Scoen. I. In answer to Chap. I. Whether Prudence be well distingui­shed into ancient and modern

FOugh! this same mixen in the stirring, is like Pepper in the Nose; but he saith, it is Helle­bore for to purge heads.

Now as concerning purging of heads, Mr. VVren, there seemeth al­ready to peep out a question. Do your Universities (gentle Sir) derive their learning from Nimrod, from the Kings of China, from the Monarchies? (to be equally with Macedon, I doubt, as to this point passed over in wise silence.) Are they descended (do you under­stand me?) from the times in Greece, called by Thucydides, The imbecility of [Page 11] ancient times; from those in Rome, cal­led by Florus, The childhood of that Go­vernment: or speak out, is their whole stock of learning, without which they had not had any kind of thing where­upon to set up, derived from the He­brew, the Greek, and the Roman Com­monwealths? If so, Mr. Wren, whe­ther I pray you call you not now that stock of learning Ancient Learning, al­beit they could not call it so then? and if Politicians have no other Pedigree of Prudence, then the same that you have of learning; why is not that Pru­dence which they have received in the like manner, ancient Prudence, albeit those Commonwealths could not call it so then?

To shift these things which are thus plain, you are in this Chapter a won­derful Artificer; yet cometh all but to this, That neither Thucydides nor Florus divide Prudence into ancient and modern. Why, Mr. Wren, neither did the Commonwealths mentioned divide Learning into ancient and mo­dern: this distinction belongs unto latter times, in regard of some mo­dern Learning that is of latter inven­tion. So, Mr. Wren, in regard of some modern Prudence, which first I tell [Page 12] you what it is, namely, Government by King, Lords and Commons: and secondly, how it came in, namely, by the Goths and Vandals; I call the Pru­dence (do you mark?) of those ancient Commonwealths, Ancient Prudence; and the Prudence remaining unto us from these Goths and Vandals, Modern Prudence. What could you desire more? Nay, and this is according unto the plain sense of Janotti too: for, saith he, as to his two limits or periods of time, Of the former, or that wherein Rome was oppressed by the Arms of Caesar, came the second, or that when Italy was overrun by the Huns, Goths, Van­dals and Lombards; and of the second came all that alteration which hath gi­ven unto the world the face in which we now see it, and utterly lost it that face which it had in the time of the Romans. VVherein relation unto the two Go­vernments (the one popular, which was the more ancient; and the other by King, Lords and Commons, which is the more modern) is so plain, that you are put unto a shift, who can say no more then that I make Janotti au­thour of the division of Prudence in­to ancient and modern. How dare you [Page 13] you for your reputation do thus, Mr. Wren? while first by your own acknow­ledgment I infer this division from more ancient Authors, as Thucydides and Florus: and secondly, my words relating unto Janotti do no where from him derive the division of Prudence into ancient and modern, as to those terms upon which runneth your equi­vocation; but fortifie this division of my own, by the two periods of time by him observed, and that are of like sense with these terms.

But, Mr. Wren, there was never the like of you! VVhereas the Question by me proposed, was, VVhether Pru­dence be not rightly divided into an­cient and modern, you have convey­ed it into a Question, whether Monar­chy be not a more ancient Govern­ment then a Commonwealth. This have I hitherto not disputed, as that which concerneth not the present Controversie: but seeing it may be for your service, I do flatly deny that Monarchy is the more ancient Go­vernment; not that Mr. Hobbes holdeth De cor. polit. Democracie to be of all Governments the first in order of time; but first, because upon the place where it is said▪ [Page 14] That Gen. 10. 8. Nimrod was a mighty hunter be­fore the Lord, it is resolved by Divines that Nimrod was the first Monarch. Now, Sir, Nimrod began his reign a­bout the One thousand eight hun­dredth year of the world: whence I conclude thus: Either the world had no Government till Nimrod, or a Commonwealth may be above a thou­sand years elder then Monarchy: Nay, unless you can finde some Govern­ment that was neither a Common­wealth nor a Monarchy, must have been no less. I know what you will say, That the Government till Nimrod was by fathers of families: why so, I hope, you will yeild it was afterwards, at least in the line of Shem. Now let us compute from Noah, and consider in the posterity of Shem, what judg­ment may be made of the Government by fathers of families; or whether this were indeed, as Divines affirm, Monar­chical, or may not much rather be e­steemed popular.

Gen. 11. Noah had three Sons, Shem, Ham and Japhet; of Shem, by Arphaxad and others, descended Reu; of Reu, Se­rug; of Serug, Nahor; of Nahor, Te­rah; of Terah, Abram; of Abra­ham, [Page 15] Isaac; of Isaac, Jacob; and of Jacob descended the Commonwealth of Israel. So much for the elder bro­ther, which was Shem. Now Sir for the second son of Noah, that is Ham: of Ham descended Cush, and of Cush, Gen. 10. Nimrod: by which, plain it is at the first sight, that the Commonwealth, as to precedence in dignity, is of the el­der house; and as to precedence in time, unless you can shew the descen­dents of Shem to have been under Mo­narchy, must also have been the more ancient Government, that is, if Go­vernment by fathers of families were popular. Now as to this, it is a tra­dition Gemara Babylonia ad tit. San­hed rim. with the Rabbins, that there were seven precepts delivered to the children of Noah: 1. Concerning Judicato­ries: 2. Concerning Blasphemy: 3. Con­cerning perverse worship: 4. Concern­ing uncovering of nakedness: 5. Con­cerning the shedding of mans blood: 6. Concerning rapine or theft: 7. Con­cerning eating of things strangled, or of a member torn from a living creature. This tradition throughout the Jewish Government, is undoubted: for to such as held these precepts, and no more, they gave not onely (as I may say) to­leration, [Page 16] but allowed them to come so near unto the temple as the gates, and called them Proselytes of the gates. Nor do I think the proof in Scripture of these precepts, though not set down together, to be obscure: as where it is said, None of you shall approach to a­ny Levit. 18. 6. 24. that is near kin to him, to uncover their nakedness:—for in all these the Nations (that is, the Canaanites) are defiled, which I cast out before you. The Canaanites were descended from Ham; and that in these words it must be implyed that they had violated the foregoing precepts, is in my judgment evident, seeing there is nothing in the Law of Nature why a man might not approach in this manner unto one that is near of kin to him.

Again, that two other of these pre­cepts were given by God unto Noah, the Scripture is plain, where he saith, Gen. 9. Flesh with the life thereof, which is the blood thereof, shall you not eat. And whoso sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed. VVhence it must fol­low, that either fathers of families were not subject unto this Law; which because it is given generally and with­out any exception, were absurd to [Page 17] think; or else that during Patriarchal Government, they subjected them­selves unto some common Judicato­ries, according unto the first of the seven precepts. Of which, saith Mai­monides, By this the sons of Noah consti­tuted Judges in every City, to judge of the other six precepts, and to govern the people; and the Gemara Babylonia saith, That this was done after the man­ner that Moses commanded Judges to be set in the gates throughout the tribes. By the advice of Jethro to Moses, the like should have been the custome of the Midianites, who, (as also the Gibeonites, descended of the same line with the Monarchy of Nimrod; and for ought perhaps to the contrary, of as ancient standing) were a Common­wealth. But above all, it should seem by some of the Rabbines, that there was a Consistory or Senate instituted by Shem, which was of use with his posterity. Now if Patriarchal Go­vernment was exercised by or un­der the common Ligament of a Senate or Consistory, then was the Govern­ment of the Patriarchs of a popular nature, or a Commonwealth; at least these, Mr. Wren, must be disproved by [Page 18] them who will have Monarchy out of all controversie to be the more ancient Government.

Good Sir, I do not know, nor do I think that this same way (do you see?) of disputation, hath any Predecessor. VVhat do you tell me then, W. Preface. that you have cause to think by the last or any Book of mine, that my stores of Reason and Arguments are brought very low? You see already that it is far otherwise. Tell not me in this place that Doderus is as good a Book as the Bible; nor let Divines (for a thing that I know) run here as they do from the Scripture unto Heathen Authors. It is confest that Diodorus Siculus, Aristotle, Cice­ro, Salust and Trogus say, That in the beginning of things and of Nations, the power was in Monarchs. But then the Heathen Stories know nothing beyond Nimrod, or his Successor Belus; which is no excuse to you, while the Scripture is so much a more ancient record; much less to Divines, at least such of them as preach against the squaring of Go­vernment according to the rule of Heathen Authors. Mr. VVren, (to be plain) there are of these that have a strange kinde of frowardness: if a [Page 19] Commonwealth be described out of Heathen Authors, they will undertake to prove that of Israel to have been a Government of King, Lords and Commons. And if a Commonwealth be out of this of Israel described un­answerably otherwise, then they run to Aristotle, Trogus, & the rest of the Hea­thens, for the antiquity of Monarchy. When none of this will do, they fall flatly upon conjuring the people to take heed how they hearken unto men of wit, reason or learning, and not in any wise to be led but by grace, and such grace onely as is without any mixture of wit, reason or learning. Mr. VVren, I desire them but to tell us once, what they mean by such grace as is without any mixture of wit, rea­son or learning; and you in the mean time to consider, That Heathen Au­thors, though they give Monarchy the precedence in time, are very far from giving it the van in prudence. Nay, for this matter you will find them so much of one minde, that we need Pol. Lib. 3. Cap. 10, 11 hear no more of them then Aristotle, who divides Monarchy into two kinds; the One whereof he calleth Barbarous; and in this he relates to your Nimrod, [Page 20] or your Eastern Monarchs; the Other Heroick, in which he relates expresly to Principality in a Commonwealth; and namely, that of the Lacedemonian Kings. Say you then, To which giveth he the van in dignity; to the Heroick, or to the Barbarous prudence? But it is no matter, strike up, and let us have the Rodomontado, which it pleaseth you shall be of or belonging unto the pre­sent Scoene: This (say you, for you may as well say it of this as of any thing else) approaches very near unto raving, and gives me cause to suspect I have taken a wrong course of curing Mr. Harrington's Political distempers. For whereas I think to do it by giving him more light, know­ing men (and known to be of the learn­edst in this age) are of opinion that I ought to have shut up the windows, and so forth. Now very passing good indeed­law!

Scoene 2.
In answer to Chap 2. Whether a Commonwealth be rightly defined to be a Government of Laws and not of men, and a Monarchy to be the Government of some man or few men, and not of Laws.

THe readiest way, Mr. VVren, of dispatch with the present Que­stion, will be to shew how far you and I are at length agreed; And we are agreed, that Law proceeds from the will of man (whether a Monarch or a Peo­ple) that this will must have a Mo­ver, and that this Mover is Interest.

Now, Sir, the interest of the people is one thing; it is the publick inte­rest: and where the publick interest governeth, it is a Government of Laws, and not of men: the interest of a King or of a party, is another thing, it is a private interest; and where pri­vate interest governeth, it is a Govern­ment [Page 22] of men, and not of Laws. What ayles ye! If in England there have ever been any such thing as a Government of Laws, was it not Magna Charta? Well, and have not our Kings broken Magna Charta some thirty times? I beseech you, Sir, did the Law go­vern when the Law was broken? Or was that a Government of men? On the other side, hath not Magna Char­ta been as often repaired by the peo­ple? and the Law being so restored, was it not a Government of Laws, and not of men? I think you are wilde! Why have our Kings in so many Sta­tutes or Oathes engaged themselves to govern by Law, if there were not in Kings a capacity of governing other­wise? And if so, then by every one of those Oaths or Statutes it is agreed both by King and people, that there is a Government by Laws, and a Govern­ment by men. VVhy goodness, Mr. Wren! is there not a Government of Men, and a Government of Laws? VVhere do you dwell! Such as have laid people in Lavender for the late great Man and his Government, it is now thought will be left unto the Law and her Government. Come, come; [Page 23] Divines and Lawyers are indeed good men to help up a Prince at a dead lift; but they are known well enough: for they will no sooner have set him up, then if he do not govern by their Laws, they will be throwing sticks at him. But do you hear? if a Prince would be entirely freed of such danger, let him get a Parliament of Mathematicians.

What Miracles hath Mr. Hobbes done in this kind! and hovv many more are there vvill make you a King by Geometry! But I shall at this time content my self, Sir, to let them pass, and consider onely your grand Mathe­matical Demonstration, vvith the nooks, crooks, angles and appurtenan­ces of the same. You Gentlemen of lovver forms, be attentive; it hath past the tryal and test of the Doctors Aca­demy, consisting of men knovvn to be of the learnedst of this age; and the manner thereof is as follovveth.

Mr. VVren, you spet crooked pins; you should be exorcised. For pray novv hear me, did you ever see 'em chuse Knights of the shire? those same people, the high shoone, as you call them, expect not, I conceive, that Angels should come dovvn there to ride upon their shoulders: Nor, I doubt, if the truth vvere knovvn, do they greatly care for Saints; they are most for men that drink vvell, or at least for such as eat good meat in their houses: Nor have I found by my rea­ding, that those same high shoone have [Page 25] at any time set the worthy Gentleman on foot, and taken his Horse upon their backs: by which it is manifest, that they do not conceive their Laws to be made by any thing above the nature of man, as Angels; or below the nature of man, as Horses. Now Sir, all you have proved by your wonderful Mathema­ticks, is, That Laws are neither made by Angels nor by Horses, but by men; therefore the high shoone are as good Mathematicians as your self. The voyce of the people is as much the voyce of men, as the voyce of a Prince is the voyce of a man; and yet the voyce of the people is the Voyce of God, which the voyce of a Prince is not; no not as to Law-giving, the voyce of the Prince who was a man after Gods own heart: for thus David pro­poseth unto the Congregation of Is­rael; If it seem good unto you, and that 1 Chro. 13. it be of the Lord our God—let us bring the Ark to us. David in matter of Law-giving, maketh not himself, but the people judge of what was of God; and the Government of Laws, saith A­ristotle, is the Government of God.

Mr. Wren, were you contented to be no wiser then Titus Livius, (who in [Page 26] passing from the Government of the Romane Kings unto that of the Com­monwealth, hath this transition: Livy. li 2. I come now unto the Empire of Laws more pow­erful then that of men) some who con­ceive the said Titus to have done passing well, would think you the better Poli­tician, for not taking the upper hand of him. You will not finde that Augustus Caesar, in whose time this Author wrote, did set any Mr. Wren upon him; which is a shrewd suspition that Princes in that age either wanted such a wit as you are, or would scarce have thanked you for your subtil Argument; somewhat too Mercurial to stay even in your own head. For do not you your self say in another place, That W. p. 171. a Commonwealth having no eyes of her own, (as if this of all other were a mark of blindness) is forced to resigne her self to the conduct of Laws? What imply you in this, less then that a Monarch is not forced to resigne himself unto the conduct of Laws? or what less can follow from this confession of your ovvn, then that a Commonvvealth is a Government of Lavvs and not of men, and that a Mo­narchy is a Government of a man, or some fevv men, and not of Lavvs, [Page 27] Nay, Mr. Wren, nor is it once that your minde mis-gives you; for soon after you are at it again, in shewing what you phansie W. p. 172. befals a Commonwealth as she is a Government of Laws.

Sir, for this Rime I have some rea­son; seeing in a Monarchy, that the Laws being made according to the in­terest of one man or a few men, must needs be more private and partial then suits with the nature of justice; and in a Commonwealth, that Laws being made by the whole people, must come up to the publick interest, which is common right and justice; are Propo­sitions, which Mr. Wren can confess to have indeed some sense in them. But this milk, alas, is kick'd down again, while you add, that they have not any more truth then those other which wanted sense. Now this is a sad case; yet such as you say, will be apparent, if we examine the different tempers of a single person and a multitude enacting Laws.

[Page 28]Are we no farther yet? I verily be­lieved that the different temper of a single person, and of a popular assem­bly, had been long since considered in the Propositions already granted, in as much as the single person is tem­pered by a private, the multitude by the publick interest: which were here­tofore by your self acknowledged to be the first movers of will, and so the efficient causes of Law. If your Ma­thematicks, or what shall I call them? would but hold to any thing, we might have some end. But for the discovery of these different tempers, you forget all that is past, and begin anew in this manner:

When a Monarch acts the Legislators part, he ought to be so far from parti­ality, or respecting his own private inte­rest, that he is then chiefly to direct his thoughts to the common good, and take the largest prospect of publick utility, in which his own is so eminently included.

This Proposition then of yours is op­posed to mine, or those in which you say there is some sense, but no truth: so in this, both the sense and the truth should be apparent. But Mr. Wren, if I should say, That the father of a family, [Page 29] in giving rules to the same, ought to be so far from respecting his private in­terest, or the regard of keeping his whole estate and command unto him­self, and holding the servants that live upon him, short, or in necessity to obey him, and work for him, that he were to take a larger, nay, the largest pro­spect of what is the publick utility of the men that serve him, which is to at­tain unto means whereby to live of themselves: Should I say that a father of a family would find the common and natural interest of his servants, which is to be free, that wherein his own inte­rest, which is to have servants, is emi­nently included; I am confident you would neither allow this Assertion to be truth nor sense. The like say I to your Monarchy, whether it be by a sin­gle person, or by a Nobility. A Mo­narchy not keeping the people in ser­vitude, is no Monarchy; therefore ei­ther servitude must be the interest of the people, or the interest of the people is not that to which a Monarch ought chiefly to direct his thoughts. Yet can you not believe that there are many ex­amples to be produced of Princes, who in enacting Laws have considered their own [Page 30] private personal interest? You are costive of belief, Mr. Wren: consider the Tur­kish and Eastern Monarchies, and shew me any one of their Laws from any other Principle. It is true, in Monar­chies by a Nobility, or by Parliaments, Princes have not in enacting Laws, been able to make so thorough work: for which cause, lest Laws so enacted, should give check unto this private interest so essential to Monarchy, they have still been breaking them. But nei­ther can you believe that Lavvs have been broken by any Prince, seeing that in buying and selling, and other private contracts, Princes are content to tye themselves up to the same rules which they prescribe to others. Rare! A King that plays fair at Piquet, can never break Magna Charta. Caesar paid no less for an horse then another man; therefore Caesar's Monarchy vvas a lawful purchase. O but such Laws, as upon that occasion were made by Caesar, were necessary to attaining the ends of Government: Good! and so that which is necessary unto a private interest, or a single person, towards the attaining unto the ends of Govern­ment, [Page 31] the same cometh up to the pub­lick interest, which is common right and justice. Is this disputing, Mr. Wren, or is it fidling? Yet again: a Prince breaketh not the Law, but for the pub­lick tranquillity. Wonderful! not the Tinkers that fight, but the Constable breaks the peace. That the posse Co­mitatus is according unto the Laws; or that there is a War in the Law for the maintenance of the publick peace, I have heard; but that the publick peace is in any case by the breach of the publick peace (whereof the Laws onely are the bond) to be defended, in good earnest I have not formerly heard. Yet take heed, I pray. On this side of yours, there must be no fond imagination: But on the other side, (say you) there can be no fonder ima­gination, then to think that (in the Republick of Israel framed by God or Moses, in the four hundred that judg­ed Benjamin, in all, in any of the Commonwealths) or when any multi­tude is assembled to enact Laws, it is ne­cessary their resolutions (though those of a single person must) should be con­sonant to publick justice. I have a weary life with you, Mr. VVren, and [Page 32] with such of your Admirers, as if at their pleasure I pick not straws, can so­berly and seriously resolve you to be Conquerer of Mr. Harrington; what is that? nay, of Moses, of Solon, and Lycurgus. The straw that is your first lance in this Encounter, is, that a great part of this multitude (so you will have it called, though Politicians understand not a people under orders by the word multitude, but the contrary) will not, for want of capacity, comprehend what this justice and interest is.

Sir, if a man know not what is his own interest, who should know it? and that which is the interest of the most particular men, the same, being sum­med up in the common vote, is the publick interest O but the abler sort will presently be divided into factions and juncta's; and under pretence of publick interest, will prosecute their own de­signes.

But, good Sir, if these abler sort act as a Council under a single person, what should hinder them from doing the like, except they debate onely, and propose unto the Prince, who onely may resolve? Wherefore if in popu­lar Government the Senate of Coun­cil [Page 33] of the people have no more then the Debate, and the Result remain wholly unto a popular Council having no power to debate; how can the abler sort any more divide into Juncta's or Factions under popular Government, then under Monarchical? Speak your Conscience; the interest of the people being as you say, That justice be impar­tially administred, and every man pre­served in the enjoyment of his own; Whether think you the more pro­bable way unto this end, that a Coun­cil, or the abler sort, propose; and a single interest, that is, a single person, resolve; or that the abler sort propose, and the common interest, that is, the whole people, have the result? O but take heed; for it is to be remembred, that the greatest part of Laws concern such matters as are the continual occasion of controversie between the people of a Na­tion, such regard regulation of trade, priviledges of corporations, &c. Sweet Mr. VVren! are there more Corpora­tions in England, then distinct Sove­raignties in the united Provinces? Have those people no trade in compa­rison of ours? Or what quarrels▪ have they about it? Perswade them to have [Page 34] a King; and to this end be sure you tell them, that if we had not had Kings in England, there had certainly instead of the Barons Wars, been Wars between the Tanners and Clothiers; and instead of those of York and Lancaster, others between the Shoomakers and the Ho­siers. Say, if you have any ingenui­ty, do you not make me pick straws? But the longest straw comes here after all. (Say you)

It being essential to popular assemblies that the plurality of votes should oblige the whole body, those Laws which lay claim to the consent of all, are very of­ten the resolutions of but a little more then half, and must consequently go less in their pretensions to publick inte­rest.

Gentlemen, here are forty of you, whereof five and twenty see in yonder Grove a Rooks-nest, which the other fifteen of you see not; now, Gentle­men, is that less a Rooks-nest for this? or do these five and twenty see farther then those fifteen? If so it be with e­very thing that is to be seen, felt, heard or understood, how cometh the world to be resolved otherwise upon any thing, then that quod pluribus visum id [Page 35] what appeareth unto the most, is most authentick? and what can you desire more of certainty in a Govern­ment, then all that certainty which can be had in the world?

It was even now that we came from the Prince to the People; now from the people to the Prince again. Good Mr. Wren, why do you say, or whoever said the like, that those Laws which are reputed the peoples greatest security a­gainst injustice and oppression, have been established by the authority of some Prince? Do you find any such thing in Israel, Athens, Lacedemon, Rome, Venice, Holland, Switz? But you equivocate; as to authority in Princes, Magistrates or sole Legislators, in matter of Law­giving, you well know that I am for it; but not as you impose upon this term for their power. Thus be it gran­ted, that Alfred, Edward, Lewis, Al­phonso, have been excellent Legislators; What is this to power, or to your pur­pose, seeing the Laws proposed by au­thority of these Princes, were enacted no otherwise then as Poinings Laws, by the power of the people, or assemblies of their three estates? But above all, (say you) several of the Roman Empe­rours, [Page 36] and chiefly Justinian, have fabri­cated those Laws so much admired for their reason and equity, which have stretched themselves farther then ever the Roman Legions were able to march, and which are still embraced by those people, who have long since ceased to ac­knowledge the Roman Empire. Herein you have paid your self to some pur­pose: for most eloquent Mr. Wren, who but your self saith, That Justinian fabricated those Laws you speak of? I have heard indeed, that he com­piled them; and surely, Sir, in that work of his, he did but new vamp the old bootes of the people of Rome: Nay, good Mr. Wren, your Roman Em­perours at the gallantest wore no bet­ter: for the ful proof whereof, I need go no foot farther then your own sweet self; for do not you give out of Justini­an this very definition of a Law; W▪ p. 59. Lex est quod Populus Romanus Senatorio Ma­gistratu interroganto (veluti consule) constituebat? How say you then, that Justinian fabricated these Laws, which he plainly telleth you, were proposed by the Senate, and resolved by the peo­ple of Rome? Do you see what your Emperours themselves acknowledged [Page 37] to have been a Government of Laws, and more excellent then a Govern­ment of men, though they themselves were the men that governed? And you your self have said enough to con­firm, that the justice of the dead peo­ple went farther then the arms of the living Emperours; nay, and that such Laws as are yet of the greatest trea­sures in the world, are still extant of the Roman people, though of the Empe­rours there remain nothing that is good.

But say you, On the other side (you may please to say as you will, but it is on the same side yet) those Common­wealths that have been most celebrated for their Laws, have received them from the hands of a Sole Legislatour (which both words and things, though you list not to acknowledge it, every▪ body knows that I taught you: now let us see how you can hit me with my own weapon) therefore it may well be doub­ted, whether these people of Athens and Lacedemon thought so well of them­selves as Mr. Harrington seems to do of popular Assemblies. Why, do not I say, That a popular Assembly, as to the formation or fabricating of Govern­ment, [Page 38] through the want of invention, must of necessity have some sole Legi­slator? What fault do you find with Mr. Harrington? Why, that with such repeated confidence he asserts, that the people never faile to judge truly of the publick interest, where (the Legislator or) the Senate discharge their duty: And what have you been saying all this while in these examples of Solon and Lycurgus, whose Laws being by them prudently proposed unto the people, were as prudently judged, and there­upon enacted by the people? So like­wise for the Roman Decemvirs: for if you think that these did any more then propose to the people, or that any Law of theirs was otherwise good then as voted and commanded by the peo­ple, you should go to school. Yet that if the Legislator or the Senate di­vide well, the people shall be sure to make a good choice, you must confess is too hard for your faith: why if it be matter of faith, you might have let it alone? but do you think it right in ci­vil matters, that the tenderness of faith should supply the want of sense in you; or vvhat is the scruple can yet remain in your conscience! Good­ness! [Page 39] the observation which Anachar­sis made, who said of the popular As­semblies in Greece, That wise men pro­pounded matters, and fools decided them. Why Mr. Wren, Anacharsis would not lose his jest, and you cannot finde it. Do you think that the Com­monwealths of Greece thought Ana­charsis, for this fine thing, wiser then Lycurgus, Solon, or themselves? Why Mr. VVren, in this earnest you make your self the Jester. But let you a­lone, you will be the Gascon still; that which is thrown out of the win­dows where-ever you come, is no less then the whole house; or if you leave any thing, it is but that you are weary to discover all the weak Arguments and false Inferences of Mr. Harrington, as awork to others of small profit, and to your self of little glory. Poor Mr. Harrington! He will now leave you a while to take breath, and confer a little with your patron.

Doctor VVilkins having laughed so much as in suggested in the Epistle, should not methinks be altogether left out of our game. He in his Book cal­led Mathematical Magick, pretends B. 1. c. 14. to a Balance too. And his Balance is [Page 40] made for all the world like a Jack; the whole force of which engine consist­eth in two double Pullies, twelve wheels and a sail: the sail is instead of the crest of the Jack, at which a fellow stands blowing; and by blowing in this manner, the said Author pretendeth to demonstrate Mathematically, that the said fellow, with the said Jack, shall tear you up the strongest Oak by the roots. This, to men who know that some ship in a storm will break the strongest Anchor that is made of Iron, and the strongest Cable that is made of Hemp, must needs be wonderful: of what then must this Jack and this string be made, that it break not before it fetch up this Oak? Nay, how can any man blow a million of years toge­ther? Or if he could, where would the Oak or the Jack be? and in a less time the Oak it is confest could not Ch. 16. by this means be removed one inch. This nevertheless must be a Mathema­tical Demonstration. Goodness! what stuff is here for Mathematicians, upon which to usurp demonstration in such wise, that it must be forbidden unto all the rest of Man-kinde?

Mr. VVren, I have Du Moulin, and [Page 41] Sanderson; vvill you deny these Au­thours to be good Logicians? upon the credit of my two eyes, in all their ex­amples of Demonstration, they have not one that is Mathematical. Are not they clearly on my side then, that there may be Demonstration, and yet not Mathematical? Why sure there may, Sir; nay, and such a Demonstra­tion may be every whit as valid and convincing, as if it vvere Mathemati­cal. For this I appeal to Mr. Hobbes: All true ratiocination (saith he) which Elements▪ p 63. taketh its beginning from true principles, produceth science, and is true demonstra­tion. This afterwards he declares in all sorts of Doctrines or Arts, and conse­quently in the Politicks, to be holding. Wherefore, say I, if [...] Common­vvealths-men have nothing that can be so strong or holding as this same Jack and Jack-line of Doctor VVilkinses, let us een vvith patience turn the spit, vvhile our salary-men eat the Rost­meat.

But now, Sir, mark me vvell: What was always so and no otherwise, and still is so and no otherwise, the same shall ever be so and no otherwise. What think you of this for a Principle? A [Page 42] Principle vvhich is right and straight, should be such as admitteth of as little proof or denial, as that the fire burns. I can no more prove the one then the other: vvherefore if you can no more deny the one then the other, by the leave of your Mathematicians, this principle is no less sure and certain then the best in their art: and what ratiocina­tion I use in my politicks, that taketh not its beginning, or is not legitimately and undeniably derived from this principle, I am contented should go for nothing. What vvould you have more? or, why must I be hit in the teeth vvith the vvant of demonstration? Stand away, I vvill demonstrate, that's certain: but here is the mischief; not every man that pretends unto understanding in the Politicks, hath conversed vvith them; and so in these, through meer vvant of understanding, a man vvill confidently deny, vvhat in other con­versation, vvhere he is more skilled, he vvould be ashamed to question. For this cause I vvill not fall full butt upon the politicks at first dash, but begin fairly and softly, in Puris naturali­bus.

That conversation vvhich vvith men [Page 43] is most general (I apprehend) to be with women: and so here I come with my first demonstration.

Mr. Wren, the reason why I begin to demonstrate in this manner, or in some­thing meerly natural and known to e­very body, is, That otherwise I should never stave men off from saying, That what was always so, and not otherwise, and still is so, and not other wise, must ever be so, and not otherwise, must needs be true; that is, except a man can give a reason why it may be otherwise. This is that when I come unto the Po­liticks, things not less natural, but onely more remote from mens knowledge or [Page 44] acquaintance, which they will be all sure enough to return: Wherefore let them begin here to shew me such rea­son as hereafter they will ask, that is, why women, notwithstanding what is past or present, may for the future be all handsome. Would not the under­taking of such an adventure, be a no­table ridiculous piece of Knight-er­rantry? In sooth, Mr. VVren, though men will not so easily see it, it is no o­therwise in the politicks, which are not to be erected upon phansie, but upon the known course of Nature; and therefore are not to be confuted by phansie, but by the known course of Nature. Remember, Sir, Anatomy is an Art; but he that demonstrates by this Art, demonstrates by Nature, and is not to be contradicted by phansie, but by demonstration out of Nature. It is no otherwise in the Politicks. These things therefore being duly con­sidered, I proceed.

I know the humour of these times: though any thing that will patch be now called prudence, it will be known that what is after this manner unde­niably deducible from the Major of these Propositions, is Prudence or Po­licy, and no other.

But Mr. VVren, true it is that the demonstration given is but Hoti, [...]. that is, from the effect; which though a cer­tain effect imply a certain cause, and come after that manner to be as good and undeniable a proof as the other demonstration; yet because this is not so honourable an Argument as the o­ther, I shall now give you the same, Dihoti, or from the Cause. [...].

Sir, this I say is Dihoti: and seeing it is a custome with you to give my things a turn over the tongue, I am re­solved hereafter to hoti 'em and dihoti 'em in such manner, as shall make you take your teeth. You will say, that I am a Passionate Gentleman. But what hath any man to do in this place to tell me of the seuds between the Senate and the people of Rome, or those of the States in regulated or Gothick Mo­narchies? did I ever undertake to hoti or dihoti any of these? If they break loose, let them look to that whom it concerneth. Nevertheless, I say, that Laws, whether in Commonweatlths or regulated Monarchies, are made by [Page 47] consent of the Senate and the people, or by consent of the States, or Lords and Commons. And I pray you, Mr. Wren, What is in your Allegation to confute this saying? Your words are these.

But doth this prove, that in case of a Senate upon Rotation, there may be feud between them and the people? or that Laws in regulated Monarchie are not enacted by the Lords and Com­mons? You might as well have argued thus, Mr. Wren: These same Lords and Commons have power enough to dis­agree, or make Wars; therefore they have no power to agree or to make Laws: Or what doth this concern me?

But now for the Jig at parting. Mr. Hobbes saith, That Aristotle and Cicero wrote not the Rules of their Politicks from the principles of nature, but tran­scribed them into their Books, out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, as [Page 48] Grammarians describe the Rules of Language out of the practice of the times. Mr. VVren, if I had answered Mr. Hobbes thus: That the whole force of his Argument amounted but to this, That because Grammarians describe the rules of Language out of the pra­ctice of the times, therefore Aristotle and Cicero did so in their discourses of Government; what would you have said? But because Mr Hobbes doth not prove, but illustrate what he saith by way of similitude; therefore I answer him by way of similitude in this man­ner: ‘That for Mr. Hobbes to say, A­ristotle and Cicero wrote not the rules of their Politicks from the principles of Nature, but transcribed them into their Books out of the practice of their own Commonwealths, is as if a man should say of famous Harvey, that he transcribed his Circulation of the blood, not out of the principles of Nature, but out of the Anatomy of this or that body.’ Yet you answer me, That the whole force of this Obje­ction amounteth but to this: That because Harvey in his Circulation hath followed the principles of Nature, therefore A­ristotle and Cicero have done so in their [Page 49] discourses of Government. Mr. Wren, I have complained of you for repeat­ing me fraudulently, but not so often as I might: for whereas upon this oc­casion I told you, ‘That a similitude is brought for illustration, or to shew how a thing is, not to prove that it is so;’ You repeat me thus: Mr. Har­rington assured me in his last Book, that he produced this onely as a similitude, and never intended that any man should look for Reason or Argument in it. Sir, though a similitude have not that proof in it which may draw a man, yet it hath such inducement in it as may lead a man. But, why should I be trou­bled, seeing in the close you heartily crave my pardon? Good, Mr. Wren, abundantly enough: Nay, no more; no more, I beseech you. Look you, do what I can, he will be making me re­paration too. Well then, if it must be so, what is it? Why, say you, By way of reparation to Mr. Harrington, I make here a solemn Declaration, That for the future he shall have no cause to accuse for expecting Reason or Argument in any of his discourses. O ingenuity! he confes­seth that he hath taken my similitude for an Argument, my Goose for my [Page 50] Pig; and the satisfaction promised, comes to this, that he will take my Ar­guments for Similitudes: when he should be shooing my Goose, he is soling my Pig; for which he will make (as ye shall find hereafter) this amends, that when he should be soling my Pig, he will be shooing my Goose. Mr. Wren, good night.