GOvernment hath in it this Order, Commanding and Obeying: The first Government was paternal, when the Fathers or the Eldest of the Family did command the rest, which lasted all the time that men lived to a great Age. Whilest this Government continued, Law was not invented, because that the Father of the Fa­mily, by the Institutions of Nature, could do nothing but what was good for the whole Family; therefore they were not neces­sitated to seek for Laws to secure them. The first, that brake this Order of Government was Nimrod, who usurpt absolute Power, and held people to servitude by Force and Policy. Besides, Families did so much increase, they were necessitated to joyn several small ones together to oppose more powerful and mighty Families who sought for Soveraignty and Dominion. In these Confederacies they united themselves; some Families under one, as their Captain, or Prince, or Monarch: Others, into a Democracy, or Number of Magistrates, that were to consult the good of that Confederacy or Society.

It would take up a Volume , to give the several Instances that are in H story, of this Nature , the which shall be waved; onely remember, that Abraham did of his own Houshold arm such a number of men, that He gave Battel to the Kings of the Plain, and recovered Lot from his Captivi­ty. [Page 3]Paternal Government ceasing, people cast themselves into severall Forms of Government, and they received their Denomination from those that were Chief, and their variety of Forms; either from their Opinion of such a Form to be best; or, because that, at the Institutio, none person, or the Nobility, or the eminentest amongst the people, or the people themselves, had m [...]st power. Even so upon a Change of Government it falleth out, that the Government receiveth its Form from them in whom Power is. The chief of the Forms of Government are, first, Monarchy, that is, by a single person, who is bound by vertue of his Office, to rule according to the Laws of the People for the profit of all: But it often falleth out, that that sort of Government degenerateth, and cannot be kept within its Limits and Bounds: But, on the contrary , conspiring in behalf of its own Interest, against the Interest of the people, it thereby converteth it self into Tyran­ny, the worst of Governments. The Tyrant ruleth by his Will, and layeth aside the Laws, and consulteth not the Interest of a people. A Monarchy is a dangerous Government in regard it can so readily make or it self a Tyranny. It is the desire of Mankind to be absolute, and a Monarch shall never want Flatterers to prompt and hasten him to a Tyranny; because, under a Tyranny, they can the better oppress the People, and arrive to Greatness and Wealth by the Peoples Ruine. They hold the people by their own Arms and Treasure, in Obedience to the Tyrant, onely for his Profit and Commodity, because he onely communicates the benefit of his power to such as conspire and are Confederates with him, in holding the people to their Servitude.

Aristocratical Government, is when the Noble-men bear sway, or such a number of men, as at the first founding, or constituting of that Government, were Chief, and had Presidency of the rest. Such is the State of Venice at this day, which suiteth well with its Situation, and the distance of the rest of its Seigniory; but it would scarce serve any ether Common-wealth; in regard that the rest of the Seigniory are Forreigners either under their Protection or Obedience, they being Subjects to the Government, not Members of it; and there is but few in the City, but what have share in the Government. This sort of Government would not be durable in a large Commonwealth, because that the Policy of this Government natu­rally must prevent and suppress the increase of other Noble Familie, in or­der to its own preservation. Thoseh [...]at are excluded , when once grown rich, and thereby attained to Education, do desire to have share in the Govern­ment, and shake off Servitude, which causeth Changes: Besides, the great men in this Government do create a distinct Interest from that of the pub­like, by fortifying the Security of their own Families; and if once they should fall into Factions, immediatly the most powerful Faction setteth up one of their own Faction to be Prince, or at least the Leader thereof hath opportunity, thereby to make himself Prince; as it fell out by the House of the Medici at Florence; and also at Rome, by Sylla, who was head of the Faction of the Nobility, against that of Marius, the Head of the popular Faction.

There are Aristocracies mixt with Democracies; as that of the United Provinces. The Great men Consult of the Affairs of the Common-wealth with the Peoples Deputies, who are Annually Chosen.

Oligarchy, is the Government of a Common-wealth by a small Number, who either hold by Policy or Force, the Supremacy; or who have absolute Authority given to them. Such were the Triumvirate and the Dec [...]mviri amongst the Romans; Such also were the Thirty Tyrants at Athens: this kind of Government was upon speciall occasions Erected amongst the An­tients, to carry on some Notable Undertaking, or to Determine and Ar­bitrate some difference as was blown big by Factions in the Common-wealth: the which power proveth Immediately dangerous, if not called in, and Nulled, so soon as the occasion is over, for which it was ordained; No Government can be more dangerous then this is, where the People are di­vided either in Civill or Religious Respects: in such a Case there shall be nothing but Changes, Murder, Miseries of all kinds, and destruction pro­duced, in the Common-wealth; it onely Respecteth me good of those that Have the Government, and those that adhe [...]e to them: For the rest of the people, they must bereave them of their Wit, Money, and Arms. That was an Excellent Oligarchy Erected by John of Leydon at Munster; and was like to have been here in England, by a ce [...]tain People▪ that are uncon­stant, unlimited, spiritually proud, and notoriously Ignorant; who think none to have Right in Government, but themselves.

Democracy is a Government, where the Governours are Elected by the People out of themselves; sometimes called Free-State, or Popular State, or Common-wealth: This kind of Government by the People, is the most Natural, and best sort of all Governments; they Elect their Magistrates, which are to continue in power but one year, or less; they Trust not their Arms in the hands of one Person, but they are managed by a Councel: This is the best sort of Government, because that the persons do not continue long in Trust: the which is the onely means to keep them from Corrup­tion or Oppression. When they shall be reduced to a private Capacity, and be subject to give an Account of their Trust, doth not that Common-wealth stand better Assured to be free from Corruption, then that Consti­tution that shall secure the persons Governing, and protect them from Ju­stice: He who doth continue alwayes in power, is enabled by virtue of his power to secure himself from being questioned; and maketh use of his Authority that should be to discourage Evil doers, to defend himself in Evill doing. But when the Common-wealth is large, and they send their Deputies, and Invest them with their Legislative power, who meet and Consult about making Lawes, Peace and War, and the management of other State-Affairs; it is more orderly and freer from all manner of Faction, than it would be, if the People should meet all in one Body, and [Page 5]make Lawes as they did at Rome, Athens, Sparta, Corinth, Thebes, and other Grecian States. Although the People have not an Immediate hand in the Supream management of Affairs; yet they have the vertual power in them by Election, which is the Original of the being of Supream Autho­rity, and also a possibility for every one that can arrive to Credit by his Parts, to be Chosen and Elected for the Next Representative: the which will animate an hundred in this Government (to one in any other sort of Go­vernment) to put themselves forth to acquire Parts, and to fit themselves with Abilities to serve the Publique, either by Councel or Arms.

I will here say nothing at all of the Defects of this Government, and the Remedies; nor of any other Government: it shall be done shortly in a Volume. But here I will give you a brief Modell of the Government of the Common-wealth or Free-State of Ragouse, scituated in Dalmatia, near the Bottom of the Ad [...]iatick or Gulph of Venice. Reader, here take notice, That a Common-wealth thus Constituted, though small, is able to preserve it self against the most powerful Princes; The Councels propor­tionably of such a Common-wealth, are more strong, and their Swords more sharp, then a Prince's. This Common-wealth or Free-State main­taineth its self by its Just Impartial Policy, in perfect Freedom and Strength, notwithstanding they border on the Tyrannicall Turk's Domi­nions.

RAgouse hath nor been alwayes a Common-weal, for that it hath obeyed divers Lords ac divers times; sometimes Grecians, some­times Albanians. But since it hath embraced this kind of Govern­ment, they have been in some reputation. The Ragousans, when as they sought to reduce the Town to a Common-weal, followed (for the most part) the order of the State of Venice. Being thus resolved, they first instituted a Great Councel, knowing, that it was the foundation of a Com­mon-weal, and as it were the firm Basis or Ground-work of their City. All Gentlemen of the City enter into this Councel, having attained to the age of Twenty years, and they are admitted proving their Gentry. In this Councel th y create all the Magistrates of the City, which are such as I will set down.

There are first the Pregadi, or Great Councel, which should be common­ly Sixty. There may be many Gentlemen of one Family; for the Families in time are reduced into a small number. These have charge of the Affairs of the Common-weal, and do judge of Civill Causes; they also judge of Criminal Causes which are of Importance in regard of the persons, as if any Gentleman be accused, or hath committed any Crime. They con­tinue a year in this Charge, and are changed, as they are void, for that they are not all created at one instant, but one after another, as they end.

The Petty Councel (so called in regard of the Great) is the Councel of the Rector, which consists of eleven Persons, all of divers Families; who assist the Rector or Head of this Common-weal. They receive and hear the Petitions and Demands of strangers, and private men, Letters, Em­bassadours, and such like like; and are as a hand that presents the things which come before them, to other Magistrates, and go afterwards to Officers ap­pointed for such matters. And these decide some of those things which are presented to them, and report the rest to the Pregadi or Great Councel. They continue but one year in this Charge, and go out together; and the others which are created by the Great Councel, enter into this Office with the new Rector, the first day of January.

This Rector, who is head of all the Councels, is chosen in the Grea [...] Councel by three Elections, as they do in all other Offices; and of these Elections, the one is made by scrutiny by three Councellors of the Rector▪ and the two others are made by Lot. The Rector remaineth but on [...] [Page 7]Moneth in Charge, and he is bound, during that moneth, to live in the Pa­lace. He wears the hab [...]te of a Duke, tint is, a Robe with open sleeves, different from others by reason of his Authority. They give seven Duckats a moneth for his ente [...]tainment: yet when he is one of the Pr [...]gadi, he hath a Duckat eve [...]y day to assist.

This Rector assembles with the Councellours upon working-dayes af [...]er d [...]nner , and on Festival dayes on some occasions. But if the Rector be not there, the most ancient Councellour enters into his place, yet they dispatch not any thing without his presence. They give this Rector a Liev­tenant, who hath Jurisdiction in matters which do not exceed three Duckats of Gold, and he is for Civill matters onely: The Councellours cannot be chosen Rectors the years, that they are in their Magistracy.

Next, there are five Purveyors, who are fifty years old and upwards, and must be of divers Families. They have authority to cause all exped [...]tions made by any Magistrate whatsoever, to be received, and they must be pre­sent when as the Councels assemble. These may be made Rectors during their Magistracy, and are so commonly. They are of the Chief of the Town, of great authority, and in a manner alwayes of the Councel.

After these, are the six Consuls which hear Civil Causes, at first for any sum whatsoever. They are most commonly men of great authority, and which enter into Councel with the Pregadi, and they frame the process of such things as they judge. The parties are not accustomed to make alle­gations; but these Consuls, hearing the matter in quest [...]on, determine what Justice requires, and draw from every Cause two Duckats in the hundred. They cannot be Rectors for the space of two years, left they should alter their proceedings in Civil Causes, and to the end the people might be soon dispatched in their Suits; For they do continually attend them.

There are also five Criminal Judges, and Expeditions go from them, at­cording to the Judgments which they make Gentl [...]men are excepted; for that in Criminal Causes they go before the Great Councel, and they that have Fees of the Commonweal answer before the petty Councel. Th [...]se Judges are made Rectors, as the Purveyors be.

There are moreover three Offices upon the Art of Wool; these do com­monly hear the differences that grow betwixt men which exercise that Trade. They enter into the Great Councel, and may be made Rectors.

This Common-weal hath also a College of 30: into which there may enter many persons of one Family. They take knowledge of Appellati­ons unto the sum of three hundred Duckats, and every o [...]e of them hath three Duckats yearly for their Wages; which is done, for that all O ficers are finable, if they attend not their Charges; for other wife they would not accept them, for they are of small profit. When any Office is void, it is sup­plied by one that is in some other Office. If one of the Pregadi dies, they supply his place by one of the Purveyors, or of his Colledge.

There are six Captains of the Night, who, one after another, have the Guard of the City in the Night, with the Ho [...]garians, who are about one [Page 8]hundred, with their Captains, and they obey these, who open and shut the Gates of the City. They remain two moneths in this Charge, and they ob­serve this order, that They which shut the City Gates at Night, do not, open them in the Morning, for they change them at Midnight.

The Captains and Earles, which go into Governments abroad through­out the Estate of this Commonwealth, are all created by the Great Coun­cel, and some of them remain in charge seven moneths, and others twelve

By this often changing of Officers, they preserve themselves: This is the true Embleme of a Free-State. The continuation of any Persons, or Coun­cels, or Senates, are but Defects; unless that the Senate were also to be ele­cted, as well as the Great Councel, or Parliament; it is hard if the people cannot be trusted with Election. It's true, the people of England would, if intrusted now at this Juncture of time, elect such as would deprive than of the blessed Government of a Free-State; but that must not be an Argu­ment to deprive them of their Right: they must be intrusted with Election with such Qualifications, as may preserve the Interest of the Common-wealth. Those that alleadge, that a Free people ought not to be limited in that Case, may also alleadge, That a Physitian must not hinder his Patient of such meat or drink as will ruine him, nor force him to take such medi­cines, as will cure him. Liberty consisteth not in every ones doing what he listeth; but true Liberty is such a thing, as a convenient and necessary Bondage; that is, I ought to be limited in such a thing: If not, it will be to the detriment of another; this Liberty would not consist with Society. He that would assassinate himself, must be deprived of his Liberty to do so horrid an act. England yet was never a Free-State; but it will be, if the L [...]g [...]slators can hit upon the Mark of denying themselves, in perpetua­ting their Power. No doubt but the People may be trusted with their Li­berty in that point, and that with safety, if they bad tasted once of the blessed Fruits of the Government intended, and much pretended to.