SO many excellent Treatises as have been sent abroad to unblind the hoodwinkt world, and all clearing this truth (That the Parliament is and ought to be supreme Judge) might make this seem needlesse, but as for a sturdy sore, many plai­sters are but sufficient; so will it not be mis-spent time by the clear demonstrations of truth and right reason to beat down that wall of the too-much-loved-ignorance which hitherto hath kept rhe divine light of the truth from entring into the dark (& therfore miserable) souls of those deluded ones who with so much earnestnesse lay out their estates, expose their families to a thousand miseries, nay spend even their dearest bloud to inslave themselves and posterity. Love and duty to religion and my countrey, now flaming with the fire these men have kindled, & yet give fuell to, yea even pitie to these men hath inforc'd a pen ever before still to expose it selfe to publike censure, and if by this poor labour of mine any of these ignorantly erring men may be reduced, I have my end; as for those who inraged with malice willingly oppose the truth, God hath provided her another champion, even the sword, to vindicate her selfe from the violence of those men on whom the power of reason hath no effect.

To attain this our end, what readier way have we then 1. To discover the falsity of those pretences by which those men are deluded, the miseries they bring themselves and po­sterity into if they yet persist: 2. To discover the way to re­gain our now almost lost liberty and religion: 3. To free us from the pretended fears of the invasion of our liberty by the Parliament, or of our religion by Brownists, Anabaptists, and the like. And here so many of these men who hitherto through ignorance, passion and mistake have been enemies to the Parliament, and in them to their religion, countrey, and themselves, I say so many of these as by Gods providence this little Treatise shal com unto, are wished out of due care & love to the Protestant Religion so desperately undermined by Jesuiti­call plots, out of love to their poor countrey, laws and liberty, now at [Page 2] the last gasp as it were either to stand or fall, out of pitie to them­selves and their posterity, designed even to Turkish slavery, they would lay aside all prejudicate thoughts, and seriously lay to heart the evidences of truth, love, and labour to defend it wheresoever they find it: and in hopes they will do this, I will proceed according to the me­thod proposed, which was first to discover the deceit of that sophistry by which these truth-haters delude their followers & to clear the pro­ceedings of the Parliament from all aspersions of wrong or injustice: but because their arts of deceiving are many, and it would require too much time to answer particulars, therefore I shall endeavour to draw them to some few generals. The first then we have to deal withall is this, The soveraigne power claimed by the Lords and Commons in Parliament to provide for the Kingdomes safety is an intrenching on His Majesties just Rights, and contrary to the knowne Lawes, say those deceivers. To answer this, and in this the whole bulk of their obje­ctions against the Parliament, I shall first propose this to your consi­deration: Whether if the King having his royall name and authority abused by those about him, or misled by his own passion or mistake, do command and act things pernicious and destructive to the people, reli­gion, liberty and lawes, contrary to the end and trust of the first insti­tutors of this Monarchy, and to the contract at his coronation, and convert the power of the people it self to back and carry on those de­signes, refusing to hearken to the petitions of his people, or Remon­strances of the great Councell of the Kingdome (if in this case the people be remedilesse) consider whether the condition of a free nation be not worse then that of a most miserable slave, and whether the fra­mers of this Monarchy have not provided better for the means, then for the end it self, the peoples welfare, which is the end of all govern­ment. For first, being before in a free and happy estate every way, it must bring it self into servitude, and each man make one another mu­tually, and those he holds dearest, and his Countrey it self slaves, and must expose his own life, that he may take the lives of whosoever re­fuseth slavery. Secondly, besides thus each man being one anothers mutually, and all their countreys executioners, each must be bound to expose all he hath, and his life as much as In him lieth, to procure or ad­vance the means of damnation of those he holds dearest, nay of innu­merable others, and of himselfe (Religion being part of the case.) Thus whereas it seems sufficient to the constitution of a slave, not to have power to dispose of himself, or of what he hath in a passive way one­ly, in this case men must be positively active against themselves.

[Page 3] Thirdly and lastly, a whole Nation cannot fly, or run away from a condition so miserable, and by any other meanes unavoida­ble, as a particular slave may.

More might be said in this point, but what needed thus much, were not their Judgements with whom we deale as turbu [...]ent as the wa­ters they have troubled; which sort a possibilitie of delusion, that yet may partly hoodwinke them, must distinguish from the other part among them, whom malice hath made utterly reason, and reli­gion proofe; and therefore their senses, whose soules seeme nothing els, are to be dealt with in another method.

But to the point; the premises and consequence being utterly ab­surd, inconsistent, contradictory, against reason and nature, Princes being instituted for the peoples happines, and so rather publici servi, as regnum splendida servitus: and since there is provision against the danger of the minoritie of a Prince, who can be onely positively ill, it being à fortiori reasonable, that it should not be wanting against the perill from such a Prince, as we propound, who by meanes of a greater maturitie and authoritie, may concurre more actively, and consequently more perniciously to the greatest evill, the people in our case, if or when the King makes such attempts in reason cannot be without meanes of remedy. It were perhaps so were a King in­stituted in an immediate miraculous extraordinary manner by God himselfe, then a lower power could not disanull the act of the high­er; or perhaps there were colour, if the people it selfe had absolutely given or entrusted it selfe to the power or Provision of the Prince at the first institution, or framing of the Monarchy. But with us the lawes, customes, priviledges, power, and use of Parliaments &c. argue, or rather are limitations, restrictions, conditions, or reserva­tions made upon the originall trust, commission, or delegation from the people, or after upon occasion, which it keeps in its owne power, or reserves to it selfe, as the supreame resort for extraordinary emer­gents. Nor let any thinke that the King having taken his oath for the keeping himselfe within his bounds, or for the observing the lawes, liberties, priviledges, or the like, that he is hereupon onely left to God and his conscience, and the people without humane remedy, if he exorbitate; for they ought not to presume, but to prove strong­ly (if they could) this, which were for the disadvantage of the peo­ple so mainely, for whose good all was intended at the first institu­tion of the Monarchy; and the peoples happines ought to be rather [Page 4] favoured and preferred in the interpretation of a doubtfull matter (were this such) as assuredly according with the first institutors in­tention: and I thinke it is not so apparent (if it be apparent at all) that the King is so left to God onely, as it is that the safetie and hap­pines of the people is L [...]x suprema, and the end of all, which is out of doubt; and therefore by this tye of an oath, and all other sitting ties, power, and meanes also intended to be procured, and secured; and all oft little enough (though such power is unlesse upon necessi­tie not onely not to be exercised, but also to be kept as secret, as may be, that the Princes authoritie in as much as it may make for the good of the people, may be kept up.) And perhaps the oath the peo­ple hath taken to the King, especially as the people is represented in Parliament, may (respecting at this time this reason onely) inferre as well on the peoples side, that it is left to God onely thereupon, and so supreame in point of judgement and power: but allowing, or ra­ther understanding truly such power to be in the people, and from it in the Parliament (as hereafter may further appeare wee are to doe) is not this way the peoples libertie, rights, happines, safer and better assured, together with the Kings just power or prerogative, since the Parliament is not capable (could it be willing) to usurpe upon either (as after may be shewed) then imagining such supreame power to be invested in the King, either the peoples right or the Kings just power it selfe can be; seeing no man will deny but Kings are subjects capable of arbitrary or tyrannicall power oft times willing and gi­ving the attempt, and sometimes actually prevailing. So, if the fra­mers of this Monarchy had intended such paramount power should be still in the King; and that in such extraordinary emergents as now appeare in England, they had been more solicitous of, and provided better far for one meanes of diverse ordeined to an end, then for the very end it selfe, the peoples happines, which they had left still de­pending dangerously on one mans conscience, or will, as it should at any time happen to change, when so [...]ure and safe a provision offe­red it selfe else-where, (as before is pa [...]y touched) and had prefer­red the meanes before the end: and so doe all the desperate malig­nants, and the disorderers of our times & State, which is retrograde to reason: others may better enforce this point touching the intent of the first institution, and adde expresse authorities perhaps out of the Lawes to this end, or the practise of Parliaments in such times (if such have ever before been) or otherwise proceed by analogie and good consequences of reason.

[Page 5] If it be said, that by such a provision of remedie for the people in danger, as abovesaid, a dangerous president of disobeying, and weakning the Ki [...]gs authority is introduced, which may worke even danger of dissolution of the Monarchy. Admitting but not granting, that upon such a president, once made, upon an extraor­dinarie cause, and that by an orderly way (and which once done may well prevent all future need of making any more such presi­dents) admit such a danger even to the Monarchy followed there­upon (which yet will not be made good in our present case, as after will appear) then here now is the point. Among divers forms of government, whereby a people may be governed, that it may be happie, which is the end and ayme of every such form, this Na­tion chose one particular one, which it judged fittest to compasse that end (as indeed Monarchy duely tempered is the best, but distempered by tyranny the worst, the advantage of union, or uni­tive power, which it hath above other forms strengthening to evill, when it degenerates, as it did to good, whilest it stood incorrupt) but if this objection were of weight it would follow, that it were more rationall, that the peoples felicity, which is the supreme end, to which all good forms of government are ordained and tend, should rather suffer, then a particular form or fashion of govern­ment, of which there are choice, and any of which are but one meanes, or way to compasse that end if it continue incorrupt, but if corrupted to destroy the end: and so one meanes to the end, nay in our case a meanes if not rectified wholly to frustrate the end, should be preferred before the end it self, which it ought onely to serve, nor can it be said the remedie were worse then the disease; for what remedie can be so ill, as that disease; a free, a glorious, a nob [...]e Na­tion to fall to servitude spirituall and temporall from a long enjoyed Liberty in both kinds, and our selves the instruments? though to go on in such a case, the remedie might not prove so ill, or difficult, if men would pay obedi [...] [...]uely there where reason tells them they owe it; And shoul [...] [...]ere be no such remedie for the people, or [...]or conservation of the frame of the government the constitu­tion of this Monarchy, which the King declareth he admireth so much, were most deficient in the most principall point of all, name­ly, the defending and preserving it selfe, the very foundation and ground-work, as the end of all, otherwise provisions orders, Laws, without which what were they but folly and phantasie? Nay were [Page 6] not the folly of the first institution rather to be as much admired (as raising an instrument utterly unfit for the purpose it was meant for: had it left the maine end of all, that is, the peoples safetie, liber­tie, happinesse in such a case as ours, without all possible, nay with­out any provision expresse or imployed by common intendment, or analogie of reason, or rule of Law, though the true, the naturall, the best, or the onely provision, or remedie to keep Prince and people in their due temper, were so at hand, so facile, so offering it self, and if not before usuall, yet used possibly at the very time of such an institution, and for that very purpose, namely, a Parliament or other meeting of the like nature, without provision, I say, against the greatest publick mischief of all, that ultimum malum Reipublicae (as divine Plato termes it) arbitrary power, or tyranny, and that a mischief, so likely to happen; more, so oft attempted, nay actually happening. But he that implores force (not now to speak of what is pretended herein by words) and that though but to resist the orders of that power, whose part alone it is to remedie the people in our case, doth in fact deny that this Monarchy hath made such provi­sion, or hath that power so necessary to help and defend it self, or that the people in this case is remediable, for by such having re­course to force or warre, though but defensive, he challengeth and assumeth all the power from the people to himself, making himself supreme Judge of all upon the last resort, of which somewhat more shortly. But the King cannot be so in our present case, in which he is a party in as much as the evill proceeds from ill counsell prevailing with him; For to bring the hypothesis to a Thesis, and not to stand alway on supposition taking it as a supposition) that a king seduced may, de facto, make such attempts as are above put, it is more evi­dent of it self then that we need look on the fall of Liberty in France; if not from the King, nor Counsell, about him consequently, then whence is the remedie for our losse? from the Judges? what ever their will may be they want power, a [...] [...]twithstanding they still were present the mischief grew on: [...] be then from the two Houses of Parliament onely (unlesse you would have the whole Nation assemble personally, as in the Vale of Jehosaphat, if you sup­pose it possible, and if possible fit for any thing but confusion, ex­cept perhaps force) the king having (to speak with what reverence we can) in this case excluded himself, and the Clergie justly being excluded, from such temporall distractions, that it may attend the [Page 7] better and advance the celestiall, and ecclesiastick, more then enough to take up the ablest men wholly, and not a little hindered and dis­credited by their so great greedinesse after worldly matters: let them do their dutie, let them teach truly, live exemplarily, like pro­fessors of mortification, this will render the people so devoted to re­ligion, to them, that they may securely trust the Parliament with all that touches them, and safely make it their proxy, themselves being absent; and whilest thus spirituall matters are the better ser­ved and attended, these, and the temporall both receive the greater blessing: but such diffidence and suspition in the Clergie (if it should not be present in Parliament) argues ill deserving, since the justice and wisdom of the Parliament, as principles of this government ought not to be questioned: but how much more is the Clergie to receive at the hands of the Parliament, that fuora, i. preti, i. e. Priests void the roome, used by that Councel in Venice, of which Bodin in the third book De republicâ, the 3. Chapter, then, when they shall be found in life and doctrine unsound, ill affected to the publick good, accessarie to the evill to be remedied, nay ardent to bring in, or maintain either Papistry, and idolatrie, or at least a most scanda­lous symbolizing with it in temporall pride, riches and greatnesse, and even Antichristian domination through the breaches and ruins of their Countrey, rather then even a Parliament shall question it. The Parliament then, and under this notion of the two Houses in these times understood, being our onely remedie, or rather Physi­tian, it follows it may and is to be Judge of the danger or disease, and that of power which is to remedie if it be so, is to try whether it be so; for without judgement or knowledge of the disease how can there be remedie? or how shall the Physitian know, what, when and how to apply? If it be the onely competent Judge of this our dangerous disease, and of the meanes to meet with, or expell it (the knowledge of the remedie depending essentially upon the know­ledge of the Maladie, and receiving thence its Judications) it hath consequently power to execute, or act, or cause to be executed or acted, what it hath, or shall judge or ordain necessary for the cure, else such power to judge were vain, and it would still return that the people were remedilesse. But WISDOM or Judgement and POWER, as they are divine coincidents, and all one really and naturally where they are supreme, and essentiall as in the Divine nature, it being but our weaknesse of understanding to conceive them disjoyned so [Page 8] (for principles of one facultie questioned are to be enforced from an higher facultie) even in this supreme power on earth (which as farre as frail mortalitie can bear imitates, and represents that above) they ought not to be by us apprehended separate, but mutually presup­posing or inferring one the other. Let us adde to make up this ter­restiall trinity; Goodnesse, which last may be understood in our pre­sent case, a doing no unjust, or dishonourable thing, but wholly in­tending the publick good, according to the peoples trust. And it were an arch heresie in the policy of this Monarchy to disjoyn in our beleef or opinion, the third from the two former. And the Law saying, no dishonourable thing is to be conceived of the Parlia­ment, it seems all one as to have said in other termes, that it is the supreme Judge of the last resort (and that even without the king, if he hath excluded himself as above, which is more then if he were far personally absent, or otherwise casually disenabled, and as much as if no king at all were for the time) where all appeals are to rest, and determine, all men to acquiesse, binding all from questioning what is there done; and inferres the supreme power there to reside, as being the whole kingdome (in which it is radically and funda­mentally by representation: such power to be exerted and used, when it judges necessarie, and that (if the nature of the occasion so requires) with the suspension of the power of the supreame, ordi­nary Delegate, or Magistrate, during that parenthesis of state; for the kingdome having entrusted the Parliament with all it holds precious, the effect of the Commission upon the matter being, that it provide ne quid respublica detrimenti capiat, it hath consequently trusted it with its power, which is the supreme, that it may be en­abled to perform and execute the trust, when it judgeth, this cannot be made good, without using that power. But to return; the Law saith also, That the King can do, or doth no wrong▪ but it denieth not, but ill Counsell about him may: or perhaps the Law intends the king as he is in his great Counsell, where he is as Sol in Leone, or any Planet (as they say) in his proper house; of farre greater vertue and power, then otherwise. But however, Reason tells us, that a Prince or a few of his Cabinet counsell, may far more easily erre in judge­ment, or possibly in point of will, then the multitude of a Parlia­ment (so many whereof are selected out of the whole Kingdom by the people) in point of Judgement, much more of will, or well willing to the publique (whereof themselves are so great a part): [Page 9] and this much the rather, in that it is to be feared, that oftentimes, those privadoes of the Prince, finding out cunningly the Princes will, inclination, or humour, before they advise, and, further to in­gratiate themselves, seconding it, much that there is agitated, be­comes to be upon the matter the judgement or will but of the Prince alone.

Well, I hope we are now come safe to this passe, that the Parlia­ment may and ought in our case to defend the people, or kingdoms rights, use the peoples power which is the supreame, (as others have proved to cleare passionate men, rather then to satisfie any judicious man, who will not require proofs in a point plain enough of it self) ever resident in the people, and so in the Parliament, though dor­mient, till it be by the Parliament thought fit to be wakened, which should it not now be done, such a seeming-secure, and supine sleep might have proved a mortall lethargy. But here these Sophisters think to enter upon us, and to take the benefit of their own wrong; for seeing they have brought the Kingdom to this passe, that unlesse the Parliament take the power of the kingdom into the kingdoms or its own hands, it cannot defend it self, or the kingdoms rights, or rather rescue them; they would cunningly prepare those, whom they intend to make slaves, by first making them such fools, as to beleeve, that the Parliament intends a change of the Monarchicall form of government, and to oppresse King and people by I know not what new kind of Arbitrarie tyrannicall government. I be­leeve the King and Parliament will soon be attoned, if any can shew the Parliament by what other way it can discharge its trust and dutie in this constitution of the times, without the power it hath assumed But what if it shall appear (I should make scruple to use the word shall, as if it did not appear alreadie without these weak offers, had we not to do with such as seem to have found out some new kind of reason, or having antiquated the old, which differenced man from irrationall creatures, to have substituted passion, or idle phantasie in the roome of it; the best method indeed for them af­terward on as good or the same proportion of reason, to advance the power of the King into the place of the power of the whole people or Kingdom; it is their own manner of speech and practise as sound and good as their own Method, to make such distinction and difference betwixt King and kingdom) what if it shall appear, time bringing every day truth to light, and perhaps even to there [Page 10] men some dilucida intervalla, that there is not the least probabilitie, that the Parliament can have such a thought of usurpation, as these men would impose or seem to suppose; much lesse was it ever heard that any free Parliament, actually made any the least attempt to that effect, so far is it, that ever it effected it: Whereas on the other side, ill Counsell about Princes have attempted oft, and de facto, sometimes performed the turning of a well poysed or tem­pered Monarchy, into an arbitrarie tyrannicall power and publique oppression; by which change, such ill instruments appear the onely gainers; and the malignant spleen swels in a miserable consumed bodie, the head not exempt, and yet the very swelling a dangerous disease even to the spleen it self at last. Unlesse such monstrous times did priviledge, it were high presumption to think it were not all sufficient to stop such mouthes to say it is a Parliament, and it were dishonourable for it to do as they calumniate, and therefore not to be imagined. This maxime or ground being no more to be denied, or questioned in this Monarchy, then that the earth is round in naturall Philosophy, as neer as morrall Philosophy may arrive at naturall in point of certitude: though should we grant them that a Parliament may erre, nay do wrong to Prince, people, or particu­lars, yet that would not follow upon this which they would mali­ciously inferre, and ayme at; for none but it self, or another Parlia­ment were to correct, or rectifie what a Parliament should have done amisse, and not the King or any other persons any way what­soever, much lesse by force or warre: for he that is allowed to judge or correct, is allowed thereby at least an equall (if equality for such an intent can be conceived sufficient possibly): but such equa­lity of power in two distinct Magistrates (for so we must distinguish King and Parliament here) of different natures, and touching one and the same point or matter in controversie, cannot be in one and the same state, then such a corrector must be allowed superiour and the corrected subordinate, but such the King cannot be in our case, as above is partly shewed, and shall be further afterwards. How then can force or warre on his side for this cause be rationall, and just? nay though it should be but defensive, much lesse if offensive, or inferred? Since even bare resisting the ordinances of the Parlia­ment, is or presupposes an assuming of the supreme power to judge and condemne, such resistance being the execution of the sen­tence.

[Page 11] But we shall not carry it away so easily that the Parliament will not be unjust to any, holding such power, strong temptations of profit corrupt: too oft, where one, or a few are ordinary Judges; as a little water standing sooner is putrified, but multitude of these Judges are like the Sea incorruptible: But moneys received, profits and emoluments accrewing, (it were a shame not without a certain mixture of presumption to insist on such base imputations here, had not frontlesse and monstrous malice been so incredibly auda­cious, as actually to raise them) may make a dividend sufficient to draw to some uniust act each man or the maior part of such a mul­titude, very likely; and to draw the more matter of profit, we see how by frequent orders they invite private causes; and do they give any publique account of the moneys they receive from the people, more then the Malignants could have done for Ship-money? But we erre; they give publique account: but it is to get credit onely with the people, that they may be in their sinister practises and ma­chinations the lesse suspected, and better served: But stay; how can they have ill ends at all on foot or in agitation, since of all their particular actions and proceedings, of most moment, from time to time, they by their Declarations, or the like, give no lesse then of the moneys an account to the world, except they be evident of themselves? Should they do that they cannot give reason for, but such malicious vigilance, as we deal with, when it might in parti­culars charge them, and article against them upon truths, would never be driven to the base and miserable shifts of these generals, and the like most ridiculous impudent transparent calumnies for want of matter to work on; and did not the people see clearly, they have reason, and that their ends are meerly the publique good, it would desert them; loosing patience upon the sence of the present evils, which (like the sicknesse, which, even the best phisick, before it can induce a finall setled state of health, works in a patient, chiefly if disorders, during the cure, also foment the peccant humours) through the malignant traverses of our Calumniators, both people and Parliament are of necessitie to passe through: and were it not so, though the King cannot dissolve the Parliament, yet the people possibly might recall their elections in each County, since the Par­liament doth but populo volenti imperare; which if then it doth not do, what ever some few inconsiderable and inconsiderate particu­lars may have attempted here and there, it appears the major part [Page 12] at least approves what passeth, and that sufficeth: but let us take heed we traduce not these traducers; they have a more honourable conceit of the Parliament: it is not base profit onely, but places of honour, such as are mentioned in their Propositions to the King, or the like they look at, and travail for: but there may be hope, that these that direct, correct the Parliament in all things, will here tell them, that they are out of their way, and that their nearest way had been to have complied with the King, which seeing these would seem to imagine the Parliament so unjust and dishonourable they need not doubt, they would follow: and by this course bring­ing in an arbitrary government; in which case (as before is said) the ill Counsellors, especially being authors or instruments of the change, carry away the advantage or the gain, and spoyls of the people, those their places would be farre more imperious, absolute arbitrary on the oppressed people (we may instance in the Starre­chamber) or more beneficiall, as lesse obnoxious to strict syndica­tions, then they can be the other way, they now hold; in everie re­gard so accountable; the King in all presumption like to be eagerly vigilant over them; and these Malignants themselves, grown yet more malicious and venemous, if possible, by seeing the tables so turned, and what they have been thus enormously wicked to com­passe, possessed by those they hate, that may be the instruments to punish them for such their wickednesse; besides the Parliaments ever hanging over their heads; and so highly interested in the de­meanors of those they have made choice of; and perhaps the next Parliament may consist of other Members then this present doth, and so▪ as strangers to those so chosen, lesse subject to favour them, if this were any thing to satisfie the insatiate malice of those who under colour of seeming suspicious of the integritie of this Parlia­ment, would through the sides of it, strike at the heart and autho­ritie of all future Parliaments: so upon the matter, by this course the Parliament now holds in such their propositions, the people and kingdom are like to be the onely gainers, as these publique mischiefs grew from ill Counsellours and Officers. But have not some of the principall Worthies of this Parliament quitted or indangered places of greater moment (besides the generall losse common I fear to the most or all of them through the neglect of their private af­fairs, whilest they are thus wholly taken up with the publique) as their Countreys confessors if not Martyrs, then they can any way [Page 13] expect by the course they hold? are not examples of such, as suffer­ing themselves to be taken off from such services (on which they purposely seemed the more sharp, that they might be so taken off) have grown almost as much in greatnesse, thereby, as they lost in goodnesse, are not such instances as vulgar as the spirits that furnish us with them? More might be said and much better herein by bet­ter Judgements, but a weak one may suffice so strong a cause: there being good reason to be short and slight in an argument or point that could afford no just reason to have begun at all, did not such monsters of men urge it; Lesse can it be conceived that hope, in­tention, or fruition of uncontroulled dissolute licentiousnesse or pleasures, by means of the capacitie they now stand in, or as they are a Parliament can be a motive to them to continue the power, or place they have, longer then the publique necessitie or good re­quires, or convert it to any other use then it for which they were and are by the people entrusted with such power, supposing they were no better then our Calumniators, that where there were a motive or cui bono it would prevail with them to do evill, had in­tention of such licentiousnesse been one of the principles that mo­ved them, what meant they without any necessitie not onely to give publique significations, that they meant to induce a strict re­formation of manners, but even amid so great and dangerous di­stractions to begin to set it on foot, not without some further dan­ger from those that hate it: As for any pleasures they may hereby pretend, they seeme to be no other then their indeficient and admi­rable pains, dangers and indignities (let me adde and base ingrati­tudes, a blessed condition to fain teares and dangers that they may continue in it) their noble constancie judging pro Deo & patria dulce periculum, for all which whereas it appears they have no earthly re­ward propounded to them (the like may be said of all those that adhere to the Parliament) but the conscience of having done nobly in serving God and their Countrey and defending it, did the King­dome give what it could afford it were short of them, and it must be an higher kingdome that can indeed equall them and such a change of the kingdome, and no such as our Malignants would have us fear, they appear to ayme at and affect; and could they would they ayme at a tyranny for themselves, what need they have laid such a block in their own wayes, as a voluntary oath generally taken for the conservation of the Kings just authoritie, and so many Decla­rations, [Page 14] and publique protests to that purpose, which they desist not from upon all occasions yet to do, when as, had not their resoluti­ons been thus fixed, divers free late declaring themselves to that ef­fect, specially since matters of difference have arrived at this height, and the Parliament so strong, and so many other circumstances [...]it­ting, might have been forborn. But to leap over all these barres in imagination (for in Reason we never can) suppose the Parliament may effect a change of the Monarchy, what form of government could they bring in instead of it (for they will not say Anarchie nor I deny a mixed government, for such is our Monarchy reduced to his right temper) Democracy? Then through perjury, great inju­stice, and danger, they pursue their own ruine: For Democracy where the people or multitude governs is enemy to the Nobilitie and Gentrie, whereof chiefly or solely the Parliament consists, bringing all to a parity, and making all men alike in power, or ra­ther taking away eminent persons quite, as envious or jealous of them; whereas such have priviledges over the vulgar in a just Mo­narchy: What then doth the Parliament affect Aristocracy? (where the Nobility, or chief govern) but the multitude or people whom the Parliament hath been charged to court, in which multi­tude resides or consists the maine strength, and who choose the Commons House, and must execute chiefly what the Parliament orders, without which their orders are nothing, after Democracy or Monarchy before Aristocracy: And doth not the Parliament (as above is said) from time to time give particular accounts of their actions to the world? doth there appear any previous preparing the way or disposing the people for such a change? which were ne­cessarie, were it intended? at least after so long a time, they would have begun to carry their designe outward, and the people having found it, would more and more have fallen off: but we see the con­trary, and the people every day more and more satisfied and assu­red of the integritie of their intents. But were the two Houses a subject possibly capable of Aristocracy, would the Lords of the up­per House concurre to it, which would reduce each of them to a parity in power with each Member of the House of Commons, as Democracy would equall them both with the multitude, for unlesse the Lords would loose by granting this, should the Commons get any thing (if this yet be any thing) by this imaginary if possible change?) yet how could they continue, or hold it without the con­sent [Page 15] of the multitude or people? And should the people unanimous­ly concurre to the erecting of this or any other forme of govern­ment, who should oppose it? But how foolish were it for a people to feare that which can never be unlesse it selfe will? and the Parlia­ment hath found it a long time strangely infatuated, insensible, un­willing to stirre (till time and experience had given too good atte­station to the Parliaments next to divine foresight) even when it hath made appeare to them their owne rights, liberties, and implo­red defence: and could the Parliament presume to finde them to concurre actively to an unjust and unreasonable thing, the erecting a new tyranny, not without great danger over themselves, contra­ry to the oaths and perpetuall Protestations of the Parliament.

And the Scots in the like occasion we see did not bring in any of these new governments: nay, were the Parliament possibly capable of such tyranny, yet it being in the hands of such a multitude, and that against the good will of the people, (for so we must here sup­pose) they were easily divided, and so the tyranny dissolved, espe­cially there never wanting a minor part contrary to the rest, and contrarietie being the cause of dissolution▪ but so were not a tyranny in the hands of one, and in him established by the good will of a po­tent faction of malignants: unitie which chiefly makes a Monarchy, duely tempered the best forme of government (as above was said) making the arbitrary or tyranny of one upon the same reason, as the worst of all, so most hardly dissolvible.

Wee may adde to all, that this Parliament having pressed for, and obtained trienniall Parliaments, whereby their actions, and demea­nours in this present Parliament, are subjected to frequent and cer­taine examens, should or could they give cause, and that perhaps by Parliaments consisting of other members then these (not to speake of other accidents that may procure such a change) should the peo­ple not be satisfied with what these doe in this present Parliament: it plainely argues, that out of the clearenesse of their intentions, acti­ons, and consciences, they are content, nay desire to leave their acti­ons to the censure of any: their persons, as concerning future electi­ons, to the opinion of the people upon their demerits; if the King please not to come among them, and looke to their doings, as they desire: If then upon these reasons and much more that might be of­fered, the Parliament cannot have any such end of establishing in themselves any arbitrary tyranny, or of their owne private emolu­ment, [Page 16] with the hurt of their Countreys; What can their ayme be all this while but the publique good, the just defence and asserting of their Countreys rights and honour, by the just regulating and re­ducing the Monarchy to the due temper? which is all the change of the government they seeme to affect (the same holds in all those that adhere to the Parliament, and in it desert not themselves) from which it had especially through want of due Parliaments exorbita­ted so dangerously, that had not this like another Moses beene sent by our gracious God to redeeme or rescue us rather then to defend us, and that with an out-stretched arme, forcing the malignants to it, who as they ever shunned it by all meanes, now deadly hate it, as fearing it, and in that feare confessing tacitly, that same politick om­nipotence of it, which is now asserted, a worse then Aegyptian servi­tude in humane probabilitie had overwhelmed us, and consequently the true principle or end that moves the malignants, cannot be a true feare of any arbitrary power to be established in the Parliament, though they so pretend, to divert us by foolishly fearing an imagina­ry impossible danger, from looking to and timely opposing the true reall danger imminent and evident, nay to draw us to concurre to the bringing of it in with our own hands, which is an arbitrary go­vernment at discretion, which the malignants themselves would e­stablish, and that by a civill warre, to the ruine of all that is precious with honest men, or men of honour: They have had such power in manner already in their hands; and that which the King is indu­ced by them to challenge at this present, amounts to no lesse in effect as shall appeare, the Parliament yet in vigour; what then may we expect if they should prevaile by force, which now their fallacies and deluding reasons are plainely discovered they flie unto: What but that the Court and Parasites of it, should wallow and revell in all li­centiousnesse, luxury, excesse, with pride, avarice, and tyranny pro­portionable, whilest the rest languish under oppression, slavery, po­verty, disgrace, perpetuall indignities or feares, accompted as their bea [...]s to labour for them, and so mediocritie a State, which the wi­sest of men prayed for, no where to be found, but a deluge of vices fro [...] co [...]trary causes, till generall ruine involve altogether; vertue and the glory of the Nation before extinct. For we must not thinke tha [...] these which love their Countrey so well (for which to doubt to dye were dishonour) that they will not be quiet and sit still to save it (for this much onely may suffice from the multitude of them, [Page 17] the heads and leaders excepted) nay can be content to ruine the glo­ry, libertie, safetie of it, even with the hazard of their estates, lives, honours, soules, so they may in some proportion share the spoiles of their Countrey, and grow fat with the bloud and teares of the op­pressed people: We must not thinke they can doe thus, but to the end to have greater meanes and power to beget more monstrous in all villany if it were possible. These can fight against their Countrey to make themselves slaves to a few above them, that the rest of their oppressed Countrey may be slaves to them, slaves of slaves: but I doubt not, but these monsters, unlesse reason transforme them, shall meete with their Herculesses, honest men and men of honour, [...]eady to die for their Countrey, if need require, judging such a death infi­nitely to be preferred before the lives of the chiefest of these, should they obtaine what they seeke.

But let us end this patheticall flying out, though it be hard for the inferiour faculties sometimes not to stirre, when the understanding somewhat inlightened hath inflamed the will.

On the other side, so divine a gift as this Parliament thankfully recognized and made use of duely, and the just power and dignitie of the Parliament, and therein all our happinesse wisely and man­fully now once asserted, moderation and mediocritie induced, the Monarchy duely tempered, may be in humaine probabilitie perpe­tuall, and all the surfet become Physicke. And this violent Feaver of the State having amazed and drawne to an head all the malig­nant humours before dispersed all over the body, and lying dange­rously hidden, and set on fire, consumed and expelled them (like the filth of an house swept into an heape and burnt) the whole body may be much clearer sounder and better disposed, then had not such a distemper ever beene.

I hope it appeares already were there no more then these presen­ted weake reasons to an ordinary rationall man (if far better from o­thers be too meane for his Majestie) what way he is to take that all may be well; and seeing but one side can be trusted with the power of the Kingdome, which of them is most unlikely to tyrannize, or reduce all to arbitrary government, or which will most probably use it to the publique good onely, or whether in such extraordinary times it doe not most safely repose where it is originally, naturally inherent, viz. in the peoples owne hands, and so in the Parliaments: Nay were the case hitherto dubious, yet since libertie first made ap­pointed [Page 18] limitted prerogative; for they confine together, as the peo­ple (in whom is the radicall, primary supreame power, and who made Kings, not Kings people) thought best, when it first made choice of, or instituted this one forme of government among divers others, which we call Monarchy, and whereof there are sundry de­grees in sundry States, some more some lesse trusted, or limited, as the first founders pleased, (els why are they not all equall since free and voluntary agents worke or doe onely so much, or so far as they please; and the various subordinate degrees or kinds of the creatures prove the divine Majestie to be agens liberrimum, els the creatures would be all equall: an involuntary or naturall agent (as Philoso­phy termes it) ever working as much as it can, or to the utmost ex­tent or sphere of its power and activitie, and so an equalitie in the effects) since I say, libertie or the people first created (as I may say) Prerogative, and that so tempered, modified, or graduated, as it thought most conducible to its owne happinesse (for the supreame power ever worketh for it selfe rather then for the subordinate or inferiour, as being the end; the efficient and finall causes being here co-incidents) it is just, that this, namely, libertie, judge and give law to that; and that this, if an unnaturall jarre fall out, gaine and pro­sper rather then the other; and since the people reserved ever in its owne hands, and saved to it selfe upon the trust to the Monarchy, what priviledges, right of Parliament, or liberties, &c. (parcell of the originall power naturally in the people, and which may draw backe to the fountaine the derivative power, as the bloud and spirits to the heart, when there is cause) it thought best, surely it must doe this with purpose to see them conserved as safely as may be, and up­on occasion to make use of them and enjoy them, which could not be surely done without a power reserved to judge of the state of them, and when they were to be used, and the like, (for if the Prince be trusted touching the keeping himselfe within his limits, he may even as well be trusted absolutely without limits:) nor such power to judge of them is to any purpose, as above-said, without power to execute what is judged hereupon fit. So the Parliament judgeth in this case as the first authour, and superintendent of the intent, and is not as a partie to be judged.

Further, were the matter yet dubious, yet seeing the Protestant Religion, the power being in the Parliaments hand, is far more out of the reach of danger then the other way, even without calling his [Page 19] Majesties good meaning into question therein, as I hope anon will appeare it ought to put it out of all question, how wee are to range our selves in these times. The Parliament having (our case so stand­ing) such power as is deduced, whatsoever would seeme to oppose that power and stand in their way, as they defend and assert the pub­lique good so invaded, must be voidable: and usuall ordinary known lawes or customes made or in use supposing, or whilest the Prince kept duely within his bounds (which the King speakes so much of, saying, that he will ever governe by them, and hold all to them) but ever intending the publique good, are no way to bound or tye up the transcendent power of the Parliament, when it shall encounter new and never before heard of exorbitances or invasions of the pub­lique good, which the times that made those knowne Lawes never heard of, so never provided against. But by proportion of reason this Parliament may and ought as well provide by new Ordinances or orders for such new evills as they encounter, as the former did for what they then met with: for they had their originall also (ex ma­lis moribus b [...]nae leges) and had those times had such causes offered, as these have, they would have provided remedies of a nature like those this Parliament hath done, the power and generall intentions of all times, or the universall ground being still the same, that is, to defend and vindicate, or procure the publique good: and to tye them to the knowne or old Lawes in this case, where the letter might kill, were irrationall; for so the first breaker of the Lawes might take the priviledge of the Lawes, and advantage of his owne wrong, and un­der the colours of the Lawes fight against and overthrow them, or the rule, reason, or intention that caused them at first.

If it be said, nothing was done by the King of publique conse­quence, but by advice of the Judges, it may be answered, that the Parliament is the onely competent Counsell & Judge in cases neere­ly concerning the publique, and people in generall, which the King is entrusted upon such occasions to call, that the whole people may not but upon extraordinary causes be troubled to elect for Parlia­ments, and attend that service: But in such a case as ours by virtue of the legislative power residing in the Parliament it may make new Ordinances, at least for the time, as it sees occasion and judges to be in order to that supreame and immutable Law, or Law of Lawes, and end of them all; Salus populi suprema lex, and that power even of making new Lawes is ever upon the matter in both Houses of [Page 20] Parliament, and that even when the King keepes himselfe within his due bounds, and is assistant in Parliament (how much more then, as before is shewed, if he shall by exorbitating dangerously bring himselfe within the compasse of our case?) and that the Kings con­sent to what the Parliament propounds to him, to be enacted for Law, ought not to be denyed, may appeare by comparing this fol­lowing part of the Oath, which the Kings of England at their Coro­nation take, or ought to take, cited in the Remonstrance of the 26 ^th of May, in haec verba: Concedis justas leges, & consuetudines esse tenendas, & permittis per te eas esse protegendas, & ad honorem Dei corro­borandas quas vulgus elegerit secundum vires tuas? Respondebit (Rex) Permitto, & concedo. Comparing this part of the Oath with the clause of the preamble of a Statute there also cited, intimating that the King is bound by his oath to remedy by Law such inconvenien­ces, as the Kingdome may suffer in the future, as well as to keepe and protect Lawes already in being; for then either those Latine words here cited, or some part of them, and that the latter, namely, Quas vulgus elegerit, are to be understood of Lawes futurely to be made, or else it cannot be shewed by what part of the Oath, as the said preamble affirmes, the King is bound by Law to remedy the mischiefs that happen from time to time to his Realme. Nor will the Lawes of Grammer, or use of speech, or custome of phrase tole­rate, that, Elegerit, without the conjunction, Si, or the like prece­ding, or regulating it (though we passe not by unconsidered the rude speaking of those times) can ever be taken for Elegit, the preter­perfect tense: but as it stands in the fore-cited place, must of necessi­tie participate a future nature, and signifie precisely, shall have chosen; that is, that the King assumeth to confirme such Lawes, as the peo­ple shall have chosen; it being to be conceived, that the people, or Parliament first amongst themselves, must have debated of, chosen and agreed upon them, before they present them to the King to be confirmed. Besides, if those cited words, Et permittis per te esse pro­tegendas, & ad honorem Dei corroborandas quas populus elegerit, should not referre to future elections, but to past onely, they were superflu­ous and vaine: the words precedent, Concedis justas leges & consuc­tudines esse tenendas (which presuppose necessarily, and cannot be un­derstood without a precedent election and consent of the people to them) expressing sufficiently Lawes and customes elected, already confirmed and in use. And the Kings answer to these cited words, [Page 21] being bimembris, or two-fold, Concedo & permitto (all the other an­swers of the King to the other Questions in the Oath, cited in the said Remonstrance, because the questions are meerely simple and single, conteined in one word only, as to one question onely; Servabo to another onely; faciam being also single, and in one word) argues the question to be double, as is said. And that the King is not bound onely in generall thus to remedy the particular wayes or meanes left to his choice; see the said Remonstrance, folio 8. which ought to have it selfe sufficed without such poore gleanings, as these, or the like: If then by these and other better reasons which others have presented, the Parliament hath such a legislative power, even where the King dischargeth his office, as upon the matter to make such Lawes as it judgeth best for the publique good; where through the prevalence of ill men about him, it is not done, but the contrary, and so the danger is from him, shall not power be in them to make new Ordinances, or provisionall Lawes, for the timely remedying such publique mischiefs, at least for the time, and to suspend some of those in being, if they judge fit? How much more then to judge of, declare, or interpret those that seeme dubious, ranging and making all to be subservient to the supreame Law Salus populi, the rule and reason of all Lawes, as was ever intended at the making of all parti­cular Lawes. Hath not even the Lord Chancellour a little touch of such a power upon the Common Law? What then may we thinke a Parliament hath, and that when the very publique is in danger? And if the whole people unanimously consenting, upon a Princes not performing what he is bound unto, may possibly change the ve­ry forme of that limitted government, which it first instituted, how much more may it conserve or defend that temper or kinde of go­vernment, which it hath erected by regulating the enormities of the Prince, by maintaining and holding what they have reserved out of that which was all theirs at the first, or their owne rights? How many degrees then are they off from being bound to become themselves the instruments to overthrow them? how strongly are they bound to the contrary? And indeed were not the Parliament the supreame Judge in all the said questions, or of like nature, (if we may call it a Parliament at all, not having this power) it could not possibly save the people, when ill men prevailing upon the King would oppresse it; for while they carry on by degrees, and mature by little and little such their mysticall and pernicious designes (which [Page 22] must be met with betimes in such tender and jealous matters, be­fore they advance and grow strong, when caution comes too late, and opposition out of season doth but exasperate and increase the evill) they will cause the King by fit instruments for the purpose, to pronounce, judge, or interpret each such degree or gaining a new and further point, still lawfull, and not subject to question, how­ever dangerous to the people in it self, and of worse consequence, till the mysterie at last unmask, and all be desperate.

It may be superadded, that should the Parliament be more jea­lous of the Prince then there were reason, (which yet as I hope hath appeared is not to be imagined of the wisdom and Justice of the Parliament) yet it were the farre lesse evill, that the Prince, being but for the people, should somewhat suffer by such the Parliaments jealousie (which were but peccare in meliorem, & securiorem partem) then that by the Parliaments too much security and beleeving in the Prince, the people or whole kingdome should be endangered, or op­pressed for whose good they both are ordeined, as means for the end: Besides that the authority and politique infallibilitie of the Parliament must be by all that love their Countrey, not blemished but held sacred and inviolate, as supreame. The King indeed saith he will defend and maintain, the Laws, Liberties, properties of Sub­jects, just priviledges of Parliament, but even in saying this he seems to violate them, if the thereby assume the supreame Judgement of them to himself, which, as already partly hath appeared, and fur­ther hereafter may do, cannot be; Admit this Trojan horse into your walls, allow this, all of them may easily resolve into nothing. Consider well, what Judgement hath been made of the Laws, the libertie, the property of the Subject, before this Parliament, whilest a future Parliament was doubted and feared, and therefore kept off as long as these Malignants could, (but their fear and hate shews what we ought ardently to desire, and love) whilest so many Mo­nopolies, Loane, Conduct, Coat, Ship-money, and the like grie­vances were brought upon us (our persons not going Scotfree) as consisting well, and compatible with our laws, liberties, properties, and adjudged lawfull, which yet what did they, or ere long going on at least would they have wanted of making them all meerly at discretion, pleasure, and will, the meer names of such things remai­ning, and used indeed, as Trophees of their Conquest, and monu­ments of our quondam felicity, and at leasure to be lamented folly [Page 23] and eternall shame. The danger of our Religion is not forgotten, because not ranked in mention with the rest, it shall have a better place by it self, as a Queen sitting alone.

The Judgement made of priviledges of Parliament during this Parliament seem to have come little short of the Judgements made of our liberties, properties, &c. and if it be duely weighed. First, that they will have the King to be judge of them, then what Judge­ment hath been lately made, both in fact and in words, or Declara­tions of them, a man meanly penetrant will find them resolved by the positions of these Malignants into next to nothing: and all this while the Parliament was and is in vigour, vindicates, and asserts them, and likely to call these men to account, what will they make of them, should they through the authority, and reputation of this Parliament, which is the essence of it, peirce at once the heart of all future: for a Parliament not free were no Parliament, and if the King be allowed judge of priviledges of Parliament, where any new case happens which may touch the very essence of it (if it be any thing else then the priviledges) will it not come to this, that the Judges he appoints, or rather such instruments, as the Malignants about him please to set over us, shall upon the matter judge the Parliament, which is to Judge their Judges, making it and the Laws what they please, and to restrain the power and freedome of it, as of the Laws, as they think fit; whereupon would follow even the same inconveniences, which were before mentioned, supposing the King the supreame Judge of the Laws, namely, that the Parliament should be disenabled to defend the people, or indeed it self if incroa­ched on, or oppressed upon the same reasons in that place expressed. But it seems more rationall, that since the Parliament is to be Judge of the Laws (as is above shewed) nay even may make them, at least in some cases; it may judge as well of its own priviledges: neither appears it in the Kings power to make them, what he pleases, save onely thus: if he doth not exorbitate, nor innovate any thing a­gainst them, neither can the Parliament desire any alteration of them in any point, betwixt it and the King, concerning them. But in case of extraordinarie emergents of never-before-heard of at­tempts on his part, whither by any verball declaration, or by fact, whereby the priviledges, authority or very being (for it may trou­ble a good School-man to distinguish clearly betwixt these three) it self of the Parliament is indangered, it is reason, that the privi­ledges [Page 24] now become any thing that the Parliament judges fit for the conservation of it self. For the maine end and intent of the first, ancient, ordinary, and usuall priviledges of Parliament, being to enable, and qualifie it for the due attending, defending or advancing the publique good (for which purpose they were judged sufficient by the first Institutors, not suspecting such new invasions, or at­tempts on them, or on Parliaments as since have happened in more corrupted times, but thinking them rather secure, as part of the Laws, or customes which Kings are bound to keep inviolate) why should not the same end and intent, which ever remains in equall force, immortall, and immovable, work and move, as well to the instituting even of new ones, if new causes happen, and without such new ones the Parliament shall remain disenabled to procure the publique good, for which it was ordained? and if the Parliament may in extraordinarie times as now make new Ordinances for the conservation of the people, it may make (if need require) new Or­dinances or Priviledges (which are but the private Laws of or con­cerning the Parliament) for its own conservation, without which they cannot defend or conserve the people; and in vain had it power to make new Ordinances upon new occasions for the publique good, if it have no inherent power to make new priviledges or or­dinances upon new emergent dangers to save it self, Posse naturally and necessarily presupposing Esse, as grounded on it; Qui dat finem, dat necessaria ad finem: the priviledges being to defend and main­tain the Parliament as the Laws the people, and as Salus populi is lex suprema, as before, so it may as well be said, Salus Parliamenti su­premum privilegium. If it may work new, it may much more inter­pret, declare, and judge of the old on occasion; and are no more to be held to the old, usuall, known, priviledges, when new extraordi­narie attempts, or affronts happen, then to the old known Laws onely in the case above spoken of, and upon the same ground and analogy of reason. And here we are fallen unawares on the old Lord Treasurer Burleigh, who we need not say was a great Statesman, who was wont to say, He knew not what a Parliament might not do: not much unlike the Archbishop Bancroft (a great Statesman) who would tremble (as is said) at the mention of a Parliament, as know­ing, or rather not knowing the power of it; and had not they both taken the word Parliament in our acception, they had told us no news. It is one effect of ill Counsell about a Prince (in the conse­quence [Page 25] somtimes better then in their intentiō) to minister occasions to the people by invasion of their rights, to look narrowly into the nature of the Princes prerogative, when by the power of truth, it oft looseth of the former reputation (which liberty gains): a more dubi­ous light setting it of better, and ignorance begetting here devotion, and admiration, of what is unknown; & hence it is perhaps, that in these times as more polite and penetrant, then many former ages, Prerogative is said generally to loose in Christendome, the better thus fortified against the so great, and growing danger from the Common enemy the Turke, and other great Mahometan Princes the great bulwark of Christendome, Germany, now so torne the more requiring it) by so maine a disparity in matter of liberty (the Mahometans using their Subjects, as their beasts, or slaves) as well as of Religion. But to our way from this Digression. We may from this place take a prospect another way into the plot of these Malig­nants; being by a crew of our own Nation but unnaturalized, part­ly not penetrating their deluding pretences by reason, as naturally simple, partly having their understandings debauched by a will in­stantly solicited, or over-ruled by enormous affections, and passions: which second kind may constitute a middle degree between malice and simple ignorance (might this simple tractate gain one of the first sort, the pains taken were a pleasure, but should it hope to win one of the second degree, this presumption might make bare par­don too much for it.) There is a third sort in whom their under­standings and consciences though having perfect light and cleerly discerning the truth, and right, yet are like slaves forced, and drag­ged by a Diabolicall will (affections in this degree not mentioned, as arguing grosse carnality, or corporealnesse: but these are spiritua­les nequitiae) by such a society, whilest they speciously pretend to de­fend priviledges of Parliament, Laws of the Land, liberty, property of the Subject, &c. but whereof the King must be supreame Judge (for in this point lyeth all the mystery, and Cabala) through this mortall wound of the authority and essence of the Parliament, the true, and onely Judge, and consequently defender of them all (as above is shewed) to strike the heart of them all, leaving us onely tenues umbrae, or manes, or apparitions of them, to pursue, distract and torment us, as accessaries to the murder, or rather principals (since no accessary in Treason) if we passively concurre, much more if we help to act it, thus the matter being disposed they may intro­duce [Page 26] the form (the perfection of the work) and the state at their dis­cretion, and the way of the Lord Pope prepared, and his crooked paths made straight, they may easily bring him in, as after we may endeavour to shew.

But if the plot seem not deep enough laid, as supposing and ho­ping at home so many monsters, and vipers (though the fewerneed­ed, the sound partie of England and Scotland already distracted by the Irish Rebellion to that end if not at first raised, yet sundrie waies fomented by them) then perhaps to peice it from abroad; and by cutting the banks of the kingdom to let in a deluge of forrein forces, and so yet further subdistract the remnant; if we conceive the Fleet of Spaniards, seen not long since at the Downs, carried any myste­rie, or came not unsent for, or moved not to no end, or Hull so eat­nestly made at, Newcastle, Portsmouth, &c. signifie any thing; which though intended to distract England, and ruine it, may rather (open­ing our eyes, and disabusing us) by Gods over-ruling unite it as in a common cause against an universall and evident danger, not to speak now of other matters judicating the same. And they intend­ing in England a government at discretion, and all made in all pro­babilitie, or after the French fashion; if the middle sort of people of England, and Y comanry, of whom chiefly consist the trained bands, and wont to be a maine strength of our victorious Armies, can by no subtilties be drawn to their party, then by policy, or even plain force to disarme them, suspecting as they have good cause that these, if once they be unhoodwinkt, will especially oppose the change as whereby they from being in the happiest condition of any of their rank perhaps in Europe, nay in the world (who here live like men, and are wont to fight, or die like men in honour or de­fence of their Countrey) might well be reduced to the termes of the Peasants of France, of villenage, and slavery: a fit recompence for their danger and pains should they fight and labour to bring it in. As for the scum of the people they judge it either sencelesse, or care­lesse of the publique, and desiring a change, or easily drawn, where there is hope of greater spoil, and pillage. We may place so much the more below this scum many of the greater sort, that stand for these Malignants against the truth and right (every day more and more p [...]in [...]y convincing them) and against their Countrey by how much they owe to it more then the Rascality doth, yet appear to be drawn with hope of spoil, and pillage in their degree and propor­tion [Page 27] as much or more then the Rascality it self.

But thought it be so with the State, is our Religion in danger that way also? why else are the Papists so active, so busie? is it onely that they may be slaves? but in a politick way onely use may be made of them, and of their power, without any intent to symbolize with them in their religion, as sometimes hath been done in other Countreys. Be it so (though it be not good to be prodigall and fa­cile in our grants which our religion may pay for) yet taking it this way, so great a service so seasonable at such a pinch (when all good Subjects, and judicious honest men fail them) received from the Papist, must draw on in way of gratefull acknowledgement, some favour at least some advantage, which cannot be but at as much dan­ger, and disadvantage of the religion (not to insist how hardly they will lay down their Armes once taken up, and victorious, or the King be able to make good his faith, or word). And are not they the fittest and surest meanes to conserve a State, that have been thought and found such for the acquiring? But be this as it may it is clear, that can the Papist bring the matter to an absolute, and arbi­trary government, and render the prerogative immense and even divine, they gaine a maine point on our religion, for then between them and the heaven of their desires, there were interposed but the turning of one will, and that one alreadie prepared, disposed and in­clined to them by such meritorious supererogatory service, and further propitiated by the so strong intercessions (how strong (to speak like those we have to do with) when used by her that may in somethings even command) our soveraigne Ladie Mary. (I had rather seem to some a little too much tyed to sence onely, and to the present times we yet live in, when I presumed to use that phrase: turn, or change of one will; then with others, by the abstraction of a potent imagination, found worthy to have been rapt into the glo­rie of those times, in stead of change of will: to have used a phrase or sence seeming to such more orthodox, terming it rather an ex­ternall manifestation and declaration onely to us here below of that which was ever from the beginning predestinated internally since in Gods no reall change nor shadow of change) but the other way a whole Parliament at least must be first turned, and that in Diame­trall opposition with the Papist, and should forreign Force come in by Portsmouth, Plymouth, or Falmouth (what if we adde Ireland?) to induce Tyranny, Religion runs equall hazard with the State. [Page 28] And it may be, the Kings forces running lately with so strong bias so eagerly at Banbury, Warwicke, Coventry, &c. esteemed most op­posite indeed to the Papist, though perhaps not otherwise direct to the first, or maine mark for the present, of these Malignants, may judicate and argue, without any sophistry, a present complication of the disease, and the duplicity of the designe, and danger: or if not a present essence of a double disease, yet a dangerous maladie now in being alreadie, but breaking out into a symptome more to be taken heed of then the very disease, and depending on it: But they object, our Religion is on the other hand more indangered by Brownisme, Anabaptisme, &c. suppose this true, and that these should get strength, nay prevail with the Parliament (which it is charged to promote upon as likely, as strong, and even the same grounds, as it is to affect the change of the Monarchy, yet as we said of we know not what new form of government, supposing ri­diculously the Parliament did introduce it, it were easily dissolvible; so obscure Brownisme or Anabaptisme were much more easily mastered, and redressed, then most politick, potent, all over bearing Papistry, likely to be backed with forreigne force, which I think none will say is to be feared from those other scarce known, weak, poore Sects, whose obscurity, and paucity, hides rather and exempts from animadversion, and would the Parliament attempt this (though we might justly refuse to dispute with those that denie principles in this kingdoms policie, calling still in question the wis­dom, Justice and honour of Parliaments) could it ever effect it without the peoples concurring? Papistry so increased at home, so countenanced might (if it doth not already with their good friends help in Ireland, and elsewhere hope to force entrance). How foolish then is it for the people to fear that, which can never take effect, unlesse it self will have it so? (I fall unawares upon the same answer here used before touching the supposed change of the State, because the false grounds they would seem to go on here, and there seeming the same) and if the whole kingdom or people will have it so there is no opposing. But hath not the Parliament taken a voluntarie Oath (besides so many publique Protestations, and other obligati­ons to us, the Scots, and the States of the Low Countreys) for the maintenance of the Protestant Religion, which they are too wise, and just needlesly to have done, and so should they do otherwise to incurre most justly universall falling of, or rather falling on them, [Page 29] had they had any intent ever to have done, as these would seeme to fear, to direct us here also from looking at the true fear and dan­ger, nay to draw us with our own hands to pull it on us; we may su­peradde, that the voluntary oaths of such a multitude as the Parlia­ment on whom no suspition at all can fasten, of inclining to that re­ligion, which takes upon it to dispence with oaths and equivocati­ons, and thereby with the Law of God, Nature and Nations (which intended to advance it, will by Gods justice advance the ruine of it) are better security, then our Malignants have or can give us on the other side, the Antithesis in each part inquired into duely as the subject well deserves.

But these men would here also take benefit of their own wrong, according to their usuall method (it may appear what correspon­dence, or good intelligence the maine dangers of our Religion and State still hold mutually, or how they resemble). Necessity of the State, nay of the very preservation of it self (whereof these Ob­jectors are manifestly the authors) may justly and too evidently doth compell the Parliament to the setling of Religion, (though the end of policy and however first in esteeme and intention, yet not so in the time of execution alwayes) after the ordering of poli­tick affairs; and in such desperate times as these, not to do this, were but a sacrifice without salt, a foolish superstition (like that of the Jews, who would rather sit still, and so suffer themselves to be cut in pieces by the capitall enemies of their State and Religion, (con­trary to David who in necessitie spared not the very Shewbread) who maliciously invaded them purposely at such a time) then arme or fight upon such necessitie on their Sabbath; Which they com­plain the Parliament will not now do; which should it now, one ruine might involve both Church and State both at once: yet hath it not altogether, even such times notwithstanding, left it self with­out some testimony of their good intentions herein, as particular Acts or Orders of theirs do shew to the world; but the attempts, and facts of the Malignants, evident to all men apologize too well for the Parliament in this point without any words from any man, if we weigh the desperate estate of publicke affaires well in these times, caused by the malice of these Monsters; which times forcing us for a while to content our selves with an implicite, or generall faith, as touching the ordering, reforming, or setling of other par­ticulars concerning Religion, which cannot for the said necessarie [Page 30] reasons and the like▪ be yet effected; yet we have, besides many o­ther raducements obvious enough to confirm such implicite faith, this also that of such ordering and setling these matters, as is to be wished, there is farre greater hope, and presumption (caeteris pari­bus) from those Divines, that preach and cry down the temporall greatnesse, pride, riches, avarice, &c. of the Clergy, and so all their own hopes and pretensions that way, and consequently from the Parliament, which we see countenanceth such men, then from the contrary side: that professing likewise in a speciall manner and de­gree, mortification, contempt and renouncing of the world, and of the glory, greatnesse, and pomp of it, humility and the like (as minding heavenly matters, and things above) as principles of the Doctrine and Religion they presse upon us, yet are not ashamed to appear to the world invested (through various mysteries of iniqui­tie) with so great a share of whatsoever the most worldly men (whose highest contemplations ascend not to the Moon) compose their Trinity of, as may enable these men thus crucified, and dead to the world by their own earthly power, greatnesse, authoritie (not to insist on that kind which they have in our times, attempted to render, in some points, or cases at least, independent of the crown and absolute; and which earthly greatnesse, rather then the Parlia­ment shall question, or regulate, they will question and condemne the Parliament, and advance a Civill Warre, or forreigne invasion, to the evident danger of a generall ruine, and abomination of deso­lation of their Countrey, nay Church it self, which these hypocrites would seem to stand for) as may enable them, I say, by their own temporall potency (which in the hand of such men becomes more dreadfull, then any spirituall power they exercise) sufficiently to keep in awfull silence, if not to bring into a kind of Inquistion, such as most heretically shall not captivate and subdue their under­standing and reason under so strong a faith, as to beleeve, that these chief ones (who ought to be most eminent of all in practising the said principles of renouncing the world, humility, mortification, &c. which they recommend, command, and enjoyn, as Leaders and Captains for all that should follow them on so difficult services) can yet practice and pursue, I say, so ardently, so desperately the clean contrary, so as if they would have others quit the world, onely that themselves might seise [...]t; and yet thus by their deeds drawing into suspition, doubt, imsprision with multitudes of men, [Page 31] nay, even consuting their Doctrine, not be a maine cause of the miseries and calamities of the world, whilest deluges of sinne and wickednesse, and pernicious consequences breake in at this so great an overture of the faith, thus discountenanced, and discredited, and even called in question; will not many incline rather to beleeve, that this practice, this doctrine, so destructive one to the other, is sowing their feilds with mingled seed, wearing a garment mingled with woollen and linnen, so for bidden in the Mosaike Law? That such a ridiculous unsuitablenes between such profession & doctrine, such practise and deeds, is rather a mockery of the world. Will they not like one Cicero speaks of, wonder cur aruspex videns risum teneret? Though the Mahumetan sect be grosse, and carnall, and the Mahu­metans themselves exceeding devout in their kinds, and superstitious, having their Church-men in great reverence, diverse of them rich and prosuse otherwise in works they conceive any way pious and charitable, and though otherwise the Nation very covetous, yet I thinke it will not be easie to shew that their chiefe Church-men in generall, in any temporall greatnesse or riches, doe not much rather resemble the mendicant Orders among the Papists (did they hold themselves to their Rules) then the Papisticall or our Prelates and chiefe Clergy-men, who yet professe themselves Leaders in so spiri­tuall, so heavenly, and sublime, so world-renouncing a way, faith and doctrine. It is true the Turkish Muphty or chiefe Priest, is by the grand Turke, partly to please the people, in shew and shadow greatly honoured; not perhaps without a competency in revenue, but I take it hereabouts their devotion of any note this way ends. As for any temporall greatnesse and riches the Mesaicall Clergie might have, wee are taught, these were rather grosse and sensible Types, then any thing else, of the spirituall eminency, graces, en­dowments, and power, that ought to shine in the sublime and hea­venly Antitype; whence their true authoritie with the people and reverence, and even veneration to their doctrine, places and persons must slow, conserved, encreased by ever constant and invincible re­jections of the least not necessary temporall matter, if pressed on them, as an high dishonour, or affront offered to discredit them, a bribe to corrupt them in the execution of their Embassage, a baite to entrap them and frustrate the service they are sent about, a temp­tation of pernicious consequence, nay, of what the State may ad­judge and assigne the Clergie as necessary (if it might be) a vo [...]n­tary [Page 32] and absolute declining of part even of that (for I doubt not but the State would appoint such a proportion, as might to duely morti­fied and spirituall men, afford matter for the honour of such a refu­sall would undoubtedly adde such authoritie and reverent regard to them, and their doctrine, that men seeing they seek them not theirs, nor will admit more of the world, then what is meerely necessary for them, for the discharge of their places; you shall discover a new world: Men by such courses which will bring on doctrine propor­tionable, will be so moved that cutting off each in his proportion greatly, even their own superfluous vanities, much more their sins: what our spirituall men may so have refused, with infinite more by others thus cut off, may be distributed among the poore, (besides the benefit of such examples and doctrine, extending even to these:) and so universall charitie, reducing all to a blessed kinde, if not of pa­ritie, yet of proportion, leaving the least in a tolerable mediocritie, a golden age or primitive times may rise againe in the world.

But the way to this heaven is first to goe by the gates of hell, as through the Parliament the Kingdome is made at by the true ma­lignants, so through or under colour of a pretended malignant par­tie, that seduceth or ruleth the Parliament, the Parliament or autho­ritie and dignitie thereof is attaqued, but sure this is propounded as an article of faith, and to weake reason past comprehension how it can well be: but how ever they are misbeleevers and hereticks that pertinaciously reject an article of faith, and with force to be pro­ceeded against; yet force being found oft none of the best wayes to extinguish heresie, but rather the canker spreaded and exasperated by rude handling, many have not and will not be deterred from ad­vancing such as these, plaine or stronger oppositions, if any of this malignant partie propound any thing (as in all great assemblies some must breake the matter and begin) and the house consent to the proposition; it is now the act of the whole house: if any propound or speake things that seeme to others offensive, or to deserve ani­madversion, and yet the house, or major part punish it not, they by such connivence (for these men may be allowed to question still principles, that the Parliament would doe dishonorably, and yet come short of their malicious intents) make it also this way their owne; and so not these censors, or any els but the Parliament, as a­bove appeared, is to judge of the Parliament; but such censors them­selves are to be condemned by the Parliament, for thus presuming [Page 33] or assuming to themselves the supreame power to judge; besides par­ticular charges and articles against such were to be offered to the House, the accusers and witnesses to be produced and forth-com­ming, that if they make not good their charges, the parties unjustly molested and accused, might have condigne reparations upon them; and the House it selfe satisfaction, the publique service thus cause­lesly interrupted, and the integritie of the House called in question, and the like, appertaining to cases of this nature. Such charges have been promised long since should suddenly appeare against the accu­sed Members of the Parliament, and by them as Justice earnestly re­quired, but appeare not all this while, not so much as to the people abroad, (though this were not the right way) which they so strive to incense against the Parliament, but rather warre in stead of them; and seeing so many of the very Members of the Houses of Parlia­ment are their enemies, falling off from them unjustly (if none such still remaine among them) were things appearing unjustifiable there said or done (if it might stand with the libertie and power of Parlia­ment not to have libertie of speech) it might easily be made appeare in particular to the world, and so complaint be made to the Parlia­ment thereof, if it were to any end to complaine there of that, which hath already passed without punishment. But seeing the Parliament hath power (the case standing as before hath been shewed) to doe in all things as they see cause; by good consequence their speeches ne­cessarily preparing, discussing, agitating, concluding what is so to be done, cannot be subject to any limitting, questioning, or accompt abroad, nor in reason therefore are to be divulged in that sence; this being incompatible with such power. But then these haters of our Law-makers and Lawes, say; Many of both Houses are away, and so the acts lesse valid; but be the number remaining little, yet the acts of the Major part of that number are still good. For neither the King that called them away, or countenanceth them that desert their stations, may ailedge this; nor the Members that voluntarily (not upon trust in those that remaine, or leave obteined) abandon their places there and duties, are to take the benefit, either of their owne wrong, whether negligence in such Members, or worse per­haps, nor of their owne unworthinesse, as Cowardise, to oppose what they liked not: which feare (admitting such could be) argues still that they that feared were the lesser number; though what nee­ded they feare to speake freely, a dissenting lesser number being or­dinary, and sometimes a very few, perhaps scarce enough to make a [Page 34] number, dissenting openly from the rest of the whole House with­out any inconvenience? It being allowed for any to speake their minds whilst a matter is in agitation before it be settled. If they say, they goe away that they may not seeme to allow what would passe though they were present: then the Major part concurres to what is done by their owne confession, els why stay they not to oppose it? If they say, so many are gone without leave of the Houses, as put to­gether would make the Major part, supposing this were true, either such a Major part went away at once in a body, and then it was their fault not to stay; for then they being the Major part had prevailed; or they went by little and little, and then still it was a Major part of the remainder that concurred to what was done, els it had not pas­sed: and so the acts still good: If they fly to say that they who thus deserted the House out of feare, did it not as fearing the Parliament, but the people; granting these men this, which is not their due, that such had cause to feare the people, and that such base feare, when as they pretend, they were to stand for the King, Countrey, Lawes, Li­berties, Religion, and did not render them utterly unworthy their places: it may be answered briefly; they that remained and carried matters, might feare the King as much or more: but their cause was noble and good; but these or the like Cavils will no more hood­winke the people: their onely course were to produce some pub­lique act of Parliament, that might certifie the world, that the King and both houses have long since unanimously concurred to dissolve this Parliament; else Sophistry will not carry it against the mani­fest truth.

By the premisses or rather by diverse excellent Tractates publi­shed by others to the same, or the like effect, I hope it is even as cleare that the Parliament is and ought to be the supreame Judge in pub­lique matters now in question in England, as what it is, it hath jud­ged and ordered touching these things, by so many publique orders, declarations, and the like; and consequently that reason wills that they be sacred in our esteeme, and punctually obeyed and executed, and so no need of warre: and whosoever goeth against reason and truth, goeth against God himselfe, who is Prima, summa, pura ratio, and it will concerne him nearely to looke to it, whether he be stron­ger then God: goeth against himselfe if he be a man, and shall first finde a civill warre in himselfe, before he can cause it in his Countrey upon such grounds, and for his Majestie he cannot as he is a King, but judge that, that man thinks dishonourably of him, who goeth [Page 35] about to perswade him, that, that can be for his good that is not for the good of his Kingdome, and so sever what is so excellently joy­ned; or that the great Counsell of the Kingdome is not the onely, at least the very best, and the onely sure and securing way without all doubt, for that Prince to follow that intends the publique good: and which will ever assuredly concurre with him to that end: nor in opposing an arbitrary power, which ill men about him for their owne private and wicked ends, would induce: Doth the Parliament any thing but disenable a Prince, or rather those about him from do­ing ill, or more properly from usurping such power; which to what end is it in a good Prince, which he will or can never reduce to act or use: but the false or pretended Mother of the childe, who would have it divided, (whom the wisdome of the King may discerne) will whisper, there is no thankes or glory to doe good, unlesse he might have done evill, and so did good freely; since free will onely merits (I beleeve they hold merits) it seemes these malignants fet­ched not this Doctrine from heaven; for there we may finde that confirmation in grace in the Angels and blessed spirits of just men, whereby compleat free will, or the remaines of it (which free will argues but imperfection and mutabilitie; power to sinne being but impotency, and the King of Kings, God himselfe, who is perfection it selfe, being above and without all power or possibilitie of doing any evill, yet, (rather therefore I should say) omnipotent in or for good) that confirmation in grace, I say, by which free will is trans­figured and sublimed into a state divine; and Posse non peccare, into non posse peccare, is a transcendent blessing, if not the very essence of celestiall beatitude; where these suggest, such a condition is to be declined, though with ruine of all: But howsoever the Divines of our times may not allow the explication or application of this point, we may hope his Majestie out of his Princely care of the good of his people, though both himselfe and it may beleeve well of his good intents to that purpose, will be far from judging such a puntiglio of arbitrary power (for however it may fill and tickle the phantasie, yet deeply and duely penetrated into by judgement, it appeares to resolve even into no more (if a puntiglio be any thing) or least it might possibly be thought, he would, or might have done evill, had he not been restreined from it (when he cannot violate such just re­strictions, without first doing the greatest evill of all to the pub­lique) from judging, I say, such a puntiglio a just and sufficient cause to destroy the people by a civill warre; when were this power in­deed [Page 36] justly belonging to him, yet true love to his people might judge it no other way usefull, then to have the glory and thanks of relin­quishing it voluntarily, least otherwise the peoples good and safetie for a puntiglios sake, or satisfying a phantasie, or an humour of one man, should depend on the turne or change of one mans will, when­soever it may happen, and more then this, great and noble minded men, though no Christians, have more then once done, when ha­ving in their hands absolute power over their Countrey (not un­justly gotten) they have freely and of their owne accord given it up absolutely, judging it so best for their Countreys good, leaving it even in full libertie, and so living themselves in, or rather under it, but much higher in true glory and honour then ever. But though such power is not here in his Majestie, he is yet not without meanes in his hands, and a faire opportunitie to lay a tye not altogether un­like on his people, and to exhibit freely great and publique munifi­cence all at once, by a faire and voluntary relinquishing all contesta­tion about it, whilest yet a malignant faction, preferring their pas­sions before reason, and conscience, before his honour and safetie, instigate and assist him as much as they can, or rather would make him their instrument to compasse it by an unnaturall pernicious ci­vill warre, on whom the blame may justly be laid, as they alone would have gone away with the benefit.

By these and the like passages had beene, and even yet (so it be betimes taken) may be the way to the true arbitrary power indeed; the peoples hearts (where God begins with man, as at the right end; this is the divine Method) which draw all the rest sweetly, which the pretended false bastard arbitrary power, could never by unjust violence effect: and thus by fairely quitting the pursuite of the false, the true may be gained: a magnanimous Prince, that confides in his owne vertue, will put himselfe boldly and securely on the free wills of his Subjects. It is in manner a divine Charecter; Scire, & velle liberis hominibus imperare; to know how to temper and governe free men, Gentlemen, Princes; and in such a condition God made man, to serve his glory best: and is it not a more glorious thing when a Prince shall by his great, proportionate, and heroike vertues, render them at his devotion, and make them his voluntary slaves, being otherwise free and noble, then if he found them made slaves by the practise and vices of others, or so made them such himselfe. Thus a free people is a strong motive and occasion to a Prince to [...]ender them wholly his by extraordinary vertue; the fall of this [Page 37] emulous Carthage would shake Rome, though in opposition with it and therefore the noblest of the Romans best and most wisely loving Rome, for Romes good advised Carthage should stand. But reason evinceth, that persisting as he doth, he remaines sequestered from all just power and authoritie, as touching the matters in question between him and his Parliament, on the justice and wisdome where­of he may safely put himselfe, secure, that they will not, nor can de­vest him of any thing, that justly belongs to him: onely reason and right require, that it be left to the Parliament to be the Judge there­of, without which power, the people and Kingdome cannot be safe, as stands deduced. Monarchy thus tempered by libertie and prero­gative, as it is remote from intrinsicke causes of dissolution, so from externall. If a Prince governing at discretion invade it, the partie in the goodly arbitrary government excluded by the distemper of such a State from the benefits of libertie (the partie, I say, for be a Prince never so absolute, yet his Mamaluks, his Militia, by whose conspi­racy or tyranny he awes and enslaves the rest, not onely equall for the most part in point of libertie, the Subjects of a free State, but ex­ceeding them far in all licentiousnes and tyrannizing, and enslaving upon the matter the Prince himselfe, as well as others, justly lay on his owne shoulders by Gods judgement, that which he makes or u­seth these as instruments to lay unjustly on the necks of his other. Subjects, whom he ought to have protected: Instances are frequent of the Pretorian Cohorts or Legions tyranny on the Roman Em­perours, of the Janisaries on the great Turke, of the Mamaluks on the Aegyptian Soldans) and reason shews this danger is most to be feared, where a Prince hath assumed the peoples libertie by publique oppression) I say, if the absolute Monarch invade the justly tempe­red, the oppressed partie is not to be trusted, but to be kept under by part of those he will trust, (he can trust none safely) as certaine ene­mies at home; so the power which he must trust, doubly lessened: the partie used goeth faintly on the free Nation, for at best by bring­ing their free neighbours (whence was the chiefe hope of assistance for the recovering their owne libertie) into servitude, they should but confirme and render remediles their owne slavery, encreasing the strength of the oppressor, and likewise on the same reason resist lesse, if invaded: Onely if the Prince will make accompt, or can be content, or cannot avoid to be himselfe an equall, a companion with his Mamaluks (Facinus, quos in quinat, aequat) or rather to be tyran­nized by them, and his honour, authoritie, name, person, to be [Page 38] made their instrument against his people, he may translate the said faintnes from them on himselfe; though when all is done, they are unsafely trusted who have before broken the great tye, that to their Countrey; else he must fly to forreigne helpe. But on the other side, the free Subjects duely interessed in the State, loving it, living like men, defend, invade the other, nobly, couragiously, as in heart, and men of honour, and as oft for the good of the conquered; with greater power, as universally to be trusted. Not to insist on riches, the nerves of Warre, infinitly increased by industry, so encouraged by industry, lost by servitude, but what needs more, or indeed so much, if any thing in a matter so apparent? Wee now have beene rapt sufficiently into the goodly imaginary heaven, and the glory of it, but with an hell of inextricable miseries to the Prince and people, which these Gods of the infinite prerogative pretended, are raising for themselves, through a government at will, but by such meanes and in such manner, as shews they beleeve, or hope for no other heaven hereafter.

These things being thus, it must follow, that those that oppose the Parliament, and in it the kingdom, in whom is the supreame power, as reason hath evinced since contestation hapning as now between King and people, the people must carry it, oppose their Countrey, reason, right, and the truth, moved by defect of judgement, or worse principles; converting themselves and their power received from their Countrey to enable them to serve and defend it, to the ruine of it, and of all that is precious to men of honour, and consequently that they are guiltie of their owne bloud, and of all the bloud and miseries which this unnaturall monstrous warre may cause (a means suitable indeed to the end they force themselves to compasse:) nor can unpartiall posteritie judge of them otherwise, then as Parricidae patriae, and damnatae memoriae, if all this be not of force with them to descend deeply into themselves, and to weigh whether they be in state fit for death every moment, at least they may deigne this last motive the honour of a deep and sad thought, or two, whether thus obstinately persisting, they contract not before God another way a guilt to contribute or be accessary to the endangering or perdition of their owne, and innumerable soules in another kinde, and more directly, and highly, there being aliquid sacri in hoc morbo, and Reli­gion sharing the hazard, as abovesaid: but if the premisses have not power to inferre thus much with them, yet I hope at least they are not so irrationall, so extravagant, as that these men can truely be­leeve, [Page 39] that they are onely to be confuted, and those that maintaine such tenents to be instructed by a civill warre: but if folly and de­fect of that reason that should governe men, or a violent forcing, tyrannizing, and enslaving their reason and conscience by enormous and monstrous passions, and sinnes, the two originall causes of sla­very, be by no art to be severed from these men, but they must and will by still persisting apply these two said generall causes of servi­tude, particularly and expresly, or in a speciall manner now to draw it upon them, it is not unlikely most of them, and their posteritie and friends may finde, and prove the effect as inseperable from the cau­ses thus redoubled and enforced, as the causes from themselves, should they be so unhappy as to carry what they by such meanes so pursue: and however some dequoy indulgence may be used towards them, to draw others, till all be in the power of the principall malig­nants (the like we may say of their cunning enforcing themselves not yet to declare all the depth of their malicious intentions towards those they disarme, or any way get within their power, using them as staiking horses, till by seeming for the present to leave these in a tolerable condition, they may make others stand out lesse resolutely or warily, and so drawing still to them, make all sure at last, and at their discretion (though even whilest matters are yet dubious, the infernall are of malice, hate, crueltie, jealousie, and the like, which is in their hearts, sometimes cannot but flash out in divers enormous words, or acts) such present indulgence, I say, notwithstanding of the malignant partie, let not these men thinke that it having all once at its dispose, and made sure, will judge it may securely repose on such of the Nation, as have violated wittingly & willingly the grea­test tye on earth, by being traytors to their Countrey, or on those that loving their Countrey, have been violently or fraudulently dis­armed, or on them that not intending the disservice of their Coun­trey, but seduced by specious pretences, have voluntarily assisted the malignant partie, when time and plaine experience shall have disa­bused these two sorts, and afford meanes of redeeming their Coun­trey and themselves, will not the malignants rather have recourse to forreigne protection, or forces (an usuall refuge of an arbitrary, or tyrannicall government, especially succeeding and having usurped libertie of the Subject, as abovesaid) under colour of being guards, garrisons, auxiliary forces, joyned in league, or the like; as France useth the Switzers, (the French Nation forsooth not populous or warlike enough;) It is true, the Spaniard, though not governing at [Page 40] discretion as the French useth the Switzers also, but not upon jea­lousie and diffidence of their own people (for ought I find) as France doth, but for want of men or some other reason of State, and may not many strangers already here also be imployed; then may these Zelots of the Malignants share largely in contributing to the wages of their forreigne Masters, and be put to maintain their own servi­tude (as they stood to bring it in) with all their power. But God be praised, these men unlesse they speedily come in and make their peace, are on the point rather of falling under the sword of Justice in the hand of the Parliament: and it is not to be doubted, but God himself whom they have by sundrie passages too notorious (if we may so speak) made a party against themselves, these Atheists belike thinking he is grown old, and impotent, and cannot drown these Egyptians in a red sea of their own blood, if they with dia­bolicall obstinacie go on as Lucian that old Atheist said of the Pa­gan gods in his time, because they begot no more sons and daugh­ters, will resist, and defend himself, and his (were humane meanes wanting) against these publique oppressors of the people in inten­tion and endeavour, which they ought to expose their lives to de­fend, and protect.

And for those that stand alreadie for that Palladium of their Re­ligion and Countrey, the Parliament, as they are herein duely sen­sible of themselves and honour, so out of the same feeling, they can­not but so lively ardently and speedily concurre with all their power (if need require) when all their fortunes, and all that is dear to such men lie at stake (and which now nobly and bravely asserted and vindicated, may for ever be secured, and the roots of dangers pluckt up) that the Scots assistance be not the second time needed (though in all presumption readie) it being the common cause) to our ex­ceeding charge, nay dishonour, as if others were more apprehensive of our honour then our selves, and we needed others to protect or defend our Liberty, or take and manage our quarrels. And now howsoever we may not share in the putting a period to the disorders of the State, yet let us think of doing it to this disordered discourse, wherein though there may not appeare manifestly one continued beaten tracke of coherent passages, to bring you readily to the truth: yet I hope you have incountred a few points here, and there, not indirect, nor impertinent thereto; like Posts of direction for Travellers, at each miles end, in some of our English deserts, to give you ayme that you may hold the right way: or rather like [Page 41] race posts quickly to be run over, lest it might seem to pretend it self worthy to hold you long. And you may the rather passe by the imperfections in regard whilest it was endeavoured to have ordered and compleated it, and to make all yet clearer, the Antiparliamen­tary partie hath so in the interim, unmasked it self in sight of the world, and given such attestation in plain matter of fact (a stronger testimony then [...]u [...] of the mouth of the adversarie) to the prospective and next to prophetick prudence and Judgement of the Parliament, so long since having penetrated and shined on the se­cret corners of their designes, and deeds of darknesse, and exposed them to view that there is little need of any further light, and the defect is rather [...]w in those who shut their eyes, that they may not see it. We see already our Laws manifestly conculcated by force and violence, our liberties, properties, lives exposed to the furie and malice of these desperate Malignants (for which violence they can­not plead their present necessitie, if being grounded and depending on their oppugning the Parliament unjust in it self as hath been shewed): the danger of our Religion and consequently of the Re­ligion abroad, from those, that having none, would bring in such, as may best suite with their pernicious purposes, and from the rest of old in direct opposition with it, on all which they are carried with such desperate ardour and violent fury, as their utmost and last attempt, that having first in a due method indeed used all machina­tions to vilifie and difanull the authoritie and very essence of the Parliament, the onely rampart of Englands happinesse, and traverse to their designes, though God and good men have herein repulst them, yet they cannot temper themselves, from breaking out into such effects as all the world sees, nor brook any delay from seising what part they can meet with of the designed prey, till they may with lesse danger of reprisall do it; but it is high time now to leave words and writing: therefore let us endeavour to conclude this Tractate, almost as indigested and troubled as the times (like that offer of that poore Countrey man, that when the great King Ar­taxerxes passed by, having nothing else to present him, before whom none must appear emptie handed, ran to a little troubled water, and thence offered the King what his hand onely could contain; but the troubled present coming from a clear and good intention, and native heartie ingenuitie, met with a serene, magnanimous, and re­gal acceptance) but let us conclude with a point of Judgement not altogether so weak as hitherto may have appeared; for I would end [Page 42] at least well and leave you with a good rellish (though I appear to begin this point also but ill) which is, that having above received it as a sacred truth and ground, that no reason shall ever shake, that the wisdom, and Justice of a Parliament freely, duely, and lawfully elected is no way to be called in question or doubt, but to be assured­ly beleeved and confided in, securely reposed upon and held sacred and inviolable by all that heartily love Englands happinesse: I will take heed at last to be found not fast and true to my grounds, and ends, by presuming (as some particular private men have done in their we [...]l otherwise understood discourses) to offer up any advice (were I otherwise able) or counsell to the wisdom, or exhortation or perswasion to the Justice of it; and thus my best is but a negative, a privative, or a nothing: but onely yet upon the whole, inferring or enforcing justly by the power of truth; That it is the part of all honest men, men of honour that love their Countrey to obey the Parliament (taken in that notion our case presents) punctually, to serve it faithfully, and zealously; to love it with that kind of love, which is morte fortior, to vindicate, assert, maintain, propugne, clear the authority and safetie of it, as a true collection of all that is or can be most deare, precious, and sacred to, and with such men, to joyn unanimously in the clearing England once again of Wolves, these man-wolves, if reducible by no reason, and not to loose their share of contributing to such a work; above all ardently to solicite and presse the divine Majestie to inspire, protect, blesse, this Con­gregation of Princes, this multitudinem Consiliariorum in quibus est salus, and in it our Countrey and all. I conclude this discourse, wherein I have spoken my heart, which nothing, but a lively and deare apprehension of the imminent and extreame danger of my Countrey, forced from so unfit a man; raising so violent but natu­rall and just a passion, as brake the strings of a tongue ever before tyed (and perhaps ever fit to have been so you may say), like that sonne of Croesus who before, or born dumbe, yet seeing his Father in the very point of being slain, so naturall a passion supplying the place and power of nature, or rather stronger then it, forcing and clearing all impediments turning dumbnesse it self into a strong vociferation; he cried out aloud: Oh man kill not Croesus, and so notifying him saved him. I need not fear you think so well of me, as that you would not remember that a similitude doth not hold throughout, and to the last, should I not put you in mind solemnly it doth not.