DEarest Publicola, how have I longed to meet you, and in the favourable silence of this long walk!

What has my noble Friend Valerius to command his faith­ful Servant?

Why really, notwithstanding the tumult of these ex­travagant Changes, your last Discourse had so much of my attention then, and hath had such digestion with me since, that I feel it running in my Veins.

Find you in that any temptation to the buckling on of High-shoon?

My thoughts, Publicola, are quite of another strain▪ sometimes methinks I see England grasping at Empire, like Rome it self.

Why then Valerius, my Discourses are not such as they say; there runneth nothing of them in your Veins, that hath imbased your noble blood.

The Heraldry of them is of as high a pitch as the Poli­cy; but I would have them be somewhat lower in some things.

What are those?

The vulgar complain of you, that you are too lear­ned.

I thought it was not you, Valerius.

For all that, I could be contented to see you raise your structure by your own strength, and without the help of other Authors.

That I dare say you may, when you please.

I must see it then, before I lose the covert of these reverent Elmes.

You take care, that the building should be well situ­ated; and for the foundation, I may presume by what hath al­ready past between you and me, that we are long since a­greed.

That the threefold Balance or Distribution of Propri­ety, is the cause of the triple way of Government, I fully con­sent with you; as also, that the Balance now in England is in the people plainly, and exclusively, both to a King and Lords.

You are not of them that grant this, and then ask which way a Commonwealth should be introduced in Eng­land.

Why truly yes; seeing not onely the people are so wholly unacquainted with the means, but their Leaders so a­verse to it.

Think you that a Plant grows the worse for not un­derstanding the means?

A Plant is not a free Agent; but among men who are free Agents, the Introduction of Government seemeth to be Arbitrary.

VVhat, where there is no more then Hobsons choice, this or none?

It is true, that if they can have nothing else, they must at length have a Commonwealth; but though they can have nothing else to be holding, yet they will be trying other things.

There is all the mischief.

And enough to ruine the Nation.

To hurt it very sore, but not to ruine it; nor yet to e­vade a Commonwealth, except they expose us unto forraign invasion.

I am glad of your confidence.

You may let it pass for confidence, if you please; but if there be no other way except that onely of Invasion, whereby the present balance can receive a change suddain e­nough to admit of any other Form, the reason why we must have a Commonwealth, is coercive.

And putting the case it be the will of God to defend us from forraign invasion, how long will it be ere they see at home the coerciveness of this reason, or which is all one, that all power is in and from the people?

Good Valerius, how long is it since this was both seen and declared in Parliament?

Perhaps as they meant, it might be admitted as a prin­ciple even in Monarchy.

This with your pardon you will revoke, seeing you well remember that this their Declaration of power in the people, hath been exclusive unto King and Lords, and that in express terms.

But in this they related not at all unto the Distributi­on of propriety.

VVhy then there is not such difference between the growing of a Plant and of a Commonwealth, as you thought; seeing a Commonwealth knowing as little, doth no less.

This of all other is unto me a consideration fullest of comfort.

It will in time proceed accordingly, through meer ne­cessity of nature, or by feeling; but your desire I suppose is to know how it should be rationally introduced, or by seeing, and that with more ease, and better speed.

If it might please God, I would live to have my share of it, though I fear I never shall.

You carve your self ill: for by hope a man enjoys even that which he never comes to attain; and by fear he is deprived even of that which he comes not to lose.

I must confess that our Army hath it now in their power to introduce a Commonwealth.

And there is no other action in their power that can excuse them.

Putting the case they would hearken unto you, what course would you advise?

The same that I have advised over and over.

As how?

As how! is that yet a Question? Let them divide the Territory into fifty equal parts.

They will never make a new division.

Why then they shall never have an equal Common­wealth.

VVhat ill luck is this, that the first step should be so difficult?

You speak as if never any Territory had been divided, whereas there is none that hath not; and Surveyors will tell you, it is a work to be perfectly performed in two months, and with ease.

Putting the case this were done, what is next?

The next is, that the Commonwealth were compleat.

Say you so? this indeed makes amends: but how?

With no more addition, then that the people in eve­ry distinct division elect annually two Knights and seven De­puties.

I dare say the people would never stick at this.

Not stioking at this, they of their own power have instituted the two great assemblies, of which every Common­wealth consisteth.

But in advising these things, you must advise men so that they may understand them.

Valerius, could I as easily have advised men how to understand, as what to do, there had been a Commonwealth ere this.

Come, I will have you try something of this kinde, and begin upon some known principle, as this, All power is in the people.

Content. But the diffusive body of the people (at least in a Territory of this extent) can never exercise any power at all.

That is certain.

Hence is the necessity of some form of Government.

That is, the people of themselves being in a natural incapacity of exercising power, must be brought into some ar­tificial or political capacity of exercising the same.

Right, Now this may be done in three ways; as first, by a single person.

How!

Nay, I am not likely to trouble you much upon this point: but as you were intimating very now, there are Royalists who derive the original right of Monarchy from the consent of the people.

There are so.

And these hold the King to be nothing else, but the Representor of the People and their Power.

As the Turk.

Yes, as the Turk.

The peoples power at that rate comes to the peo­ples slavery.

You say right; and so it may at other rates too.

As how?

Why as I was about to say. The power of the peo­ple may be politically brought into exercise three ways: by a single person, by an Assembly consisting of a few, or by an Assembly consisting of many.

Or by a mixture.

Nay, I pray you let that alone yet a while: for which way soever you go, it must come at length to some mixture, seeing the single person you named but now, without his Divan or Council to debate and propose to him would make but bad work even for himself. But as the Government cometh to be pitched fundamentally upon one of these three, so it differ's not only in name, but in nature.

I apprehend you, as Monarchy, Aristocracy and De­mocracy.

Nay, you are out with your learning, when you have forbidden it me. But in Countries where there is not a Nobility sufficiently balanced or enriched, there can be none of your Aristocracy; and yet there may (as long as it will last) be a Government in a few.

What call you that?

Nay, what say you?

Come, it is Oligarchy: when all is done, some words of Art we must use.

I thought you would come to it; and yet seeing I have promised, I will be sparing. But with your pardon, you [Page 6] have disordered my Discourse, or by this I had shewed, that if the Power of the people be committed to a single Person, the common interest is submitted unto that of a Family; and if it be committed to a few, it is submitted to the interest of a few Families.

Which so many times as they are more then one, is so many times worse then Monarchy.

I am not sorry that you are of that mind. For there is no such thing as a Commonwealth, or as you say Demo­cracy in nature, of it be not pirched upon a numerous Assem­bly of the people.

What call you numerous?

Why an Assembly such for number, as can neither go upon the interest of one single Person or Family, nor the interest of a few Persons or Families.

How will you constitute such an Assembly?

Commonwealths for the constitution of their Popu­lar Assemblies, have had two waies. The first by inrolling all their Citizens, and stating the Quorum in such sort, that all to and above the stated number repairing at the time and place appointed, are impowered to give the Vote of the whole Commonwealth.

The Athenian Quorum was six thousand; which to­wards the latter end of that Commonwealth, came to five.

So, so, you may quote Authors. But you may re­member also, that Athens was a small Commonwealth.

How many would you advise for England?

Put the case I should say, ten thousand?

They will laugh at you.

What can I help that? or how many would you ad­vise?

I would not go above five thousand.

Mark you then; they only that are nearest, would come; and so the City of London would give Law unto the whole Nation.

Why really that same now is clear; but would there be less danger of it, in case you stated your Quorum at [...]en, at twenty, or though it were at an hundred or two hundred thousand?

No: for which cause, as to England, it is a plain case, that this is no way, for the institution of a popular Assembly.

Which way then?

For England there is no way but by Representative, to be made rise equally and methodically by stated election of the people throughout the whole Nation.

Need this be so numerous as the other?

No.

Why?

Because it is not obnoxious unto a party, to any cer­tain rank, or such as are soonest upon the spur, or make least account of their pains or of their mony.

Will you be so curious?

Hold you this a curiosity? How else will you avoid improvement in the interest of the better sort, to the detri­ment of those of meaner rank, or in the interest of the few to the detriment of that of the many?

Even this way then there is danger of that foul beast the Oligarchy.

Look about you. The Parliament declares all pow­er to be in the people; is that in the better sort only?

Stay, the King was to observe Leges & constitutiones quas [...] vulgus elegerit: that vulgus is to be understood of the Parliament; and the Parliament consisted wholly of the bet­ter sort.

It is true; but then that Commonwealth went for the rest accordingly.

It was, you will say, no Democracy.

And will you say it was?

No truly: yet this derived in part from the free ele­ction of the people.

How free? seeing the people then under Lords, dared not to elect otherwise then as pleased those Lords.

Something of that is true; but I am perswaded that the people not under Lords, will yet be most addicted unto the better sort.

That is certain.

How then will you prevent the like in your institu­tion?

You shall see presently. The diffusive body of the People, in which the Power is, and is declared to be, consist­eth in the far greater part of the lower sort: wherefore their Representative to rife naturally, and to be exactly compre­hensive of the common interest, must consist also in the far greater part of the lower sort.

Of what number will you have this Representative?

Say a thousand, or there about.

What proportion will you have the meaner sort in it, to hold unto the better?

Say about six to four.

How will you order it, that it shall be so constituted?

Why thus: let the people in every Precinct or Shire at Election chuse four, under one hundred pounds a year in Lands, Goods or Money, together with three at or above that proportion.

I see not but this Representative must be exact.

It is yet none at all, that is, unless you presume Changes: for one thousand without change governing the whole people, amounteth neither to a Representative, nor to a Commonwealth, but comes still unto your hard name.

How do you order your changes?

By annual election of one third part for three years.

So that every year one third part of your Assembly falls out of it, and a new third part at the same time, enters into the same.

Even so.

This causeth the Representative to be perpetually extant.

It doth so. But to respite that a little, I should be glad, before I stir farther, to know which way the Vote of a Representative thus constituted, can go one hairs beside the common and publick interest of the whole diffusive body of the people.

No way in the earth that I can imagine, except through ignorance.

No Humane Ordinance is infallible; and what is done through meer ignorance or mistake, at one time, will be [Page 9] found and amended at another.

A thousand men, and six to four of the lower sort, perpetually extant! this must be a grievous charge to the most of them; it will be hard to bring them, and impossible to hold them together.

Upon such as are elected, and come not, considerable Fines must be levied; and such as come and stay together, must have good Salaries.

Salaries to so many! what will that come to?

Not, with the rest of the Pomp of the Common­wealth, unto three hundred thousand pounds a year.

Why? the Kings have rarely had above six.

And did England ever grudge them of that propor­tion?

I must confess the quarrel grew, when they would not be contented with so little.

Now if England never did, nor needed grudge a King of six hundred thousand pounds a year, to be spent among Courtiers; why should we imagine she should grudge a Com­monwealth of three hundred thousand pounds a year, to be spent among Magistrates?

But Parliament-men have taken nothing.

Have the people given nothing?

That was for the maintenance of Armies.

And whether had you rather maintain Armies or Magistrates?

But putting the case, that this Assembly needed not to be perpetually extant, this charge in the whole or in the far greater part might be abated.

I cannot tell: for how often think you fit that this Assembly should convene?

Parliaments at the most met not above once a year.

If they had been perpetually extant, there would have been no King.

No truly, except in name only.

Therefore the popular Assembly in a Common­wealth, ought not to be perpetually extant.

To the end (you will say) that there may be some King.

Mock not; or what other guard of liberty is there in any Commonwealth, but the popular Assembly?

Come, let them assemble twice a year upon their or­dinary guard.

And what if there be extraordinary occasion?

Then, as often as there is any such occasion.

How much will this abate of their necessary charge, or of the Salaries? And how much better were it for a Re­presentative to lead the life of States-men then of Carriers?

Commonwealths, whose Assemblies have been of the former kind, have called them no otherwise then at stated times, or upon extraordinary occasions.

But then their Assemblies were not equal. Repre­sentatives, but consisted of such as being next at hand were still ready upon any occasion.

That makes indeed a considerable difference. But were this Representative always extant, I cannot see but it would have nothing to do.

And in case it be not always extant, you imagine that it may have something to do.

Yes.

Then whether goeth it better with the Common­wealth when the Representative hath something to do, or when it hath nothing to do?

This is very quaint.

No truly, Valerius, it is plain, that the guard of Liber­ty perpetually extant, in doing nothing, must do much; and not perpetually extant, in doing much may do nothing.

I am affraid that having nothing to do, they will make work.

Such I warrant you as the Parliament and the Army made the other day.

Nay, I am not so wide. A civil Council and a stand­ing Army must needs have interests much more distinct, then two civil Assemblies; and where there is not like cause, I know well enough there cannot be the like affect.

I shall desire no more, then that you will hold you to this; and then tell me what disputes there use to be between [Page 11] the Senate of Venice and the great Council, which is perpetu­ally extant, and consisteth of about two thousand.

Nay, certain it is, that between those two, there ne­ver was any dispute at all.

Then tell me for what cause such a thing should any more happen between the Assemblies proposed; or according to your own rule, from like causes, expect like effects.

You put me to it.

Nay, it is you that put me to it; for you will be presuming that this Assembly can have nothing to do, before we come to consider what are their proper businesses and Functions.

Cry you mercy, and what are those?

Why surely no small matters: for in every Com­monwealth truly popular, it is inseparable from the Assembly of the people, that first they wholly and onely have the right of result in all matter of Law-giving, of making peace and War, and in levying men and money. Secondly, that the ul­timate Result in Judicature lie unto them; and thirdly, that they have right to call unto account, and to punish their Ma­gistrates for all matter of Male-administration of Govern­ment.

I assure you this must amount unto a great deal of business.

Certain it is, that in some Commonwealths the po­pular Assembly by this means, hath been perpetually em­ployed.

And so I think it might be in England.

It might; but I do not think it would: However, if it be in the undoubted right of the popular Assembly to pro­ceed against their Magistrates for Male-administration, would you leave it upon the hand of those Magistrates, whether this Representative should assemble or no?

Come, you have said enough, it were not prudent: but as to the matter of Appeals it is certain that in Israel the ultimate resort was to the Sanhedrim or 70 Elders.

I know it very well: nevertheless you shall find that the Congregation judged Benjamin; and if you mark the [Page 12] appeal unto the 70 Elders, you shall find that it was not an appeal of the party for relief, but of the Judges in inferiour Courts for further light and direction in difficult cases of the Law.

Let me but know in what manner this Assembly is to perform these Functions, and I have done.

Why as to matter of Law-giving, I told you that they wholly and onely have the right and power of result.

But to Result, there must necessarily go precedent Debate; seeing a man, much less an Assembly, resolveth not upon any thing without some Considerations, Motives or Reasons thereunto conducing, which ought to be first order­ly and maturely debated: and how will you bring a thousand men, especially being six to four of the lower sort, to debate any thing with order and maturity?

You say that the popular Assembly in Athens con­sisted at the least of five thousand.

And I said true.

Yet this debated: why may not one thousand men de­bate as well as five thousand men?

As well! Nay Publicola, if they debate no better in your Commonwealth then they did in that, you may know what will become of it. And to tell you true, I do not think that one thousand men can debate any whit more orderly and maturely then five thousand.

And so think I too.

How then?

How then? Why this is the reason of the Senate in every Commonwealth.

So there must be a Senate; which amounts unto thus much, without a Senate there can be no Commonwealth; and with a Senate, there will always be practising upon the Liber­ty of the people.

How prove you that?

Why by the Senate of Lacedemon in the beginning▪ and by the Senate of Rome throughout.

But finde you the like by the Senates of Athens and Venice?

No.

Consider then that these were by Election of the people, and upon frequent removes, and that the former were defective in one or in both these Circumstances.

You intend your Senate upon removes then?

Right.

And Elective by the people?

Yes.

How? by the popular Assembly, or by the body of the people in their precincts?

By the body of the people in their precincts, at the same time when they elect their other Deputies; and with the same circumstances, save that these be all elected out of such as have one hundred pounds a year real or perso­nal.

What hurt if they were elected by the popular As­sembly?

They would not derive so immediately, nor rise so e­qually from the people, as chosen in the precincts; because this way every Shire cometh necessarily to have a share in the Senate: besides, wise men and understanding are better known in their Tribes, then they can be in an Assembly out of their Tribes; especially while they are new comers: nor will the popular Assembly afford so good choice as the whole people. There are other Reasons.

Enough, enough. Of what number constitute you this Senate?

Of three hundred.

Why should not one hundred be full enough for a debating Council; especially seeing debate is the more order­ly, where the Counsellors are fewer?

You are to bear it in minde, that this Senate is upon annual change in one third part.

That is, every year one hundred having served three years, go out, and a new hundred come in.

Right: for which cause, to have one hundred well practised in debate, your Senate must consist of three hun­dred.

May not those that go out, come presently in again by new Election?

In no wise; for that were yet another way of con­tinuing the Government in a few.

Mean you that no man serve in this capacity, or that of the popular Assembly, but once in his life?

I mean, that a man having served his term in one of these, may after a like vacation or interval be elected again to serve in either of them, and not before.

At what age do you make a man capable of these E­lections?

Not till thirty.

He stays a great while ere he come to preferment, and is soon out again; at which rate a man should have much ado to attain unto sufficient knowledge for the leading of the Commonwealth.

This was never objected against Parliaments.

It is true: but then the Election of Parliament-men was not obliged to any Interval, and divers have been of eve­ry Parliament that was summoned during their lives.

Parliaments [...]hen they were the most frequent, as­sembled not above once a year, very rarely so often; and how long I pray you did they usually sit?

Some two or three moneths.

I allow you with the most you ask: at which rate a man that had sitten in twenty Parliaments, could not have sitten above four years compleat.

And in your Parliament, at one Election he sits three.

Mark you that?

Yes, and more: whereas a Parliament-man without Interval could in twenty years have sitten but four compleat, in your Assemblies a man observing his Intervals, may in twenty years serve ten years compleat.

You allow that, I hope, to be some advantage to­wards acquiring knowledge in conduct; and yet anciently your Parliament-men were in this point thought able e­nough.

Now would I desire no more then to be as fully sa­tisfied, [Page 15] that these Senators must be honest enough.

Which way can they be dishonest?

Verily I am not yet acquainted with their ways: but if nothing can be proposed unto the popular Assembly, save by these onely, they methinks should propose nothing but what is for their own advantage.

They are the Senate; and in that, they have all the advantages that a well-ordered Commonwealth can give un­to a Senate.

But they will be still hankering after more.

As what?

Why Riches or Power.

All Migistrates are accountable unto the popular Assembly; and so without acquisition of power, I cannot imagine which way they should turn themselves unto the ac­quisition of riches.

They will drive then at power; they will be co-ordi­nate.

In the world there hath never yet been any Senate that durst so much as pretend unto power.

No? Had not the Senate of Israel and that of La­cedemon power?

Executive power they had, in as much as they were Judicatories; but Legislative or Soveraign power (which is that whereof we speak) they had none at all.

Other Senates have had other power, as in the ma­naging of forraign affairs, and the like.

Which still cometh not unto the point in hand, be­cause in these and like matters, as the creation of divers Ma­gistrates, the Senate useth to be made plenipotentiary by the popular Assembly, that is, by Law.

I hear them talk of making a co-ordinate Senate first, and without the people, and then of assembling a Parliament in the old way to govern with that Senate.

Things Valerius are soon said; but if any Parliament whatever, so it be elected by the people (and it may be though otherwise) do not make it one of their first works to pull down a co-ordinate Senate, I ask no credit to my Politicks.

This is to Prophesie.

Then to reason. I say, That the Senate assuming power, the popular Assembly falls immediately to debate; and the popular Assembly debating, the Senate is ipso facto deposed, there being no other necessary use or function of the Senate, but debate only.

You said but now, That the popular Assembly could not debate.

Not orderly and maturely: but upon such an occa­sion as this, they will do as they can; nor is it avoidable.

Nay, if there be some occasion in which you allow that the popular Assembly must and ought to debate, there will hardly be any in which they will be perswaded that they may not. So this will come to the pulling down of the Se­nate, as often as the people please.

Which is so much the rather to be feared, because you shall never find that popular Assembly, which did ever actually depose their Senate.

Our Army hath pull'd down a good many Parlia­ments.

What is that to the purpose? is our Army a popular Assembly? yet let them pull down a Parliament as of­ten as they please, they must set up another; and in this in­deed there may be some resemblance: for let a popular As­sembly pull down the Senate as often as they please, they must set up another.

Or a Single person.

Right: for that holds both waies too, and (as to our case) will stand neither.

The people of Athens debated, yet in that was not their Senate deposed.

Not formally; but it remained little better then a Warrain, wherein great men did as it were start Hares, to be hunted in the tumult of the popular Assembly.

Verily Publicola, this model of yours is a most intire thing.

This with the necessary consequences, as the divisi­on of the Senate into Senatorian Councils, the adorning [Page 17] and actuating of this and the other Assembly with fit Magi­strates, whereof I have sufficiently Discoursed in other places, amounteth unto an intire thing.

And you offer it freely.

I do.

Would it not grieve you, to see them crop a little of it, and spoil it?

They had better take it to some purpose.

Nay, what they take, will be to some purpose I war­rant you. Come, there is a party, a select, a refined party, a Nation in a Nation, must and will govern.

That is it which I desire to see.

You are of a rare temper; happy in unhappiness.

O I love often changes.

Is that any of your virtues?

Yes, where we are certain never to go right, while there remains a way to go wrong.

They are confident men. They cannot be perswaded but they can govern the world.

Till they have tried. Such as can govern the world, are such as can be governed by reason. Now there is no par­ty refin'd, select, or what you will in England, amounting to one twentieth part of the whole people.

One twentieth part of the people, for ought I know, may amount unto one hundred thousand; there is no party any thing neer this account, I dare say.

A twentieth part of the people, can never govern the other nineteen, but by a perpetual Army.

They do not like that the worse.

The people having been governed by a King without an Army, and being governed by a Commonwealth with an Army, will detest the Government of a Commonwealth, and desire that of a King.

Yes, such is the spirit of the Nation.

Such is the spirit in this case of any Nation.

And yet they make it a particular quarrel.

They make every thing particular: if you speak of Israel, Athens, Rome, Venice, or the like, they hear you with [Page 18] volubility of countenance; and will not have it, that God ever minded the matter of Government, till he brought them in play. Nay, though they have come heels over­head, for this very thing, I know not how often, yet they are resolved to take no warning.

Publicola, you will be shent.

I am to perform my duty. To flatter is not my duty!

But between you and me, do you not think that the spirit of the Nation, or the main body of the people of this Land, desires the restitution of their antient Govern­ment?

I make little doubt of it.

How then in case of a Commonwealth are they to be trusted?

In case of a Commonwealth, it is not the people that are trusted, but the orders of the Commonwealth.

The Commonwealth must consist of the people.

The people under the Monarchy, when that inva­ded them, invaded it.

True, and in such manner as hath caused the ruine of it.

What was the spirit of the people then?

But it is now another thing.

Nay, the very same: for then it invaded a Govern­ment that invaded their liberty, and now it would invade a Government that invadeth their liberty.

But how should this be mended?

Do you not see that this should not be mended, but encouraged?

How should it be encouraged then?

By giving them a form, that must preserve their li­berty.

I little doubt but there is in your form a full securi­ty unto the people of their liberty; but do you think that there is in it any full security, that the people shall not cast off this form?

If it secure their liberty, why should they?

My question is not, why they should, but whether they can.

They cannot, without going against their own in­terest.

But they can go against their own interest.

Nay, remember your self, whether the form shewn be not such, as you have already granted can in no wise go besides the interest of the whole people.

They that are now in power, have no trust at all in forms.

Do they sail in Ships, not upon planks? do they ride Horses, not Hogs? do they travail in Coaches, not upon Hur­dles? do they live in Houses, not in Ditches? do they eat Bread, not Stones?

Enough, enough.

But in so doing, they acknowledge such a form to be security for such an use or action. And must the forme of a Commonwealth be the onely forme in which they can allow no security for the proper use and a­ction?

They observe none of this.

Do they observe that there is any security in men?

That, especially in our times, were somewhat an hard matter.

And how many securities are there?

I know no more, then one personal, or in men; ano­ther real, or in things.

Chuse you whether you would have.

Well, be the necessary action or use of your form what it will, I would see it more plainly and particularly demon­strated, how the spirit of the Nation, or the whole people, be­ing freely eligible into your Assemblies, must presently lose that inclination, which now plainly they have to set up Mo­narchy, or to persecute for Conscience.

You will allow no weight in the Argument, that a people in liberty, unless the orders of their Commonwealth were first fundamentally ruined, that is, broken in the ba­lance or foundation, did never do either of these.

What weight soever I allow unto this Argument, it is no wise to my present purpose.

You will put me then besides experience, and to shew by what reason it is that a Pear-tree must bear Pears, or why men gather not grapes on thorns, or figs on thistles.

Poor Publicola, be the task as hard as it will, I am for this time resolved to hold you to it.

What is it then that any Government can be suffi­ciently founded or balanced upon, but such an interest as is sufficiently able to bear it?

Good Sir, a Government ought to be founded upon Justice, I take it.

Right: and is not that Government which is foun­ded upon an Interest not sufficiently able to bear it, founded upon injustice?

I suspect whither this will go. A Government foun­ded upon the over-balance of propriety, is legitimately foun­ded? and so upon Justice; but a Government founded upon the under-balance of propriety, must of necessity be founded upon force, or a standing Army. Is not this that which you mean by Interest sufficient or not sufficient to sustain a Go­vernment?

You have it right.

Atheist, this damns the Government of the Saints.

Look you now, how irreligious a thing it may be made, to speak but with common honesty. Do you think that such as are plainly Oligarchists, or shall exercise by a force, and without election by the people, such power, as is both naturally and declaredly in the people, and in them only, can establish their Throne upon justice?

No.

Do you think that such as are truly Saints, can esta­blish their Throne upon in justice?

No.

Why then you have granted, that such as are plain­ly Oligarchists cannot be truly Saints. Again, do you still think, as you once intimated, that a Government now intro­duced in England, exactly according unto the principles of prudence and justice, would Rule the earth?

Yes.

Do you think, that such as are truly Saints, if they introduce Government, ought to introduce it exactly accor­ding to the principles of prudence and justice?

Yes.

Why then, let such as are truly Saints but see what it is to Rule the Earth; and take the Rule of the Earth.

They will not approve of this way.

How! not the Saints approve of prudence and ju­stice! who is the Atheist now, Valerius?

Good Publicola, let us keep unto the point in hand. You say, That the security of liberty lieth not in the people, but in the form of their Government; so I am yet to expect when you will shew, what there is in your form, why it must be impossible for the people under it, to restore Monarchy, or to persecute for Conscience.

See you not, that to do either of these under such a form, must be point-blank against their interest?

But so either of these is now, and yet in this posture you will confess that they would do both.

Mark how I am used. I speak of a form supported by an interest sufficiently able to bear it, and of an interest contained under a form sufficiently able to secure it; and you instance in a posture which is no form at all, but such a confusion among, and force upon the people, as createth an interest in them, to rid themselves which way they can of such a misery.

I did acknowledge and must confess, that your popu­lar Assembly is such as cannot erre, except through igno­rance; but through this, you your self have acknowledged, and must confess, that it may erre.

I retract nothing.

Now first, or never, they will restore Monarchy through ignorance.

But they cannot do this first, therefore they can ne­ver do it.

Why cannot the popular Assembly do this first?

Because it must first be proposed by a Senate, that can neither do any such thing through ignorance nor through knowledge.

Nay, then have at you; I will set this same Senate and Representative of yours to work in such a manner, that you shall confess they may set up Monarchy.

Do your worst.

Your Senate being assembled (I will not have them make long speeches.

Nor 1.)

Rises me up one of the Senators, and saith, Mr. Speaker, This Nation hath been long in labour, but now through the mercy of God, the child is not only come to the birth, but there is also strength to bring forth: in the number of Counsellours there is strength; the number of this House is good (far better then hath usually been of late) and their Election hath been very free and fair. Here is also, I know not how (but the inventions of men are over-ruled by the providence of God) an extraordinary and exceeding great confluence of honest men, who are not so well here; and if you determine any thing that is good for your Country, will go home and pray for you. Now Sir, (to be brief) since our Government consisted of King, Lords and Commons, the antient, the only, the most happy Government that this Nation, nay, that the World ever knew, it is but too well known, that we have had no Government at all: wherefore my opinion is, that we propose (as they call it) unto these honest men (who you need not doubt will receive it with glad hearts) the restitution of right, and of the Government in this Nation by King, Lords and Commons. As sure as you live, Publicola, thus much being said, your whole Senate will immediately agree to propose it unto the Repre­sentative: and thus much being proposed unto the Represen­tative, those people will throw up their Caps for joy, and forthwith return unto their houses.

But Valerius, thus much hath been said in Parlia­ment when the house was fuller; when they who were for this restitution, were backed by a single Person in actual pos­session of the Throne; when over and above the zeal of Presbyterians, there were parties that knew no other means of self-preservation; as without Divines adoperating the Oak [Page 23] of every Pulpit; and within, Lawyers and Salary-men: yet was it so far from being carried, that the single person hath been forced to dissolve Parliaments, and that through appa­rent danger of being over-run by the principles of a Com­monwealth not in being. But if this were so when a Com­monwealth could scarce be hoped, what will it be when the Commonwealth shall be in such a condition as cannot be withstood? for the Senate can never come to propose any thing unto the people, without first agreeing upon debate, what it is that they will propose; nor is it possible that such debate should be brought unto any end, but by reasons thereunto conducing: now it must not only be impossible to find reasons for the restitution of Monarchy, but the reasons why Monarchy ought not to be restored, must be obvious; not only in regard that it is quite contrary to the interest of the Nation, and of these Assemblies, but to the interest ten to one of every particular man in either of these Assemblies: nor are or have the reasons been less obvious, or less venti­lated in Parliament, why Monarchy as to this Nation is im­possible in itself.

Will you say the like for liberty of Conscience?

Yes; because without liberty of Conscience, civil li­berty cannot be perfect; and without civil liberty, liberty of Conscience cannot be perfect.

These things are true, but they will never see them, never, Publicola: you your self say, That the people cannot see, but they can feel.

I meant that of the diffusive body of the people, not of the people under good Orders; in which case they are the sharpest sighted, of any kind of Government whatsoever: and therefore it is not modest, that you or I, or any particu­lar man or party, blinded with self, should pretend to see with such a constitution; or shew me that eye under the Sun, that sees like that of Venice. But putting the case it were other­wise as to seeing, these things are plainly palpable or obvi­ous unto feeling.

I have indeed observed, that in Commonwealths there are very few that see or understand them, and yet their [Page 24] affection unto that way of Government is exceeding vigo­rous.

Whence then can this otherwise be, then from feel­ing? But one thing, Valerius, I take at your hands extream heavily.

What is that, Publicola?

That you with one little speech of a single Senator, should run so regardlesly over these two Assemblies, without taking any notice at all of the necessary course of them.

What course, Publicola?

Why you might easily have thought, that among three hundred Senators there might have been at least one hundred as good Speakers as yours.

Have I said any thing to the contrary?

And do you or I what we can, ten to one of them will be longer winded then you have allowed.

For that matter, let them please themselves.

I but then you should not have made an end of your debate in a minute.

What is all this?

Why I say, They would have been debating upon that point at least a fortnight.

Well, and when that had been done, would never have agreed.

No.

Did not you say that before?

Well, but I am now upon another point; that was to the matter in debate, this is to the manner of proceeding: imagine the matter had been such upon which they could have agreed.

VVhat then?

Then such an agreement had been a Decree of the Senate.

Is a Decree of the Senate binding?

If it be upon Law made, it is binding; if upon Law to be made, it is to be proposed unto the people. Now every Proposition to the people is to be promulgated, that is, prin­ted and published to the whole Nation, six weeks before the [Page 25] time that the Representative is to assemble and give the Vote of the Commonwealth, or that test without which no such Proposition can be any Law.

By this means it must follow, that the whole people both by discourse and letters, debate six weeks together up­on the matter.

You are right.

How is it then that you say, The Representative of the people must not debate? allow you unto these less privi­ledge, then unto the whole people?

No less, nor in this point any more.

Yet amounteth this to debate in those that are of the Representative.

You say well, but not unto any debate at all in the Representative.

Why this Representative is nothing else but an In­strument or Method, whereby to receive the result of the whole Nation, with order and expedition, and without any manner of tumult or confusion.

And is that any thing the worse?

No; but I am glad you have told it me: for, that those of the Representative would one way or other have debate, I knew certainly.

In sum, are you satisfied, that the spirit of the Nati­on, or the people, however they may now under no form at all, and in detestation of such as having governed them by force, will let them see no way out of confusion, desire their old Government, as having never yet known any other; yet under such a form as is proposed, can never go about to in­troduce Monarchy, without obvious discovery, that as to their interest, it is quite contrary, and as to it self impossible?

The satisfaction is pretty good.

Pretty good! give me but half so good, that the spi­rit of the Army, not formerly obedient unto Parliaments, and now dreading or despising them, must apprehend the re­stitution of Monarchy to be quite contrary to their inte­rest.

You surprize me: for if the Army will have no Par­liament, [Page 26] and a King restored can now in England without an Army have no Government, they may imagine this their only way unto greatness and continuance.

Had not the Oligarchy then, if they meant well, bet­ter to have used sober expressions, and minded what those true and real interests are, which in the foundation and pre­servation of every kind of Government are Paramount, then to have overcast them with the mist of new affected phrases, and fallen on conjuring up spirits?

You have conjured up a spirit will keep me waking.

Set him on pulling down the Law and the Ministry; when that is done, let him blow-up Winsore Castle, Hampton Court, and throw Whitehall into the Thames.

It is the only way, for then there can be no King.

You may be sure of that, seeing the Count of Hol­lands Domaine, and his houses are yet not only standing, but diligently preserved by the Hollanders.

Publicola, have you any more to tell me?

Valerius, have you any more to ask me?

Not, except why you have not given the Parliament to understand thus much.

I have printed it over and over.

They take no great notice of Books; you should have laid it, as they say, in their dish by some direct Address, as a Petition, or so.

I did Petition the Committee for Government.

What answer did they make you?

None at all.

I would have gone further, and have presented it un­to the House.

Towards this also I went as far as I could.

How far was that?

Why I think my Petition may have been worn out in the Pockets of some two or three Members.

Have you a copy of it about you?

Let me see—here are many Papers; this same is it.

I would it had been delivered.

Look you, if this had been presented to the House, I intended to have added this other Paper, and to have prin­ted them together.

Thou-boy! and yet I hope well of thy reputation.

Would it were but as good now, as it will be when I can make no use of it.

The major of the Petition is in some other of your writings; and I remember some objections which have been made against it. As, that à non esse, nec fuisse, non datur ar­gumentum ad non posse.

Say that in English.

What if I cannot? are not you bound to answer a thing, though it cannot be said in English?

No truly.

Well, I will say it in English then. Though there neither be any house of gold, nor ever were any house of gold, yet there may be an house of gold.

Right: but then, à non esse nec fuisse in natura, datur argumentum ad non posse in natura.

I hope you can say this in English too.

That I can, now you have taught me. If there were no such thing as gold in nature, there never could be any house of gold.

Softly. The frame of a Government is as much in Art, and as little in Nature, as the frame of an house.

Both softly and surely. The materials of a Govern­ment are as much in Nature, and as little in Art, as the ma­terials of an house. Now as far forth as Art is necessarily disposed by the nature of her foundation or materials, so far forth it is in Art as in Nature.

What call you the foundation, or the materials of Government?

That which I have long since proved, and you gran­ted; The balance: the distribution of propriety, and the power thence naturally deriving; which as it is in one, in a few, or in all, doth necessarily dispose of the form or frame of the Government accordingly.

Be the foundation or materials of an house what they will, the frame or superstructures may be diversly wrought up or shapen; and so may those of a Common­wealth.

True: but let an house be never so diversly wrought up or shapen, it must consist of a roof and walls.

That's certain.

And so must a Commonwealth, of a Senate and of a popular Assembly, which is the sum of the Minor in the Pe­tition.

The Mathematicians say, They will not be quarrel­some; but in their Sphere there are things altogether new in the World, as the present posture of the Heavens is, and as was the Star in Cassiopoeia.

Valerius, if the Major of the Petition extend as far [Page 32] as is warranted by Solomon, I mean, that there is nothing new under the Sun, what new things there may be, or have been above the Sun, will make little to the present pur­pose.

It is true; but if you have no more to say, They will take this but for shifting.

Where there is Sea, as between Sicily and Naples, there was antiently Land; and where there is Land, as in Holland, there was antiently Sea.

What then?

Why then the present posture of the earth is other then it hath been, yet is the earth no new thing, but consist­eth of Land and Sea, as it did always; so whatever the pre­sent posture of the Heavens be, they consist of Star and Fir­mament, as they did always.

What will you say then to the Star in Cassiopoeia?

Why I say, If it consisted of the same matter with o­ther Stars, it was no new thing in nature, but a new thing in Cassiopoeia; as were there a Commonwealth in England, it would be no new thing in nature, but a new thing in Eng­land.

The Star you will say in Cassiopoeia, to have been a new thing in nature, must have been no Star, because a Star is not a new thing in nature.

Very good.

You run upon the matter, but the newness in the Star was in the manner of the generation.

At Putzuoli neer Naples, I have seen a Mountain that rose up from under water in one night, and poured a good part of the Lake antiently called Lucrine into the Sea.

VVhat will you infer from hence?

VVhy that the new and extraordinary generation of a Star, or of a Mountain, no more causeth a Star, or a Mountain to be a new thing in nature, then the new and ex­traordinary generation of a Commonwealth, causeth a Com­monwealth to be a new thing in nature. Aristole reports, that the Nobility of Tarantum, being cut off in a Battel, that [Page 33] Commonwealth became popular. And if the Powder-Plot in England had destroyed the King and the Nobility, it is possible that popular Government might have risen up in England, as the Mountain did at Putzuoli. Yet for all these, would there not have been any new thing in nature.

Some new thing (through the blending of unseen causes) there may seem to be in shuffling; but nature will have her course, there is no other then the old game.

Valerius, let it rain or be fair weather, the Sun to the dissolution of nature shall ever rise; but it is now set, and I apprehend the mist.

Dear Publicola, your health is mine own; I bid you goodnight.

Goodnight to you, Valerius.

One word more, Publicola: pray make me a present of those same Papers, and with your leave and license, I will make use of my memory to commit the rest of this Discourse unto writing, and Print it.

They are at your disposing.

I will not do it as hath been done, but with your name to it.

VVhether way you like best, most noble Valerius.

Octob. 22. 1659.