Antient and Modern Prudence. CHAP. I. Whether Prudence be well distinguished into Antient and Modern.

THe Considerer, where by Antient Prudence I understand the Policy of a Common-wealth, and by Modern Prudence that of King, Lords and Commons, which introduced by the Goths & Vandals upon the ruine of the Roman Empire, hath since reigned in these Western Countreys, till by the predominating of some one of the three parts, it be now almost universally extingui­shed; thinks it enough for the confutation of this distin­ction, to shew out of Thucidides that of Monarchy to be a more Antient policy than that of a Commonwealth. Upon which occasion, I must begin here to discover that which the farther I go will be the more manifest; Namely that there is difference between quoting Authors, and say­ing some part of them without book: this may be done by their words, but the former no otherwise then by keeping unto their sense. Now the sense of Thucidides as he is tran­slated by Mr. Hobbs, in the place alleaged is thus: The manner (saith he) of living in the most Antient times of Greece was Thieving, the stronger going abroad under the Thu. B. 1. P. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. conduct of their most puissant Men, both to enrich themselves, and fetch home maintenance for the weak; for there was neither traffick, propriety of Lands, nor constant Abode, till Minos built a Navy, and expelling the Malefactors out of the Islands, planted Colonies of his own, by which means they who inhabited the Sea coasts, becomming more addicted to riches, grew more constant to their dwellings; of whom some [Page 2] grown now rich, compassed their Towns about with walls. For out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the Mighty; and the Mighty (thus overballancing at home) with their wealth, brought the lesser Cities (abroad) into sub­jection. Thus Pelops, though he were a stranger, obtained such power in Peloponesus that the Countrey was called after his Name; Thus Atreus obtained the Kingdome of Mycenae, and thus Kingdomes with honours limitted came to be heredi­tary; and rising to power proceeded afterwards to the war against Troy. After the war with Troy, though with much adoe, and in a long time Greece had constant rest (and land without doubt came to propriety) for shifting their seats no longer, at length they sent Colonies abroad; The Athenians into Ionia with the Islands, the Peloponesians into Italy, Si­cily, and other parts. The power of Greece thus improved, and the desire of money with all, their Revenues (in what? not in money, if yet there were no usury: therefore ex­cept a Man can shew that there was usury in Land) being enlarged, in most of the Cities there more erected Tyrannies. Let us lay this place unto the former, when out of desire of gain the meaner sort underwent servitude with the Mighty, it caused hereditary Kingdomes with honours limitted, as hap­pen'd also with us since the time of the Goths and Vandals. But when the people came to Propriety in Land, and their Revenues were enlarged, such as assumed power over them, not according unto the Nature of their Propriety or Bal­lance, were Tyrants; well, and what remedy? why, then it was (saies the Considerer) that the Grecians out of an extreme aversion to that which was the cause of their present sufferings slipt into Popular Government, not that upon calm Consid. p. 4. and mature debates they found it best, but that they might put themselves at the greatest distance (which spirit usually ac­companies all Reformations) from that with which they were grown into dislike. Whereby he agrees exactly with his Author in making out the true force and Nature of the ballance, working even without deliberation, and whether Men will or no. For the Government that is Natural and easie being in no other direction than that of the respective ballance, is not of choice but of necessity. The Policy of King, Lords and Commons was not so much from the pru­dence [Page 3] of our Ancestors, as from their Necessity. If Three hundred Men held at this day the like overballance unto the whole People, it were not in the power of Prudence to institute any other then the same kind of Government, through the same Necessity. Thus the meaner sort with Thucidides submitting unto the Mighty, it came to King­domes with hereditary honours; but the People comming to be wealthy, called their Kings though they knew not why, Tyrants, nay and using them accordingly found out means with as little deliberation it may be as a Bull takes to tosse a Dog, or a Hern to split an Hawk; that is, rather (as at the long run they will ever doe in the like case) by instinct than prudence or debate, to throw down that, which by the meer information of sense they could no longer bear, and which being thrown down they found themselves eased. But the question yet remains, and that is (forsooth) whether of these is to be called Antient Prudence. To this end, never Man made a more unlucky choice then the Considerer hath done for himself of this Author, who in the very beginning of his book speaking of the Pelopenesian war, or that between the Commonwealths of Athens and Lacedemon, saies, that the Actions which preceded this, and those again that were more antient, though the truth of them through length of time cannot by any means be clearly disco­vered, yet for any argument that (looking into times far past) he had yet light on to perswade him, he does not think they have been very great either for matter of war, or otherwise; that is for matter of Peace or Government; And lest this should not be plain enough, he calls the Prudence of the Mr. Hobbs in the Magire. three Periods (observ'd by Mr. Hobbs) that from the be­ginning of the Grecian memory to the Trojan war, That of the Trojan war it self, and that from thence to the present Thu. B. 1. p. 3. Commonwealths and Wars, whereof he treateth, The Im­becility of antient times. Wherefore certainly this Prevarica­tor (to give him his own fees) hath lesse discretion then a Common Attorney, who will be sure to examine onely those Cousid. p. 34. witnesses that seem to make for the cause in which he is en­tertained. Seeing that which he affirmeth to be Antient Prudence is deposed by his own witness to have been the imbecility of antient times, for which I could have so many [Page 4] more then I have leisure to examine, that (to take onely of the most Authentick) as you have heard one Greek, I shall add no more then one Roman, and that is Florus in his Prologue where computing the ages of the Romans, (in the same manner Thucidides did those of the Greeks) he affirmeth the time while they lived under their Kings, to have been their infancy, that from the Consuls until they conquer'd Italy, their youth; that from hence unto their Emperors, their Manly age, and the rest (with a Complement or Salvo unto Trajan his present Lord) their dotage.

These things, though originally all Government among the Greeks and the Romans were Regall; are no more then they who have not yet passed their Novitiate in story might have known. Yet says the Considerer, It seems to be a de­fect Consid. p. 2. 3. of experience to think that the Greek and the Roman actions are only considerable in antiquity. But is it such a defect of experience to think them only considerable, as not to think them chiefly considerable in antiquity, or that the name of ancient Prudence doth not belong unto that prudence which was chief in Antiquity? True saith he, it is very frequent with such as have been conversant with Greek and Roman Authors to be led by them into a belief that the rest of the world was a rude inconsiderable people, and which is a term they very much delight in, altogether Bar­barous. This should be some fine Gentleman that would have Universities pulld down; for the Office of an Uni­versity is no more then to preserve so much of Antiquity as may keep a Nation from stinking or being barbarous, which falt grew not in Monarchies but in Commonwealths; or whence hath the Christian world that Religion and those Laws which are now common, but from the He­brews and Romans, or from whence have we Arts but from these or the Greeks? That we have a Doctor of Divinity or a Master of Art we may thank Popular government, or with what languages with what things are Schollars conversant that are otherwise descended? will they so plead their own cause as to tell us it is possible there should be a Nation at this day in the world without Universities, or Universities without Hebrew, Greek and Latine, and not be barbarous, that is to say, rude, unlearned, and in­considerable? [Page 5] Yes, this humour even among the Greeks and Romans themselves was a servile addiction unto narrow Prin­ciples, and a piece of very pedantical pride. What man! the Greeks and the Romans that of all other would not serve, servile! their Principles, their Learning, with whose scraps we set up for Bachelours, Masters and Doctors of fine things, narrow! their inimitable eloquence a piece of very Pedantical pride! The world can never make sense of this any otherwise then that since Heads and Fellows of Col­ledges became the only Greeks and Romans; the Greeks and Romans are become servily addicted, of narrow Principles, very Pedants, and prouder of those things they do not understand, then the other were of those they did; For say they, in this question, the examples of the Babyloni­ans, Persians, and Egyptians (not to omit the antient and like modern discoveries of the Queen of the Amazons, and of the King of China) cannot without grosse partiality be neglected. This is pretty; they who say nothing at all to the policy of these governments, accuse me, who have fully opened it, of negligence. The Babylonian, Persian, and (for ought appears to the contrary) the Chinesse Po­licy, is summed up, and far exceld by that at this day of Turky; and in opening this, I have opn'd them all, so far from neglect, that I everywhere give the Turk his due, whose policy I assert to be the best of this kind, though not of the best kind. But they will bear me down and but with one Argument (which I beseech you mark) that it is absolutely of the best kind; for say they, it is of a more absolute form (hath more of the Man and less of the Law in it) then is to be met with in any Kingdome of Europe.

I am amazed! This is that kind of government which to hold Barbarous, was in the Greeks and Romans Pedan­tical pride, but would be in us who have not the same tempta­tion of Interest, downright folly. The Interest of a people is not their guide but their temptation! we that hold our land divided among us, have not the same temptation of in­terest that had the servile Hebrews, Greeks and Romans, but the same that had the free people of Babylon, Persia and Egypt, where not the people but the Prince was sole Land­lord! O the Arts in which these men are Masters! To fol­low [Page 6] the Pedantical pride of Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, Ro­mulus, were with us downright folly; but to follow humble and learned Mahomet or Ottonian, in whose only Model the perfection of the Babylonian, Persian, Egyptian policy is consummated, is antient Prudence! Exquisite Polititians! egregious Divines for the leading of a people into Egypt or Babylon! These things considered, whether antient pru­dence as I have stated it be downright folly, or as they have stated it, be not downright knavery, I appeal unto any Court of Claims in the world, where the Judges (I mean) have not more in their Caps then in their heads, and in their Sleeves then the scarlet. And whereas men love compen­dious works, if I gain my cause, the Reader, for an answer unto the Oxford book need look no farther then this Chap­ter. For if Riches and Freedome be the end of Govern­ment; and these men propose nothing but slavery, beg­gary and Turcisme, what need more words?

CHAP. II. Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Go­vernment of Laws and not of Men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of some Man or few Men, and not of Laws.

THat part of the Preliminaries, which the Praevari­cator (as is usual with him) recites in this place fasly and fraudulently, is thus. Relation had unto these two times (that of Antient, and that of Modern Prudence) the One as is computed by Janotti ending with the Liberty of Rome, the other beginning with the Arms of Caesar (which extinguishing liberty became the translation of Antient into Modern Prudence, introduced in the ruine of the Roman Empire by the Goths and Van­dals) Government to define it (de jure) or according unto Antient prudence, is an Art whereby a civil Society of Men, is instituted and preserved upon the foundation of Common right or interest, or (to follow Aristotle and Livy) it is an Empire of Laws, and not of Men.

[Page 7] And Government to define it (de facto) or according unto Modern prudence, is an Art whereby some Man, or some few Men subject a City or a Nation, and rule it according unto his or their private interest, which because the Laws in such cases are made according to the interest of a Man, or some few Families, may be said to be an Empire of Men, and not of Laws.

Hereby it is plain, whether in an Empire of Laws, and not of Men, as a Commonwealth; or in an Empire of Men, and not of Laws, as Monarchy;

First, That Law must equally proceed from will, that is either from the Will of the whole People, as in a Common­wealth; from the will of one Man, as in Absolute, or from the will of a few Men, as in regulated Monarchy.

Secondly, That will whether of one, or more, or all, is not presumed to be, much lesse to Act without a Mover.

Thirdly, That the Mover of Will is Interest.

Fourthly, That Interests also being of one, of more, or of all; those of one Man, or of a few Men, where Laws are made accordingly, being more private, then comes duly up unto Law (the Nature whereof lyeth not in partiality but in Justice) may be called the Empire of Men, and not of Laws: And that of the whole People comming up to the Publique Interest (which is none▪ other then Common right and Justice, excluding all partiality or private Interest) may be truly called the Empire of Laws, and not of Men. By all which put together, whereas it is demonstrable, that in this division of Government, I do not stay at the Will, which must have some Motive or Mo­ver, but go unto the first and remotest Notion of Government in the Foundation and Origination of it, In which lies the cre­dit of this Division, and the Definition of the several members; that is to say, of interest whether private or publique: The Praevaricator telleth me, That this Division of Govern­ment Consid. p. 6▪ having (he knows not how) lost her Credit, the defini­tions of the several Members of it need not be considered far­ther then that they come not at all up to the first and remotest notion of Government in the Foundation and Origination of it, in which lies all the difficulty, and being here neglected, there is little hope the subsequent discourse can have in it the [Page 8] light of probable satisfaction, much less of force of infallible demonstration.

Very good, Interest it should seem then is not the first and remotest Notion of Government, but that which he will out-throw, and at this cast, by saying that the Declaration of the will of the Soveraign power is called Law, which if Consid. p. 8. it out-live the person whose will it was, it is onely because the persons who succeed in power are presumed to have the same will, unless they manifest the contrary, and that is the abroga­tion of the Law; so that still the Government is not in the Law, but in the person whose will gave a being unto that Law. I might as well say, The Declaration unto all men by these presents that a man oweth money is called a Bond, which if it outlive the person that entred into that bond, it is only because the persons that succeed him in his estate, are presumed to have the same will, unlesse they manifest the contrary, and that is the abrogation or cancelling of the bond; so that still the debt is not in the bond, but in his will who gave a being unto that Bond. If it be alledged a­gainst this example that it is a private one, the Case may be put between several Princes, States, or Governments, or between several States of the same Principality or Go­vernment, whether it be a regulated Monarchy or a Com­monwealth; for in like Obligation of the States, (as of the King, the Lords and Commons) or parties agreeing, Au­thoritate Patrum & jussu Populi, till the Parties that so a­greed to the Obligation, shall agree to repeal or cancel it, lyeth all law, that is not meerly in the will of one Man, or of one State, or Party as the Oligarchy. But not to dis­pute these things farther in this place, let the Government be what it will, for the Prevaricator to fetch the Origina­tion of Law no farther then the will, while he knows very well that I fetcht it from interest, the Antecedent of will; and yet to boast that he hath out-thrown me, I say he is neither an honest man, nor a good Bowler. No matter, he will be a better Gunner; For where I said that the Magi­strate upon the Bench is that unto the Law, which a Gun­ner upon his Platform is to his Cannon; he goes about to take better Aim, and says, if the proportion of things be ac­curately considered, it will appear that the Laden Cannon [Page 9] answers not to the Laws, but to the power of the person whose will created those Laws: which if some of them, that the power of the person whose will created them, intended should be of as good stuff or Carriage as the rest, do never­theless according unto the Nature of their matter or of their charge, come short or over, and others break or re­coyl: sure this Report of the Prevaricator is not accord­ing unto the bore of my gun, but according unto the bore of such a Gunner. Yet again, if he be not so good a Gunner, he will be a better Anatomist; For whereas I affirm, that to say, Aristotle and Cicero wrote not the rights or rules of their Politicks, from the Principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, is as if a man should say of famous▪ Hervey, that he transcribed his Circulation of the bloud, not out of the principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that body: he answers, that the whole force of this objection amounts but to this, that because Hervey in his Circulation, hath follow'd the Principles of Nature; therefore Aristotle and Cicero have done so in their Dis­courses of Government.

Pretty! It is said in Scripture, thy Word is sweet as honey; Amounts that but to this, because honey is sweet, there­fore the Word of God is sweet? To say that my Lord Protector hath not conquer'd many Nations, were as if one should say that Caesar had not conquer'd many Nati­ons; Amounts that but to this, that because Caesar con­quer'd many Nations; therefore my Lord Protector hath conquer'd many Nations; what I produce as a similitude, he calls an objection, where I say as he says because; what in­genuous man doth not detest such a cheat! A similitude is brought to shew how a thing is or may be; not to prove that it is so; it is used for illustration, not as an argu­ment; the Candle I held did not set up the post, but shew where the post was set, and yet this blind Bayard hath run his head against it. Nor hath he yet enough; if he be not the better Naturalist, he will be the better Divine, though he make the worse Sermon. My Doctrine and Use upon that of Solomon, I have seen servants upon horses, and Princes walking as servants upon the Earth, discovers the true means [Page 10] whereby the Principles of Power and of Authority, the goods of the mind and of the fortune may so meet and twine in the wreath or Crown of Empire, that the Go­vernment standing upon Earth, like an Holy Altar, and breathing perpetual Incense unto Heaven, in Justice and Piety, may be something as it were between Heaven and Earth, while that only which is proposed by the best, and resolved by the most becomes Law; and so the whole Go­vernment an Empire of Laws, and not of Men. This he says, is a goodly Sermon; it is honest and sense. But let any man make sense, or honesty of this Doctrine, which is his own; To say that Laws doe or can govern is to amuse Consid. p. 7. our selves with a form of speech, as when we say Time, or Age, or Death does such a thing, to which indeed the phansie of Poets or superstition of Women may adapt a person, and give a power of Action; but wise Men know they are onely expres­sions of such Actions or qualifications as belong to things and persons.

Speak out, is it the word of God, or the knavery and nonsense of such Preachers that ought to Govern? Are we to hearken unto that of the Talmud, There is more in the word of a Scribe then in the words of the Law, or that which Christ thereupon saith unto the Pharisees; You have made Mat. 15. 6. the word of God of none effect by your traditions? Say, is a Commonwealth to be govern'd in the word of a Priest or a Pharisee, or by the Vote of the People, and the Interest of Mankind?

CHAP. III. Whether the Ballance of Dominion in Land be the Na­tural Cause of Empire.

THe Doctrine of the Ballance is that, though he strain at it, which choaks the Prevaricator: for this of all other is that Principle, which makes the Politiques (not so before the Invention of the same) to be undeniable throughout; and (not to meddle with the Mathematicks [Page 11] an Art I understand as little as Mathematicians doe this) the most demonstrable of any whatsoever.

For this cause I shall rather take pleasure then pains to look back or tread the same path with other and perhaps plainer steps; As thus; If a man having one hundred pounds a year, may keep one servant, or have one man at his Command, then having one hundred times so much, he may keep one hundred servants; and this multiply'd by a thousand, he may have one hundred thousand men at his Command. Now that the single person, or Nobility in any Countrey of Europe, that had but half so many men at Command, would be King or Prince, is that which I think no Man will doubt. But ( Point d'argent Point de Suisse) if the Money be flown, so are the Men also. Though riches in general have wings, and be apt to bate; yet those in Land are the most hooded and ty'd unto the Pearch, whereas those in money have the least hold, and are the swiftest of flight. A Bank where the money takes not wing, but to come home seased, or like a Coy Duck, may well be great; but the Treasure of the Indies going out, and not upon returns makes no Bank; Whence a Bank never paid an Army, or paying an Army, soon became no Bank. But where a Prince or a Nobility hath an estate in Land, the Revenue whereof will defray this Charge; there their men are planted, have toes that are roots, and Armes that bring forth what fruit you please.

Thus a single person is made, or a Nobility makes a King not with difficulty or any great prudence, but with ease, the rest comming home, as the Oxe that not only knows his masters Crib, but must starve or repair to it. Nor for the same reason is government acquired with more ease then it is preserved; that is, if the Foundation of Propriety be in Land; but if in money, lightly come, lightly go. The rea­son why a single person or the Nobility that hath One hundred Thousand men, or half so many at Command, will have the Government, is that the Estate in Land whereby they are able to maintain so many, in any Euro­paean Territory, must overballance the rest that remains unto the People, at least, three parts in four, by which means they are no more able to dispute the Government [Page 12] with him or them, then your servant is with you. Now for the same reason, if the People hold three parts in four of the Territory, it is plain there can neither be any single person nor Nobility able to dispute the Government with them; in this case therefore (except force be interposed) they govern themselves. So by this computation of the ballance of propriety or dominion in Land, you have according unto the Threefold Foundation of Propriety, the root or generation of the Threefold kind of Govern­ment or Empire.

If one man be sole Landlord of a Territory, or over­ballance Oceana, p. 4. the whole People, three parts in four, or therea­bouts, he is grand Seignior; for so the Turk not from his Empire, but his Propriety is called, and the Empire in this case is absolute Monarchy.

If the few, or a Nobility, or a Nobility with a Clergy be Landlords unto such a proportion as over ballanceth the People in like manner; they may make whom they please King, or if they be not pleased with their King, down with him, and set up whom they like better, an Henry the fourth, or the seventh, a Guise, a Montforth, a Nevil, or a Por­ter, should they find that best for their own ends and pur­poses: For as not the ballance of the King, but that of the Nobility in this case is the cause of the Government, so not the Estate or riches of the Prince or Captain, but his virtue or ability, or fitnesse for the ends of the Nobility, acquires that Command or Office. This for Aristocracy, or mixed Monarchy. But if the whole People be Landlords, or hold the Land so divided among them, that no one Man, or Number of Men within the Compasse of the Few or Aristo­cracy overballance them, it is a Common-wealth. Such is the branch in the Root, or the ballance of Propriety na­turally producing Empire, which not confuted, no Man shall be able to batter my superstructures, and which con­futed, I lay down my Armes. Till then, if the Cause ne­cessarily praecede the effect, Propriety must have a being before Empire, or beginning with it, must be still first in order.

Propriety comes to have a being before Empire or Go­vernment two wayes, either by Natural or violent revolu­tion. [Page 13] Natural revolution happeneth from within, or by Commerce, as when a Government erected upon one [...] ­lance, that for example of a Nobility or a Clergy, through the decay of their Estates comes to alter unto another bal­lance; which alteration in the Root of Propriety leaves all unto Confusion, or produceth a New branch or Govern­ment according to the kind or nature of the roote. Vio­lent revolution happeneth from without, or by Armes, as when upon Conquest there followes confiscation. Confis­cation again is of three kindes, when the Captain taking all unto himself, plants his Army by way of Military Colo­nies, Benefices, or Timars, which was the policy of Maho­met; or when the Captain hath some sharers, or a Nobi­lity that divides with him, which was the policy introdu­ced by the Goths and Vandals; or when the Captain di­vides the Inheritance by lots, or otherwise, unto the whole People; which Policy was instituted by God or Moses in the Commonwealth of Israel. This triple distribution whether from natural or violent revolution, returns as to the generation of Empire, unto the same thing that is unto the nature of the ballance already stated and demonstra­ted; Now let us see what the Praevaricator will say, which first is this.

The Assertion that Propriety producing Empire consisteth only in Land, appears too positive. A Pig of my own Sow; Consid. p. 14. this is no more then I told him, only there is more imply'd in what I told him, then he will see; which therefore I shall now farther explain. The ballance in money may be as good or better then that of Land in three cases. First, where there is no propriety of Land yet introduced, as in Greece during the time of her Antient imbecility, whence (as is noted by Thucidides) the meaner sort through desire of gain, underwent the servitude of the Mighty. Se­condly, in Cities of small Territory and great Trade, as Holland and Genoa, the Land not being able to feed the People, who must live upon Traffick, is overballanced by the means of that Traffick; which is money. Thirdly, in a narrow Countrey, where the lots are at a low scantling, as among the Israelites, if Care be not had of money in the regulation of the same, it will eat out the ballance of [Page 14] Land. For which cause though an Israelite might both have money, and put it forth unto usury; ( Faenera­bis multis gentibus, Thou shalt lend (upon usury) unto many nations) yet might he not lend it upon usury unto a Citi­zen Deut. 15. 6. 23. 19. or brother ( Non Faenerabis fratri tuo) whence two things are manifest. First, that Usury in it self is not unlawful. And next that Usury in Israel was no other­wise forbidden, then as it might come to overthrow the ballance or foundation of the Government, for where a Lot as to the General amounted not perhaps to four acres: a Man that should have had a Thousand pounds in his Purse, would not have regarded such a lot in compari­rison of his mony, & he that should have been half so much in debt, would have been quite eaten out. Usury is of such a Nature as not forbidden in like cases, must devour the Government. The Roman People while their Territory was no bigger, and their lots (which exceeded not two Acres a Man) were yet scanter, were flead alive with it; and if they had not helped themselves by their tumults and the institution of their Tribunes, it had totally ruin'd both them and their Government. In a Commonwealth whose Territory is very small, the ballance of the Go­vernment being laid upon the Land, as in Lacedemon, it will not be sufficient to forbid usury; but money it self must be forbidden; Whence Lycurgns allow'd of none, or of such only as being of Old, or otherwise useless Iron, was little better, or (if you will) little worse than none. The Prudence of which Law appeared in the neglect of it, as when Lysander General for the Lacedemonians in the Peloponesian war, having taken Athens, and brought home the spoil of it, occasion'd the ruine of that Commonwealth in her Victory. The Land of Canaan compared with Spain or England, was at the most but a Yorkeshire, and Laconia was lesse then Canaan. Now if we imagine York­shire divided as was Canaan, into six hundred thousand lots, or as was Laconia into thirty Thousand; a Yorkeshire Man having one Thousand pounds in his purse, would, I believe, have a better estate in Money then in Land; wherefore in this Case to make the Land hold the bal­lance, there is no way but either that of Israel, by forbid­ding [Page 15] usury, or that of Lacedemon, by forbidding money. Where a small summe may come to overballance a Mans estate in Land, there I say Usury or money for the preser­vation of the ballance in Land, must of Necessity be for­bidden, or the Government will rather rest upon the bal­lance of money, then upon that of Land, as in Holland and Genoa. But in a Territory of such extent as Spain, or England, the Land being not to be overballanced by money, there needeth no forbidding of money or usury. In Lacedemon Merchandize was forbidden, in Israel and Rome it was not exercised; wherefore unto these Usury must have been the more destructive; but in a Countrey where Merchandise is exercised, it is so far from being de­structive, that it is necessary; else that which might be of profit to the Commonwealth would rust unprofitably in private purses, there being no Man that will venture his money but through hope of some gain; which if it be so regulated that the Borrower may gain more by it then the Lender (as at four in the Hundred, or thereabouts) Usu­ry becomes a Mighty profit unto the Publique, and Cha­rity unto private Men; in which sense we may not be per­swaded by them that do not observe the different causes that it is against Scripture. Had usury to a brother been permitted in Israel that government had been overthrown: but that such a Territory as England or Spain cannot be overballanced by money, whether it be a scarce or a plen­tiful Commodity, whether it be accumulated by Parsi­mony, as in the purse of Henry the 7th, or presented by Fortune, as in the Revenue of the Indies, is sufficiently demonstrated, or shall be.

First, by an Argument ( ad hominem one) good enough Consid. p. 12. for the Praevaricator, who argues thus; The wisedom or the riches of another Man can never give him a Title to my Obe­dience, nor oblige Mr. Harrington to give his Cloaths or Money to the next Man he meets, wiser or richer then himself.

If he had said stronger, he had spoiled all; for the par­ting with a mans Cloaths or Money in that case cannot be helped; now the richer as to the case in debate, is the stronger; that is, the advantage of strength remains unto the ballance. But well; he presumes me to have Cloaths [Page 16] and Money of mine own, Let him put the same case in the People or the similitude doth not hold: But if the people have Cloaths and Money of their own, these must either rise (for the bulk) out of Propriety in Land, or at the least out of cultivation of the Land, or the revenue of Industry, which if it be dependent, they must give such part of their Cloaths and Money to preserve that dependence out of which the rest ariseth, to him or them upon whom they depend, as he or they shall think fit, or parting with no­thing unto this end must lose all; that is, if they be Te­nants, they must pay their Rent or be turned out. So if they have Clothes and Money dependently, the ballance of Land is in the Landlord or Landlords of the People: but if they have cloaths and money independently, then the ballance of Land must of Necessity be in the People them­selves, in which case they neither would if there were any such, nor can because there be none such, give their money or cloaths to such as are wiser, or richer, or stron­ger then themselves. So it is not a mans cloaths and money, or riches, that obligeth him to acknowledge the title of his obedience unto him that is wiser or richer, but a mans no cloaths, nor money, or his poverty, with which if the Praevaricator should come to want, he could not so finely praevaricate but he must serve somebody, so he were rich, no matter if less wise then himself; Wherefore seeing the People cannot be said to have cloaths and mo­ney of their own without the ballance in Land, and ha­ving the ballance in Land, will never give their cloaths, or money, or obedience unto a single person or a Nobility, though these should be the richer in money, the Praevari­cator by his own Argument hath evinced that in such a Territory as England or Spain, Money can never come to overballance Land.

For a second Demonstration of this Truth, Henry the Seventh (albeit he mist of the Indies, in which for my part I think he hit) was the richest in money of English Princes. Neverthelesse this accession of Revenue did not at all praeponderate on the Kings part, nor change the bal­lance. But while making Farmes of a Standard, he en­creased the Yeomanry; and cutting off Retainers, he a­based [Page 17] the Nobility, began that breach in the ballance of Land, which proceeding hath ruin'd the Nobility, and in them that Government.

For a Third, the Monarchy of Spain, since the silver of Potosi sailed up the Guadalquivir, which in English is, since that King had the Indies, stands upon the same ballance in the Lands of the Nobility on which it al­ways stood.

And so the Learned Conclusion of the Praevaricator, Consid. p. 16. That it is not to be doubted but a Revenue sufficient to main­tain a force, able (to cry ware hornes) or beat down all opposition, does equally conduce to Empire, whether it arise from Rents, Lands, Profits of ready Money, Duties, Customs. &c. asks you no more then where you saw her premisses: For unless they ascended his Monti, and his Banks, it is not to be imagined which way they went, and with these be­cause he is a profest Zealot for Monarchy; I would wish him by no means to be Montebanking or medling; for the Purse of a Prince never yet made a Bank; nor till Spending and Trading money be all one, ever shall. The Genoese (which the King of Spain could never doe with the Indies) can make you a Bank out of Letters of Exchange, and the Hollander with Herrings. Let him come no more here; Where there is a bank, ten to one, there is a Commonwealth. A King is a Souldier, or a Lover; neither of which makes a good Merchant; and without Merchandize, you will have a lean bank. It is true, the Family of the Medice's were both Merchants, and made a Bank into a Throne: but it was in a Commonwealth of Merchants, in a small Territory, by great purchases in Land, and rather in a meer confusion then under any set­tled government; which causes if he can give them all such another meeting, may do as much for another Man; otherwise let it be agreed and resolved, that in a Terri­tory of any extent, the ballance of Empire consists in Land and not in money, always provided that in case a Prince have Occasion to run away (as Henry the third of France out of Poland) his ballance in ready money is abso­lutely the most proper for the carrying on of so great, and suddain an Enterprize.

[Page 18]It is an excellent way of disputing, when a man hath alled­ged no experience, no example, no reason to conclude with no doubt. Certainly upon such occasions it is not unlawful nor unreasonable to be merry. Reasons (says one Comme­dian) are not so common as Blackberrys. For all that (saith an­other Commedian) no doubt but a revenue in taxes is as good as a revenue in fee-simple, for this, in brief, is the sense of his former particular, or that part of it, which the Monti and the Banks being already discharged, remains to be answer'd. Yet that the Rents and Profits of a mans land in Fee-simple or Propriety, come in naturally and easily, by common consent or concernment; that is, by virtue of the Law founded upon the publick interest, and there­fore voluntarily established by the whole people, is an ap­parent thing. So a man that will receive the Rents and Profits of other mens Lands, must either take them by meer force, or bring the people to make a Law devesting them­selves of so much of their Propriety; which upon the mat­ter is all one, because a people possest of the ballance, can no otherwise be brought to make such a Law farther then they see necessary for their common defense, but by force, nor to keep it any longer then that force continues. It is true, there is not only such a thing in nature as health, but as sickness: nor do I deny that there is such a thing as a government against the ballance. But look about, seek, find where it stood, how it was ycleeped, how liked, or how long it lasted. Otherwise the comical Proposition comes to this, It is not to be doubted but that violence may be permanent or durable, and the Blackberry for it is be­cause nature is permanent or durable! What other con­struction can be made of these words? It is not to be doubted but a revenue sufficient to maintain a force able to beat down all opposition (that is a force able to raise such a revenue) doth equally (on which word grows the Blackberry) con­duce to Empire: that is as much as could any natural ballance of the same! He may stain mouths, as he hath done some, but he shall never make a Politician. The Earth yieldeth her natural increase without losing her heart; but if you come once to force her, look your force continue, or she yields you nothing: and the ballance of [Page 19] Empire consisting of Earth, is of the nature of her E­lement.

Divines are given to speak much of things which the Considerer baulks in this place that would check them, to Consid. p. 23. the end he may fly out with them in others, whereunto they do not belong, as where he saith, that Government is founded either upon Paternity, and the natural advantage the first Father had over all the rest of Mankind, who were his sons, or else from the increase of strength and power in some Man or Men, to whose will the rest submit, that by their submission they may avoid such mischief, as otherwise would be brought upon them. Which two Vagaries are to be fetched home unto this place.

For the former; if Adam had lived till now, he could have seen no other then his own Children, and so that he must have been King by the right of Nature, was his pecu­liar Prerogative. But whether the eldest son of his house, if the Praevaricator can find him, at this time of the day. have the same right, is somewhat disputable; because it was early when Abraham and Lot dividing Territories, became several Kings: and not long after when the sons of Jacob being all Patriarchs, by the appointment of God (whose right sure was not inferiour unto that of Adam though he had lived) came under Popular Government. Wherefore the advantage of the first Father is for grave Men a pleasant phancy, neverthelesse if he had lived till now, I hope they understand that the whole Earth would have been his demeans, and so the ballance of his pro­priety must have answered unto his Empire: as did that also of Abraham and Lot unto theirs. Wherefore this way of deduction comes directly home again unto the ballance. ( Pater familias Latifundia possidens, & neminem aliâ lege in suas terras recipiens quam ut ditioni suae, qui recipiuntur, G. De jure belli, l. 1. c. 3. se subjiciant est Rex) Fathers of families are of three sorts, either a sole Landlord, as Adam, and then he is an abso­lute Monarch; or a few Landlords as Lot and Abraham with the Patriarchs of those days, who if they joyned not together, were so many Princes, or if they joyned, made a mixed Monarchy, or as Grotius believes a kind of Com­monwealth administred in the Land of Canaan by Melchi­sedec, [Page 20] unto whom as King and Priest Abraham paid tithes of all that he had. Such a Magistracy was that also of Je­thro King and Priest in the Commonwealth of Midian. Fathers of families for the Third sort, as when the Multi­tude are Landlords (which hapned in the division of the Land of Canaan) make a Commonwealth; and thus much how ever it was out of the Praevaricators head in the place now reduced, he excepting no farther against the ballance, then that it might consist as well in money, as in land, had confessed before.

His second Vagary is in his deduction of Empire from increase of strength, for which we must once more round a­bout our Coal fire. The strength wherof this effect can be expected, consists not in a pair of fists, but in an Army, and an Army is a beast with a great belly, which subsisteth not without very large pastures; so if one man have sufficient pasture, he may feed such a beast, if a few have the pasture they must feed the beast, and the Beast is theirs that feed it. But if the People be the sheep of their own pastures, they are not onely a flock of sheep, but an Army of Lyons, though by some accidents, as I confessed before, they be for a season confinable unto their Dens. So the advan­tage or increase of strength depends also upon the bal­lance. There is nothing in the world to swear this Prin­ciple out of countenance, but the fame of Phalaris, Gelon, Dionysius, Agathocles, Nabis, &c. with which much good do them that like it. It is proper unto a Government upon the ballance to take root at home and spread out­wards; and to a Government against the ballance to seek a root abroad, and to spread inwards; The former is sure, but the later never successeful. Agathocles for having conquer'd Affrica, took not the better root in Sy­racusa. (Parvi sunt arma for as nisi sit consilium domi.)

To conclude this Chapter, the Praevaricator gives me this thank for finding out the ballance of dominion (be­ing as antient in Nature as her self, and yet as new in Art as my writings) that I have given the world cause to com­plain of a great disappointment, who while at my hand that satisfaction in the Principles of Government was expected, which several great wits had in vain studied, have in diver­sifying [Page 21] riches in words only as Propriety, Dominion, Agrarian, Ballance, made up no more then a new Lexicon expressing the same thing that was known before, seeing the opinion that riches are power is (as antient as the first book of Thucydi­des or the Politicks of Aristotle, and) not omitted by M. Hobbs, or any other Politician. Which is as if he had told Dr. Harvey, that whereas the blood is the life, was an O­pinion as antient as Moses, and no girl ever prickt her fin­ger, but knew it must have a course; he had given the world cause to complain of a great disappointment in not shewing a man to be made of Gingerbread, and his Veins to run Malmesey.

CHAP. IIII. Whether the Ballance of Empire be well divided into National and Provincial; and whether these two, or Nations that are of distinct ballance, comming to de­pend upon one and the same head, such a mixture create a new ballance?

THe Ballance of Empire that is National as it is stated in the former Chapter, stands in regulated or mixed Monarchy upon the Propriety or Native interest of the Nobility, in a Commonwealth, upon the Propriety or Native interest of the People; so these are very natural. But the ballance of absolute Monarchy partaking of force, as well as Nature, is a mixed thing and not much different from the ballance of Provincial Em­pire, or the manner of holding a Province or conquer'd Countrey. In a Province, if the Native that is rich be admitted unto power, the power grows up Native, and o­vertops the Forreign; therefore you must either▪ not plant your Citizens in your Provinces, where in time they will become native, or so planting them neither trust them with Power nor with Armes. Thus the Provincial bal­lance comes to be contrary to the National. And as [Page 22] where Empire is Native or national the administration of it can be no otherwise then according to the National bal­lance; so where Empire is forreign or provincial the admi­nistration of it can be no otherwise then contrary unto the national ballance. That this may be admitted without Opposi­tion, Consid. p. 16. 17. the Considerer is inclining to allow, Always provided that he be satisfied in this demand, whether distinct ballances under the same Head or Governour, as those of Castile and Aragon, the power of the King (I presume he means by the ballance of a Nobility) being greater in the One, and that of the People in the other, may not so poise one the other, as to produce a new ballance. To which I answer, that no One government whatsoever hath any more then one of two ballances; that (except in the Cases excepted) of Land which is National, or that of Armes which is Pro­vincial. Wherefore if the King of Spain by his war a­gainst the Commons alter'd the Ballance of Aragon, it must have been one of two ways, either by strengthning the ballance of the Nobility, and governing the Aragonian People by them, in which case their ballance though al­ter'd, remained yet National; or by holding both Nobi­lity and People by a Provincial Governour and an Army, in which Case his Empire in that Kingdome is Provincial. There is no Third way, nor putting the Case that the bal­lance of Castile be National, and that of Aragon Provin­cial; doth this any more create in the Monarchy of Spain a Third ballance of Empire, then did the Multiplication of Associations and Provinces diverse for their ballances in the Commonwealth of Rome. England and Scotland be­ing united in one Prince, made (if it had been rightly used) an increase of strength, but not a Third ballance; nor do the Kingdoms in Spain. Whether a Soveraignty have many Territories and Provinces in subjection, or in League, it is all one as to this point; the stronger Union or League will give the stronger ballance, and the Case of the present Soveraignties in Europe being no other; the more nice then wise Speculation of the Considerer, who hath not been able to discern the ballance of a League from that of Empire, is a Mares nest.

CHAP. V. Whether there be any Common right or interest of Man­kind distinct from the parts taken severally; and how by the Orders of a Commonwealth it may best be distinguisht from private interest.

IN the next place the Prevaricator does not go about to play the man, but the unlucky boy. Where I say that Consid. p. 19. 20 the soul of man is Mistress of two potent rivals, Reason and Passion; he doth not stand to weigh the truth of the thing, or the fitness of the comparison, either of which had been fair; but tumbles Dick upon Sis, the Logick upon the Rhetorick, the sense upon the figure, and scuds away in this manner. If I could be perswaded Mr. Harrington were so far in earnest, as to expect any man should be convin­ced by the metaphorical use of two or three words some far­ther consideration might be proposed. This is to use his Readers, as the Fox doth the Dogs, when having pissed upon his tail, and flapped it in their eyes, he gets away. Doth not his Book deserve to be guilded and carry'd in Statesmens pockets? Alasse, mine are nothing ( Quis leget haec? vel duo vel nemo) they break the Stationer. And yet let me comfort my self, Whose are better? the preva­ricator seems to set every whit as light by those of Hooker and Grotius, at least where they favour me. The opinions of Grotius (saies he) cannot oblige us beyond the reasons whereon they are founded; and what are those? he will dispute against that which he dares not repeat: that his Comment may take you by the Nose he hath left out the Text. The words of Grotius are of this sense. Though it In preleg. De jure B. ac. P. be truly said that the creatures are naturally carried forth, unto their proper utility: this ought not to be taken in too general a sense, seeing diverse of them abstain from their own profit, either in regard of those of the same kind, or at least of their young. Which words, saith the Prevaricator, carry a great restriction in them, and the way of producing actions [Page 24] in beasts is so different from the emanation of humane reason (mark the Impostor! the Author is speaking of natural affection, and he wipes out that, and puts in humane rea­son) that the inferences from (the natural affection of) the one, to the (degree of reason which is in the) other, must needs be very weak. Excellent! doth it therefore follow that the eminent degree of reason, wherewith all God hath endued man, must in him deface that natural affection, and desertion in some cases of private for common good, which is apparent even in beasts? What do reverend Di­vines mean to cry up this Infidel? Nay, is not he worse then an infidel that provideth not for his own family? A Commonwealth is but a great family; and a family is a little Commonwealth. Even Beasts in sparing out of their own mouths, and exposing themselves unto danger for their young, provide for their families; and in providing for their families, provide for their whole Commonwealth; that is, forsake in some things their private good and safe­ty, for the good of the publick or of the kind. In this case it is that even stones or heavy things (saies Hooker) for­sake Book 1. their ordinary wont or center and fly upwards, to re­lieve the distress of nature in common. Wretch that he is, shall a stone upon this occasion fly upwards, and will he have a man to go downwards! Yes, Mr. Hooker' s ex­pression (saith he) is altogether figurative, and it is easier to prove from thence that things wanting sense make dis­courses, and act by election, then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind. This is like the rest, Hooker speaketh of the necessity that is in nature, and this Gentle­man translateth that sense into the word election. So be­cause a stone is necessitated to comply with the common interest of nature, without Discourse or Election; there­fore it rather follows from hence that things wanting sense make discourses and act by election then that there is such a thing as a common interest of mankind. His old trick. I do not say that because it is so with the creatures, there­fore it must be so with man: but as we see it is with the creatures in this part, so we find it to be with man. And that so, and more then so, we find it to be with man (who though he le evil gives good things unto his children, will work [Page 25] hard, lay up, deny himself, venture his life for his little Commonwealth) is thus farther demonstrated. All civil Laws acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind, and all civil laws proceed from the nature of man; therefore it is in the nature of man to acknowledge that there is a common interest of mankind. Upon this acknowledgement of mankind, a man that steals is put to death, which certainly is none of his private interest; nor is a man put to death for any other mans private interest; therefore there is a common interest of mankind distinct from the parts taken severally. But this though acknow­ledged in part by all Governments, yet through their na­tural frailty is nothing so well provided for in some as in others: for if the power be in one or a few men; one or a few men (we know) may be thieves, and the rather be­cause applying money that is publick, without a conside­ration that is publick, unto uses that are private, is thie­ving. But such thieves will not be hanged; in this case therefore the Government goeth not upon publick but private interest. In the frame of such a Government as can go upon no other then the publick interest, consi­steth that whole Philosophy of the Soul which concerneth Policy: and this whole Philosophy of the Soul being throughout the Commonwealth of Oceana demonstrated; For the Prevaricator to insinuate that I have omitted it, is to shew what it is that he loveth more then truth. The main of this Philosophy consisteth in deposing passion and advancing reason unto the Throne of Empire. I expected news in this place, that this were to promise more for the Magistrate or the people, then hath been performed by Stoicks, but two Girles (meaning no body any harm) have provoked his wrath (forsooth) to such extravagancy by the way, that though in all modesty it were for­bidden (as he confesseth) by their cheeks, which discove­ring the green sickness, shew'd that they were past the rod, he hath taken them up! ( Tantaene animis coelestibus ire!) what he may have in school Divinity for so rude a charge, I do not know; but he shall never be able to shew any Maxime for this kind of Discipline or Philosophy of the soul either in Chevalry or the Politicks. The offence of the [Page 26] Girles was no more, then that having a Cake (by gift of an Uucle or an Aunt, or by purchase, or such an one per­haps as was of their own making) in common, or between them, the one had most accurately divided, and the other was about to choose; when in comes me this rude fellow. How now Gentlewomen, saies he, what dividing and choo­sing! Consid. p. 22. 23. will no less serve your turn then the whole mystery of a well order'd Commonwealth? who has taught you to cast away passion (an't please you) like the Bran, and work up Reason as pure as the Flower of your Cake? Are you acquainted with the Author of Oceana, that hath seen forraign Countries, conversed with the Speculativi, learnt of the most serene Lady Venetia to work with bobbins, makes you a Magistracy like a Pippin pye, and sells Butterprints with S. P. Q. R. ? Have done as you dread Ballads, fusty Pamphlets, or the O­stracisme of Billingsgate. Have done I say; will you vy that green in your cheeks with the purple of the State? must your mother, who was never there her self, seek you in the Oven? Come, when I live to see Machiavil in puff-paste, a Commonwealth come out of a Bakehouse, where smocks were the boulters, let me be a Millhorse.—But now you must know comes the best jest of all, and I need not say that it comes from Oxford; he tells them that their Cake is dough, (let it not be lost I beseech you) and so snatching it away, eats it▪ for all the world as Jack pudding eats the Custard. Did you ever see such a Bestia?

But whereas either Office, that of dividing or choosing, was Communicable unto either of the Girles, it is not in­different in the distribution of a Commonwealth, because dividing is separating one thing, one reason, one interest, or consideration from another, which they that can so discern in private affairs are called discreet, but they that can doe it in Publick are prudent, and the way of this kind of di­viding in the language of a Commonwealth, is debating. But they that are capable of this kind of dividing or deba­ting are few among many, that when things are thus di­vided and debated, are able enough to choose, which in the language of a Commonwealth is to resolve. Hence it is that the debate of the few because there be but few that can debate, is the wisest debate, and the result of the many [Page 27] (because every man hath an interest what to choose, and that choice which suteth with every mans interest, exclu­deth the distinct or private interest or passion of any man, and so commeth up unto the Common and Publick inte­rest or reason) is the wisest result. Unto this end, God who doth nothing in vain, hath so divided Mankind into the Few, or the Natural Aristrocacy, and the Many, or the Natural Democracy, that there can hardly be upon any Occasion, a meeting of Twenty men, wherein it will not be apparant; or in which you may not see all those lines which are requisite unto the face of a beautiful Common­wealth. For example among any Twenty men, occasio­nally met, there will be some few (perhaps six) excelling the fourteen in greatness of parts. These six falling into discourse of business, or giving their judgement upon per­sons, or things, though but by way of meer conversation, will discover their abilities; whereupon they shall be list­ned unto and regarded by the Fourteen; that is, the six will acquire an Authority with, and imprint a Reverence upon the Fourteen, which Action and Passion in the Ro­man Commonwealth were called Authoritas Patrum, & verecundia Plebis; Nevertheless if the six endeavour to ex­tend the authority which they find thus acquired to Power, that is, to bring the Fourteen to Terms or Conditions of obedience, or such as would be advantageous unto the few, but prejudicial to the many; The Fourteen will soon find that consenting they hurt not only themselves by endam­maging their own interests, but hurt the Six also who by this means come to lose their virtue, and so spoil their de­bate, which while such advantages are procurable unto themselves, will go no farther upon the Common good, but their private benefit. Wherefore in this Case they will not consent, and not consenting they preserve not onely their own liberty but the integrity of the Six also, who perceiving that they cannot impair the Common inte­rest have no other interest left but to improve it; And neither any conversation nor any people, how dull soever and subject by fits to be deluded, but will soon see thus much, which is enough, because what is thus proposed by the Authority of the Six or of the Senate, and resolv'd by the [Page 28] Fourteen or by the People, is enacted by the whole, and becomes that Law, then which (though mankind be not infallible) there can be nothing less fallible in Mankind. Art is the imitation of Nature, by observation of such lines as these in the face of Nature, a Politician limbs his Com­monwealth. But saith the Praevaricator, the Parologisme lies in this, that the Twenty men are first supposed to be a Consid. p. 26. Commonwealth, and then it is considered how they would dis­pose of the Government: What is this? Art is the imitation of nature; therefore Art presumes Nature to be Art. A Picture is the representation of a face; therefore the Pi­cture-drawer presumed the face to be a picture; and in this same, there is lying, being or squatting, a thing called a Parologisme. Did you ever hear such a Parakeetisme; for to speak a word without understanding, the sense of it is like a Parrat. And yet I wrong the Parrat in this com­parison; for she though she do not understand her self, is understood by others, whereas neither can this Prevarica­tor tell what he means, nor any man else; Or riddle me, riddle me what is this? The sense of want among men that are in equality of power may beget a desire of Exchange, as Consid. p. 27. Let me have your Horse, and you shall have my Cow, which is the fountain of private Contracts; but it is not to be with reason imagined, that this should be enough to make a man part with a natural freedome, and put himself into the hands of a Power from which he can afterward have no shield, though it should be used to his own destruction.

Most Victorious nonsense! for he that saies nothing, can­not be answered. It should seem if the Twenty men were indeed a Commonwealth, or in equality of power, (for so he puts the case) they might truck Horses and Cows, but not by any means consider or once let it enter into their heads, how by Art to make good their Natural freedome: That (unlesse they set up a Prince, as you shall see anon) were to part with their Natural freedome, and put themselves into the hands of a Power from which (there being no other Power but themselves) they can afterwards have no shield. To read it throughly for the understanding, as is intimated in his Epistle, will be more (I doubt) then his Book will obtain of any reader. Yet is he, in his own [Page 29] conceit, as sure footed as any Mule, & knowes the road. But Mr. Harrington hath not lost his way without company, (his brother) Grotius complains, that they who treat of Jus Genti­um do commonly mistake some part of the Roman Jus civile for it▪ & even so he laments (an't please you) that while Men professe to consider the Principles of Government they fall upon notions which are the meer effects of Government. But as an Ape is the more ugly for being like a Man; so this Praevaricator for making faces like Grotius. I, who am complained of, deriving Government from the true prin­ciple of the same, in the ballance or foundation, set the Superstructures accordingly, and he who complains (for­sooth) never so much as proposeth any thing like a Prin­ciple or Superstructure, but runs altogether upon meer Notions; As where he asks me, what security will you give, that the Six in their Consultations shall not rather aim at their own advantage then that of the Fourteen, and so make Consid. p. 28. use of the eminence of their parts to circumvent the rest? In another place he can answer himself and say, that the Fourteen or the People in this Constitution have the Vote and the Sword too. How then should the Six circumvent them? what security hath a Prince that his people will not pull him out of his Throne? why a Nobility or an Army; and are not the people in a Commonwealth their own Army? Is this to mind principles! On the other side, How (says he) shall we be satisfied that the Fourteen will not soon begin to think themselves wise enough to consult too, and making use of their excesse in power pull the Six off their Cushions? as if there were any experience publick or pri­vate, any sense, or reason, that men having the whole power in their own hands, would deprive themselves of Counsellours, or that ever a Commonwealth deposed the Senate, or can depose the Senate, and remain a Com­monwealth. The People of Capua being enraged to the full height, resolved and assembled together, (the Se­nate, if the People will, being always in their power,) on purpose to cut the Throats of the Senators, when Pacu­vius Calavius exhorted them that ere they went upon the design, they would first make election among themselves of a new Senate, which (the Throats of the Old being cut) [Page 30] might for the safety of the Commonwealth immediately take their places; for said he, (Senatum omnino non habere non vultis. Quippe aut Rex, quod abominandum, aut quod unum liberae civitatis Concilium est, Senatus habendus est) You Livy. must either have a King, which I do not finde by you that you intend, or what ever become of this, you must have some other Senate; for the Senate is a Council of such nature▪ as without it, no free City can subsist. By which speech of Pacuvius, the People (who thought themselves as the Considerer hath it, wise enough to consult,) being convinced, fell to work for the Election of a succeeding Senate out of themselves (the Praevaricator should not tell me of Notions, but learn that in a Commonwealth, there must be a Senate is a Principle) While the People of Cupua were intent upon choosing this new Senate, the parties proposed seemed unto them to be so ridiculously unfit for such an Office, that by this means comming to a neerer sight of themselves, they were secretly so filled with the shame of their Enterprize, that slinking away they would never after be known so much as to have thought upon such a Thing. Nor ever went any other people so far, not the Florentines themselves though ad­dicted to Innovation or changing of the Senate beyond all other examples. Sons of the University, Brothers of the Colledge: Heads and Points; you love fine words; whe­ther tendeth to bring all things into servitude, my Hypo­thesis, or his arochet. Hypothytes? For saith he, I am willing to gra­tifie Mr Harrington with his partition of the Twenty men into Six and Fourteen; but if I had been in an humour of contradiction, it had been as free for me to have said that some one of the twenty would have excell'd all the rest in judg­ment, experience, courage, and height of Genius, and then told him, that this had been a natural Monarchy established by God himself over Mankind. As if the Twenty would give their cloaths or money to the next man they meet wiser or richer then themselves, which before he denied (Oportet esse memorem) God established Kings no otherwise then by election of the people; and the Twenty will neither give their cloaths nor money, How then? why in comes a Gal­lant with a file of Musqueteers, what saies he, are you di­viding and choosing here? Go to, I will have no dividing, [Page 31] give me all. Down go the pots, and up go their heels: what is this? why a King! what more? by divine Right! As he took the Cake from the Girles!

CHAP. VI. Whether the Senatusconsulta or Decrees of the Roman Senate had the power of Laws?

AMong diverse and weighty reasons why I would have that Prince look well to his file of Musque­teers, this is no small one, that he being upon no ballance will never be able to give Law without them. For to think that he succeeds unto the Senate, or that the power of the Senate may serve his Turn, is a presumption will fail him. The Senate, as such, hath no power at all, but meer Authority of proposing unto the people, who are the Makers of their own Laws, whence the Decrees of the Senate of Rome are never Laws nor so called, but Senatus­consulta. It is true that a King comming in, the Senate as there it did, to his aid and advantage may remain, so they propose not as formerly unto the People, but now unto him who comes not in upon the right of the Senate, but upon that of the People (whence saith Justinian. Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem, quum lege Regia quae de ejus imperio lata est, Populus ei, & in eum omnes imperium Consid. p. 30. 31. suum & potestatem concedat) Thus the Senatusconsultum, Macedonicum, with the rest that had place allowed by Justi­nian in the compilement of the Roman laws, were not Laws in that they were Senatusconsulta, or proposed by the Senate, but in that they were allowed by Justiman or the Prince, in whom was now the right of the People. Wherefore the Zelot for Monarchy hath made a ( pas de clerc or) foul step in his procession where he argues thus out of Cujacius. It was soon agreed that the distinct decrees of the Senate and People should be extended to the nature of laws; therefore the distinct decrees of the Senate are laws whether it be so a greed by the people, or by the Prince, or no. For thus he hath [Page 32] no sooner made his Prince, then he kicks him heels over head; Seeing where the Decrees of the Senate are Laws without the King, that same is as much a King, as the Prae­varicator a Politician. A law is that which was passed by the power of the people, or of the King. But out of the Light; In this place he takes a Welsh bait, and looking back makes a Muster of his Victories like the busling Consid. p. 32. Guascon, who to shew what he had thrown out of the Windows in his debauchery, made a formal repetition of the whole Inventary of the House.

CHAP. VII. Whether the Ten Commandements were proposed by God or Moses, and voted by the People of Israel.

ONe would think the Guascon had done well, Is he satisfied? No, he will now throw the House out of the Windows. The principal stones being already ta­ken Consid. p. 33. 35. from the Foundation, He hath a bag of certain windes wherewithall to reverse the super structures. The first wind he lets go is but a Puff, where he tells me that I bring Switz and Holland into the enumeration of the Heathen Commonwealths, which if I had done, their Liberties in many parts and places being more Antient then the Chri­stian Religion in those Countries (as is plain by Tacitus where he speaks of Civilis and of the Customs of the Ger­mans) I had neither wronged them nor my self: but I doe no such matter, for having enumerated the Heathen Com­monwealths, I add that the proceedings of Holland and Switz (though after a more obscure manner) are of the like Oceana p. 19. nature. The next is a Storm, while reproaching me of rudeness, he brings in Doctor Ferne and the Clergy by the head and the shoulders, who till they undertake the quarrel of Monarchy, to the confusion of the Common­wealth of Israel, at least so far forth that there be no weight or obligation in such an Example, are posted. As if Consid. p. 35. 40. for a Christian Commonwealth to make so much use of [Page 33] Israel, as the Roman did of Athens, whose Laws she tran­scribed, were against the Interest of the Clergy, which it seems, is so hostile unto Popular power, that to say the Laws of Nature though they be the fountains of all Civil Law, are not the Civil Law, till they be the Civil Law; Or thus, that thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not steal; though they be in natural Equity, yet were not the Laws of Israel or of England, till voted by the People of Israel, or the Parliament of England, is to assert the People into the Mighty liberty of being free from the whole Moral Law; and inasmuch as to be the adviser or perswader of a thing is lesse then to be the Author or Commander of it; to put an indig­nity upon God himself. In which fopperies, the Praevari­cator, boasting of principles, but minding none; first con­founds Authority, and Command, or Power: and nextfor­gets that the dignity of the Legislator, or (which is all one,) of the Senate succeeding unto his Office, as the San­hedrim unto Moses, is the greatest dignity in a Common­wealth; and yet that the Laws or Orders of a Common­wealth derive no otherwise, whether from the Legislator (as Moses, Lycurgus, Solon, &c.) or the Senate (as those of Israel, Lacedemon, or Athens) then from their Authority re­ceived and confirmed by the Vote or Command of the People. It is true, that with Almighty God it is other­wise then with a Mortal Legislator, but through ano­ther Nature which unto him is peculiar, from whom as he is the cause of being, or the Creator of Mankind, Omni­potent power is inseparable; yet so equal is the goodnesse of this Nature unto the greatnesse thereof, that as he is the Cause of welbeing by way of Election for Example in his chosen people Israel, or of Redemption, as in the Chri­stian Church, Himself hath prefer'd before his Empire, his Authority or Proposition. What else is the mea­ning of these words, or of this proceeding of his? Now therefore if ye will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Cove­nant, Exod 19 5. ye shall be unto me a Kingdom, or I will be your King; which Proposition being Voted by the People in the Affir­mative, God proceeds to propose unto them the Ten Com­mandements in so dreadful a manner, that the People be­ing exceedingly affrighted, say unto Moses, speak thou with [Page 34] us, and we will hear thee; that is, be thou henceforth our Exod. 20. 19. Legislator or Proposer, and we will resolve accordingly; but let not God speak with us, lest we die. From whence­forth God proposeth unto the People no otherwise then by Moses, whom he instructeth in this manner, These are the judgements which thou shalt propose or set before them. Deut. 29. 1. Wherefore it is said of the book of Deuteronomy contain­ing the Covenant which the Lord commanded Moses to make with the children of Israel in the Land of Moab, beside the Covenant which he made with them in Horeb (Haec est lex quam Moses proposuit) this is the law which Moses set before Deut. 4. 44. the children of Israel. Neither did God in this case make use of his Omnipotent power, nor Christ in the like, who also is King after the same manner in his Church, and would have been in Israel, where when to this end he might have muster'd up Legions of Angels, & been victorious with such Armies, or Argyraspides, as never Prince could shew the like, saies no more then O Jerusalem, Jerusalem, how often would I have gathered thee and thy Children, as an Hen ga­thereth Math. 23. 37. her Chickens under her wings, and ye would not? where it is plain that the Jews rejecting Christ that he should not reign over them, the Law of the Gospel came not to be the Law of the Jews; and so if the Ten Comman­dements came to be the Law of Israel, it was not onely because God proposed them, seeing Christ also proposed his Law, which neverthelese came not to be the Law of the Jews, but because the people received the One, and reje­cted the Other. It is not in the Nature of Religion, that it should be thought a profane saying, that if the Bible be in England, or in any other Government, the Law or Re­ligion of the Land, it is not onely because God hath pro­posed it, but also because the People or Magistrate hath received it, or resolved upon it; Otherwise we must set lighter by a Nation or Government, then by a private person who can have no part nor portion in this Law, un­less he Vote it unto himself, in his own Conscience, with­out which, he remains in the Condition he was before, and as the Heathen who are a Law unto themselves. Thus whereas in a Covenant there must be two parties, the Old and New Testament being in summe the Old and New [Page 35] Covenant, These are that Authority and Proposition of God and Christ, to which they that refuse their Vote or result may be under the Empire of a Clergy, but are none of his Commonwealth. Nor seeing I am gone so far, doth this at all imply free-will, but (as is admirably observ'd by Mr. Hobbs) the freedome of that which naturally pre­cedes will, namely, Deliberation or Debate, in which as the Scale by the weight of Reason or Passion comes to be turned one way or other, the Will is caused, and being caused, necessitated. When God commeth thus in upon the Soul of Man, he gives both the Will and the Deed; from which like Office of the Senate in a Commonwealth that is from the Excellency of their Deliberation and Debate which prudently and faithfully unfolded unto the People, doth also frequently cause and necessitate both the Will and the Deed, God himself hath said of the Senate, that they are Gods: an expression though divine yet not unknown to the Heathens ( Homo homini Deus) one Man for the Ex­cellency of his aid, may be a God unto another; but let the praevaricator look to it; for he that leadeth the blind out of his way, is his Divel.

For the things I have of this kind, as also for what I have said upon the words Chirotonia and Ecclesia, the Praevari­cator is delighted to make me beholding underhand unto Mr. Hobbs, Notwithstanding the open enmity which he saith I profess to his Politicks. As if Josephus upon that of Sa­muel 1 Sam. 8. 7 [...]. they have not rejected Thee, but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them, had not said of the People [...] that they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdome. Now if they unchirotonized or unvoted God of the Kingdome, then they had chiroto­nized or voted him to the Kingdome, and so not only the Doctrine that God was King in Israel by Compact or Co­venant, but the use of the word Chirotonia also in the sense I understand it, is more Antient then Mr. Hobbs. I might add that of Capellus (Deus Populi Judaici Rex erat veluti In Diatriba de▪ vota Iephts▪ Politicus, & Civilis Legislator) God was as Political King and Civil Legislator of the Jews. And for the use I have made of the word Ecclesia, as no Man can read such as have written of the Grecian Commonwealths, and misse it, [Page 36] so I do not remember that Mr. Hobbs hath spoken of it: To these things fuller satisfaction will be given in the se­cond Book which nevertheless I do not speak to the end I might wave Obligation to so excellent an Author in his way. It is true, I have opposed the Politicks of Mr. Hobbs to shew him what he taught me, with as much disdain as he opposed those of the greatest Authors, in whose wholesome Fame and Doctrine the good of Mankind being concern'd; my Conscience bears me witnesse, that I have done my duty: Nevertheless in most other things I firmly believe that Mr. Hobbs is, and will in future Ages be accounted the best Writer, at this day, in the World: And for his Treatises of Humane Nature, and of Liberty and Necessity, they are the greatest of New Lights, and those which I have followed and shall follow.

CHAP. VIII. Whether a Commonwealth comming up to the perfection of the kind, come not up unto the perfection of Go­vernment, and have no flaw in it.

WHat a Comonwealth comming up to the per­fection of the kind is, I have shewn both by the definition of an equal Commonwealth, and the Exemplification in all the parts.

The Definition is contained in the first of my Pre­liminaries, which because it is short I shall repeat.

An equall Commonwealth is a Government established upon an equall Agrarian arising into the super structures or three Orders, The Senate debating and proposing, the People re­solving, and the Magistracy executing, by an equall Rota­tion, or interchangeable election, through the suffrage of the People given by the Ballot The Exemplification is the whole Commonwealth of Oceana. Each of which by him, [Page 37] who, if his doctrine of pure and absolute Monarchy be ob­serv'd can be no English man, is called an Irish bog; as in some sense it is, seeing the Praevaricator hath set never a foot in it, that will stand, nor hath more to say, then that Consid. p. 43. where there is one ambitious poor man, or one vicious rich man, it is impossible there should be any such Government as can be secure from sedition.

Which first is rather to make all Governments alike, then to object against any, seeing that there should not be one ambitious Poor man, or one vicious Rich man, is equally if not more improbable in a Monarchy then in a Com­monwealth.

Secondly, That one Man alone, whether he be rich or poor should without a party be able to disturbe a Com­monwealth with sedition, is an absurdity; nor is such a party as may be able in some sort to disturbe the Peace by robbing upon the High-way, or some such disorder always able to disturbe a Government with sedition: Wherefore this feat goes not so much upon the ability of any one man Rich or Poor, as the puissance of the Party he is able to make, and this puissance of the party goes upon the Nature of the Government and the content or discontents thence deriving to the Few, or the Many. The discontents whether of the Few or the Many derive from that which is, or by them is thought to be some bar unto their Interest, and those Interests which are the causes of sedition are three; the desire of Liberty, the desire of Power, and the desire of Riches, nor be there any more▪ for where the People through the want of bread, through violence offer'd unto their Women, or Oppression, rise up against their Governours, it relates unto the desire of Liberty, those also under the name of Religion make not a fourth but come unto One of the Three.

Now to speak in the first place of the Many, and anon of the Few, the people in an equal Commonwealth, have none of these three Interests. Not the desire of Liberty, because the whole Frame of an equal Commonwealth is no­thing else but such a Method whereby the liberty of the People is secured unto them. Not of power, because the power which otherwise they could not exercise, is thus [Page 38] estated in them. Nor of riches, because where the rich are so bounded by an Agrarian that they cannot overballence; and therefore neither Oppresse the People nor Exclude their industry or merit from attaining to the like estate, power, or honour, the whole People have the whole riches of the Nation already equally divided among them, for that the riches of a Commonwealth should not go accor­ding unto the difference of mens industry, but be distri­buted by the Pole were unequal; Wherefore the people in an equal Commonwealth having none of those interests which are the causes of sedition, can be subject unto no such effect.

To affirm then with the Considerer, that the whole of this Libration, is reduced to the want of power to disturbe the Commonwealth, must needs be mistaken, seeing in the Commonwealth proposed the people have the power, but can have no such interest, and the people having no such interest, no party can have any such power, it being im­possible that a party should come to overballance the People, having their Arms in their own hands. The whole matter being thus reduced unto the want of power to di­sturbe the Government; this according to his own Argu­ment will appear to be the Libration in which the power whereof the Governour is possessed so vastly exceeds the power remaining with those, who are to obey (which in case of contest must be so small a party) that it would be desperately un­reasonable for them to hope to maintain their Cause. If the true Method then of attaining to perfection in Government be to make the Governour absolute, and the people in an equal Commonwealth be absolute, then there can be none in this Government, that upon probable terms can dispute the power with the Governour, and so this State by his own Argument must be free from Sedition. Thus far upon oc­casion of the ambitious poor Man Objected. I have spoken of the Many, and in speaking of the Many, implicitely of the Few; for as in an unequal Commonwealth, for Example, England during the Peerage or Aristocracy, the Many de­pended upon or were included in the Few; So in an E­qual Commonwealth the Few depend upon or are included in the Many, as the Senate of Venice depends upon, or is [Page 39] included in Great Council, by which it is annually ele­cted in the whole or in some part. So what was said in an equal Commonwealth of the Many or the Poorer sort, is also said of the Few or of the Richer; who through the virtue of the Agrarian, as in Oceana, or of other Orders supply­ing the defect of an Agrarian, as in Venice, not able to o­verballance the people can never have any power to disturbe the Commonwealth in case they had such an interest, nor can have any such interest in case they had such power. For Example in Oceana putting the case, that the Few were as powerful as it is possible they should be; that is, that the whole Land were fallen into five thousand hands. The Five Thousand excluding, the People could get no more Riches by it, because they have the whole Land al­ready, no more Liberty by it, because they were in perfect Liberty before; nor any more power by it, because through the equality of the ballance or of their Estates, they can be no more by themselves, then an equal Commonwealth, and that they were with the people; but would be much lesse, the power or Commonwealth, in which there be Five thousand Equalls, being not greater but much less then the power or Commonwealth wherein the whole people are E­quall: because the power or effect of a greater People is proportionably greater then the power or effect of a lesser people, and the Few by this means would get no more then to be the lesser people. So the people being no bar unto the riches, Liberty, nor power of the Five Thousand and the desire of Liberty, Riches, and Power being the only causes of Sedition, There could arise no Sedition in this Com­monwealth by reason of the Nobility, who have no such interest, if they had the power, nor have any such power if they had the interest, the people being equally possessed of the Government, of the Arms, and far superior in Number. In summe, an equal Commonwealth consisteth but of one hereditary Order, as the people, which is by election divi­ded into two Orders as the Senate and the Congregation in Lacedemon, or the Senate and the Great Council in Venice; for the Gentlemen of Venice, as hath been often said, are the people of Venice, the rest are Subjects. And an unequal Commonwealth consisteth of two Hereditary Orders, as [Page 40] the Patritians and Plebeians in Rome, whereof the former only had an hereditary capacity of the Senate; whence it comes to passe that the Senate and the people in an equall Commonmealth having but one and the same interest, never were, nor can be at variance; and that the Senate and the people in an unequall Commonwealth having two distinct interests, never did nor can agree. So an equall Common­wealth cannot be seditious, and an unequall Commonwealth can be no other then Seditious.

If a Man be resolved as the Considerer is, to huddle these things together, there is no making any thing of this kind of Policy; of which therefore it will be a folly to talk. For example, Lacedemon is either to be considered as not taking in the Helotes, and then in her self she was an equall Commonwealth void of any sedition, or cause of it, how much soever she were troubled with the Helotes. So the Objection made by him, of her troubles by the Helotes is impertinently urged, to shew that she was a Seditious Com­monwealth. Or if he will needs have it, that she took in the Helots, it is undeniable that she took them in unequally, and so was unequall, whence the troubles by the Helots must needs be impertinently urged against an equall Com­monwealth.

Again, when I alledge Venice from Piero Gradenigo, that is for the space of about four hundred years from the present date, at which time the Reformation yet in force began, as an Example of an equall Commonwealth, for him to instance in the times before, when though the Common­wealth according to the intention, were as Equal as now, yet being not bound by sufficient Orders to give her self security of her Native Liberty, her Dukes on the one side, did what they pleased, and the inraged People on the other side banished, condemned to death, or murthered them, who sees not the Imposture? Indeed he blushes at it himself. Wherefore my Assertion being not yet knocked on the head, he promiseth to kill it better, first by the Example of Lacedemon leaving out the Helots, and next by that of Venice since the time of Piero Gradenigo.

For the first you must know that once upon a time Consid. p. 60. Pausan. Lacon. there was a quarrel between Cleomenes and Demaratus [Page 41] Kings of Lacedemon about succession which was determi­ned by the Ephori, that is, by a Court of Justice and not by the Sword; the like hapned in Leotychides the known bastard of Alcibiades or so confessed to be by his Mother Plut. Alc. unto divers of her Maids. Now this is a Maxime in the Politicks where the differences of Kings can go no farther, then a Court of Justice, there the Government is seditious. Most ridiculous! Is there a stronger Argument that such a Government is not Seditious? No matter give him room, Much more fatall was the contest between Cleonymus and his brother Areus the son of Acrotatus by whose war Zarax was ruin'd and Pyrrhus came into the game, who besieg'd the Capital City: the reign of Agis and Cleomenes was so full of turbulency as would put a man out of breath to re­late. Fair, and softly was not all this after Lysander, and the Spoils of Athens and so ruin'd Lacedemon? I affirm there can be no sedition in an Equal Cmmonwealth, and he to oppose me, shews that there was Sedition in an unequal One; whether doth this Affirm his Assertion or mine?

But for better luck in Venice. This City by Mr. Har­rington' s own confession, is possest of several advantages. Yes, I say that the Commonwealth of Venice, thus Seated is like a Man in a Cittadel who thereby may be the safer from his Enemies, but nere a whit the safer from diseases. What conclusion would you expect he should infer from hence? why among these therefore there is good cause to reckon her Immunity from seditions; Doth not our Logician repeat faithfully and dispute honestly? Again, Sir, she is like a Ship ready to be boarded by Pirates, hath the Turk on this Frontier, the Pope on that, the King of Spain on ano­ther. As if this were an Argument every Govern­ment must not be void of Sedition, seeing there is none except they be Islands, whose frontiers are not bounded by the Territories of other Princes. Well, but since the last Reiglement (in English Reformation) in the time of Gra­denigo; you have had three seditions in Venice, that of Marino Boccone, that of Baiamonte Tiepolo, and that of Marino Falerio.

Bodin hath been long since beaten for this like Stockfish, [Page 42] and yet our Author will be serving it up for a Courtly dish. Bocconi would have kill'd the Duke, but was hanged before he could doe it. Felton kill'd a Duke, that had greater power here then the other in Venice, and was hang'd afterwards, therefore England was a seditions Go­vernment; for this must either be undeniable for Felton's sake, or why must the other be so for Bocconi's? Again, Falerio and his Complices would have destroyd the great Council, but were hanged before they could do it. Vaux and his Accomplices would have blown up the Parliament, but were hanged before they could doe it; therefore England was in this relation a seditious Government, else why was Venice? There passeth not a Moneth but there die Rogues at Tiburn, is the Government therefore seditious? or is this one regard in which it is not? where all that so invade the Government are by virtue of the same brought unto that end, there the Commonwealth, or the Orders of it are not the Cause but the Cure of Sedition, and so these are undeniable Arguments that Venice is not seditious, where since the Reformation there hath not been a cut Fin­ger upon this score, save onely through the conspiracy of Baiamonte, which indeed came to blows. Nor for this yet, can Venice be called a seditious Commonwealth. You find no man accusing Rome of sedition in that she had a Manlius or a Melius that dangerously affected Monarchy, because unto these her Orders, by which they suffered death assoon appli'd the remedy. But Rome was a sediti­ous Commonwealth because the perpetual fewd that was between the Senate & the People sprung out of her Orders, and was that to which there was no Remedy to apply. Eng­land was not a seditious Government because it had a Vaux or a Felton, but because the power antiently of the Nobility, and late of the People was such by the Orders of the same as might at any time occasion Civil war. Put the case a slave or some desperate fellow have kill'd a Great Turk, the Government for that cannot be said seditious, but in this that through the very nature of the Policy, the Janizaries at any time may do as much, it is undeniable seditious. Baiamonte's conspiracy he will not say was of this nature. It was not a disease in the bones of the Commonwealth, but a [Page 43] thing that no sooner appear'd, or broke out (though it be true, there happen'd a little scratching first) then it fell off like a scab; such an accident may befall the best constitu­tion, and Venice never had the like but once: if he could say as much of a Monarchy, he gains no advantage; yet let him say it, and prove it, I give him all. I omit many falshoods and absurdities in the proceeding of the Prevaricator, as where he intimateth the power of the Dukes to have been that wherby Venice gained I know not what, and yet to have been that also by which Falerio had like to have spoiled all: Each of which (the Duke of Venice having no power at all) is known to be false. Why should▪ I stay to put you in mind that having affirmed Venice to derive her Immunity from intestine discord no otherwise then a Ship, that is ready to be boarded by Pirates, he instanceth in such exam­ples to the contrary, as took Occasion by the hair of a Forreign scalpe, while in those of Boccone and Tiepolo the Commonwealth by her Wars with the Genoeses and Ferrara, was put to her plunges, and in that of Falerio reduced unto the last extremity. I shall onely Note that if such suddain Flashes as these may come under the name of Se­dition, he hath done a fine Office for Monarchy, seeing no Senate is so much exposed to like blowes, as any Prince.

Well; but for all this it is confessed that there may be such a thing as a seditious Commonwealth, in that the fewd between the Senate and the People of Rome could not be cured; what security saith he will you give us, that Consid. p. 48. the like may not happen in Oceana, or that the whole body of the People being intrvsted with giving a Vote and keeping a Sword, may not by way of Counsel or Arms, fall to such work as Levelling the Five Thousand, or bringing the Agrarian from two to one Thousand pounds a year, or less, as they phansie.

To which I answer by a like question, What security will he give me that the People of any Commonwealth shall not cast themselves into the Sea? A Prince may be mad and doe so, but the people is naturally incapa­ble of such madnesse: If men will boast of their know­ledge in principles and yet talk of nothing but effects; [Page 44] why may not a Man fly as well as a Bird? but if causes may be regarded, let him once shew how the Will seeing it is not free, nor moved without some Object, should move the people in such a manner; or for what, they ha­ving all the Liberty and all the Power that can be had, should strive? Well, that is soon done, for the Land may come into the hands of Five thousand, and so the Booty may be great and the resistance small. Good. The Romans being the wisest of all people went no farther towards the Remedy of their grievances then to strive for the intro­duction of an Agrarian, in which they fainted too, even to the Destruction of that Government. Except these, none have been so wise, and if there be any such thing familiar with the Nature of the people, why appeared it but once, and then vanished without effect? why did not the people for Example under the late Monarchy (when the Dominion or Freehold of the Nation, by greater shares, was in a smaller party, and they had not onely Riches, but Liverty, and Power too, to whet them on) ever so much as think of levelling Three hundred Men for the Nobility and Clergy in whom was the ballance, were no more. If it be reply'd that the people were not armed; by whom did the Barons make War with the Kings? If that they were not trusted with a Vote; what was that of the House of Commons? Let Dominion or Freehold stand upon what ballance you will, unequal or equal, from the begin­ning of the world you shall never find a people turning Levellers: And as Reason is Experience in the root, so Experience is Reason in the branch, which might there­fore be sufficient in the Case. Nevertheless for clearer sa­tisfaction in a point of such Concernment, I shall endea­ver to dig up and discover the Root of this branch, or the reason of this Experience. That which in Beasts is instinct, whereof they can give no Account, is in it self that wisdome of God whereby he provideth for them; so is it with the People, they are not Levellers, nor know they why, and yet it is, because to be levellers, were to destroy themselves. For seeing I must repeat, to repeat briefly. There is no Territory of any Extent and Populousnesse where the Re­venue of Industry is not twice as much as the dry Rent. [Page 45] (This hath been demonstrated in Oceana.) The revenue of industry is in those that work, that is, the People: Wherefore the Revenne of the People, where their industry is not obstructed, is twofold unto that of the Nobility, holding the whole Territory in Freehold. But where their Industry is obstructed, their Revenue is nothing. Civil war being of all other the greatest obstruction of Industry, the People in taking Arms must venter all they have, for that, which if they obtain, they lose two for one; and if they obtain not, all for nothing. Wherefore a People never will, nor ever can; never did, or ever shall take Arms for Levelling. But they are instructed with a Vote; and therefore taking away the Lands of the five Thousand, or diminishing the Agrarian by way of Counsel, they need not obstruct their industry, but preserving the Re­venue of that, may bring themselves into the possession of the Land too. This will they, this can they lesse do, be­cause being in Counsel they must propose something for the advantage of the Commonwealth, or of themselves, as their End in such an Action. But the Land coming to be in the possession of five Thousand, falleth not into a Number that is within the compass of the few, or such an One as can be Princes, either in regard of their number, or of their estates, but unto such an One as cannot consent to abolish the Agrarian, because that were to consent to rob one another, nor can have any Party among them, or against their Common interest, strong enough to force them, or to break it, which remaining, the five thousand neither be nor can be any more then a Popular State, and the ballance remaineth every whit as equal, as if the Land were in never so many more hands. Wherefore the Commonwealth being not to be bettered by this means, the People by Counsel can never go about to level nor diminish the Agrarian for the good of the Commonwealth. Nor can they undertake it for the enrichment of them­selves, because the Land of Oceana, as hath been demon­strated, being levell'd or divided equally among the Fathers of Families only, cometh not to above Ten pounds a year unto each of them, whereas every Footman costeth his Master Twenty pounds a year; and there is not a [Page 46] Cottager having a Cow upon the Common, but with his own labour, at one shilling a day, gets Twenty pounds a years; which the Land being levell'd, were impossible, because there would be no body able to set a Labourer on work, or to keep a Servant; wherefore neither would, nor could the People by Counsel go about any such businesse. So there being no possible cause of disagree­ment between the Few and the Many, the Senate and the People, there can be no such effect; whence this is the government, which being perfectly equall, hath such a Li­bration in the frame of it, that no man in or under it, can contract such Interest or Power, as should be able to disturb the Commonwealth with Sedition. Yet after all this, the Praevaricator will only tell Mr. Harrington (for to deny the Conclusion, is a fair way of disputing) that this Libration Consid. p. 67. is of the same Nature with a perpetual motion in the Me­channicks. But let me tell him, that in the Politicks there is nothing Mechannick, or like it. This is but an Ideo­tism of some Mathematician resembling his who imagined the Stream of a River to be like that of his Spiggot,

The Mathematician must not take God to be such an One as he is. Is that of the Sun, of the Stars, of a River, a perpetual Motion? even so One generation goeth, and Galen de usu partium. l. 4. another cometh. Nature (saith Gallen) hath a tendency to make her Creature immortal, if it were in the Capacity of the Matter on which she hath to work, but the People never dieth; This Motion of theirs is from the hand of a perpetual Mover, even God himself, in whom we live and move, and have our being; and to this Current the Po­litician addeth nothing but the banks, to which end, or none, the same God hath halso created humane Prudence. Wherefore there is not any thing that raiseth it self against [Page 47] God or right reason, if I say that it is in humane prudence so to apply these banks, that they may stand as long as the River runneth; or let this Considerer consider again, and tell me out of Scripture or Reason, why not. Mathe­maticians, it is true, pretend to be the Monopolists of demonstration; but speak ingenuously, have they, as to the Politicks, hitherto given any other demonstration, then that there is difference between seeing, and making of Spe­ctacles? Much more is that comparison of the Politicks, going upon certain and demonstrable Principles, unto Astrologers and Fortune-tellers, who have none at all vain and Injurious: For as in relation to what David hath said, and Experience confirmed, of the Age of Man, that it is Threescore years and Ten; I may say, that if a Man lie bed-rid, or die before Threescore years and Ten, of any Natural infirmity, or disease, it was not through any imperfection of Mankind, but of his particular Con­stitution. So in relation unto the Principles and definition of an Equal Commonwealth yet unshaken, nay untouched by this Praevaricator, I may safely affirm, that a Common­wealth is a Government, which if it have been seditious, it hath not been from any imperfection in the kind, but in the particular Constitution, which where the like hath hapned must have been unequal. My retrait unto these Principles is called running into a bogg; as if such as have no Principles were not boggs, Informis limus, Stygiaeque Paludes.

CHAP. IX. Whether Monarchy comming up to the perfection of the kind, come not short of the perfection of Government, and have some flaw in it? In which is also treated of the ballance of France, of the Original of a landed Clergy; of Arms and their kinds.

OF Monarchy I have said, that whereas it is of two kinds, the One by Arms, the Other by a Nobility; for that by Arms, as (to take the most perfect mo­del) in Turkey, it is not in Art, or Nature to cure it of this dangerous flaw, that the Janizaries have frequent in­terest, and perpetual power to raise Sedition, or tear the Magistrate in Pieces. For that by a Nobility, as (to take the most perfect Model) of late in Oceana, it was not in Art or Nature to cure it of that dangerous flaw that the Nobility had frequent interest and perpetual power by their Retainers and Tenants to Raise sedition and Levy war; whence I conclude that Monarchy reaching the per­fection of the kind, reacheth not the perfection of Go­vernment, but must still have some dangerous flaw in it.

This place (though I did not intend by it to make work for a Tinker) could not be of lesse concernment then it proves to the Prevaricator, who as if he were obliged to Mend all; falls first to patching with a Monarchy by Arms, then with Monarchy by a Nobility; at length dispairing, throws away each, and betakes himself with egregious confidence, to make out of both a New Monarchy, which is neither. By observation of these three Flourishes, the present Chapter may be brought into some Method: The first blow of his Hammer, or that whereby he intends the flaw or hole in Monarchy by Arms, shal henceforth be men­ded and Tite, is this. That the Guards of the Kings person be Consid. p. 16. not increased beyond Necessity of security, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation [Page 49] drawn out upon service, and chiefly that they consist not of one intire body, united under the same head, but be divided into distinct parties and Commands; as we may see in France, where though (in proportion to the: extent of their Domini­ons) the Kings guards be more Numerous then those of the Roman or Turkish Emperours, yet being divided into di­stinct bodies of French, Scots and Switz under their several Colonels and Captains, they have never been the Authors of any the least sedition: And in Turkey of late years they begin to learn the Art of poizing the Janizaries by the Spahy's, and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies. Which fine work at the first view goes upon this false ground, that the Foundation of Monarchy by Arms is laid upon the Princes Guards or the Court Militia, whereas Monarchy by Arms consisteth in no other ballance, then the Princes being sole Landlord, which where imperfect as it was in that of the Roman Emperors, the Empire is the most troubled, and where perfect as in Turkey, the Empire is lesse seditions: For that which he saith of France, it re­lates to Monarchy by a Nobility; and therefore is not to be confounded (according to his method) with this, but re­fer'd unto the next branch.

As to Monarchy by Arms, though it be true that the bal­lance of Dominion in any of the three kinds may be said to be Natural, in regard of the Effect; yet seeing God hath given the Earth unto the Sons of Men, that of a sole Landlord, as Turkey, is not so Natural in the cause or foun­dation, as the Timars, and therefore requireth the Applica­tion of some kind of force, as the Janizaries, who are not the root of the Government, that being planted in the Earth of the Timars or military Farmes and Colonies (for that the Janizaries are not the Foundation of this Empire, which was founded long before, is plain in that this Order was not introduced, till by Amurath the second) but the Dragon that lyeth at that root, and without which the fruit would fall into the Mouths of the Timariots by way of propriety (as when the Knights fees granted first for life, became afterwards hereditary in Oceana) which would cause such a fall from Monarchy that it would be­come (as we have seen) the rise of Popular power (the [Page 50] Lots in case this should happen, of the Timariots, little differing from those divided by Joshua unto the Children of Israel) wherefore when this happens in the Turkish Mo­narchy, it is at an end: And that this doth not happen, though there be diverse other concurrent Policies, I would have any Man shew me, how it could be but for the Jani­zaries: Otherwise it is plain that the Janizaries being a flying Army, on wing at all games, and upon all occasions, are not so much the guard of the Prince, as of the Empire; which ruin'd, the Prey falls unto the Timariots, as those that are in possession, except these be ruin'd too, who being all Horse, and far greater in Number then the Janizaries, that are Foot, would in case the awe of the Prince, and the policy of the Government which holds them divided, were broken, be invincible by the Janizaries, who never­theless by these aids can easily contain them. Whence the sedition of the Janizaries, like that of a Nobility, may be dan­gerous to the Prince, but never threatens the Throne; whereas the sedition of the Timariots like that of a people would be more against the Throne then the Prince. These things considered, and in them the Nature, Constitution, or Disease of Monarchy by Arms, we may consult the more rationally with the Considerer upon the Applications or remedies by him offer'd, which are three.

First, that the Guards of the Kings person be not increased beyond the necessity of security. But of what security, that of his Person, or of his Empire, or of both? for speaking of a Monarchy by Arms, in this later sense only it is true; and if so, then this singular Maxime of State (Frustra fit per plura, quod fieri potest per pauciora) might have been spared (Celais'en va sans le dire come les heures de nostre curè.)

Secondly, that they be not suffered to stagnate at Court, but be by a perpetual circulation, drawn out upon service; for if there be not perpetual service (it should seem) Men might be apt to think that Government was instituted for peace as well as War. I add no more then is imply'd in his words, which as to this of Turkey have chanced well; where not the Stagnation of the Janizaries only but of the Court it self (which by the institution should always be in [Page 51] exercise of Arms) is the cause of that present decay, so per­ceivable in this Empire. But the Prince sitting still or stagnating, to what the Circulation of the Janizaries (whose alienation from the Government, or intelligence with the Timariots, must needs be of dangerous conse­quence) could tend, should have been thought on; other­wise to expose the Empire to danger, for the safety of the Prince, is no cure of the Government.

But his chief remedy remains, this Court Militia must not consist of one intire body united under the same head, but be divided under several Colonels, Captains, Parties, Brigades, and distributed unto several Quarters. As if this were a Cure, there were any Army that could be mutinous; but where he saies not united under the same head, he intimates perhaps divers Generals, and divers Armies; Now such are the Turkish Beglerbegs and the Provinces under their Go­vernments. That these therefore be kept divided, so that not any two of them can lay their heads together, without having them cut off; nor any Son succeed the Father in Government, requires that there be always a sufficient force (distinct from the interest of the Timariots and Beg­lerbegs) united, and still ready upon occasion of this ser­vice, and the Janizaries with the Spahi's or Court horse, being united, are no more then sufficient for this service: wherefore if these also were so divided as thereby to be weakened, they could not be sufficient for this service; and their division except such as might weaken them would be of no security to the Prince. That the Pro­vinces, under this awe, are lesse apt to Rebel, then the Court guards to Mutiny, is no wonder; but the Court­guards being cured by the prescription of this Physitian, of possibility of Mutiny (which without weakening them is impossible) the Provinces (if Liberty, or Riches, or Power, be desirable) would never indure the yoak of this Govern­ment. Wherefore it being inavoidable in the Turkish Em ­pire, that either the Janizaries, or the Timariots may doe what they list (in regard that whether of them be able to give law unto the other, must at the same time be able to give law unto the Prince, and to bring them unto an equal ballance, were to make a Civil war, or at least to sow the [Page 52] seed of it) the Native wound of Monarchy by Arms re­mains uncured and uncurable. What more may be done for Monarchy, founded upon a Nobility, comes next to be tried. In this the Considerer gives his word, that there never riseth any danger unto the Crown, but when either a great part of the Soveraign power is put into the hands of the Nobility, as in Germany and Poland, (where it should Consid. p. 47. seem by him, that the Electors, and the Gentry, do not put power into the hands of the Emperor, or King, but the Emperor, or King, puts power into the hands of the Electors, or Gentry) or when some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and De­pendance, as the Princes of the bloud, and Lorrain, not long since, in France; and of old the Montforts and Nevi [...]s in England. The first of these he declareth to be a vicious government, and a Monarchy only in Name; the second he undertakes shall easily admit of this remedy. That the great ones be reduced (decimo sexto) to a lesser volume, and levelled into an Equality with the rest of their Order.

His put-pin is pretty, the Emperor puts power into the hand of the Electors; and the King of Poland puts power into the hands of the Gentlemen; which Governments there­fore (and all such like, as when the King of England put power into the hands of the Barons, at such time as he was no longer able to keep it out of their fingers, by which means the Antient and late Government of King, Lords, and Commons was restored) are vicious Constitutions, and Monarchies only in Name; such as he will not meddle with, and therefore let them go. Well; but where is the Patient then? if these be not Monarchies by Nobility, what do we mean by that thing? or what Government is it that we are to Cure? why such an One, where some Person or Family is suffered to overtop the rest in Riches, Commands, and Dependance, as the Princes of the bloud, and Lorrain, not long since, in France; and of old the Montfords and the Nevils in England. So then the same again (for these are no other) upon recollection, are those that admit of this Easie cure. Let the great Ones be re­duced to a lesser volume, and levell'd with the rest of their Order. But how? if they be the weaker party, they are [Page 53] not the great ones, and if they be the stronger party, how will he reduce them? Put the case a Man have the Gout, his Physitian does not bid him reduce his overtopping toes unto the volume of the other foot, nor to levell them unto Equality with the rest of their Order, but prescribes his remedies, and institutes the Method that should do this feat. What is the Method of our Aesculapius? (Point de Novelle,) or where are we to find it? e'en where you please. The Princes of the bloud, and of Lorrain in France; the Montforts, and the Nevils in England, overtopped not their Order, by their own riches or power, but by that of the party, which for their fidelity, courage, or conduct, intrusted them with the managing of their Arms, or affairs. So the Prince that would have levelled them, must have levelled their party; which in case the controversie be upon the right, or pretended right of the Nobility in the Government (which commonly makes them hang together) may come to the whole Order: what then? Why then, Consid. p. 49. says he, the Prince must preserve his Nobility weighty enough to keep the People under, and yet not tall enough in any par­ticular person to measure with himself: which abating, the figure is the same again; and so I have nothing to answer but the figure. Now for this, the Prince himself is no otherwise tall, then by being set upon the shoulders of the Nobility; and so if they set another upon the same shoulders, (as in Henry the 4th. or the 7th. who had no Titles unto the Crown, nor could otherwise have measured with the Prince) be he never so low, he comes to be tall enough in his particular person to measure with the Prince, and to be taller too, not only by those Old Examples, but others that are younger than our selves, though such (the Nobility having not of late, been weighty enough to keep the People under) as derive from another Principle, that of Popular ballance. A Prince therefore preserving his Nobility weighty enough to keep under the people, must pre­serve in them the ballance of that kind of Empire; and the ballance containing the riches, which are the power, and so the Arms of the Nation; this being in the Nobility, the Nobility, when willing, must be able to dispose of the King, or of the Government. Nor under a lesse weight [Page 54] is a Nobility qualified to keep down the people, as by an Argument from the contrary; Henry the 7th. having found the strength of his Nobility, that set him in a Throne to which he had no right, and fearing that the tide of their favour turning, they might do as much for another, abated the dependance of their Tenants, and cut off their Train of Retainers, which deminution of their weight, releasing by degrees the People, hath caused that Plain, or Level, into which we live to see the Mountain of that Monarchy now sunck and swallowed; wherefore the ballance of the Nobility being such as failing that kind of Monarchy comes to ruine, and not failing, the Nobility, if they joyn may give Law unto the King, the inherent disease of Monarchy by a Nobility, remains also uncured, and un­curable.

These are points to which I had spoken before; but The ballance of France. something concerning France, and Forraign Guards, was mumbled by the Praevaricator in a wrong place, while he was speaking of Turkey, where there is no such thing. This least I be thought to have courted Opposition for no­thing, shall open a New Scene; while I take the occasion in this place to speak first of the Ballance of the French Mo­narchy, and next of the Nature and use of Forraign Guards.

The whole Territory of France, except the Crown Lands, which on this account are not considerable, consisteth of three shares, or parts, whereof the Church holdeth one, the Nobility another, and the Presidents, Advocates, other Officers of the Parliaments, Courts of Justice, the Citizens, Merchants, Tradesmen, the Treasurers, receivers of the Customes, aids, taxes, impositions, Gabells, all which toge­ther make a vast body, hold a Third; by how equal portions I am sorry that I do not know, nor where to learn, but this is the ballance of the French Monarchy, unto which the Paisant holding nothing, but living (though in one of the best Countrys of the world) in the meanest and most miserable Condition of a Labourer, or Hiend, is of no account at all.

The parties that hold the ballance in a Territory are those of whom the Government doth naturally consist, wherefore these are called Estates; so the Clergy, the No­bility, [Page 55] and the Commons, are the three Estates of France. Though the Third because the Paisant partaking not of the ballance can (in relation to Government) be of no account, is not called the Commons, but only the Third Estate: whereas the Yeomanry and Gentry in England, having weighed as well in the ballance, as the Church, and the Nobility, the three Estates of England, while the Monarchy was in vigour, were the Clergy, the Nobility, and the Commons. The Consent of Nations evinceth that the Function of the Clergy, or Priest, except where otherwise Grotius de Imp. Sum. Pot. circa sacra. C. 2. S. 4. determined of by Law, appertaineth unto the Magistrate. By this right Noah, Abraham, Job, with the rest of the Pa­triarchs, instructed their Families or sacrisiced, There seem­eth to have been a kind of Commonwealth in Canaan, while Melchisedec was both King and Priest; Such also was Moses till he consecrated Aaron, and confer'd the Priesthood upon the Levites, who are expresly said to succeed unto the first born, that is unto the Patriarchs, who till then exercised that Function. Nor was it otherwise with the Gentiles, where they who had the Soveraign power or were in eminent Magi­stracy, did also the Priestly Office (omnino apud veteres qui rerum potiebantur, iidem Auguria tenebant: ut enim sa­pere, sic divinare, regale ducebant, saith Cicero and Vir­gil Rex Anius, Rex idem hominum, Phoebi (que) Sacerdos) You find the Heroes, that is, Princes in Poets sacrificing; The Ethiopian, Egyptian, Lacedemonian Kings did the like; in Athens constantly and in Rome, when they had no Kings, occasionally they elected a Rex sacrorum, or King-Priest. Original of a Sauded Cler­yg. So that a free People had thus far power of electing their Priests, is not deny'd by any Man. This came it should seem, to be otherwise Established by the Law in Egypt, where the Priests ( whose Lands Joseph when he bought those of the People did not buy) being great Landlords Gen. 47. 22. (it may be unto the Third of the whole Territory) were one of the three Estates of the Realm. And it is clear in Scripture that the People, till they Sold their Lands, be­came not Servants unto Pharaoh. While Agesilaus was in Xenop. in Oatr. de Agel. Egypt they deposed their King, which implies the recovery of their ballance; but so seeing they set up another, as withall shews the ballance of the Nobility to have been [Page 56] predominant. These particulars seem to come near unto the account of Diodorus Siculus, by whom the ballance of Egypt should have stood thus. The whole Revenue was divided into three parts, whereof the Priests had the first, the King L. 1. had the second, and the Nobility had the Third. It seems to me that the Priests had theirs by their Antient right and title, untouched by Joseph, that the Kings had all the rest by the Purchase of Joseph, and that in time (as is usual in like cases) a Nobility came through the bounty of succee­ding Kings to share with them in one half. But however it came about, Egypt by this means is the first Example of a Monarchy upon a Nobility, at least distributed into three Estates, by means of a Landed Clergy, which by consequence came to be the greatest Counsellors of State, and fitting Religion unto their uses, to bring the people to be the most superstitious in the whole World.

Where it not for this Example, I should have said, that the Indowment of a Clergy or Religious Order with Lands▪ and the erecting of them into an Estate of the Realm or Government, were no Antienter then the Goths and Van­dals, who introducing a like Policy, which unto this day taketh place throughout the Christian world, have been the cause;

First, why the Clergy have been generally great Coun­sellors unto Kings, while the People are led into super­stition.

Secondly, by planting a Religious Order in the Earth, why Religion hath been brought to serve worldly ends;

And thirdly, by rendring the Mitre able to make War; why of later Ages we have had such a thing as War for Re­ligion, which till the Clergy came to be a Third State or Landlords, was never known in the World: For that some Cities of Greece, taking Arms upon the usurpation or violation of some Temple, have called it the Holy war; Thucyd. l. 1, such disputes having been but upon matter of fact, and not of faith▪ (in which every Man was free) came not to this Account. Moses was learned in all the learning of the E­gyptians, but a landed Clergy introduced he not in Israel: nor went the Apostles about to lay any such foundation of a Church. Abating this one Example of Egypt, till the [Page 57] Goths and Vandals who brought in the Third Estate, a Government, if it were unequal, consisted but of two E­states, as that of Rome, whether under the Kings or the Commonwealth consisted of the Patritians and Plebeians, or of the Nobility and the people. And an equal Com­monwealth consisteth but of One, which is the people; for Example of this, you have Lacedemon and Venice, where the people being few, and having many Subjects or Ser­vants, might also be called Nobility, as in regard of their Subjects, they are in Venice, and in regard of their Helots or Servants, they might have been in Lacedemon. That I say which introducing two Estates, causeth division, or makes a Commonwealth unequal, is not that she hath a Nobility (without which she is deprived of her most espe­cial Ornament, and weakned in her conduct) but when only the Nobility is capable of Magistracy or of the Se­nate, and where this is so ordered, she is unequal as Rome: But where the Nobility is no otherwise capable of Magi­stracy nor of the Senate, then by Election of the People, the Commonwealth consisteth but of one Order, and is Equal as Lacedemon or Venice.

But for a Polititian commend me to the Considerer, He will have Rome to have been an equal Commonwealth, and Venice to be an unequal one, which must be evinced by Wyre-drawing. For having elsewhere as hath been shewn, admitted without-opposition that the ballance of Empire is Consid. p. 16. 69. 70. well divided into national and provincial, the humour now takes him to spin that wedge into such a thred as by intang­ling of these two, may make them both easie to be broken. Hereunto he betaketh himself in this manner. As Mr. Harrington hath well observed (p. 5.) where there are two parties in a Republique with equal power, (as in that of Rome the people had one half and the Nobility had the other half) confusion and misery are there intayled. For remedy whereof, or to avoid this, there can be no way but to make the Commonwealth very unequal.

In answer to this, there will need no more then to re­peat the same things honestly. Mr. Harrington speaketh of the National ballance of Empire ( p. 5.) unto this sense, where the Nobility holdeth half the propriety or about [Page 58] that proportion, and the people the other half, (the shares of the Land may be equal; but in regard that the Nobility have much among Few, and the People little among Many; the Few will not be contented to have authority, which is all their proper share in a Commonwealth; but will be bringing the People under power, which is not their proper share in a Commonwealth; wherefore this Commonwealth must needs be unequal; and except by altering the ballance, as the Athenians did by the Sisa­cthia, or recision of debts; or as the Romans went about to do by an Agrarian, it be brought to such equality that the whole power be in the People, and there remain no more then Authority unto the Nobility) where is no remedy but the one (with perpetual fewd) will eat out the other, as the People did the Nobility in Athens, and the Nobility the People in Rome. Where the Carkass is, there will be the Eagles also; where the Riches are, there will be the Power: So if a few be as rich as all the rest, a few will have as much power as all the rest; in which case the Commonwealth is unequal, and there can be no end of staving and tayling, till it be brought unto equality. This for the National ballance; for the provincial, there power doth not follow propriety, but to the contrary. This the Praevaricator having acknowledged, lets slip, to the end that he may take a grip of Venice; which because the three or four thousand of which originally consisted, and now consisteth that whole government, having acquired Provinces, and encrease of their City by later comers, do not admit these unto participation of power, he saith is an unequal Commonwealth. He will be a Mill-Horse, whether the Cake be dough or not; for this is to draw in a circle; and Rome, which by his former arguments should have been equal, by this again must be unequal, seeing Rome as little admitted her Provinces into the body of the Commonwealth as doth Venice. This clash is but by way of Parenthesis, to return therefore unto the businesse in present Agitation.

The estates, be they one, or two, or three, are such (as was said) by vertue of the ballance, upon which the Go­vernment must naturally depend. Wherefore constitu­tively [Page 59] the Government of France (and all other Monar­chies of like ballance) was administred by an Assembly of the three Estates, and thus continued, untill that Nation being vanquished by the English, Charls the 7th. was put to such shifts, as for the recovery of himself in the greatest distresse, he could make, unto which recovery while the Estates could not be legally called, he happening to attain without them, so ordered his affairs, that his Successors by adding unto his Inventions, came to rule without this Assembly; a way not suiting with the nature of their ballance, which therefore required some Assistance by force, and other concurring Policies of like nature, whereof the forraign Guards of that Monarchy are one; The great baits alluring the Nobility another; and the Emergent interest of the Church a Third.

To begin with the last of those, the Church, except it be in a War for Religion, as when they joyned with the Princes of Lorrain; and what party of the French No­bility were made, or they could make, against the King of Navarre, are not of themselves so hot at hand, or prompt unto Arms, but the King being (to use their word) no Heretick, through their great apprehension of the third Estate, as that which is most addicted unto the Protestant Religion, may be confident, they will never side with the People: So by this Emergent interest, or accident, he hath the Church sure enough.

For the Nobility, which is exceeding gallant, this Change hath the greatest baits; for whereas the Church being not spared, the Third Estate is laden, and the Paisant overladen with taxes, the Nobility is not only at better ease in this regard, but for the greater, or more considerable part, receiveth advantage by it; the King having always, whether in peace, or war, a great Cavalry, then which there is no better in the world for the Exercise, Entertainment, and profit of the Nobility; Governments of Cities, Castles, Provinces in abundance, which he rarely distributes unto any other. The greater Nobility are Mareschals, Generals; the lesse Officers in the Armies, especially of the Horse, the Emoluments whereof they receive also in time of peace; and many of this Order [Page 60] being Pensioners, taste of the Kings liberality, without taking pains, or having any Imployment at all. By which both that France is a Monarchy by a Nobility, and how she holdeth her Nobility is apparent.

Now the Church and the Nobility standing thus in­gaged unto the King, by which means he hath two parts of the ballance to one, it is demonstrable that the Govern­ment must be quiet. Nor seeing the Church for the reason shewn is sure enough, comes the Government (since the Protestant Cities and Holds were demolished) to be other­wise disquieted then by the flying out of the Nobility, which whenever it happens in any party considerable, either for the Number, or the Interest, causeth the Crown to shake; for it seldome cometh to passe upon this occasion, but the Third Estate, or some part of it taketh Arms im­mediately. In which place it is worthy to be observed, that Wealth, according unto the distribution of the ballance, hath contrary motions. The Third Estate in France having riches, and those laden with Taxes, come to have something to lose, and something to save, which keepeth them in continual fear or hope. The Nobility holding unto the King, the Third Estate hath something to lose, which withholdeth them from Arms, through fear; but the Nobility flying out, the Third Estate hath some­thing to save, which precipitateth them into Arms through hope; whereas the Paisant having nothing to save, or to lose, to hope, or to fear, never stirs. The Case standing thus, the sufficiency of the French Politician (since the Master-piece of Cardinal Richelieu, in demolishing those walls of the Protestants, which had otherwise by this time been a refuge for the Third Estate, and perhaps overturned the Monarchy) lieth altogether in finding for the Nobility work abroad, or ballancing them in such sort at home, that if a party flie out, there may be a stronger within to reduce it, or at least to be opposed unto it. In this case, lest the Native interest of the Nobility, since the Assemblies of the three Estates were abolished, might cool the re­maining party, or make them slower in the redresse of such disorders, or discontents, then were requisite, the King is wisely provided of Forraign Guards; which being [Page 61] always in readinesse, and not obnoxious unto the Native interest, may upon like occasions be of more Expedition and trust. Being come thus unto Forraign Arms, which is the point I more especially proposed unto my self in the present discourse, One objection in relation to what hath been already said seemeth to interpose it self. Seeing France, while it is not governed by the Assembly of States, is yet of the same ballance it was, when governed by the Assembly of States; it may be said that a government of the same ballance may admit of divers Administrations.

To which I need make no other answer, then to put you in mind that while this Government was Natural, or ad­ministred by the Assembly of States, it is celebrated by Machiavel, to have been the best order'd of any Monarchy in the world; and that what it is, or hath been of later times, you may believe your own eyes or ears.

There be yet, before I can come unto Forraign Guards, Of Arms, and their kind. some praevious considerations; All government as is im­plied by what hath been already shewn, is of these three kinds. A government of Servants. A government of Subjects; Or a government of Citizens. The first is absolute Monarchy, as that of Turkey: The second Aristocratical Monarchy, as that of France: The third a Commonwealth, as those of Israel, of Rome, of Holland. Now (to follow Machiavel in part) of these, The Government of Servants is the harder to be conquer'd, and the Easier to be held. The Government of Subjects is the easier to be conquer'd, and the harder to be held. To which I shall presume to add, That the Government of Citizens is both the hardest to be conquer'd, and the hardest to be held.

My Authors reasons why a Government of Servants is the hardest to be conquerd, come to this, that they are under perpetual discipline and command, void of such interests and factions, as have hands or power to lay hold upon advantages or innovation, whence he that invades the Turk must trust unto his own strength, and not rely upon disorders in the Government, or forces which he shall be sure enough to find united.

His reason why this Government, being once broken, is easily held, are, That the Armies once past hope of [Page 62] rallying, there being no such thing as Families hanging together, or Nobility to stir up their Dependants, unto far­ther reluctancy for the present, or to preserve themselves by complacence with the Conquerors, for future discontents or advantages, he that hath won the Garland, hath no more to doe but to extinguish the Royal line, and were it ever after in security. For the People having been always slaves, are such whose Condition he may better, in which case they are gainers by their Conquerer, but can never make worse, and therefore they loose nothing by him. Hence Alexander having conquer'd the Persian Empire, he and his Captains after him could hold it without the least dispute, except it arose among themselves. Hence Maho­met the second having taken Constantinople, and put Paleo­logus the Greek Emperor (whose Government was of like Nature with the Persian) together with his whole Family unto the Sword, the Turk hath held that Empire without reluctancy.

On the other side, reasons why a Government of Sub­jects is easilier conquer'd, are these. That it is supported by a Nobility so Antient, so powerful, and of such hold and influence upon the People, that the King without dan­ger, if not ruine to himself or the Throne (an Example whereof was given in Hen. 7th of England) can neither invade their Priviledges, nor level their Estates, which re­maining, they have power upon every discontent to call in an Enemy, as Robert Count of Artois did the English, and the Duke of Guise the Spaniard into France.

The Reasons why a Government of Subjects being so easily conquer'd, is neverthelesse the harder to be held, are these. That the Nobility being soon out of counte­nance in such a case, and repenting themselves of such a bargain, have the same means in their hands whereby they brought in the Enemy, to drive him out, as those of France did both the English and the Spaniard.

For the Government of Citizens, as it is of two kinds, an Equal or an unequal Commonwealth, the Reasons why it is the hardest to be conquer'd, are also of two kinds; As first the Reasons why a Government of Citi­zens where the Commonwealth is equal, is hardest to be [Page 63] conquer'd, are, that the Invader of such a Society must not only trust unto his own strength, in as much as the Commonwealth being equal, he must needs find them united, but in regard that such Citizens, being all Soul­diers or trained up unto their Arms, which they use not for the defence of Slavery but of Liberty (a Condition not in this world to be better'd) they have more especially upon this occasion the highest Soul of Courage, and (if their Territory be of any Extent,) the vastest Body of a well disciplin'd Militia, that is possible in Nature; where­fore an Example of such an One overcome by the Arms of a Monarch, is not to be found in the World: And if some small City of this Frame have happen'd to be vanquisht by a potent Commonwealth, this is her Prerogative, her Towers are her Funeral Pile, and she expireth in her own Flame, leaving nothing unto Conquest but her Ashes, as Sag [...]ntum overwhelmed by Carthage, and Numantia by Rome.

The Reasons why a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is unequal, is next the former, the hardest to be conquer'd are the same, with this difference, that al­beit her Peace be not perfect within, her Condition is not to be better'd by any thing that is without; Wherefore Rome in all her strife never call'd in an Enemy; and if an Enemy upon occasion of her strife, and hopes of advantage by it, came without calling, he presented her with her most Soveraign Cure, who had no leisure to destroy her self, till having no Enemy to find her work, she became her own.

Nor is there any Example that a Government of this kind was ever subdued by the Arms of a Monarch; though some indeed may be found that have called or suffer'd Forraign Princes or Force to come in, as Holland by Marriages of their Princes, and Genoa through her Facti­ons, as those of the Fiesci and Adorni.

To conclude this part for the Reasons why a Govern­ment Cuic. l. 11. of Citizens so acquir'd or possest as through Marri­age, [Page 64] or faction is the hardest to be held, there needs no more then that Men accustomed unto their Arms and their Libertys will never endure the yoak; Wherefore the Spaniard, though a mighty King, no sooner began in Hol­land, a small Commonwealth, to innovate or break her Orders, then she threw him off with such Courage and Disdain, as is Admirable unto the World. And somewhat of the like kind did Genoa by the help of her Doria in the vindication of her liberty from France.

To come by this farthest way about as I think the near­est way home. Arms are of two sorts, Proper or Improper; Proper and improper Arms. that is, Native or Forraign.

Proper and Native Arms, are according unto the triple nature of Government, of three kinds; Servants in Arms, as the Helots in Lacedemon, the Timariots and Janizaries in Turkey: Subjects in Arms, as the Horse in France, and the Sea-guards or Forces in Venice: or Citizens in Arms, as those upon the Lexiarcha in Athens, of the Morae in La­cedemon, and the Legions in Rome.

Auxiliaries are such as are supply'd by vertue of some League, as were those of the Latines and Italians unto the Romans; and those of the Cantons of Suisse (except Zurick) unto the King of France; or they may be such as are oc­casionally lent freely, or let forth for money by one State unto another, the later whereof differ not much from Mercenaries.

Mercenaries are Souldiers of Fortune that have no other Trade then their Arms, and let out themselves for money; of such consisted the greatest part of the Carthaginian strength, such is the land Force of Venice, and notwith­standing the Antient League of France with those Nations, such at this day are the Suisse and Scottish Guards (and sometimes a good part of the Foot) in France.

Machiavil discourseth upon these particulars in his Art of War, unto Admiration: by whom I shall therefore steer.

Where the Arms in bulk are proper, and consisting of Citizens, they have other Trades; and therefore are no [Page 65] Souldiers of Fortune; and yet because the Commonwealth hath Arms for her▪ Trade (in regard she is a Magistrate given for the good of Mankind, and beareth not her Sword in vain) they are all educated as well in Military as Civil discipline, taking their turns in service of either Nature according unto the Occasion, and the Orders of the Com­monwealth, as in Israel, Athens, Lacedemon and Rome, which had if their Territories permitted, and sometimes (as I may say) whether their Territories permitted or no, as in Israel, the vastest the highest temper'd & the best disciplin'd Militia, that is to be found in the whole compass of Story. Some Armies of Israel have consisted of three or four hundred thousand Men: Rome upon the rumour of a Gal­lick tumult, armed in Italy only, without Forraign aid, Pliny L. Aemi­lio Papo. C. A. tilio Regulo Cos. seventy thousand Horse and seven hundred thousand Foot; things in our days (when the Turk can hardly Arm half so many) not to be credited.

Hence that a Commonwealth, which had not first broken her self, or been broken by some other Common­wealth, should not be found to have been conquer'd by the Armes of any Monarch, is not miraculous but a natural effect of an apparent Cause. In this place, or upon this text, Divines whom I would desire not to be Enemies of Popular power, but to give Machiavil his due, shall, if they please, hear him make a goodly Sermon, in these words. If Antient Commonwealths and Governments used diligence Arte della guerra Proem. in any other Order to make their people Lovers of peace, faithfully unto their Countrey, and having the fear of God before their eyes, they doubled it in this of their Militia: for of whom should your Countrey expect greater faith, then of such as have offer'd themselves to die for her? whom should she endeavour to make greater Lovers of peace, then them who only can enslave her by force? In whom should there be grea­ter Fear of God, then in such as carry their lives in their hands? This when Lawgivers and Captains rightly con­sidered, was the Cause why Souldiers were esteemed honour'd, followed and imitated above all men in the world, whereas since such Orders are broken, and Custome is altogether de­viated from the course of Antient prudence; men are come to detest the iniquity of the Campe, and fly the conversation of [Page 66] such as are in Arms, as the Pestilence. Where the Arms in bulk are proper, but consist of Subjects, they are the best next; and but the best next as appears by all Examples, Antient, or Modern. The Arms with which Pyrrhus Prince of Epyrus invaded the Romans were of Subjects, yet that Prince though he were not vanquished by the Romans, confessed their advantage, and gave them over. The Spaniard, being a far more potent King then was Pyrrhus, hath acknowledged as much unto the Hollanders, though a far less Commonwealth then Rome: So have the Princes of Austria, and of Burgundy, unto the Switz. That the Arms of Subjects are nevertheless as much superior to the Arms of Servants, as inferior to the Armes of Citizens, is as plaine; Seeing as Alexander, with Thirty thousand Sub­jects, vanquished Darius having innumerable slaves; so Thirty thousand Christians are at this day a Match for any Army of Turks; and we see Venice, whose force by Sea consists of Subjects, to have made him quit that Element near as fully unto her Dominion or Empire, as did the Persian to Athens.

To Arms, that are proper, but consist of Servants, all the preheminence that can be given, is that they are better then forraign Arms; a proof whereof we have in those of Selimus, whereby he conquered the Mamalucks; who being but a forraign Force that held Egypt in subjection, the Countrey was irrecoverably lost, and (for the reasons al­ready shewn) as easily kept.

Improper Arms, whether Auxiliary or Mercenary, where the Force of a Prince or of a Commonwealth consisteth, for the bulk or greater part, of no other, are the least effe­ctual, and the most dangerous of all. For Auxiliaries, or what effect hath been found of them by Princes or Com­monwealths, it was seen in France, during the League by the Spaniard; and in Holland during the Reign of Queen Elizabeth, by the English; but especially in the Goths and Vandals, who having been Auxiliaries or Mercenaries rely'd upon by the later Emperors, came thereby to ruine the Roman Empire.

Mercenaries, who make their Arms their Trade, must of all other be the most pernicious; for what can we expect [Page 67] lesse of such whose Art is not otherwise so profitable, then that they should (as Machiavil shews) be breakers of their faith, given up unto rapine, Enemies of peace and Govern­ment?

To instance in some Commonwealths, that of Carthage after her first war with the Romans, fell through the Re­bellion of Spendius, and Matho, Ring-leaders of her Mercenaries, into another that was far more dangerous. Of such a Dilemma were the Arms of this State, that if Hannibal had conquered Rome, he must have been King of Carthage; and not conquering Rome, Carthage was ruin'd. The Commonwealth of Milan, trusting her self unto F. Sforza, and his mercenaries, became the Subject of her Servant, and he her Duke. Nor is Venice, whose Land forces are of the same kind, otherwise in safety, as to these, then by her situation. To give some instances of the same nature in Princes. The father of F. Sforza, being Captain of a like Mercenary Army, forced Joan Queen of Naples, whom he left disarm'd in the midst of her enemies, to lay her self at the feet of the King of Aragon; and Braccio by such another treachery had plainly possessed himself of the Kingdome of Naples, had he not been broken at Aquila, where death intercepted his design. From what hath been said, first of Government and then of Arms; if a Government of servants be harder to be conquer'd, and easier to be held, then in this Forraign Arms must needs be least necessary, and most dan­gerous.

If a Government of Subjects be easier to be conquered, and harder to be held, then in this Forraign Arms may be more necessary, but must be lesse dangerous.

But though a Government of Citizens be both hardest to be conquered, and hardest to be held, yet as it is, again in this regard, of two kinds, this cannot be said of each kind alike, wherefore I must distinguish.

In a Government of Citizens, if the Commonwealth be not for encrease, but preservation only, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Venice, Forraign Arms are both necessary and dangerous; but in a Government of Citizens, where the Commonwealth is both for increase and preservation, as [Page 68] Rome, Forraign Arms are neither necessary, nor dan­gerous.

To Repeat the parts of this Conclusion, which being brief, is obscure, more fully and particularly.

The Empire of Turkey is of the harder kind to be con­quer'd, wherefore the Turk needeth not forraign guards, to defend him, but it is of the easier to be held, wherefore let him take heed of intrusting his person with Forraign Guards, who having a forraign interest, may have a forraign Nation to assist them; and so the person of the Prince being in their hands, they have no more to do then to Extinguish the Royal Line, and the Empire, being easily held, is their own thenceforth with security. Thus the Mamalucks which were at first Forraign Guards, extinguishing the Royal line of the Kings of Aegypt, came to possesse, and hold that Realm without opposition. Who well considers this point, will never enough admire the policy of the Turk, in the creation (as it were) of his Janizaries, free from any National interest that might make them dream of, or desire liberty, and yet soevoid of all forraign interest, or knowledge, that they know not what, or who were their Country or Parents. Hence though they have interest to murther the Turk, and some­times do accordingly, they have no farther interest in the world, but what depends upon the Government; and so the Empire is safe, though the Prince be in danger; whereas if they were Forraign Guards, or had any Native interest, not only the Prince, but the Empire too would be in danger, the rest being servants, and such whose con­dition might be bettered by a Change, but could be no worse. Wherefore a Government of Servants must by no means admit of Forraign Guards, or Mamalucks.

But the Empire of France, where the Nobility are not only subject to flie out, but to call in strangers, may have use of Forraign Guards, which not obnoxious to Native interest, and factions, as those of the Nobility, are the readiest and best help at this lift, yet not dangerous, though having the Prince in their power, because by him they are safe from the Nobility, who, were it not for the Prince, would be so far from bearing or brooking Forraign [Page 69] Guards, that in case a Forraigner came in upon their call, having the same means to help themselves, whereby they brought him in, they would shake the yoak, and the Ends why they called him in being satisfied or repented of, drive him out again, as they did the Spaniard, and the English; but if this Government being invaded or con­quered, be so hard to be kept, how much harder being surprized? Wherefore in a Government by Subjects Forraign Arms may be more necessary, but must be lesse dangerous.

In a Commonwealth for preservation, as Lacedemon, Carthage, Venice, Forreign Arms are necessary: So Lace­mon, though able to defend her self by her proper forces against any one City; yet the wars in Greece going much upon leagues and Confederates, was forced also to make use of her Confederates, and sometimes of her Helots.

But as anciently to Carthage, so now to Venice, Forreign or Mercenary Forces are essential, because for Land-service such a Constitution can have no other: Yet is this course extreamly dangerous, as appeared by Lacedemon, who (being ever in fear of her Helots) when she had acquir'd upon the matter the whole Empire of Greece, came by the rebellion of her Confederates, not only to lose all, but to ruine. For Carthage upon the Mutiny of Spendius & Ma­tho, she escaped as at other times upon like occasions, very narowly. That such an accident neither hath befallen Venice nor can befall her, is to be attributed unto her situation, by which, in this regard, she is secure: Neverthelesse, her progresse, or increase, which by this means either cannot be great, or being great, must render her but the more infirm, is full bard.

To a Commonwealth for increase, which always taketh in the whole body of the People, Forraign Arms (seeing she aboundeth above all other kinds of policy, with such as are proper) must needs be the least necessary; and they are the most safe, because never admitting them, but for her meer convenience, and frugality in expense of Native bloud, she receiveth no such charge of them as can recoyl, but must carry point blank, and as vigorously at her proper interest, very neer as her proper Arms. Thus did the Latine and Italian Auxiliaries, of which joyned with [Page 70] the Roman Legions, consisted a Consular Army.

By thus much it seemeth that an inference from the success of Arms unto the perfection of Government, and from the perfection of Government, to the successe of Arms, should be no fallacious way of disputing.

But this hath been sweaty work with▪ the Considerer; (who loves his ease) it is enough to argue thus. The Switz, Scottish, and French guards, have never been the Authors of any sedition, therefore the seditiousnesse of a Nobility may be mended by Forraign Guards; which is, as if one should say, such a Physitian hath never been the cause of the Gout; therefore the Gout may be cured by such a Physitian. That Forraign Arms may be well enough applied in the case of a seditious Nobility, and have some good effects, is not denied, but is France therefore cured of her sedition, or remains she notwithstanding her Forraign Guards, the most sedious example in the world? If thus she have not been, nor be, what hath he read of the Princes of the bloud in former times, or heard of late from them? But if thus she have been, and be, is it not a fine way of cure to give us an example of the disease for the remedy? Nor are her Guards so void of sedition neither; but the Switz, if he want his pay, dares threaten Paris; the Scot (at least of late years) hath not been so bold; but if a Prince flie out, the Ensigns of the French Guards will one way or other be Captains, while Souldier and Officer too follows his affections or interests, which way soever they frame. I should be glad to know when a Dragon fell from that Court, that did not bear down stars with his train. But the Prevaricator is set upon it, whereas of late years, the Janizaries are known to have been far more imbrued in the bloud of their Princes then ever: he gives us his honest word, that of late years in Turkey, they begin to learn the art of poising the Janizaries (who are the foot of the Princes Guard) by the Spahyes, (who are the horse of the same) and so have frequently evaded the danger of their mutinies. At which rate, seeing every Army consisteth of Horse and Foot, no Army could be mutinous. If these had not been meer slights, and so intended, he might have done well to have shewn us One Mutiny of the Janizaries appeased by the Spahyes. But all the parts of his Politicks (as was [Page 71] said of those in Rhetorick) consist of Pronunciation.

Thus the wounds of Monarchy, notwithstanding the former, or this last remedy of Forraign Guards, are still bleeding, or festering.

But his courage is undaunted, ( aut viam inveniat aut faciat) he will either mend a Government, or make one, by asserting without any example, but with egregious Consid. p. 48. 49. confidence, That the perfection of Monarchy is free from those flaws, which are charged upon it, and that it consists in go­verning by a Nobility, weighty enough to keep the People under, yet not tall enough in any particular person to measure with the Prince; and by a Moderate Army kept under the Notion of Guards, and Garrisons, which may be sufficient to strangle all sedition in the Cradle, from which mixture, or Counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army, ariseth the most excellent form of Monarchical Government.

There's for your learning now, A Model which is a short horse, and a Legislator that hath soon curried him. To the parts of it, consisting of a Nobility, and in force, I have already spoken severally. I shall now speak unto the whole together; that is, unto the imagined mixture or Counterpoise of a Nobility and an Army; and because there is nothing in Nature, that hath not had a natural effect by some example.

The scale of Arms, or of Iron, continued in the Line of William the Conqueror, and the scale of Propiety, or gold, continued in the Barons of England, and their Successors. But in this, before the Barons wars consisted not the perfection of the Monarchy, because it preponde­rated too much on the side of Arms; nor after the Barons wars, because the King, putting power (which he could not keep out of their fingers) into the hands of the Nobility, it became a vicious constitution, and a Monarchy only in Name, (so saith the Considerer) therefore the ballance being then only even, when neither the King could over-ballance, or get the better of the Barons, nor the Barons over-ballance, or get the better of the King; the perfection of Monarchy consisted in the Barons wars! Lycurgus the Second!

Mark; the King by all means must have a Nobility weighty enough to keep down the people; and then he must [Page 72] have an Army to hold gold weight with his Nobility; as if the Nobility in that case would keep down the People, and not fetch them up (as did the Barons) into their scale, that so together they might weigh down the Army; which sooner or later is the infallible consequence of this phantasie; or let it be shewn where it was ever otherwise; to instance in France is quite contrary, where all the con­siderable offices, and commands being in the Nobility, or the richer sort of that Nation, the ballance of Arms, and of propriety are not two, but one and the same. There is no way for Monarchy, but to have no Army, or no other then the Nobility, which maketh the regulated Monarchy, as in France, Spain, &c. or to have an Army that may weigh down Nobility and People too; that is, destroy them both, which maketh the absolute way of Monarchy, as in Turkey; the wit of man never found, nor shall find a third, there being no such thing in Nature.

This Chapter is already with the longest, and yet I must give you a (corollary pouce de roy, or) Piece above mea­sure; upon a question which the greenest Politician that ever brought his Verjuce to the Presse, hath spurr'd me.

Where he desires to know my opinion of the way of go­verning by Councils, which he confesseth he hath always thought admirable; he doth not mean such as are co-ordinate with the Prince (which have been seen in the world) but such Consid. p. 49. 50. as those of Spain, purely of advice and dispatch, with power only to inform and perswade, not limit the Princes will. For almost all the weaknesses which have been thought incident to Monarchy, are by this course prevented, and if there be any steadinesse and maturity in the Senate of a Commonwealth, this takes it all in.

To give my Counsel without a fee, and deal sincerely with a Prevaricator: Let the Prince (that is, such an one as his) hold himself contented with his Divan, or Cabinet. If this be that he means, we are agreed; but if he would have more, I can make no lesse of his words, then an han­kering after such Councils as I have proposed, and that these are such as he always thought admirable, such as pre­vent almost all the weaknesses incident to Monarchy, and take in the steadinesse and maturity of a Commonwealth.

How may we make this agree with that other place? [Page 73] where he saith that there is no frame of laws, or constitution of government, which will not decay and come to ruine, unlesse repaired by the prudence and dexterity of them that govern. Now that this may not be expected from a Monarch, as well as Consid. p. 68. from a Senate, or assembly of men, he hath not yet met with any conviction, but rather finds it reasonable to think that where debates are cleerest, the result of them most secret, and the execution suddain, (which are the advantages of Mo­narchy) there the disorders of a State will soonest be disco­vered, and the necessary remedies best applied. In that former place he bethought himself, that the debates of Rome were as clear as those of Antiochus, that her results were as secret as those of Philip, or Perseus, and of more suddain execution then either of theirs. He doubted it might be true, which is affirmed by good Authors, and commonly enough known, that for the clearnesse of debate, and se­crecy of result, the world never saw any thing like the Senate of Venice, and that in all apparence they are for execution, as quick with the Divan, as the Divan can be with them. Now when all this is done, to banish so ge­nerous thoughts without shewing us for what cause, and knock under the table, is sad news. But he shall find me, in any thing that is reasonable, most ready to serve him. To the question then, how such Councils as I have pro­posed would do with a Prince? I answer, truly the best of them, I doubt, but untowardly. One, that is the Po­pular Assembly, hath no mean, but is either the wisest in Nature, or hath no brains at all. When affairs go upon no other then the Publick interest, this having no other interest to follow, nor eyes to see withal, is the wisest Council: but such ways are destructive to a Prince, and they will have no nay: The Congregation of Israel, when Rehoboam would not hearken to their advice, deposed him: and we know what Popular Councils, so soon as they came to sufficient power, did in England. If a Prince put a Po­pular Council from this ward, He does a great matter, and to little purpose, for they understand nothing else but themselves. Wherefore the Kings of France and of Spain, have dissolved all such Assemblies. It is true, where a Prince is not strong enough to get money out of them, but by their cocsent, they are necessary, but then they are not [Page 74] purely of advice and dispatch, but share in the Government, and he cannot be meddling with their Purses, but they will be meddling with his Laws. The Senate is of fitter use for a Prince, and yet except he have the way of Tiberius, but a ticklish piece, as appears by Maximinus, who was destroyed by Pupienus and Balbinus, Captains set up against him by this Order. To go unto the Root. These things are not otherwise in prudence or choice then by direction of the ballance; where this is Popular no remedy, the Prince must be advised by the People, which if the late King would have endured, the Monarchy might have subsisted somewhat longer, but while the ballance was Aristocrati­cal, as during the great Estates of the Nobility and the Clergy, we find not the People to have been great or wise Counsellors. In sum, if a King govern by a Popular Council, or an house of Commons, the Throne will not stand long. If he governs by a Senate, or an house of Lords, let him never fear the Throne, but have a care of himself: there is no third as I have said often enough but the Divan.

CHAP. X. Whether a Commonwealth that was not first broken by her self, were ever conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch?

I Come in this Chapter to resume the discourse, where I broke off in the former, making good my assertion that a Commonwealth is the Goverment, which from the beginning of the world unto this day was never conquer'd by any Monarch; For if the Commonwealths of Greece came under the yoak of the Kings of Macedon, they were first broken by themselves.

When I speak of a Commonwealth, in relation to this point, I am no more to be argued against out of the Little Cities in Asia, or those of Ragusa, and San Marino, which cannot be shewn to have had the Command of any consi­derable Army, then I argue against the Praevaricator, where he asserts Monarchy to consist of a mixture of Arms and of a Nobility, from the King of Yuetot who had neither.

This assertion in the judgement of any rational Man [Page 75] ought not to be encountered, but where there was a Natu­ral possbility of defence, in regard that a City which hath no Army at all, as Geneva (which yet being invaded by the Duke of Savoy found means to defend her self) or such an one as is not considerable, should be subdued by some potent Monarch (if we could find the Example) concerns the Government no more, then if it had been overwhel­med by some inundation, or swallowed up by some Earthquake. And yet all that is Opposed by the Consi­derer, amounts not unto thus much. The testimony he brings out of Pausanias comes far short; for it is recorded (saith the Author speaking of the Lucedemonians) that be­ing corrupted by the bounty of Craesus, they were the first that Consid p. 53. Paus. Messen. contracted Amity with the Barbarians at the time when that King added the Territories inhabited by the Dorians upon the border of Caria, with other Commonwealths in Asia unto his Empire. So that Craesus corrupted the Lacedemonians with gifts, Pausanias is express, but whether he obtain'd the Asiatick Cities (likely in this case to have been easilier corrupted then the Lacedemonians) by Arms or by Pur­chase, he is not express; and the presumption of the later, as in other regards, so in this is the stronger; that Craesus by the te­stimony of Solon, was more potent in Gold then in Iron. Now if it were so, (and if otherwise let the Considerer shew) that these Commonwealths, inveagled by the Trea­sure of Craesus, came first under the Lydian, and fell with that under the Persian Empire, when Craesus was subdued by Cyrus; All I can learn by this example is no more than that Craesus, for ought that is perceivable, might have bought those Commonwealths as Cosimo of Medices did Florence; of whom it is affirm'd by Machiavel that there was not a considerable Man in the whole City that had not re­ceived some considerable sum. So this Example presumes; but in the next (which is of Sicily) there is not so much as a Presumption in favour of the Assertor, The State of Si­cily before that which the Romans call the first Carthagi­nian war being clear in Story against his design. For that Africa for the generation of Monsters is not more famous Fazello Hist. de Sicil Polyb. l. 1. then Sicily for that of Tyrants, they who have passed their Novitiat in Story are not ignorant; nor how when Timo­leon had freed her of this Vermine, and with Liberty she [Page 76] had recovered some strength and virtue, she relapsed under Agathocles and his horrid violation of faith, while he was trusted with the Arms of her Citizens: how after him Pyrrhus was called in from Epirus, after Pyrrhus Hiero usurped; all, by the same Arts, getting first into Trust or Charge, and then recoyling upon them that would take no warning: by which it is apparent that the Common­wealths of Sicily, like those of Greece, were ruin'd by them­selves, and their own disorders; and no more subdu'd upon these changes by forraign Arms, then was Israel by the Canaanites, or Rome by the Gauls or Decemvirs.

Israel (having broken her orders) was indeed sometimes opprest by the Canaanites; Rome was sacked by the Gauls, and usurped by the Decemvirs, but as the Man that having gotten a fall in a Duel throws off his Adversary, recovers himself, and his sword, is not conquer'd, so neither the Com­monwealth; wherefore neither Holland nor Genoa, though Decree of the States of Hol­land apud Grot. Hist. 4. they have been under, being yet standing, can be said to be conquer'd by the Arms of Spain or of France, but ra­ther to the contrary, seeing the Liberty of Holland (in many Cities more Antient then any Records or other Mo­numents there can witness, and in it self then that of Ta­citus, whereby Civilis born of Princely bloud, is affirmed to have vindicated the Batavian freedome) is still the same; And Genoa though happy in her Doria, remaineth as she was before he was born. Nor did the Family of the Me­dices banished out of Florence where by virtue of their pro­digious wealth, and the inevitable consequence of the bal­lance their Ancestors had been Princes many years before Charles the fifth was a Souldier, any more by the help of his Arms, those of the Pope (at that time of the same family) and their party at home, then get into their known saddle. To insist a little more at large upon the Stories of Genoa & Florence (because upon these the Prevanicator sets up his rest that Mr, Harrington must needs be afflicted) Genoa was and is an Oligarchy consisting of Twenty eight Families making the Great Council or Aggregation as they call it, none but these being capable of the Senate or of Magistra­cy and if ever it could be said of a Commonwealth that she had broken her self, it might be said at the time rela­ted to, of Genoa where not only the faction of the Guelphs and Gybelins, which had destroyed many Cities in Italy then [Page 77] reigned, but the few'd between the People included, and the Subject excluded, was as great as ever had been between the Nobility and the People in Rome, besides that of the Fieschi and the Adorni two families, like Caesar and Pompey, which having many years together, as it were ingrost the Magistracy of Duke, were neverthelesse perpetually striving each with other, which should have it, and if one of these (as it did) brought in the King of France, there is nothing plainer then that this Common­wealth, was subdued by her own sedition, nor is there a man knowing any thing of her affaires, that maketh any doubt of it. That of Florence in deed if the Praevari­cator could shew it had been ever up, I should grant were down, but to relate the Story of this City, I must relate that of the House of Medices. From Cosimo, a Comines. P. Jovius. Ma­chiavill. Citizen famous throughout Europe both for his wisdome and his riches, this family for the space of sixty years, ex­ercised, under the praetext of some Magistracy, very great power in Florence. To Cosimo succeded Peter, to Peter Laurence a Man in Prudence and Liberality resembling his Grandfather, save that he used more absolute power in menaging the Common-wealth, yet with gentlenesse, and not altogether unto the suppression of Liberty. Neverthe­less he obtained of the Siginory (which did for the most part as he would have them) some small guard for his person, he was a Man renowned through Italy, and looked up­on by foreigne Princes with much respect. To him suc­ceeded his Son another Peter who through youth and rash­ness conceiving the power exercised by his Predecessors to be no more than his due, took upon him the Goverment as absolute Lord of All, and standing most formidably up­on his Guard grew sottishly profuse of the Publick money, committed many absurdities and violences; By which means having incurred the hatred of the Citizens, he was banished by the Signiory, with Cardinal John and Julian his brothers. This John coming after to be Pope Leo the Tenth, required the revocation of his brothers banish­ment, and the restitution of the House of Medices, to which finding the prevailing party of the Florentines to be refracto­ry, He stirred up the Armes of the Emperor Charles the [Page 82] fifth against them, by whose Joynt Ayd the City, after a long siedge, was reduced unto her Old Ward, and Alexander of Medices, Nephew unto the Pope and son in Law unto the Emperor, set in the known Saddle of his Ancestors. This is the Action for which the Praevaricator will have a Com­mon-wealth to have been conquered by the Armes of a Monarch, though who reades the story may very safely af­firm, First that Florence never attained unto any such Or­ders as could deserve the Name of a Common-wealth; and next that the purse of Cosimo had done that long before, which is here attributed unto the Armes of the Pope and the Emperour. Reason and Experience (as I said) are like the roots and the branches of Plants and trees: as of bran­ches fruits and flowers being open and obvious unto the eye, the smell, the touch, and tast every gyrle can skill; so examples unto vulgar capacity are the best Arguments. Let him that saith a Common-wealth hath been at any time conquer'd by a Monarch, to it gain, and shew us the Example. But though fruits and flowers be easily known each from other; their Rootes are latent, and not only so, but of such resemblance that to distinguish of these a man must be a Gardiner or an Herbalist. In this manner, the reason why a Common-wealth, hath not been overcome by a Monarch, hath been shewn in the distribution of Armes, those of a Prince consisting of Subjects or servants, & those of a Common-wealth rightly Order'd, of Citizens, which difference relates plainly unto the perfection or im­perfection of the Goverment.

But, sayes the Prevaricator this seemes intended for a Try­all Consid. p, 51. of our Noses whether they will serve us to discover the falla­cy of an inference from the prosperous successe of Armes to the perfection of Government. If she who should have some care of the Vineyard of Truth, shall lye pigging of wide bores, to grunt in this manner and fear with the tush, and I happen to ring some of them (as I have done this Marcassin for rooring) there is nothing in my faith, why such tryall of their Noses should be sin; but for fallacions in­ferrences such I leave unto them whose Capps are squarer then their play.

[Page 77]For all that, Great and well policyd Empires (saith he) have been subverted by People so eloigned from the perfection of government, that we scarce know of any thing to tye them together, but the desire of booty. Where, or how came he to know this? what reason or experience doth he alledge for the proof of it? May we not say of this, it is for the tryal of our Noses, whether they will serve us to discover that a Conclusion should have some Premisses? He gives us leave to go look, and all the premisses that I can finde are quite contrary.

The Arms of Israel were alwayes victorious, till the Judges ch. 1. & 2. death of Josua, whereupon, the orders of that Common­wealth being neglected, they came afterwards to be sel­dom prosperous. Isocrates in his Oration to the Areopa­gites, speaks thus of Athens, The Lacedemonians, who when we were under Oligarchy, every day commanded us something; now while we are under popular Administration, are our Peti­tioners that we would not see them utterly ruined by the The­bans. Nor did Lacedemon ruine till her Agrarian, the foundation of her Government was first broken. The Arms of Rome (ever noted by Historians, and clearly evin­ced Arte della guerra▪ by Machiavil to have been the result of her policy) during the popular government were at such a pitch, as if Victory had known no other wings then those of her Eagles: nor seeing the Gothes and Vandalls are the Legisla­tors from whom we derive the government of King, Lords, and Commons, were these when they overcame the Ro­man Empire, a people so eloigned from the perfection of Go­vernment, but their Policy was then farre better than that of the Emperors, which having been at first founded upon a broken Senate, and a few Military Colonies, was now come unto a Cabinet, and a Mercenary Army. The Judge­ment of all ages and writers upon the Policy of the Ro­man Emperors, is in this place worthy, and through the pains already taken by Erasmus and Sleiden, easie to be in­serted. O miserable and deplorable State (saith Erasmus) the In his Preface▪ to Suelonius. Authority of the Senate, the power of the Law, the Liberty of the People being troden under-foot; to a Prince, that got up in this manner, the whole World was a servant, while he him­self was a servant unto such, as no honest man would have [Page 78] endured the like servants in his house! the Senate dreaded the Senate dreaded the Emperor, the Emperor dreaded his execrable Militia: the Em­peror gave Lawes unto Kings, and received them from his Mercenaries. To this is added by Sleiden, That the con­dition De qual. Imp. of these Princes was so desperate, it was a wonderful thing, Ambition her self could have the courage to run such a hazard; seeing from Cajus Caesar slain in the Senate to Charles the Great, there had been above thirty of them mur­thered, and four that had layd violent hands upon themselves; For there was alway something in them that offended the Soul­diery which whether they were good or bad was equally sub­ject to pick quarrels, upon the least occasion raised tumults, and dispatcht even such of them as they had forced to accept of that dignity, for example▪ Aelius Pertinax. But, if this be true, that of the Gothes and Vandalls, when they subdued this Em­pire, must have been the better Government; for so ill as this never was there any, except that only of the Kings of Israel, which certainly was much worse. Those of the Britains and the Gauls, were but the dregs of this of Rome, when they were overcome by the Saxons and Franks, who brought in the Policy of the Gothes and Vandalls.

When Tamerlan overcame Bajazet, the Turkish Policy had not attain'd unto that extent of Territory, which is plainly necessary unto the nature of it, nor was the Order of the Janizaries yet instituted. The Hollander, who under a potent Prince, was but a Fisherman, with the restitution of the popular government, is become the better Soul­dier; nor hath been matcht but by a rising Common­wealth, whose Policy you will say was yet worse: but then her ballance (being that especially which produceth men) was farre better. For vastness, for fruitfulness of terri­tory, for bodies of men, for number, for courage, nature never made a Country more potent then Germany: yet this Nation anciently the Seminary of Nations, hath of late years, meerly through the defect of her policy (which in tending one Common wealth hath made an hundred Monarchies in her bowels, whose crosse interests twist her gutts) been the theater of the saddest Tragedies under the Sun; nor is she curable unless some Prince alling to work with the Hammer of Warre, be able totally to de­stroy [Page 79] the old, and forge her a Government intirely new. But, if this come to be, neither shall it be said, that a well polycy'd Empire was subverted, nor by a people so eloigned from perfection of government, but theirs must be much better then the other. Let me be as ridiculous as you will, the World is ( in faece Romuli) ripe for great changes which must come. And look to it, whe­ther it be Germany, Spain, France, Italy, or England, that comes first to fix her self upon a firm foundation of policy, she shall give law unto, and be obey'd by the rest There was never so much fighting as of late dayes to so little purpose; Arms, except they have a root in poli­cy, are altogether fruitless. In the Warre between the King and the Parliament, not the Nation only, but the policy of it was divided, and which part of it was upon the better foundation?

But saith he, Ragusa and San Marino are commended for Consid. p. 51. their upright and equal frame of Government, and yet have hardly extended their Dominion, beyond the size of an handsom Mannor.

Have Ragusa, or San Marino been conquer'd by the Arms of any Monarch? For this (I take it) is the Questi­on; though, if they had, these being Common wealths unarmed, it were nothing to the purpose. The question of encrease is another point. Lacedemon could not increase (because her frame was of another nature) without ruine; yet was she not conquer'd by any Monarch.

Come, come says he for all this. It is not the perfection of Consid. p. 52. Government, but the populousness of a Nation, the natural va­lour of the Inhabitants, the abundance of Horses, Arms, and o­ther things necessary for equipping of an Army, assisted with a good Military Discipline, that qualifie a People for Con­quest; and where these concur, Victory is intayled upon them, Very fine▪

As if these could concur any otherwise then by vertue of the policy. For example, there is no Nation under Hea­ven more populous then France. Yet saith Sir Francis Ba­con, If the Gentlemen be too many, the Commons will be base, Essay 29. and not the hundredth Pole fit for an Helmet, as may be seen by comparison of England with France, whereof the former, [Page 80] though far lesse in Territory and Populousness; hath been never­theless the over-match; in regard the middle People in England make good Souldiers which the Paisants in France do not. This therefore was from the Policy, by which the one hath been the freest, and the other the most inslaved Subject in the World, and not from populousness, in which case, France must have been the Over match.

The like is observable in the natural valour of the people, there being no greater courage of an Infantry, then that of the middle people in England, whereas the Paisant having none at all, is never used in Arms. Again, France hath one of the best Cavalries in the World, which the English never had, yet it availed her not. Victory is more especially intayl'd upon courage, and courage upon liber­ty, which groweth not without a root planted in the poli­cy or foundation of the Government.

Alexander with an handful of freermen, overcame the greatest abundance of Horses, Arms, and other things necessa­ry for the equipping of an Army, the hugest Armies, the most vast and populous Empire in the World; and when he had done, could not by all these subdue that handful of freer men (though he kill'd Clytus with his own hand in the quarrel) unto the servile customs of that Empire. And that the best Military Discipline derived from the policy of the Romans, I intimated before, and have shewn at large in other places.

But the Praevaricator neither mindes what is said, nor cares what he sayes; to affirm that a Common wealth was never conquer'd by any Monarch, and that a Common­wealth hath conquer'd many Monarchs, or frequently led mighty Kings in triumph, is to run upon the foile, the se­cond proposition being, with him, no more then, onely the conversion of the first. As if that, Rome was not conquer'd Consid. p. 55. by the World; and that the World was conquer'd by Rome, were but a simple conversion. So the World having not conquer'd Venice, it must follow, that Venice hath con­quer'd the World. Do we take, or are we taken? Nor is he thus satisfied to burn his fingers, but he will blister his tongue.

[Page 81]Where I said that the COMMON-WEALTH OF VENICE, consisting of all them that first fled from the main Land, unto those▪ Islands where the City is now planted, at the institution took in the WHOLE PEOPLE, he would make you believe I had said that the SENATE OF VENICE at the first institution, TOOK IN THE WHOLE PEOPLE. It is matter of fact, and that in Consid. p. 70. Oceana p. 9. which his integrity will be apparent unto every mans judgement. I pray you see the places. And yet when he hath put this—upon me, he tells me, perhaps it is not true, and this only I grant him, past peradventure is false, whe­ther that I said it, or that the thing is possible. For how is it possible, that the Senate, which is no otherwise such▪ then as it consisteth of the Aristocracy, or select part of the People should take in the whole People? It is true, that good Authours, both ancient aud modern, when they speak of the Senate of Rome, or of Ve­nice historically, imply the People. Machiavil, speaketh of the Magistracy of Publilius Philo as prolonged by the Se­nate of Rome, without making any mention of the people, by whom nevertheless it was granted: the like is usuall with other Authours. Thuanus seldom mentioneth the Common wealth of Venice, but by the name of the Senate; which not understood by the learned Considerer, where Contarini speaks in the same manner, of the courses taken by the Common-wealth of Venice, for withholding the Subject in the City from sedition, he takes him to be speaking of the meanes, whereby the Senate (an't please you) keeps the People under: and so having put one trick upon me, and another upon Contarini, these two are his premisses, whence he drawes this conclusion, That Venice is as much as any in the World, an unequal Common wealth. Now the conclusion, you know no body can deny.

Chap. XI. whether there be not an Agrarian, or some Law, or Lawes of that Nature, to supply the defect of it in every Common wealth: and whether the Agrarian, as it is stated in Oceana, be not equal and satis­factory unto all Interests.

IN this Chapter the Praevaricator's devices, are the most well favour'd; for whereas the Agrarian of Oceana, doth no more than pin the Basket, which is already filled, he gets up into the Tree, where the Birds have long since, eaten all the Cherries, and with what Clouts he can rake up, makes a most ridiculous scar-crow. This pains he needed not to have taken, if he had not slighted o­ver much, the Lexicon of which, he allowes me to be the Authour, yet will have it, that he understood the words before; some of which nevertheless, his ill understanding requireth, should be farther interpreted in this place, as Propriety, Ballance, Agrarian, and Levelling.

Propriety is that which is every Mans own by the Law of the Land, and of this there is nothing stir'd, but all in­tirely left as it was found by the Agrarian of Oceana.

Propriety in money (except as hath been shewen in Cities that have little or no Territory) commeth not unto the present Accompt: But Propriety in Land, according to the distribution that happeneth to be of the same, causeth the Political ballance producing Empire of the like Nature: that is, if the Propriety in Lands be so diffused through the whole People, that neither one Landlord, nor a few Land­lords over-ballance them, the Empire is popular. If the propriety in Lands be so ingrossed by the Few, that they over-ballance the whole people, the Empire is Aristocra­ticall, or mixed Monarchy; But if Propriety in Lands be in one Landlord▪ to such a proportion as over-ballanceth the whole People, the Empire is absolute Monarchy. So [Page 83] the political ballance is three-fold, Democratical, Aristo­cratical, and Monarchical.

Each of these Ballances may be introduced either by the Legislator, at the institution of the Government; or by ci­vill Vicissitude, alienation, or alteration of propriety under Government.

Examples of the ballance introduced at the institution, and by the Legislator▪ are first those in Israel and Lacede­mon, introduced by God or Moses; and Lycurgus, which were Democratical or Popular. Secondly, Those in Eng­land, France and Spain▪ introduced by the Gothes, Vandals, Saxons, and Franks, which were Aristocratical, or such as produced the Government of King, Lords and Commons. Thirdly, those in the East and Turkey, introduced by Nimrod and Mahomet, or Ottoman, which were purely Mo­narchial.

Examples of the Ballance introduced by civil Vicissi­tude, alienation▪ or alteration of Propriety under Govern­ment are in Florence, where the Medices attaining to ex­cessive wealth, the ballance altered from Popular, to Mo­narchial: In Greece, where the Argives being Lovers of e­quality Pausan: Corith. and liberty▪ reduced the power of their Kings to so small a matter, that there remained unto the Children and Successors of Cisus, little more than the Title, where the ballance alter­ed from Monarchical to Popular. In Rome, about the time of Crassus, the Nobility having eaten the People out of their Lands, the ballance alter'd from Popular, first un­to Aristocratical, as in the Triumvirs, Caesar, Pompey, and Crassus; and then to Monarchical, as when Crassus being dead, and Pompey conquer'd, the whole came to Caesar. In Arist. Pol. L. 5. C. 3. Tarentum, not long after the Warre with the Medes, the Nobi­lity being wasted, and overcome by Iapy [...]es, the ballance▪ and with that the Common wealth changed from Aristocratical, to Popular: the like of late hath discovered it self in Oceana. When a ballance commeth so through civil Vicissitude to be changed, that the change cannot be attributed unto hu­mane Providence, it is more peculiarly to be ascribed unto the hand of God; and so when there happeneth to be an irresistible change of the ballance, not the old Government which God hath repealed, but the new Government, [Page 84] which he dictateth as present Legislator, is of Divine right.

This volubility of the ballance being apparant, it be­longs unto Legislators to have eyes, and to occur with some prudential or legal remedy or prevention; and the Lawes that are made in this Case are called Agrarian. So an Agrarian is a Law fixing the ballance of a Government, in such manner that it cannot alter.

This may be done divers wayes, as by entailing the Lands upon certain Families, without power of Alienation in a­ny case, as in Israel and Lacedemon, or except with leave of the Magistrate, as in Spain; but this by making some Fa­milies too secure, as those in possession, and others too despairing, as those not in possession, may make the whole People lesse industrious.

Wherefore the other way, which by the regulation of purchases, ordains only, that a Mans Land shall not exceed some certain proportion; for example, two thousand pounds a year, or exceeding such a proportion, shall divide in descending unto the Children, so soon as being more than one, they shall be capable of such division, or sub-di­vision, till the greater share exceed not two thousand pounds a year in Land, lying and being within the Native Territory, is that which is received and established by the Common wealth of Oceana.

By Levelling, they who use the word, seem to under­stand, when a People rising invades the Lands and Estates of the richer sort, and divides them equally among them­selves; as for example,—No where in the World; this being that both in the way, and in the end, which I have al­ready demonstrated to be impossible. Now the words of this Lexicon being thus interpreted; Let us hearken what the Praevaricator will say, and out it comes in this manner.

To him that makes propriety, and that in Lands the founda­tion Consid. p. 73. of Empire, the establishing of an Agrarian is of abso­lute necessity, that by it the power may be fixed in those hands to whom it was at first committed.

What need we then proceed any farther, while he ha­ving no where disproved the ballance in these words, gives the whole cause? For as to that which he faith of money [Page 85] seeing neither the vast treasure of Henry the 7th, altered the ballance of England, nor the Revenue of the Indies al­ters that of Spain, this retrait (except in the cases excep­ted) is long since barricadoed. But he is on and off, and, any thing to the contrary notwithstanding, gives you this for certain.

The Examples of an Agrarian are so infrequent; that Mr. Harrington is constrained to wave all, but two Common­wealths, and can finde in the whole extent of History only Is­rael, and Lacedemon to fasten upon.

A man that hath read my Writings, or is skilled in Hi­story, cannot chuse but see, how he slurs his Dice, never­theless, to make this a little more apparent, It hath seemed to some, (sayes Aristotle) the main point of institution in Go­vernment, Pol. L. 2. C. 5. to order riches right: whence otherwise derives all Civil discord? Ʋpon this ground, Phaleas the Calcedonian Le­gislator made it his first work to introduce equality of goods, and Plato in his Lawes, allowes not increase unto a possession beyond certain bounds. The Argives, and the Messenians had each their Agrarian, after the manner of Lacedemon, If a Plut. Lycur. man shall translate the words ( [...], vir­tus & facultas civilis) Political virtue or faculty, where he findes them in Aristotles Politicks, (as I make bold, and appeal unto the Reader, whether too bold to do) by the words Politicall ballance, understood as I have stated the thing, it will give such a light unto the Authour, as will go neerer than any thing alleadged (as before by this Praevaricator) to deprive me of the honour of that Pol. L. 3. C. 9. invention. For Example, where Aristotle saith, If one man, or such a number of men, as to the capacity of Government come within the compasse of the Few, excel, all the rest ( [...]) in ballance, or in such manner, that the ( [...]) Political faculties or Estates of all the rest, be not able to hold weight with him or them; they will never condis­cend to share equally with the rest in power; whom they excell in ballance; nor is it to any purpose to give them Lawes, who will be as the Gods, their own Lawes: and answer the People as the Lions are said, by Antisthenes, to have answer'd the hares, when they had concluded, that every one ought to have an e­quall portion. For this cause (he adds) Cities that live under popular power, have instituted the Ostracism, for the▪ preserva­tion [Page 86] of equality; by which, if a man increase in riches, reti­nue, or popularity above what is safe, they can remove him (without losse of honour or estate) for a time.

If the Considerer think that I have strained courtesie with Aristotle (who indeed is not alwayes of one minde) further then is warrantable, in relation to the ballance, be it, as he pleaseth, I who must either have the more of Au­thority, or the lesse of Competition in the point, shall lose neither way. However, it is in this place enough, that the Ostracism being of like nature, was that which supplyde the defect in the Grecian Cities of an Agrarian. To proceed then unto Rome, that the People there, by striving for an Agra­rian, strove to save their Liberty, is apparent, in that through the want of such a Law, or the non-observance of it, the Common wealth came plainly unto ruine. If a Venetian should keep a Table, or have his House furnished with re­tainers, he would be obnoxious unto the Council of Ten: and if the best of them appear with other state or equipage, then is allowed unto the meanest, he is obnoxious unto the Officers of the Pomp, which two Orders in a Common­wealth, where the Gentry have but small Estates in Land, are as much as need be in lieu of an Agrarian. But the German Republicks have no more to supply the place of this Law, then that Estates descending, are divided among the Children, which sure no man but will say, must needs be both just and pious, And we ask you no more in Oce­ana; where grant this, and you grant the whole Agrarian. Thus had I set him all the Common wealths in the World before; and so it is no fault of mine, that he will throw but at three of them, These are Israel, Lacedemon, & Oceana.

First at Israel. Mr. Harrington (sayes he) thinks not up­on the promise of God unto Abraham (whence the Israelites Consid. p. 77. derived their right unto the Land of Canaan) but considers the division of the Lands as a Politick Constitution upon which the Government was founded, though in the whole History of the Bible, there be not the least foot-step of such a design.

What meanes the man! The right of an Israelite unto his Land, derived from the promise of God unto Abraham▪ therefore the right of an Oceaner unto his Land, must de­rive from the promise of God unto Abraham? Or, why else should I in speaking of Oceana (where Propriety [Page 87] is taken as it was found, and not stirred an hair) think on the promise to Abraham? Nor matters it for the manner of division, seeing that was made, and this was found made, each according unto the Law of the Government. But in the whole Bible (sayes he) there is not the least foot-step that the end of the Israelitish Agrarian was Politicall, or that it was intended to be the foundation of the Government.

The foot-steps of God by the Testimony of David, may be seen in the deep waters, much more by the consent of the whole Bible, in Land, or in the foundation of Empire, un­less we make the foot-steps of God to be one thing, and his wayes another, which as to Government are these.

God by the Ballot of Israel (more fully described in Grot. ad Numb. 26. 53. the next Book) divided the Land (some respect had unto the Princes and Patriarchs, for the rest) to every one his inhe­ritance, according unto the number of names, which were drawn out of the one Urne first, and the Lots of Land, (the measure with the goodness of the same considered) drawn after­wards out of the other Urn unto those Names. Wherefore God ordaining the Cause, and the Cause of Necessity pro­ducing the effect, God, in ordaining this Ballance, inten­ded popular Government. But when the People admit­ting of no Nay, would have a King. God thereupon com­manding Samuel to shew them the manner of the King, Sa­muel declared unto the People, concerning the manner or 1 Sam. 8. policy of the King, saying, He will take your Fields and your Vineyards, and your Olive-yards, even the best of them, and give unto his servants (which kind of proceeding must needs create the ballance of a Nobility). Over and above this, he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your Vineyards, and of your sheep (by way of tax, for the maintenance of his Armies) and thus your Daughters shall come to be his Cooks and Confectioners, and your Sons to run before his Chariot. There is not from the ballance to the superstructures, a more perfect description of a Monarchy, by a Nobility. For the third branch, the People of Aegypt in time of the Fa­mine, Gen. 47. 19. 20. which was very sore, come unto Joseph, saying, Buy us and our Land for bread, and we and our Land will be servants unto Pharaoh. And Joseph bought all the Land of Aegypt (except that of the Priests) for Pharaoh. So the Land became [Page 88] Pharaohs: who lest the remembrance of their former Propriety by lively marks, and continual remembrancers Grot. ad Gen. 47. should stir them up (as the Vandalls in Africa, exuted in like manner of their Propriety, and yet remaining in their anci­ent dwellings, were stirred up by their Women) unto se­dition, removed the People thus sold, or drave them like Cattle even from one End of the borders of Aegypt unto the other end thereof. In which you have the ballance of a sole Land-lord or absolute Prince, with the miserable, and yet necessary consequence of an inslaved people. Now the ballance of Governments throughout the Scrip­tures, being of these kindes, and no other, the Ballance of Oceana is exactly calculated unto the most approved way, and the clearest footsteps of God in the whole History of the Bible: and whereas the Jubile was a Law instituted for preservation of the Popular ballance from alteration; so is the Agrarian, in Oceana.

But says the Praevaricator, Hocus Pocus, or in the name of wonder, how can this Agrarian be the foundation of that Go­vernment, which had subsisted more than forty five years with­out it? For they were so long after the giving of this Law for the division of the Land, before they had the Land to di­vide.

Which is as if one should say upon that other law of the like date. Judges and Officers shalt thou make thee in all thy gates; Hocus Pocus, or in the name of wonder, how should the Children of Israel make them Judges and Officers in in their gates, before they had any gates to make them in? fine sport to be play'd by an Attorney for the Clergy with Scripture, where it is plain enough that the Laws of a Common-wealth were given by Moses unto an Army to be put in Execution, when that Army should become a Common-wealth, as hapned under Joshua.

But no saying will serve his turn. If this Agrarian were meant as fundamentall to the Government, the Provi­sion (he will have it) was weak and not proper for attaining the end proposed, there being nothing in the Nature of the A­grarian to hinder, but that the whole Countrey might for the space of near fifty years, that is, the time between the two Ju­bilees, have come into the hands of One Man, and so have destroyed Ballance, Agrarian, Government, and all.

[Page 89]This they that boast of their Mathematicks might have taken the pains (before they had been so confident) to have demonstrated possible; as how or by what meanes one Lot could come in fifty years to be multiplied six hun­dred thousand times, and that without usury, which barre (the Israelites being no Merchants) was thought sufficient to be given; or thus to call the prudence of God by their impracticable Phansyes, in question, is abo­minable.

I would have Divines (as this Praevaricator perswades) and, it should seem, hath perswaded some of them, to overthrow the Common-wealth of Israel; for otherwise I will give them my word they shall never be able to touch that of Oceana, which expect in the hereditary suc­cession and dignity of the Princes of the Tribes, and the Patriarchs, and that the Senate was for life, differs not from the former: for as to the divers working up of the super­structures in divers Common-wealths according unto the diversity of occasions, it comes unto no Accomptable difference; and much (I conceive) of this carving or finishing in Israel, (which had it been extant would per­haps have shewn a greater resemblance) is lost. For the Senates, as to their Numbers, that of the 300 in Oceana, considering the Bulk of the People, exceedeth not that of the Seaventy in Israel; the succession and dignity of the Princes of the Tribes and of the Patriarchs, was Ordain'd for the preservation of the Pedegrees, which (Christ being born) are not any more to be of like consequence; And that the Senators were for life, derived from a former Custome of such a Number of Elders exercising some Au­thority in Aegypt (though not that of the Senate till it was instituted by God) from the descent of the Patriarchs into that Land, who being at their descent se [...]venty per­sons, and governing their families by the right of Paterni­ty; as the people increased, and they came to dye had their Successors appointed in such manner that the num­ber of Seaventy in remembrance of those Patriarchs was diligently preserved. And forasmuch as the Patriarchs governing their own Familied (which at first were all) in their own right were consequently for life, [Page 90] this also pleased in the substitution of others. These things rightly considered, I have not varyed from the Authority of Israel in a tittle, there being neither any such necessa­ty use of Pedigrees, nor uninterrupted succession of El­ders for life in Oceana; and unlesse a Man will say, That we ought to have the like Effect, where there is not the like Cause (which were absurd) the Authority of a Com­mon wealth, holdeth no otherwise then from the cause to the effect.

Oceana, I say, cannot be wounded but by peircing the Authority of Israel, with which she is armed Cap, a pie. Consid. p. 36. It is true (as the Praevaricator saith in another place) that Law can oblige onely those to whom it was given, and that the Laws of Israel were given as to the power or Obligation of them onely to the Children of Israel. But the power (as hath been shewn) of a Common-wealth and her Authority are diffe­rent things, her power extends no farther than her own people, but her Authority may govern others, as that of Athens did Rome; when the later writt her twelve Tables by the Copy of the former. In this manner, though a Man or a Common-wealth, writing out of Antient governments have liberty to choose that which sutes best with the occasi­on, out of any; yet, whether we consider the wisedome and Justice of the Legislator supremely good, or the excellency of the Lawes; the Prerogative of Authority, where the na­ture of the thing admitts, must needs belong unto Israel. That this opinion should go sore with Divines, is strange; and yet if there be any feeling of their pulse by this their Advocate or Attorney, as true.

For while he finds mee writing out of Venice, he tells In his Epist. me I have wisely put my self under her Protection or Authority, against whom he dares not make warre, lest he should take part with the Turk.

But when he finds me writing out of Israel, he tells me Consid. p. 39. that he is not aware of any Prerogative of Authority belonging to the Israelitish more then any other Republick: which is to take part with the Devill.

So much for Israel: Now for Lacedemon, but you will permitt me to shake a friend or two by the hand, as I goe.

Chap. XII. Whether Courses or Rotation be necessary unto a well-or­dered Common-wealth? In which is contained the courses or Pare [...]bole of Israel before the Captivi­vity, together, with the Epitome of Athens and Venice.

ONe bout more, and we have done; this (as Ocean. p. 22. reason good) will be upon wheeles or Rotati­on, for,

As the Agrarian answereth unto the Equali­ty of the Foundation or Root, so doth Rotation unto the Equality of the Superstructures or branches of a Common­wealth.

Equall Rotation is equall Vicissitude in, or Succession unto, Magistracy confer'd for equal termes, injoyning such equal vacations, as cause the Government to take in the body of the People, by parts succeeding others, through free Election, or suffrage of the whole.

The contrary whereunto is prolongation of Magistracy, which trashing the wheel of Rotation, destroyes the life, or natural motion, of a Common wealth.

The Praevaricator, what ever he hath done for himself, hath done this for me, that it will be out of doubt, whe­ther my Principles be capable of greater Obligation, or con­firmation, than by having Objections made against them. Nor have I been altogether ingrateful, or nice of my labour but gone farre (much farther then I needed) about, that I might return with the more valuable Present, unto him that sent me on the Errant; I shall not be short of like proceeding upon the present Subject, but rather over.

Rotation in a Common wealth, is of the Magistracy; of the Senate; of the People; of the Magistracy and the People; of the Magistracy and the Senate; or of the Ma­gistracy of the Senate, and of the People; which in all, come unto Six kinds.

[Page 104]For example of Rotation in the Magistracy, you have the Judge of Israel, called in Hebrew, Shophet, the like Magi­stracy Grot. after the Kings Ithobal and Baal came in use with the Tyrians, from these with their Posterity the Carthagi­nians, who also called their Supreme Magistrates, being in Number two, and for their Terme Annuall, Shophetim, which the Latines by a softer pronunciation render Suffetes.

The Shophet or Judge of Israel, was a Magistrate, not that I can finde, obliged unto any certain Terme, throughout the Book of Judges; Nevertheless, it is plain, that his E­lection was occasional, and but for a time, after the man­ner of a Dictator.

True it is, that Eli and Samuel, ruled all their lives, but upon this, such impatience in the People followed through the corruption of their Sonnes, as was the main cause of the succeeding Monarchy.

The Magistrates in Athens (except the Areopagites be­ing a Judicatory) were all upon rotation. The like for La­cedemon and Rome, except the Kings in the former, who were indeed hereditary, but had no more power than the Duke in Venice, where all the rest of the Magistrates (ex­cept the Procuratori; whose Magistracy is but meer Orna­ment) are also upon Rotation.

For Rotation of the Senate you have Athens, the Achae­ans, Aetolians, Lyceans, the Amphictionium, and the Se­nate Pol. l. 2. c. 7. of Lacedemon reproved, in that it was for life, by Ari­stotle: Modern Examples of like kind, are the Diet of Switz, but especially the Senate of Venice.

For the Rotation of the People, you have first Israel, where the Congregation, which the Greeks call Ecclesia, the Latines Comitia, or Concio, having a twofold capacity; first, that of an Army, in which they were the constant Guard of the Countrey; and secondly, that of a Repre­sentative, in which they gave the Vote of the People, at the Creation of their Lawes, or election of their Magi­strates, was monethly. Now the Children of Israel after their Number, to wit, the chief Fathers, and Captains of thousands 1 Chron. 27. and hundreds, and their Officers that served the King in any matter of the courses which came in and went out moneth by [Page 105] moneth, throughout all the moneths of the year, every course, were twenty and four thousand.

Such a multitude there was of military age, that with­out Grot. ad locum. inconvenience, four and twenty thousand were every moneth in Arms, whose Terme expiring others succeeded, and so others, by which meanes the Rotation of the whole People came about in the space of one year. The Tribunes, or Commanders of the Tribes in Arms, or of the Preroga­tive for the moneth, are named in the following part of the Chapter, to the sixteenth Verse; where begins the E­numeration of the Princes, (though God and Ashur, for what reason I know not, be omitted) of the Tribes, remain­ing in their Provinces, where they judged the People, and as they received Orders, were to bring or send such far­ther enforcement or recruits, as occasion required unto the Army; after these, some other Officers are mentioned. There is no question to be made, but this Rotation of the People, together with their Prerogative, or Congregation, was preserved by the monethly Election of two thousand Deputies in each of the twelve Tribes, which in all, came to four and twenty thousand; or let any man shew how o­therwise it was likely to be done, the Nature of their Of­fice being to give the Vote of the People, who therefore sure must have chosen them. By these, the Vote of the People was given to their Lawes, and at Elections of their Magistrates.

Unto their Lawes, as where David proposeth the re­duction of the Ark. And David consulted with the Captains 1 Chron. 13. of thousands and hundreds, and with every Leader. And Da­vid said unto all the Congregation of Israel, If it seem good un­to you, and it be of the Lord God, let us send abroad to our Bre­thren every where (the Princes of the Tribes in their Pro­vinces) that are left in the Land of Israel, and with them al­so to the Priests and Levites, which are in their Cities and Su­burbs, that they may gather themselves unto us; And let us bring again the Ark of our God to us; for we enquired not at Gror. è. Tertul. it in the dayes of Saul. And all the Congregation (gave their suffrage in the Affirmative) said that they would do so; for the thing was right in the Eyes of the People. (Nulla lex sibi soli conscientiam Justitiae sua debet, sed et à quibus obsequium [Page 106] expectat) Now that the same Congregation or representa­tive gave the vote of the People also in the Election of Priests Officers and Magistrates, Moreover David and the Captaines of the Host separated to the service of the Sonnes of 1 Chron. 25. A [...]aph, and of Heman, and of Jeduthun, who should Prophesy with Harps with Psalteryes & with Cymballs. But upon the oc­casion untowhich we are more especially beholding for the 1 Chron. 28. 2. preservation and discovery of this admirable order ( David having proposed the businesse in a long and pious speech,) the Congregation made Solomon the Sonne of David King the second time and annoynted him unto the Lord to be Chief, Governor, and Zadok to be Preist. For as to the first time 1 Chron. 29. 22. that Solomon was made King, it happened, through the sedition of Adoniae to have been done in hast and tumultu­ously by those onely of Jerusalem; and the reason why Kings 1. 23. Zadoc is here made Priest is that Abiathar was put out for being of the Conspiracy with Adonia.

I may expect (by such Objections as they afford me) it should be alleadged, that to prove an order in a Com­mon-wealth, I instance in a Monarchy; as if there were any thing in this Order Monarchiall, or that could, if it had not been so received from the Common-wealth, have been introduced by the Kings, to whom in the Judge­ment of any sober man (the Praevaricator onely excepted, who hath been huckling about some such Councill for his Prince) no lesse could have follow'd, upon the first frown of the people, then did in Rehoboam, who, having 1 Kings 12. used them roughly, was deposed by the Congregation or the Major part. It is true, that while Israel was an Army, the Congregation, as it needed not to assemble by way of Election or representative, so I believe it did not, but that by all Israel assembled to this end, should be meant the whole people after they were planted upon their lots, and not their Representative, which in a politicall sense is 1 Chr. 9. 29. as properly so called, were absurd and impossible, Nor need I go upon presumption onely, be the same never so strong, seeing it is said in Scripture of the Korathites, that they were keepers of the gates of the Tabernacle, and their fa­thers being over the Host of the Lord, were keepers of the En­try. That is (according to the interpretation of Grotius) [Page 107] the Korathites were now keepers of the gates, as it appears in the Book of Numbers, their Ancestors the Kohathites Num. 4. had been in Camp, or while Israel was yet an Army. But our Translation is lame of the right foot as to the true discovery of the Antient manner of this service, which according to the Septuagint and the Vulgar Latine was thus, they were keepers of the gates of the Tabernacle ( [...], & familiae eorum per vices) and their fathers by turnes or Rotation. So that offices and services by courses turnes or Rotation are plainly more auntient then Kings in the Common-wealth of Israel; though it be true that when the courses or Rotation of the Congregation or Representative of the people were first introduced, be as hard to shew, as it would be how, after the People were once planted upon their lotts, they could be otherwise assembled. If writers argue well and lawfully from what the Sanhedrim was in the institution by Jehoshaphat unto what it had more auntiently been, to argue from what the Congregation was in the instituti­on by David, unto what it had more auntiently been, is sufficiently warranted.

These things rightly considered, there remaines little doubt, but we have the courses of Israel for the first Ex­ample of Rotation in a Popular Assembly. Now to come from the Hebrew unto the Grecian prudence, the same is approved by Aristotle, which he exemplifies in the Com­mon-wealth of Thales Milesius, where the people, he Poll. L. 4. C. 14. saith assembled ( [...]) by turnes or rotation. Nor is the Roman prudence with­out some shadow of the like proceeding, where the Prero­gative (pro tempore) with the jure-vocatae being made by Lot, gave frequently the Suffrage of the whole people. But the Gothick prudence in the policy of the Third State, runs altogether upon the collection of a Representative by the suffrage of the People, and though not so diligently regulated, by terms and vacations as to a standing assem­bly were necessary, by Turns, Rotation, Parembole, or cour­ses; As in the Election of the late House of Commons, and the constitutive vicissitude of the Knights and Burgeses is known by sufficient experience.

[Page 108]When the Rotation of a Common-wealth is both in the Magistracy and the People, I reckon it to be of a fourth kinde, as in Israel, where both the Judge and the Congre­gation were so elected.

The fifth kinde is when the Rotation of a Common­wealth is in the Magistracy and the Senate, as in those of Athens, of the Achaeans, of the Aetohians, of the Lycians, and of Venice; upon which examples, rather for the influ­ence each of them, at least Athens, may have upon the fol­lowing Book, than any great Necessity from the present occasion, I shall inlarge my self in this place.

The Common wealth of Athens was thus administred.

The Senate of the Beane being the proposing-Assembly Epitome of the Athenian Com­mon wealth. (for that of the Areopagites, called also a Senate, was a Ju­dicatory) consisted of four hundred Citizens chosen by Lot, which was performed with beanes, these were annually re­moved all at once. By which meanes Athens became fru­strated of the natural and necessary use of an Aristocracy, while neither her Senators were chosen for their parts, nor remained long enough in this function, to acquire the right understanding of their proper Office. These thus e­lected, were subdivided by Lot into four equal parts, call­ed Prytanys, each of which for one quarter of the year was in Office. The Prytany or Prytans in Office elected ten Presidents, called Proedri, out of which Proedri or Presidents, they weekly chose one Provost of the Council, who was called the Epistata. The Epistata and the Proedri were the more peculiar Proposers to the Prytans, and to the Prytans it belonged especially to prepare businesse ( [...]) for the Senate: they Petit. de Leg. Att. gave also audience unto any that would propose any thing concerning the Common wealth, which if, reported by the Prytans, it were approved by the Senate, the party that pro­posed might promulgate the business, and promulgation be­ing made, the Congregation assembled, and determined of it. ( Sic data concio Laelio est, processit ille & Graecus apud Cic. pro Flac. Graecos, non de culpa sua dixit, sed de paena quaestus est, por­rexerunt manus, Psephisma natum est).

[Page 109]The Prytans and their Magistrates, had right to assem­ble the Senate; and propose unto them; and what the Se­nate determined upon such a Proposition, if forthwith to be offer'd unto the People, as in private cases, was called Proboulema; but if not to be proposed, till the People had a year's tryall of it, as was the ordinary way in order unto Lawes to be enacted, it was called Psephisma; each of which words with that difference, signifies a Decree. A De­cree of the Senate in the latter sense had for one year, the power of a Law, after which tryall, it belonged to the Thesmothetae ( [...]) to hang it in writing upon the Ulpian ad Phil. 1. Statues of the Heroes, and assemble the Congregation. These Magistrates were of the number of the Archons, which in all were nine, the chief more peculiarly so called▪ was Ar­chon Pollux. L. 8. C. 8. Eponymus, he by whose name the year was reckon'd or denominated (his Magistracy being of a Civil concern­ment) the next was the King, a Magistrate of a Spirituall concernment) the third the Polemarch (whose Magistracy was of a Military concernment): the other six were the Thesmothetae, who had several functions common with the Nine, Others peculiar or proper to themselves, as ( [...]) to give the People (by ply-carts) notice when the Judicatories were to assemble, that is, when the People were to assemble in that Capacity, and to judge according to the Law made; or when the Senate, or the People were to assemble upon an ( [...]) a crime that was not provided against by the Law, as that of Alcibiades, (the wits about that time in Athens, being most of them Atheists) for laughing at Ceres discovering her secrets, and shaving of the Mercury's. If an Archon or Demagogue were guilty of such a Crime, it belonged unto the cogni­zance of the Senate, otherwise unto that of the People, whom the Thesmothetae were also in like manner to warn, L. 8. C. 16. when they were to come unto the suffrage.

These six like the Electors in Venice, presided at all E­lections of Magistrates, whether made by the lott as the judges, or by suffrage, as the new Archons, the Strategus or Generall, and most of the rest. They also had the hearing and introducing of all causes into the Judicatories.

[Page 110]But the right of assembling the Ecclesia or Congregation belonged to the Prytans, by whom the Senate proposed unto the People.

The Congregation consisted of all them that were upon the role of the Lexiarcha, that is to say, of the whole People having right unto the City▪ The Prytans seated upon a Tribunal were Presidents of this Assembly; The Assembly ha­ving sacrificed & made Oath of fidelity unto the Common­wealth; the Proedri or Presidents of the Prytans, proposed by Authority of the Senate unto the People in this manner. July the 16th Pol [...]cles being Archon, and the Tribe of Pan­dion in the Prytaneate, Demosthenes, Peaneus, thought thus, or was of this Opinion. The same Custom whereby the first Proposer subscribes his Opinion or Parte with his name, is at this day in Venice. Proposition being made, such of the People as would speak, were called to the Pulpit; they, that were fifty years of age, or upwards, were to come first, and the younger afterwards; which Custom of prating in this manner, made excellent Orators or Demagogs, but a bad Common wealth.

From this that the People had not only the result of the Common wealth, but the debate also; Athens is called a Democracie, and this kind of Government is opposed unto that of Lacedemon, which because the People there had not the power of debate, but of result only, was called Aristo­cracy, sometimes Oligarchy: thus the Greeks commonly are to be understood to distinguish of these two; while according to my Principles, (if you like them) debate in the People maketh Anarchy, and where they have the re­sult, and no more, the rest being mannaged by a good Aristocracy, it maketh that which is properly and truly to be called Democracy, or Popular Government. Neither is this Opinion of mine new, but according to the Judge­ment of some of the Athenians themselves; for saith Iso­crates in his Oration unto the Areopagites for reformation of the Athenian Government; I know the main reason, why the Lacedemonians flourish, to be, that their Common wealth is popular. But to return. As many of the People, as would, having shewed their Eloquence, and with these the Dema­gogues, [Page 111] who were frequently bribed, concealed their kna­very; the Epistata, or Provost of the Proedri, put the Decree or Question unto the Vote, and the People gave the result of the Common wealth by their Chirotonia, that is, by hol­ding up their hands; the result thus given, was the Law, or Psephisma of the People.

Now for the functions of the Congregation, they Dem. Phil. 1. were divers; as first, Election of Magistrates, ( [...]); Namely, the Archons, the Strategus, or Generall, the Field-Officers, the Admiralls, with divers others, all, or the chief of them Annuall, and commonly upon Termes and Vacations, though it be true, (as Plutarch hath it) that Phocion was Strategus four years together, having that honour still put upon him by the Congregation, without his seeking. The next Office of this Assembly, was to elect Judges into five Courts or Judica­tories, for the People being in the Bulk too unweildy a bo­dy for the performance of this duty, they exercised the su­preme Judicature, by way of Representative, into which E­lection was made by Lottery, in such manner, that five hun­dred one thousand, or 1500. of them (according to the importance of the occasion) being above thirty yeares of age, and within the rest of the qualifications in that case provided by the Law, became the Soveraign Judicatory, called the Heliaea. In all Elections, whether by lot or suf­frage, the Thesonothetae were Presidents, and ordered the Congregation. Farthermore, if they would amend, alter, repeal, or make a Law, this also was done by a Representa­tive, of which no man was capable, that had not been of the Heliaea, for the rest elected out of the whole People: this amounting unto one thousand, was called the Nomo­thetae or Legislators. No Law received by the People, could be abrogated but by the Nomothetae; by these any Athenian (having obtained leave of the Senate) might abrogate a Law, provided, that withall, he put another in the place of it. These Lawes the Proedri of the Prytans, were to put unto the Suffrage.

First, the old, whether it agreed with the Athenian people, or not? then the new; and whether of these hap­ned [Page 112] to be chirotonized or voted by the Nomothetae, was ra­tified; according to that piece of the Athenian Law cited by Demosthenes against Timocrates ( [...]) what hath been said of the Common-wealth of Athens, in relation unto the present purpose, amounts unto thus much, that not onely the Senate and the Magistracy in this Policy was upon rotation, but even the People also, at least, as to the Nomothetae, or their Legislative power, and the Supreme Judicatory of the Heliaea, each of these being a Represen­tative, constituted of one Thousand or fifteen hundred Cittizens.

But for what followes in the second book it is necessary that I observe in this place the proceeding of certain Di­vines, who indeavour to make use of this Common­wealth for ends of their own▪ as particularly Doctor Sea­man; who in his book called Four propositions, argues after this manner.

Chirotonia (as Suidas hath it) signifies both Plebiscitum a Law made by the People, and Psephisma. Now (saith he) Pse­phisma is the ordinary word used in the Attick lawes and in De­mosthenes, for (Senatesconsultum) a Law made by the Senate; whence he drawes this conclusion. As, when the People make a Law, they are said to Chirotonize; so may the Rulers in like manner, in those Lawes that are made by themselves alone.

These wayes with divines are too bad. The words of Suidas are these ( [...]) Chiroto­nia is Election or ratification by the Many: which expresly excludeth the Few or the Senate from being otherwise con­tained by the word Chirotonia, than a part is by the whole. Nor hath the Authour the word Psephisma, or Plebiscitum in the place. I would faine know what other word there is in Greeke for Plebiscitum but Psephisma; and yet the Doctor puts it upon Suidas that he distinguishteh between these two, and, taking that for granted where he findes Psephisma in Demosthenes and the Attick Laws, will have it to signifie no more then a decree of the Senate. It is true that some decrees of the Senate were so called, but those of the people had no other name, and when ever you find [Page 113] Psephisma in Demosthenes or the Attick Laws, for a Law, there is nothing more certaine then that it is to be under­stood of the people, for to say that a Law in a Popular Com­monwealth can be made without the people, is a contradicti­on.

The second passage, is a what think you of these words Pollux, l. 8. c▪ 9. of Pollux ( [...]) which the Doctor having englished in this manner; The Thesmothetae do privately prescribe when Judg­ment is to be given, and promulge publick accusations, and suf­frages unto the people, askes you whose Suffrages were these, if not the Ruler's? By which strange construction, where Pollux having first related in what part the function of the Thesmothetae, was common with that of the Nine Archons, comes ( [...]) to shew you what was peculiar to them­selves, namely to give notice when the Heliaea or other In­dicatoryes were to assemble; the Dr. renders it, they do pri­vately prescribe: as if the Session of a Court of Justice, and such an one as contained a thousand Judges, being the re­presentative of the whole people, were to be privately pre­scribed, then to this private prescribing of Justice, he addes that they do publickly promulge ( [...]) citations upon crimes not within the written Law; as if private prescrip­tion and publick promulgation could stand together. Next whereas promulgation in the very Nature of the word signi­fies an Act before a Law made, he presumes the Law to be first made by the Rulers, and then promulgated by the Thes­mothetae to the people, kim kam to the experience of all Common-wealths, the Nature of promulgation, and the sense of his Authour, whose words as I shew'd before, de­clare it to have been the proper or peculiar office of the Thes­mothetae to give the people notice when they were to assemble for Judicature, or when for giving their Chirotonia or suffrage, by promulgation of the cause ( [...]) upon which they were to determine.

For the fourth passage the Dr. quoting a wrong place for these words, ( [...]) that the Nomothetae (being a Representative, as I shewd▪ of the whole people, chosen by lot, and in number one thousand) chirotonized [Page 114] or gave the Legislative suffrage; thence inferrs▪ that the Rulers chirotonized, voted or made Lawes by themselves without the People: which is, as if one should say that the Prerogative Tribe in Rome, or the House of Commons in England, gave their Vote to such or such a Law, therefore it was made by the Rulers alone, and not by the People of Rome or of England.

For the fourth passage, Stevens quotes Demosthenes at large in these words, ( [...]). This the Doctor interprets of an Officer; to which I shall say more, when he shews me where the sentence is, or what went before: for as yet I do not know of an officer in any Common wealth, whose Election was indifferently made, either by the Senate, or by the People; nor do I think the Doctor hath lookt farther for this, than Stephens, who hath not interpreted it.

The fifth passage is, That a Decree of the Senate in Athens, had the force of a Law for one year, without the People. So had the Edicts of the Praetores in Rome; But I would fain know, whence the Senate in Athens, or the Praetors in Rome, origi­nally derived this right (which was no more then that such Lawes might be probationers, and so better understood, when they came to the Vote) but from the Chirotonia, or suffrage of the People.

The sixth passage, stops the mouths of such as having no­thing to say unto the matter of my writing, pick quarrels with the manner or freedom of it, the liberty I take in the defence of truth, seeing the Doctor takes a greater liberty upon other termes, while he bids his Antagonist (one that desended the cause now in my hand) go and consult his Au­thours, namely, Stephens and Budaeus again; for, saith he, you wrong those learned men, while you would have us be­lieve that they were as ignorant of the Greek Story as your self, or that things are to be found in them, which are not. To which confidence, I have better leave to say, that the Doctor should do well to take no worse counsel than he gives.

But what is become of my Praevaricator, I have quite lost him, else I should have intreated him to compare his Notes out of my Sermon, with these out of the Doctors: [Page 115] or retract that same affectation, in saying, I know not, but Mr. Harrington has conceiv'd a great unkindness for the Clergy. As if these their Stratagems, with which they make perpetual Warre against the unwary people, did not con­cern a man that hath undertaken the cause of popular Go­vernment.

The Policy of the Achaeans consisted of divers Common­wealths under one, which was thus administred, the Cities sent their Deputies twice every year of course, and oftner if they were summoned by their Strategus, or their Demi­urges, to the place appointed. The Strategus was the Su­preme Magistrate, both Military and Civill, and the Demiur­ges being ten, were his Council, all Annuall Magistrates e­lected by the People. This Council thus constituted, was called the Synarchy, and performed like duties, in relation unto the Senate, consisting of the Deputies sent by their pe­culiar Soveraignties or Cities, as the Prytans unto that in Athens. The Policies of the Aetolians and Lycians, are so near the same again, that in one you have all; So both the Senates and the Magistracy of these Common wealths, were upon rotation. To conclude, with Venice.

The Common wealth of Venice, consisteth of four parts, The Epitome of the Common­wealth of Venice. The great Council. great Council, the Senate, the Collegio, and the Signiory.

The Great Council is the aggregate body of the whole People, or Citizens of Venice, which for the paucity of their Number, and the Antiquity of their Extraction are called Gentlemen, or Noble Venetians; every one of which, at five and twenty years of Age hath right of Session and Suffrage in this Council; which right of Suffrage, because through­out this Common-wealth, in all Debates and Elections, it is given by the ballot, is called, The right of ballotting, whereby this Council being the Soveraign power, createth all the rest of the Orders, Councils, or Magistracies; hath constitutely the Ultimate result, both in cases of Judica­ture, and constitution of Lawes.

The Senate called also the Pregati, consisteth of Sixty Se­nators, The Senate. properly so styled, whereof the great Council e­lecteth six on a day, beginning so long before the Moneth of October, that these being all chosen by that time, then receive their Magistracy; it consisteth also of sixty more, [Page 116] called the Juncta, which are elected by the Scrutiny of the Old Senate, that is, by the Senate proposing, and the great Council resolving; the rest of their Creation, is after the same manner with the former. In the Sixty of the Senate, there cannot be above three of any one kinred, or Family, nor in the Junta so many, unless there be fewer in the for­mer. These Magistracies are all Annuall, but without in­tervall, so that it is at the pleasure of the great Council, whe­ther a Senator having finished his year, they will elect him again.

The Collegio is a Council, consisting more especially of The Colledge. three Orders of Magistrates, called in their Language Saui as the Saui grandi, to whose cognizance or care belong the whole affaires of Sea and Land; the Saui di Terra ferma, to whose care and Cognizance belong the affaires of the Land, and the Saui di Mare, to whose Cognizance apper­tain the affaires of the Sea, and of the Islands. These are e­lected by the Senate, not all at once; but for the Saui Grandi, who are six, by three at a time, with the interposi­tion of three moneths; and for the Saui di terra ferma, and the Saui di mare, who are each five, after the same man­ner▪ save only that the first Election consisteth of three, and the second of two; Each Order of the Saui elects weekly one Provost, each of which Provosts hath right in any affair belonging unto the Cognizance of his Order, to propose unto the Collegio. Audience of Embassadors, and mat­ters of forraign Negotiation, belong properly unto this Council.

The Signiory consisteth of the Duke, and of his Counsel­lors. The Signiory. The Duke is a Magistrate created by the great Council for life, to whom the Common wealth acknowledgeth the Reverence due unto a Prince, and all her Acts run in his Name, though without the Counsellors he have no power at all while they can perform any function of the Signi­ory without him. The Counsellors, whose Magistracy is An­nual, are elected by the scrutiny of the Senate▪ naming one out of each Tribe, (for the City is locally divided into six Tribes) and the Great Council approving; so the Counsellors are six, whose function in part is of the Nature of Masters of Requests, having withall, power to grant certain privi­ledges: [Page 117] but their greatest preheminence is, that all, or a­ny one of them, may propose unto any Council in the Com­mon wealth.

The Signiory hath session and suffrage in the Collegio, the Certain Rights of the Councils. Collegio hath Session and suffrage in the Senate, and the Se­nate hath Session and suffrage in the Great Council. The Signiory, or the Provosts of the Saui, have power to assemble the Colledge, the Colledge hath power to assemble the Senate, and the Senate hath power to assemble the Great Council; the Signiori, but more peculiarly the Provosts of the Saui, (in their own Offices and functions) have power to pro­pose unto the Colledge, the Colledge hath power to propose unto the Senate, and the Senate hath power to propose un­to the Great Council: what ever is thus proposed and resol­ved, either by the Senate (for sometimes, through the secu­rity of this Order, a Proposition goes no farther) or by the Great Council, is ratifide, or becomes the Law of the Com­mon-wealth. Over and above these Orders▪ they have three Judicatories, two Civill, and one Criminall, in each of which, forty Gentlemen elected by the great Council, are Judges for the Terme of eight moneths; to these Judicatories, belong the Avogadori and the Auditori, who are Magi­strates, having power to hear causes apart, and, as they judge fitting, to introduce them into the Courts.

If a man tell me, that I omit many things, he may perceive I write an Epitome, in which no more should be comprehended, then that which understood may make a man understand the rest. But of these principal parts, con­sisteth the whole body of admirable Venice.

The Consiglio de Dieci, or Council of Ten, being that which partaketh of Dictatorian power▪ is not a limb of her, but as it were a Sword in her hand. This Council (in which the Signiory hath also Session and suffrage) consisteth more peculiarly of ten Annuall Magistrates, created by the Great Council, who afterwards elect three of their own number by Lott, which so elected are called Capi de Dieci, their Magistracy being monethly; again, out of the three Capi, one is taken by Lot, whose Magistracy is weekly, this is he, who over against the Tribunall in the Great Council, fits like another Duke, and is called, the Provost of the [Page 118] Dieci. It belongs to these three Magistrates, to assemble the Councill of dele Ten which they are obliged to do weekly of course, and oftner as they see occasion. The Councill being assembled, any one of the Signiory, or two of the Capi may propose to it, the power which they now exercise, (& wherin for their assistance they create three Magistrates called the grand Inquisitors) consists in the punishment of certaine heynous crimes▪ especially that of Treason; in re­lation whereunto they are as it were Sentinells, standing up­on the guard of the Common-wealth: But constitutively with the Addition of a Junta, consisting of other fifteen to­gether with some of the chiefe Magistrates, having right in cases of important speed or secrecy unto this Councill; they had the full and absolute power of the whole Com­mon-wealth, as Dictator.

That Venice either transcribed the whole and every part of her Constitution out of Athens and Lacedemon; or hap­peneth to be framed, as if she had so don, is most apparent. The Result of this Common-wealth is in the Great Coun­cill, and the debate in the Senate▪ so was it in Lacedemon. A decree made by the Senate of Athens had the power of a Law for one yeare without the people, at the end whereof the people might revoke it: A decree of the Senate of Venice stands good without the great Councill, unlesse these see rea­son to revoke it. The Prytans, were a Councill preparing businesse for the Senate; So is the Collegio in Venice; the Presidents of the Prytans were the Ten Proedri; those of the Collegio are the three Provosts of the Saui. The Ar­chons or Princes of Athens being Nine, had a kind of Sove­raigne inspection upon all the Orders of the Common­wealth, so hath the Signiory of Venice consisting of Nine besides the Duke. The Quarancys in Venice are Judicato­ryes of the nature of the Heliaea in Athens; and as the Thesmothetae heard and introduced the causes into that Ju­dicatory, so do the Avogadori and the Auditori into these. The Consiglio de dieci in Venice is not of the body but an Appendix of the Common-wealth; so was the Court of the Ephori in Lacedemon, and as these had power to put a King a Magistrate or any Delinquent of what degree soever unto death, so hath the Consiglio de dieci. This again is [Page 119] wrought up with the Capi di dieci, and the weekly Provost, as were the Prytans with the Proedri, and the weekly Epi­stata, and the Ballot is lineally descended from the Beane; yet is Venice in the whole, and in every part, a farre more exquisite policy than either Athens or La­cedemon.

A Politicall is like a naturall body. Commonwealths resemble and differ, as men resemble and differ; among whom you shall not see two faces, or two dispositions, that are alike. Peter and Thomas in all their parts are e­qually men, and yet Peter and Thomas of all men may be the most unlike; one may have his greater strength in his armes, the other in his leggs; one his greater beauty in his soule, the other in his body; one may be a fool, the o­ther wise▪ one valiant, the other cowardly. These two which at a distance you will nor know, one from the other; when you looke nearer, or come to be better acquainted with you will never mistake. Our Considerer (who in his Epistle, would make you believe, that Oceana is but a meer Transcription out of Venice,) hath Companions like himself, and how near they look in matters of this nature, is plain, while one knoweth not Jethro from Moses, and the other takes a state of Civill Warre, to be the best modell of a Civill Government.

Let a man look near, and the shall not finde any one Or­der in Oceana (the Ballot only excepted) that hath not as much difference from, or resemblance unto any one order in Rome or Venice, as any one Order in Rome or Venice hath from, or to, any one Order in Athens or Lacedemon: Which different temper of the parts, must of necessity in the whole, yield a result, a soul or Genius, altogether new in the World, as embracing the Arms of Rome, and the Coun­sels of Venice; and yet neither obnoxious unto the Turbulency of the one, nor the Narrowness of the other.

But the sum of what hath been said of Venice, as to the business in hand, comes to no more, then that the Senate and the Magistracy of this Common wealth are upon Ro­tation. No more: nay I am well, if it come to so much. For [Page 120] the Praevaricator catching me up, where I say, that, for all this, the greater Magistracies in Venice are continually wheeled through a few hands, tells me, that I have confes­sed it to be otherwise. I have indeed confessed, that albeit, the Consid. p. 93. Magistracies are all confes'd for certain termes; yet those termes do not necessitate vacations, that is, the terme of a Magistracy being expired, the party that bore it, is capable upon a new Election of bearing it again without intervall or vacation; which doth not altogether trash the Rotati­on of the Common wealth, though it render the same ve­ry imperfect. This infirmity of Venice, deriveth from a com­plication of causes, none of which is incident unto a Com­mon wealth, consisting of the Many: wherefore there lies no Obligation upon me, to discover the reason in this place. But on the contrary, seeing, let me shew things ne­ver so new, they are slighted as old; I have an Obligation in this place, to try whether I may get esteem▪ by conceal­ing some thing. What is said, every body knew before; this is not said▪ who knowes it?

A Riddle. Riddle me, Riddle me, what is this? The Magistracies in Venice (except such as are rather of Ornament then of power) are all Annuall, or at most Biennial. No man whose terme is expired, can hold his Magistracy longer, but by a new Election. The Elections are most of them made in the Great Council, and all by the Ballot, which is the most equall and impartial way of Suffrage. And yet the greater Magistracies are perpetually wheeled, through a few hands.

If I be worthy to give advice unto a man that would study the Politickes; let him understand Venice, he that▪ understands Venice right, shall go nearest to judge (not­withstanding the difference that is in every Policy) right of any Government in the world. Now the assault of the Considerer deriving but from some (Pique, or) Emulation, which of us should be the abler Polititian; It the Councill of State had the curiosity to know either that, or who understands Venice, this riddle would make the discove­ry; For he that cannot easily unfold this Kiddle, doth not understand her.

The sixth kinde of Rotation is when a Common-wealth goes upon it in all her Orders, Senate, People, and Magi­stracy. Such an one taking in the Many, and being fixed upon the foot of a steady Agrarian▪ hath attain'd un [...]o per­fect Equality. But of this, Example there is none, or you must accept of Oceana.

The Rotation of Oceana is of two parts, the one of the Rotation, of Oceana. Electors which is Annuall, and the other of the Elected which is Trienniall.

Speaking of Electors in this sense, I mean as the great Councill in Venice are Electors of all other Orders, Councills, or Magistrates. But the Common-wealth of Oceana taking in the whole People cannot, as doth the great Councill of Venice (wherein they that have right are but a few) attain unto this capacity at one step: for which cause she taketh three steps; One at the Parishes, where every fifth El­der is annually elected by the whole people▪ (there is no doubt but there was some such Order in Israel whereby the Monethly Rotation of her Congregation or Perogative, by election of two thousand in each Tribe, was preserved). The next step she takes is at the Hundred, whereby Electi­on of Officers and Magistrates, the Troopes, chosen at the Parishes, are well near formed. Her third step, is at the Tribe, where the whole body of her deputies are in ex­act forme, discipline, and function, Headed by proper Officers and Magistrates, these altogether consisting of One fifth part of the whole people. This Rotation, being in it self Annuall, comes in regaurd of the body of the People to be Quinquennial or such as in the space of five years gives every Man his turn in the power of Election.

[Page 122]But though every Man be so capable of being an Electpr▪ that he must have his Turn, yet every man is not so capa­ble of being elected into those Magistracies, that are Sove­raigne or have the Leading of the whole Common-wealth, that it can be safe to lay a Necessity, that every Man must take his turn in these also; but it is enough that every Man, who in the Judgement and Conscience of his Country is fit, may take his turn. Wherefore upon the Conscience of the Electors, (so constituted as hath been shewn) it goes to determine, who shall partake of Soveraign Magistracy, or be, at the Assembly of a Tribe, elected into the Senate or Prerogative; which assemblyes are so Trienniall, That one Third part of each falling every year, and another being elected, the Parliament is thereby perpetua­ted.

Such was the constitution of those Councills which the Praevaricator hath confessed he alwayes thought admirable: but now the toy takes him to be quite of another minde; for, saith he, That, Ancient Republicks have through a maliti­ous Consid. p. 90. jealously (let them take it among them) made it unlawful even for persons of the clearest merit to continue long in Com­mand, but have by perpetuall vicissitude substituted new men in the Government is manifested enough; but with what successe they did this, will best appear by Veturius, Varro, and Manci­nus. He is still admirable: One would wonder what he meanes, if it be that there were but three weak or unfor­tunate Generals in the whole course of Rome; how strange is it to urge this as an argument against Rotation, which is as strong an one as can be urged, for Rotation? If the Ro­mans by this way of Election, having experience of an able Generall, knew ever after, where to have him; or lighting upon one they found not so fit for their purpose, could in the Compasse of one year, be rid of him of course, without dishonor or reproach to him, taking thereby a warning to come no more there; was this a proceeding to favour malice; or such an one as removing the cause of malice, left no root for such a branch or possibility of like effect? Certainly by this Assertion the Praevaricator hath Joled his presumptuous head; not onely against the prudence of Auntient Common-wealths, but of God [Page 123] himself in that of Israel. Veturius, Varro, and Mancinus (though some of them cannot be at all points excused) by this mark upon them, may be thought hardlier of, than is needfull; for which cause there being that also in their Stories, which is neither unpleasant nor unprofitable, I shall endeavour to make the Reader somewhat better acquainted with them. One of the greatest blowes Rome ever received was by Pontius, Captain Generall of the Samnites, who having drawn her Consulls, Posthumius and Veturius, by Stratagem into the fastenses of Caudium, a Valley of narrow Entrance, and shut up the mouth of it Liv. l. 9. by possessing him self of the onely Passage, the rest being invironed with insuperable Rocks, the Samnite came to have both the Armyes, and so upon the matter, the whole strength (in those dayes) of Rome inevitably at his discretion. Hereupon, having leisure and being desirous (in a matter of such moment) of good advice he dispatcht a messenger unto his father Herennius the ablest Counsellor in Samnium, to know what might be his best course with the Romans now inavoydably at his mercy, who answered that he should open the Passe, and let them return untouched. The young Generall amazed at this Counsell, desired far­ther direction; whereupon Herennius for the second time made answer that he should cut them off to a man. But the Generall upon the strange disagreement of such opinions, having his fathers age (for he was very old) in suspition took a third course, which neither (according to the first advice of wise Herennius) making friends; nor (according unto the second) destroying enemies, became as he pro­phesyed the utter ruine of the Common-wealth of Samnium. For the Romans being dismissed safe, but ig­nominiously, the Senate upon their Return, fell into the greatest streight and consternation, that had been known among them. On the one side to live and not revenge such an Affront was intolerable; on the other to revenge it, was against the faith of the Consulls, whose Necessity (the losse of two Armies lying upon it) had in truth forced them to accept of a dishonourable League with the Sam­nites. Now not the Armies, but the Senate it self was in Caudium, not a man of them could find the way out [Page 124] of this Vale invironed with Rocks, but he only that could not finde it out of the other, Posthumius, who having first shewed, that neither Warre nor Peace could be so made, as to ingage the Common wealth ( injussu Populi) without the Command of the People, declared that the Senate re­turning the Consuls, with such other as had consented unto so wicked and dishonourable a peace, naked, and bound unto the Samnites, were free, nor ceased till the Senate (thereunto prest by the Necessity of the Common wealth) resolving accordingly, Hee, Veturius, and some of the Tri­bunes, were delivered unto the Samnites; who neverthe­less, to hold the Romans unto their League, dismissed them with safety. The disputes on either side that arose hereup­on, and comming to Arms, ended with the destruction of Samnium, I omit: that which as to the present Occasion, is material, is, the reputation of the Consuls, and Veturius, though he were not the leading man, being for the rest, as deep in the Action as Posthumius; the People were so farre from thinking themselves deceived in this choice, that the Consuls were more honour'd in Rome, for having lost, then Pontius in Samnium for having won the day at Caudium.

I do not rob Graves, nor steal Winding-sheets; my Controversies are not but with the Living, with none of these that have not shewed themselves best able for their own defence; nor yet with such, but in the prosecution of truths opposed by them unto the dammage of mankind; yet the Praevaricator accuseth me of rude charges, what are his then in defence of falshood, and against such as cannot bite? or whether of these is the more noble?

For Varro, who being Consul of Rome, lost the battail of Cannae unto Hanibal Captain General for the Carthag ni­ans, though without Cowardize, yet by rashness, he is not so excusable.

But for Mancinus, brought (as was Posthumous, by the Florus. l. 2. c. 18. Samnites) unto dishonourable condition▪ by Megera▪ Cap­tain General of the Numantines, there be excuses: As first the Numantines, for their number not exceeding four thousand fighting men, were the gallantest of so ma­ny, on which the Sun ever shone.

[Page 125]Fourteen years had their Common-wealth held tacke with the Romans, in courage, conduct, and virtue, having worsted Pompey the Great, and made a League with him, when she might have made an end of him, ere ever Man­cinus (of whom Cicero gives a fair Character) came in Play: So his misfortunes having great Examples, can­not want some excuse, but suppose ner' One of them de­served any Excuse, what is it at which these Examples drive, against a Common-wealth? Sure the Samnites, the Carthaginians, the Numantines were as well Common­wealths as the Romans; and so where-ever the advantage go, it must stay upon a Common-wealth; Or if it be Ro­tation that he would be at (for we must guesse) granting Pontius the Samnite, and Megera the Numantine, to have been no more upon Rotation, then Hannibal the Carthagi­nian; yet is it plain that Rome upon her Rotation overcame not onely, Pontius, Hannibal and Megera; but Samnium Carthage, and Numantia. So much for Rome, but, sayes Consid. p. 91. he, No lesse appeares by the rabble of Generalls often made use of by the Athenians, while men of Valour and Conduct have layn by the walls.

A Rabble of Generals did I never hear of before; but not to meddle with his Rhetorick, whereas each of his Objecti­ons hath at least some one Contradiction in it, this hath two (one à Priore, another à Posteriore) One in the Snoute, another in the taile of it. For had there been formerly no Rotation in Athens, how should there have been Men of valour and conduct to lye by the walls? and if Rotation thenceforth should have ceased, how could those men of valour and conduct have done other than lye by the walls? so this inavoydably confesseth, that Rotation was the meanes whereby Athens came to be stored with per­sons of valour and Conduct, they to be capable of Imploy­ment, and the Common-wealth to imploy the whole vir­tue of her Citizens; And it being (in his own words) an Argument of much imperfection in a Government not to dare to employ the whole virtue of the Cittizens; This wholly Routes a standing Generall, for the Government that dares imploy but the virtue of One, dares not employ the virtue of all. Yet he jogs on.

[Page 126] Those Orders must needs be against Nature, which exclu­ding Consid. p. 91. persons of the best qualifications give admission unto o­thers, who have nothing to commend them but thier Art in Canvasing for the suffrage of the People. He never takes notice that the Ballot barrs Canvasing beyond all possibi­lity of any such thing; but we will let that go; Canva­sing, it is confest, was more frequent in Rome and A­thens then is laudable, where neverthelesse it is the stronger Argument for the integrity of Popular Suffrage, which being free from any aid of art, produced▪ in those Common-wealths more illustrious Examples, (if a Man go no farther than Plutarchs lives) then are to be found in all the rest of Story.

Yet (saith he) this Law hath been as often broken as a Com­mon-wealth Consid. p. 91. hath been brought into any exigence, for the ha­zard of trusting affaires in weak hands then appearing, no scruple hath been made to trample upon this Order, for giving the power to some able man at that time rendered uncapable by the Vacation, this Law requires. The continuation of the Consulship of Marius is sufficient to be alleadged for the proofe of this, though if occasion were it might be backed by plenty of Examples. His choice confutes his pretended variety, who jests with edged tooles, this Example above all will cutt his fingers, for by this prolongation of Magistracy, or to speak more properly of Empire (for the Magistracy of the Consul was civill and conferd by the people Centuriatis co­mitiis, but his Empire was Military and conferrd Curiatis) Rome began to drive those wheels of her rotation heavily in Marius, which were quite taken off in Caesar.

I have heretofore in vaine, perswaded them upon this occasion, to take notice of a Chapter in Machiavill, so wor­thy of regard, that I have now inserted it at length▪ as fol­loweth.

All the Dilemma that Machiavil observes in these words is, that if a Common-wealth wilt not be so slow in her ac­quisition as is required by Rotation, she will be lesse sure then is requisite unto her preservation: But the Praevarica­tor (not deigning to shew us, upon what reasons or experience, he grounds his Maxime) is positive.

That the Dilemma into which a Common-wealth is in this case brought is very dangerous, for either she must give her self Consid. p. 92. a mortall blow by gaining the habit of infringing such orders as are necessary for her preservation, or receive one from with­out.

This same is an other Parakeetisme: these words are spoken by me after Machiavill in relation unto Dictatori­an power, in which they are so far from concluding against Rotation, that this in case of a Dictator is more especially necessary ( Maxima libertatis custodia est, ut magna imperia Mamercus apud. Liv. l. 4. diuturna non sint, & temporis modus imponatur, quibus juris imponi dele non potest) which could not be more confirmed then by him, who in the example of Marius shew's that the contrary course spoild all.

The Romans if they had sent a successor unto Publilius Philo at Palepolis, it may be might have let the Victory slip out of his hands, it may be not; However this had been no greater wound unto the Common-wealth, then that her Acquisition would have been slower, which ought not to come in Competition with the safety of a Government, and therefore amounts not unto a Dilemma, this being a kind of argument that should not be stubb'd of one horne, but have each of equall length and danger. Nor is it so certain that encrease is slower for Rotation, seeing neither was this interrupted by that, nor that by this, as the great­est Actions of Rome, the Conquest of Carthage by Scipio [Page 129] Africanus, of Macedon by Flaminius, and of Antiochus by Asiaticus, are irrefragable Testimonyes.

I would be loath to spoil the Considerers preferment, but he is not a safe Counsellour for a Prince; whose provi­dence not supplying the defect of Rotation whether in ci­vill or military affaires, with some thing of like nature, ex­poseth himselfe if not his Empire as much unto danger as a Common-wealth. Thus the Sons of Zeruiah, Joab Cap­taine 2 Sam. 3. 39. of the Hoast and Abishai his brother, were too strong for David; thus the Kings of Israel and of Juda fell most of them by their Captaines or Favourites, as I have else­where observed more particularly. Thus Brutus being standing Captaine of the Guards could cast out Tarquine: Thus Sejanus had meanes to attempt against Tiberius, Otho Arnisi. to be the Rivall of Galba, Casperius Aelianus, of Nerva; Cassius, of Antoninus; Perennis, of Commodus; Maximinus, of Alexander; Philippus, of Gordian; Aemilianus of Gal­lus, Ingebus, Lollianus, Aureolus, of Gallienus; Magnesius of Constantius; Maximus, of Gratian; Arbogastes of Va­lentinian; Ruffinus of Arcadius; Stilico of Honorius. Goe from the West into the East, upon the death of Marcianus, Asparis alone, having the command of the Armes, could prefer Leo to the Empire: Phocas deprive Mauritius of the same, Heraclius depose Phocas, Leo Isaurius do as much to Theodosius Adramyttenus; Necephorus, to Irenes; Leo Armenius, to Michael Curopalates; Romanus Lagape­nus, to Constantine, Nicephorus Phocas to Romanus Puer; Johannes Zismisces to Nicephorus Phocas; Isaac Comnenus, to Michael Stratioticus; Botoniates to Michael the Sonne of Ducas, Alexius Comnenus to Botoniates; which work continued in such manner till the destruction of that Em­pire. Goe from the East unto the North. Gustavus at­tained unto the Kingdom of Sweden, by his power and command of an Army, and thus Secechus came neer to supplant Bolessaus the third of Poland. If Wallesteine had lived, what had become of his Master? In France, the race of Pharamond was extinguished by Pipin, and that of Pipin in like mannner, each by the Major of the Palace, a standing Magistracy of Exorbitant trust. Goe to the Indies: You shall find a King of Pegu to have been thrust out of the [Page 128] [...] [Page 129] [...] [Page 130] Realme of Tangue by his Captaine Generall. Nay goe where you will, though this be pretty well, you shall adde more than one Example. But as to the Praevaricator, if he were not given to make such mouths as eate up nothing else, but his own words, I needed not have brought any other Testimony to absolve a Common-wealth of malice in this order than his own, where he saith, that when some Consid. p. 47. 48. person over-tops the rest in commands, it is a disease of Monar­chy which easily admitts of this cure, that he be reduced unto a lesse volume, and levelled unto an equality with the rest of his Order. Now a Prince can no otherwise Levell a Noble Man, that excells the rest through Command, unto equality with his order, then by causing those of the same Order to take their turnes in like command. Good witts have ill Memoryes. But, saith he, I know not what advantage Mr. Harrington may foresee from the orders of this Rotation, for Consid. p. 93. my part I can discover no other effect of it then this, that in a Common-wealth like that of Oceana, taking in the Many (for in Venice he confesseth it to be otherwise) where every man will presse forward toward Magistracy, this Law by tak­ing off at the end of one year some Officers, and all at the end of Oceana, p. 213. three will keep the Republick in a perpetuall Minority. No man having time allow'd him to gain that Experience; which B. 2. 9. may serve to lead the Common-wealth to the understanding of her true interest either at home or abroad.

What I have confessed to be otherwise in Venice, I have shewn already at least so far as concerneth the present Occasion, the causes of that defect being incompatible with a Common-wealth consisting of the many; otherwise why was not the like found in Athens or Rome, where though eve­ry man pressed forward towards Magistracy, yet the Magi­strates were, for illustrious Examples, more in weight and Number, than are to be found in all the rest of the world.

If where Elections were the most exposed to the ambi­tion of the Competitor, and the humours of the People they yet failed not to excell all others that were not Popu­lar, what greater vindication can there be of the Naturall integrity of Popular suffrage even at the worst? But this, where it is given by the Ballot, is at the best, and free [Page 131] from all that pressing for Magistracy in the Competitor, or faction of the People that can any wayes be layd unto the former; or let the Considerer consider again, and tell me by what meanes either of these in such a State can be dan­gerous or troublesome, or if at worst the orders for Ele­ction in Oceana must not perform that part, better then a Crowd and a Sheriff. Well but putting the case the Ele­ctions which were not quarrell'd much withall be rightly Stated; yet this Law for Terms and Vacations by taking off at the End of One year some Officers, and all at the end of Three, will keep the Republick in perpetuall Minority, no man having time allowed him to gain that Experience, which may serve to lead the Common-wealth to the understanding of her true interest at home or abroad. Because every Man will presse forward for Magistracy, therefore there ought not to be Termes and vacations, least these should keep the Com­mon-wealth in perpetuall Minority. I would once see an Argument that might be reduced to Mood and Figure. The next Objection is, that these Orders take off at the end of One year some Officers, which is true, and that at the end of Three years, they take off all, which is false; for whereas the Leaders of the Common-wealth are all Tri­enniall, the Orders every year take off no more then such onely as have finished their three yeares terme, which is not all but a Third part. Wherefore let him speak out; three years is too short a Term for acquiring that knowledge, which is necessary unto the leading of a Com­mon-wealth. To let the courses of Israel which were Monethly, the Annuall Magistracyes of Athens and Rome go. If three years be too short a Term for this purpose, what was three moneths? A Parliament in the late Go­vernment was rarely longer liv'd then three moneths, nor more frequent then once in a year, so that a Man having been twelve years a Parliament man in England, could not have born his Magistracy above three years, though he were not necessarily subject unto any Vacation. Where­as a Parliament-man in Oceana may in twelve years have born his Magistracy. fix, Notwwithstanding the Necessity of his Vacations, which of these two are most streightned in the time necessary unto the gaining of due experience or [Page 132] knowledge for the leading of a Common-wealth? Neverthe­lesse the Parliament of England was seldome or never without Men of Sufficient skill and ability; though the Orders there were more in Number, lesse in Method, not written and of greater difficulty then they be in Oce­ana: There, if not the Parliament man, the Parliament it self was upon Termes and Vacations, which unto a Council of such Nature is the most dangerous thing in the world, seeing dissolution, whether unto a body Naturall or Po­liticall is death. For if Parliaments happened to rise again & again, this was not so much coming unto themselves, (see­ing a Council of so different Genius hath not been known) as a New birth and a Councill that is every year New­borne indeed must keep a common-wealth in perpetnall Minority or rather Infancy; alwayes in danger of being overlaid by her Nurse, or strangled by her Guardian: whereas an Assembly continued by Succession or due Rotation regu­lated by Terms giving sufficient time for digestion, growes up, and is like a Man, who though he change his flesh neither changeth his body, nor his soul. Thus the Senate of Venice changing flesh, though not so often as in a Com­mon-wealth consisting of the Many were requisite, yet of­tenest of any other in the world, is, both in Body and Soul or Genius, the most unchangeable Councill under Heaven. Flesh must be changed or it will stink of it self; there is a Terme necessary to make a man able to lead the Common-wealth unto her interest, and there is a Terme that may inable a Man to lead the Common-wealth unto his interest. In this regaurd it is, that (according to Mamerous) the Vacations are ( mazima libertatis custo­dia) the Keepers of the Libertyes of Oceana.

The three Regions into which each of the leading Councills, is divided, are three formes (as I may say) in the Schoole of State, for them of the Third (though there be care in the choice) it is no such great matter what be their skill: The Ballot which they practised in the Tribe being that in the performance whereof no Man can be out, and this is all that is Necessary unto their Novitiate or first year, during which time they may be Auditors: by the Second, they will have seen all the Scenes, or the whole [Page 133] rotation of the Orders, so facile, and so intelligible, that at one reading a Man understands them as a Book, but at once Acting as a Play, and so Methodicall, that he will remember them better. Tell me then what it is that can hinder him for the second year from being a Speaker; or why for the third, should he not be a very able Lead­er.

The Senate and the Prerogative, or representative of the people, being each of like constitution, drop annually four hundred, which in a matter of ten yeares, amount to four thousand experienced Leaders, ready upon new electi­ons to resume their leading.

Another thing which I would have considered, is, whe­ther our most Eminent Men found their parts in Parlia­ment, or brought them thither. For if they brought them, think you not the Military Orders of the youth, the Disci­pline of the Tribes, the eight years Orb of the Embassa­dors, the Provincial Armies of Oceana, likely to breed Men of as good parts, as no such matter? Nor have Astro­nomers that familiarity with the Starrs, which Men with­out these Orbs will have with such as are in them. He is very heavy, who cannot perceive that in a Government of this frame, the Education must be Universal, or diffused throughout the whole Body. Another thing which is as certain, as comfortable, is that the pretended depth and difficulty in matter of State, is a meer cheat. From the be­ginning of the World unto this day, you never found a Common wealth, where the Leaders having honesty e­nough, wanted skill enough to lead her unto her true interest at home or abroad: that which is necessary unto this end, is not so much skill as honesty, and let the Leaders of Oceana be dishonest if they can. In the leading of a Common­wealth aright; this is certain, wisdom and honesty are all one, and though you shall finde defects in their vertue, those that have had the fewest, have ever been, and for ever shall be the wisest.

Rome never ruin'd, till her ballance being broken, the Nobility forsaking their ancient vertue, abandoned them­selves unto their lusts; and the Senators, who as in the Case of Jugurtha, were all bribed, turned knaves; at which [Page 134] turn, all their skill in Government, (and in this never men had bin better skilled) could not keep the Common wealth from over-rurning. Cicero (an honest man) labour'd might and main. Pomponius Atticus ano­ther, despaired: Cato tore out his own bowels, the Poig­niards of Brutus and Cassius, neither considered Prince nor Father. But the Common wealth had sprung her Planks, and spilt her ballast, the World could not save her.

For the Close, the Praevaricator, who had judged before, that There was much reason to expect, some of the Clergy (a­gainst all of whom, Mr. Harrington hath declared Warre) Consid. p. 36. p. 94. will undertake the quarrel: tells me in the last line, that There be unto whom he hath recommended the disquisition of the Jewish Common wealth.

It is a miserable thing, to be condemned unto the per­petual Budget; once turn an honest man to me. In the mean time, that it may be farther seen, how much I am delighted in fair play, it being, so belike, that some Di­vines are already at work with me, and I have not so fully explained my self upon that point, which with them is of the greatest concernment, that they can yet say, they have peept into my Hand, or seen my Game; as I have won this trick, Gentlemen, or speak, so I play them out the last card in the next Book for up.