, Sampson had a secret the disclosing of which proved his ruine. No man but hath something that is most proper for himself to know and no other: and I should think it the greatest bondage to be restrained here imagina­ble, my friend is not my confessor, nor a com­petent Judge in every case, he is a traytor and no friend, that would induce me (as Dalila did Sampson) to betray my self in any thing sorbidden by conscience and prudence. These things must be left to the wisdom of your friend, who is not worthy of that relation, if he cannot manage this affair without prejudice to himself or his friend. Nor could I with reason conclude that man could keep my secrets that could not keep his own, or be faithful to me that betrayed himself.

Eleventhly, never indent nor impose on your friend after the friendship is made; that were to make propositions after the truce is concluded, which is very irregular, you had your liberty in your first choice: you might have made what ex­ceptions you pleased: and if inequallity had ap­peared have deserted him without censure or prejudice, but now it is too late: by such an en­deavour you extreamlie disoblige your friend, because you presuppose him unfit for that relati­on [Page 145] without manacles and bolts, and this speaks, him a prisoner, where he ought to have the grea­test freedom; and plainly delares you selfish, wholly aiming at your own satisfaction, little regarding that of your fr [...]end; besides you expose your judgement to censure by fixing, before you were in all points thorowly resolved, in all things relating to this great concernment. Likewise you make your self a judge of the qualifications pro­per for friendship, excluding your friend as be­ing a novice in this point. Lastly you plainly tell him, he is obliged, and you are not: he stands upon his good behaviour, and you at your liberty: thus you article with him: by all which you declare, you are unfixed till he answers all those articles, and that he must stand and fall by your judgment. I love liberty as well as any per­son, yet would expect no more here than I would give: I would never ask of my friend what was slavish or unhandsom, or prejudicial to him, or any thing that may speak me mercenary or uncivil; nor would I grant it if he desired it of me, I may conceal my errors, but never com­mend them, nor communicate them, they do not deserve an interest in a vertuous person that doth so.

Twelfthly, Never contend for superority, since friendship hath made you equal; It is more prudence to shrink than stretch here; such quar­rels that arise about place and superiority, are mechanick and base, and they that least deserves it mostly contends for it. I would abate in this case rather than contend, yet should I be no lo­ser, [Page 146] for what I lost one way I should gain ano­ther (if humility be better then pride;) I would not grudge my place, where I could give my heart, nor fear any censure, because thereby I do not give away my right, or make him more de­ferving that takes it, but I lay this obligation up­on my friend that I can deny my self any thing, him nothing.

Thirteenthly, In all differences between your friend and others endeavour to be absent (if pos­sible,) if you cannot, be sure you be silent: by intermedling there you can do no good: if you speak for him you will be thought to be partial, if you be never so just; if you speak against him you can neither be friendly nor civil: and these two inconveniences will necessarily follow there­upon, the strengthning your friends enemy a­gainst him, and weakning your interest in your friend, beside his disappointment is so much the greater having this aggravation entailed upon it, that whereas your friend had but one to contend with before, (and that enemy, which he did not care were he satisfied or not) he hath now a friend also to perswade, lest he should by any means espouse the quarrel: it being not seldom the endeavour of an enemy so to widen the difference as they may take in our best friends: I do not wonder that I see wise men sometimes to seek to finde arguments to plead their innocency, when such crosse accidents as these fall out, in which men are surprized. It is probable a man may be provided with arguments enough for his adversary; but these may be too harsh and im­pertinent [Page 147] for his friend, which he desires to treat with more moderation than the other may de­serve, but now he is at a losse; for while he is making good his atgument with the one, he lo­ses it with the other, because he may be urged to passion by his enemy, but bound to patience with his friend; and while he exercises patience to him, passion out-runs him in his adversary, which may very well be because he hath two parts to act, the adversary but one; he hath not only passion to contend with against his enemy, but moderation to exercise towards his friend, therefore cannot keep equal pace with his adver­sary; so his task is doubled. This is the reason men are argued many times of their right: passion is quicker-witted than patience in all ha­sty matters, and will not stay till patience can deliberately deliver it self: passion is more ready with accusations, than patience can be with vindications, there being much more of the use of reason in the last than in the first. Commonly men are generall in their aspersions, which when they come to be divided and answered to par­ticularly, requires much reason in order to the right arguing of them. I would never trust that man that should joyn in a quarrel, or be a voluntary evidence against his friend, this were a crime that could not be palliated by any pretence whatsoever. There are but two things I ever saw offered by way of defence in this case, neither of which can excuse it: It may be (you will say) your friend contended with his superiour, and did not observe his distance, [Page 148] and you thought that you should have been no lesse uncivil if you had not at least shewed your dissent by way of reproof, I never saw such civi­lity seasonable or grateful to either; for the first he thinks he deserves it, and therefore will own it not courtesie, the other will believe it a breach of friendship, which ought to be considered be­fore complements: this seems to be allowable only in parents, who sometimes in quarrels a­mong their children, may condemn the most in­nocent either out of complement to a father who may be honoured for his title, or by way of re­proof to affrighten h [...]m from contention where he may be overmatched to his damage; there is no such obligation in friendship, parents walk in a path of unsearchable liberty in this regard, and may dispence with the rules of exact justice, there being none capabl [...] of questioning them, be­cause of their power and propriety which is su­pream; but friends are under restrictions & tyed up to laws that are indispensable; But (may be) you will say in the second place, your friend did not state the case right, and therefore you could not understand his innocencie: if so, you had the least reason to censure him: if your friend had not been readie with his arguments, you had the more reason to help him, or at least have been silent till you could have been better infor­med: you know prejudice is a dangerous drugg, and like a pill easily swallowed, but like poyson hardly purged out by the best arguments; nor will he that hath done the injury stay to cure a wound he hath designinglie made, but like a cow­ard [Page 149] secretly strikes a trecherous blow, and runs away, being afraid to contend where he is sure to be vanquished: I could never take him to be my friend that could easily be brought to con­demn me.

To avoid this and many inconveniences more, Never ambition to be with your frend in all companyes, nor dive into his transactions with all persons without his consent: this is to im­pose upon him, and entrench upon his freedom, which cannot be acceptable: men will not wil­lingly be abridged of their liberty; nor can it be always civil either with respect to your friend or those he converses with: no man but hath some­thing he in prudence ought to manage himself a­lone, without the presence of the dearest friend. I would asmuch desire to discourse my busines with a stranger alone sometimes, as at other times to enjoy my own thoughts without any interrupti­on: and it is as necessary: it is possible the per­sons with whom I converse sometimes, cannot have that freedom to discourse matters of weight before a stranger, who though he be never so inge­nious, cannot be fit to be trusted with their af­faires, without just suspicion and exception. I never thought it any breach of frendship to forbid the frequent opening of my letters by my best friend, believing it reasonable to preserve that priviledge to my self; I never remember I ever made a quarrel with any friend about that, but certainly I have often signifyed my displeasure at it. I conceive by the same rule, that all truths are not to be spoken at all times: so letters may [Page 150] not be broken at all times, beeause hereby I am not only liable to prejudice my self, but all those that entrust me; and I must deal faithfully with every man as well as with my friend. It is possi­ble I may be trusted with those affairs for some person that will think it as much against his inte­rest as his inclination, to have them revealed to any, but what he had designed and prepared. My friend though he be bound to me, is not bound to all that converse with me, neither is he constrained by any manner of tye to fancy all that I fancy, or to make a quarrel with every per­son I cannot like; I confess I would not give that ground for suspicion to hold an intercourse by letters or otherwise, without his knowledge and approbation; yet in businesses that more particu­larlie concern my self, if they must be known (especiallie in those things, wherein there may be scruples,) I would willinglie be the relater my self; and this may be necessarie sometimes because business may be uncertainlie understood, or by the unfaithfulnefs of the relater so falslie re­presented, that it may admit of such interpretati­ons as might much prejudice credit, and question conscience; not because there is any other rea­son for it, but the ignorance or malice of the in­former. I have known little pettie discontents in letters, not handsomelie worded, made mat­mer of contempt and scandal, whereas if the per­son had been present that understood the mean­ing of it, he might have given such solid satisfa­ction, that might have answered all the cavils and exceptions with much ease, and obtained a cer­tain [Page 151] vindication. I would never impose upon my friend, but would willingly absent my self at any time (if I saw it necessary) but most espe­cially in such seasons as these are; Instance when he is to converse with his near relations private­lie: there are many reasons to be given why a dear friend and nearest relations should not alwaies be pleasant one to another. The persons concerned may through Jealousie be ungrateful, and a friend can hardlie carrie it so, as to give e­qual content in that case, or at least would not willingly be at that trouble; neither would I de­sire to be present when weightie businesses that did no way concern me, were transacting between my friend and strangers: above all, I would withdraw my self, when I saw him se­riouslie inclined about matters of eternal con­cernment, and I would give him all the help possi­ble there; and hereby I should wonderfullie ex­presse my real and intire affection, also my own advantage would incline me to encourage him rather than divert him; being sure of this, that his advantage will be my gain, because he would certainly interest me in his prayers, and I should partake of the benefits of his contemplati­ons, and this may sometimes be so seasonable, that I would not be without it for all the world. I have seen private contemplations and meditati­ons, through the blessing of God so improved, as to prove more effectual for the resolving of some puzling scruples coming from a particular Chri­stian, than the advice of several Divines; and this comes to passe, because experimental know­ledg [Page 152] hath more credit, than that which is doctri­nal: the one may floate in the head, the other sinks into the heart; and makes the face of a man to shine, like Moses conspicuously in his friend­ly conversation.

Fourteenthly, give sound and serious advice to your friend without obliging him to obedi­ence, leave him to his libetty, why should not his judgment be as good as yours? draw your argument as fair as you can, it is no harm to arm at successe, but do not contend for it, nor be an­gry, if your counsel be neglected; advise [...] empire: this is not the way to be honoured with victory to make your self a judge, If you give advice and exact obedience, you rather act like an ambitious man, than a kind and ingenious friend. Counsel is most taking, when propound­ed with humility and indifferency. I can per­swade my friend to any thing, when I can com­mand him to nothing: arguments they are sometimes like food, that in the first tast cannot be rellished, but afterwards is very delicious and pleasant to the pallat; or like some spirits, that are very unpleasant to the palate, but of great benefit after concoction to the stomach. I would leave my counsel as my books to be well scan­ned before I would expect either a complyance to the one, or an approbation to the other: and at last would not think the worse of my friend if he liked neither.

Fifteenthly, Never harbour any suspition of your friend; be well advised here: you cannot act more displeasing than in entertaining cause­less [Page 153] suspition, because hereby you may wrong him, and impeach him when he is most innocent: and what is more thornie and wounding then causeless suspition, it creates jealousie and mistrust of that person who intends most unfeign­edly; I would never make frendship where I could not confide without suspition; because if I can't be confident of his sincerity, I cannot believe nor trust him, nor count him honest, nor pay him that civility that frendship requires, If you have any temptation to this, argue it gravely and so­lidly: may be the defect is in the eye, not in the object: when we consider the various acci­dents of everie day, in which no man is constant­ly pleased or displeased with the same things, we may suspect our selves. Melancholy is verie sus­pitious, and in that dark state we stumble at e­very straw: and because my own distemper hath cast stumbling blocks in my way, shall I suspect my friend of treacherie, and unfaithfulness, or want of real affection, &c. and say, because I cannot always discern his sincerity, (when hap­pily I am blinded with prejudice, passion, or discontent, surely there is no such thing:) O this were most unreasonable: we may as well say, that half of the oare is broken, because out of our sight and in the water: and a blind man may as truly conclude, there is no sun in the heavens, because he cannot see it: or we may dispute a­gainst the being of the sun, because it is under a cloud, or in an ecclipse.

Sixteenthly, Never think a new friend better than an old; many things are most valuable for [Page 154] their age: frendship is one of these; an old friend like old wine is much better then new; It gathers spirits, as it expends days: without question friendship grows more vigorous and active by the delightful intercourse, and those endearments it feeds upon. Frendship is not so perfect in its infancy, as in its riper years: it augments as those worthy qualities it first pitched upon im­proves, and are more splendid: the hidden parts of frendship are not seen all at once, nor can be: they discover themselves according to the acci­dents and times they are most welcome and ne­cessary in: a friend acts many parts which require time and order: if you esteem your friend wor­thy, he will appear much better by tryal, and experience, whereby you will be satisfied of his habitual worthiness; he was new, you have kept him till he is old: say not now the new is bet­ter. I could never fancy any earthly thing in hope equal much less beyond that in hand; or expect happiness in the change of what I was in a good measure satisfied in before; that proverb is not contemptible, seldom comes a better. I could never neglect and despise any whom I once thought worthy of my affection: nor think it prudence to part wirh my cabinet, in which my chief treasure lies, because the varnish is worn off, & it is not so handsome as when it was new, I mean my secrets, which are my most precious jewels. One friend according to this measure is enough for my whole life, if death doth not se­parate, nothing else shall by my occasion or con­sent. I cannot change but at a great uncertainty, [Page 155] for if I could not find reason to continue the old frendship, I should find less to make another. It must be some errour in the first that induces me to make a second, and that must be what I did not at first discover, and therefore cannot be certain, I shall not find the same defect in ano­ther; because men act▪ as their age and temper of body inclines them, and that may be very dif­ferent at one time, to what it is at another. We cannot expect that pleasure in age, we found in youth, nor that content in sickness we found in health; all these things must be considered and allowed: If you have found a faithful friend, you have found a treasure, & admit he may not be in all points what you would have him to be, he is too good to part with, & most likely your gain in the change will never recompense your losse, nor can you ever rationally think to gain credit with a new friend, when you have lost it with the old, he may flatter you, but he will never trust you: he may humour you, but can never honour you, nor hartily close with you, having great grounds for suspition, and fear of a heart breaking sepa­ration.

Seventeenthly, Be free and generous: A gift (saith the wise man) fasteneth friendship: give bountifully and receive thankfully, the smallest kindness: think nothing too good or too great for your friend: nor esteem that a recompence fit for kindness received, except you can equal or exceed it; better still lie under an obligation than make a half satisfaction: nothing short is ac­counted any thing in this case: it may underva­lue [Page 156] the gift, but never gratify the giver. I some­times take a small gift kindely from my friend, because it makes me no great debtor, and speaks his love as truly as a greater, yet I would not give meanly, were I obliged and able to do better; and it is no crime in me to endeavour to outdo my friend in noble and generous actions: this seems a paradox because we cannot under­stand how we speak properly when we speak of giving or receiving among friends, where hearts are united and consequently they can have no divided interest, but all things are common; ex­cept we mean by it the signification of the thing which is more then the thing it self, as a reall and sincere affection: I would not value any courte­fie or civility that did not bring more of affection than profit: I can easily compensate the last and discharge my self, but must lie under an eternal obligation for the other.

Eighteenthly, Never dissemble with your friend, but deal plainly with him, especially when he referrs himself to you: do not call bit­ter sweet, and sweet bitter: this is the worse way of ingratiating your self, and by this means you may prove a traytor to him if you can keep off evil, do it with all possible care and endea­vour, but when you see it will come unavoida­bly, rather prepare him for it, than keep it from him: nothing more cruel than disappointment; which no man oftner finds then he that is flattered into a belief of what is really impossible. It is as great a wrong to a man, to heap upon him un­meritted commendations, as to detract from his [Page 157] just deserts. I would not be the first that would impeach my friend, nor the last that would un­deceive him, is I saw him inclinable to overvalue himself.

Nineteenthly, Let your speech and communi­cation be religious, solid and civil, it is Pauls advice, that we be courteous; there is much in this to promote content: words may be healing, and they may be wounding. Solomon observed, that they are like honey. David observes, they are like arrows, that shoots fwistly, secretly, and deadly, saith he, they shoot arrows against me, even bitter words: in order hereunto, shun all unfaithful repetitions. I mean by this, such as for matter represents things absolutely contrary to the meaning of them that speak. It is usual with us to wrest words according to our own fancies: good meanings may be often so ill-worded, that they may prove matter of reproach▪ and scorn; es­pecially because often seconded by smart and cruel reflexions: acceptable words are very pleasant; such as these Paul refers to, when he says, let your words be seasoned with salt, admi­nistring grace to the hearers: such words as these leave a kinde of titillation and pleasure upon the heart, which sweetness absence, and reconciles all crosse accidents that are present whereas on the other side contrariwise evil words leave a disrellish upon the heart, and extreamly imbit­ters and aggravates such accidents: Evil words are the ground of all quarrels; it is exceeding necessary, as well as pleasing, that there be a ha­bit of good words among friends, because the [Page 158] tongue is not seldom like an unruly and unfaith­ful servant, that very often runs without the con­sent of his master, and is not seldom prompt­ed by passion; we think it a sufficient excuse, when the injury is done, to say, I was rash, and spake what I did not believe or think; This is breaking my head and giving a plaister, and very seldom signifyes any thing in reference to a reconciliation: besides passion doth not study privacy, and if a scandalous word reaches the ear of a third person, it may prove like a gan­grene, that will admit of no cure, and surely provides work for the Devil and his imps, who would rejoice in such an opportunity, that they might aggravate things to a final separation. Solo­mon gives us a hint of this, and saith, a talebearer separates chief friends; and St. James tells us, such a tongue is set on fire of hell: therefore we had need have the more care, and conclude all our dis­putes with this exhortation of S. Paul, Let all bit­ternesse, wrath, anger, clamour, evil speaking, be put away from you, and be kinde one to another, ten­der-hearted, forgiving one another, as God for Christs sake hath forgiven you. Again, never passe sentence against your friend, or willingly be judge in any case that concerns him, especially if the matter be hidden and intricate, or if you finde in your heart the least partiality; otherwise you wrong your self and your friend; both your self in indulging a passion, your friend in condemning the truth, or at least injuring of it; which must needs suffer where partiality is concerned. If you must judge because your friend will have it [Page 159] so, let him not lose his end, who expects from you justice mixed with clemency and charity, and be as willing to clear as to condemn, if no cause very criminal appears.

Lastly, banish all things that may alienate your heart from your friend▪ Entertain him kindly, let him have a seat in your heart: think of him with delight; love his company: bear with him, though he appear sometimes not so amiable; commend him when he doth well; excuse him when he is in fault: cast the mantel of love upon his infirmities: win him rather by love then fear: study his humour: think it not beneath you to comply, though little reason induces you to it at that instance: contemplate all his vertues and imitate them: decline his errors, and by a contrary example convinee him: live together: love & re­joice together: comunicate your vertues, improve your society to a mutual advantage: he only is fit for frendship that can do all those offices for which frendship is excellent; treat your friend handsomly and nobly, multiply those endear­ments upon him that shall make him your own inseparably; improve society by frequent com­merce; nothing in this relation more endearing than repeated fruition; and in this respect frend­ship surpasses all other relations because it is without disgust: study what friends you would have upon the exactest election, and be that, ex­ample is much: frendship is not for contempla­tion and shew, but for material comfort and mu­tual satisfaction, and is advantageous to the spi­ritual as well as rational parts, when religion and [Page 160] reason go hand in hand the frendship is most illu­strious because singularly advanc't hereby. I come now to the Last thing promised, viz. the con­clusion by way of commendation; here see the il­lustration and confirmation of the happiness, ho­nour, and excellency of the capacity and state of frendship.

In order hereunto give me leave to set before you the best and highest example possibly in hea­ven or earth: the man Christ Jesus, who may if we consult reason and Scripture be verily con­cluded to contract a frendship with John the E­vangelist. We do not find that our▪ Lord took any delight in sensuall pleasures upon earth: yet it is more than probable, he had pleasure in this rati­onal recreation of a moral friendship: which may easily reach our belief if we examine his own books, the holy Scriptures that testifie [...] of him, if the cause may be concluded by the effect, the thing by its properties, then it will not be hard to prove, that there was a moral friendship be­tween Christ and John, and that which seems to strengthen the argument may be this: if friend­ship be the improvement of the rational part, as it hath been already proved; then it must neces­sarily be in our saviour, who improved both na­turals and spirituals to the highest perfections imaginable; nor is this any paradox, that Christ should improve in his naturals; for it is undeny­able, he was a child and in minority before he came to riper years: and it cannot be thought that our Saviour had as much perfection in his reason when he was wrapped in his swadling [Page 161] hands in the Inn, as he had when he was thirty years of age, teaching in the temple; without question he improved in his reason as he multi­plyed years, and had a more imperfect use of his reason in his youth than after he came to be a grown man: nor can it be absurd to believe our Saviour having so sweet a nature was not with­out some sociable pleasure, as a diversion for the repair of his humane nature, which was of­ten afflicted, vexed and grieved: and that his hu­mane nature needed repairs, may be concluded by his eating, drinking, and sleeping, John. 4. 6. it is said, Jesus being wearied, sat down upon the well: othertimes he withdrew from the multitude, and conveyed himself from them, when they pressed upon him: and no diverfion so innocent, and had so litle temptation, as this of friendship. There are these seven arguments following, that seems to prove this, and they are all eminent properties of a moral friendship.

First, the denomination given to John; that he was the disciple whom Jesus loved: we finde John among the disciples rarely known by any other name, and this plainly discovers the love that our Saviour had to the person of Iohn in a moral sense, and this is most evident, because it came within the observation of the rest of the disciples; for had it been Christs love to the soul of Iohn that was intended by that appellation, that had been inward and spiritual, and could not have been understood by them; and we do not finde our Saviour by any declaration demonstrate any such thing; so that nothing can rationally be con­cluded [Page 162] here, but that the disciples did gather this love of Christ to John from some outward and vi­sible cause, as his friendly discourse and behavi­our towards Iohn, as also the intimacy that was observed between them; as lying in his bosome and constant communion, and his indulgence; all which we shall consider more particularly in the following arguments.

Secondly, the familiar converse between our Lord and Iohn is another propertie, and eminent­ly declares friendship: John is said to lye in the bosome of Christ, and this seems to import much intimacy, and much affection: we dearly love them we take into our bosomes; yet this is but an outward expression, and therefore may be a mo­ral frendship, and the rather because these imbra­ces are the proper acts of a moral friendship▪ Now as the former denomination did expresse our Saviours transcendent kindnesse to Iohn beyond the other disciples, so this doth no lesse speak the intimacy, that was between them beyond what was enjoyed by the rest of the disciples. It is pro­bable Peter lay as near the heart of Christ as Iohn in a spiritual sense, and many believers since; if we could not conclude our Saviours love to us but by such expressions, we must be shut up under despair; nor could the disciples them­selves, have been without just cause of despon­dency, doubtless that which did satisfy their spi­rits was, they looked upon it only as an outward expression of his love to Iohn, as also the delight he had in his person, happily for some obliging qua­lity our Saviour saw in him, more than in the [Page 163] rest; and this made them rather incline to honour, than envy Iohn who unquestionably was exceed­ing honourable and happy in this relation of friendship, wherein he stood towards our Savi­our: And this may be the better credited if we consider that it is not usual with men to be unsatis­fied with one another touching their elections of friendship, nor think themselves disobliged that they are passed by and others pitched upon; be­cause they allow a freedom to every man in that case according as his fancy and affection leads him.

The third Argument is drawn from the interest Iohn seemed to have in our Saviour above the rest of his Disciples, as appears in that case of Iudas, Iohn 13. 26. and when our Saviour signified that one should betray him, they were all amazed, saying, is it I? is it I? Mark. 14. 19. and none presumed to ask our Saviour a resolution in this doubtful case: such was the distance between our Lord and them; but this distance was not between Iohn and him▪ for the Disciples no soo­ner applyed themselves to Iohn to move our Sa­vior in the case, but the question was immediatly answered: nor do we finde that Iohn used the least ceremony in his addresses to our Lord, but with as much freedom as possible asked the question of our Saviour; who readily answered, with as much satisfaction; and this is a notable property of friendship; because this act carries in it the greatest intimacy & propriety, both which must needs make up a full and perfect frendship, including every thing that can make that capacity happy.

Fourthly, It is very probable, Iohn had more of the secrets of Christ than the rest; and this is no small property of frendship; the communion that passed between our Saviour and Moses and Elias in the Mount, was a secret many of the disciples knew nothing of, yet it was not peculiar to Iohn; for Peter and Iames was there also: Mark. 9. 2. by which it appears Christ had peculiar fa­vours which he contributed as he pleased, & I ve­rily conceive that person who was most especi­ally beloved, was not without peculiar discove­ries, at least of those things which concerned his person: it's probable Iohn knew more of our Saviours prudential proceedings, and moral transactions then the rest did. I conclude it from hence, because though the rest of the disciples were ignorant of this treachery of Iudas, it is ve­ry like Iohn was not; if so, he would not have needed an incitement to be resolved who should betray our Saviour, having the advantage of ly­ing so near him as in his bosom; we may proba­bly conjecture he would have readily asked that question, and we may as rationally conceive, that our Saviour had not only discovered this sad and perplexing providence publickly to all his disci­ples, but privately to Iohn the beloved disciple▪ and there is the more credit to be given to this supposition, because we know that there can be no frendship where there is not a communicati­on of affairs; and we find our Saviour did often discourse of his death to all his disciples, and therefore most likely to Iohn the beloved disciple and friend of Christ: friends delighting as much [Page 165] sometimes to discourse their afflictions; as other times to discourse their affections▪ it appears by what hath been already observed, that our Savi­our had a friend, so I conceive we may without prejudice conclude, he did not d [...]ny the use and benefit of him, as to social satisfaction, service, content, and pleasure; yet notwithstanding from all this, or any thing else, we connot conclude Iohn had more knowledg in spiritual things than the other disciples, who (we know) were igno­rant of many truths and some fundamentals; for they dreamed of an earthly kingdom, that our Saviour should have here on earth: and it was af­ter his resurrection before they were informed of many things touching him; and then our Savi­our sent his spirit that taught them all things: It is probable Iohn was no more instructed; than the rest before, because if any of the disciples had understood those things, it is likely none would have been ignorant; for we see they were willing to inform each other by the discourses that passed between them at the sepulchre, & in their travail to Emaus about our Saviours death and resurrection; nor do we ever finde that the disciples did ever addresse themselves to Iohn to be informed of any of Christs miracles, or any hidden and divine thing; yet we know they often hesitated about such things, and reasoned among themselves concerning them, so that the conje­cture is pretty clear, that the outward acts of Christs prudential negotiations upon earth, as his travelling and healing and other outward acts may be better known to Iohn the beloved disci­ple [Page 166] than any of the rest,

Fifthly, another argument of our Saviours af­fection to Iohn may be drawn from his iudul­gence to Iohn. We never read that he rebuked Iohn, as he did Peter by any particular reflecti­on. Chri [...]t severely checks Peter and calls him devil, get thee behind me satan; No doubt but Iohn was subject to mistakes, as well as Peter; for we find that Iohn was as drowsy as the rest when Christ was in his passion, where it might have been expected he should have been most watchful above any of the rest of the disciples; yet we do not find that our Saviour takes any no­tice of this so as to reprove Iohn more than the rest, and it is probable Christ may use more ten­derness, because of the relation, though his want of watchfulness in such extremity of af­fairs, seems a great fault in Iohn. A friend never inclines to grieve the heart of him he dearly loves, because the greater kindness the more wounding is any thing that looks like the con­trary; our Saviour was tender towards Iohn, who happily could not have born a reproof with­out much heart breaking trouble, because of his transcendent affection to his Lord. No person more considerate than our Lord, who was com­passion it self; the man Christ Jesus was a man of bowels, as we perceive by his lamenting over Ierusalem, Luk 19. 42, 48. yet we find that our Saviour was more compassionate to some, than others, according as his affections was set. The Jews observed he wept for Lazarus, when he was dead, and why so? because he loved him, as [Page 167] appears by that passage in Iohn 11. 3. Lord, him whom thou lovest is sick, and we see by that pas­sage of the young man in the Gospel, that our Saviour could love a man for any worthy quali­ty, or moral aceommodation; the text saith, he looked upon him and loved him; not that he saw his own image upon his heart, (for this he had not, as is evident, because he parted with our Saviour) but saw reason in his witty answers, which pleased our Saviour, so that he gave him an outward commendation suitable to his super­ficiall acquirements.

Sixthly, the constant communion between our Saviour and Iohn is another argument to prove the frendship. Iohn was very rarely separated from our Lord before his death and after his riseing again while he was upon the earth. Peter took notice that this disciple was following Christ after his ariseing from the dead, and seems to be much concerned about him, how he should be disposed of, being to leave his dear Lord; and thereupon makes this question to our Lord: Lord, what shall this man do? as is he had said, our losse is great, but his much greater, as in­deed it was; Iohn 21. 22. our Saviours answer, seems to check Peters curiosity: If I will that he tarry till I come, what is that to thee? The me­thods of kindness between Christ and Iohn was not fit to be enquired into; as is evident by our Saviours more than tacite rebuke to Peter. It is most probable that Iohn saw our Saviour before any of the rest aster his resurrection, because he came with him, when our Lord appeared to [Page 168] them, for Peter takes special notice, Iohn 21. 20. that he saw that disciple following our Saviour; by which it is evident he was not among them▪ and it is observable, that Iohn is seldom called by the disciples or known by any other denominati­on but these, viz. the other disciple; or, the disci­ple whom Jesus loved. I conceive the disciples might so srequently give him those titles, either as titles of honour to signify the relation in which he stood to our Lord; or because it pleased our Saviour, that his affections to I [...]hn should be observed, and taken notice of; probably that a suitable respect might be given unto him, as the friend of Christ: for our Saviour was not asha­med to own this relation, but publickly upon the crosse signified it to men and angels, as will appear further in the seventh and last particular▪ but I submit to better judgments in this matter; and only give my notion of it, and what seems most rational to me: but this is evident: our Sa­viour and Iohn had much communion, they were still together in his transfiguration, conversation, and communication: he never left our Saviour while on earth: you shall find him in the garden, and in the high-priests hall, where Peter denyed him in the one and deserted him in the other: he was with him at the crosse and at the sepulchre▪ and no wonder that our Saviour delighted in the society of that person he would take into his bo­som; and Iohn was so improved by this commu­nion with his Lord, that he speaks and writes nothing but love, and this will appear a great confirmation of the frendship, if we compare it [Page 169] with the frendships between ingenious men. Obferve and you shall find that when frendship is in reality, it mightily sweetens the nature of those persons, so that they cannot endure harsh­ness and crossness, but endeavour all things with all persons by love. Men in their communication and conversation are as much as they are with whom they converse. There are no arguments more pregnant to prove the dear and near com­munion and union between our Lord and Iohn, than the strains of love that runs through all his writings, by which we may judge of the inter­course between our Lord and him; and what manner of expressions they were that passed be­tween them in their particular acts of frendship.

Seventhly and lastly, the last argument may be drawn srom our Saviours last act of frendship towards Iohn, and were sufficient, had there been no more to prove this frendship, viz. his recom­mending his mother to Iohn, when he was upon the crosse. Iohn 19. 26. 27. and breathing out his last breath expressed in this last passage; woman, behold thy son: and he said to the disciple whom he loved, Beheld thy mother, and from that hour that disciple took her to his own home▪ you, see here the union that was between our Saviour and Iohn; they were brothers; though the relation of brothers precisely considered do not make friends, yet the relation of frends al­ways makes brothers; our Saviour by this charge to Iohn did imply thus much; that though his mother had lost him, she had a son still, that was obliged to take a special care of her upon a dou­ble [Page 170] account, partly in obedience to his dear master, who had laid that command upon him; but most especially by that tye of frendship, that was upon him: so he takes his last farewell of Iohn and his mother together, expressing his na­tural affection towards the one, his frendship towards the other: There is no greater evidence of frendship than this, the confidence dying per­sons have in their living frends, and the trust they impose in them, as to their dear and near relations: and how secret soever friends may carry it in their lives, yet at their death they de­clare to all the world, who they take to be their most faithful friends, when they commit their dearest relations to their charge, and bestow their last breath upon them by a trembling farewell: we do not read that our Saviour spake one word more after he had taken his solemn farewel of his mother and Iohn but this; I thirst: and It is fi­nished: Thus you see the frendship between our Saviour and Iohn clear'd. I shall draw to a con­clusion of this whole discourse, only give me leave to add these few words, which I hope will not be impertinent.

If frendship be the improvement of reason, the happinesse of a sociable state, the pleasure of our Lord, then it is great pitty this relation and state of friendship is no more in credit in the world than it is, especially among ingenious per­sons, who seem to mistake this great case, or think it too hard a task to accomplish.

First, believe that it is attainable, this is the first step towards it; and that it is not a study too [Page 172] mean for the greatest prince in the world; and which is more, he can hardly be happy without it, if he considers the directions he may have in his weighty affairs by the wisdom; the safety he he may promise himself in the faithfulness, the wonderful pleasure and delightful diversion he may enjoy in the society and integrity of a suita­ble friend; I cannot believe but all persons seri­ous and judicious must need ambition this capa­city, yet they do not all attain it, being possibly crossed by accidents unfriendly and unreasonable, in their endeavours after it, the ways of vertue being strewed with thorns: well, if the way be not so grateful and easy, as that which is sensual, yet the end will be glory. Let this qui [...]ken your endeavours to that end which will crown your action; and when you have obtained perfection here, you will set to your seal, that this is true; that you have found an experiment that can swe­ten you sorrows, divide your griefs, augment your comforts, gratify your affections, improve your religion and reason, and that capacity whereby you may live the life of angels, still con­templating things that are excellent while on earth, and when you are dead, your name shall be as a precious ointment powred forth sweet and pleasant to all posterity; like Abel, who being dead, yet speaketh.