An Answer to a Letter Written by the R. R. The L d B p of Rochester. Concerning The Chapter of Original Sin, In the Ʋnum Necessarium.

By JER. TAYLOR D. D.

London, Printed by E. Cotes for R. Royston at the Angel in Ivie-lane, 1656.

An Answer to a Letter Written by the R. R. The L. B p. of Rochester.

R. R. Father and my good Lord,

YOur Lordships Letter Dated July 28. I received not till Septemb. 11. It seems R. Roy­ston detained it in his hands, sup­posing it could not come safely to me while I remain a prisoner. But I now have that liberty, that I can receive any Letters, and send any; for the Gentlemen under whose custody I am, as they are carefull of their charges, so they are civil to my person. It was necessary I should tell this to your Lordship, that I may not be under a suspicion [Page 2]of neglecting to give accounts in those particulars, which with somuch prudence and charity you were plea­sed to represent in your Letter con­cerning my discourse of Original Sin. My Lord, in all your Ex­ceptions, I cannot but observe your candor and your paternal care con­cerning me. For when there was nothing in the Doctrine, but your greater reason did easily see the ju­stice and the truth of it, and I am perswaded could have taught me to have said many more material things in confirmation of what I have taught; yet so careful is your cha­rity of me, that you would not omit to represent to my considera­tion what might be said by captious and weaker persons; or by the more wise and pious who are of a different judgement.

But my Lord, first you are pleased to note that this discourse runs not [Page 3]the ordinary channel. True; for if it did, it must nurse the popular error: but when the disease is epidemical, as it is so much the worse, so the extraordinary remedy must be ac­knowledg'd to be the better. And if there be in it some things hard to be understood, as it was the fate of S. Paul's Epistles (as your Lord­ship notes out of S. Peter) yet this difficulty of understanding proceeds not from the thing it self, nor from the manner of handling it, but from the indisposition and prepossession of mens minds to the contrary, who are angry when they are told that they have been deceived: for it is usuall with men to be more displeased, when they are told they were in error, then to be pleased with them who offer to lead them out of it.

But your Lordship doth with great advantages represent an ob­jection [Page 4]of some captious persons, which relates not to the material part of the Question, but to the rules of art. If there be no such thing as Original Sin transmitted from Adam to his posterity, then all that sixth chapter is a strife about a shadow, a Non ens. A. It is true my Lord, the Question as it is usually handled, is so. For when the Franciscan and Dominican do eternally dispute about the conception of the Bles­sed Virgin, whether it was with, or without Original Sin, meaning by way of grace and special exemption, this is de non ente; for there was no need of any such exemption: and they supposing that commonly it was otherwise, troubled themselves about the exception of a Rule, which in that sense which the sup­pos'd it, was not true at all: she was born as innocent from any im­purity or formal guilt as Adam was [Page 5]created, and so was her Mother, and so was all her family. * When the Lutheran and the Roman dispute, whether justice and original righ­teousness in Adam was Natural or by Grace, it is de non ente: for it was positively neither, but nega­tively only; he had original righte­ousness till he sin'd, that is, he was righteous. till he became unrighte­ous. * When the Calvinist troubles himself and his Parishioners with fierce declamations against natural inclinations or concupiscence, and disputes whether it remains in bapti­zed persons, or whether it be taken off by Election, or by the Sacra­ment, whether to all Christians or to some few; this is a [...]; for it is no sin at all in persons baptiz'd or unbaptiz'd, till it be consented to.

My Lord, when I was a young man in Cambridge, I knew a lear­ned professor of Divinity, whose [Page 6]ordinary Lectures in the Lady Mar­garets Chair for many years toge­ther, nine as I suppose, or therea­bouts, were concerning Original Sin, and the appendant questions: This indeed could not choose but be Andabatarum conflictus. But then my discourse representing that these disputes are uselesse, and as they discourse usually to be de non ente, is not to be reprov'd. For I professe to evince that many of those things, of the sense of which they dispute, are not true at all in any sense, I declare them to be de non ente, that is, I untie their intricate knots by cutting them in pieces. For when a false proposition is the ground of disputes, the process must needs be infinite, unless you disco­ver the first error. He that tels them they both fight about a sha­dow, and with many arguments proves the vanity of their whole [Page 7]processe, they (if he saies true) not he is the [...]. * When S. Au­stine was horribly puzled about the traduction of Original Sin, and thought himself forc'd to say that either the Father begat the soul, or that he could not transmit sin which is subjected in the soul, or at least he could not tell how it was transmitted: he had no way to be relieved but by being told that Ori­ginal Sin was not subjected in the soul, because properly and for­mally it was no reall sin of ours at all; but that it was only by imputa­tion, and to certain purposes, not any inherent quality, or corrupti­on: and so in effect all his trouble was de non ente. * But now some wits have lately risen in the Church of Rome, and they tell us another story. The soul followes the tempe­rature of the body, and so Origi­nal Sin comes to be transmitted by [Page 8]contact: because the constitution of the body is the fomes or nest of the sin, and the souls concupiscence is deriv'd from the bodies lust. But besides that this fancy dis­appears at the first handling, and there would be so many Origi­nal Sins as there are several con­stitutions, and the guilt would not be equal, and they who are born Eunuchs should be lesse infected by Adam's pollution, by having lesse of concupiscence in the great in­stance of desires, [and after all, con­cupiscence it self could not be a sin in the soul, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it] Besides all this, (I say) while one does not know how Original Sin can be derived, and another who thinks he can, names a wrong way, and both the waies infer it to be another kinde of thing then all the Schools of learning teach [and in [Page 9]the whole process it must be an im­possible thing, because the instru­ment which hath all its operations by the force of the principal agent, cannot of it self produce a great change and violent effect upon the principal agent] does it not too clearly demonstrate, that all that in­finite variety of fancies agreeing in nothing but in an endless uncertain­ty, is nothing else but a being busie about the quiddities of a dream, and the constituent parts of a shadow? But then, My Lord, my discourse representing all this to be vanity and uncertainty, ought not to be call'd or suppos'd to be a [...]: as he that ends the question between two Schoolmen disputing about the place of Purgatory, by saying they need not trouble themselves about the place; for that which is not, hath no place at all; ought not to be told he contends about a shadow, when he [Page 10]proves that to be true, which he sug­gested to the two trifling litigants.

But as to the thing it self: I do not say there is no such thing as Original Sin, but it is not that which it is supposed to be: it is not our sin formally, but by imputation on­ly; and it is imputed so, as to be an inlet to sickness, death and disorder: but it does not introduce a necessity of sinning, nor damn any one to the flames of Hell. So that Original Sin is not a Non ens, unless that be nothing which infers so many real mischiefs.

The next thing your Lordship is pleas'd to note to me, is that in your wisdome you foresee, some will argue against my explication of the word Damnation, in the ninth Article of our Church, which af­firms that Original Sin deserves damnation. Concerning which, My Lord, I do thus (and I hope fairly) acquit my self.

1. That it having been affirmed by S. Austin that Infants dying un­baptized are damn'd, he is deserved­ly called Durus pater Infantum, and generally forsaken by all sober men of the later ages: and it will be an intolerable thing to think the Church of England guilty of that which all her wiser sons, and all the Christian Churches generally ab­horre. I remember that I have heard that King James reproving a Scottish Minister, who refus'd to give private Baptism to a dying In­fant, being askt by the Minister, if he thought the childe should be damn'd for want of Baptism? an­swer'd, No, but I think you may be damn'd for refusing it: and he said well. But then my Lord, If Original Sin deserves damnation, then may Infants be damn'd if they die without Baptism. But if it be a horrible affirmative, to say that [Page 12]the poor babes shall be made De­vils, or enter into their portion, if they want that ceremony, which is the only gate, the only way of salva­tion that stands open; then the word [Damnation] in the 9. Article must mean something less, then what we usually understand by it: or else the Article must be salved by ex­pounding some other word to an allay and lessening of the horrible sentence; and particularly the word [Deserves] of which I shall after­wards give account. Both these waies I follow. The first is the way of the Schoolmen.

For they suppose the state of un­baptized Infants to be a poena damni; and they are confident enough to say that this may be well suppos'd without inferring their suffering the pains of hell. But this sentence of theirs I admit and explicate with some little difference of expression. [Page 13]For so far I admit this pain of loss, or rather a deficiency from going to Heaven, to be the consequence of Adam's sin, that by it we being left in meris Naturalibus, could never by these strengths alone have gone to Heaven. Now whereas your Lord­ship in behalf of those whom you suppose may be captious, is pleas'd to argue. That as loss of sight or eyes infers a state of darkness or blindness: so the losse of Heaven in­fers Hell; and if Infants go not to heaven in that state, whither can they go but to hell? and that's Damnation in the greatest sense. I grant it, that if in the event of things they do not go to Heaven (as things are now ordered) it is but too likely that they go to Hell: but I adde, that as all darkness does not infer horror and distraction of minde, or fearful apparitions and phantasms: so neither does all Hell, [Page 14]or states in Hell infer all those tor­ments which the Schoolmen signi­fie by a poena sensus (for I speak now in pursuance of their way). So that there is no necessity of a third place; but it concludes only that in the state of separation from Gods presence there is a great va­riety of degrees and kinds of evil, and every one is not the extreme: and yet by the way, let me observe, that Gregory Nazianzen and Nice­tas taught that there is a third place for Infants and Heathens: and Irenaeus affirm'd that the evils of Hell were not eternal to all, but to the Devils only and the greater criminals. But neither they nor we, nor any man else can tell whether Hell be a place or no. It is a state of evil; but whether all the damned be in one or in twenty places, we can­not tell.

But I have no need to make use [Page 15]of any of this. For when I affirm that Infants being by Adam reduc'd and left to their meer natural state, fall short of Heaven; I do not say they cannot go to Heaven at all, but they cannot go thither by their naturall powers, they cannot with­out a new grace and favour go to heaven. But then it cannot pre­sently be inferred, that therefore they go to hell; but this ought to be infer'd, which indeed was the real consequent of it; therefore it is necessary that Gods Grace should supply this defect, if God intends Heaven to them at all; and because Nature cannot, God sent a Saviour by whom it was effected. But if it be asked, what if this grace had not come? and that it be said, that with­out Gods grace they must have gone to Hell, because without it they could not go to Heaven? I answer, That we know how it is, now that God in his goodness hath [Page 16]made provisions for them: but if he had not made such provisions, what would have been we know not, any more then we know what would have followed, if Adam had not sinned; where he should have liv'd, and how long, and in what circumstances the posterity should have been provided for in all their possible contingencies. But yet, this I know, that it followes not, that if without this Grace we could not have gone to Heaven, that therefore we must have gone to Hel. For although the first was ordinarily impossible, yet the second was absolutely unjust, and against Gods goodness, and therefore more impossible. But because the first could not be done by nature, God was pleased to promise and to give his grace, that he might bring us to that state whi­ther he had design'd. us, that is, to a supernatural felicity. If Adam had not fallen, yet Heaven had not been [Page 17]a natural consequent of his obedi­ence, but a Gracious, it had been a gift still: and of Adam though he had persisted in innocence, it is true to say, that without Gods Grace, that is, by the meer force of Nature, he could never have ar­riv'd to a Supernatural state, that is, to the joyes of Heaven; and yet it does not follow, that if he had re­main'd in Innocence, he must have gone to Hell. Just so it is in In­fants, Hell was not made for man, but for Devils; and therefore it must be something besides meer Nature that can bear any man thi­ther: meer Nature goes neither to Heaven nor Hell. So that when I say Infants naturally cannot go to Heaven, and that this is a punish­ment of Adam's sin, he being for it punished with a loss of his gracious condition, and devolv'd to the state of Nature, and we by him left [Page 18]so; my meaning is, that this Dam­nation which is of our Nature, is but negative, that is, as a consequent of our Patriarchs sin, our Nature is left imperfect and deficient in order to a supernatural end, which the Schoolmen call a poena damni, but improperly: they indeed think it may be a real event, and final con­dition of persons as well as things: but I affirm it was an evil effect of Adam's sin: but in the event of things it became to the persons the way to a new grace, and hath no other event as to Heaven and Hell directly and immediately. In the same sense and to the same purpose I understand the word Damnation in the 9. Article.

But the word [Damnation] may very well, truly, and sufficiently sig­nifie all the purposes of the Article, if it be taken only for the effect of that sentence which was inflicted [Page 19]upon Adam, and descended on his posterity, that is, for condemnation to Death, and the evils of mortali­ty. So the word is used by S. Paul 1 Cor. 11.29. He that eateth and drinketh unworthily, eateth and drinketh Damnation to himself. [...] is the word, but that it did particularly signifie temporal death and evils, appears by the instances of probation in the next words, For, for this cause some are weak a­mongst you, some are sick, and some are fallen asleep. This also in the Article. Original Sin deserves dam­nation, that is, it justly brought in the angry sentence of God upon Man, it brought him to death, and deserv'd it: it brought it upon us, and deserv'd it too. I do not say that we by that sin deserv'd that death, neither can death be properly a punishment of us till we superadde some evil of our own; yet Adam's [Page 20]sin deserv'd it so, that it was justly left to fall upon us, we as a conse­quent and punishment of his sin be­ing reduc'd to our natural portion. In odiosis quod minimum est sequi­mur. The lesser sense of the word is certainly agreeable to truth and reason: and it were good we us'd the word in that sense which may best warrant her doctrine, especi­ally for that use of the word, having the precedent of Scri­pture.

I am confirm'd in this interpre­tation by the 2. §. of the Article: viz. of the remanency of concu­piscence or Original Sin in the Re­generate. All the sinfulness of Ori­ginal Sin is the lust or concupi­scence, that is, the proneness to sin. Now then I demand, whether Con­cupiscence before actual consent be a sin or no? and if it be a sin, whe­ther it deserves damnation? That [Page 21]all sin deserves damnation, I am sure our Church denies not. If therefore concupiscence before con­sent be a sin, then this also deserves damnation where ever it is: and if so, then a man may be damned for Original Sin even after Baptism. For even after Baptism, concupi­scence (or the sinfulness of Origi­nal Sin) remains in the regenerate: and that which is the same thing, the same vitiousness, the same enmity to God after Baptism, is as damna­ble, it deserves damnation as much as that did that went before. If it be replied, that Baptism takes off the guilt or formal part of it, but leaves the material part behinde, that is, though concupiscence re­mains, yet it shall not bring damna­tion to the regenerate or Baptized. I answer, that though baptismal re­generation puts a man into a state of grace and favour, so that what [Page 22]went before shall not be imputed to him afterwards, that is, Adam's sin shall not bring damnation (in any sense) yet it hinders not, but that what is sinful afterwards shall be then imputed to him, that is, he may be damn'd for his own concupi­scence. He is quitted from it as it came from Adam; but by Baptism he is not quitted from it, as it is sub­jected in himself, if (I say) concu­piscence before consent be a sin. If it be no sin, then for it, Infants un­baptized cannot with justice be damn'd; it does not deserve dam­nation: but if it be a sin, then so long as it is there, so long it de­serves damnation; and Baptism did only quit the relation of it to Adam (for that was all that went before it) but not the danger of the man. * But because the Article supposes that it does not damn the regenerate or baptized, and yet that it hath the na­ture [Page 23]of sin, it follows evidently and undeniably, that both the phrases are to be diminished and understood in a favourable sense. As the phrase [the Nature of sin] signifies; so does [Damnation] but [the Na­ture of sin] signifies something that brings no guilt, because it is af­firm'd to be in the Regenerate, therefore [Damnation] signifies something that brings no Hell: but [to deserve Damnation] must mean something lesse then ordinary, that is, that concupiscence is a thing not morally good, not to be allowed of, not to be nurs'd, but mortifi'd, fought against, disapprov'd, con­demn'd and disallowed of men as it is of God.

And truly My Lord, to say that for Adam's sin it is just in God to condemn Infants to the eternal flames of Hell: and to say, that concupiscence or natural inclinati­ons [Page 24]before they pass into any act, could bring eternal condemnation from Gods presence into the eter­nall portion of Devils, are two such horrid propositions, that if any Church in the world would expres­ly affirm them, I for my part should think it unlawful to communicate with her in the defence or profession of either, and do think it would be the greatest temptation in the world to make men not to love God, of whom men so easily speak such horrid things. I would suppose the Article to mean any thing rather then either of these. But yet one thing more I have to say.

The Article is certainly to be expounded according to the analo­gy of faith, and the express words of Scripture, if there be any that speak expresly in this matter. Now whereas the Article explicating Ori­ginal Sin affirms it to be that fault [Page 25]or corruption of mans nature ( vi­tium Naturae, not peccatum) by which he is far gone from ori­ginall righteousness, and is in­clin'd to evil: because this is not full enough, the Article adds by way of explanation [So that the flesh lusteth against the spirit] that is, it really produces a state of evil temptations: it lusteth, that is, actually and habitually; [it lusteth against the spirit, and therefore deserves Gods wrath and damnation] So the Article: Therefore; for no other reason but because the flesh lusteth against the spirit; not because it can lust, or is apta nata to lust, but because it lusteth actually, therefore it de­serves damnation: and this is Ori­ginal Sin: or as the Article ex­presses it, it hath the nature of sin; it is the fomes, or matter of sin, and is in the original of man­kinde, [Page 26]and deriv'd from Adam as our body is, but it deserves not damnation in the highest sense of the word, till the concupiscence be actual. Till then, the words of [Wrath and Damnation] must be meant in the less and more ea­sie signification, according to the former explication: and must on­ly relate to the personal sin of Adam. To this sense of the Ar­ticle I heartily subscribe. For besides the reasonableness of the thing, and the very manner of speaking us'd in the Article; it is the very same way of speaking, and exactly the same doctrine which we finde in S. James, (Jam. 1.14.) [...]: Concupi­scence, when it is impregnated, when it hath conceiv'd, then it brings forth sin: and sin when it is in production, and birth, brings forth death. But in Infants, concu­piscence [Page 27]is innocent and a virgin, it conceives not, and therefore is without sin, and therefore with­out death or damnation. * Against these expositions I cannot imagine what can be really and materially objected.

But my Lord, I perceive the main outcry is like to be upon the authority of the Harmony of Confessions. Concerning which I shall say this, that in this Article the Harmony makes as good mu­sick as bels ringing backward; and they agree, especially when they come to be explicated and untwisted into their minute and explicite meanings, as much as Lutheran and Calvinist, as Papist and Protestant, as Thomas and Scotus, as Remonstrant and Dor­drechtan, that is, as much as pro and con, or but a very little more. I have not the book with me here [Page 28]in prison, and this neighbour­hood cannot supply me, and I dare not trust my memory to give a scheme of it: but your Lord­ship knows that in nothing more do the reformed Churches dis­agree, then in this and its ap­pendages; and you are pleased to hint something of it, by say­ing that some speak more of this then the Church of England: and Andrew Rivet, though unwil­lingly, yet confesses, de Confessio­nibus nostris & earum syntagmate vel Harmonia, etiamsi in non nul­lis capitibus non planè conveniant, dicam tamen, melius in concordi­am redigi posse quàm in Ecclesia Romana concordantiam discordan­tium Canonum, quo titulo decretum Gratiani, quod Canonistis regulas praefigit, solet infigniri. And what he affirmes of the whole collecti­on, is most notorious in the Ar­ticle [Page 29]of Original Sin. For my own part I am ready to subscribe the first Helvetian confession, but not the second. So much difference there is in the confessions of the same Church.

Now whereas your Lordship adds, that though they are falli­ble, yet when they bring evidence of holy Writ, their assertions are infallible, and not to be contra­dicted: I am bound to reply, that when they do so, whether they be infallible or no, I will beleeve them, because then though they might, yet they are not deceived. But as evidence of holy Writ had been sufficient without their au­thority: so without such evidence their authority is nothing. But then, My Lord, their citing and urging the words of S. Paul, Rom. 5.12. is so far from being an evident probation of their Ar­ticle, [Page 30]that nothing is to me a surer argument of their fallibi­lity, then the urging of that which evidently makes nothing for them, but much against them: As 1. Af­firming expresly that death was the event of Adam's sin; the whole event, for it names no other; temporal death; according to that saying of S. Paul, 1 Cor. 15. In Adam we all die. And 2. Af­firming this process of death to be [...], which is and ought to be taken to be the allay or condition of the condemnati­on. It became a punishment to them only who did sin; but upon them also inflicted for Adam 's sake.

A like expression to which is in the Psalms, Psal. 106.32, 33. They angred him also at the waters of strife, so that he punished Moses for their sakes. Here was plainly [Page 31]a traduction of evil from the Na­tion to Moses their relative: For their sakes he was punished, but yet [...] for as much as Moses had sin'd: for so it fol­lowes, because they provoked his spirit, so that he spake unadvised­ly with his lips. So it is between Adam and us. He sin'd and God was highly displeased. This dis­pleasure went further then upon Adam's sin: for though that on­ly was threatned with death, yet the sins of his children which were not so threatned, became so punished, and they were by na­ture heirs of wrath and damna­tion; that is, for his sake our sins inherited his curse. The curse that was specially and only threat­ned to him, we when we sin'd did inherit for his sake. So that it is not so properly to be called, Ori­ginal Sin, as an original curse upon our sin.

To this purpose we have also another example of God trans­mitting the curse from one to ano­ther: Both were sinners, but one was the original of the curse or punishment. So said the Prophet to the wife of Jeroboam, 1 King. 14.16. [ He shall give Israel up be­cause of the sins of Jeroboam, who did sin, and who made Israel to sin] Jeroboam was the root of the sin and of the curse. Here it was also (that I may use the words of the Apostle) that by the sin of one man [Jeroboam] sin went out into all [Israel] and the curse, captivity, or death by sin, and so death went upon all men [of Israel] [...] in as much as all men [of Israel] have sinned. If these men had not sinned, they had not been punished: I cannot say they had not been afflicted; for David's childe was smit­ten [Page 33]for his fathers fault: but though they did sin, yet unless their root and principal had sin­ned, possibly they should not have so been punish'd: For his sake the punishment came. Upon the same account it may be, that we may inherit the damnation or curse for Adam's sake, though we deserve it; yet it being transmit­ted from Adam and not particu­larly threatned to the first poste­rity, we were his heirs, the heirs of death, deriving from him an original curse, but due also (if God so pleased) to our sins. And this is the full sense of the 12. verse, and the effect of the phrase [...].

But your Lordship is pleased to object that though [...] does once signifie [For as much as] yet three times it signifies in or by. To this I would be content to [Page 34]submit, if the observation could be verified, and be material when it were true. But besides that it is so used in 2 Cor. 5.4. your Lordship may please to see it used (as not only my self, but indeed most men, and particular­ly the Church of England does read it and expound it) in Mat. 26.50. And yet if [...] were written [...], which is the same with in or by, if it be rendred word for word, yet [...] twice in the Scripture signifies [for as much as] as you may read Rom. 8.3. & Heb. 2.18. So that here are two places besides this in question, and two more ex abun­danti to shew, that if it were not [...], but said in words expresly as you would have it in the mea­ning, yet even so neither the thing, nor any part of the thing could be evicted against me: [Page 35]and lastly, if it were not only said [...] but that that sense of it were admitted which is desired, and that it did mean in or by in this very place: yet the Question were not at all the nearer to be concluded against me. For I grant that it is true [in him we are all sinners] as it is true that [in him we all die] that is, for his sake we are us'd as sinners; be­ing miserable really, but sinners in account and effect: as I have largely discoursed in my book. But then for the place here in question, it is so certain that it signifies the same thing (as our Church reads it) that it is not sense without it, but a violent breach of the period without prece­dent or reason. And after all; I have looked upon those places where [...] is said to signifie in or by, and in one of them I finde it so, [Page 36]Mar. 2.4. but in Act. 3.16. & Phil. 1.3. I finde it not at all in any sense: but [...] indeed is used for in or by, in that of the Acts; and in the other it signifies, at or upon; but if all were granted that is pretended to, it no way prejudices my cause, as I have already pro­ved.

Next to these your Lordship seems a little more zealous and decretory in the Question upon the confidence of the 17, 18, & 19. verses of the 5. chapter to the Romans. The sum of which as your Lordship most ingeniously sums it up, is this. ‘As by one many were made sinners: so by one many were made righteous, that by Adam, this by Christ. But by Christ we are made [...] just, not by imputation only, but effectively and to real purposes; therefore by Adam [Page 37]we are really made sinners. And this your Lordship confirms by the observation of the sense of two words here used by the A­postle, The first is [...], which signifies a sentence of guilt, or punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon whom the condemnation comes, because God punishes none but for their own sin, Ezek. 18.2. From the word [...] clear from sin, so your Lordship ren­ders it: and in opposition to this, [...] is to be rendred, that is, guilty, criminal per­sons, really and properly.’ This is all which the wit of man can say from this place of S. Paul, and if I make it appear that this is invalid, I hope I am se­cure.

To this then, I answer: That the Antithesis in these words here [Page 38]urg'd, (for there is another in the chapter) and this whole argu­ment of S. Paul is full and in­tire without descending to mi­nutes. Death came in by one man, much more shall life come by one man; if that by Adam, then much more this by Christ: by him to condemnation, by this man to justification. This is e­nough to verifie the argument of S. Paul, though life and death did not come in the same manner to the several relatives; as indeed they did not: of which afterwards. But for the present: It runs thus. By Adam we were made sinners; by Christ we are made righteous: As certainly one as the other, though not in the same man­ner of dispensation. By Adam [...] death reigned; by this man the reign of death shall be destroyed, and life set up in [Page 39]stead of it; by him we were us'd as sinners, for in him we died: but by Christ we are justified, that is, us'd as just persons, for by him we live. This is suffici­ent for the Apostles argu­ment, and yet no necessity to af­firm that we are sinners in A­dam any more then by imputa­tion: for we are by Christ made just no otherwise then by imputa­tion.

In the proof or perswasion I will use no indirect arguments, as to say, that to deny us to be just by imputation is the Doctrine of the Church of Rome and of the Socinian Conventicles, but ex­presly dislik'd by all the Luthe­ran, Calvinist, and Zuinglian Churches, and particularly by the Church of England, and indeed by the whole Harmony of Confes­sions: [Page 40]this I say, I will not make use of; not only because I my self do not love to be press'd by such prejudices rather then arguments; but because the question of the imputation of righteousness is very much mistaken and misun­derstood on all hands. They that say that Christs righteousness is imputed to us for justification, do it upon this account, because they know all that we do is imperfect, therefore they think themselves constrain'd to flie to Christ's righteousness, and think it must be imputed to us, or we perish. The other side, considering that this way would destroy the ne­cessity of holy living; and that in order to our justification, there were conditions requir'd on our parts, think it necessary to say that we are justified by inherent righteousness. Between these the [Page 41]truth is plain enough to be read. Thus:

Christ's righteousness is not imputed to us for justification di­rectly and immediately; neither can we be justified by our own righteousness: but our Faith and sincere endevours are through Christ accepted in stead of legal righteousness: that is; we are ju­stified through Christ, by impu­tation, not of Christs, nor our own righteousness: but of our faith and endevours of righteous­ness as if they were perfect: and we are justified by a Non-impu­tation, viz. of our past sins, and present unavoidable imperfecti­ons: that is, we are handled as if we were just persons and no sinners. So faith was imputed to Abraham for righteousness; not that it made him so, legally, but Evangelically, that is, by grace and imputation.

And indeed My Lord, that I may speak freely in this great question: when one man hath sin'd, his descendents and rela­tives, cannot possibly by him, or for him, or in him be made sinners properly and really. For in sin there are but two things imagina­ble: the irregular action; and the guilt, or obligation to punishment. Now we cannot in any sense be said to have done the action which another did, and not we: the acti­on is as individual as the person; and Titius may as well be Cajus, and the Son be his own Father, as he can be said to have done the Fathers action; and therefore we cannot possibly be guilty of it: for guilt is an obligation to punish­ment for having done it: the acti­on and the guilt are relatives; one cannot be without the other: something must be done inwardly [Page 43]or outwardly, or there can be no guilt. * But then for the evil of punishment, that may pass further then the action. If it passes upon the innocent, it is not a punish­ment to them; but an evil in­flicted by right of Dominion; but yet by reason of the relation of the afflicted to him that sin'd, to him it is a punishment. But if it passes upon others that are not in­nocent, then it is a punishment to both; to the first principally; to the Descendents or Relatives, for the others sake; his sin being im­puted so far.

How far that is in the present case, and what it is, the Apostle expresses thus: It was [...]; vers. 18. or [...], vers. 16. a curse unto condemna­tion, or a judgement unto con­demnation, that is, a curse inhe­rited from the principal; deserv'd [Page 44]by him, and yet also actually de­scending upon us after we had sin'd, [...] or [...]; that is the judgement passed up­on Adam; the [...], or [...] was on him; but it prov'd to be a [...], or a through condemna­tion when from him it passed upon all men that sin'd. [...] and [...] sometimes differ in degrees: so the words are used by S. Paul other­where (1 Cor. 11.32.) [...]; a judgement to pre­vent a punishment, or a less to fore­stal a greater in the same kinde: so here the [...] pass'd further; the [...] was fulfilled in his posterity passing on further, viz. that all who sin'd should pass under the power of death as well as he: but this became formally and actual­ly a punishment to them only who did sin personally: to them it was [...].

This [...] or [...], is the [...], vers. 17. the reign of death; this is called [...], vers. 21. the reign of sin in death: that is, the effect which Adam's sin had, was only to bring in the reign of death, which is already broken by Jesus Christ, and at last shall be quite destroyed. But to say that sin here is properly transmitted to us from Adam, formally, and so as to be inherent in us, is to say that we were made to do his action, which is a perfect contradiction.

Now then your Lordship sees that what you note of the mea­ning of [...] I admit, and is indeed true enough, and agree­able to the discourse of the Apo­stle, and very much in justificati­on of what I taught. [...] sig­nifies a punishment for sin, and this sin to be theirs upon whom [Page 46]the condemnation comes. I ea­sily subscribe to it: but then take in the words of S. Paul, [...], by one sin, or by the sin of one the curse passed upon all men unto condemnation; that is, the curse descended from A­dam; for his sake it was propa­gated [...] to a real con­demnation, viz. when they should sin. For though this [...] or the curse of death was threatned on­ly to Adam, yet upon Gods be­ing angry with him, God resol­ved it should descend: and if men did sin as Adam, or if they did sin at all, though less then Adam, yet the [...] or the curse threatned to him should pass [...] un­to the same actual condemnation which fell upon him, that is, it should actually bring them under the reign of death.

But then my Lord, I beseech you let it be considered, if this [...] must suppose a punishment for sin, for the sin of him, his own sin that is so condemn'd, as your Lordship proves perfectly out of Ezek. 18. how can it be just that the [...] condemna­tion should pass upon us for A­dam's sin, that is, not for his own sin who is so condemn'd, but for the sin of another? S. Paul easily resolves the doubt, if there had been any. The [...], the reign of death passed upon all men [...] in as much as all men have sinned. And now why shall we suppose that we must be guilty of what we did not, when without any such [...] there is so much guilt of what we did really and personally? why shall it be that we die only for Adam's sin, and not rather as [Page 48]S. Paul expresly affirms [...] in as much as all men have sinned, since by your own argument it cannot be in as much as all men have not sinned; this you say cannot be, and yet you will not confess this which can be, and which S. Paul affirms to have been indeed: as if it were not more just and reasonable to say, that from Adam the curse descended unto the condemnation of the sins of the world, then to say the curse descended without conside­ration of their sins; but a sin must be imagined to make it seem reasonable and just to condemn us. [Now I submit it to the judge­ment of all the world, which way of arguing is most reasonable and concluding: You my Lord in be­half of others argue thus. [...] or condemnation cannot pass up­on a man for any sin but his [Page 49]own: Therefore every man is truly guilty of Adam's sin, and that becomes his own. Against this I oppose mine. [...] or condem­nation cannot pass upon a man for any sin but his own: therefore it did not pass upon man for A­dam's fin; because Adam's sin, was Adam's, not our own: But we all have sinned, we have sins of our own, therefore for these the curse pass'd from Adam to us. To back mine, besides that common no­tices of sense and reason defend it, I have the plain words of S. Paul; Death passed upon all men, for as much as all men have sinned; all men, that is, the gene­rality of mankinde, all that liv'd till they could sin, the others that died before, died in their nature, not in their sin, neither Adam's nor their own, save only that A­dam brought it in upon them, or [Page 50]rather left it to them, himself be­ing disrobed of all that which could hinder it.

Now for the word [...], which your Lordship renders [clear from sin] I am sure no man is so justi­fied in this world, as to be clear from sin; and if we all be sinners, and yet healed as just persons, it is certain we are just by imputation only, that is, Christ imputing our faith, and sincere, though not unerring obedience to us for righteousness: And then the Antithesis must hold thus; By Christ comes justification to life, as by Adam came the curse or the sin to the condemnation of death: But our justification which comes by Christ is by imputa­tion and acceptilation, by grace and favour: not that we are made really, that is, legally and perfectly righteous, but by im­putation [Page 51]of faith and obedience to us, as if it were perfect: And therfore Adam's sin was but by im­putation only to certain purposes; not real, or proper, not formal or inherent. For the grace by Christ is more then the sin by Adam: if therefore that was not legal and proper, but Evangelical and gracious, favourable and imputa­tive, much more is the sin of Adam in us improperly, and by im­putation. * And truly my Lord, I think that no sound Divine of any of our Churches will say that we are [...] or [...] in any other sense: not that Christs righ­teousness is imputed to us with­out any inherent graces in us, but that our imperfect services, our true faith and sincere endevours of obedience are imputed to us for righteousness through Jesus Christ: and since it is certainly [Page 52]so, I am sure the Antithesis be­tween Christ and Adam can never be salved by making us sinners really by Adam, and yet just or righteous by Christ only in ac­ceptation and imputation. For then sin should abound more then grace; expresly against the ho­nour of our blessed Saviour, the glory of our redemption, and the words of S. Paul. But rather on the contrary is it true, That though by Christ we were really and legally made perfectly righ­teous, it follows not that we were made sinners by Adam in the same manner and measure: for this similitude of S. Paul ought not to extend to an equality in all things; but still the advantage and prerogative, the abundance and the excess must be on the part of Grace: for if sin does abound, grace does much more abound; and [Page 53]we do more partake of righteous­ness by Christ, then of sin by Adam. Christ and Adam are the several fountains of emanation, and are compar'd aequè, but not aequaliter. Therefore this argu­ment holds redundantly, since by Christ we are not made legally righteous, but by imputation only; much less are we made sinners by Adam. This in my sense is so in­finitely far from being an ob­jection, that it perfectly demon­strates the main question; and for my part I mean to relie up­on it.

As for that which your Lord­ship adds out of Rom. 5.19. That [...] signifies sinners, not by imitation, as the Pelagians dream, but sinners really and ef­fectively; I shall not need to make any other reply; but that 1. I do not approve of that gloss of [Page 54]the Pelagians, that in Adam we are made sinners by imitation; and much less of that which af­firms, we are made so properly and formally. But [made sinners] signifies, us'd like sinners; so as [justified] signifies healed like just persons: In which interpreta­tion I follow S. Paul, not the Pelagians; they who are on the other side of the question, follow neither. And unless men take in their opinion before they read; and resolve not to understand S. Paul in this Epistle, I wonder why they should fancy that all that he sayes sounds that way which they commonly dream of: But as men fancy, so the Bels will ring. But I know yovr Lordships grave and wiser judgement, sees not on­ly this that I have now opened, but much beyond it, and that you will be a zealous advocate [Page 55]for the truth of God, and for the honour of his justice, wisdome and mercy.

That which followes, makes me beleeve your Lordship resolv'd to try me, by speaking your own sense in the line, and your tempta­tion in the interline. For when your Lordship had said that ‘[My ar­guments for the vindication of Gods goodness and justice are sound and holy]’ your hand run it over again and added [as ab­stracted from the case of Original Sin.] But why should this be ab­stracted from all the whole Oeco­nomy of God, from all his other dispensations? Is it in all cases of the world unjust for God, to im­pute our fathers fins to us unto eternal condemnation; and is it otherwise in this only? Certain­ly a man would think this were the more favourable case; as be­ing [Page 56]a single act, done but once, repented of after it was done, not consented to by the parties inter­ested, not stipulated by God that it should be so, and being against all lawes and all the rea­son of the world: therefore it were but reason that if any where, here much rather Gods justice and goodness should be relied up­on as the measure of the event. * And if in other cases lawes be never given to Ideots and Infants and persons uncapable, why should they be given here? but if they were not capable of a Law, then neither could they be of Sin; for where there is no law, there is no transgression. And is it un­just to condemn one man to hell for all the sin of a thousand of his Ancestors actually done by them? and shall it be accounted just to damn all the world for one sin of [Page 57]one man? But if it be said, that it is unjust to damn the innocent for the sin of another; but the world is not innocent, but really guilty in Adam. Besides that this is a begging of the question, it is also against common sense, to say that a man is not innocent of that which was done before he had a being; for if that be not suffici­ent, then it is impossible for a man to be innocent. And if this way of answer be admitted, any man may be damned for the sin of any Father; because it may be said here as well as there, that although the innocent must not perish for anothers fault, yet the son is not innocent as being in his fathers loyns when the fault was committed, and the law cals him and makes him guilty. And if it were so indeed, this were so far from being an excuse, to say [Page 58]that the Law makes him guilty, that this were absolute tyranny, and the thing that were to be com­plain'd of.

I hope, by this time your Lord­ship perceives, that I have no rea­son to fear that I praevaricate S. Paul's rule: [...]. I only endevour to un­derstand S. Paul's words, and I read them [...], in proportion to, and so as they may not intrench upon the repu­tation of Gods goodness and ju­stice: that's [...], to be wise unto sobriety. But they that do so [...] as to resolve it to be so whether God be honour'd in it, or disho­nour'd, and to answer all argu­ments, whether they can or can­not be answered, and to efform all their Theology to the ayre of that one great proposition, and [Page 59]to find out waies for God to pro­ceed in, which he hath never told of, [...] waies that are crooked and not to be insisted in, waies that are not right, if these men do not [...], then I hope I shall have less need to fear that I do, who do none of these things.

And in proportion to my secu­rity here, I am confident that I am unconcern'd in the consequent threatning. If any man shall E­vangelize, [...] any o­ther doctrine then what ye have received, something for Gospel which is not Gospel, something that ye have not received, let him be accursed. My Lord, if what I teach were not that which we have received, that God is just and righteous and true: that the soul that sins the same shall die: that we shall have no cause [Page 60]to say, The Fathers have eaten sowre grapes, and the childrens teeth are set on edge: that God is a gracious Father, pardoning iniquity, and therefore not exact­ing it where it is not: that Infants are from their Mothers wombs beloved of God their Father: that of such is the Kingdome of God: that he pities those souls who cannot discern the right hand from the left, as he declar'd in the case of the Ninevites: that to Infants there are special Angels appointed who alwaies behold the face of God: that Christ took them in his arms and blessed them, and therefore they are not hated by God, and accursed heirs of Hell, and coheirs with Satan: that the Messias was promis'd be­fore any children were born; as certainly as that Adam sin'd be­fore they were born: that if sin [Page 61]abounds, grace does superabound; and therefore children are with greater effect involv'd in the grace then they could be in the sin: and the sin must be gone before it could do them mischief: if this were not the doctrine of both Testaments, and if the contrary were, then the threatning of S. Paul might well be held up against me: but else my Lord, to shew such a Scorpion to him that speaks the truth of God in sincerity and humility, though it cannot make me to betray the truth and the honour of God, yet the very fear and affrightment which must needs seize upon every good man that does but behold it, or hear the words of that angry voice, shall and hath made me to pray not only that my self be preser­ved in truth, but that it would please God to bring into the way [Page 62]of truth all such as have erred and are deceived.

My Lord, I humbly thank your Lordship for your grave and pi­ous Councel, and kisse the hand that reaches forth so paternal a rod. I see you are tender both of truth and me: and though I have not made this tedious reply to cause trouble to your Lordship, or to steal from you any part of your precious time, yet because I see your Lordship was perswa­ded induere personam, to give some little countenance to a po­pular error out of jealousie against a less usual truth, I thought it my duty to represent to your Lordship such things, by which as I can, so I ought to be defended against captious objectors. It is hard when men will not be pati­ent of truth, because another man offers it to them, and they did [Page 63]not first take it in, or if they did, were not pleas'd to own it.

But from your Lordship I ex­pect, and am sure to finde the ef­fects of your piety, wisdome and learning, and that an error for being popular shall not prevail against so necessary, though un­observed truth. A necessary truth I call it; because without this I do not understand how we can declare Gods righteousness and justifie him, with whom unrighte­ousnesse cannot dwell: But if men of a contrary opinion, can reconcile their usual doctrines of Original Sin with Gods justice, and goodness and truth, I shall be well pleased with it, and think better of their doctrine then now I can.

But untill that be done, it were well (My Lord) if men would not trouble themselves or [Page 64]the Church with impertinent con­tradictions; but patiently give leave to have truth advanced, and God justified in his sayings and in his judgements, and the Church improved, and all errors confuted, that what did so prosperously be­gin the Reformation, may be ad­mitted to bring it to perfection, that men may no longer go quâ itur, but quâ eundum est.

The By of Rochester 's Letter to Dr. Taylor, with an account of the particulars there given in charge.

WORTHY SIR,

—Let me request you to weigh that of S. Paul, Ephes. 2.5. which are ur­ged by some Ancients: and to remember, how often he cals Concupiscence Sin; whereby it is urg'd that although Baptism take a­way [Page 66]the guilt as concre­tively redounding to the person, yet the simple ab­stracted guilt, as to the Na­ture remains: for Sacra­ments are administred to Persons, not to Natures. I confess, I finde not the Fa­thers so fully, and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till Pelagius had pudled the stream: but, after this, you may finde S. Jerom in Hos. saying, In paradiso omnes praevaricati sunt in Adamo. And S. Ambrose in Rom. 1.5. Manifestum est omnes peccasse in Adam, quasi in massâ, ex eo igitur [Page 67]cuncti peccatores, quia ex eo sumus omnes; and as Greg. 39 Hom. in Ezek. Sine culpâ in mundo esse non potest, qui in mundum cum culpâ ve­nit; But S. Austin is so fre­quent, so full and clear in his assertions, that his words & reasons will require your most judicious examinati­ons, and more strict weigh­ing of them; he saith epist. 107. Scimus secundùm A­dam nos primâ nativitate contagium mortis contrahere; nec liberamur à supplicio mor­tis aeternae nisi per gratiam renascamur in Christo; Id. de verb. Apost. Ser. 4. pec­catum [Page 68]à primo homine in om­nes homines pertransiit, etenim illud peccatum non in fonte mansit, sed pertransiit, and Rom. 5. ubi te invenit? ve­nundatum sub peccato, tra­hentem peccatum primi ho­minis, habentem peccatum antequam possis habere arbi­trium. Id. de praedestin. & grat. c. 2. Si infans uni­us diei non sit sine peccato, qui proprium habere non po­tuit, conficitur, ut illud traxe­rit alienum; de quo Apost. Per unum hominem peccatum intravit in mundum; quod qui negat, negat profectò nos esse mortales; quoniam mors est [Page 69]poena peccati. Sequitur, ne­cesse est, poena peccatum. Id. enchir. c. 9.29. Sola gra­tia redemptos discernit à perditis, quos in unam per­ditionis massam concreverat ab origine ducta communis contagio, Id. de peccator. mer. & remiss. l. 1. c. 3. Concupi­scentia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi inobedientia contra dominatum mentis, Quid potest, aut potuit nasci ex servo, nisi servus? ideo sicut omnis homo ab Adamo est, ita & omnis homo per Adamum servus est peccati. Rom. 5. Falluntur ergo om­nino, qui dicunt mortem so­lam, [Page 70]non & [...]peccatum tran­siisse in genus humanum. Pro­sper. resp. ad articulum Au­gustino falsò impositum; Om­nes homines praevaricationis reos, & damnationi obnoxios nasci perituros (que) nisi in Chri­sto renascamur, asserimus. Tho. 12. q. 8. Secundum fi­dem Catholicam tenendum est, quod primum peccatum pri­mi hominis, originaliter tran­sit in posteros, propter quod etiam pueri mox nati defe­runtur ad baptismum ab in­teriore culpâ abluendi. Con­trarium est haeresis Pelag. un­de peccatum quod sic à pri­mo parente derivatur, dici­tur [Page 71]Originale, sicut pecca­tum, quod ab animâ deriva­tur ad membra corporis, dici­tur actuale. Bonavent. in 2. sent. dist. 31. Sicut pec­catum actuale tribuitur ali­cui ratione singularis perso­nae: ita peccatum originale tribuitur ratione Naturae; corpus infectum traducitur, quia persona Adae infecit na­turam, & natura infecit per­sonam. Anima enim inficitur à carne per colligantiam, quum unita carni traxit ad se al­terius proprietates. Lombar. 2. Sent. dist. 31. Peccatum originale per corruptionem car­nis, in animâ fit: in vase enim [Page 72]dignoscitur vitium esse, quod vinum accescit.

If you take into conside­ration the Covenant made between Almighty God and Adam as relating to his posterity, it may conduce to the satisfaction of those who urge it for a proof of Origial Sin. Now that the work may prosper under your hands to the manife­station of Gods glory, the edification of the Church, and the satisfaction of all good Christians, is the hear­ty prayer of

Your fellow Servant in our most Blessed Lord Christ Jesu. Jo. Roffens.
My Lord,

I Perceive that you have a great Charity to every one of the sons of the Church, that your Lordship refuses not to sollicite their objections, and to take care that every man be answered that can make objections against my Doctrine; but as your charity makes you refuse no work or la­bour of love: so shall my duty and obedience make me ready to perform any commandement that can be relative to so excellent a principle.

I am indeed sorry your Lord­ship is thus haunted with obje­ctions about the Question of Ori­ginal [Page 74]Sin; but because you are pleas'd to hand them to me, I cannot think them so inconside­rable as in themselves they seem; for what your Lordship thinks worthy the reporting from others, I must think are fit to be answe­red and returned by me.

In your Lordships of Novem­ber, 10. these things I am to re­ply to:

Let me request you to weigh that of S. Paul Ephes. 2.5. The words are these [ Even when we were dead in sins, (God) hath quickned us together with Christ] which words I do not at all suppose relate to the matter of Original Sin, but to the state of Heathen sins, habitual Idolatries and impurities; in which the world was dead before the great Reformation by Christ. And I do not know any Expo­sitor of note that suspects any [Page 75]other sense of it; and the second verse of that chapter makes it so certain and plain, that it is too visible to insist upon it longer. But your Lordship addes fur­ther.

And to remember how often he cals concupiscence Sin] I know S. Paul reckons Concupiscence to be one of the works of the flesh, and consequently such as excludes from heaven, Col. 3.5. Evil concupiscence] concupiscence with something superadded, but cer­tainly that is nothing that is na­tural; for God made nothing that is evil, and whatsoever is natural and necessary cannot be mortified; but this may and must, and the Apostle cals upon us to do it; but that this is a super­inducing, and an actual or habi­tual lusting appears by the fol­lowing words, vers. 7. in which [Page 76]ye also walked sometimes when ye lived in them, such a concupi­scence as that which is the effect of habitual sins or an estate of sins, of which the Apostle speaks, Rom. 7.8. Sin taking occasion by the com­mandement wrought in me all man­ner of concupiscence; that is, so great a state of evil, such strong incli­nations and desires to sin, that I grew as captive under it; it in­troduced a necessity like those in S. Peter, who had eyes [...] full of an Adulteress: the women had possessed their eyes, and therefore they were [...] they could not cease from sin: because having [...] all concupiscence, that is the very spirit of sinful desires, they could relish nothing but the producti­ons of sin, they could fancy no­thing but Colloquintida and Toad­stools of the earth. * Once more [Page 77]I finde S. Paul speaking of Con­cupiscence, 1 Thess. 4.5. Let every man knew to possess his vessel in holiness and honour, not in the lust of concupiscence, as do the Gentiles which know not God. In the lust of Concupiscence, that is plainly in lustfulness and im­purity: for it is a Hebraism, where a superlative is usually ex­pressed by the synonymon: as Lutum coeni; pluvia imbris; so the Gall of bitterness and the ini­quity of sins; Robur virium; the blackness of darkness, that is, [...], the outer darkness, or the greatest darkness: so here the lust of Concupiscence, that is, the vilest and basest of it. I know no where else that the Apostle uses the word in any sense. But the like is to be said of the word lust, which the Apostle often uses, for the habits produced or the preg­nant [Page 78]desires, but never for the na­tural principle and affection, when he speaks of sin.

But your Lordship is pleased to adde a subtlety in pursuance of your former advices and notices, which I confess I shall never un­derstand.

Although Baptism take away the guilt as concretively redound­ding to the person, yet the simple abstracted guilt as to the Nature remains; for Sacraments are ad­ministred to persons, not to na­tures] Thus I suppose those per­sons from whom your Lord­ship reports it, intended as an an­swer to a secret objection. For if Concupiscence be a sin, and yet remains after baptism, then what good does Baptism effect? But if it be no sin after, then it is no sin before. To this it is answered as you see: there is a [Page 79]double guilt; a guilt of person, and of nature. That is taken away, this is not: for, Sacraments are given to Persons, not to Na­tures.

But first, where is there such a distinction set down in Scri­pture, or in the prime antiquity, or in any moral Philosopher? There is no humane nature but what is in the persons of men; and though our understanding can make a separate consideration of these, or rather consider a per­son in a double capacity, in his personal and in his natural, that is (if I am to speak sense) a person may be considered in that which is proper to him, and in that which is common to him and others; yet these two considera­tions cannot make two distinct subjects capable of such different events. I will put it to the trial.

This guilt that is in nature, what is it? Is it the same thing that was in the person? that is, is it an obligation to punishment? If it be not, I know not the meaning of the word, and therefore I have nothing to do with it. If it be, then if this guilt or obliga­tion to punishment remains in the nature after it is taken from the person, then if this concupiscence deserve damnation, this nature shall be damned, though the per­son be saved. Let the Objectors, my Lord, choose which they will. If it does not deserve damnation, why do they say it does? If it does, then the guilty may suffer what they deserve, but the inno­cent or the absolved must not; the person then being acquitted, and the nature not acquitted, the nature shall be damn'd and the person be saved.

But if it be said that the guilt remains in the nature to certain purposes, but not to all; then I reply, so it does in the person; for it is in the person after Baptism, so as to be a perpetual possibili­ty and proneness to sin, and a principle of trouble; and if it be no otherwise in the nature, then this distinction is to no purpose; if it be otherwise in the nature, then it brings damnation to it, when it brings none to the Man, and then the former argument must return. But whether it pre­vail or no, yet I cannot but note, that what is here affirmed is ex­presly against the words common­ly attributed to S. Cyprian (De ablutione pedum) Sic abluit quos parentalis labes infecerat, ut nec actualis nec Originalis macula post ablutionem illam ulla sui vestigia derelinquat: How this supposing [Page 82]it of Baptism can be reconcil'd with the guilt remaining in the nature, I confess I cannot give an account. It is expresly against S. Austin (Tom. 9. Tract. 41. in Johan. epist. ad Ocean.) saying, deleta est tota iniquitas! expres­ly against S. Hierom, Quomodo justificati sumus & sanctificati, si peccatum aliquid in nobis relin­quitur?

But again (My Lord) I did suppose that Concupiscence or Ori­ginal Sin had been founded in nature, and had not been a per­sonal but a natural evil. I am sure, so the Article of our Church affirms; it is the fault and cor­ruption of our Nature. And so S. Bonaventure affirms in the words cited by your Lordship in your Letter: Sicut peccatum actu­ale tribuitur alicui ratione singula­ris personae: ita peccatum origi­uis [Page 83]tribuitur ratione naturae. Ei­ther then the Sacrament must have effect upon our Nature, to purifie that which is vitiated by Concupiscence, or else it does no good at all. For if the guilt or sin be founded in the nature, (as the Article affirms) and Baptism does not take off the guilt from the nature, then it does no­thing.

Now since your Lordship is pleas'd in the behalf of the ob­jectors so warily to avoid what they thought pressing, I will take leave to use the advantages it ministers: for so the Serpent teaches us where to strike him, by his so warily and guiltily de­fending his head. I therefore argue thus.

Either Baptism does not take off the guilt of Original Sin, or else there may be punishment [Page 84]where there is no guilt, or else natural death was not it which God threatned as the punishment of Adam's fact. For it is cer­tain, that all men die as well af­ter baptism as before; and more after then before. That which would be properly the consequent of this Dilemma, is this, that when God threatned death to A­dam, saying, On the day thou ea­test of the tree thou shalt die the death, he inflicted and intended to inflict the evils of a trouble­some mortal life. For Adam did not die that day, but Adam be­gan to be miserable that day, to live upon hard labour, to eat fruits from an accursed field, till he should return to the earth whence he was taken. (Gen. 3.17, 18, 19.) So that death in the common sense of the word was to be the end of his labour, [Page 85]not so much the punishment of the sin. For it is probable he should have gone off from the scene of this world to a better, though he had not sin'd; but if he had not sin'd, he should not be so afflicted, and he should not have died daily till he had di­ed finally, that is, till he had returned to his dust whence he was taken, and whither he would naturally have gone: and it is no new thing in Scripture that mi­series and infelicities should be cal­led dying or death. (Exod. 10.17. 1 Cor. 15.31. 2 Cor. 1.10. & 4.10, 11, 12. & 11.23.) But I only note this as probable; as not being willing to admit what the Socinians answer in this argu­ment; who affirm that God threatning death to the Sin of Adam, meant death eternal: which is certainly not true; as we learn [Page 86]from the words of the Apostle, saying, In Adam we all die; which is not true of death eternal, but it is true of the miseries and cala­mities of mankinde, and it is true of temporal death in the sense now explicated, and in that which is commonly received.

But I add also this probleme. That which would have been, had there been no sin, and that which remains when the sin or guiltiness is gone, is not properly the punishment of the sin. But dissolution of the soul and body should have been, if Adam had not sin'd, for the world would have been too little to have en­tertain'd those myriads of men which must in all reason have been born from that blessing of Increase and multiply, which was given at the first Creation; and to have confin'd mankinde to the [Page 87]pleasures of this world, in case he had not fallen, would have been a punishment of his innocence; but however, it might have been, though God had not been angry, and shall still be, even when the sin is taken off. The proper con­sequent of this will be, that when the Apostle sayes, Death came in by sin, and that Death is the wages of sin, he primarily and literally means the solemnities, and causes, and infelicities, and untimeliness of temporal death, and not meer­ly the dissolution, which is direct­ly no evil, but an inlet to a better state. But I infist not on this, but offer it to the consideration of inquisitive and modest persons.

And now that I may return thi­ther from whence this objection brought me; I consider, that if any should urge this argument to me:

Baptism delivers from Origi­nal Sin.

Baptism does not deliver from Concupiscence; therefore Concu­piscence is not Original Sin.

I did not know well what to an­swer; I could possibly say some­thing to satisfie the boyes & young men at a publique disputation, but not to satisfie my self when I am upon my knees and giving an ac­count to God of all my secret and hearty perswasions. But I con­sider, that by Concupiscence must be meant either the first inclina­tions to their object; or the pro­per acts of Election which are the second acts of Concupiscence. If the first inclinations be meant, then certainly that cannot be a sin which is natural, and which is ne­cessary. For I consider that Con­cupiscence and natural desires are like hunger; which while it is natural and necessary, is not for the destruction but conservation [Page 89]of man; when it goes beyond the limits of nature, it is violent and a disease: and so is Concupiscence; But desires or lustings when they are taken for the natural propen­sity to their proper object, are so far from being a sin, that they are the instruments of felicity for this duration, and when they grow towards being irregular, they may, if we please, grow instru­ments of felicity in order to the other duration, because they may serve a vertue by being restrai­ned; And to desire that to which all men tend naturally, is no more a sin then to desire to be happy is a sin: desire is no more a sin then joy or sorrow is: nei­ther can it be fancied why one passion more then another can be in its whole nature Criminal; either all or none are so; when any of them growes irregular or [Page 90]inordinate, Joy is as bad as Desire, and Fear as bad as either.

But if by Concupiscence we mean the second acts of it, that is, avoidable consentings, and deliberate elections, then let it be as much condemned as the Apostle and all the Church after him hath sentenc'd it; but then it is not Adam's sin, but our own by which we are condemned; for it is not his fault that we choose; If we choose, it is our own; if we choose not, it is no fault. For there is a natural act of the Will as well as of the Understanding, and in the choice of the supreme Good, and in the first apprehen­sion of its proper object, the Will is as natural as any other faculty; and the other faculties have de­grees of adherence as well as the Will: so have the potestative and intellective faculties; they are de­lighted [Page 91]in their best objects. But because these only are natural, and the will is natural some­times, but not alwaies, there it is that a difference can be.

For I consider, if the first Con­cupiscence be a sin, Original Sin, (for actual it is not) and that this is properly, personally, and inhe­rently our sin by traduction, that is, if our will be necessitated to sin by Adam's fall, as it must needs be if it can sin when it can­not deliberate, then there can be no reason told, why it is more a sin to will evil, then to understand it: and how does that which is moral differ from that which is natural? for the understanding is first and primely moved by its object, and in that motion by no­thing else but by God, who moves all things: and if that which hath nothing else to move it but the [Page 92]object, yet is not free; it is strange that the will can in any sense be free, when it is necessitated by wisdome and by power, and by Adam, that is, from within and from without, besides what God and violence do and can do.

But in this I have not only Scripture and all the reason of the world on my side, but the com­plying sentences of the most emi­nent writers of the Primitive Church; I need not trouble my self with citations of many of them, since Calvin ( lib. 3. Instit. c. 3. § 10.) confesses that S. Au­stin hath collected their testimo­nies and is of their opinion, that Concupiscence is not a sin, but an infirmity only. But I will here set down the words of S. Chry­sostome ( Homil. 13. in epist. Rom.) because they are very clear; Ipsae passiones in se peccatum non sunt [Page 93]Effraenata verò ipsarum immode­rantia peccatum operata est. Con­cupiscentia quidem peccatum non est quando verò egressa modum fo­ras eruperit, tunc demum adulte­rium sit, non à concupiscentia sed à nimio & illicito illius luxu.

By the way I cannot but wonder why men are pleased, where ever they finde the word Concupiscence in the New Te­stament, presently to dream of Original Sin, and make that to be the sum total of it; whereas Con­cupiscence if it were the product of Adam's fall, is but one small part of it; [Et ut exempli gratiae unam illarum tractem] said S. Chry­sostome in the forecited place; Concupiscence is but one of the pas­sions, and in the utmost extension of the word, it can be taken but for one half of the passion; for not only all the passions of the [Page 94]Concupiscible faculty can be a principle of sin, but the Irascible does more hurt in the world; that is more sensual, this is more devillish. The reason why I note this, is because upon this account it will seem, that concupiscence is no more to be called a sin then anger is, and as S. Paul said, Be angry, but sin not; so he might have said, Desire, or lust, but sin not. For there are some lustings and de­sires without sin, as well as some Angers; and that which is indiffe­rent to vertue and vice, cannot of it self be a vice; To which I add, that if Concupiscence taken for all de­sires be a sin, then so are all the passions of the Irascible faculty. Why one more then the other is not to be told, but that Anger in the first motions is not a sin, ap­pears, because it is not alwaies sin­ful in the second; a man may [Page 95]be actually angry, and yet really innocent: and so he may be lust­ful and full of desire, and yet he may be not only that which is good, or he may overcome his desires to that which is bad. I have now considered what your Lordship received from others, and gave me in charge your self, con­cerning concupiscence.

Your next charge is concerning Antiquity, intimating that al­though the first antiquity is not clearly against me, yet the second is. For thus your Lordship is pleased to write their objection [ I confess I finde not the Fathers so fully and plainly speaking of Original Sin, till Pelagius had pudled the stream; but after this you may finde S. Jerom &c.]

That the Fathers of the first 400 years did speak plainly and fully of it, is so evident as nothing [Page 96]more, and I appeal to their testi­monies as they are set down in the papers annexed in their proper place; and therefore that must needs be one of the little arts by which some men use to escape from the pressure of that authority, by which because they would have other men concluded, sometimes upon strict inquiry they finde them­selves entangled. Original Sin as it is at this day commonly expli­cated, was not the Doctrine of the primitive Church; but when Pelagius had pudled the stream, S. Austin was so angry that he stampt and disturb'd it more: and truly my Lord, I do not think that the Gentlemen that urg'd against me S. Austin's opi­nion, do well consider that I pro­fess my self to follow those fa­thers who were before him; and whom S. Austin did forsake as I [Page 97]do him in the question. They may as well press me with his autho­rity in the Article of the damna­tion of Infants dying unbaptized, or of absolute predestination. In which Article, S. Austin's words are equally urged by the Janse­nists and Molinists, by the Remon­strants and Contra-remonstrants, and they can serve both, and therefore cannot determine me. But then (My Lord) let it be remembred, that they are as much against S. Chrysostome as I am against S. Austin, with this only difference; that S. Chrysostome speaks constantly in the argument, which S. Austin did not, and particularly in that part of it which concerns Concu­piscence. For in the inquiry, whe­ther it be a sin or no; he speaks so variously, that though Calvin complains of him, that he cals [Page 98]it only an infirmity, yet he also brings testimonies from him to prove it to be a sin, and let any man try if he can tie these words together. ( De peccator. mer. et remission. l. 1. c. 3.) Concupiscen­tia carnis peccatum est, quia inest illi in obedientia contra dominatum mentis. Which are the words your Lordship quotes: Concupiscence is a sin because it is a disobedience to the Empire of the spirit. But yet in another place; ( lib. 1. de civit. Dei cap. 25.) Illa Concupi­scentialis inobedientia quanto ma­gis abs (que) culpa est in corpore non consentientis, si abs (que) culpa est in corpore dormientis? It is a sin and it is no sin, it is criminal, but is without fault; it is culpable be­cause it is a disobedience, and yet this disobedience without actual consent is not culpable. If I do beleeve S. Austin, I must disbe­leeve [Page 99]him; and which part soever I take, I shall be reproved by the same authority. But when the Fathers are divided from each other, or themselves, it is indiffe­rent to follow either; but when any of them are divided from reason and Scripture, then it is not indifferent for us to follow them, and neglect these; and yet if these who object S. Austin's autho­rity to my Doctrine, will be con­tent to subject to all that he saies, I am content they shall follow him in this too, provided that they will give me my liberty be­cause I will not be tied to him that speaks contrary things to himself, and contrary to them that went before him; and though he was a rare person, yet he was as fallible as any of my brethren at this day. He was followed by many ignorant ages, and all the world [Page 100]knowes by what accidental advan­tages he acquired a great reputa­tion: but he who made no scru­ple of deserting all his predeces­sors, must give us leave upon the strength of his own reasons to quit his authority.

All that I shall observe is this, that the Doctrine of Original Sin as it is explicated by S. Austin, had two parents; one was the Do­ctrine of the Encratites, and some other Hereticks, who forbad Mar­riage, and supposing it to be evill, thought they were warranted to say, it was the bed of-sin, and children the spawn of vipers and sinners. And S. Austin himself, and especially S. Hierom (whom your Lordship cites) speaks some things of marriage, which if they were true, then marriage were highly to be refused, as being the increaser of sin rather then of [Page 101]children, and a semination in the flesh, and contrary to the spirit, and such a thing which being mingled with sin, produces uni­vocal issues, the mother and the daughter are so like that they are the worse again. For if a proper inherent sin be effected by chaste marriages, then they are in this particular equal to adulterous em­braces, and rather to be pardoned then allowed; and if all Concupi­scence be vicious, then no marri­age can be pure. These things it may be have not been so much considered, but your Lordship I know remembers strange sayings in S. Hierom, in Athenagoras, and in S. Austin, which possibly have been countenanced and main­tained at the charge of this opi­nion. But the other parent of this is the zeal against the Pelagian Heresie, which did serve it self [Page 102]by saying too little in this Arti­cle, and therefore was thought fit to be confuted by saying too much; and that I conjecture right in this affair, I appeal to the words which I cited out of S. Austin in the matter of Concupiscence; concerning which he speaks the same thing that I do, when he is disingaged; as in his books De civitate Dei: but in his Tractate de peccatorum meritis & remis­sione, which was written in his heat against the Pelagians he speaks quite contrary. And who ever shall with observation read his one book of Original Sin against Pelagius, his two books de Nuptiis & Concupiscentia to Valerius, his three books to Marcellinus, de pec­catorum meritis & remis [...]ione, his four books to Boniface, contra duas epistolas Pelagianorum, his six books to Claudius against Ju­lianus, [Page 103]and shall think himself bound to beleeve all that this ex­cellent man wrote, will not only finde it impossible he should, but will have reason to say, that zeal against an error is not alwaies the best instrument to finde out truth. The same complaint hath been made of others; and S. Jerome hath suffer'd deeply in the infir­mity. I shall not therefore trou­ble your Lordship with giving particular answers to the words of S. Jerom and S. Ambrose, be­cause (besides what I have al­ready said) I do not think that their words are an argument fit to conclude against so much evi­dence, nor against a much less then that which I have every where brought in this Article, though indeed their words are capable of a fair interpretation, and besides the words quoted out [Page 104]of S. Ambrose are none of his; and for Aquinas, Lombard, and Bo­naventure, your Lordship might as well press me with the opinion of Mr. Calvin, Knox and Buchannan, with the Synod of Dort, or the Scots Presbyteries: I know they are against me, and therefore I re­prove them for it, but it is no disparagement to the truth, that other men are in error. And yet of all the Schoolmen, Bonaven­ture should least have been urg'd against me, for the proverbs sake: for, Adam non peccavit in Bonaven­tura; Alexander of Hales would often say, that Adam never sin'd in Bonaventure. But it may be he was not in earnest: no more am I.

The last thing your Lordship gives to me in charge in the be­half of the objectors, is that I would take into consideration the [Page 105]Covenant made between Almigh­ty God and Adam, as relating to his posterity.

To this I answer, that I know of no such thing; God made a cove­nant with Adam indeed, and us'd the right of his dominion over his posterity, and yet did no­thing but what was just; but I finde in Scripture no mention made of any such Covenant as is dreamt of about the matter of original sin: only the Covenant of works God did make with all men till Christ came; but he did never exact it after Adam; but for a Covenant that God should make with Adam, that if he stood, all his posterity should be I know not what; and if he fell, they should be in a damnable conditi­on, of this (I say) there is nec vo­la nec vestigium in holy Scri­pture, that ever I could meet [Page 106]with: if there had been any such covenant, it had been but equity that to all the persons interessed it should have been communicated, and caution given to all who were to suffer, and abilities given to them to prevent the evil: for else it is not a Covenant with them, but a decree concerning them; and it is impossible that there should be a covenant made between two, when one of the par­ties knowes nothing of it.

I will enter no further into this enquiry, but only observe, that though there was no such co­venant, yet the event that hap­ned might without any such co­venant have justly entred in at many doors. It is one thing to say that God by Adam's sin was moved to a severer entercourse with his posterity, for that is cer­tainly true; and it is another [Page 107]thing to say that Adam's sin of it self did deserve all the evill that came actually upon his chil­dren; Death is the wages of sin, one death for one sin; but not 10000 millions for one sin; but therefore the Apostle affirms it to have descended on all, in as much as all men have sin'd; But if from a sinning Parent a good childe descends; the childs inno­cence will more prevail with God for kindness, then the fathers sin shall prevail for trouble. Non omnia parentum peccata dii in libe­ros convertunt, sed siquis de ma­lo nascitur bonus, tanquam benè affectus, corpore natus de morboso, is generis poena liberatur, tan­quam ex improbitatis domo, in ali­am familiam datus: qui vero mor­bo in similitudinem generis refer­tur at (que) redigitur vitiosi, ei ni­mirum convenit tanquam haeredi [Page 108]debitas poenas vitii persolvere, said Plutarch (De iis qui sero à Nu­mine puniuntur. ex interpr. Clu­serii.) God does not alwaies make the fathers sins descend upon the children. But if a good childe is born of a bad father, like a healthful body from an ill affected one, he is freed from the punishment of his stock, and passes from the house of wickedness in­to another family. But he who inherits the disease, he also must be heir of the punishment; Quo­rum natura amplexa est cognatam malitiam, hos Justitia similitudi­nem pravitatis persequens suppli­cio affecit, if they pursue their kindreds wickedness, they shall be pursued by a cognation of judge­ment.

Other waies there are by which it may come to pass that the sins of others may descend upon us. [Page 109]He that is author or the perswa­der, the minister or the helper, the approver or the follower, may de­rive the sins of others to him­self, but then it is not their sins only, but our own too, and it is like a dead taper put to a burning light and held there, this derives light and flames from the other, and yet then hath it of its own, but they dwell together and make one body. These are the waies by which punishment can enter, but there are evils which are no pu­nishments, and they may come upon more accounts, by Gods Do­minion, by natural consequence, by infection, by destitution and dere­liction, for the glory of God, by right of authority, for the institu­tion or exercise of the suffe­rers, or for their more immediate good.

But that directly and properly one should be punish'd for the sins of others was indeed practi­sed by some Common-wealths; Utilitatis specie saepissimè in re­pub. peccari, said Cicero, they do it sometimes for terror, and be­cause their waies of preventing evil is very imperfect: and when Pedianus secundus the Pretor was kill'd by a slave, all the family of them was kill'd in punishment; this was secundum veterem morem said Tacit. ( Annal. 14.) for in the slaughter of Marcellus the slaves fled for fear of such usage; it was thus, I say, among the Romans, but habuit aliquid iniqui, and God forbid we should say such things of the fountain of Justice and mercy. But I have done, and will move no more stones, but hereafter carry them as long as I can, rather then make a noise by [Page 111]throwing them down; I shall only add this one thing: I was troubled with an objection lately; for it being propounded to me, why it is to be beleeved that the sin of Adam could spoil the nature of man, and yet the nature of Devils could not be spoiled by their sin which was worse; I could not well tell what to say, and therefore I held my peace.

THE END.

An Advertisement to the Reader.

PAg. 8, & 9 there are seven lines misplaced, which are to be read thus: pag. 8. lin. 16. read, till the body was grown up to strength enough to infect it] [and in the whole process it must be an impossible thing, because the in­strument which hath all its operations by the force of the principal agent, cannot of it self produce a great change and violent effect upon the principal agent] Besides all this, (I say) while one does not know how Original Sin can be derived, and another who thinks he can, names a wrong way, and both the waies infer it to be another kinde of thing then all the Schools of learning teach: does it not too clearly demonstrate,—

The names of several Treatises and Sermons written by Jer. Taylor D.D.
  • 1. [...], a Course of Sermons for all the Sundaies in the year, together with a Discourse of the Divine Institution, Necessity and Separation of the Office Ministe­rial, in fol.
  • 2. Episcopacy asserted, in 4.
  • 3. The History of the Life and Death of the Ever-blessed Jesus Christ, 2. Edit. in fol.
  • 4. The Liberty of Prophesying, in 4.
  • 5. An Apologie for authorised and Set formes of Liturgie, in 4.
  • 6. The Rule and Exercises of holy li­ving, in 12.
  • 7. The Rule and Exercises of holy dying, in 12.
  • 8. The Golden Grove, or, A Manual of daily Prayers fitted to the daies of the week, together with a short Method of Peace and Holiness.
  • 9. The Doctrine an practice of repen­tance rescued from popular Er­rors, in a large 8. Newly published.
Books written by H. Ham­mond. D. D.
  • [Page]A Paraphrase and Annotations upon all the Books of the New Test. by H. Hammond D.D. in fol.
  • 2. The Practical Catechism, with all other English Treatises of H. Ham­mond, D. D. in two volumes in 4.
  • 3. Dissertiones quatuor, quibus Episcopa­tus Jura ex S. Scripturis & primaeva Antiquitate adstruuntur, contra sen­tentiam D. Blondelli & aliorum. Authore Henrico Hammond, in 4.
  • 4. A Letter of Resolution of six Que­ries, in 12.
  • 5. Of Schism. A Defence of the Church of England, against the Exceptions of the Romanists, in 12.
  • 6. Of Fundamentals in a notion re­ferring to practice, by H. Hammond D. D. in 12.
  • 7. Six books of late Controversie in defence of the Church of England, in two volumes in 4. newly pub­lished.
Books newly published.
  • [Page]DOctor Cousins Devotions, in 12. The persecuted Ministery, by William Langley late of St. Maries in the City of Liechfield, Minister, in 4.
  • A Discourse of Auxiliary Beauty, or Artificial Handsomenesse. In point of Conscience between two Ladies, in 8.
  • Lyford's Legacy; or, an help to young People. Preparing them for the worthy receiving of the Lords Supper, in 12.
  • The Principles of Holy Christian Religion: or the Catechism of the Church of England paraphrazed. By R. Sherlock B. D. at Borwick Hall in Lancashire, in 8.
  • A Discourse. 1. Of the Holy Spirit of God, His Impressions and workings on the Souls of Men. 2. Of Di­vine Revelation, Mediate and Im­mediate. 3. Of Error, Heresie, and Schism: the Nature, Kindes, Cau­ses, Reasons, and Dangers thereof: with directions for avoiding the same. By R. Sherlock, B. D. in 4.
THE END.

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