Whether, Those whose Title is held unlawfull, yet being possest of Authority may lawfully be obeyed.

THere are two great questions now in chase and agitation, 1. Whether the present power be just and lawfull? 2. Whether, supposing them unlawfull, they may not law­fully be obeyed? The first of these is waved by this Gentleman, as undertaken by o­thers; with what strength or weaknesse, let others judge. The second is the subject of the present debate. The Gentleman speaks of a Declaration published, wherein the grounds of setling the present Government are exprest. But for ought I hear, few rationall, conscientious men are satisfied with that Declaration; considering those Vowes, Oaths, Covenants, whereby the Authors of it, stood before engaged. And whatever the people may do, in submitting to obey this power of the new Go­vernment, I fear they that altered it, and those that act it on, or they that abet it, can­not be innocent. But let them look to that; We shall not, at present, discusse the lawfullnesse or the unlawfullnesse of their power, and proceedings, but consider how far we our felves may submit unto them, without sin. For this purpose we shall first consider how the Gent. hath stated the question. And we observe that he laies it on­ly upon the Lawfullnesse, not upon the necessity of our obedience; For so he saies, Though the change of a Government were beleeved unlawfull, yet it may lawfully be obey­ed. Not it must necessarily, but may lawfully be obeyed; and yet his text produced, Rom. 13.1, &c. is pressed with this inference, Wherefore ye must be subject, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake. Now some there are, who are of opinion, that though such an unlawfull power may be obeyed, yet it need not for conscience sake be obey­ed. if a man will hazard the punishment annexed, and submit himself to suffer it. But it is otherwise in a lawfull power in lawfull things; a man is bound to active obe­dience unto them, and it sufficeth not, to satisfie conscience, to suffer the penalty, but is a resistance of the ordinance of God, which in lawfull commands, requires active obedience, in unlawfull, passive. What then is the difference between a lawfull power and an unlawfull, both commanding lawfull things? but this, That a man may, if he will, obey the one, but must obey the other; not only passively, by suffering, if by ignorance, or weaknesse he neglect the command, but also actively, in acting that command, or else he sins. And to this purpose the Gent. adds, page. 2. If the powers in that time were ordained of God, and were to be obeyed for conscience sake, &c. where he takes it for granted (as well he may, if the powers were ordained of God) that be the powers never so unlawfull; yet they must be obeyed for conscience sake. Yet the question runs only of the lawfullnesse. That's first.

Secondly, For the clearer stating of the question, we must necessarily distinguish, in many particulars, which the Gent. hath either omitted, or confounded.

1. We must distinguish of a Government: A State may be considered, either as constituta, long setled, or constituenda, as yet in setling: A people may perhaps, law­fully obey a Government, when there is no probability of recovering their lost Go­vernment; [Page 3]whereas while it is yet in setling, they may suspend obedience.

2. A people also may be considered, either as free to settle upon what Government they will, as having no Government yet setled, or the line of succession being expi­red: or as bound by Oathes and Covenants to a former Government, or Governours, who are oppressed in their right, by violent usurpation. In the first, a people may obey an usurping power; but the question is of the latter.

3. A Tyrant also who is an usurping power is of two sorts; First, by Title, or ra­ther without a Title; Secondly, by oppression; or as the Gent. himself expresseth it, pag. 6. A Tyrant in regard of an unjust Title, or in respect of Tyrannicall oppression, when his Title is good. Now the question is, whether a Tyrant by an unjust Title, not only may, but must be obeyed, when he commands lawfull things; And whether, as when a lawfull power commands unlawfull things, he may justly, yea must be dis­obeyed; so, when an unlawfull power commands lawfull things, he must be obeyed?

4. Obedience is differenced, into active and passive. The latter may be yeelded, when the former may not, at least needs not: As when a lawfull power commands unlawfull things, a man must suffer, not doe: so when an unlawfull power com­mands lawfull things, a man perhaps may obey, but not necessarily must; at least this is the question now in hand.

5. Because we have occasion to look at impossibility, in this discourse, we must difference it also here, it is either Present, as when there is at present an over-ruling power which we cannot withstand: or else Absolute, when there is a totall cessation of all hopes of recovery of the former Government; the heirs, and lawfull succes­sors, being either all naturally dead, or unnaturally extinct, and slain; as it was suppo­sed to be, in Athalia's case: the people thought she had slain all the Royall seed, and perhaps upon that ground, knowing of none surviving, they submitted to her Go­vernment; but as soon as they knew Ioash, one of that Line, was alive, they shook off their obedience to her. These things being thus premised, we consider the strength of his Arguments.

The first basis of all his building, is taken from the Scripture, Rom. 13.1, &c. The Apostle (saies he) treating of purpose, upon the duty of obedience to Authority, laies down this precept; Let every soul be subject to the higher pow­ers, &c. and hereupon infers; wherefore you must needs be su [...]ject, not only for wrath, but for conscience sake, &c.

In answer to this; Let it first be observed, that he concludes more then he under­took to prove: His question was of the lawfullnesse, but his proof is for the necessity of obedience, active, as well as passive; Now I would gladly know, what difference there is, in our obedience, to lawfull powers, and to unlawfull powers, The word is [...] not [...] lawfull authority not usurp­ed power. Script. & Reas. pag. 5, 6. Pag. 4. if it be neces­sary to both.

Secondly, The question is, in this Text, of what power the Apostle speaks; of Lawfull, or Tyrannicall; and if of Tyranicall, whether of a Tyrant by a [...] u [...]ju [...] Title, or a Tyrant in regard of oppression; and the judgement of very able Divines is, that the Apostle speaks of a legall power; not of a Tyrannicall, in either sense: This latter, is learnedly and largely discussed by the Authour of that Tract; called, Scripture and Reason for Defensive Arms: who asserts, and proves, the text is not meant of any powers whatever, but of Legall powers, not Tyrannicall at all. His Arguments are these from the context: 1. If I be bound to be subject to Tyranny by vertue of the commandment here; then Tyranny is the Ordinance of God (for the Apostle argues [Page 4]for subjection, from Gods ordaining the power) But this is false: Therefore so is that, that I should be subject to Tyranny. 2. He brings many Arguments against this Gentlemans Interpretation. Pag. 9. 1. The Magistrate that must be obeyed is the Or­dinance of God. 2. Not a terrour to good works, but to evil. 3. The Minister of God to thee for good. But a Tyrant is not the Ordinance of God; is a terrour to good works: is not the Minister of God for good; Therefore not to be obeyed. I confesse he carries it all along, of a Tyrant by oppression, whose Title is lawfull and just; and he speaks (more then we argue for) of Resistance of such a Tyrant; where­as we plead only for non-obedience; or against necessity of obedience, to a Tyrant, in regard of unlawfull Title. We say then the Gent. misinterprets, and so misapplies the text, which speaks only of a lawfull power, not of an unlawfull.

But he goes on, to prove his assertion, that the Apostle meant it of a power un­lawfully gotten; by applying it to the then present Roman powers: It was either Claudius, or Nero, that then ruled: who were both made Emperours by the Souldiery, against the Wills, and Resolutions of the Consuls, and Senate, &c.

Where first, he takes it for granted (which cannot well be proved) that because the Apostle writ in their times, therefore he meant it of those powers, that they were ordained of God: not by his permission only, but approbation also. Whereas the Apostle might mean it (and we have heard, did so mean it) of any legall power; ab­stractedly, from the Roman, or any particular State. 2. But grant it meant of them, yet it is known, that Caesar had gotten the consent of the Senate, and people: and they succeeded upon the same Title, and so might be lawfull powers. 3. This Ar­gument is of no force in our case; for though it hold parallell, in the Instruments of setling, or rather changing of the Government, the Souldiery; yet not in the Ratifi­cation of it by Senate, and people. Mark the words of the Historian, englished by the Gent. pag. 3. This sentence of the Souldiers, was followed with the consent of the Senate; and then it was not scrupled in the provinces: That is, it was consented to by the Genera­lity of the people. But ours hath neither consent of Senate (in its true and full Autho­rity) nor people, but the Renitency, yea Abhorrency of both, for the far greater part. If indeed the two Houses freely and fully sitting, had consented to it, and the people Generally submitted to it, the case might seem easier to resolve. Butstill this scru­ple would remain, whether both Senate and people could consent, without sin, to the change of Government, lying under so many bonds and engagements, to another Power: of which more hereafter.

The Roman State then will not help him: let us see our own: Many persous (saies he) have been setled in Supreme power, by meer force, without Title of Inheritance, or just Conquest, and obeyed by the people of this land: and Laws made by forced Parliaments are still in force and obeyed: so that the voice of the Nation, with one consent, seems to speak aloud, that those, whose Title is held unlawfull, may lawfully be obeyed.

There are many answers to be given to this: 1. Those times were very dark, in prevailing of Popery, and therefore no presidents for a Reformed State to imitate. 2. Those people were not perhaps precluded, by so many Oaths and Covenants, from alteration of the former Government, as we of this Generation are. 3. The question is not de facto, but de jure, whether they did will, in so doing. The scruple is justly made, Whether they ought not rather to assert (as far as in them lay) the right of the [Page 5]true Heir; than to close with the usurper; especially if under our engagements: It they ought in conscience to assert the Right of the true Heir, they ought not to obey (actively) any other, commanding in his prejudice. If they were not bound, by want of power, to assert that right, yet the question is, Whether they might either directly, or indirectly, do any act, which might affirm the right of the usurper, or deny, but so much as interpretatively, the just Title of the Heir, without being guilty of the sins of lying, treachery and falsenesse; if not of perjury and Vow-breaking: In suffering, I confesse, if a thief take my purse, I cannot help it; if I must part with that, or my life, I choose to lose my purse; not for fear least I break the filth or eighth Commandment, but least I break the sixth, and be guilty of self-murder: yet rather than say, he hath autho­rity to take it, I must lose my life. In point of protection, If I be in the hands of theeves, I will desire some of them, to preserve me from the violence of some others: yet must I not (to obtain that protection,) say, that their robbery is just, or good, much lesse, join with them in robbing others, or be an abetter to their actions, though the de­niall of such abetting, indanger my life. 4. As for our present submitting to those Laws, first made by usurpers, and forced Parliaments; we say, they have been often ratified (being thought wholsome Laws) by succeeding lawfull Parliaments, and so make nothing to the case in hand: and, perhaps, till then, not to be judged valid Acts. See that Ordinace of Aug. 20 1647. Declaring such Votes passed, to be null at the time of the pas­sing, be­cause the House was the under a force.

And hereunto (saies he) Divines and Casuists give their concurrence, Azorius, Navarr, Alsted, Paraeus, &c.

In answer to these we say, 1. Its one thing to claim justice of a Tyrant (for neces­sary subsistence,) by established Laws not yet repealed (which perhaps may justifie those that are forced to prosecute suits under the present Courts,) wherein we con­sent to the power of the former Laws, which are our birthright, not properly, but by accident, to the power that manages them at present. 2 ^ly The reason given by the first, is this, The Commonwealth tacitely consents in this, that though he have no right or Title, yet he may administer Law, to Citizens subjected, facto, not jure, as if he were a Competent Judge, and lawfull Superiour: But this varies the question two waies; 1. That there is a tacite consent of all. 2. That he administers the old Laws establi­shed, not any new ones of his own, to the overthrow of the old, which we have sworn and covenanted to maintain. 3 ^ly The reason given by the second, is scarcely sound; because (saies he) they that seek the administration of justice, do endeavour to free him from a greater sin; that he that sind by usurping jurisdiction, may not also sin, by pre­termitting the administration of Justice. This perhaps, is but a popish nicety; for the question is. Whether in so doing, he be not guilty of his former sin of usurpation, by complying so far with him, as to stablish his jurisdiction thus usurped; and whether he ought not rather to suffer losse, than sinupon himself. 4 ^ly But Paraeus is of most credit, and so of most weight: It matters not (saies he) by what waies or acts Nimrod, or Jeroboam, or others, got Kingdoms; for the power is one thing which is of God, and the getting, and the use of the power is another. Another more plainly, when a que­stion is made whom we should obey, it must not be looked at, what he is that exerciseth the power, or by what right or wrong he hath invaded the power, &c. To this we say, first, Paraeus may be understood, to speak of an usurpation over a free people; engaged by no Oathes or Covenants, to another Government: such I beleeve was Nimrods case; or if otherwise, the question is, Whether a people do not sin, in submitting to such a power, as in Ieroboams case; the people revolting from Rehoboam. 2. I see not how that others words can well be justified: is it not to be looked at, whether [Page 6]it be Jack Cade, or John of Leyden, that exercises the power? Is not this (if literally taken) a way, to open a doer, as to insurrections and seditions, if men can but get power to suppresse the Legall Authority: so to dispense with Oaths, &c, when such an usurpation is made? not only, that such may, but must be obeyed, heartily, and for conscience sake? may we, or must we obey every one that hath gotten power, though never so wrongfully? might not some infer from this ground, Satan, the prince of this world, having usurped power, over the sons of disobedience, must be obeyed, as the ordinance of God, forasmuch as there is no power but of God, &c.

But he gives his own reason for it. And how (saies he) can it be otherwise? for when a person, or persons have gotten supreme power, and by the same exclu­ded all other from authority, either this authority, must be obeyed, or else all authority fall to the ground, and so confusion be admitted (worse than Titular Tyranny.

I confesse this is a very hard case, to naturall reason: but perhaps, it is not hard to a Christian; whose rule is, Ye must not do the least evil, to prevent the greatest misery. But is there no remedy, in the whole body of a people, to prevent this? If they would all, in conscience of their Oaths and Covenants, be constant to their duty; either in re­sisting, or not complying, or suffering; what could that power do? whereas if they willingly, and readily comply, with every usurped power, do they not confirm Ty­rants, and fasten Tyranny upon themselves? and by such compliance make them­selves guilty of that usurpation? If, as is asserted, we may lawfully; nay must neces­sarily, obey such usurped power in all acts materially good, then is it impossible, that any one, whose Title is once wronged, can ever be lawfully righted; for it will be al­waies sinfull, to help the weaker party, and it cannot, without help, be other then such. And supposing it lawfull, and our duty, to obey such usurpers, it will be unlawfull to rescue our selves out of their hands, for it being lawfull to submit, and we bound in conscience to obey, in what is lawfull, we are bound in conscience so to submit, with­out endeavouring to get our liberty, or to become the stronger party; which without endeavouring it can never be, and so we are bound to be perpetuall slaves.

That of the Masters Mate, throwing the Master over-board, &c. is not every way parallell with ours in hand: The necessity not alike absolute: But if the Mate would command the Mariners, by any word, or act, to acknowledge his violence to be just, and his Government lawfull, ought they not rather to die then sin? But when we comply, actively, to the ratifying and setling of an usurped power, with wrong to the right Heir, we sin; and so much the more, if bound by Oathes and Covenants, not to assist, or comply with any others, neither for fear, nor favour, deserting our engage­ments (which are the words of the solemne Covenant,) Not suffering our selves, di­rectly, or indirectly, by whatsoever combination, perswasion or terrour, to be withdrawn from this blessed union &c. but shall all the daies of our lives, zealously & constantly con­tinue therein against all opposition, and promote the same, according to our power, against all lets and impediments whatsoever, &c. All which, whether it can so easily be dispen­sed with, as this Gent. seems to hold forth, I leave to every conscience to consider.

And whereas (saies he) some speak of a time for settlement, they indeed do rather speak for a time of unsettlement, &c.

They mean, if a Government be once setled, by the generality of the people, and no power appears to bring it back to the former state, they may better comply with it; In repub, constituta, not constituenda: And this is no unsettlement, unlesse it be an [Page 7]unsetling of an usurped Government, which men in Covenant, ought to endeavour to their utmost power; and however, to be rather passive in, than active to the settle­ment of it; which if it were generally done, might (by the blessing of God upon faithfullnesse to a right Heir, and to our Oaths and Covenants,) perhaps prevail, to make the usurpers think of some better way, of reducing the Government to the an­cient channell: Whereas this way of compliance, fastens and settles them, in their sin and Government together: And whereas he saith, that may be called a settlement, when there is such a way setled, that men may have justice, if they will; and may enjoy the main end of Magistracy, to live a peaceable life, in godlinesse and honesty. I answer, Such a settlement as is pleaded for, is not the way to enjoy the main end of Magistra­cy, &c. For how can a people, consenting readily together, to a violation of so sacred a Covenant, and Oath, ever be like to live a peaceable life, in godlinesse or honesty?

And indeed (saies he) when one is in possession by power, and another pretends a Title, what can the body of a Nation do, in this case? they cannot judge of Titles, &c.

True, in some doubtfull cases they cannot; but in our case, who is so simple that he cannot judge of the Title, where it is, and where it is not? who hath not, or may not hear, of the Oathes of Allegiance and Supremacy? who hath not heard of Parlia­mentary Declarations for the right and Title? Whatever it was in former times, the Title is now clear to every eye; and if it were doubtfull, our engagements are gone out into all the world.

To that he answers: Surely Oathes are sacred bonds, and reverend obligements, &c. yet there are faults on both hands: on the one side, the slighting of an Oath: But we finde some part of the Vow and Covenant, to speak of all the daies of our lives &c. True it is, the obligation of some things may end, as that of the Kings Person, &c.

To which and the rest we say; the Kings Person in England never dies, saies the Law; such a King we are bound to preserve. Suppose the King had died in wars, or a naturall death, and his Son had been in Arms at his death, would not our Covenant have reached, to binde us to the preservation of the Sons person, as well as of the Fathers? whatever men think now, I am confident, two or three years ago, most men would have been of this minde. 2. It is indeed impossible, to preserve that Kings person, yet (saies the Gent.) We finde some part of the Vow and Covenant, to speak of all the daies of our lives, as to extirpate profanenesse, heresie, blasphemy, and for Reformation. All which it were well if the Covenanters would remember to observe. But I shall remember him of more. To preserve the rights and priviledges of Parliament, and the Liberties of the Kingdom, &c. Are these things impossible now to be preserved? and if not, do they not still binde us, to endeavour them? 2. His words are worthy to be printed, and printed again, Will any man that understands, and favours Religion and piety, say, that the clauses, which concern Religion and piety, are expired? Did we promise to God, in our se­verall places and callings, to extirpate profanenesse, heresie, blasphemy, and to endeavour a Reformed life, in our selves and ours, onely till our enemies were overcome, and then to make an end? (Say the same of our promises, to preserve the rights and priviledges of Parliament, and liberties and Laws of the Kingdom,) What were this, but to say unto God, if thou wilt deliver us, we will be bound to thee, till we are delivered, and no longer, &c. Surely this is too like that course of carnall Israel, Ps. 78.14, &c.

But he goes on; Here it were good to consider, whether there be any clause, in any Oath or Cove­nant, which, in a fair and commonsence, forbids obedience to the commands of the present Go­vernment: much lesse, when no other can be had, and so the Commonwealth must go to ruine?

We answer, yes, there is, by necessary consequence: that clause in the Oath or Covenant, that com­mands obedience, and faith, to the King, his Heirs and Successors, and to the Laws established, forbids obedience to any other power or Authority, raised up against them. Nor will that salve it which he adds (when no other can be had) for another may be had, and might perhaps have been had, ere this, if some men in place had not complied with that force put upon the Houses and Kingdom. If they did it upon antecedent consent, they are deeply and hainously guilty; if upon perswasion, or terrour (con­trary to their engagements in the Covenant,) yet are they too guilty, to be excused, as accessaries post factum, to say no more.

But saies he, If the Kings Heirs be not his Successors, how doth that Oath binde? either the word Successors, must be superfluous, or else it must binde to Successors, as well as to Heirs. And it hindes not to a Successor, that is not an Heir, how can it binde to and Heir that is not a Suc­cessor?

In answer we say, 1. Who keeps the Heir from being a Successor? They that made the Act against succession; to which this Gent. perhaps gave his Vote; or at least, complies and acts with those, that did so Vote; in acting for a Republike in opposition to it. 2. The word Successor, is not superflu­ous: for it is put, by way of exposition of the word Heir; who ought to be the Successor. And it mat­ters not, how Successor is sometime taken; In the Oath of Supremacie or Allegiance; it is not meant of any Successor, but a lawfull Successor; as the words expressy are. If then, any force debar the succession of the right and lawfull Heir, let him consider, whether they that took that Oath, are not bound to resist that force, if they have any power, and to help to settle the Heir: or if they want pow­er, yet not to submit willingly to that force, in opposition to that right, and in violation of that Oath. Though the Covenant speaks not of the Allegiance to Heirs and Successors, yet the Protesta­tion refers unto it, in terminis. And that (we suppose,) binds us, to endeavour the succession of the Heir: Else how could the Lady Iane be a Traitor against Qu Mary? whose claim of the Crown, an tecedent to the others enjoyment, could only be a crime, because it prejudiced the Heir, in hindering, as much as in her was, the succession. Nor could any thing be Treason, which is only derogatory to the succession. And if such, as at any time have power, debar a rightfull Heir, they must not be punished afterward, when the other is stronger, because the strength of the former made it no crime, at the time when it was done. However, the many obligations to Monarchy, as well as to the partia [...] Monarch, are obligatory though there were a doubt, concerning the person. We cannot close with such a party (we think,) but we become accessaries, post sacsum, to what perhaps it is impossible, at present, to be helped.

At last he puts a quaerie, While the Son is in the same posture with the Father, how comes this Oath to plead for disobedience in regard of the Son; that was asleep, and silent, in regard of the Father?

The answer is, 1. The Son is not altogether in the same posture with the Father: for the Father was in Arms against a lawfull, and coordinate Authority of the Kingdom; but the Son, now, is claiming his own right, as Heir to the Crown; hath a good cause (so far) and a just claim; oppo­sing, not the same power (as some think) but unlawfull Martiall usurpation, over his own personall rights, and over the three Estates (the sundamentall Authority of this Kingdom.) the King, Lords and Commons. 2. The Father himself was under those pretended crimes (for which he was put to death) then, and before the Covenant was taken, to preserve his person: and the King, the Law [...] never dies, 3. Disobedience was not pleaded, to his Authoritative will, but his personall will: and so the objection was neither silent nor asleep in regard of the Father; but all things being acted is the name of the King and Parliament, his Title was both acknowledged and asserted; which is now o­therwise, when in regard both of the Son, and of Monarchy it self, it is disclaimed. 4 If the Son were in any crime, equall with the Father; yet the right or Title to the Crown, upon his Father dea [...] doth quit him from all stain, by the Laws of the Land. Therefore obedience may be due to him, and the Oath may stand up, to plead for disobedience to usurped power, in regard of the Son, which was asleep, and silent, in regard of the father,

For a conclusion of all: If men were as sensible of duty, as they are of danger, and more af [...] to sin, than to suffer; I am very confideut, that such weak shifts, as large consciences can finde, [...] help them swallow a Cammell, who heretosoth strained at a gnat; and such consulting with [...] and bloud, would have no place with them: I shall only make two requests; One, that the Auth [...] of the Tract, would consider seriously, whether the maintaining, and abetting those, that [...] with the fist of wickednesse, be the way to peace? The Other, That the Lord would guide all L [...] of truth and peace, into the way of peace (which is Righteousnesse,) and that be would grant [...] all the people of the Land, faithfullnesse to their Oathes and Covenants, and sincerity and upright­nesse of heart, that they may have no fellowship with the unfruitfull works of darknesse, but rather reprove them.