FRIEND­SHIP.

To the truly honourable M rs A.O.

MADAM,

YOu have all the Right in the world to this Trifle; for 'twas first penn'd by your Commands, & is now by them made thus more legible: whose Name then should it wear but yours, whose only Patronage is enough to pro­tect it, could any thing that is yours want Protection?

Nothing but your VVill to have it so could have made me come so near the Presse as to make use of an iron pen: for I am certainly assured it cannot bear a publick scrutiny; nor is there any thing here fitted to the Pallat of the Times, or that will relish a severe Reader.

My Comfort is it has past your Approbation, which is all it asked, and has received no advantage from the Presse, but security from the errours of Transcribers, (if any could be found so vain:) and this I had some Rea­son to be solicitous of, having given it so many blemishes and imperfections, that nothing but one intire Blot could cure.

The few Copies I suffered to wear this character, and [Page]none of those Voeniall, secures me from all but mercifull eyes; and if it were possible for me to hear it commended, would secure me from vain glory too.

I remember my Lord of Cherbery having sent divers copies of a Book he printed to severall eminent persons beyond Sea, and receiving thence as many gratulatory Complements, was told by our excellent Selden, if He would know what people thought of his Book, He should suffer it to ly on the Stall, and be sold by the Stationer for eighteen pence or two shillings apiece. Indeed every Book an Authour gives is a Bribe, and the Recei­vers Testimony made thereby rather his Civility then his Judgement.

'Tis an old observation, that those Philosophers who wrote the most severe Tractates in contempt of glory, still prefixed their names to those Pieces, as loth to lose the glory of being such Contemners. You, who are the seve­rest Self-denyer in the world, have taught me another les­son, & this very Dedication may serve for a Testimony of that virtue in you, and that desire of it in me. For upon what other score can you bear with so triviall, and (to you at least) so uselesse a Piece? Or upon what other ac­count could I wrap my Name in a Disguise, and de­cline the publick Honour of being known so devotedly yours?

How beneficiall any thing in these following lines may [Page]prove to others I cannot prophesie; to you I am sure it is very unnecessary, who have already out-done, and out-liv'd all that hath been, or can be said of Friend­ship.

When I have said that, I need not mention your other Virtues: for in my Notion of Friendship they are in­cluded. I dare not so much as name them here, least you should think me (though You would be the onely Person of that opinion) a Flatterer, which I hate as much (if pos­sible) as I do Hell, or love Heaven and the VVay thi­ther, which is an Endearment and Ʋnion with Lucasia, and the being constantly and eternally

March 30. 1654.
Your most devoted, faithfull Palaemon.
D. Noble Lucasia-Orinda.

TIs not without much regret as well as disad­vantage to my self, that I disobey any of your Commands. But you ought not therefore to quarrel at my Disobedience: for when you require things im­possible, as ingenious Discourses from Men that have it not about them; you may be so mercifull as to allow your self mistaken in the merits of the Person whose obedience you exact, and do him so much right as to acknowledge and preserve the Empire you still have, by distinguishing between Impotency and In­fidelity.

The assurance I have that you will not easily con­found these two, had begot some hope in me that my silence on a subject you are so absolutely Mistresse of, Friendship, should have a very candid Interpreta­tion: but since you thunder out Excommunications a­gainst it, and in the onely Names I reverence to such a height as takes off all colour and thoughts of dis­pute, Lucasia and Orinda; I am resolved to give you [Page 2]a Testimony of my Obsequiousnesse, though in it I must also of my Inability, which you might much more to my advantage perhaps, have concluded by my saying nothing.

How to begin I know not; and if I find it as dif­ficult to end, I may possibly swell this into a bulk in­congruous for a letter, and I am sure aforehand it will neither have Method nor Solidity enough to deserve the appellation of a Treatise, or Discourse.

Some order I would willingly observe, without any confinement to strict Philosophicall Definitions of, and inquiries into it, or Historicall Deductions of its O­rigination, Rise, and Growth, enumerated in severall Examples, whereof we have little left besides the Names.

But however he that were happy enough in his Proficiency in so blessed a Mystery as Friendship, as to pen all it deserved with all the accuratenesse desireable, might (as farre as I yet understand) comprehend all under these three heads, The Nature of it, The Causes of it, and the Benefit and Ʋse of it. And these three I shall touch at.

First, by the Nature of it I do not mean the Na­turall Causes of it, for that were to confound the first member of my Division with the second. But by Na­ture here I mean Quality or Condition. And perhaps it [Page 3]is not preposterous to see first what kind of thing this Friendship is, before we ask whence it comes; for here­by those who are not satisfied with the value and qua­lity of it, may spare further questions concerning it as uselesse and impertinent.

Some have been so prodigall in their Encomiums and descriptions of Love, that they have not been content to keep the other Passions at a just distance and subjection, but have quite swallowed them up: and by making the objects of every Passion lovely in the eyes of that Passion whereby they are pursued, have taken away the proper name of that Passion and ana­baptised it Love. And thus the Extreams of a Passion which hardly avoid being vitious where the Passion it self is virtuous, must carry the plausible inscription of Love, though Love it self be thereby brought in­to Detestation. Ambition is hence stiled the Love of Honour, Covetousnesse the Love of Money. But it is not the name of Love can excuse, much lesse trans­form Vice into Virtue; for Love it self is like the Pla­net Mercury, which hath no influence properly its own, but follows the predomination of those other Planets with whom he is in Conjunction, and so is good with the good, bad with the bad: and just so is Love, vitious or virtuous according to its objects.

But reserving to every Passion its due Name, and [Page 4]to Love its just Superiority, I shall believe I have done that and Friendship Right together, when I have said, Love is the Crown and Perfection of all our Passi­ons, Friendship of our Love. I bate not the highest pitch of Love, our Love to God, for Friendship crowns that too: which I shall not take much pains to prove, if Abrahams love of God and Gods of him be allowed of as high a degree as any others mentioned in Scripture; (and surely 'tis no prodiga­lity to give so much to the Father of the faithfull.) 'Tis more then once that Abraham is stiled in Scripture the Friend of God. 2 Chron. 20.7. Isa. 41.8. James 2.23. And we find one of the highest and constituent qualities and effects of Friendship expressed clearly by God in the preambulatory chapter to Sodoms destruction, to wit, Communication of secrets and counsels; Shall I (sayes God) hide from Abraham the thing I am about to do? What followes we know, a positive Declara­tion of the doom of Sodom, and a concession of all those Conditions and Qualifications for the reversing the Decree and preservation of the place, Abraham could think fit to desire.

But to come out of the clouds, and descend to the proper stage of Friendship, (and if you believe Guz­man, the onely true Friend) the Earth: I do not think the love of any Relation hath that Candour, [Page 5]Vigour, Complacency, and eminent Perfection, which is in the love of Friends. And the reason here­of (to my present apprehension) is, That in all other Relations, whether Naturall or Politick, our love is a Duty imposed; in this a Duty too, but freely chosen at first, and made so by our selves. Now regularly, what ever we are bound to by a Law, we look on as an incroachment upon and abridgement of our freedome, and be the thing never so good we are ob­lig'd to, it alters not our conception of, and quarrel to the Obligation; and hence we qualifie our Obedience as much as we can, and think we have shaken off a yoke and piece of servitude, when we have found out a way to slacken our dependance on those Rela­tions: In this case we are all like Princes, who take it very unkindly to have their Counsellours and Confi­dents appointed them by their Father; and therefore, as they usually do at their Fathers death, we count it the first part of our Royalty to advance some new Fa­vourite, and the stranger the better we think, because it gives the clearer testimony of our Absolutenesse.

Notwithstanding all which, it is a great happiness, and rather to be wished then found, that the Relati­ons of Bloud (especially the most capable ones) might twine and grow up into those of Friendship; that where Nature hath made some Ties, we may adde [Page 6]others, and so twist a Cord into a strength not easily broken. But to effect this there must be an Allyance or correspondence of Souls and Humours, as well as bloud, and where they may be found, there is not a­ny consanguinity in an equall degree (as between Brothers and Sisters) which ought to hinder the stricter union of Friendship. And though Diversity and (may be) Contrariety of Humour hinder so happy a progression; yet this must not unravel the affection Nature knits 'twixt those of such affinity. There is a vast difference betwixt admission of one into my dearest thoughts, and exclusion of him from all: and before we have done with all the requisites towards making a Friend, we shall certainly find it highly necessary He be not without naturall affe­ction.

It is hardly worth the while to enquire why it is so rare to find a Friendship contracted 'twixt Rela­tives. But the wonder, if it be one, is taken off, if we consider that their Souls are of as different makes as if their Persons had no Relation. For either the Fa­ther does not beget the Soul of the Child; or if he does, since no man differs more from another then the same man at severall times does from himself, the next child may be of as contrary a frame of spirit, as if he had been the issue of a stranger.

Now in Relations which have not that equality, as Father and Son, and the like, or Politick Relati­ons, as King and Subject, the inequality and aw crea­ted thence quite destroyes possibility of Friendship; and this incapacity of the greatest happinesse here, is the sharpest Thorn in a Kings Crown. Some one King may be there is of so extraordinary a Genius, as by unvailing much of his Majesty, and descend­ing to appear in an addresse and converse more fami­liar & obliging, may arrive at the felicity of Friend­ship: but I must not name him, lest Historians ex­plode the Narration (as fabulous) and Politicians Him.

And 'tis so certain that Superiority, whether Na­turall or acquired, forbids Friendship, that every place will give you examples of stricter Ʋnions 'twixt younger Brothers one with another, then any of them with the elder; especially if the elder Brother hath a kind of adopted Paternity over the younger, and they depend wholly upon him.

If any Love may stand in competition with that of Friends, it is the Conjugall; and that, if any where, where the Marriage was purely the choice and congruity of the Persons united, without the Byasse of other Interests which usually bear a great sway in that Union.

Now even here, unlesse the Love proceed to a Friendship, it is short of what it might come to, and of that Passion which the very Persons have towards others, if so be they are really and indeed Friends to any. There be many can adore one as a Mistresse, affect her for a Wife, and yet believe her not so pro­per for all the Relations of Friendship; More that while she is a Mistresse believe her fit for all those offices, and find themselves afterwards deceived.

But to bring Marriage and Friendship into Compe­tition, allowing onely to Marriage the legal and or­dinary Union, I think it will be past dispute where the Transcendency lies, if we admit the most unque­stionable Gradation that can be any where desired. Take it as it lies in Deuteronomy, the 13. chapter, and a­bout the 6. or 7. verse: where God commanding en­ticers to Idolatry how near soever to be put to death, thus reckons them up; If thy brother the Son of thy Mother, or thy own Son, or Daughter, if the Wife of thy bosome, nay if thy Friend, which is as thine own soul, en­tice thee to Idolatry, &c. thou shalt not spare them. Higher then a Friend we cannot go. There be those would sacrifice their other Relations for the preser­vation of this; but he that can be perswaded not to spare this, needs little weaning from the rest. It is not possible for me to go higher in evincing the ex­cellency [Page 9]of Friendship in relation to all other Loves. Let us look a little nearer and more narrowly into its Nature and Qualities.

One I have already mentioned, its being Commu­nicative: and this keeps Friendship in perpetuall Mo­tion and Action, and so makes it more resplendent. By this a private person is happier then his Prince, all his Actions and Counsels being subjected to a more ingenuous and free debate, and the result given more impartially, according to true Interest, not af­fections, and what is worse, parasiticall cockering of the humour.

Then Friendship hath an Ʋniting quality, it makes two as it were One, but so as the Communication is hereby increased: for who can doubt disclosing what troubles or perplexes him to one so much himself? 'tis but appealing from my distemper'd self, to my self compos'd; all the difference is for my advantage: and when my Pallat is down or my sight vitiated by some ill-acquired Tincture, I have the advantage left of a Tast and Sight uncorrupted, which restores me to as perfect a Judgement as if I were in my own Nature infallible.

Thirdly, Friendship is Secret: its communicative­nesse extends no further then its Relation. And this is the very Prop and Support of all the comforts it is [Page 10]capable of imparting by virtue of its other Qualities. 'Tis the Harbour in which the weather-beaten friend is safe after all storms. One cannot readily instance a greater incapacity of Friendship, then a Spongy Na­ture; one ready to suck in what secrets you please, but as ready to give them up to the first hand that calls for them. The Boy in Plutarch that having no where to hide a live Fox he had stole, but next his skin, and being pursued for the crime, chose rather to have his Bowels gnaw'd out by it, then confesse the Theft, should teach us a greater constancy of Na­ture.

He that betrayes the Secrets of his friend intrusted to him is doubly guilty, and by adding Fraud to his Violence, and breach of the greatest trust to his Robbery, has withall done execution upon himself too, and lives branded and infamous to that degree, that the Gallows, which his Desperation of so much Mercy may in time make him find way to, shall be thought a Pardon.

Lastly, Friendship is virtuous; for indeed nothing that is not so is or can be lasting. Nor can one long retain a good opinion of Persons otherwise habited. It delights in nothing more then preserving those in the paths of virtue whose inclinations hearken to the worse. And that very consideration hath restrained many [Page 11]from courses which, but for the interest and preser­vation of their Friendship, they would have embra­ced to their Ruine.

I deny not but there may be some kind of Union betwixt Persons of a Complexion very different from virtuous: but that is a Combination, not a Friendship; and though the Covenant be never so Solemn, will be like an Almanack out of Date, as soon as the precious Ends for which it was contracted are accomplished.

When I have said Friendship is virtuous, I have given it its proper Title, but too comprehensive to be instanced in particularly in the severall Exercises of its virtue. And much of that Nature will fall under consideration in descending to speak of the Benefit and Ʋse of Friendship, somewhat, in inquiring into the Causes of it, which I now am come to.

The Causes of Friendship are either such as respect our desire of Friendship in generall, or more particular­ly our contracting it with this or that Person rather then another; which may as properly be called the Occasions of our Friendship. The first are Ʋniversal­ly Naturall, our common Nature and Principles of Humanity necessarily put us upon the acquisition of Friends. There is an innate desire in every man from the Principles of Self-preservation, to make his party as strong and considerable as he can, by ingaging [Page 12]some other to the protection of that Self which is so dear to him.

Again, Man being naturally a Sociable Creature, and a common outward formal Converse being very empty and unsatisfactory to a communicative Spirit, especially as the world commonly goes, when Peo­ple watch like Wolves to make a Prey one of another; the Soul boils and grows impatient, till it find some­what where it may more freely and safely dilate it self, and that cannot be any where but in the Bosom of a Friend. The inhabitants of the Air and Desarts, Birds and wild Beasts are farre more innocent Au­ditours of our Complaints or Discourses, then Man, un­lesse Friendship hath civilized him. And since our Passions must either have vent or they will burst us, 'tis not onely necessary to seek the onely proper re­lief, a Friend, but very advisable till we find one, to put Demosthenes practice for the cure of his stam­mering afoot again, and like him Harangue it to the Woods.

In a word, the miserable uncomfortable Solitude of being without a Friend, the incapacity of advising our selves or taking discreet Counsels, since He who teacheth himself hath alwayes a fool to his Master, the unrelievablenesse of our bad condition, the unplea­santnesse of our best for want of a congratulating [Page 13]partner, are powerfull incentives of this Desire of Friendship in all Men.

But then particular Friendships, and with one ra­ther then another, are the results of particular Na­tures and Fancies; sometimes, which are guided by a prevalent Humour to consort with the Disposition they choose; and other times perhaps are contracted not by particularity of choice, preferring the person chosen to all others, but by some accidentall occasi­onall circumstance offering that Person to an endear­ment, which our Naturall Desire and indeed Ne­cessitie of Friendship makes us eagerly embrace.

VVhat the Common Occasions or Causes of con­tracting Friendships are, may be usefull for our in­quiry, especially if we desire to preserve any of our concernes from too hasty and unadvised contracts of that kind. This Caution is indeed as necessary and as much to the advantage of those committed to our Care, as the very supervising their Marriages: A Crosse and misfortune in the Election of a Friend as fatall as of a Wife. Therefore though Friendship it self be virtuous, yet all Persons of all ages and Tem­pers are no fit disposers of themselves; no more then in Marriage, which is virtuous and honourable, but yet does not preserve all those such who enter in­to it.

The Constitutions of Men are various: some of a serene, free, transparent, open Genius from their Cra­dles, of a soft tender affectionate Nature, and if they follow the guidance of their own thoughts before they come to a Maturity of Judgement, are easily insnared by those of a more subtle and naturally dis­sembling temper, and so may by such as study onely their ownadvantage, by a few fair words and left­handed kindnesses, in the dayes of their Credulity, be betrayed into an endearment, from which they ex­pect the Name of Friend, when more truely that of Stalking-horse fits better the use they are put to.

The Common Occasions of beginning Friend­ships with particular Persons, are either a long ac­quaintance, begun especially in the Age of greatest tendernesse and fondnesse, but least judgement; or when we come to understanding, a sense of Gratitude where we are obliged highly upon slender or no me­rit; at least not particularly applyed to the person ob­liging. The Naturall and Congeniall Return of Love is Love, it will not be barter'd for any thing else, nor admit any other thing in Exchange for it: and though it brings all things with it, as he that gives himself will surely deny nothing; yet it brings it self, which is better then all, and without which all the rest is nothing.

Now whosoever desires to grow into a Friendship [Page 15]with a particular Person, whom his own observation (as farre as a stranger can observe) and a generall Fame hath recommended to his thoughts, will quick­ly be ingenious enough to find wayes of expressing the Esteem He hath, and Endearment He desires: and if the Resentment be answerable to Expectation, which it will be if there be any of that Common In­genuity which a truely noble and friendly Nature is alwayes furnished with, here is a fair foundation laid whereon to build a firm and lasting Friendship.

But because no Person credits Fame enough to take up Friendship on Trust from her, though he may receive thence great praevious inclinations, and such as may go very farre in blinding his Judgement when he hath greatest Ʋse of it; we may consider that the first ordinary designation of the Person we af­fect, (where we have not been prepossessed with a Traditionall Merit in him) is from the Eyes; and 'tis the Eye too that where we have trusted much to Re­port, gives the first Testimony of our assent to its Ve­racity.

Every Motion, Passion, Affection, and Alteration of the Soul, is indeed first perceptible in the Eye, the motions whereof are much nimbler then of any o­ther part; and I have known Blushes visible in the Eyes of those whose Bloud hath come much slower [Page 16]into their Face, and onely time enough to testify that they were not deceived who read their Blushes in their Eyes before.

Nor is the Eye merely Declaratory of our choice, but instrumentall in it too. All men believe (or by their practice seem to believe) that from the Aspect, Countenance, Meine, Aire, or Spiritous Resultance (arising from the Composure of the Face) call it which you please, a shrewd Judgement is to be made of the Nature and Conditions: And the Principles of this Philosophy are probably clear, if the Rules to reduce them into Practice were so. But however, we all al­low our selves so well skill'd in this Physiognomy, that we venture to descant to our selves upon the Conditi­ons of a whole Company, though merely Strangers to us, and shall preferre some and condemn others, right or wrong, because Our (may be deceiving) Sight hath imprinted Characters in us to their favour or pre­judice.

Two, though never so estranged to us, can hardly contend either in Fight or Play, but that we shall be factious in our wishes and fancies for the one rather then the other: and amidst a throng of such we ne­ver saw before, our Eye will fix on and mark out some one or other, as a more desireable Object of Friendship then all there besides.

VVhen we have gone thus farre, we cannot be so much wanting to our own satisfaction as not to ex­periment by innocent arts and applications whether we are deceived in our Judgement of that Person: and if we are, the comfort is the Errour is not fatal; for no Reflections of unkindnesse, or rather estrange­ment from one for whom we have onely harboured an extraordinary good opinion, without a progresse to mutuall endearments, will proceed to Heart-break­ings and dyings for Love.

The first experimentall applications in order to this discovery are, Observation of the Inclinations of such person, and practicall compliances with them as much as is possible, particular addresses of the Eyc and Dis­course to that person, unsatisfactorinesse in other com­pany where that may be had, and a greedy catching at Opportunities of doing Civilities of such a Nature as flow not from Principles of mere Civility; all which if received as meant, will not be long without very sensible Returns, such as our selves could wish.

But if the Eye be tinctured with selfishnesse, and these common Organs of Election vitiated and indis­posed by some such ill predominant humour, if either an extraordinary Morosity of Nature, want of Na­turall affection, Pride, and Self-conceitednesse, or in a word any vitious and contrariant Habit to the Piety [Page 18]and Innocency of Friendship, makes our sight perfect­ly uselesse to the Settlement of our Judgement con­cerning the aptitude of any one to the Relation we are speaking of, it is a very impertinent labour to designe other Rules for his guidance, since till those impediments be remov'd and his Eye-sight clear'd, he is incapable of being a Friend.

Now since Nature as well as Manners hath some contradictions to Friendship, and those not so easily removeable neither, (for, by the way, though all men do naturally appetite Friendship, they are not ca­pable of the perfection of it, and yet to satisfie their naturall necessities of it, they must have some­what like, or instead of it) we have the more Reason to proceed leisurely and with deliberation our selves in a thing of so great concernment as the chu­sing a Friend, and retard the Election of those of a more tender age (within our verge) who are not yet arrived at Discretion to make Judgement of their own Nature, much lesse of anothers.

And though we could possibly afford them some help in deciphering the Nature of their Compeeres, that being as legible, to a considering and that-way­intelligent Person, in a small Print, even Childhood, as a fairer Letter: Yet their Manners depending com­monly upon imbibed Principles, and alwayes upon [Page 19] Custome and Practice (whereby now and then they are swayed against their Principles) it cannot be safe to enter into so strict an Ʋnion, which invovles them in the same courses, till they have given Evidences of a life seasoned with so much Religion and Morality together as will not in probability miscarry.

'Tis true, our Younger yeares are not capable of the Seriousnesse and Solidities of Friendship; but notwith­standing that they are very apt for the contracting Habituall Inclinations to the constant companions of our Converse, and those not so easily eradicated after­wards, when there appears just cause to wish they never had footing or Plantation.

Some are so severe, they will not allow the Bonds of Friendship to be entred into before those of Ma­trimony: for this being the Criticall change (or if you will, beginning) of our life, and the Espousall of new Interests, perhaps they may be such as are prejudici­all to, or inconsistent with our former friendships; which will beget a strange and bitter conflict in the Soul, wherein which Side soever gets the better, the Man is miserable and unfortunate, and hath no cause to triumph for the Victory. For indeed in Civil warres of old, the Romans never allowed the Conquerour to ride in Triumph. Therefore the severity is very safe and usefull, especially if exercised by one over himself: for [Page 20]so long he is free and happy, while his Passions are in his own Subjection and Awe, and no bodies else.

But then He who is arrived at this Empire over himself, is not so easily engaged in Marriage oppo­site to and destructive of his Friendship, and hath Pru­dence enough to reconcile those seeming or (if reall) ill-grounded Oppositions. For it is the Disease and Corruption of our Natures that animates these contra­ry Interests, and seeks to give Feuds a greater duration then Amities. And yet we find this disease very catching.

For very seldome do we find Friendlinesse descend in a Bloud. The next generations and descents may, for the freshnesse of the Example, and Speech of Peo­ple, keep in reasonable good Intelligence; but at the se­cond or third descent they look upon themselves like Cosin-Germans so many times removed: and as they by a popular errour believe themselves incapable of Intermarriage, which in a nearer Degree they hold lawfull; so these are, or at least commonly act in re­lation to the continuance of the old, or contracting of new Friendships.

Nay, what is more unpardonable then all this, you shall sometimes see the surviving Friend wholly un­concern'd in the Relations of him deceased, at least too-too-forgetfull of the precious Reliques of his Friend. [Page 21]But where that happens, it shews clearly, if either of them did love really, who loved best; a Controversie (and the onely one) irreconcileable 'twixt the Persons themselves while alive.

And would we had no Examples of this kind in our own observation. But the saddest one I ever met in return of the Noblest and dearest Friendship, was that of David towards Mephibosheth. A Pick-thank malicious Informer, upon no colour of truth, accuses him to David: He, without further examination, gives this informer Ziba his Estate; and afterwards, though convinced of the Innocency of Mephibosheth, would notwithstanding onely restore him half his Estate. Have I not said it (sayes David) Thou and Ziba divide the land? Yea (sayes Mephibosheth) Let him take it all, seeing my Lord the King is returned in peace. Surely Jonathans sonne deserved better u­sage from David, if but for Jonathans sake: and I am perswaded, if the Scales had been turn'd, Jonathan would not have used a sonne of Davids so: and therefore I shall never question which of them two loved best; no more then I shall who wept most at their last parting, save that the Scripture is positive in this, that David exceeded, and Reason evinces that Jonathan did so in the clearnesse of his Friend­ship.

On the other side, if we once conceive our selves injured, and thereupon entertain high Animosities, we will take speciall care to entail them, and most commonly do it with that advantage, that our Po­sterity will preserve this more precious part of their Inheritance to go in Succession, though they leave nothing else of their estate; as if like Mordecay's, an affront (and that possibly of our own making or in­terpretation) were irreparable without the extinguish­ment not of the Person alone whence the Fire first kindled, but the very Eradication of his Name and Race: So much apter are we through the Depravation of Nature and Morality, rather to revenge ill turns, then acknowledge good ones.

Eminent examples of these hereditary Feuds there be in all Nations, especially Forreigne; but so few of reall and solid friendship, that it will be the lesse won­der to find Persons that have spent many yeares in Travell, and amongst such as live rather by Rules of Policy then Honesty, (though that be the best) and such are the major part, seldome (if ever) contract more then superficiall and formall Friendships: un­lesse it be with some continued partner of his Travels, whom the Circumstances of mutuall kindnesses and uniting dangers, have firmly endeared and knit toge­ther; or except it was entred into before his flying a­broad, [Page 23]and kept alive there by a continued correspon­dence.

The two usuall Residences of those who do not so much ride abroad, as inhabit, are France and Italy: in one of which the reigning Humour is Levity, in the other Jealousie; either of which possessing a Soul makes it inhabitable by a clear and sublime Friend­ship.

Now some Fathers are so over-politick, that though they know this, or rather, because they know this, commend those they designe for the Support of their Name to be Principled there, and are very glad to see them suck in and hug dark and pernicious Axiomes of Dissimulation, and sacrificing all to Interest. They please themselves strangely to find their hopefull Po­sterity count a Good-natur'd Man and a Fool the same thing under various expresssion; to say of Friendship as of Plain-dealing, that it is a Jewell, but who uses it shall die a Beggar. A number there are of Maximes to this effect, which whether borrowed from Ma­chiavil or Ignatius is not much materiall: but let not Friendship hear the worse for these clamours, especial­ly since the same Persons, and upon the same slender account say the self-same things of Religion.

But as no body ever spoke against Religion but they that had none, and therefore endeavour to con­fute [Page 24]it by Votes rather then Arguments; so 'tis of Friendship too. But while men speak against what they understand not, the greatest Non-plus they can put their Auditours to is, to resolve whether these Detractours have more Ignorance or Impudence.

A good wit that had leisure enough, might with­out Force extend the Parallell 'twixt Religion and Friendship very farre. Certainly there is a very near resemblance betwixt them: They grow and thrive best in the same soil: They have the same Enemies; the same weeds choke them.

We make a just account that all Vice is destructive of Friendship, for the Progression of Vice is infinite, and the Multiplication like that of Hydra's heads, or the Covetous mans desires, they have no bound nor Damm; and therefore if we could allow some one Vice compatible with this sacred Amity, yet ere long that Vice would have got company, that Devil seven more, and they worse then himself: For even the De­vil loves not to be alone; and therefore the old Adage which sayes the Solitary Man that loves to be alone is either a God or a Devil, is not to be literally strain'd, for it was never meant farther then to shew such Persons are extraordinary, either good, or bad. And so by this Catenation of Vices, some one link of the chain would be found confessedly too heavy for Friend­ship to bear.

I do not say a Friend must not sin, much lesse can­not; that were to confesse there could be no Friend­ship here on Earth, for I am sure there cannot be any Condition of man exempt from sin. But there is a vast difference 'twixt a Sin and a Vice, at least I would be understood so now. Every going lesse then our Du­ty is a Sin: but by Vice I intend some chosen approved darling Habit of doing wickedly, which we indulge to our selves. And this, let it be of what kind you please, quite incapacitates the soul for Friendship, be­cause it hath seated this Vice in a higher Place and a dearer affection, then it reserves for the Friend; and consequently on a necessity of parting with one of the two, would shake hands with the Friend and re­tain the Vice.

'Twere extreamly tedious to run over all the Vi­ces, and shew how they were particularly exclusory of Friendship, since their Priority in our affection (if there were no other) is evidence enough. But let us cast our eyes upon two or three of them that have the mildest Names, & either for their Customariness in most places, or Connaturalnesse with many Tempers, seem to claim a little more connivence or Indulgence; and when we have found these upon Triall to have no Right at all to Friendship, we conclude safely against all others which have onely the same or (it may be) more weak Title.

I will instance in Lust or Wantonnesse, Drunken­nesse, and Covetousnesse; which their favourers call A Trick of youth, Good-fellowship, and Thrift.

For the first; Did not the satisfying of Curius his Lust cost him the lives of his dearest and Sacrament­ally-combined Partners, while his prostitute Fulvia sucks from him the deep Secret of Catilines conspira­cy? And after so solemn a Consignation of Secrecy 'twixt the Conspiratours, can we believe he that would expose them, would if they had been the most dear Friends have been more continent? Nay did not Sampson betray that Secret to Dalilah (after he had reason enough to guesse for what end she was so inquisitive) that cost him his life? and can we imagine, He that could not continue his own friend, should have conquered and withstood the same Temptations for the Preservation of another? And to leave examples, hath not the Apocrypha, (Canonicall enough in this particular) given us a large Muster-Roll of the Forces of Women?

For Drunkennesse (give it as good words as they please) is it not a confessed betrayer of Secrets, and consequently of Friendship? Did not Alexander in his drink stab one of most esteem with him? Drunkennesse does the same thing every day, it kills the Friend though not the Man, destroyes the rela­tion [Page 27]though not the Person: in a word, an habituall drunkard though he was once my Friend, cannot be so when he is drunk, because he is no longer himself.

Thirdly, the Covetous man that makes money his God, will Sacrifice his dearest friend Religiously to it. Tell him he hath dealt dishonourably with his Friend, Hang honour (sayes he) Give me twelve pence. Tell him he hath basely sold his Friend, he will reply, I got five hundred pound by it, and would I could sell all the friends I have at that Rate. These pithy Sen­tences are too true and Moderne. But what Fruits of Friendshipp can be expected from the Root of all Evil?

That Religion then and Friendship have the same Enemies I take for granted, from the past instances and genuine Consequences of them; and so have they the same Friends and Interests; They are like Hip­pocrates Twins, they live and die together. I need not stretch the Parallell any farther; This is more then enough to justifie Friendship against the loudest Ca­lumny, and take off part of the wonder (if it be one) to find so loud clamouring against that and Reli­gion.

But to give a clear account why the best things are used so ill, we are to consider, That the greatest part of the World are Strangers to Piety (not to say [Page 28] Enemies) and consequently to Friendship. He that is an underminer of the Foundation must of necessity ruine the Superstructure. Now Religion is the best Groundwork and Foundation imaginable, whereupon to build a dear and most firm Friendship: for how is it possible He should not be admirable in the love and en­dearing of his friends, who hath learn'd of a Master that hath taught him to love his enemies?

But this is not all: 'Tis not the Open enemies of Friendship and Religion that have brought them into Question and Contempt, but the pretended Professours, through whose sides they are wounded. It hath been the ill Logick of many ages, and we have had sad Examples of it in this Nation, to transferre the Crimes of Persons upon the function, place, office, and calling; from hence it is that all the Accusations against Bi­shops and Kings are urged to the abolition of Episco­pacy and Monarchy. Now though this be a very ir­rationall way of argument, yet when made use of a­gainst Friendship and Religion it is farre more absurd: For those men upon whose account Episcopacy and Monarchy are condemned, are really Bishops and Kings; but they through whose default Friendship and Religion are calumniated, are neither Religious nor Friends, but onely Hypocriticall Pretenders.

At the beginning of our Combustions here, when [Page 29]the main Argument of all companies was the Law­fulnesse or Ʋnlawfulnesse of raising Arms against the King, I happened to be in company where a Graecian Patriarch of Constantinople urged severely (as being moved with indignation at the example of Subjects taking Arms against their King) the Apology of Bi­shop Jewel for the Church of England, wherein in the Name of the Church he teaches other Doctrine, which notwithstanding this Forreigner could by no means be perswaded to credit as a received professed Pro­testant Doctrine, against such a Cloud of witnesses as were in Arms against it. The onely answer a Pro­testant Divine gave him was, Those you talk of in Arms are none of our Church, we disclaim them. Truely the self-same answer we may justly give concerning them whose Scandalous Courses bespatter things so Sa­cred as Religion and Friendship.

'Tis high time, as I take it, to put an end now to this tedious— what shall I call it? I have scribled much more then I promised, intended, or thought possible for me. You are too ingenious to object my promise of treating of the Benefits and Ʋses of Friendship, as an obliging argument for my protracti­on of this, which must have more then tired you ere now: for you cannot but have collected all I can hint on that account, from what is already past your [Page 30]view. I would not willingly come to repetition of them, since it must of necessity be irksome to you, whose own observation hath collected more particu­lars of that kind then I have or can expresse. But yet upon the same score all this might have been spared. For you want no knowledge of what Friendship is, nor any allurements to it. If I were to recapitulate all the Motives proper for perswasion of those who yet un­derstand not what this Friendship is, I should be Vo­luminous. But yet since the Designe it self of court­ing men into a good opinion of Friendship is in it self so Noble, and people have so awkward Imaginations of it, that all the art of the most powerfull Pen is lit­tle enough to winne their attention, and reconcile them to their own true Interest, for Friendship is so, when it is rightly understood; I will offer somewhat as a Motive to our embracing it: which shall not be any painting or artificiall Dresse, but its own Native Beauty and Lustre; which will appear best in the in­quiry into its Use and Benefit, that being the touch­stone which makes it passe for currant or not.

The Benefits, Advantages, and Comforts that flow from Friendship are as many, nay more then flow from Life it self. Life is a burthen to many for want of a Friend; but a Friend was never, never can be a Burthen to any, and who thinks otherwise never knew what Friendship was.

I had almost said a Man never lives, truely lives, till he has a Friend; and if I had, those who are Friends would believe me, so improved a way of li­ving is that of Friendship; those who are not will, when they come to be so happy.

Friendship does the same thing to the whole Man that the Rationall Soul does to the imperfect Embryo: as that addes a higher and more sublime life to what had onely Vegetation and Sense before, so does this to that.

There is not any Condition of our life that either does not receive, or at least is not capable of recei­ving a vast Support and Comfort from Friendship. The saddest condition imaginable, when thy Pati­ence as well as Strength fails thee, and thy Grief car­ries a weight with it able to sink thee to the Centre of the Earth, and crush thee to Nothing, may be sup­ported by the assistant Arm of a Friend. And the best Condition thou canst fancy to thy self here, un­lesse thou hast friends, falls and dies and perishes in a moment. For thy Gladnesse, like the Shunamites oile, encreases still and never stops, while thou hast a Ves­sel, a Friend, to poure it into. And is not this more then enough to recommend Friendship to us, to find it capable of abating our Grief, and increasing our Joy?

Nor does the common Objection against Friends, of disparity of Condition, invalidate this Benefit of Friendship: For that wealth and imaginary Honour wherein so many pride themselves, are transitory, and may perish; a Friend cannot, and therefore is farre the more considerable Treasury: Nay the ve­ry wealth and honour it self is hardly preserved with­out a Friend. Now he that after that Pomp which made him deem all Persons below his Friendship, shall fall into a Condition of Poverty as eminent in its kind as his former Splendour, and the more pointed at for that Splendour; hath nothing left in Art or Na­ture to make his Condition tolerable, and becomes in­sufferably Ridiculous. Even his being humbled will ten to one be without either the pleasure or rewards of Humility; for it is rare if it prove so to such Spirits, so much difference is there 'twixt being humble and humbled, Humility and Humiliation.

I remember Aesop tells us of an Asse, that being overburthen'd with his Masters Carriage, desired a Horse, his fellow-servant and led leer by him, to ease him by bearing a Part: but the Horse was too proud, and so refused. What follows? The Asse dies un­der the Oppression, and so the whole load devolves to the Horses back. The Fable moralizes it self. Ma­ny prepare heavy and insupportable burthens for them­selves [Page 33]by being Brutish, unsociable, and uncommuni­cative.

I but (sayes my politick Objectour) is this your Rhetorick and art of perswasion towards Friendship, to make men carry Burthens? This is not to make us Friends, but Porters. I answer, it is farre other­wise: For had the Horse been the Asses friend, he had proved his own too, and by parting the load made it none; For Burthens, like Rivers, divided loose their Name.

Friendship is very farre from being oppressive in a­ny of its Offices; for that cannot be a Burthen which is neither thought so nor felt so: and were it possible for me to receive one from my Friend, his Caution to preserve me from it would make my own needlesse. I have known very ingenious arts practised by Friends in conferring (on one part) and declining (on the other) Civilities, which the receiving hand hath imagined oppressive to the giving: But that is rare. Yet where a Friendship doth grow so bound­lesse that it shall be thought to want limits, those li­mits must be of thy Friends setting, not thy own.

I could (to save my self more pains) very con­tentedly believe I have by this time (taking what's scattered in the former Pages into consideration, to­gether [Page 34]with this last supply) given considerations enough to render Friendship desireable, without the addition of any more. But one more will necessa­rily fall into our Examination, by a short inquiry in­to what may fit us for Friendship, as friendship is fit for us (unlesse the fault be ours) and that is Reli­gion, the having or wanting whereof is the main Hinge upon which our Friendship is turn'd.

All Souls are Equall; and unlesse they have taken up ill & contrary Principles either from ill Education, or an unlucky Temper and composition of their respe­ctive Bodies, whose Temperament they follow, so would our Dispositions be too all Equall and very like. But let the Assimilation hold in as many par­ticulars as you can fancy, if they differ in Piety (not in degrees, but the whole) there is a dissimilitude ir­reconcileable by Friendship.

I am told in Architecture that Lime and Timber are so unsociable, that the Beams of that House which are laid in Morter will be by it corroded and burnt up, to the destruction of the Fabrick, and the worse this morter is temper'd the sooner. Now a Man without Piety and Religion is this untemper'd Morter, and will certainly eat out the heart of that Friendship you thought firmly built upon him.

If you desire therefore to have a Friend, learn first to be Religious. 'Tis not any fantasticall imagina­ry Greatnesse and disproportion of Condition can make the inferiour Person uselesse as a Friend: You have heard of the Lion in the Fable that was deli­vered from the Net and Death by the little Mouse; and no man differs so much from another; or if you can think they may, yet you have heard of a Poore Woman, who by her wisedome delivered a great City from as great a danger. 'Tis onely the want of Religion, which makes either us incapable of others Friend­ships, or them of ours: For this flatuous tumorous hu­mour which makes us too bigge to be grasp'd by a Friend, and all other contrariant tempers to Friendship will be mortified by Religion.

I must not go on here, lest I send a Homily instead of a Letter. All I shall adde is this; Let us all labour to get this necessary Foundation, Cement, and All of Religion, and then we are not onely Excuseable if we want Friends, but have this Comfort and Suppletory and Cordiall left us, when those whom we chose for friends have through their own Vanity and Impiety forsaken us, that God is, and while we be Religious, will be our Friend.

To that Almighty Friend, I recommend you, who [Page 36]have a Soul so exactly built up for an Eternall and Glorious Friendship, that I cannot want any of the happinesses I have described here, and wish you (though the wish be needlesse) eternally Parta­ker of, while I have the honour and advantage of being

Octob. 30. 1653.
Your Friend (all Epithetes are needlesse and go lesse) PALAEMON.

This keyboarded and encoded edition of the work described above is co-owned by the institutions providing financial support to the Text Creation Partnership. Searching, reading, printing, or downloading EEBO-TCP texts is reserved for the authorized users of these project partner institutions. Permission must be granted for subsequent distribution, in print or electronically, of this EEBO-TCP Phase II text, in whole or in part.