SECT. I.

1. THE first attempt of our Dispatcher, is to give an account of his writing at all, and his second to defend his manner of treaty from the charge or blame of contumeliousnesse: These two were to march together in the front, and Syllabus of his first Section, being so ingaged, and intricated the one in [Page 2] the other, that if he may not have liberty to write in that style of scoffe, and declamation, he must not write at all, his ovation being the prime of his strength, his noise and report of his victories the only means to perswade the Reader that he hath obtain'd them.

2. This stratagem promises it self many advantages; for, 1. It hath the reputation of having gotten some conquests, routed the unexpert adversaries, by crying they flie (a strange priviledge of confident fiction, by majoration, to lose its nature, and become truth.) And being thus incouraged, it (2) likes the augurie, and hopes still to be in like manner successefull; the slow ravener, whose speed serves him not to overtake and seise his prey, on design to charm, doth roare after it; and if it thrives not, yet (3) 'tis the putting a good countenance upon an ill matter, and that is the only relief in an irremediable mis­adventure. Mean-while the admission of this among other of Polyaenus's stratagems is so far from being any ingredient in the Christian warfare, that it is an unquestionable indication of the want of those weapons, with which that arraies its cham­pions; and the artifice is still so mean, that they must be very importunate interests, that shall be able to recommend it to any trafficker, but ordinarily ingenious, and that can but live without it; There is none but the profess'd Quack or Moun­tebanke, that avowedly brings the Zany upon the stage with him; such undoubtedly is this scoptical humor, when 'tis al­low'd to bear any considerable part in the Christian palaestra, let it call it self what it please, zeal or drollery, 'tis at best the Buffon, designed to assist and combine with Sophistry, (as the Ballad-singer with the Cut-purse) to ensnare and lurch the sim­ple; so one of your Sorbon Doctors lately advertiseth the Be­nedictine Monke Launoy de Prim. Cenoman. Praes. Epoc. p. 167., Convitia apud imperitos et st [...]lidè credul [...]s rationum instar haberi solent, this kind of treaty uses the Reader, as ill as the adversary, calls them fools, that are moved by it; The managing a controversie, saith he, with ostentation of words, secularis potius quam Monasticae militiae professorem decet, becomes a Fenser better then a Monke, but for rudenesse or incivility to him that had given him never an ill word, he must more seri­riously instruct the brother, what character belongs to it. [Page 3] Ibid. p. 180. Modestia virtus est tum omnium, tum maximè Christianorum, & inter Christianos vel maximè Clericorum, & Monachorum, qui caeteris virtutum omnium exemplo praelucere debent: veritas quoque non indiget patrocinio convitiorum, ipsa sibi sufficit, & quò nudior est, ac simplicior, eò comptior, eò amabilior, eò fortior & ad vin­cendum mendacium aptior. Modesty is the duty of all Christians, especially of Ecclesiasticall persons, and truth needs not contumely for its Advocate, is much more lovely, and apt to convince without this Auxiliary. This I choose to say in his, rather than in my own words, that it may not come to him under the prejudice of preaching or saint-like; and if Greek, though heathen, may not be as nauseous as either of those, I shall give it a perfect parallel out of [...]. Plutarch, [...], Valour needs not anger, having imbibed reason. Which madeTom. IV. p. 709. l. 33. St. Chrysostome conclude, [...]. Of all men living they that strive, (controvertists) are obliged not to be angry. And if S. W. will turn to a saying of Phavorinus inl. 19. c. 111. A. Gellius (which assures me the degree of praise which he hath afforded me, p. 18, 19. was more skil­fully designed to myTurpius est exiguè & fri­gidè laudari, quam insectanter & graviter vi­tuperari. Qui infoecundè & jejunè laudat, destitui à causae videtur. disadvantage, than all his Index of Con­tumelies; giving this reason for the Aphorisme, Quoniam qui maledicit & vituperat, quantò id acerbiùs facit, tam maximè illi pro iniquo & inimico ducitur, & plerumque propterea fidem non capit: The bitterer his reproaches are, the lesse they are credited) he will h [...]ve reason to think, that what I have hitherto said in these wordish testimonies (as he will call them) is more for his, than mine own advantage, if his cause will but allow him to make use of it.

3. For my self, as I must professe to believe that there is no one simple error in Popery more pernicious, nor consequently more fit to be resisted, and contested with, than are the con­trarieties to charity, the fermentations, and paroxysmes of bitter zeal, which are here avowed and justified by S. W. so I have not a greater obligation to any part of this Reply, than to proceed yet farther on this proemiall Theme, how extrinse­cal soever it may seem to the main Controversie; and examine (with what brevity I may, being herein tied to anothers mo­tions) all that he hath here said in defense of it, separating as [Page 4] well as I can his pleas from his scoffes, his Logick from his Rhetorick, and making my rejoinder only to the united force of the former, not to the diffused of the latter.

4. And first to the plain texts of Scripture, which I produ­ced against railers, revilers, contumelious persons, he replies, A sad case, that no punishment lesse than hell must be poor S. W's doom, because he layd open the weaknesse of D. H's defense of a per­nicious cause, after the manner that such a defense deserved; and he wonders I had no more charity, than not to be afraid, lest I should drive S. W. into despair of his salvation, by denouncing and preach­ing to him such horrid judgements for writing against the Saints.] To this I reply, 1. That it is indeed a sad case, that Gods de­nuntiations against a sin, so charitably, and affectionately men­tion'd by an Apostle as a speciall part of his Apostolicall office, to call all to self-examination, but the guilty to repentance, should be entertain'd with so little of earnest, or of that tem­per of mind, which is due to any Apostolical denuntiation. 2. I demand as sadly, whether if S. W. did but suspect that any Christian (though most unknown to him) which he had to deal with, were guilty of drunkennesse, or adultery, and should thereupon mind him of the Apostles denuntiations against such, that neither the Drunkard nor Adulterer should enter the King­dome of God, and the other should return, whether seriously or but scoptically, that he wondred S. W. had no more charity, than not to be afraid of driving him into despair of his salvation, he would think it a Christian reply, and either an argument of his innocencie, or a symptome of his relenting? 3. I hence learn somewhat of his dialect, 1. His notion of preaching, which he so oft useth as a style of scorn. 2. That other of Saints, which with him is wont to sound the same way. Preaching is here joyned with denouncing such horrid judgements, as were cited out of St. Paul, and can signifie no other than what St. Paul was guilty of, and I no otherwise, than as I transcribed St. Pauls words. And let him then judge, if 'twere truely his art, as elsewhere he pretends, which suggested this ironie, this part of his dialect to him. Next [the Saints] can signifie no more or other than Dr. H. for against him only it was that S. W. was charged to have written that, which he here affirms written [Page 5] against the Saints: and then he that most seriously thinks him­self ten thousand times lesse than the least of all Saints (and never assumed more, if so much as this) that knowes it hath been the general practice of Hereticks and Scismaticks, to call themselves by titles of this kind, the pure, the perfect, the spiritual, the holy, the Saints, the godly, (and the very worst of men, the Gno­sticks, meant the same, when they assumed that title) must yet be as solemnly scoff't at under that style, as if he had indeed assumed it. 'Tis true I had mentioned saints in that Paragraph, to which he thus replies, and so also the true prophets of God, but the former in the expresse Scripture notion, for those that reign in heaven, and shall judge the world; and the second for those very Prophets whom the Jewes defamed and persecured; far from imagining, and as far from appearing, to include my self in either number; and if he meant to perswade any incau­tious Reader, that I did, then this was very injurious to us both, and an early instance of the undue and undeserved manner of his replies to my defense, which yet he averts in this period, and pretends no farther to vindicate his practises from the A­postles sentence, than he can justly avert it. I demand therefore, did I in the Paragraph he now replies to, (or any where else) assume to my self or party, the title of Saints? If he saith I did, I leave him to his own eyes and conscience to refute him; If I did not, then this part of my defense deserved not this man­ner of Reply which he hath given it; and having nothing to pretend for it but my desert, he hath already lost his only plea, as soon as he hath produced it.

5. Secondly, he proceeds to view the charge of contumelie, how he may appear to be concerned in it, and begins with my acknowledgement (as if that would yield him some advantage) that it was not he which wrote the Bill of fare, to which he saith he may with truth adde, that he did not so much as know of it.] I reply, 1. That my confession of the Romish factor, concerned only the style of drollery and Picquant sauce, by him made use of, and is no farther to be extended, then that the publisher gave a civiller title to his contumelies, than the Author himself. 2. That the list which the publisher set in the front of the book, was exactly conformable to what the Author had dispe [...]sed in the [Page 6] body of it, and can no more lessen by dividing and taking part of his blame, than the divulger or proclaimer of a libell exte­nuates the crime of him that pen'd it, and delivered it to be publisht. Nay 3. the bill of fare is so imperfect an Index of the contumelies of the book, that I have reason to think it set as a blind rather to conceal the greater variety of them, which was sure to be found in the Book, than a map only to point at them. 4. That as I, whose only businesse it was to consider the contumelies, can be no more presumed to know, or conse­quently to reflect on the person of S. W. than of the Romish factor, the Master of the Feast, than the collector of the bill of fare: so nothing that I have said in this matter is concerned in that inquiry. I have indeed oft heard the names, by which both of them are known, but as I am no whit satisfied for the in­justice of their contumelies, by my having those imperfect ima­ges of them, or by their having shared it betwixt them, (the heap, or load of soil smells never the more temperately, that there were more hands joyned to the collecting of it) so the Apostles sentences against that sin were produced by me for the use of all that had any part of that guilt on them, and meant not to raise a suspicion of guilt on any, that had it not. And yet 5. if S. and W. be characters that any one person means, or is willing to be known by, whoever it is that hath the comfort of being, or vanity of assuming to be the Author of these Answers, he is certainly responsible for all that appears from the Presse under his Signatures, as a Merchant is for the transactions of his Factor. Lastly, I have now no motive to incline me to affixe the collecting of the Index of Schisme di­spatcht to any other hand, than what compiled the book, and that is much more contumelious, and injurious, than the former bill of fare, and so here be grounds enow to supersede and de­prive him of all benefit of that confession of mine, with which he begins his defense.

6. But, saith he, Dr. H. thinks he hath got a notable advantage against me from my own confession, that my blowes were rude and my adversary civil, whereas I used both those phrases as an ob­jection of the Readers, as is most palpable.] I reply, 1. How he used them, must be judged by his own words, to which I [Page 7] referred in the Epistle to the Reader. Before, saith he, you can have past three Chapters, I know you will be objecting, that the blowes I give are too rude for so civil an adversary.] From hence all that I assumed was, that the Author who was fittest to name his own births, hath allowed them the plainer title of rude blowes. And what can be more palpable, than that he hath done so? 2. 'Tis as palpable that when this was written to the Reader, to meet him, as he saith, in the very entry, the Reader, of whom he speaks, could not as yet have made this objection, or be with truth by him pretended to make it, any otherwise then as S.W's conscience assured him, there was place for this objection; These words [I know you will be objecting] being spoken by the Dis­armer, can import no lesse to my understanding, than that this was a reflex't act of his own conscience, that there were in the three first Chapters competent motives to suggest to the Reader this objection, and I am not subtile enough to distinguish be­twixt this signification of this reflex't act of conscience, and his own confession, which yet he here vehemently averts, with what palpablenesse or evidence of truth, let him now judge. 3. If the Reader indefinitely taken, i. e. (in materia necessariâ, which alone is the matter of knowledge, here mention'd) every Reader be by S. W. yielded to object this, then is this as fair and large a testi­mony as may be, of the truth of the thing questioned, viz. That S. W's blowes were not only rude, but too rude, which was all that I designed to conclude from this medium. Other col­lections I might have made from his mentioning the three first Chapters, and no more, and his mentioning them in an undue style, when that book of his is not divided into Chapters, but into three parts: and 13 Sections in the first part: But I desired not then, nor am yet fond of making impertinent discove­ries.

7. But he hath more to say to this head. Had I, saith he, used them, the rudenesse of blowes argues not that they were not just, since none doubts but malefactors are very rudely, yet most justly whipt, and the courteous Epithet of civl denyed not, but the oyle in his tongue was accompanyed with venome in his heart, and so made it more necessary to discover that, whose only advantage it was to lurk undiscoverable. I reply, 1. That I assumed no more from his [Page 8] confession, than that the blowes were rude, and the adversary civil, and if that be granted, I have no more to demand, nor he to quarrel in this matter. For 2. if rudenesse should not conclude injustice, much lesse will it conclude the contrary; there will need other mediums to prove the blowes just, than [that they are rude, or that malefactors are punished justly] And till those me­diums are produced and proved effectual to the end, the affir­ming them just, is the begging the question, and so of no force to his present defense, and will be proved but a new contumelie, as oft as I shall in the process of this answer shew, that there is as much injustice, as rudenesse in his blowes. 3. I shall appeal to custom of speech, the best Dictionary, whether when a male­factor is whipt by the Lictor, or beheaded by the Executioner, without any addition of his own spleen to the Judges sentence, he shall be said to have dealt rudely, or contumeliously with the malefactor? or whether strength of argument in a disputant would by the Reader indefinitely be certain (and so, as to be the object of S.W's knowledge) to be styled rudenesse? If so, he hath not lost by this instance, though withall he hath not gained by it; but if not, let him then judge what cause it is, that is capable of no better defenses. But then 4. I must set a remark on that piece of Logick that follows, [The courteous Epithet of Civil denyed not, but the oyle in the tongue was accompanyed with venome in his heart, and so made it more necessary to discover that—] The force of this consequence and propriety to its being a part of S. W's defense, depends on these two things, 1. That under the outside of Civility, poyson was discovered to lurk. 2. That the rude blowes were some way necessary to the making this discovery; now 1. I demand, is that presently eo ipso inferred and proved, that every thing else doth not deny: The word [civill] is not pretended by me to have any force of probation, either as to the truth, or the wholesomenesse of what is propounded, but neither is it any symptome of falsehood or poyson, any more than the contrary rudenesse is of the contrary. By what means then is the discovery made, which is here supposed? The only medium here mention'd, is, That [The courteous Epi­thet of Civil denyed it not.] But 1. it doth as much deny it, as words signifie things, or lips are interpreters of the heart, (for he [Page 9] that treats a man civilly, doth at least tell him, that he means him no hurt) and all humane affirmations and negations are thus transacted; though it is true, there is frequently deceit in them, when false hearts have the managing of them. 2. Therefore, if it doth not deny it, what is gained toward the discovery? There be ten thousand propositions (which are more than single words) in the Bible, none of which deny Lucifer to be the Messias; will this yield him any assistance to­ward the acquiring of that dignity? To suppose then this lurking poyson without any other ground of inferring it, than that the Epithet of Civil denyed it not, is one essay of his discursive faculty that I was here to consider. And another is, the in­fluence that this hath on the rude blowes, or propriety to be an ingredient in the plea for them. For I must again demand, In case there were any latent poyson in the civil Tract of Schisme, was not civil reason able to search and discover it? Doe Physitians use to inveigh, or scoffe at poysons? tell them they are absurd and ridiculous, and Saint-like; or do they not think it sufficient to furnish their patients with Antidotes against them? If there were never a Smith in Israel, could not the true Religion be preserved, without going down to the Philistins Grindstones to whet their piety, as well as their Shares? If all the Romanists were throughout good Christians, and so really the meekest men upon the earth, and such as would not rail, any more than ly for God, were the Infallibility and visibility of their Church ascer­tain'd (or but more likely) to be lost by this means? If so, then S. W. need no more be rude, Dr. H's civility hath insured and prepared his own ruine, and then still, be the supposition of the poyson never so certain, and the discovery never so necessary, yet ad quid perditio haec, why were these loads of contumelies brought in, which might have been sold to the Jewes for some price (it matters not how great) or laid out in charity on some strong-hearted Heretick, which were like to dye a lin­gring death, without them. If a wordish testimony or two may here have place against such rigorous evidences as these, I shall propose to him the words of Cicero and Seneca, which may de­serve to be believed in their own facultiesCic. Tusc. Qu. l. IV.. Non desiderat for­titudo advocatam itacundiam, satis est instructa, armata, parata per sese; [Page 10] An non vir fortis nisi stomachari coeperit, non potest esse fortis? Gla­diatorum id quidem est. AndSenec. de Ira. l. 1. c. XVI. Nil aliu instrumentis opus est, satis nos instruxit ratione natura: Haec dedit telum firmum, perpetuum, ob­sequens, nec anceps, nec quod in dominum remitti possit: The common notions that prevailed uniformly with these, might, if consulted, have assured S. W. that reason, without the rude blowes, was his best armature, such as would not fail to doe, what he would have it, could not be taken out of his hands, and used against him, as all other weapons may, but especially that of contumelie, if the adversary be no better man than S. W. is a Disputant.

8. I shall not now further disquiet him, by examining how he could, as he saith, discover that venome, whose advantage, he also saith it was, to lurk undiscoverable, because I doubt not, but this new tube hath the faculty of discovering things, which are other­wise undiscoverable, this magnifying glasse hath alwayes been able not only to inlarge, but create, first to improve Mites into Swine, and then each single meer nothing into the largest Co­lossus, and all this by the rules of severe reason, and rigorous de­monstration.

9. 'Tis time we now advance from the rude blowes (for which I am to account not with S. W. it seems, but with the Reader only, it being so palpable, that the Reader was the man, that put those words into S. W.'s mouth, without any the least consent of his) to the twitchings by the beard] which he cannot, doth not deny to have been his own style; Nay, (that I may not conclude, as he doth, from not denying) he expressely confesses, he spoke it. But to this he hath some few things to say also. 1. That I reiterate it to make my Reader smile. 2. That the twitch­ing by the heard is indeed somewhat too rude a carriage, if under­stood in the down right sense, as, saith he, I seem to take it, but he spake it only in an allegory, and in order to my wearing a Vizard, which he pluck't off. 3. That since he did only so, let me but acknowledge that he found me attired in such a Mask, and he is contented to be thought so unreasonably uncivil, as to plucke it off so rude­ly.]

10. This, it seems, is all the satisfaction that may be expected to attend on S.W's confession, when himself is both the penitent and the confessor. But to these I reply, to the first, 1. That it were [Page 11] not unreasonable in him to allow me the comfort once to sol­licit the Readers smile, when he hath the profuser joyes of en­tertaining him with a loud laughter, whole dayes together. Hath he the Leviathans priviledge of sporting alone in the waters, the inclosure of game, the patent of having all mirth wrapt up in his papers? Was it an undecency in me thus to refresh the Reader, once in a long wearisome journey, or was it not? If not, why is it mention'd by him, whose every word is presu­med to be immediate, and so to have demonstrative force in it? If it was, why doth S. W. so over-imitate what he thus con­demns? But 2. for the truth of what he charges on me, either that I reiterate it at all, or to that end of making the Reader smile, I have been at so much leisure, as to read over all I have said in that matter, and find his suggestion very distant from all appearance of truth, in both particulars. I name the phrase but twice, and that at no lesse distance than is be­tween the first part of the 2^d, and the last of the 6^th page, once in reciting his words, the other time in refuting them, and if this had been called iterating, I had not resisted, but I am sure it is not reiterating. And when the Reader turns to the places, he will find, that as the iteration had no propriety to make any man smile, so each passage was delivered with as much of earnest, and as little of irony, as any other line of the Book, and then again he will judge, what credit is to be given to S. W's relations.

11. To the second, 1. What appearance or semblance is there, that I took the phrase in the downright sense? or how was it possible I should so take it? Could I think his printed sheets had fingers, or pincers, or other instruments of violence or rud [...]nesse, properly so called? or did I expresse an attempt to phancy what was thus impossible? Nay, are not these my words? Rude blowes and twitchings by the beard, declamation and satyre, are none of these justifiable and lawfull means? What could more wit­nesse my understanding his allegory, than my interpreting it? 2. If in the down-right sense his twitching be acknowledged somewhat too rude, can it avoid being so in the allegory? Are his tropes so inartificial, his expressions so feeble, and imperfect, as to signifie lesse than they sound? Is not that which was alle­gorically [Page 12] meant by that style, as really rude in another kinde, as the down-right twitching would be? If it be, then what a defense is this? [if understood in the down-right sense it was somewhat too rude, but being spoken in a sense that signified as much as the down­right, it did not yet signifie so much rudenesse.] If it be not, we have then lost our Rhetoricks too, as well as our Logick former­ly. 3. Then, hath he mended the matter by adding, he spake it in order to my wearing a Vizard? Is a contumely allayd by being doubled, shall falsities imitate negations, and two Pasquils become a Panegyrick? I must not blame S. W. but his art, for this also.

12. Yet all these are but preparatives to his third, and last medicament, wherewith he hath throughly purged himself. Let me confesse that he found me in a vizard, and he is content to be thought so uncivil— It seems, I must justifie his calumnies, and then he will bear the blame of them. My avowed guilts must evince me injured, and the truth of his accusations demonstrate them unreasonable: Mean while, till I deserve rudenesse, he that heaps it on me, is innocent. Thus deer must a man pay for S. W's repentance, for which yet there is no place, till it be confess'd, that he hath not offended. I may court the Readers compassion, though not his smile, when a hundred such Monsters of discourse as this, are all commenced branches of rigorous evidence.

13. His next Paragraph, p. 4. and 5. is spent in inquiring with what Logick I huddle together those testimonies out of Scripture for S. W's pasport to hell, unlesse I could evidence that they were particu­larly appliable to him.] I reply, 1. That I should think it strange Logick indeed, to inferre from my producing the sentences of Scripture against railing, that I gave any man that is most guilty of it, a pasport to hell. I had thought denuntiations of Scripture had been designed to bring sinners to repentance, to rescue from hell, not to conveigh any man thither. I had thought, that this was one of our Saviours means to demonstrate himself a Saviour, by warning of the danger of sin, to redeem men from it, and so to blesse by turning, and by terrors the means of turn­ing. And I am sure no man can evacuate this Logick, but he that resolves he will not amend what is under those denuntiations, and till S. W. professe finally to be of that number, he will [Page 13] make good my Charity, as well as my Logick, and when I know he is of that number, I will no more importune him with that kinde of exercise of either. But then 2. what defect could there be in my evidence, that those testimonies were particularly appliable to him? When the crime to which those testimonies belong'd, was so visible almost in every page (of the first part especially) of his Book, that himself profess'd to know that the Reader would think him guilty of it, and as plainly acknow­ledges it, as twitchings by the beard shall allegorically be able to sig­nifie contumelies, and when I had first laid that for the ground of my procedure, before I advanced to produce those testi­monies.

14. But it seems another kind of particular application he re­quires of me, that of shewing that contumelious words are so per­fectly damnable, that no circumstance can render them inculpable, or at least venial, if not necessary or convenient.] But I reply, that if this strict manner of application be with any reason required of me, to be super-added to the producing of so plain, and ge­neral, comprehensive testimonies, that very reason is alone suf­ficient to evacuate the main of his Apology, that either in his Epistle to the indifferent Reader, or in this place, he hath offer'd for himself. For it falls out this one time, that he that is so profess'd an enemy to testimonies, hath yet in this matter spe­cially applyed himself to this advocate; 1. In his Epistle to the Reader, in defense of his smiling, he sends them that are wedded to a severer humor, to Tertullian, concerning some passages of his book that move to laughter, and St. Augustine of the unreasona­blenesse that Catholikes should be bound to write in a dull and drousie style, reciting words from each of them, (the very same which the late Author of Les Provinciales in his 11^th Letter had done against the Jesuites) but utterly failing of what he here exacts of me, i. e. neither comparing, nor considering the ap­pliablen sse of circumstances, nor so much as quoting the places in either of the Fathers, (that Author having in like manner failed herein) by help whereof his Reader might have consi­dered them, much lesse deducing the parallel either betwixt me and those against whom those Fathers wrote, or betwixt me and the Jesuites, against whom only this Author of Les [Page 14] Provintiales produced them; from whom as I differ in nothing more, than in their moral Divinity, (which Montalt there prin­cipally paradigmatizes) so I need give no other instance of my differing, than that theyLet. XV. professe it lawfull for the preserving a mans own honour, to calumniate where there is no crime, but I think it unlawfull to reproach where there is. Who now it is which is most guilty of the crime which heP. 5. l. 5. here objects, of laying about blindly against friends and foes, the Reader will best judge, when what is produced (I must suppose pertinently) by his own friends against others of his own friends, he cites against me, whom he owns for his adversary, and that (I say not blindly, but) upon trust, without examining, or leaving any possibility to others to examine his testimonies, or so much as directing to the coast where they are to be found. This being said in gene­ral to his two pretended testimonies, I shall not adde any thing more particular (though by what is recited of them, 'tis manifest, they come not home to contumelies) till I am certainly informed by him, that they are to be found in those Fathers and then shall not doubt to shew him, that they belong not to his circumstances. Meanwhile I shall pay him in part with two visible passages of the same Fathers, ofEdit. Pamel. p. 145. C.D.E. Tertullian, De Patient. c. xv. Satis idoneus patientiae s [...]quester Deus, si injuriam deposueris penes eum, ultor est, si domnum, restitutor est. Quantum patientiae licet, ut Deum habeat debitorem, fidem munit, pacem gubernat, dilectionem adjuvat, carnem regit, Spiritum servat, linguam froenat, manum conti­net, tentationes inculcat, nec inflatur, nec inquietatur, sedet in thron [...] Spiritus mitissimi & mansuet [...]ssimi, qui non turbine glomeratur, non nubile livet— Ʋbi Deus, ibidem & alumna ejus patientia scilicet. God is the proxy and advocate of patience, lay up your injury with him, and he is the avenger, your losse, and he is the restorer. What an advantage hath patiente, which hath God for its debtor? It defends the Faith, governs peace, helps love, rules the flesh, keeps the Spirit, bridles the tongue, restrains the hand, repells temptations, is not puffed up, is not disquieted, sits in the throne of the most mild and calm spirit, which is not carried about in the whirle winde, nor discol [...]ured with the cloud— Where God is, there also is this his Client, patience. And of St. Augustine in hisL. III c. 1 Op. Aug. Tom. VII. Ed. Basil. p. 163. D. 16 [...]. A. Answer to the Letters of Petilian the Do­natist (I suppose as professed a defender of acknowledged Schis­maticks, [Page 15] as I am pretended to be) Si et ego tibi vellem pro male­dictis maledicta rependere, quid al [...]ud quam duo maledici essimus, ut ij qui nos legerent, alii detestat [...]s abjicerent, sanâ gravitate, alii sua­vitèr haurirent malevolâ voluntate. Ego quando cuiquam vel dicendo vel scribendo respondeo, etiam contumeliosis criminationibus lacessitu [...], quantum mihi dominus donat, froenatis atque coercitis vanae indignatio­nis aculeis, auditori lectorive consulens, non ago ut efficiar homine con­vitiando superior, sed errorem convincendo salubrior. If I would repay you contumelies wi [...]h contumelies, what would the result be, but that we should be two contumelious men, that of them that read us, some would detest and reject us with a sober gravity, others would take down our writings with pleasure but maliciously. When I make answer to any by word or writing, though I am provoked by contumelious charges, yet as far as God gives me strength, I bridle and restrain the stings of vain indignation, thereby taking care of the auditor or reader, and en­deavour not to overcome the adversary in contumelies, but to cure him by convincing his error. And much to the same Theme to the end of the Chapter, which if it be not exactly applicable to our present circumstances, it is because S W's adversary hath offered him no exercise of his patience, neither hegan to him, nor at­tended him in reproachfull language; I hope he will forgive me that injury, and wink at that unevennesse in the parallel. And let this serve for his two testimonies in his Epistle.

14. In this place also p. 4. he appeals to testimonies (such as when I produced, brought the irony of preaching on me) 1. Of good John Baptist, who called the Jewes a generation of Vipers. 2. Of St. Paul, that called Elymas sonne of the Devil, &c. 3. Of our Saviour, who called Herod fox, the prophaners of the Temple thieves, the Scribes and Pharises hypocrites. 4. And to come neerer the present circumstances, of St. Policarpe, who meeting an heretick, who began complementally to insinuate himself into his acquaintance, re­jected his courtesie with this rude language, I know thee to be the first-born of the Devil. 5. Of St. Jude, who calls hereticks clouds without water, autumnal trees,— And 6. to come yet neerer home, of Gods Church, whose custom it is to anathematize and curse hereticks, and of St. Paul, who bids anathema even to an Angel from heaven, if he should preach false d [...]ctrine.] But in all these six there is no evi­dence tendred of the particular appliablenesse of them to the case [Page 16] in hand, for that must consist of two branches. 1. A parallel betwixt me, and those Jewes, that Elymas, that Herod, those profaners, those Scribes and Pharises, that heretick, and others of the same denomination, and 2. a parallel betwixt S. W. and the Baptist, St. Paul, our Saviour, St. Polycarpe, St. Jude, Gods Church, and St. Paul again. Either of these was 1. as necessarily his task, as it can have been mine, to evidence the words of St. Paul particularly appliable to him; and 2. so much more his, as he that censures a defect in another, is obliged to repaire it in himself, yea and 3. much more difficult and impossible for him to repair, than mine is.

15. To shew him this, and at once to give him an example of perfecting incomplete discourses (which I acknowledge need not be so perfect at first, that nothing can be added to them, if they must, the Dispatchers pains were very unseasonable) I shall now for distinctnesse sake adde, that St. Pauls denuntiations against [...], are (at least) in force, 1. against all those that are confessed to have used contumelious speeches to them who have not at all offended, 2. against all that have laid them out above proportion of the offence, 3. against all that lavish them out indifferently on their aequals, who are in no wise subject to any authority of theirs. The two former are immediately deduced from the foundation of St. Pauls doctrine, the express words of Christ, Mat v. 22. where the old Commandement, Thou shalt not kill, v. 21. is by him extended to the interdict of being angry with the brother, and calling him Racha and thou fool, [...] either without any cause, or above the proportion of it; and the third also from the analogy which is there observed betwixt killing (the original precept there) and such expressions of anger or contempt, for as in the one the justice of the cause, the reality (much lesse pretence) of a crime is not sufficient to justifie him, who hath not a competent authority for it, so neither is it in the other.

16. I shall purposely omit to reflect any farther on the two former, 1. Because although S. W's insinuations, that all his displeasures are just, and proportionable, are not sufficient to prove any one to be such, yet my denying it must be as weak, or else be founded in some better evidence, and there is no [Page 17] giving that, but by the view of each passage, and that is too long for this preliminary, and must wait the leisure of the sub­sequent discourse; and 2. because still there will remain place for passion, and prejudice in this matter, and he that is already known to call one heretick, whatsoever the matter of the pre­tended heresie be, will think he hath this cause of just and or­dinate anger on his side. I shall rather choose to pitch on the third, wherein the application will be most visible and parti­cular, and all his instances as yet proposed, expressely exclu­ded from being argumentative for him, or against me. I shall demand then, In case a private man, without any signature of authority upon him, shall take upon him to kill another, will it in the least avail to his defense or excuse, to pretend the examples of Kings and Magistrates, nay of Prophets and Apostles, and of God himself, that have done so before him? If it will not, then what can be said for an uncommissionated S. W. who certainly is invested with no sort of authority over D. H. if he shall call him Racha and the like, upon no other pretense of claim to such liberty, but what is deduced from this argument, Because Christ, Prophets, Bishops and Governors of the Church have all used it toward their inferiors? A Bishop, 'tis certain, may excommunicate an heretick of his diocese, but may a Presbyter by that argum [...]nt doe the same to another Presbyter, or but to a Lay-m [...]? A Bishop though he must not be [...] a striker, 1 Tim. 3. (which the Fathers interpret of the allegorical strokes, [...], saith Theophylact, not striking unseasonably the brethrens conscience) yet he is required [...], to rebuke sharply, or by way of excision; But doth this office ly in common to all men, or to any others that are not so called? or can it by the Judaical pretended right of zealots, belong to any private man, that can but pretend a zeal for it, which is all that S. W, doth at this time? If not, as cer­tainly it doth not, then is the application of general denuntiations, as particular as can be, and S. W's cloud of witnesses to the contrary perfectly ineffectual.

17. If this were not in both parts sufficiently cleared, and thereby the whole debate concluded, I would minde him fur­ther, not of the size, and notoriety of every of those guilts, [Page 18] by him specified to have been rebuked by Christ, the Baptist, the Apostles, &c. (though I hope I am not arrived to those heights, am no profess'd opposer of Christianity, no Sorcerer, no Gnostick, or Cerinthian, or Marcionite, whatever more minute name of heresie he is pleased to think due, and so to be­stow upon me) but of the spirit of discerning, which most of these confess'dly had, by which they infallibly pronounced, not only that the crimes were crimes, and that of a first magnitude, but also that those, whom they rebuked, were ominently guilty of them; such constantly is the word of God, the rebukes of Scripture, [...], discerners of thoughts, and could not misse in the propriety of the applications to the guilts and persons, a priviledge to which I hope S. W. doth not pretend, how infallible soever he supposes the doctrine, which he asserts; which also being only supposed, not infallibly proved by him, can bear no kind of proportion with the discerning of thoughts, that was in Christ, and the Apostles. And this is all I shall re­ply to his second offer of testimonies, by which he will now fur­ther discern his main conclusion superseded, and see that there was no such necessity The Texts al­leadged by Mr. H. are very ge­neral, and he allowes them here no excepti­on at all, or if he does, the reason must be, because the words spo­ken to such per­sons as hereticks, the common good concern'd made the private per­sons repute not considera­ble, p. 5. l. 4. &c., as he pretends, of fetching the reason of difference betwixt these censures of Christ and Apostles, &c. and S. W's contumelies, from the quality of the persons, against whom they were delivered; the difference of the persons that did deliver them, would be sufficient, if there were no other.

18. I demand then, was hisThe Reason must be, &c. ib. [must be] a sign of a rigorous evidence and demonstration, or was it not? If it was, then I learn hence the interpretation of that style, rigorous demonstration, that it is competible to those things which are not only not demonstrably, or but probably true, but even evidently and de­monstrably false, (and then next to S. W's contumelies, I must ex­cept against his demonstrations, which till they are mended, will spoil him for a controvertist, as he is willing to style himself) for 'tis manifest I have assigned another reason of difference, be­side that which he confidently affirms must be the reason. But if that be not the interpretation of [must be] our language is not yet understood, and so one way or other we have our choice, to get us new Logicks, or new Dictionaries, new measures of dis­course, or else new means of expressing our notions.

[Page 19]19. The same strein further shewes it self in the next Para­graph: [Whence (saith he) followes first, that I am not excommunicate, or in the state of damnation, for having used contumelious words, since the use of them, if taken simply in it self, is not impious, but for ha­ving used them against D. H. Ʋnhappy I, who was not aware how sacred a person my adversary was!] I desire to be shew'd the ground or bottom of this consequence, I suppose it is this, that seeing contumelious words used by Christ, &c. against Herod, &c. are not impious, there can no other reason be pretended, why S. W's contumelies should be thought impious or dangerous, save only this, because they are against D. H. But I have already shewed him another double reason, viz. that there is not a greater difference betwixt Herod and D. H. than there is betwixt Christ and S. W. both in respect of the authority of the one, and none of the other, and the discerning of thoughts in the one, which is not, I hope, pretended to in the other; On both which accounts, I acknowledge my self inforced to yield, that if S. W. after he hath done with me, should be divided into two Catholicks, and those fall out among themselves, one departing into the Jesuites quarters, and t'other remaining among the Jansenists, and as in Epiphanius the great Snake in the bladder after it had devoured all the lesser Snakes, one end of it seized and preyed on the o­ther, so S. should heap loads of contumelies on W. or W. on S. the texts in St. Paul would be then as fitly appliable to either of them, as now they are to both of them together, when D. H. is concerned in it. It is then the shortnesse of S. W's dis­course, that he could discern nothing beside his adversaries being a sacred person, (as he will speak) which brought the unhappi­nesse upon him. The incompetentnesse of his own person was sufficient without any other.

20. As little doth it follow, which he next superstructs, [Next it followes, that if D. H. evidence n [...]t his cause to be no heresie, and himself in maintainer of it, all those former harsh expressions a­gainst hereticks are his due, and without scruple of sin might be given him by S. W.—] For 1 D. H's cause may be no heresie, though. he should die before he wrote one word more to evidence it to be none. 2. He cannot be bound both to evidence his cause to be no heresie, and himself no maintainer of it, which are two distinct [Page 20] things: of which certainly one were abundantly sufficient; for if he be no maintainer of it, how is he concerned, though it were evidenced to be heresie? (which yet is much more than being not evidenced not to be) or if it be evidenced by him not to be heresie (which again is much more than not to be, because all things that are, are not by him evidenced) why may not he blamelessely be the maintainer of it? 3. Every supposed here­sie is not so criminous, as that abomination of the Gnosticks and Gerinthus, nor consequently will it follow that all that was cer­tainly due to that, shall without scruple of sin be heaped on this, though it were not really free from all heresie. But then 4. the incompetency of S. W's person, in the two respects forementioned, is a further addition of a double barre against the demonstrativenesse of his deduction. And these are infirmities enow in one infe­rence.

21. And yet on the back of that, he hath made hast to fasten another, [Wherefore unlesse D. H. makes his evidence good, S. W. may also justly retort on him the charge of contumeliousnesse—] But 1. this wherefore hath no more possible force in it, than the ground on which it was built gave it, and that having no lesse than four faileurs in it, cannot communicate that strength, which it hath not. 2. In case I should never make my evidence good, yet so long as that were imputable to any thing else, save to the weaknesse of my cause, yet still I were freed from this charge, though all else were granted, which he supposes. 3. If as I did not make my evidence good, so he did not evince it bad, (which yet certainly he hath not) there could yet be no place for his contumelies, according to his own grounds of the dueness of them, nor consequently for retortion of the charge of contumeliousnesse on me, who may lawfully warn him of the dan­ger, that but seems to incurre the guilt, much more him that hath really incurr'd it, and cannot on his own (and those insuf­ficient) grounds, excuse, or free himself from it. But then 4. I am now actually entred upon the task of making my evidence good against all, he hath suggested to the prejudice thereof, and if herein I doe not finally fail, I shall then have abun­dantly disproved this inference also, though as yet I had not replyed a word to it.

[Page 21]22. He hath yet a third inference behind, that [it were easie, and he saith, as easie for S. W. using the Drs. method, to gather out of Scripture all the vigorous words and severe execrations against the wick­ed, and then by his own voluntary explication and application, clap them all upon the Doctor; as for example, that of Curse yee Meroz, &c. and then say, that by Meroz is meant such as Ma. H. who writes against Gods Church.] This Consequence depends upon a supposed ex­actness of proportion betwixt these two things, on one side the express denuntiation of S. Paul, against the contumelious, applied to a Writer of Controversies, so far proved to be contumelious, as his own confession of twitching by the Beard, allegorically under­stood, amounts to, and on the other side, all the Curses of Scri­pture, not only against Meroz, but against the Wicked indefinite­ly, i: e. all the wicked that are execrated in Scripture, clapt on the back of one that S. W. hath nothing to object to, but that he is pleased to affirm he writes against Gods Church. To make good which proposition, 'tis necessary that whosoever is by S. W. affirmed to write against Gods Church, be, eo ipso, proved to be as guilty of all the wickednesses execrated in Scripture, be they never so incompetible one with the other (i. e. to be an Atheist, a Polytheist, an Idolater, a Church-robber, a Necromancer, and so on, to the end of the beadrol of the blackest, and withall most contra­ry sins) as contumelies cast by S. W. upon D. H. are proved to be contumelies. The proportionableness of which two Schemes I must leave to those brains of the now grown wiser World (as he phrases it) that are most sublimed with the Mathematicks, to en­deavour to demonstrate, and till that be done, behold with some kind of astonishment the admirable discursive, and illative fa­culties of my unparalleld Adversary.

23. This is the sum of S. W's first plea for Contumelies, which was therefore necessary to be attended and backt with a second, Pag. 6. and that I acknowledge prudently chosen [his disclaim­ing in behalf of his book, any such language toward Dr. H.]

This indeed made good, will soon end these debates; only it will declare the Authors great leisure, and accuse the foregoing Pages of great impertinency, and improvidence, that they had not foreseen this guard, but preferred the sensuality of an ha­rangus, before the more solid comforts of innocence. As it is, let [Page 22] us now see, upon what grounds his temerarious confession of twitching by the Beard, and the Readers falsely foreseen charge of the rude blows, are retracted, and called in, and so his repentance, such as it was, soon repented of. Why, only upon a more advised description of a Contumely, which, saith S.W. [notes some personall and morall fault in another] and then he asks [Did I note any [...] him?]

24. Let us stay here a while, 1. A Contumely is defined or de­scribed by noting some personall and morall fault in another: To this I reply, That either this is a sufficient description of Contumely, or it is not: If it be not, then how can it be of use to prove that S. W. is not guilty of contumely, by not falling under the parts, (one or both) of this description, as long as there be others, omitted in this unsufficient enumeration, under some, or any of which, he may still be chargable to have fallen? But if it be a vow'd to be a perfect, and sufficient description, then I appeal to him or his Reader, in either part of it, 1. Whether all Con­tumelies note some personall fault? whether the calling one Ba­stard be not contumelious? and whether that be a personall fault in him, that is, or is thought chargable of it? So in like manner for the reproaching a Christian, of any denomination, be it a Jesuite, or Jansenist, with the Crimes of any of his party, where­of he is no otherwise guilty, than that he herds with many, that are guilty of it, whether this be the noting of somewhat personal in him, in whom it is not, and whether it be not con­tumely? That this is my case with S. W. I am not bound to shew, whilst my present business only is to consider the insufficiency of his description of Contumely. So again, 2. Whether the faults being personal, be obliged to be moral also? or else the noting of them be no contumely? May not intellectual faults be the matter of con­tumely? and sure those are not moral. Doth not Christ describe Contumely, Mat. V. by saying to thy Brother, Racha, and thou Fool? And is not emptiness, and folly, an intellectual, no (necessarily) moral fault? Thus infallibly convincing is each of the two words of S. W.'s description of Contumely.

25. But then 2 When he asks, Did I note any (either personal or moral fault) in him? I take my turn also of asking, whether being insincere, blasphemous, weak, ridiculous (all which S. W. [Page 23] avows in the ensuing words, and saith,P. 7. l. 7. It were madness to expect that he should not shew them, where his Adversary writ insincerely, &c. i. e. writ what he will thus accuse of these Crimes) be neither personal, nor moral faults? Is not weakness personal, and blasphemy moral in the highest degree? but I shall not exagitate this any further, in relation to my own concernments, but from his [did I note any in him?] conclude (by the help of that Art, which hath as well taught me, that an affirmative Question doth strongly deny, as him, that ridiculous things ought to be exprest i [...]ni­cally) that he utterly disclaims having noted any such: And if indeed he hath not noted any personal or moral fault in me, the Consequence is natural, that either all his Charges affixt on me, that have formerly made up the Bill of fare, and now fil'd the Index of Schisme dispatcht (to the number of 356. beside many more sans nombre, and among them blasphemies and calumnies, and false dealings; and omissions of necessary duty) are neither personal nor mo­ral, or at least that those that are moral, are not personally mine, or those that are personally mine, are not moral, which when the Reader hath laid up in his memory, I hope S. W.'s Index would not much inflame him, though I should add never another word to demonstrate, that there is not the least appearance of truth in any one of those numberless Charges, or other imaginable design of framing them, than that of the persecuting heathen Emperor, Galerius, who made a Law that Christians should be in­famous, and then by another Law, any man might despoyl them that would, there being no other real Crime in his Adversary to deserve the rudeness of his blows, save only that through that rude­ness his Adversary hath been defamed by him.

26. But 'tis possible he may mean somewhat else by fault per­sonal and moral, than vulgar language (my only Instructer) un­derstands by them, for as clear as he is from noting either of these in me, he confesseth, that as a Writer, I was his and the Churches Adversary, and as such it was irrational he should spare me.] But I demand, Are not faults objected to a Writer, as a Writer, supposed to be personal, and may they not also be moral faults? if they be blasphemies, insincerities, and the like: If not (as his distinction implies) then I begin to discern the one way in the world to free S. W. from the guilt of Contumelies; His being a [Page 24] Writer may salve them from being personal or moral in him, as well as the imputing blasphemy to me may, by my being conside­red as a Writer, be freed from noting in me any personal and moral fault. This is still more of the refined faculty, of distinguishing betwixt the Writer and himself, not sparing the one, and yet u­sing no severity to the other, telling the Writer of his falsifications and blasphemies, without noting any thing personal or moral in him.

27. There is more added on this subtile Theme, to all which I make no other return but this, that if S. W. could really have shewed one blasphemy or falsification in all the Tract of Schisme, he needed not so industriously have defamed it, His Logick would have served his turn, without that which he calleth his Rheto­rick; one solid proof of such a Charge having much more force in it, than all his ostentation of words hath. As for the proportio­nableness of my deserts to the excess of his expressions, the triall must be in the due place, where particulars come to be examined; mean while, he must not begg the principle, and have the privi­ledges of my Judge, while he is but my Adversary.

Pag. 7.28. But beyond expectation, I am in the next Paragraph ap­pealed to, and S. W. undertakes the Dostor shall inform the Rea­der, that all his pretended revilings are no other, then the proper treaty, which Reason grants, Religion avoucheth, and the circumstances make necessary.] This is another Magistery, let's see what will be made of it. The words of mine, from whence this unexpected con­clusion is drawn, are affirmed to be these: The Doctor complains pag. 2. that the Publisher of the Book hath solemnly annext a list of the Contumelies, three and thirty pickt out by specialty, &c. Upon which he straight-way infers, Since then these, as he sayes, are the speciall or chief Contumelies, not to trouble the Reader with the whole Roll, we will only take notice of the first of them, which is this; How the Doctor of Divinity hath forgotten his Accidence.] Thus far S. W. at his Limbeck, to draw water out of a Flint, and to yield the Reader a large Confession of mine, overthrowing all my defences past and future at one dash, out of plain words that signifie not a sylla­ble toward it.

29. This could not be attempted without a conspiration of many Artifices; let us view them orderly: 1. My words are [Page 25] mutilated, with an &c. which was probably meant to do some small service, for if he had read out, my period had thus evi­denced its own sense, He hath solemnly annext a list of the contu­melies, 33 pickt out by specialty out of the farre greater number. Here then I supposed and affirmed, that there were a far greater number than 33, and nothing hinders, but several of those o­mitted, might be far greater then any that were set down in the publishers list, and I never informed him or the Reader, that there were not. For 2. that I say these were the special or chief, is absolutely imposed upon the Reader, who at the first cast of his eye on my words, will discern 'tis S. W. not I, that sayes it. 3. That by picking out these by specialty, I should mean, though not say, that these were the special, as that word signifies the chief of them, is a great violence to the words, and as great to my sense, of which those were the Interpreters. To pick out by specialty, I conceived to signifie, choosing out so many particu­lars, and setting them down distinctly and severally, as in com­mon speech it hath been familiar to my ears; And what if special oft signifies chief, that use of the adjective hath no in­fluence on the (as common) use of specialty. Had I meant as he would have me, I had certainly said, pickt out as the prime, or special, or principal, but because I meant not so, these were not my words, but others which to any that understands plain English, suffi­ciently exprest this my other meaning. 4. Of these 33. he will instance only in one, and his only pretended reason of doing so, is, that he may not trouble the Reader. But he hath not been so tender of the Readers trouble, when he hoped for advantage thereby, and I can tell him another more usefull, and so not im­probable reason of his reservednesse; When that one is produced, he knowes it is but one, and that there be 32. behind in that list, and many more not entred into that catalogue, every of which is as contumelious as this one, and all together, by accumula­tion, much above 32 times as great, as this one by it self is: And yet this one must be the only measure, by which the whole matter must be judged, as if he that had stollen many more than 33 prizes, or committed as many acts of drunkennesse or forni­cation, should make a slight confession of one of them, and then were presently free from the guilt of that, and of all the rest also. [Page 26] 5. This one, that is named, hath not a word said in defense, or extenuation, or excuse of it, either to shew that it is no contu­mely, or that there was the least pretense of justice in it (as in my Answer to the Disarmer, I had shewed there was not, Chap. 3. Sect. 2.) which alone could have had any semblance of force to support his pretended conclusion, that this was no other than the proper treaty that reason grants, religion avoucheth, and the circum­stances make necessary. Hence again we see what kind of inferen­ces must be expected of these demonstrators, even no other, nor more immediate, than this, when examined and driven to the issue, [The Doctor, saith the Publisher, hath set down 33 several con­tumelies of a far greater number, one of which S. W. be it never so un­just, hath had the confidence again to name, though not to say any thing in defense of it, ergo, the Doctor hath informed the Reader that S. W. hath used no other contumeliousnesse, but what reason grants, Religion avoucheth, and the circumstances of the matter do more than justifie, even make necessary in him.] If this be not an essay of high Chimistry, I know not where to direct any young Student to seek for it.

30. And in the strength of this he goes on in full triumph to the end of the Section, 1. Saying what he had said, over again, to the wits of the Ʋniversity, then 2. framing a dilemma to demonstrate it charity in him to shew me my greatest faults. And 3. by long beating about the bush, discovering at last, that my producing St. Pauls words against him concludes me the greater railer of the two, and to this the Puritanical Dame cudgelling her maid in Scripture phrase,] is resolved to be appliable. Lastly, objecting to me, that I flatly accuse him of falsifycations, calumnies certainly, if not avouched. To all, and first to the first of these, I reply, that I have replyed already, when the same thing was said, though not address'd to the wits, and though he seek ad­vantage by repeating in another mode, I need it not, and there­fore do not seek it. To the second, that his Dilemma takes for granted my pernicious errors, and confound [...] discovering of errors, with contumelies, whereas 1. I have already shewed him, that contumelies are not the proper glasses to discover errors, be they never so pernicious; nor ordinarily made use of by such artists as S. W. but when the errors are so far removed from vulgar [Page 27] sight, that they may well passe for invisible. 2. That he is not a competent Judge in this matter; Let his Reader by the dire­ction and conviction of his Logick discern the error, and not be born down with his noises. And 3. that whether there be any one such error duely noted by him, is the main question still, as confidently denyed by me, as pretended by him, and as it must not be granted him for supposing it, so much lesse by it can a­ny thing else be justified, that he shall unduely build upon it. To the third, 1. That producing St. Pauls plain words against a sin, is far from railing at all, farther yet from exceeding him in that language. 2. That for the parallel of his dame, which is his (only rhetorical) argument to prove it, it is of no force, be­cause though I should allow the parallel to hold in one part, between St. Pauls words produced on one side, and Scripture phrase on the other (which yet till I know what that phrase was which the Dame used, but S. W. hath not recited from her Le­cture, I am not obliged to doe) yet still the question remains, what parallel will be found for the cudgell, wherein surely all the weight of the simile, and the Dames severity consisted, and not in the Scripture phrase; To the last, that when it appears that I have accused him of falsifying, if I do not render a reaso­nable account of it, I will, as he requires, confesse, and make satisfaction for the calumny; but as yet he hath not directed me to the place, and my memory suggests it not, and therefore I discern not my self to be under any further present obligation. Only I shall demand, who it is, whom he can think it possible I should have accused of falsifying? Is S. W. the name of any man, or be there any Lawes of Brachygraphie, by which those letters are authorized to signifie any more than N. N. are wont to doe? Is any person living vulgarly known, or called by that name? If not, 'tis not only not true, but not possible, that in answering N. N. or S. W. I have calumniated any man.

31. And thus at length we are at an end of the first Section, which coming to recapitulate in the beginning of the second, he avoucheth to have conteined ordinary considerations, and obvious to common sense (with what truth, hath now been examined) let­ting the Reader see, that this manner of writing is very rational, but [Page 28] that not absolutely, but on a double condition, if the cause deserve any zeal, and the truth of the thing makes good what is said. But we have seen the bottom of these two conditions, and found 1. That though the cause were granted to deserve zeal, it must yet disclaim contumelie, for so every true Christian cause doth. 2. That the truth between disputants is to be contested, not supposed. 3. That the truth of a proposition is no competent commission, or authority for (and so cannot make good) a contu­mely.

SECT. II.

1. HIS second Section is yet of severer concernment, re­commended to the attentive consideration of the Reader, and undertakes to prove upon a fundamental ground (as if every ground were not fundamental) that this kind of writing, which I have hi­therto accused in him, and he laboured to vindicate, is (not blamelesse, but) necessary in controversies about Faith, against the deemed adversaries thereof, and this ground of that necessity no other, than the certainty of faith it self, which certainly is founded in his way of universal Tradition.] And then ere we proceed any further, what will become of all Catholike Writers, dead and living, which having not S. W's faculties, or temper, or being not aware of this necessity, have not so much as endeavoured to attain to this height of bitter zeal, which now appears to have been their duty? In this matter I must not admonish him of the [Page 29] other as severe denuntiations of Scripture, against those, who adde to the word of God, or teach for doctrines the commandements of men (which certainly he will be guilty of, who teaches and un­dertakes to demonstrate that to be necessary, which God hath ne­ver made so, especially if it be that, which God hath forbidden, as he hath all bitternesse and evil-speaking, Eph. IV. 31. command­ing kindnesse, tender-heartednesse, &c. v. 32.) for I see he is forti­fied against such impressions, and the improsperous attempt will but exasperate, and conclude me again the greatest railer. Wherefore I shall only demand, whether since all Christian duties, righteousnesse and temperance, &c. are eminent branches of the Christian faith, as well as believing the judgement to come, &c. the acknowledging this his method to be necessary, and so duty, be any part of that certain faith, that hath this universal testifi­cation; whether all the Catholike world, if but for these last ten years, have said, they received from their forefathers as received from theirs, that contumelies are necessary to a Catholike Writer of con­troversies; for otherwise I hope, be the Faith never so certain, the means to propagate or propugne it, may be those prescribed by St. Paul to Bishop Timothy, gentlenesse, readinesse to teach, patience, 2 Tim. 2.24, 25. in meeknesse instructing those that oppose themselves, and so not contu­melie, which is contrary to these. And let him not in his An­swer deal with me, as Mr. White doth with Monsieur Dallee, p. 221. rebuking him for asking from St. Jerom, Whether it be a part of faith to visit the Holy Land, as if (saith he) et adorasse ubi steterunt pedes Domini pars fidei est,] signified truly that to exercise adoration were an Article of faith, than which what can be spoken more sencelessely, whereas, saith he, the true meaning is, that 'tis a duty of Faith.] Where truly I should have conceived, that a duty of faith was a part of faith, though not such as we vulgarly call Articles, and so I suppose now, and ask of a duty, not an Article, whether it have this universal testification, which all are supposed to have, which are truly duties, as well as those which are articles of Faith. This therefore I may be allowed to have ask'd in passing, because this Section is such, as will not afford any store of matter for debate, how demurely soever he hath offer'd and recommended it to our attentive considerations.

[Page 30]2. I shall shortly reduce it to these heads, concerning 1. the deemed or believed certainty of S. W's faith. 2. The one ground of that, universal Tradition, together with the notion in which he understands that phrase. 3. The duty consequent to this, of using the means and wayes, which wit and art can invent to confute, and discredit his adversaries harmfull sophistry, and disparage his autho­rity, as far as truth can justifie his words. 4, The deemed uncer­tainty of their faith, who rely on any other but this one deemed certain Rule, together with the obligation incumbent on them, and arising from the deemed uncertainty of their faith, to write without any great zeal, heat, or earnestnesse, which in them, saith he, can arise from nothing but passion and interest. 5. What he hath thought fit to adde concerning my person, abstracted from the cause.

3. For the first of these he is carefull himself to propose it under that cautious style of deemed certainty, foreseeing as he saith, that else the Doctor would mistake him (as his custom is) to begge the question, by supposing their faith certain.] But to this I make my demands, 1. Whether it be indeed, or possibly could be a mistake in the Doctor, contending with S. W. con­cerning the truth of his faith, to affirm that his supposing his faith certain, is the begging of the question? Might he not as well have said that the Doctor was apt (as his custome is) to mi­stake in affirming twice two to be four? For is not the sup­posing that certain, of which the question is whether it be true, as evidently the begging the question, as it is evident, that what is certain, is true, and more than true, true with the advantage of certainty? And is any common notion, or any axiome, or con­clusion in the Mathematicks more evident than that? What semblance of truth then is there in suggesting, or intimating this to be a mistake in the Doctor? or how can his art, as he saith, bear him out in thus suggesting. 2. Doth S. W. mean to keep himself precisely from the guilt of this fallacy for the future? Is he so sensible of the unskilfulness of it, as seriously to disclaim having any more to do with it? Nay, hath he indeed by this early caution shut it out of this Section? or is it sufficient to fore-see crimes and then presently to rush into [Page 31] them? 'tis the begging of the question for him to suppose his faith certain, and is it not so also to suppose contumelies a lawfull means to defend a deemed truth, at the very time when we are in the debate, whether such means are not utterly unlawfull? This certainly he supposes at this time, for else 'tis not ima­ginable how the deemed certainty of his faith should found a necessity of his contumelies. That which is in it self lawfull, may by circumstances become necessary to some man, and so to S. W. but if it be in it self unlawfull, neither the deemed nor real cer­tainty of their faith can make it lawfull, much lesse necessary. This then of its lawfulnesse, which cannot be founded in his deemed certainty, nor is endeavour'd here to be inferr'd either by that, or by any other medium, and yet is necessary to be supposed in that discourse, where the necessite is inferr'd from some circumstances, is no other than the begging of the question, for no doubt that is said to be begg'd, which is supposed, without all attempt of proof. And so visibly here is the lawfulnesse, though not the necessity, which yet also is uncapable of any solid proof, till the lawfulnesse be first proved. This is there­fore that which I now charge as guilty of this fallacy (and not the deeming his faith certain) at the time when he so sol­licitously averts it. And this is all I need say to the first point, his deemed certainty, being in charity as well as civility ready to allow him to deem or believe (whatsoever his grounds are) whatsoever he affirms himself to deem or believe. And I hope he will anon do as much for me, who believe my faith as certain, as he can his, and have one ground more to believe it, (as anon will appear) than I see he means to have.

3. To the second head also, the one ground, on which he is pleased to build his deemed certainty, that of universal Tradition, together with the notion in which he understands that phrase, the same which the Author of, and Apologist for Rushworths Dialogues hath of it, I have nothing to object in this place, knowing de facto that this is his ground, and allowing it as fit to support his deemed certainty, whil'st 'tis no more than deemed, as any other medium could be, for as long as he is granted to deem it, it matters not to our present debate, on what grounds [Page 32] he deems it. And indeed having first profess'd that he speaks now only of a deemed certainty, 'twas not needfull to adde at the same time upon what grounds he built it, the deeming being the onely thing, on which the reason (insisted on in this Section) was founded, and not the real, or grounded certainty. What therefore he hath for several pages inlarged, on this Theme of the grounds of his deemed certainty, I should think inserted by another hand, and not by him that was so carefull to pro­fesse that he spake only of a deemed certainty, but that it is pos­sible it might have another design, the amusing of the Reader, and the supplying some other vacuity in this reasoning, or the drawing of his adversary from the point in hand, to this other, wherein S. W. deemed himself more conversant; which mo­tives have not prevailed on me so far to gratifie him in this place, (having allow'd another fitter season for it, in my next Chapter) as to forget my present Theme, and follow him through his whole field of Tradition, so wide and distant from it, and wherein so few others beside himself will be concern'd, himself having here told me, that few there are who have re­fined their understanding to this degree of discerningnesse, and that only the best (which in his opinion are not the greatest) sort of wits do as yet begin to own their reason so far.

4. For the third then (which alone is pertinent to the ar­gument in hand) the necessity, and so duty consequent to this deemed certainty, of using the means and wayes which wit and art can invent to confute and discredit his adversaries harmfull Sophistry, and disparage his authority, as far as truth can justifie his words.] I shall bring it to a speedy issue by asking, Of what latitude is that phrase [the means and wayes that wit or art can invent?] Is it designed to take in, or not exclude all manner of means and wayes, that the most riotous wit, or forbidden arts can invent, or that the tropes of Rhetorick, or good managery of words (be they never so contumelious) can yield toward the mention'd end, that of discrediting the adversary, &c. only with that one restraint as far as truth can justifie his words? or is it no further to be inlarged, then all other Christian rules, as well as that one of truth, permit one private man to treat another? If he [Page 33] take it in the second sense, I grant it, and he hath gained no­thing by it, for I willingly yield him the freest exercise of the nimblest wit, and all lawfull arts, to discover, and so discredit any weaknesse in my defenses, but think not a multitude of contu­melies to be any of those lawfull, no nor so much as proper means toward that end, being only a cloud cast before the eyes of the Reader, to hinder his discerning any difference betwixt true, and pretended discoveries, betwixt boasts and victories. But if his indefinite words [the means and wayes] must be more largely extended in the first sense, I then deny that the great­est justice of a cause, be it a deemed, or a real certainty, can convert any the least or greatest sin into duty, christianize or consecrate contumely, though it should not have calumny joyned with it; and I hope I shall have no need of proving what is thus obvi­ous, when the more excellent the cause is, the more it abhors and deems it self defamed and polluted by whatever unlawfull arts, and can no more justifie any one of them, than either want, or be gratified with them; Si malo religionem defendere velis, jam non defendetur illo, sed polluetur, atque violabitur, saith Lactantius. If you will defend religion by any thing that is evill, you shall not defend, but pollute and violate it. Should I endeavour to assist this evident truth, it would by others, as well as S. W. be call'd preaching.

5. This ambiguity then of his words being removed, there remains no kind of difficully in the whole Section, as far as concerns the argumentative part, the conclusion which the deemed certainty of his faith was obliged and undertook to inferre; the whole question being, not whether any, or all lawfull arts are to be used, but whether the cause, whatsoever, or how certain soever it be deemed to be, can render any one unlawfull means, by name contumely, lawfull; which unlesse it can, 'tis certain it cannot on this account become necessary. Here then the one condition of restraint which he takes care to adde [as far as truth can justifie his words, and If his Adversary be found to deserve it, and the like] will avail him nothing, 1. Because he is not the judge of the truth of that which he endeavours to disprove, nor of the deserts of him whom he thinks himself obliged to dis­parage. [Page 34] The Disputant must prove, and the Replyant defend, but neither assume the office of judging, but leave that to the Reader only, and till that judgement be past, 'tis not yet his time to deal with his Adversary as his captive, to lead him in tri­umph, to represent him, as he saith, ridicul [...]us, nonsensical, weak, blasphemous, &c. every of which, as far as they want in truth, a­bound in calumnie, and must not be supposed to have truth, whilest they are contested to have none, and no judgement is yet pass'd between the litigants, but what one of them, who must be supposed partial, gives in his own favour. Nor will the deem­ed certainty of his own faith (the one medium of this Section) herein assist him, 1. Because a deemed certainty inferres not a real truth, and to suppose that without proof in time of argu­ing, is the begging of the question. 2. Because the, whether deemed, or real, certainty of his faith concludes not the truth of every discourse which he can make use of, to demonstrate that cer­tainty; Truth hath oft-times been ill defended, and so still, not­withstanding the certainty in the main, the weaknesse in the re­tail may be as probably on his side, who chargeth his adver­sary of weaknesse, and in some respects more probably, on this prejudice, that he already appears so weak, as to mistake his businesse, to fly to indirect means, to endeavour to forestall the Readers judgement, to vaunt of his feats, all which are the ef­fects and known symptomes of weaknesse.

5. Secondly, as I said, this restraint pretends only to guard him from calumny, and there be other sins of the tongue and pen beside that. He knowes, I must instance in contumely, for though every calumny be a contumely also, and most contumelies have somewhat of falsity, and so calumny in them, and I doubt not to prove, that every one which I have received from S. W. is of this sort, yet I have that respect to ordinary style, and that reverence to our Saviour, Mat. V. 21, 22. who referres contumelies [Racha, and thou fool] to the sixt Commandment of the Decalogue, as to discriminate them from calumnies, which undoubtedly are forbidden in the ninth. And indeed he that shall bestow either of those titles on his fellow Christian, and then adde, that he hath said no more than is truth, or then he de­serves, [Page 35] is so far from lessening, that he cannot use any surer means to inhanse and multiply the contumely. Thus far is S. W's one restraint from justifying the practises, which his wit or art have suggested to him.

6. As for his examples of Jude to the Gnosticks, of the Fa­thers to Porphyrie the enemy and derider of Christianity, and Elias's scoffing the Priests of Baal] 1. The deemed certainty of his faith, the one medium in his present argument, is not sufficient to complete the parallel between them and me, the utmost that principle can assist or authorise him to deem of me, is, that I deny some few things to be true, which he deems certain, but neither that I deifie Simon Magus, nor deny Christ to have come in the flesh, nor offer sacrifice to Idols, nor joyn with the Jewes to persecute the Christians, nor forbid marriage, and set up unna­tural lust instead of it, nor profess'dly maintain Heathenisme, nor the worship of Baalim or dead Heroes, nor any thing which he can deem equivalent to all or any of these, which consequent­ly are necessary to make good his parallels. Neither 2. will that or any other imaginable medium make that lawfull to him, which was lawfull to Jude, or the Fathers, or Elias, the first being an Apostle, the third a Prophet, and such as whose Spirit was interdicted the Disciples of Christ, the second Governors of the Church, in none of which capacities I discern S. W. to be placed over me, nor consequently to be commissionated or priviledged to do whatsoever they did; if he were, the fire from heaven, and the fate of the Priests of Baal, might soon become mine, and be by the same art of concluding ab exemplo, justi­fied also.

7. On this head comes in one auxiliary more, the pretense of charity to undeceive my adherents, and preserve others from a cer­tain believed danger, and that the greatest of dangers, eternal damna­tion.] Thus hath Gregory Nazianzen long since told us, That Christian Religion was the [...], apple of contention, and the pretense to enhance it, [...], that some men were vehement lovers of Christ, of God. But neither will charity justifie the doing of any ill, on the most charitative intu­itions, or make that necessary, which is not lawfull; On the [Page 36] other side, what shall otherwise be approved to be lawfull, is already freely allow'd him to exercise his gifts in, upon the bare pretense of his deemed certainty; and so sure the conside­ration of charity might here have been spared, and being used, doth gain him nothing. Especially when 'tis considered that my adherents (as he will call them, to whom he aims the first fruits of his charity) professe to have never the worse opinion of a cause, that 'tis persecuted with the Sword, and therefore are not in much danger to be disheartened with the meeker dangers of the tongue, or pen, by seeing some scoffes and contu­melies fall upon it; having learnt from our Saviour Mat. 5.11. whilest he was in preaching (but I hope not to be scofft at for it) that they are happy which are reviled, as well as persecuted falsely for his sake. We see then what this grand argument pompously in­troduced, by being recommended to the attentive consideration of the Reader, and fetcht from the deemed certainty of his faith, a­mounts to, even the gaining him that which was willingly yielded him before, the use of all lawfull means to support that deemed certainty, but not the authorizing unlawfull, or making that necessary, which was, sub lite, depending, whether it were lawfull, or no, and could not be proved to be so by that argu­ment, whose whole force was founded in supposing it.

8. And then what heed is due to his conclusion from hence, thatPag. 12. though S. W. may perhaps be blamed for holding his faith cer­tain, yet he is inculpable for proceeding consequently to the former tenet.] and again, He who holds ill principles is blameable indeed in that regard, but yet he is worthy of praise for proceeding consequently upon them, since to deduce consequences aright is very laudable.] As if he had said, He that is fallen into one absurdity, is not only to be excused but commended for heaping the thousand more upon the back of it, he that is once out of the way, doth very well to go on in the road before him, though it lead him into hell; he that is once drunk, is to be reproved for that, but that Lecture being over, he is to be praised and so rewarded for all the oaths, or rage, or murther, or incontinence, which that, by a chain of consequences, one after another, very regularly leads him to. I had thought that the one thing, which such a [Page 37] man could do laudably, was to unlearn his ill principle, to get to be rightly informed, and the next to that, or the most tole­rably ill, to sit still, and act nothing upon it: Nor indeed did I ever learn that deducing of consequences, though it were not of one vice or error from another, would presently be of the number of things very laudable, for such is nothing but what is morally good, and very good. And no doubt such the nature of the consequential discourse may be, as the picking of thrums ends (to which he compares the producing of testimonies) may be an employment as highly dignified, and praise worthy, as that, and yet the deducing of a consequential ill practice from an ill prin­ciple be still lesse laudable, because more blame-worthy than that.

9. One thing more he after reverts to cast in on this head,Pag. 15. that it beiongs to the Catholike who holds his faith certain to mani­fest the contrary to be perfectly absurd, and nonsense, and since the know­ledge of this must in his grounds be held so necessary for the salvation of man-kinde, he ought in plain terms let men know it is such, otherwise he breeds a just apprehension in his Readers that the contrary (else why should he proceed so reservedly) may have some degree of proba­bility—] In this place I might ask, whether the Archangell wanted confidence in the infallible certainty of his cause, when he refused to bring any railing accusation against the Devil, as St. Jude assures us he did. But my reply to this his reasoning will be sufficient, if instead of asking more, I only answer his one question in the parenthesis [else why should he proceed so reservedly?] by telling him that there are other very pregnant reasons of that kind of reservednesse, we now speak of (which consists, as the Archangels did, onely in abstaining from all contumelie, as well as calumny) beside the want of certainty in his faith, or the ap­prehension that the contrary is in any degree probable. As 1. a consci­entious regard to the precepts of Christ, and his Apostles, which expressely forbid contumely, and of which we have oft minded him. 2. A well-grounded opinion that truth is able to propugne and evidence it self by its own light, and wants not (as he ima­gines) plain terms, as those signifie revilings of his adversary, to let men know it is such. 3. The daily experience, that reason is [Page 38] most expedite in its motion to any sober dispassionate minde, when it comes like David with the Staffe in the hand, and the five smooth stones, and is not incumbred with Sauls Armour; And 4. an apprehension of that which is most obvious, that ruffling will not be interpreted solid confidence, but rather con­sciousnesse of weaknesse, as we know he that dares fight, will seldome give any ill words, the tongue being not oft called in to the assistance, but to divert, and supply the place of the hands; and lastly, a dependance on God in his own way, that the means which he hath directed us to, will in fine be most successefull; which till S. W. hath chosen to make use of, he can have no experience of the force of them, and consequently must judge as worldlings doe, that charity and liberality, added to observation of strictest rules of justice, will never tend to the inriching, but impoverishing, and upon that account con­tinue to apply himself to those only means, to support his faith, which are most proper to betray it. And this is all the advantage I mean to take (and not that other which he was wil­ling to foresee) in that Paragraph. And thus we have the up­shot of what he hath cast in on the third head for the assisting his grand argument.

10. Fourthly for the deemed uncertainty of our faith, and the obligation to write without any great zeal, heat, or earnestnesse,—] which he here insists on, I reply, 1. That his words of Prote­stants [that they confesse their faith fallible, P. 14. i. e. such as may possibly be otherwise for any thing they know] are either very equivocal in the phrase [for any thing they know] or in the word Protestants, and so belong to other men, whose words I assume not to de­fend, or being singly understood of me, and those whom I undertake to vindicate, and of a confessed uncertainty, and fallibi­lity of our faith, are far removed from all degree, or appearance of truth. For this I appeal to expresse words in my Answer to Schisme Disarm'd, p. 36. l. 2. He that is in many things fallible—may yet infallibly know or believe some one or more other things, (In this number I professe to contain all matters of our Christian faith) either by his own senses, or by the testimony of others, founded in their several sensations, which being faithfully conveighed to us by [Page 39] undenyable Tradition supply the place of an [...], are as unquesti­onably certain, as what we have seen our selves. And again lin. 8. I know infallibly that I now write,—and the same I affirm of all other matters of fact, testified by my own senses, or by universal unquestionable Tradition, for that is founded in the repeated sensations of so many o­ther men, which being communicated and sufficiently testified to me, I have no more reason to doubt of, then of my own sensations. And of this sort is the Tradition of the Ʋniversal Primitive Church, concer­ning the Apostles delivering some Doctrines (here again I professe to mean our whole Christian faith) and some Books (viz. all the Cano­nical Books of the New Testament) &c. With what semblance of truth then can I be told, in a reply to this very Book, where I have thus profess'd the infallible certainty of our faith, that Pro­testants confesse their faith fallible, i. e. such as may possibly be other­wise for any thing they know.] Can this be suggested of those things, which I say are as unquestionable as what I have seen my self, and that I know them infallibly? Is this dealing tolerable in a plain matter of fact (for so it is, that we, of whom I am one, and that book, acknowledged to be mine, confesse our faith fallible) and can the deemed certainty of his faith support this part of his earnestnesse of affirming what is quite contrary to his own eyes, as well as mine? If so, then I professe to allow him the inclo­sure of such kind of zeal, as this, for I hope I shall never, whilest I am in my right wits, make use of it: If I would, I should have cut this whole Section of his short, by denying the ground of it, not only the certainty of his faith, but even his deeming it certain, for this is his dealing with me, contrary to what was visible to him.

11. I cannot pertinently insist longer on this Theme of the certainty of our faith in this place, to which it is so unsuteable, and then there is no more needfull to be added on this fourth head, but that if deemed certainty of our faith would support, or authorise contumely, I were also commissionated to make use of such gifts, and might be as bitter as he, but 1. I am as confident it cannot, as Scripture (which is the ground of my faith, as well as Tradition, and I hope written and unwritten Tradition both will amount to as much as one of them, without the other) [Page 40] or any other ground of credibility which the matter is capable of, can afford me. And 2. (besides many other motives) I pro­fesse to think I have no need of such auxiliaries, and that is with me as prevailing an argument against, as his pretended necessity is to him for the use of them.

12. One thing only I shall further note on this head of dis­course; Otherwhiles as the Romanist can project advantages to his cause from the Protestants charitable perswasion of them, whilest they cannot afford any like return to us, and by this their Proselytes are obliged to be averted from us, as from those who can yield them no degree of safety, and to adhere confi­dently to them, who are not by Protestants denyed it; On another occasion the Roman is presumed to be the Only infallible Church, because no other doth (i. e. is so assuming, or self-opinio­nate, as to) pretend to that vast title. And now it seems Pro­testants are obliged to be meek, and the Romanists as much obli­ged to be zealous and earnest, which are S. W's style for the rude blowes, and so signifie contumely. From these three all the con­clusion I can make, is this, that we Protestants are willingly al­lowed the exercise of the greatest morall and Christian virtues, such are ingenuity, and meeknesse, and charity, and the Romanist must have the inclosure of the contrary, and pretend necessity and obligation of zeal for all three, and if this be it, 'tis not hard to foresee who will be the greatest looser by such advanta­ges.

13. Lastly, for his page and half of my practises, he will allow me the modesty not to make any more particular reci­tations of, or reply to them, than this, that Tertullian hath long since told me of the Votaries of Saturn, who though in their zeal (and that also founded in the deemed certainty of their faith) they were so cruel, as to expose and slaughter their most blamelesse Infants, yet at the same time theyInfantibus blandiebantur, ne immolarentur lachrymantes, Apol. c. IX. stroked and flattered them, that they might not be sacrificed weeping; and the like must I look on in S. W. not as an effect of his tendernesse (which he thinks himself obliged to disclaim) but of his care of averting ill omens, or some other such like consideration, on account of which, and in complyance with his design, I am cheerfully to [Page 41] support, and take in good part, whatsoever afterward falls upon me, from the necessity of his zeal and d [...]votion, as that is but consequent to the deemed certainty of his faith. And I am resol­ved to do it, having one motive more to it, beside his com­mendations, viz. this very advertisement of his, that 'tis the deemed certainty of his cause (a thing which I can no way help or be answerable for, either in it self or its consequences) which, as heP. 20. saith, concludes me certainly pernicious, and uponP. 17. which he doubts not to affirm that it is most perfect nonsense, to think all the testi­monies in my book can bear so much as a show of probability, if compa­red with that clear evidence he deems to shine in the other. For by this I am assured that all the reproaches that fall upon me, are deserved (and so ought not to be complained of) yet not by me personally, or by any avoidable misadventure of mine, in the retail, but only in the general, and the grosse, because I am not of S. W's faith in all things, from which grand comprehen­sive original guilt, as from my destiny, and not from mine own su­peradded miscarriages, I am to derive all my calamities, the sharpest effects of his displeasure. And with this comfort his second Section, and the pursuit of the grand argument of it hath furnished me, and so resolving to continue my good hu­mour, in despight of his other discouragements, I shall hasten to take my leave of it.

13. Yet before I do so, I am a little concerned to take no­tice of his more than oblique intimation (least I should be too insolent on his praises) 1. Of my too much vanity in using of Greek on all, or rather no occasion. And 2. my chief and almost only talent lying in the way of testimonies. Of both these I shall give the Rea­der and him this short account. 1. That of citing Greek Au­thors in the language wherein they wrote, or using a Greek word or phrase, which appeared most expressive, I never heard any man, till now, admonished, as of a fault, but by those Rea­ders, which profess'd their want of skill in that language, and for the sake of such, I have been carefull so far to translate, or otherwise to supply that want, as to leave them no just occa­sion of complaint, or cause of interruption. And then for the va­nity, possibly adherent to this, as to other lawfull, and pru­dentially [Page 42] chosen actions, if I ever were guilty of any degree of it, I shall now sure be effectually cured by S. W. who assures me, how far I should be mistaken, if I projected any mans praises by this means, and that on the contrary, I hereby give my Readers a fair title to suspect me either of too much vanity in that, or emptynesse in other knowledges. And truely I shall not so far heed, as studiously to avert the Readers suspicion of either of these (though if S. W's authority were of force, I might have thus much to plead, that 'tis no more liable to the suspicion of va­nity in me to use Greek, than in him to say he much loves it, and thinks it a great ornament to a Scholar, for he that were jealously disposed, would have temptation to suspect, that he that thus said, either had or desired to seem to have a liberal portion of it, and I hope S. W. will thank me, that I make not this conclu­sion) but expect from him that justice for the future, that when I do use Greek, it shall be thought I am not a Platonick lover of being esteemed vain and empty, and therefore that I have some (with me prevailing) reason, that moves me thus far to deny my self, and contemn my reputation, rather then omit to do that which is most for the Readers profit, in my opinion. I know no possible way of superseding this conclusion, but by surmising, that S. W. was not the reporter of any other mens sense, but his own, and that his judgement bears not much weight with any. But I supose he hath a better opinion of himself, than to suspect himself liable to such surmises.

14. Secondly, then for the way of Testimonies, I must not a­vert or disclaim it, or be troubled that my adversary acknow­ledges my chief talent to lie that way. For as long as matter of Faith is founded not in natural reason, but divine Revelation, and con­sequently is not determinable from common notions, like pro­blemes in the Mathematicks (neither hath any such close con­nexion with them, as that it can duely be said, what yetApol. for Trad. p. 11. Mr. White hath adventured to say, that God must of necessity pitch upon this or this way, resolving that if God hath not already taken this course, certainly he should have done it) but depends wholly on the evidence of its delivery from Christ, and his Apostles, and so is establish'd either by Scripture, or by Oral Tradition of the Apostles, [Page 43] or by both (and the latter of these is most surely conveighed to us at this distance, by the writings of those which dwelt neerest to them) so long, I say, I must think it reasonable to make my appeals to testimonies both of Scripture and ancient witnesses of Tradition, and if there be possibility of misinterpreting either or both of these, yet however to use them diligently, and use the best means I can to conduct my self and others to the right understanding of them▪ hoping confidently that St. Chrysostome said true, [...], and that I understand his meaning, that as what is necessary is plain, so what is intelligible is not ne­cessary. And there being two obvious means to this end of at­taining the sure meaning of a period, by searching the notion of the original words and phrases, and 2. by adverting to the rational importance, in conjunction with antecedents and conse­quents, if both these will not competently assist me to conclude inerrably from plain, and not enigmatical testimonies (written by pious and prudent men, to instruct, and not to torment, to benefit and not amaze and pussle their Reader) I must then give over the trade whether of writing controversies, or reading books, yea, and conversing with men, whose words may by this account be as great riddles, as sacred or Ecclesiastical writings, and so be obliged to take my leave of my Dispatcher abruptly, whom certainly I may not seasonably attempt to answer, till I do understand, and can no more hope that I doe not erre in thinking I do under­stand him, than in thinking I understand St. Augustine, or St. Matthew, or in expecting their words will bear the same sense with all other men, as they do with me, when I fairly make my representation of them.

15. How unkind and fastidious soever he shewes himself to testimonies, even to all in my book (whether from Fathers or from Scripture it self) upon the account of a thousand Grammatical, Philological, Sophistical, Historical, and Logical difficulties, P. 17. 'tis cer­tain he must in the change of the Scene, when he hath no in­terest concerned, or hypothesis served by it, discern his mistake, or else he would not so impertinently wast his time in reading, and answering, and writing of books, each of which are his silent confession, that books are intelligible, that words and periods, [Page 44] written, as well as unwritten, read, as spoken, found in antient re­cords, as delivered from the antients by Father to Sonne, by word of mouth, which he styles written in mens hearts, are surely and equally intelligible, and then again I may have his leave for all this rebuke, to make use of my talent, of producing testimonies, and not to complain of my portion, if whilest the matter chief­ly, if not only depends on testimonies, my chief, if not only talent lye that way.

16. And so much for his [...] (I am still very sub­ject to this vanity of using Greek, when I might have lived with­out it) his sweet and bitter cup, his praises, and his rebukes, mixt prudently, that I might not be immoderately afflicted with the one, or transported with the other.

SECT. III.

1. HIS third Section is taken up, all but the last leaf, in fetching patterns of bitternesse from St. Hierome, to which he willingly appeals, and pretending I have chosen him for my Patron (afterwards, for my Ʋmpire) in this point, Let us stand, saith he, to his award and example, and see how he treated Vigi­lantius, [Page 45] Dr. H's and the Protestants forefather in denying venera­tion to h ly Reliques.] But let us first see, how I have chosen St Hierome for my Patron or Ʋmpire, which is all the appearance of reason produced by him, why I should stand to his award or exampl [...] in this point. After the Apostles denuntiations against contumely, I mention'd many other unhappy characters, all rea­dy to fall upon this manner of treaty, one from the words of our Saviour, Mat. 5. a second from the example of Michael, Jude 9. a third from its unreconcileablenesse to the Spirit of meeknesse, com­manded by St. Paul, 2 Tim. 2.23. 1 Cor. 4.21. Gal. 6.1. in op­position to biting one another, &c. characters of the Gnostick heresie at that time, and a last in these words, that as this is a most unskil­full deviation from all rules of art, as well as civility, and St. Hierom, notes it as a great error in Helvidius, that he took railing for eloquence, so it is not imaginable how so much learning and abilities, as this Disarmer is believed to have, should admit so great a mixture of rude­nesse and scurrility, had it not appeared necessary to assist in the counter­poise to supply some other defects—Now what hath this Dispu­tant to return to all this? Why, of the three former particu­lars he takes not so much notice, as to offer any the least an­swer, in the compasse of no lesse than 26 pages, which are all spent on this matter, nor of the fourth, save only in catching hold of the name of St. Hierome (incidentally mention'd) who therefore is presently noised for my chosen Patron, and the whole umpirage referred not to the passage in him, to which alone I referred, but to his practice, and that especially in his Epistles against Vigilantius, which I did not so much as referre to, or mention.

2. First then we have here an Essay of Dispatch, to passe over all that had the weight layd on it, and strike in with some one incidental passage, and by that inch of ground get over pre­sently into another Region, and there triumph over his adver­sary, in a new Scene of Pageantry. This mindes me of Trypho and the Jewes dealing with Justine Martyr, P. 287, D. [...], saith he, [...], they endeavour not to understand what is said to them, only they whet them­selves to say something. And had not St. Hierome's name (which [Page 46] I might well enough have spared) casually fallen into that fourth branch of the character of contumely, 'tis hard to divine where S. W. would have found a Grindstone to have whet his style, or given any more edge to this part of the fourth, than he had to the rest, and to all the three former branches.

3. S [...]condly, here is a rule, by which I shall not fear to lose much, if it may be allow'd of, that whosoever names an Author, and reflects on some one passage in him, is obliged to stand to his award; and then S. W. having named St. Paul, and cited as much from him, as I did from St. Hierome, must sit down with St. Pauls award; and then contumelies must be exterminated from Christian disputes, and be no longer own'd any part of his du­ty. 2. If S. W's refutation of St. Hieroms words by his con­trary practice, be of force, then though he that cites any Au­thors words to his purpose, must not expect to gain any thing by them (he hath told usP. 17. before, that all the testimonies of my book are subject to a thousand difficulties) yet if that Author have done any thing contrary to his words, he that cited him must then stand to his award and example; and thus not only Christs speech of the Scribes and Pharisees hypocrites, must be inverted, though they sit in Moses chair, and say but do not, yet we must do after their works, not rule our selves by their commands, but even good mens frailties or crimes must become our patterns, and have more force with us, than their calmest advises, or se­verest resolutions, and so St. Peters vow of never-forsaking Christ must not deserve heeding by us, but be much preponderated by the Ʋmpirage of his actions, the example of his denying him. 3. The short is, St. Hierome in the coole of the day, knew what was amisse in another, and justly noted it, and if he were some­times provoked to exceed the bounds, that his calmer and dis­passionate reason prescribed, and exacted from others, it were more reverence to the Reliques of that holy man (of which S.W. pretends such care in this Section) to bury those practises, than to transcribe them, or reproach him by appealing to them; 'Tis evident, from his words tol. 1. c. 7. Ruffinus [Cornutam bestiam petis, et nisi caverem illud Apostoli, maledici regnum Dei non possidebunt, &c. (the very Text of which I minded S. W. and is the matter of [Page 47] our present debate whether I did it seasonably or no) jam nunc sentires, &c.] that he observed this asperity of his own temper, and thought himself bound by that Apostles denunciation, to restrain it, and accordingly he gives him that reason of say­ing no more, then he did, [Sentisne quid taceam? quod aestuanti pectori verba non commodem, & cum Psalmista loquar, Psal. 141.3.] that he consider'd that vengeance belonged to God, which conclu­ded him conscientiously obliged not to take it into his own hands. On which ground he tells him, l. III. c. XI. of railing accusations, that non chartae Ecclesiasticae, sed libelli judicum debent continere, they become not the writings of Church-controver­sies.

4. Lastly, here is a compendious way (and that is dispatch still) of making D. H. and all Protestants, hereticks, and fit to be reviled, because forsooth Vigilantius for denying veneration to holy Reliques, was thus treated.] But to this I answer, more ex­plicitly, 1. That we Protestants are as far from Vigilantius's here­sie, if St. Hierome understood it aright, in his Epistle to Riparius, as St. Hierome himself wasTom. 11. Ep. 53.. St. Hierome sets it down as part of Vigilantius's charge, that those who did suspicere reliquias marty­rum, he called Cinerarios & idololatras qui mortuorum hominum ossa venerentur. Against which charge that Father professes, Nos non dico martyrum reliquias, sed ne solem quidem & lunam, non an­gelos, non archangelos, non cherubim, non seraphim, & omne nomen quod nominatur in seculo presenti & futuro colimus & adoramus, ne ser­viamus creaturae potius quam creatori. And we English this with a perfect accord to it, We are far from worshipping and adoring whether the Reliques of Martyrs, or the very highest Angels, or any creature in the world. 2.Ibid. St. Hierome professes, Honora­mus reliquias Martyrum, ut eum cujus sunt Martyres adoremus, and we do the same, honour the reliques of Martyrs, that we may adore God whose Martyrs they are. 3. He concludes against him, that by his Doctrine, he affirm'd the Reliques of Peter and Paul to be unclean, and that as oft as men entred the Basilicae of the Apostles, Prophets, and Martyrs, so oft they payed veneration to the Temples of Idols, that the candles lighted before them were Ensigns of Idolatry, nay further, that the body of Christ laid in the Grave was uncl [...]an. [Page 48] And these consequences we dislike as much as St. Hierome, and the principle whatever it was that own'd them. 4. The ho­nour which he avouched due to the Reliques of the Martyrs, he made good by the words of the Psalmist, Pretious in the sight of the Lord is the death of his Saints, (and we believe it as precious, as any) that the bones of dead men do not pollute those that touch them, by Elisha's touching, when he raised the dead, and the like, and we doubt not of the conclusion, and so need not that medium to prove it. All that we differ in from St. Hierome in that Epistle, is, 1. That we use no reproaches against them that charge us with Doctrines, that we never taught. 2. That we do not im­pose our own consequences upon the Doctrine of Vigilantius, or any man else, without having seen his writings, asPlura dictare volueram, si li­brorum ipsius ad nos voluisses mit [...]ere cantile­nas, ut scire pos­semus ad quae rescribere debe­remus. Nunc cutem aerem verberavimus — it seems St. Hierome did. 3. That he could think Phinees's javeline, Elias's austerity, the zeal of Simon Cananaeus (not Simon of Canance, as S. W. translates it, (I desire to know by the next, whether Ca­nanee be the name of a place, or a man) but in plain words Si­mon the Zelote, Luk. VI. 15. called [...], or [...], not from the name of a place, but from [...] zeal) Peters severity on Ananias and Saphira, &c. and the command of shedding the blood of the Seducers, Deut. XIII. any way applicable to the pre­sent circumstances, as the case then stood between him and Vigilantius. And S. W. which hath avouched these words from St. Hierome, in defense of contumely, might have done well to assure us, he would not extend them to any further liberty, than he hath already taken, (to the metaphorical only, not real lance) or transcribe this more dangerous severity, this bloodyer copy from him.

P. 24.5. Secondly, 'tis not duely suggested that these harsh expres­sions of St. Hierome, which had there been premised, fell on Vi­gilantius for denying veneration to holy reliques; In his Book against Vigilantius (which S. W. calls his second Epistle, and produces the greatest store of the harsh expressions from thence) he might have seen other manner of Doctrines layd by St. Hie­rome to his charge, and that upon sight of his writings, which by this time he saith he had received from Riparius and Deside­rius, viz. that Vigils were to be condemn'd, that Allelujah was [Page 49] never to be sung but at Easter, that continence was heresie, that pudicitiousnesse or single life was a seminary of lust. And till D. H. and the Protestants concurre with him in all these, who as yet have not transcribed one of them, how can it be truely said, that these harsh expressions, which were poured out on all these conjoyned, are due to us, upon that only score, upon which, as hath been shewed, no least severity can be due to us?

6. Lastly, when with this matter of St. Hieromes dealing with Vigilantius. S. W. compares his own temper, and expects my thanks for his moderation, that he did not call me monster, prodigious monster, possess'd with the devil, &c. adding that all these were my due, as I am in the same fault with Vigilantius, besides what accrues to me of later titles] I shall ask him these two questions, somewhat di­stant the one from the other, 1. How he can think to excuse this his great moderation, that he hath not called me so many monsters and Demoniacks as St. Hierome did Vigilantius? how he hath made good the ingagements, under which he hath conclu­ded himself, both by standing to St. Hieromes award and ex­ample, and by acknowledging it necessary duty, if he hath any zeal and care of his conscience, to use the means, which wit and art can in­vent to discredit, disparage—as far as truth can justifie his words? Hath he not here resolved, that truth gives as much my due, as was payd to Vigilantius? with what care of his conscience then, if he were before in earnest, he could for the bribe of a few thanks (the utmost he demands) use this temper, and abstein from those obvious arts, and wayes, which St. Hierome had traced before him?] is my first question, not founded in what he hath really performed by way of temper, but what he saith he hath performed.

7. The second is, how he hath deserved my thanks for his moderation, when at the same time he tells me, there is as much due to me, on one score, as all St. Hieromes expressions amount to, and yet more accruing to me out of other titles? Doth he that tells a man publikely, that the title of frantick monster, prodigious monster, possess'd with the Devil, with an unclean Spirit, Snake, famous for wickednesse, block-head, &c. (as S. W. hath con­tracted them) are due to him for one fault beside what accrues to [Page 50] him out of later titles, deserve his thanks, for not whipping him with Scorpions? What nice distinction hath he discovered be­twixt giving me these titles, and publickly telling me and all o­ther men, they are due to me? 'Tis true indeed, that money is not payd, when 'tis only acknowledged due, but is it so in railing? Is it not one of the figures of that art, to tell his antagonist, this and this worst of titles is his due, yea much more also, than that, but he is kinde, and will not deal thus with him, as he deserves. And this piece of art, as all others, S. W. was obliged in con­science to make use of, and accordingly hath discharged his obligation to conscience, to the utmost farthing; and I that am not the Noon-shadow of Vigilantius's pourtraiture, that assert not a syllable of all his heretical dictates, must thank, and be obliged, that I am thus meekly treated, and my only question is, how these thanks came to be so due from me?

8. What he addes of his manner of handling Helvidius, and calling him Snake, and sillyest of men, made famous by wickednesse, dancing Camel,] is I hope by this time answered also, by ana­logie with his treating of Vigilantius, viz. That I mention'd his dislike of Helvidius's railing (which if it were theP. 25. l. 1. appealing to his authority, was not to his example, which S. W. unduely joyns together, as if I had appealed to loth) and if he practi­sed otherwise himself, his words are certainly to be heeded be­fore his actions, and the rather, because though through passion or weaknesse he were guilty of it himself, yet it was too foul for him to tolerate in another. I shall not therefore any farther reply to the parallel S. W. makes at large betwixt St. Hierome and himself, in this matter, I had rather be like that Father in his other excellencies, than come within any distance of him in that, which hath alwayes been look'd on as his blemish, and is so far from excusing S. W. that it self is unexcu­sable.

9. It remains only, that I adde a few words in mine own de­fense, to clear me from the more and more weaknesse, that S. W. discovers in me, for construing, as he saith, loquacitas, to be railing, St. Hierom's words of Helvidius being these, loquacitatem facundiam existimat.] But I answer, that I cited neither these, nor any [Page 51] other words of St. Hieromes, I only said, in my own words, that he noted▪ it as a great error in Helvidius, that he took railing for elo­quence. If it be then now demanded, where he noted it, I an­swer, in the first Chapter of that Epistle against Helvidius, in several passages, especially in this (of which S. W. recites a part) loquacitatem facundiam existimat & maledicere omnibus bonae conscientiae signum arbitratu [...], accepta materia disputandi amplius in­cipit blasphemare, & quasi de sublimi loco in totum orbem ferre senten­tiam, meque quia veritate non posset, lacerare convitiis. Here I not only found mention of loquacity, but saw the sort of his loqua­city, express'd by evil speaking, blaspheming, censuring, raving, ren­ding innocent persons with reproaches, and this is my ground for discriminating his loquacity from all other species of it, and in­terpreting it (but that is not construing it) railing. And if here I have shew'd more and more weaknesse than in all the Section, I shall thence take confidence, as far as S. W's judgement will support it, to believe, I have not been very culpable, and so am not as yet much humbled by his Discipline.

10. There be two things still behind in this Section, which being heterogeneous to that of St. Hierome, the main subject, come now to be attended to. 1.P. 23. P. 27. His dilemma concluding the justice of his rigorous expressions. 2. My counterfeiting a mistake that I may by that means fix a slie calumny on a worthy Gentleman. His Dilemma is in these words, Either Doctor H's cause is false, and then 'tis laudable to use zeal against him— or it is true, and then he deserves as great a reprehension, who abuses his cause by going a­bout to defend it by such wilfull falsifications, frauds and weaknesses, as he hath been discovered.] And this as a cure for his begging the question, in supposing me an adversary of the true faith.] This Di­lemma I might retort with as much force, as he hath begun it, (i. e. I confesse with little enough, but yet with as much.) Thus, either my cause is true, and then it is not laudable in him to use zeal against it, or to labour to oppresse it with noyse and clamour, or it is false, and then I cannot be so much repre­hended for using no better means to defend it, then a bad cause is capable of. But I like not the last part of my dilemma much better than I did his, and therefore having only shewed him [Page 52] the no force of it by this image, I answer, 1. That I take this cure for his begging the question to be palliate, and that it is still a begging the question to affirm, that either my cause is false, or that I have defended it with falsifications, and that I have there­in been so much as once discovered. There is a middle betwixt these, my having defended a true cause without any falsifications &c. and till he hath not only said, but proved the contrary, which cannot yet be done in the beginning of this reply to my Discovery of his former Dexterities, his saying it, is the begging the question. 2. In case my cause were false, and his zeal lauda­ble, yet whether contumelies are that laudable zeal, or his twitch­ings by the beard, pure zeal, and not contumely, is another question, at this present under debate, and therefore now in this Section most unskilfully begg'd by him. 3. Supposing the cause good, and some faults, and weaknesses discovered, in defending it, yet neither would it follow that those supposable faults were either frauds, or falsifications, or any way wilfull (which includes their being known to the author, as to me, I am sure, they are not) any more than the weaknesses are, which are generally most op­posite to willfull, nor that they deserved as great a reprehension, be they what they can, as the like in maintaining a bad cause would deserve, the badnesse of the cause being allowable to adde some degree to the guilt, when the falsifications or whatsoever other crimes are supposed equal, and equally wilfull on both sides. 4. Faults may be reprehended without contumely, and so still bare reprehensions come not home to the point in hand, and that S. W's twitchings are bare reprehensions, is another beg­ging of the question, and these be frailties enow in his one Di­lemma.

11. Then for the Counterfeited mistake and calumny, thus he layes it, I had, saith he, upon occasion of the evidence of our Churches Infallibility, in my Schism Disarm'd p. 20. told him he might to his amazement see it in that incomparable Treatise of Rushworths Dia­logues vindicated from all possible confute by that excellent Apology for it, writ by the learned pen of Mr. Thomas White. Now what does Mr. H.? he tells us that S. W. sayes his arrowes are beyond all possible confute, meaning that S. W. the Author of Schism Disarm'd, was the [Page 53] same with the Author of the Apology for Tradition (though I am cer­tainly informed that he knowes S. W. to be another person) and reports again afterwards the same phrase to the same purpose, and so on, phansying two advantages that I meant to make by this one pro­ject.] But before we proceed to more, let us a while reflect on this.

12. His own words, of which there was no doubt, he cites from Schism Disarm'd, naming the very page, where they were, But my words, on which all depended, he gives his Reader no direction to finde, either as he first cites them, or, as he saith, I report afterward the same phrase to the same purpose, Nor can I, who am presumeable to be better acquainted with my own writings than any other Reader, tell whither to repair for this second report of this phrase, and must therefore satisfie my self by resorting to the first, on which the weight seems to be laid, and that is in the Disarmers Dexter. Exam. p. 4. l. 35. where having compared his treating me to the Aethiopians poysoning their little arrowes, I added, having thus imbibed high virtues, they make very quick work, are very killing, or in the Disarmers phrase, beyond all possible confute. And this it seems hath brought on me this unexpected displeasure, and censure of counterfeiting a mi­stake, and fixing a slie calumny upon a worthy person. But I de­mand, 1. How is it possible I should have mistaken in these words? Did not S. W. p. 20. use this phrase [beyond all possible confute]? and is not S. W. my Disarmer? and might not I spell these together, and then write, [in my Disarmers phrase, beyond all possible confute]. I confesse, I that took [confute] for a Verb, should not on my own head have used it for a Substan­tive, and therefore using it so, cited it from my Disarmer, (as if I should now render Simon Cananaeus, Simon of Cananee, I would adde, according to my Disarmers interpretation) but who would think there were any least mistake committed in this, when 'tis palpable there was none?

13. This indeed, to yield some support to his charge, he hath disguised into another form, affirming that I tell him that S. W. sayes, his arrows are beyond all possible confute, and adding that I mean that S. W. was the same with the Author [Page 54] of the Apology for Tradition. But 1. it is v sible that I do not tell him or any man, that S. W. sayes so of his own arrowes, but on the contrary, that 'twas no excellent indication of his perswasions of his own performances, that he deemed it necessary, geminare venenis vul­nera, (which he could not think necessary, if they were of them­selves in his opinion beyond all possibility of being confuted.) What I farther adde there, is evidently no more than this, that the killingnesse of his arrowes, the impossibility of his being confuted, comes from the high virtues they have imbibed, i. e. from the con­tumelies (the only parts of his book, which I know my self un­qualified to answer in kinde, or make any proportionable re­turn to) and what is this toward telling that S. W. sayes this of his own arrowes?

14. Secondly, having affix'd on me words which I never wrote, 'tis no wonder, but consequent (and in his opinion lau­dable) that he should proceed, and give them a meaning, which I never meant; And at this rate who can be free from mistakes, from counterfeiting, from calumny, from any thing, that S. W. will say I meant, by words, first of his own framing, and then inter­preting also?

15. But neither will all this (which, if allowed, hath ill luck if it cannot do any thing) prove what he hath charged on me, (i. e. my purposely counterfeiting a mistake, &c.) without one far­ther aid, and that he hath furnished it with also, affirming, that he is certainly informed that I know S. W. to be another person.] Certainly I have no least obligation to make any return to this; yet I shall, by these steps, to perfect the Readers observati­ons of S. W. 1. I am the most competent testifier of mine own secrets, and I am sure, I doe not know, who is the Author of that Book, nor 2. what one name S. W. are the first letters of, nor 3. do I, or ever did I so much as believe ('tis not ima­ginable I should know) that Mr. S. who was once a Servant to my Lord of D. and hath, as I have heard, assumed to be the Author of Schism Disarm'd, was the Author of that whole Book, but only of a part of it. How then could he be certainly in­formed, that I knew this, which I know I never so much as believed? If he was informed so, he neither was, nor could be [Page 55] certainly informed (which to my ears signifies the certain truth of his information) and if he was any way informed that I believed it, yet that could not signifie that I knew it, when in truth I nei­ther knew nor believed it. I was told (Sect. 2.) that he was much mine for the sakes of some friends common to him and me; I now de­mand, did any of them ever so much as tell him, that I be­lieved otherwise, than now I affirm; If any did, let him be named, if they did not, what may not he say that thus speaks? 4. Though I have now no least inducement or obligation to tell him my present thoughts, or suspicions (for above those I cannot be imagined to have penetrated the disguise) of Schisme Dispatcht, yet as far as my present information or conjectures lead me, I shall not be nice to discover it, and it is this, that Mr. S. must not inclose all the honour (or rather just reproach) either of the scoffes, or, which is the second principal ingredient, the cavils of it; And if Mr. Wh. be suspected by many to have brought in liberal contributions to him, I have not much grea­ter arguments to incline my assent to it, than these, 1. That without any occasion given by me, this remote opportunity was laid hold on, sollicitously to avert that suspicion. 2. That in his answer to Mr. Daillee, or Daillees arts discovered, he hath without any disguise treated him in as much ill language, and sometimes upon as little occasion, as I am treated in either of these Replies, and that he may with as much honour have writ­ten either, or both of these whole Tracts, as one passage a­gainst Mr. Daillee, which I shall for an essay desire S. W. to turn to p. 249. usher'd in, p. 248. with these words, [Here I particularly invite the eye of the serious Reader, to observe how mali­ciously he (Mr. Daillee) corrupts the Councel of Trent in two very con­siderable passages.] On the second of these he sets the remark, that the abuse is more grosse and palpable (concerning our Ladies im­maculate conception) p. 248. and in the next page, 249. he that p. 4. had profess'd, beside his reason, to be beholding to his nature for its extreme aversnesse to incivilities, and captious proceedings, is yet induced (by what principle I guess not, but it seems neither of reason, nor nature) to fasten on it all these expresse charges of foul play, cheat, falsenesse, perversnesse, want both of face and [Page 56] conscience, more than ordinary malice, desperate notorious absurdity, shamelesse forehead outfacing the whole Catholike world, the title of a bold jugler, all this and more in the compasse of 30 lines) and then concludes at the top of the next page 250. in the greatest [...] of Contumely, that he could reach, [Can any thing be an­swered in his defense, or any excuse made, why he should not be ac­counted an impudent lying knave?] This sure is the noting of some fault, personal and moral with a witnesse, and so by S. W's description of contumely, must needs fall under it. And what was it that made all this severity so necessary? Why, saith he, He undertook to prove, that 'tis impossible so to expound the words of the Councel of Trent, that they shall not in plain terms give the lie to all the Fathers, and to render this foul play the more plausible to such as look not well to his fingers, he translates [in hoc decreto] false­ly and perversely [in this number] as if the Councel had positively de­creed the blessed Virgin not to be in the number of those, who are born in Original sin.] This then being the crime, and the former part of it [that it is impossible to explicate their words, En sort qu' elles ex donnent un desmenti a tous les Peres] being in that place assumed to be proved by an argument, there following by way of Di­lemma (to which Mr. Wh. hath not offered a word of answer, and till he had done so, could not reasonably proceed to any sharp Discipline on the conclusion) I must suppose the second part to be it, which alone could be thought to support the crimen falsi, and so be charged in such variety of language, cheat, jugler, &c. viz. that he falsified the words of the Councel, and translated in hoc decreto, in this number] But that could not be, for Mr. Daillee wrote not English but French, and if the English Translator misrendred him, without his privity, 1. That should have been wholly charged on that Translator, and 2. it would not then have amounted to those enormous crimes, of cheat, jugler &c. that now are fasten'd on it, by being mispla­ced upon Mr. Daillee, who was herein most perfectly innocent. And this is the very truth of the matter, The English Interpreter impertinently (yet probably without any design of seducing any) added those words [in that number] but Mr. Daillee set down the words of the Original Latine of the Councell most [Page 57] punctually, as they lye in the Acts of the Councel, and gave them no other rendring but this, Ils declarent a la sin Que leur in­tention n' est pas d' y comprendre le bien heureuse et immaculee Vierge Marie mere de Dieu. They declare in the end (of their Decree be­fore-mention'd, En leur Decret) that it was not their intention to comprehend the blessed and immaculate Virgin Mary the mother of of God] adding no syllable that sounded to that sense of [in that number] Now 'tis not question'd but Mr. Wh. was abun­dantly qualified to read, at least to consult the author, whose arts he undertook to discover, in his own language, which if he did, he must needs discern him free from this charge of falsi­fying, if he did not, he knowes whose fault that was, to con­demn a person without due cognizance of his fact, and so from whom the reparations are due. And 'tis not his proemial ad­vertisement, that [the Animadversions on Daille are applyed to the English Translation by T. S. not to the French Original] that will justifie him, for still the title of his Book is, Dailles Arts disco­vered] to whom the errors of the Translator (by the way, with his good leave, that was not T. S.) are not with the least justice imputable, much lesse are the casual slips of the one a­ny way interpretable to be the inexcusable lyes, and knavery, and impudencies of the other. By the way, it may be remem­bred, that even that which the Translator conceived to be the meaning of the Councel, is expressely the definition, in the Ro­manists Catechisme, compiled for universal use by Cardinal Bellar­mine, Christ. Doctr. p. 142. Our Lady had never any spot of sinne, neither Original nor Actual. This one instance I have chosen to give, by way of digression from my own to another person, having truely the same dislikes to this sort of treating, when others, as when my self am concerned in it. And lest it should be thought, that poor Hereticks are the only men, that meet with this course usage from him, I referre the Reader to his Or­dinary the Bishop of Chalcedon his Letter to him, part of which is inserted in G. L.s Manifest to his Brethren residing in England, in these words. Only for your souls sake I request you to leave those naughty reproaches which you give to one equall to your self in all things, I pray you forget not the words of the Apostle, Maledici regnum [Page 58] Dei non consequentur, or of our Saviour, Qui dixerit fratri suo, [...]atue, reus crit Gehennae ignis, such reproachfull words as you use in your Letter, become neither Christian, nor Priest, but discover too too great passion, and again— To omit the taunts of Paramount Bishop, and domineering wayes, and such others, which you bestow upon my self, it seems you have forgotten your solemn promise which you made at your Ordination, to give reverence and obedience to your Ordinary, &c.

16. Ere I leave this Theme, I am yet farther to take notice of the two advantages which I am suggested to have aimed at in this wilfull mistake, 1. That I honour my self in making the world be­leive I had so worthy an adversary as that miracle of wit and learning. 2. That I dishonour my pretended adversary as the vainest person in the world, by intimating [that himself gave himself such an high cha­racter. To these I answer joyntly. 1. That I could have no aims in saying that, which, as hath already appeared, I never said. 2. That I could never foresee that the world would collect that from my words, which I neither said nor thought, and which my accuser at the same time saith was contrary to my knowledge.

17. As for the severals, they now can need no reply, yet ex abundanti I shall give them some. 1. That I might as reasonably be allowed thus to honour my self (if it were but to reward the patience of being in S. W's company so long) as 'tis certain Mr. Wh. assumes to have answered two persons of such a quali­ty,P. 5.as the Protestant party never produced before, and seems to have chosen them to live by, or die with, whose el [...]quence none were found to exceed, whose wits none will be found to equall— adding much more in their praises, and thus much in Mr. Dailles, P. 260. that those noble Lords had great reason highly to esteem him, and yet sure he doth more than desire to make the world believe, he had such worthy ad­versaries, 'twere but a poor satisfaction this, if they were not his Captives too. And why might not another man have S W's pardon,P. 28. if having such an example from a person of the pro­foundest humility (as S. W. that best knowes, assures us also) he had permitted this spark of ambition a while to have warmed his breast? It might perhaps have inspirited him, and raised his faculties above that meannesse, that S. W. at every turn [Page 59] discovers in him, and so contributed to the glorys of his tri­umphs also, which now are likely to be obscured by the despi­cablenesse of his Captive. But whatever just title I might have to his pardon for this insolence, I may with truth professe, I have no inclination to be guilty of it, and assure him, 1. That I am not fond of so much as seeming to enter the lists with Gyants, of having to do with miracles of any sort, especial­ly those of wit, having been advertised long since, that quanto ingeniosores sunt, tanto iracundius docent, the more miraculously quick their own perceptions are, the lesse patience they have for those that do not as nimbly apprehend, and submissively embrace them; were it not for this dread of this ill attendant of his wit, I should not disown the ambition of beholding his learning, that I might benefit by it, which I never did in the least from all my conversation with S. W. and therefore if he be but in the number of those whom he calls the meanest and youngest of his Scholars, Florid. l. [...]. he must put me in minde of what Apuleius saith of the Indians, ad nascentem solem siti sunt, et in toto corpore nox est, for I yet discern not, that he hath considerably edified or im­proved by his neernesse to him. 2. I shall ask what honour it was to Mr. Daille that the world knew (which is more than be­lieving) that this worthy man had written against him? Can any man be meaner, and more uncapable of true honour, than he is there (as even now appeared) represented to be? and yet he hath attained that honour, who then need despair, that were am­bitious of the like? 3. What advantage were it for him, that had sought honour from the worthinesse of his adversary, presently (as S. W. supposes) to dishonour him? were it still an honour to combat with the vainest person in the world, or to have him ap­pear thus vain, with whom I was to combate? Yet these, and thus unreconacileble are the advantages that S.W's mint would help me to. 'Tis certain Mr. White could not need his own prai­ses (and so must have been impertinently vain in this contri­vance) His friends have freely bestowed them on him, and I heartily wish, that having so many titles to them, he may ne­ver do any thing to blemish them.

[Page 60]18. My greatest quarrel to him as a man I have already ex­press'd, and should not have done so, had it not been as legible to all under his own and anothers hand, as it is now under mine. But as to a writer of Controversies, I have this other, that the answering of his Apology for the Dialogues, is not the way to satisfie the Romanists, there being few of those which go on his grounds, either in the notion of Tradition, or some other particular points of Controversie. In relation to the former it was that Mr. White hath not only told us expressely in his Epistle Dedicatory before that Apology, that the Doctrine of Rushworths Dialogues takes a path not much beaten by our modern Controvertists, but farther gives us (in the beginning of the Apology it self) the first rise of his way, from a slight familiar conference between him and his Kinsman, as it were only for exercise to train themselves, and practise their postures, which now by the oppositions of those two Lords seems (to him) to spread it self into a publick and solemn warre.] Which though poetically spoken, and above the proportion of vide as concurrere bellum, Atque virum— yet he can make good the phrase, he saith, without much straining, since the eminent names on the one side (a private Letter of the Lord Digby, and a short Reply of the Lord Folkland) and the great advantages of ground on the other (one single person on that advantageous ground) may justly be ad­mitted to supply the number of an Army in both; I may adde that that Army being of two sides, must, if any, be two armies (and that would be newes indeed, two Armies made up of three men.) That it is not otherwise than in this poetick Dialect, and in the Authors fancy, grown much more numerous since, I may safely collect from S. W. who, I suppose, hath narrowly observed the progress of this doctrin, and without respect to his interest true­ly told me, that few there are that have refined their understanding to this degree of discerningness, though he perceived to his comfort that the best sort of wits (himself, I suppose, and some, but still few others) which sure are not the most, begin (and do yet but begin) thus to own their reason. And for the latter 'tis no secret, that other of his tenets were not liked, if they had, they had not been, as himself in a second Epistle Dedicatory before that Apology, saith, so deeply censured even by Catholikes (whom he there cen­sures [Page 61] back again, as unworthy the Function they professe, and highly obstructive of the progresse of the Catholike Faith, noting them of Destructive errors, of striving to possesse the Church of God, and break the eternal rule of Faith) and in fine condemned at Rome. And then what honour it may be, I know not, but truely I see not the advantage would accrue from such a duell, wherein so few beside the Combatants, would think themselves concerned; And that is one sufficient reason (beside the no obligation to be for ever in the Palestra) why the challenge so oft intimated in Sch. Disarm'd and Dispatcht, to enter the lists with that Apo­logist, is not yet accepted. It were not hard to make that re­turn to him, which would satisfie all disinterested persons of either party, but those having no need of, nor demanding that satisfaction, there is no hope of satisfying those few others, that are resolved it is beyond all possible refute, the deemed certainty of which perswasion layes on them a necessity of concluding every thing ridiculous, and nonsensicall, that is aimed against it. 'Tis fitter then that these few should be permitted to enjoy their own humors, then that they should be studiously, but imper­tinently disquieted. Another reason there is, which hath weight with me; The title of that Apology promises an answer to the exceptions of the Lords Falkland and Digby, the former of which I know hath very largely and fully refuted one an­swer of his (which therefore himself stylesApol. p. 3. an unlicked mola) to that Lords little discourse of Infallibility; setting down the full of his argument, and well nigh of his words, and giving them so fair a Reply, that the sweetnesse of itApol. p. 6. surprized him, he acknowledges, with admiration. But to this the Apologist hath not made those regular, and equal returns, that the Reader might expect, and were due (if but by way of reparation for the defects of his former, aboveSee Answ. to L. Falkl. p. 27. and L. Falkl.'s Reply, p. 176. half of which was spent, be­fore he pretends to give any answer to, or take the least notice of his adversary) butApol. p. 4. as he professes, to select such objections as he (the only judge in this matter) thinks really to interest the Con­troversie, and to handle them without relation to books or distinction of Authors, or citations of places, as one that seeks truth, not the glory of confuting, or vanity of answering (when yet in the title [Page 62] page, the most conspicuous place in the City, it was distinctly proclaimed, that those Lords exceptions were answered) so he hath accordingly performed, producing what objections he thought fit, not noting from whence they were produced. And if this have rendred that Lords discourse lesse defensible, and his adversaries beyond all possible refute, this was a piece of skill in the manager, and let not S. W. feign to himself any other reason of it. I have now on his summons given my attendance and surveyed it a second time, and find some things very true, and seasonably observed, as that neither the Chiliasts nor the Arrians had any title to universal Tradition (which if he learnt not from the Preaching Protestants, was yet surely no newes to them, nor the least prejudice to our pretensions, nor refutation of his Lordship, as to that of the Chiliasts, hathView of In­fallib. p. 87, &c. elsewhere largely been manifested) thatP. 111. if impertinent curi­osities be hindred from importuning the Church, her truths will un­doubtedly be seen in her belief and practice without making new defi­nitions; thatP. 117. probable arguments have no truth in them, nor isP. 146. a conclusion neerer being true for an hundred unconvincing arguments, then for one, thatP. 195. the place urged by Mr. Daille out of Hegesippus of heresie deflowring the Church after the Apostles death, belonged only to the rising up of hereticks against the Church not to the Churches cor­ruption, (if he had added that the hereticks were there specified to be the [...], the Gnosticks, he had fully con­firmed his interpretation.) But in divers other particulars he hath not shew'd himself that miracle, that S. W. tells us of, especially in interpreting the Greek of the New Testament, as [...], Lu. 1.1.P. 165. in great abundance acted, [...], v. 3. present at all things almost from the be­ginning, [...], Joh. V. 39.P. 152. you deceive your selves if you think you have life in them, [...], Act. XXVI. 22.P. 159. testifying or protesting to great and little that I spoke nothing. So likewise in his account of other Greek passages, as of that ofP. 233. Joannes Thessalo­nicensis, that he saith no such thing as Daille makes him say, [viz. that the Church held Angels had subtile and airy bodyes] only this, that the Church knowes Angels to be intelligent Creatures] [Page 63] when yet the expresse words are, [...], the Catholike Church acknowledges, or is of opinion (as [...] sententia is from [...], and as [...] and [...], are exactly the same both in the nature of the words and in use, though he guesse otherwiseP. 81. elsewhere) that they are intelligent, not indeed altogether incorporeal and invisible, but thin-bodyed, and airy or fiery. These I mention, as things manifest to every eye, and shall not here, so much out of the place, (anon there will be a fitter season) descend to any mat­ters of the main dispute or controversie, wherein I must not ex­pect S. W. will be of my minde: But if in these which I have named he will not, the Reader will know what sentence to passe on Tutor and Disciple both. And thus much for this learned Author, upon S. W's importunity, and withall to give him the reason of that silence, which is, it seems, misinter­preted amazement, the least degree of which I know no person that ever was under, upon the account which S. W. men­tions.

19. This Section concludes with a reflection on Irenaeus his words of much laughter, and he hath replyed to them by fiction of other words, that Irenaeus might have said, but hath not; And then passing them on Mr. H. and appealing to the Readers eyes, if they were not very suteable, he hath shew'd him no­thing, but that he was obliged to write another Defense, of Calumny, after this of Contumely, and then examine which were the most necessary accomplishment of a Catholike Controver­ [...]ist.

SECT. IV.

1. HIs fourth Section, the last on this subject, wherein his Defense, in relation to contumelies, is compleated, is the charging on me a grievous mistake committed in even ground, in a plain Epistle to the Reader. 'Twill cost us some circuit and windlace, to discern wherein this mistake consists. First he tells us the design of that his Epistle, to render the Reader an account, why the civility of his adversary should not hinder him from giving him his own, if the care of an eternal good interested his zeal to lay him open, and then addes the two parallel questions, which he pro­posed in these words, How would you take it if one should spit in your face, and justifie the affront because his breath is sweet, &c. And then again repeating his design in the questions, he reproaches me for not understanding it in my answer, (which yet was punctu­al [...] to his question, telling him how a Christian were bound to take it, if any man should spit in his face, were the breath swee [...] or otherwise) To this rebuke I answer, 1. That if to a que­sti n asked, I had given a punctual answer, abstracting from the main design of it, this might yet be farre from a grievous mistake. For unlesse the particularity of the design have such an influence on the question, that the answer to the question will be unsufficient, unlesse the design be explicitely taken no­tice of, there is sure no mistake at all in this method.

2. But then 2. the answer which I gave, was perfectly home to the design, as well as to the question, which I shall thus ma­nifest [Page 65] to him. The question I must suppose pertinent to the businesse in hand, and that was certainly for the justifying of S. W's dealing in Sch. Dis. and that precisely in the point of rude blowes, or contumelies only, and not as 'tis now pretended, of giving the adversary his own (which is bare justice) or laying o­pen, discovering the infirmities of his reasoning (which if it be no more then so, is justice again) This is most visible in the first words of the Epistle [I know you will be objecting that the blowes I give are too rude] (not that I give him his own, &c.) Hence it followes that this, which he now pretends to have been his design, could then have no influence on the question, which was to justifie not his justice, but his rudenesse, and therefore my answer, which reflected only on rudenesse, not on justice, was home to the de­sign. So again for another ingredient in his design, the civility of his adversary, and the influence of that upon his blowes, that certainly I took notice of, and by proving to him from Christs command, that an uncivil adversary was not to be answered with rudenesse, I inferred with advantage, that a civil adversary was not thus to be answered. Lastly, for the care of an eternal good, interessing zeal, which is the last circumstance in his design, that only in my answer I took not notice of, and the reason is clear, because no such care can thus interesse zeal, as to justifie contu­mely. No mans eternal good depends upon S. W's Contumelies, nor if it did, must he on that account neglect his own, as he certainly doth, that sins in order to the best end, and that the contumelious doth so, had a little before been proved, and was not there again to be insisted on. Let the Reader now, or, if he please, his own conscience judge, on whose side the grievous mistake lyes, on mine, who answered sully to the one true de­sign, that rude blowes were not for any, much lesse for a civil adversa­ry, or on his, that is now fain to substitute a fained design, and convert Rudenesse inhansed by the civility of the adversary, into exact distributive justice, which is known by this very form of words, suum cuique tribuere, giving every man, and so an adver­sary, his own, which he could not know, as he said he did, his Rea­der would object to him.

[Page 66] P. 30.3. This is still more manifest against S. W. when he saith, that D H's courteous style could not oblige S. W. to treat him tenderly, and favourably.] Let him now reflect on the first words of his Epistle; Was the Reader supposed to object that he did not treat the Doctor tenderly or favourably? Or had the style of the tract of Schisme courted favour or tendernesse from S. W. (who could not then by any divination be foreseen) or from any man else? Or, is there no middle between favour and too much rudenesse? Whose now is the guilt of totally mistaking the common sense not of a strangers, but of his own plain Epistle? And what can be imagined more plain, than that he hath studiously en­deavoured to impose this mistake on others, if he have not re­ally imposed it on himself, which will be believed with most charity to the designer.

4. But that he may indeed prove, that the Doctors wits were not well awake, he layes to my charge, that I neither go about to grant or deny the invalidity of those pretended excuses, which only was to be done] To which I have already answered, that contumelies being proved exterminating sins, 'twas evident none of those pre­tended motives of them, could be imagined to have any force to justifie them, why then should I grant, or deny the invalidity of these, when upon the grounds promised, all were indifferently invalidated? When then in great vehemence he appeals to my conscience and reason, whether my answer taken from Christs rule of bearing of injuries, be any thing to this question, whether the sweet­nesse of the breath justifie the affront of spitting in ones face, or, civil language sufficiently excuse pernicious Doctrine.] I answer him again, that neither of these were questions between him and me, or his Reader, but this only instead of them, whether rude blowes were a sutable return to a civil adversary, nay even to an uncivil, accor­ding to the law of Christ? And I am sure my answer (and he cannot doubt it) was pertinent, and more than home to that question. This manner of dealing I desire may be entred into S. W's character.

5. The answer to his second question, he saith, is yet more pleasant, for instead of telling whether swearing demurely be any excuse for per­jury, so as to secure it from the punishment or treaty which otherwise [Page 67] might justly be given it, he tells us, saith he, in good sober sadnesse, that a man may use all lawfull means to defend his estate, and discover perjury, and blames me for accusing him of pe [...]ju [...]ious tampering— as super-adding to the former [...]rror, that I mistake the comparison for the thing that it is brought to resemb [...]e To the substantial part of this charge, the same account belongs, which was given to the former. That the question betwixt us, was not whether civility could ex­cuse from justice, but whether it ought not to secure from rude­nesse; and so proportionably, not whether the demurenesse of the swearing or forswearing, could secure the perju [...]ious from any just returns, but whether so great a supposed crime, as perjury, would justifie the rude blowes, or twitchings by the beard, declamation, or Satyre; Of these only he knowes the question was, and the Readers supposed objection, to which he undertook to give satis­faction by this other double question, what return soever should be made to it; To which therefore I was so to accommodate an­swer, that it might appear, whether he in his supposed rude blowes were innocent, or no, and that he was not, did irrefra­gably appear by these two steps, 1. That as all lawfull means might be used to discover perjurie, and defend the estate, so unlawfull might not, and the rude blowes were of that number (the latter part of which being that, whereon the weight of the answer lay, he hath wholly omitted in his recitation, with what fairnesse, let him now judge.) 2. That this of demure perjury was far from the case of S. W's adversary (whose civility was all that was sup­posed in the objection) and who was as free from that, or any thing proportionable to that, as from Necromancy or sacrificing to Idols. And then what answer could be more pertinent, and home to the purpose, then this, that his plea for rude blowes, depending on the concession or supposition of two things, 1. That the adversary was guilty of perjury, or the like. 2. That rude blowes were a justifiable return to that, neither of these had any degree of truth in them. How this, that was thus plain, made a shift to be disguised, I leave the Reader to consider, and account with S. W. for it.

6. And when for the inflaming of the bill, he addes, that I mistook the similitude for the thing it is brought to resemble. I wonder [Page 68] how he came to be so farre of my counsel; If I repeated the words, which he spake, and made answer in the same Dialect, and there was an allegory in his words, it is strange I may not be allow'd to have had the same in mine; Is my keeping close to his words, an evidence that I forsook his sense? If it be not, I am sure he hath no other from which to inferre it. Nay, is it not yet more evident, that I began that period (now accused of this error) thus, 'Tis certain and visible that as the defending the Church of England from Schisme, bears no proportion to the ruining S. W's estate, so neither is there any oath incumbent on us— and pursue it in like manner, that his style, which was robust in the mention of perjury, becomes much fainter when he comes to the [...]—Now if I had mistaken the similitude, for the thing it was brought to resemble, how could I mention proportion, and [...]? Doth not proportion] expressely signifie the comparison, and though [...] be a Greek word, to which S. W. hath a picque, yet sure it is, in plain English, the second part of a compa­rison, or the thing resembled by it, and having noted it twice in so few lines, why must I be obliged to note it a third time, to praeclude, what I had not the sagacity to foresee, S. W's dis­covering of my error? Let the Reader now advise, whether it were any great debasement to S. W. to be set to pick thrums­ends out of over-worn garments (as he is pleased to style his exami­ning of testimonies produced out of Scripture and Fathers) who when he is not so imployed,P. 18. sets himself to the picking of holes, where his fingers meet not with the least temptations.

7. Of the same thred exactly is the next, that followes, and is, saith he, greater than all the rest, that when he made it his only plea to the Reader for some blowes— that our controversie was about things concerning mans eternal salvation, and therefore the Rea­der knowing that he (as all Catholikes) hold their Faith certain, he had no reason to expect that S. W. should favour an opponent in an all of such a nature, as is publikely harmfull to mens souls, yet the Doctor takes no notice of this his plea.] But I answer, 1. That I did take notice of it, and assured him that I took it for a plain begging the question, to suppose that guilt which he was to prove, to assume so early, what he must, but hath not yet so much as attempted to demonstrate. [Page 69] 2. That if I had not taken notice of it, I had not in the least offended, as long as I had proved that Contumelies in a Con­trovertist were simply unlawfull, for then no supposed truth, or weight of the cause could justifie them. The more Chri­stian and important the cause were, the more it should confine it self to the use of means exactly Christian, and Contumelies were not such, and of these only the controversie was, though he now softens the matter, and asks whether he should favour an opponent in an act of such a nature, and that he would have little contention with me, were the difference in things of lesse concernment than eternity. But sure, 'twas not his favour was courted, nor his not contending, nor any thing expected of him, in return to civility, but what was ever under obligation of strict Christian duty to those who are uncivil, and if without all temptation he will break through those rational, as well as religious tyes, and pretend piety for doing so, and care of souls, and challenge me of wilfull mistakes, for not attending to his pleas, when he thus forsaketh his question, and substitutes another, which was never controverted, I foresee not, when I shall attain to any ordinary degree of his favour.

8. So when he saith, I transfer the matter from the publick in­jury to mens Souls, to the case of private injury, and then asks, Whe­ther if a man be certainly held to have ruin'd some Souls eternally, Christ bids him let him ruine more?] He is doubly mistaken; for 1. I only shewed from Christs word, that even Injuries are not to be repayed with Injuries, much less Civility with Contumelies, and this must hold in the most publick Concernment, as well as in the most private, unless Contumely be proved to be in the number of those things, that are allowed in Gods Cause, or in the cause of Souls, though not in mans cause, or the matters of his Body and Estate; which as it is most untrue, so 'tis not here pretended to be proved to have truth in it. 2. I do not en­deavour to perswade him, that he that can hinder that which he deems the ruining of any Soul, shall be blameless in permit­ting it, or that Christs precept, of turning the other Cheek belongs to him; but 1. That unlawfull means are not to be used for the most glorious end, and Contumely is such: And 2. That it hath [Page 70] no propriety to the pretended end, being but the Weapons of those that are desperatly worsted, and not rationably supposa­ble to be made use of by any other. One of their ownD. Lauroy de Bull Sab. Johan. XXII. p. 127. Sorbon Doctors, formerly mentioned, in his dispute with the Carmelites, about a supposititious Bull, gives for the seventeenth, or last rea­son to prove it such, the Contumeliosus scribendi modus, that the Advocates of the Bull used against their Adversaries, when they wanted Arguments substituting reproaches; concluding in those words, which may be competent to conclude this mat­ter. Quis autem nescit cordatos & cruditos viros in ea versari sen­tentia, ut omnino putent calumnias argumentum esse desperatae causa, ac perditae quam certissimum? Calumniae siquidem arma sunt eorum qui vincuntur. The Argument appeared to him of so much force, that he makes use of it again on a like occasion, and in the same words, de Bull. Alexandri, V. c. XII. Ʋndecima suppositionis ratio ex contumelioso scribendi modo. And again, de Bull. Clem. VII. c. 3. Id est primo manifestum ex contumeliis, quae bonarum rationum vices obeunt. His very first reason, and that sufficient to manifest the matter in hand, he takes from the Disputers Contumelies, which supply the place of good reasons. And once more de Bull. Alex. V. c. XIII. Ad convincendam fraudem accedunt probra & ma­ledicta, quibus Cheronius & Aquinas enervia responsa, & aridas emaciatasque rationes contegunt, ac veluti saginant; sperant fore, ut sic bene curata responsionum & rationum suarum prima cutis tentura sit lectorum oculos, & impeditura, ne in ipsam saniem ea­rum & vitium penetrare possent. I leave S. W. to english it, and observe that it is not an heterodoxe-protestant-doctrine, this, to think that Contumely is not necessary to a Controvertist. What then shall be said of (that Shepherd) that care of Souls, which by its own ill managery tends so regularly to the betraying of them, and interpretatively joyns with the deemed Wolf against the Sheep.

9. Nec dum finitus- My weaknesses are not yet at an end, I sayd, that if he mark it, his Style that was robust in the mention of perjury, is grown much fainter, when he comes to the [...], pre­ [...]nds to no more than perverse meaning and abusive treating matters of Religion. And this is heavily charged upon me that I make [Page 71] account that abusesive treating matters of Religion, which is able to plunge millions of Souls into eternall damnation, is of less moment then perjury against ones temporall estate.] But I answer, that the phrase against ones temporall estate is here put in by S. W. above what my words yeilded him. 'Tis evident the Comparison I observed, was betwixt Perjury, on one side, and perverse meaning and abusive treating on the other side, yet neither simply con­sidered, but supposing the matter, viz. Matters of Religion, refer'd to, both in the comparison and the thing signified, to be the same. This I was to suppose in all Justice to his words, who used that mention of Perjury, as a resemblance, (and even now rebuked me, when he conceived I had not so understood it) and then could not confine it to his temporall Estate, (as now to found his rebuke he hath chosen to do) because on that he could not think my Tract of Scisme had any influence, but im­definitely mentioned ruining their Estate by Perjury; where I supposed there was a spirituall as well as temporall estate, and ac­cordingly ('tis visible p. 7.) accommodated my answer, in re­lation whether to his earthly or heavenly possessions Thus hard is it to forestall S. W's severities, when one while I am accused for not taking notice of his similitude, and after when I doe take notice of it, and ground my answer upon it, I am then fetcht back to the letter, as if it had not been a similitude, and rebu­ked for my weaknesse in that also. But this artifice (by the in­terposition of [temporal] both to mine, and his own words) being now discovered, I appeal to him, whether it be not a growing fainter, when his style that began big, with ruining by perjury, and, if it observed decorum, ought to be answered by somewhat as high and criminous as perjury, and as noxious to the souls, as that which ruins the temporal estate, is to that, is yet dwindled into perverse meaning, which is not so much as perverse speaking (no man being able to affirm of anothers meaning, which is not express'd) when yet perverse speaking is not neer so much as ruining by perjury, and into abusive treating, which again supposing the matter the same (as it is manifest I supposed) is much lesse than perjurious ruining.

[Page 72]10. Having triumph'd over this piece of conquered aire of his own creating, he asks very demurely if this Doctor be fit to have the charge of souls, who professes to set more by his temporal, than their eternal felicity?] And I as seriously demand, whether any the least heed be due to the observations of one, that can thus put words in his adversaries mouth, and then accuse him for the ill consequences of them, which if he hath so little charity to hereticks, as to believe him guilty of, he will hardly have so mean an opinion of his skill, as to expect he should professe it, if he were guilty. 'Tis not long since I was rebu­ked,P. 28. for professing an earnest desire to speak the full truth of God, and then that was an indication of Pharisaical hypocrisie, and now I am brought on the Stage, without any disguise (and so my hypocrisie is dropt off) supposed to make open profession of profane­nesse, and no crimes fit enough for me, but those which are unreconcileable with one another, so that I shall have the ho­nour to be a miracle of something; How much more then will be owing to S. W. who hath the creative power to make me so?

11. The Reader will be glad of the newes, that we are now coming to the last part in his charge in this matter. And what is that? That I complain he begges the question to suppose that guilt which he was to prove, to assume so early in the Epistle to the Reader what he must (but hath not yet so much as attempted to) demonstrate. Where first he will note, that Doctor H. would have men believe that he made account that the Epistle to the Reader is to be writ by the Author before he writes the Book, next that he pretends that S. W. who was to answer his book, ought to prove and demonstrate, i. e. oppose and object, which are, saith he, two very good counterfeited and affected mistakes] And granting that they are so, my only question is, who 'tis to whom the reward of them is due, to me, who only supposed that an Epistle was prefixed before the book, and would first be read, though writ­ten last, and could not desire to appear to think it written before the book, when in my whole discourse I supposed it to be an apology for the errors of the book, or, to him that feigns me thus to mistake, when he could not but see I did not, and had [Page 73] no temptation to affixe it on me, but that I said he begged the question in it, and assumed what he had not yet in that Epistle at­tempted to demonstrate, which whensoever 'tis done, be it before, or after the writing of the book, is the guilt of that Elench, and must needs be so, unlesse being not attempted to be de­monstrated in the Epistle, it were more than attempted in the book, which I shall still avouch, and in due time make appa­rent, that it was not.

12. His other note, or branch of charge is more notable, making it an error in me, to pretend that he who was to answer, ought to prove, &c. But I hope the Reader may be allowed to remember, what it was that I thought him bound to prove, even nothing else, but his charge of falsifying, which I deemed the lowest, which could bear any proportion with that of rui­ning his estate by perjury. Of this 'tis evident I spake, when I said, I trust it shall appear, that there is not one single falsity in that whole tract of Schisme, and his supposing the contrary was the only petitio principii, which there I charged on him. And if now it be the priviledge of an answerer, that he may charge of fal­sifying, without proof of his charge, and may not have his charge denyed, or the proofs of it required, (which is all that is meant by telling him, he begges the question) and this upon the pre­rogative of an answerer, and because to prove or demonstrate is to oppose and object, then I see there be other g [...]ounds to autho­rize Calumnies, and Contumelies, beside that of the deemed cer­tainty of his faith, and he might but have said he was the answe­rer, and superseded all this large trouble of any farther justifi­cation.

13. From these thus specified weaknesses, the Reader is ad­vised to consider what a pitifull spectacle the Doctor would prove, if S. W. were but at leasure to pursue him.] And I believe so too, for it cannot but extort some degree of compassion, to see any man set to so sad a task, of wiping off all those phasmes of guilt, which S. W's representations can fixe on him. By this I sup­pose the Reader sees, what he is to look for, and that the wa­tery colours which are said to be in the Rainbow, are only in S. W's eye, and produced by it. And so we are at an end of his [Page 74] defense of the blowes, which the Reader, he knew, would judge too rude, till he had timely met, and disabused him; with what rigorous evidences, he will now discern, better than through S. W's Opticke.

14. What he addes, in conclusion of his fourth Section, con­cerning my opinion of the affinity betwixt the Epistle of the Catholike Gentleman and the first part of Schisme Disarm'd, I shall no farther reply to, than that I was cautious to set this down, as my opinion only, wherein as I may be mistaken, so I may still be in the right, notwithstanding the argument drawn from the style, which is not the same in a letter, and in a Discourse, in hast, and on greater deliberation, when the Author desires to disguise, and when to discover himself. In either of these cases, more probable judgements are made by lesser characters, which are not so sure to be guarded by the disguiser, as are those, which he knowes are most visible. But I know such judge­ments to be deceivable, and the sagacity that Caesar had in dis­cerning any period of Ciceroes, to have been farre greater, and more unerring, than I ever aspire to have of S. W's lines, and that upon many reasons of difference. If I shall now upon his bare word change my minde, and perswade my self that the Author of that Epistle was one of my old acquaintance, I am sure I shall be press'd with the same difficulty, not discerning it by the style to be penn'd by any such, and having other arguments of so much more force to the contrary, that unlesse Mr. Cressy, which really is one of mine old acquaintance, tell me he was the Author of that letter, or some othe [...], whom my memory hath quite lost, reminde me that he was of my old acquaintance, it will still be my wisest course to advise of it, and remember how extrinsecal to the arguments, and how impertinent it is, who is the penner, or who the suggester of them.

14. But ere this Section concludes, I must once more be re­buked, for styling my answer to Sch. Disarm'd an Appendix to the Reply to the Catholike Gentleman, and a gleaning after the rake, when the former consisted of 303. pages, and the latter but of 165. as if husbandmen, saith he, used to rake armfulls, and leave cart-loads to be gleaned.] But 1. I was n [...]t obliged to be a good [Page 75] husband-man by that or any equal necessity, which is affirmed to ly on S. W. to render all that his adversary saith, nonsensical. 2. My ill husbandry was not yet of that degree, as to qualifie it for his rebuke, who at the same time made the proportion of 165. to 303. to be parallel to the proportion of armfulls to cart-loads, which concludes lesse than two armfulls to make a cart-load. 3. I now see it was not really so great, nor so plea­sant an error (which p. 31. was in me accused as such) to mistake the comparison or similitude for the thing it is brought to resemble, or else 2. that S. W. is a mortal, and subject to error, like other men, or 3. that some kinde of creatures are refresh'd with those plunges in the water, which would drown others; for 'tis cer­tain, had not S. W. here thus mistaken, he might well have un­derstood, that I only meant by the similitude of gleaning, to ex­presse my care (in the second Answer, that to Sch. Disarmed) to gather up, and make returns, to all, were it much, or little, which I had not taken notice of in the Reply to the Catholike Gentleman. And yet 4. if he review that third Section of mine, to which he makes this answer, he shall finde that it was but the first part of Schisme Disarm'd, which I thought penn'd by the same hand, that wrote that Catholike Gentlemans letter, and consequently that my farther answer to that part, was it, which would have but the nature of an appendage, and so it had, being evidently much shorter, than the former reply, amounting to no more but 74. pages, which notwithstanding, there remained still the two other parts, and those might be allowed to have many fresh passages, the answers to which might, with S. W's good leave, be bound up with that Appendix.

15. And yet there are two things more to be charged on me, 1. That I said he had time to have taken notice of my Reply to the Catholike Gentleman, 2. that I apprehended not all truth, be­cause not that of his occasions.] I answer, 1. That if at the Print­ing of Schisme Disarm'd, he had not seen, or heard of my Reply to that letter, it must be through some circumstances, which I could not then, nor can now after his admonition app [...]ehend. For where-ever he were, the Reply might reach him as well as the Original Tract of Schisme. 2. I might also say with perfect [Page 76] truth, that he had time to take notice of it, it being competently certain, that the space of many moneths, which intervened between the one and the other is called time, and that that was afforded him, as well as any other; so that these two rebukes are of the strein of the many foregoing: Yet if in this Dispatch of his he shall be found to have made full returns to that whole Reply, the matter is not great; if he shall not, (as certainly I may have his leave to assume he hath not, having not offer'd any syllable to the latter half of it) then I have, under his hand here, his leave to conclude, that he deems it not likely to indam­mage those dear souls of his brethren; And so all may be safely believed, which he hath not attempted to refute, and that will prove a farre greatest part of that book; Which is all I have need to say to these concluding charges. It is now somewhat more then time that I should set a period to this Theme and Chapter, whose length may yet usefully serve the Reader, and help him to some variety of experiments concerning S. W's manner of managing Controversies, over and above the satisfy­ing of the main engagement, (the first perhaps that was ever solemnly written on the subject) examining his plea for Con­tumelies.

SECT. I.

1. THE Scene is now altered, and S. W. from an Advo­cate of Contumely, having a while retired, comes out in a more venerable shape or dresse, as an Invincible Propugner of his Infallible Church, and speedy Dispatcher of Schisme, and of all Protestants under that title. But before he thinks fit to enter the lists, to set close to the one proper task, of frustrating all my attempts of Reply to his former Answers in Schisme disarm'd, he is resolved (asIn the first VI. Chap. of An­swer to the L. Falkland of In­fallib. In the first en­counter of the Apol. for Trad. in Schism Dis­arm'd. Par. II. Sect. 10. and 11. elswhere the manner is, and, it seems, it is the most usefull course in their esteem, else it would not be so constantly resorted to) to begin with a Diversion of some length, erecting a fabrcik of his own, therein to in­trench, and fortifie himself, but more distinctly designed to praepossesse his Readers with some Grounds (summed up in possession, and Tradition of the present Roman Church) which when they [Page 78] have taken up, on trust, from him, and so imbibed no less that the very quintessence and Elixir of all Rushworths Dialogues, he doubts not but they will be fit to give up their names with him, in perfect resignation to the dictates of the Apologist, and then I confesse I am not likely to finde any eminent favour from them.

2. Should I now refuse or omit to take notice of this coun­ter-work, he would easily be tempted to believe himself, and perhaps to perswade some others, that 'twere another invincible piece, and withall, out of this Trojane horse once admitted, finde no difficulty at every turn to draw out Instruments for his ad­vantage both of defense and battery, which they that had en­tertain'd his grounds, would not know how to resist: On the other side, if I should be thus led out of the way, or but stop, to make this halt at the entrance, and treat with him abou [...] these his grounds, it must, I see, be a businesse of some length (such is the ploughing up of foundations) which yet with the Readers leave, I shall not avert or decline, hoping, that that same advantages which he projected to himself from some mens em­bracing of his grounds, receiving his tinctures, may be really ac­quired to others, by discerning the faintnesse and fadingnesse of his best colours, the feeblenesse and unconcludency of the mediums, whereby he hath recommended them.

3. In order whereunto, if in imitation of him, I should set out with another as large a digression, draw out also my parallel lines, and pitch my camp over against his, and to his strong hold of Possession and Tradition (meaning by the latter, that which is retrograde, from this present age, by way of ascent, to the fore­going, and so back to the Apostles, which for distinction sake, I shall know, by the style of Tradition Reverst) oppose ours of Scripture, and Tradition in the vulgar notion, progressive, and des­cending from the Apostles to their successors, and from them to us; though I doubt not, the parties thus intrenched would be so opposite, and withall so neer, as to denounce wrath, and warre, articulately and audibly, the one to the other, yet it will be impossible (by the nature, and the known demonstration of parallel lines) that they should ever meet, to trye out the con­troversie, [Page 79] by entring the lists, and combating the one with the other; I shall therefore no farther transcribe S. W's method of laying foundations, than to point out the clear and brief state of both our pretensions, which lyes thus.

4. On the one side, S. W. puts in his claim, fetcht from a pretended possessi [...]n, and the Tradition of the present Roman Church [...]rom father to sonne, upon which he undertakes to conclude, 1. The right of the Papacy to supreme universal Monarchy, 2. The Infallibility and Apostolicaln [...]sse of every Article of the modern Roman Faith, and both these with that irrefragable evidence of conviction, that belongs to grounds: So that if in this his whole Scheme there shall appear to be any one line, which neither carries this evidence with it in its own terms (as he most common­ly pretends) nor receives it immediately from S. W's assistance, the whole fabrick must necessarily fail, a demonstration (lesse than which he pretends not) being made up of nothing, that is either untrue, or only probable, but all uniform, and like it self, evident, convincing, and demonstrative, Mr. White having with great truth assured us of probable arguments, that there isApol. p. 117. nothing more certain than that they have no truth, i. e. no truth of an argument, no force of concluding in them; and grounds, in the vulgar notion of grounds, being equivalent with principles, of which there can be no dispute, or doubt of the truth of them.

5. This then being the state of S. W's pretensions on one side, his Protestant Adversary on the other side, not only pretends, but (for his security) is by consent of parties acknowledged to have all the same grounds of assurance for all the parts, and for the intire body of his Faith (i. e. for all that he believes to be ne­cessary to be believed for his souls health) which S. W. pretends to for his, viz Possession and Tradition, yea and both in S. W's notion of them, 1. Present acknowledged (which is more than preten­ded, but not acknowledged) Possession, and 2. Tradition Oral, and that of the present Church, and of all the Churches of the Roman Communion, and that as received from our immediate ancestors, as received from theirs, and so up to the Apostles, and not only thus much (which is all that S. W's pretensions really amount to) but much more than this.

[Page 80]6. First the like acknowledged (and not only pretended, or by questionable deduction inferred) Possession through all ages of the C [...]urch: This is apparent, and cannot be denyed of the Crede, and that evidently is the intire body of our Faith.

7. Secondly, Tradition Oral, truely and unquestionably univer­sal, both for time and place, of the East, as well as West, of the Greek, as well as the Latine Church, and that of all ages, inclu­ding the Apostles, not any one, or more, but all the Apostles, and their immediate successors in the Churches of their plantations. That I adde [all, and not only one or more, Apostles] is in compli­ance with S. W's good friend Mr. White, who having defined Tradition by delivery of Christs Doctrine, and express'd his notion of that phrase, forApol. p. 7. that which was generally preached by the Apo­stles, doth after pronounce of a Tradition affirmed by St. Au­gustine (yea and Pope Innocentius) to be Apostolical (communica­ting of Infants) that it was so indeed, we, saith he, are of his mind, but with this qualification, it was a Tradition begun by some Apostles, not all, in some Countreys not all, in some circumstances not all, and on this one account concludes, that as it was no superstition to use it, so it was no sacrilege to leave it off, which reasoning if it have any force in it (as with S. W. I shall presume it must) it will then conclude, first that no Tradition is sufficiently testified to be (not only free from superstition, but withall) obligingly Apostolical, and so as it may not without sacrilege be left off, but what is testi­fied to come from more than some, even from all the Apostles, and therefore 2. that nothing but the Crede is thus obliging, even by S. W's own rule, that of the Oral Tradition from Father to Sonne, as delivered generally, and not only from one, or some, but from all the Apostles.

8. Thirdly, the written word of God, which Vincentius the great acknowledged assertor of Catholike Tradition against Heresie, affirms to be theDuplici modo munire fidem, primò scilicet di­vinae legis au­thoritate—contr. Haeres. c. 1. prime, if notQuascunque antiquiores vel Schismatum vel haereseon profanitates nullo modo nos oportet con­vinoere, nisi aut solâ, si opus est, Scripturarum authoritate— Ibid c 39. only way of propugning the Faith, as that which was by the Apostles (for the confirming at least of [Page 81] their faith, to whom they wrote, and for the instructing of o­thers) delivered to the Churches, and which is byDe Verbo Dei, l. 1. c. 2. Bellarmine him­self acknowledged to be the most certain and most safe rule of be­lieving, and by Roffensis, Cont. Luther. Art. 37. de Purg. (even when it was least his interest, in his dispute of Purgatory) Conclave quoddam omnium veritatum quae Christianis scitu necessariae sunt a certain repository of all verities which are necessary to be known by Christians.

9. Fourthly, the writings (which are somewhat more steady and [...], Pallad. Laus. Hist. p. 966. B. creditable, than the bare Oral Traditions) of Apostolical men, Fathers and general Councels, which not only assure us by way ofLitera sunt una custodia fi­delis memoriae rerum gestarum, Liv. l. 1. unquestionable testification, that all these Articles of Faith, which we receive, were by Christ, and not one but all his Apostles, orally delivered, but also teach us, 1. That they were delivered as their depositum, carefully to be kept, and believed, i e. as the Faith of the Christian Church, and foundation of special efficacy for the planting of Christian life in the world: and (not only so, but) 2. as the whole Faith, or doctrine thus designed, intire, and wanting nothing, vera & unica Christiana fides, the true and only Christian Faith, say the Greeks in their censure of the Germans, Ch. 2. and to which (consequently) no new Article might lawfully, or reasonably be added, Regula fidei una, sola, immobilis, & irre­formabilis, the one sole, unmoveable, unreformable rule of Faith, saithDe Veland. Virg. c. 1. Tertullian of the Crede, the repository of these; which two last particulars being the things principally considerable, on which as I expect, so I desire the Reader would lay the greatest weight, and of which when (formerly, in theCh. VIII. §. 5. Tract of Schisme) I made my profession, the Catholike Gentleman told me, that truely he knew not what a Catholike professed more, intimating his wish, that I would speak it aloud, and S. W. Schis. Disarm'd, p. 233. re­solved, that I was become a plain Papist, I shall therefore be as plia­ble as they can wish, and with some advantage repeat the grounds here, on which I haveReply, p. 136. elsewhere establish'd them, and so speak out as distinctly, and aloud, as is possible.

10. First, that in St. Athanasius his judgement, those heads, (wherein we professe the Faith to be compleared) are [...] sufficient in themselves (without any additions) [...], for the averting of all impiety (and so [Page 82] of all heresie, if heresie be any sort of impiety) and for the establish­ing of piety (that again by the force of indefinites, and by the lawes of opposition, must be of all piety) in the Church.

11. And if Athanasius in this said true, or if we have a farre greater testimony of it, than the affirmation of any one or more Fathers of the Church, even the one grand ruling design of the whole Gospel, the one end and aim of all divine revelations, and institutions, as of the very death of Christ, to purchase to himself a peculiar people zealous of good works, to advance our obedience to his precepts, and in order to this one end, the unerring because divine­ly directed judgement of the Apostles themselves, who being by Christ sent out as his great Commissioners, particularly intrusted, and instructed for this purpose, to call home sinners to repentance, and convert a world of Jewish and Heathen unbelievers to the Christian faith and obedience, did questionlesse know what was ge­nerally usefull or necessary to this design, and cannot be suppo­sed to have been deficient in necessaries, and yet by joynt con­sent, all and every of them contented themselves with those few heads, which are summed up in their symbol; If, I say, this be thus far unquestionable, the consequence must needs be so also, that either the Christian Doctors have now somewhat else in their design, than that one great end of their preaching pro­posed by Christ, the Reformation of Lives, that they have indeed (as Spectators are tempted to believe) converted their power and office, designed for ends purely divine, into an engine of state (the greatest pollution, violation, and sacrilege imaginable) or else have received revelation of some new expedients toward that end, above what the Apostles thought such, in order to that same design, (the latter of which can as little be pretended, as the former will be owned by any sober man) or else it may be irrefragably concluded against them, that they ought to avoid all new definitions, and still allow the Apostles Crede to contain a compleat Catalogue of Fundamentals; all other Doctrines, how true or probable soever, being praejudged from being Articles of the Christian Faith, or tesserae of Communion; the Peace and charity and unity of all Christians, which eminently depends on this, being much more prizeable, than the uniform profession [Page 83] of any, or all those other doctrines, which have either none, or but an accidental, or questionable influence on good life (the one end of Christs coming into the world) and the imposing of which unnecessarily, is experimented to be the occasion, if not the cause of the many breaches in Christendome, of the lessening of that reputation, and inward esteem which was wont to attend the institutions, and Ministers of Christ, of the scandalous neglect of the one great necessary, and so the most direct contribution of strengths and aids to the subtilest and most vigilant and im­placable enemy of our souls; For if by this, or any other arts of diversion (such certainly are passionate, and eternal disputes about things not necessary) he can either wholly wear out, or but abate the edge of our zeal to that, which is indispensably our duty, and is of such weight and fruit, and obligation to all, as to exact and deserve our utmost diligence, the united vigour of all our whole heart, and soul, and minde, and strength, and then convert those weapons to the disquieting at least, if not woun­ding and destroying one another, which are all little enough for the guarding our selves from his enterprises, 'tis easie to divine, if we did not already daily discern, the inlarging of Satans, and the too scandalous decay of Christs Kingdome (that not in word, but in power) in the hearts and lives of the farre greatest number of Christians.

12. Secondly, that when this Faith [...] delivered once, or at once, was by the Councel of Nice, and Constantinople, not inlarged in any new article, but only somewhat explained, on occasion of heretical disturbers of this depositum, the great and general Council ofCan. 7. [...]— Ephesus, which came after that of Nice 106. years, solemnly decreed, and enacted, what was in it self thus highly reasonable, and what (if we may believe theStanisl. Socol. Ann. in Cens. Or. c. 1. Romanists citation out of an Epistle of Liberius the Pope to St. Athanasius) the Nicene Councel it self had before determin'd in the same words, though we finde it not in the Acts of that Councel, that it should not be lawfull for any man to produce, or write, or compose any other Faith, beside that which was defined by those Nicene Fathers, and that they that should dare to compose or offer any such to any, that would from Gentilisme, Judaisme, or whatsoever heresie, convert to the acknow­ledgement [Page 84] of the t [...]uoh, if they were Bishops (such sure is the Pope) should be deposed, if Lay-men (such for ought I know is S W.) anathematized.

13. This is abundantly confirmed to us by Cyrill of Jerusalem Edit. Morell. p. 115. 117. (who flourished between the sitting of the Nicene and Constan­tinopolitan Councel, and accordingly the Crede which in the Baro­cian Manuscript is set down [...]. E. concludes at [...], in the Holy Ghost, as at Nice it did) who commands his Ca­techumenus to receive and keep the Faith, and not only so, but [...] the Barocian Copy leaves out [...]) [...], that only Faith which hath been delivered thee by the Church, that which is fensed or fortified from all the Scripture, adding that by way of provision for un­learned and slothfull persons, that could not, or were not at lei­sure to read the Scriptures, [...], the whole Doctrine of the Faith was comprehended in a few lines, which they were therefore [...], to ingrave in their heart, their memory (so the Barocian Copy reads it intelligibly, [...]) this they were, saith he, to have for their [...], viaticum all the time of their lives, [...], and never to take any other beside this, no not if he himself should change his minde, and contradict what he now sayd, applying that of St. Paul that if an Angel from heaven shall [...], preach to them any Gospel beside what they have now received, let him be anathema, and again, that the Articles of Faith were not composed, as it pleased men, [...], but the chiefest being collected out of all the Scripture com­pleated the Doctrine of Faith, and this Faith in few words, [...], involved as in its bosome all the knowledge of piety in the old and new Testament. And then requiring them to look, and hold fast the Traditions, which they then received and write them as on [...]. the plate of their hearts, the Barocian Copy immediately addes (to assure us what Tra­ditions these were) [...]— We believe in one God, and so on to the end of the Nicene Crede, and this as the depositum and Tradition, which must be kept [...], unspotted unto the day of Jesus Christ.

[Page 85]14. To which in respect to the Romanist, I adde the express ground, whereupon Pope Gregory the first, exalted the four first General Councels so high, as toSicut sancti Evangelii qua­tuor l bios, sic quatuor Conci­lia suscipere & venerari me fateor, Nicenum scilicet— l. 1. Regest. Ep. 24. professe of them, that he received and reverenced them as the [...]he four Books of the Holy Gospel, Quia in his velut in quadrato lapide sancta fidei structura consurgit, & cujuslibet vitae & actionis norma consistit. Ibid. because saith he, on these, as on a square stone, the structure of the Holy Faith riseth, and the rule of every life and action consists.

15. Thirdly, that when the authority of that Ephesine Ca­non was by the Greeks press'd to the Latines, in the Councel of Florence, with this weight set on it, that [...]. Conc. Tom. VII. p. 642. no man will charge the Faith (there spoken of) with imperfection, un­lesse he be mad, all the answer the Latines there give, is no more but this, that the Canon for­bad not [...], p. 644. B. another exposition agreeable to the truth in that Crede, confessing it did forbid [...], a difference and contrariety, and so dif­ference, as well as contrariety, and even for the bare explication, they esteemed not that lawfull for any to at­tempt, but the Fathers convened in Oecumenical Councels. And this they there cited from2^a 2^ae qu. 1. art. 10. Aquinas, adding their sense of his words, that they belonged to, and held of [...], p. 641. D. any Crede whatsoever, which was common to the whole Church. And again, they there avouch it from the Epistle of Pope Caelestine to Nestorius, that [...], p. 644. D. the faith de­livered by the Apostles requires neither addition nor diminution

16. So when the Eastern Church in their Censure written to the Germans, set down theCens. Or. c. 1. Constantinopolitan Crede, as that trea­sure of the true uncorrupted Faith, sacredly sealed by the Holy Gh [...]st, that nothing should be taken from it, nothing aliene, or adulterine ad­ded to it, as that divine, most holy, perfect, and universal Tessera of the Christian people diffused over all t [...]e world, the common Confession [Page 86] of all the Holy Fathers, the most certain boundary of the whole Christian Faith— theStan. Socol. ad Greg. XIII. Pontif. Romanist publisher, though, consi­dering the Western interest in the point of Filioque, he think himself obliged to shew that this Ephesine Canon excluded not such interpretations as that (P. 17. adding that it was made by the Roman Synod assembled by Damasus at the very time of the Constantinopolitane Councels sitting, and of that Popes confirm­ing that Councel) yet he doubts not but it hath force against all that shallP. 22. aliam fidem conscribere, write any other faith, instancing in our latter unhappy age, and not only in some followers of the antient Hereticks, but in the Lutheranes and Calvinists, who, saith he, do not blush to compose another Faith: when yet he knows they teach nothing repugnant to the Nicene; which therefore infers his confession, that all addi­tions (not only contrarieties) to the Nicene rule of Faith, are con­trary to the Ephesine Canon. Nay the Councel of Trent it self hath not denyed to give us its suffrage; forSess. 3. being willing so far to transcribe the antient copies, as to begin with the Crede, they give it the title of Scutum fidei in quo possunt omnia tela nequissimi ignea extinguere; the shield of faith by which they may extinguish all the fiery darts of the most wicked one. Ibid. And again, that the more sacred Councels were wont to set this up in the begin­ning of their Actions, Scutum contra omnes Haereses, a shield a­gainst all Heresies, quo solo aliquando & infideles ad fidem tra­xerunt, Haereticos expugnarunt, & fideles confirmarunt, by which alone heretofore as they drew the Infidels to the Faith, and confirmed the faithful, so they overcame the Hereticks (which sure they could not, if those doctrines might passe for He­retical which were no way contrary to this Faith) and in brief,Ibid. that it is fundamentum firmum ac unicum, the only, as well as firm foundation, against which the gates of hell shall never prevail, an argument that either Heresies are no parts of the interpretation of the Gates of hell, in Christs promise, or that there are none such, but which are contrary to the doctrine of the Crede, against which (and which only) the pro­mise is that they shall not prevail.

[Page 87]17. Fourthly, that in the seventh Councel, the second of Nice, which hath full authority with a Romanist, speak­ing of the six Councels forgoing, we have these words,Act. VI. Conc. Tom. V. p. 732 A. [...]. They have confirmed and establisht all that from the first times have been delivered in the Catholick Church, written and unwritten, (and yet I suppose it will easily appear to any that will look, that no one of those additi­onals, which are taken in by the Romanist, and denyed by us; was so much as named, or any way con­firmed in those six Counsels.)

18. To all which may be annext the plain words of Cardi­nal Bellarmines Catechisme, thatAmple De­cla [...]. of Chr. Doct. ch. 2. in believing and professing these two mysteries (1. the Trinity and Ʋnity. 2. the Incarnation)P. 12. we manifest our selves distinct from all the false Sects of Gentiles, Turkes, Jews and Hereticks (and so from all the false Sects of Hereticks, as well as the other three) under these four names (as soonP. 14. after he declares) comprising all the enemies of the holy Church. Which renders it lesse necessary to have added in the last place, that the Catechism collected out of the Works of C [...]sterus, Petrus a Soto, &c. and published by the command of the Bishop of Triers, hath these words,Neque ulla unquam extitit Haeresis, quae non hoc Symbolo damnari potue­rit. Resp. ad 2. qu. There was never any Heresie which might not be condemned by the Apostles Crede. Which resolutions so express of so considerable Roma­nists, would give us some ground of hopes, if we saw them not too largely and daily confuted, that we should not be Hereticks for this, which is the first, and signal part of our pretension, not admitting into our Creed any more then the Apostles, Fathers, and first Councels have taught de fide, and recommended to the Church as such; which therefore by these precedents we desire may be judged of, in the first place.

19. Secondly then, the Protestant which thus pretends, doth also solemnly oblige himself to stand to, and acknow­ledge the infallible truth of all, whatsoever shall be regularly deduced, and avouched from any, or all of these grounds of necessary belief.

[Page 88]20. Thirdly, having gone thus far, he demandeth it, a [...] part of Christs depositum to him (as to all) and every Chri­stians debt of peace and charity to every Christian, that he may not be anathematized and exterminated, adjudged to the fagot, and to hell, for his not farther believing, what is not thu [...] avouched to him, and which consequently he hath no solid unerrable ground, on which to believe it, and for whic [...] the Romanist doth not pretend to offer him any but those, which in the very first proposal of the question he knows are no [...] acknowledged (with what reason, he now sees) but renounce [...] by him.

21. Fourthly, he professeth his incapacity of apprehen­ding, how, or that he should be obliged to affirm any thing as de fide, which on either of these grounds, common to him with all Christians (Scripture and Apostolical Tradition) he can finde no cause to believe.

22. And lastly, having been instructed and assured by Christ and his Apostles, that the condition of Evangelical obe­dience is not only an easie yoke, but a reasonable service, and that no man shall be required to do, what he cannot do, or believe what he hath no sufficient motive to believe, he hopes his mistake, if there should lurk any, will be pardonable, if having repentance for all his sins known and unknown, of wilfulness and weakness, he only refuse to profess, what he doth not believe, and cannot force, or incline his beliefe to the accepting of all the Roman Additionals, without some other and better grounds and motives, than that of their pretended possession, and infallability of their Church, the former of which he believes to be a pretension without force and reality, and the latter he more disbelieves, and upon greater strength of evidence, than any of their par­ticular doctrines, which yet he hath no least colour of motive to assent to, but what is fetcht from those least credible (which is far from infallible) grounds.

23. This then is the sum of that which comes to be de­bated betwixt S. W. and me at this time, Whether it be tole [...]ably reasonable on his part, what is by him, and whe­ther [Page 89] sufficient to affix on us the guilt and condemnation of Schism, what is by us thus pretended. And herein I desire not to forestal or incline the Readers sentence, or to lay ambush for his favour by any circuit of words, or aide of Rhe­torical exaggerations, but to leave him disingaged to passe it for himself, according as the demonstrative grounds, which S. W. promises him, and which alone by consent of par­ties deserve to be attended to, shall in the issue appear to be such, both in themselves, and in counterpoise with that, which we thus barely offer to him, as the true state of our pre­tension, without boasting either of the severity, or rigorousness of our demonstrations.

24. Having thus prepared the field, set down the termes on which this debate is to be managed betwixt us, let us set forth to a view of those weighty grounds and deductions emergent thence, P. 36. which S. W. thought fit (as he saith) to set down in most manifest and evident termes, from the bare position and explication of which (it seems they need no­thing else, but as principles, will be granted, as soon as by explication they are rendred intelligible) he doubts not to gain so far upon the rational Reader (he then that will not thus be gained on, must, by his award, be content to lie down with the herd of irrationals) that he shall confess he sees the question truly stated (that I hope he doth, by what hath been already said) and not only so, but (he addes) according to plain reason (this the Author of Rushworths Dialogues calls the judgement of common sense) resolved also: which again assures us of S. W's opinion, and undertaking, that his Grounds are to every the plainest, if rational, man, evident, as principles, in themselves, and the undoubted parents of the deductions he hath brought from them. SoP. 96. elsewhere he saith of Grounds, that the nature of them is to intrench near on the first principles, and that their termes for the most part are unquestionably true; And that you may not conclude lesse from those fainter words [neer, and for the most part] heare the layer of grounds himself, † Mr. White, speaking of a Romanist, Dailles Arts Discov. p. 191. He (but with a [perhaps] which sure was not meant to signifie, and so destroy [Page 90] the whole period) would have offered you choise either of faith or knowledge; produced in order to this as perfect demonstration [...], as Aristotle is adored for, and towards that ingaged you in the most evident director [...] of humane life, and clearly evidenc'd by the prin­ciples of common sense, that if you refuse the authority of the Roman Church, you renounce all the certainties on which you build every serious action of your life, and in a word constreined you to deny or affirm somewhat that your self in another case will confesse a meer madnesse to deny or affirme.

25. This then I desire may be taken notice of, concerning his Grounds in general, the irrefragable evidence which they un­dertake to bring with them: The Reader shall judge of their performance, by the more particular view of them.

SECT. II.

1. THe first then of these self-evident Grounds is this, That the first pretenders to reform in the point of the Popes autho­rity in England, found England actually subject to that autho­rity in Ecclesiastical matters.] And this, saith he, carries its evidence in its own termes, since they could not be truly said the first Reformers from it, unlesse before, that authority had been there acknowledged, for the word Reformation, which they pretend, argues that tenet was held there before.

2. If the Reader shall here observe what is introduced with [since] and [for] the ordinary dialect of probati­ons, he will indeed soon discern the self-evidence of this ground, as far as concernes S. W's perswasions of it, all the strength which he hath lent it, being but that which is pro­per to priciples, the proving the question by it self, or a de­monstration, which is made up of thrice repeating the same thing in words lightly varied, using this his first ground, as Balak did Balaam, when he did not his business in one, re­moving him to another place of advantage, from the high places of Baal to Pisgah, and again from Pisgah to Peor, and then tis an ill-natured unimprovable ground, a very [...], a repro­bate soil, in the husbandmans style, if in none of the th [...]ice varied appearances, it will aford or yield what he would have it, become self evident, and demonstrative, to the bringing down curses upon Israel, anathema's on the poor Protestant.

3. But to shew that this great lustre is not in the object or medium, but only in S. W's Optick nerve, or phansie. I shall briefly demand, what he means by [the Popes, and that Authority] If only the Primacy and dignity of the Patriarch of the west, introduced by the Canons, or Customes of the Church, or any other acquired, or assumed precarious and mutable authority, or power in some Ecclesiastical matters, [Page 93] depencing wholly on the concessions of Princes, and revo­cable at the pleasure of them, or their successors, I may safely grant the acknowledgednesse of that in England, at what time soever he shall dare the first pretending to Reforme in the point of the Popes authority, that yeelding no advantage to S. W's pretensions, who (in his second ground) defines this authority to be that of the head of the universal Church, and (in his third) derived to the Pope as successor to St. Peter, and censures it in me for frivolous and impertinent to talk of the Kings power to charge Patriarchates, when, saith he, they are questioning an authority above Patriarchs, and pretended to be constituted by Christ himself; and again, as held then of Christs institution.

4. If then (as must hence he assumed, and his second and third insuing grounds expresse) he here means, 1. this super­eminent transcendental, far more than Patriarchal power, as it is pretended to be constituted by Christ himself, and 2. the self evidence, that this was acknowledged in England, when the first pretenders to reform appeared, I shall then first consider the truth of what he here concludes, [that the first pretenders to reforme found England actually subject to it in Ecclesiastical matters] and again, [that that authority was acknowledged, that tenet held there before (that must be immediately before) the first Reformers] And 2. I shall examine (what he so confidently pretends) the self-evidence of it.

5. In examining the truth of his conclusion, I may first take notice of his interposing that restrictive phrase [in Ec­clesiastical matters] not that I have any dislike to his mode­ration therein, because I suppose he meant by interposing it to make a difference between the acknowledgment of the Popes supreme power over this Nation in Ecclesiastical, and in temporal matters, and that he was so possest of the former, as he was not of the latter, which indeed very well agrees with what he addes of this power being constituted by Christ himself, by the line of St. Peter; for that must needs be con­fined to that sort of power which alone was given to St. Peter by Christ, viz. a regiment Ecclesiastical.

[Page 94]22. This then being supposed to be the express sense of S.W's first ground, that the Popes supereminent authority or plenitude of power over all Churches, and so over the Church of England, as conferred on him by Christ, was here acknowledged before (and if his inference have any force, immediately before) the first pre­tenders to reform in the point of the Popes authority, I suppose it will be brought to a speedy issue, if we shall inquire, and ob­serve, what was the declared opinion in this point in the years immediately preceding the rejection of the Papal power in this Nation.

6. Who it was that signally rejected it, is sufficiently agreed, Henry VIII. by Act of Parliament, Anno Dom. 1536. in the 28 year of his reign, called An Act of extinguishing the authority of the Bishop of Rome, and prescribing an Oath to all Officers Ecclesiasti­cal and Lay, of renouncing the said Bishop and his authority. Here then is the point of time to be fastened, as the date of the first Reformers, to which S. W's first ground referres, and then 'twill cost us little pains to discover what immediately before that, was the acknowledgement of this Kingdome.

7. Herein I referre him to one competent [...], (though formerly mention'd) the decision of the Ʋniversities, and chief Monasteries, in the XXVI year of his reign, i. e. two years be­fore the foremention'd date, a Record fitted to the point in hand, and a proof that at that time it was not thus acknow­ledged. For when Henry VIII. May 18. 1534. willing to be duely advised how he might fitly behave himself toward the Pope, applyed himself, after the example of his Predecessors, to the faithfull Counsel of the English Church, and dispatch'd his Letters to the Ʋniversities, as to men of virtue and profound li­terature (and so likewise to the chief Monasteries, and the rest of the Clergy) requiring their opinion of a certain question, in writing, under their Seal, according to the meer and sincere truth of the same, and proposing the question in no higher a style then this, Whether the Bishop of Rome have in this Kingdome any greater juris­diction in holy Scripture conferred on him then any other forain Bishop? they after mature deliberation, and consideration of the whole matter, returned answer, Jun. 27. expressely in the Negative, [Page 95] Romanum Episcopum majorem aliquam jurisdictionem non habere sibi a Deo collatam in S. Ser. in hoc regno Angliae, quam alium quemvis externum Episcopum. That the Bishop of Rome hath not any greater jurisdiction conferred on him by God in the holy Scripture, in this King­dome of England than any other foraign Bishop. These were the words of the Answer of the Ʋniversity of Oxford, as appears in their Register.

8. If it be here suggested by any man else (for S W. is not capable of receiving advantage by it) that this decision of the Ʋniversity set down in those large terms of non majorem quam alium quemvis] was in prejudice also to the Patriarchal dignity, as well as to the Papal Monarchick power of Rome, the bare Patri­archal dignity being superior to that of other foraign Bishops, the answer is obvious, that the decision is peculiarly of majorem aliquam jurisdictionem, any greater jurisdiction, and not of superior dignity, and so that the Patriarch, which in respect of power was no more then a Primate, and had nothing of jurisdiction an­next to him, farther than in relation to the [...] (Dioecese in the ancient notion of it for a joynt administration of more Provinces, of which the Patriarch was Primate) but only a pri­ority of dignity, was not touched or violated by this deci­sion.

9. To which purpose I referre the Reader to the Corpus Juris Canonici (formerly cited) Decret. Par. 1. dist. 99. c. 3. Primae sedi [...] Episcopus non appelletur Princeps facerdotum, vel summus sacerdos. The Bishop of the first See, i. e. the Patriarch, is not to be called Prince of the Priests, or supreme Priest, nor (as theAfric. Conc. Can. VI. African Canon addes) aliquid hujusmodi, any other thing of the same kinde under another title. And the practice was agreeable, as hath appeared (Reply to Cath. Gentl. p. 39) from the Milevitane Councel where St. Au­gustine was present, Can. XXII. forbidding under pain of excom­munication any appeal from the African Councels or Primates of those Provinces, to any foraign Councells or Judicatures, and this again (as there appears) consonant to the V. [...]non of Nice, and (before that) to the XXXIV. Apostolike, where the Prima [...] in every Nation is to be accounted their head. But this by the way.

[Page 96]10. Testimonies of other writers of that time we cannot fail of. Erasmus alone will furnish us with sufficient, who thereby hath▪ brought that character upon himself, Nem [...]nem probè Catho­licum dicimus, qui Erasmo nimium delectatur, He that is exceedingly delighted in his writings, may not be deemed a good Catholike, though he himself lived and dyed a member of the Romish Communion. How far he was from owning the Divine right of the Ʋniversal Pastorship, appears sufficiently by that one ingenuous confession of his, of the first ages. Certè nomen hoc nondum illis temporibus erat auditum, quantum ex veterum omnium scriptis licet colligere; Ti­tuli isti, nempe Ʋniversalis Pontifex, Caput Ʋniversalis Ecclesiae, Christi in terris vicarius, Princeps Sacerdotum, non vulgò recipiebantur ante Bonifacium tertium, Surely that name, as far as we can collect from the writings of all the antients, was not heard of in those times. Those titles, Ʋniversal Bishop, Head of the Ʋniversal Church, Vicar of Christ on earth, Prince of Priests, were not vulgarly received before Boniface the third. But instead of such particular, personal, (or such as may by S. W. be deemed partial) affirmations (which yet are com­petently qualified to supersede the pretended universal acknow­ledgement of those times, immediately foregoing the extinguish­ing Act) and for the farther clearing of this matter I shall assume to prove this proposition (by as undenyable evidences as a matter of this nature is well capable of) that the universal Pastor­ship of the Bishop of Rome, as it is explained, and interpreted by S. W. to be derived to him by St. Peter from Christ, was not held as Catholike Doctrine generally in the Christian Church of the West, more particularly in the Church of England, at the time, when Henry VIII. abrogated the authority of that Bishop in this Nation.

11. My first argument shall be drawn from the opinion, that was had of the equality of the power given to the Apostles, in Tu es Petrus, Thou art Peter, and Feed my sheep, &c. For the first (to omit the current of the ancient Fathers in this point) I shall insist r [...]her on those that are neerer hand, such is Lyra on Mat. XVI. Durand. à St. Porciano in 4. Sent. dist. 18. qu. 2. both which wrote in the fourteenth Century. Thus Abulensis in the fifteenth Century argues vehemently more than once, that none of the [Page 97] Apostles did understand that any supremacy was given to Peter by those words of Christ, for saith he, afterward they contended for superiority, Mat. XVIII. Again, the two sonnes of Zebedee have their desire of Preference promoted by their Mother, Mat. XX. At the last Supper, the contention is up again, which of them should be the greater, Luk. XXII. and ista contentio fuit omnium duodecem, Abulens. in Mat. XVIII. qu. 7. saith he, that contention was of all the twelve, andId. in Mat. XX. qu. 83. again, Quilibet Apostolorum dubitabat, quis eorum esset major, & istud dubium man­sit usque ad diem mortis Christi, nam in caena ultima Christi incepe­runt inter se conquirere quis eorum major videretur, Luk. XXII. Et tamen non facerent publicè istam disputationem, si putarent Petrum per collatas claves eis praepositum. Ideo adhue putabant se aequalos, cum nesci­rent quis eorum esset major. Every of the Apostles doubted which of them should be the greater, and that doubt remained untill the day of Christs death, for in his last Supper they began to inquire among them­selves which of them should seem the greater, Lu. XXII and yet they would not publikely have made that dispute, if they thought Peter by the collating of the Keyes preferred before them, therefore they yet thought they were aequal, when they knew not which of them was greater. Qu 84. Again, dicendum verisimilius quod valdè ambiebant omnes discipuli mutuum Primatum, it is to be said with more probability that all the Disciples vehemently desired Primacy one over another, which they could not doe, if Christ had declared for St. Peter. De Concor­dant. Cathol. l. 2. c. 13. et c. 34. Cusanus, his contemporary, argues thus, if Praelates derived their jurisdiction from the Pope, verum foret Petrum aliquid singularitatis recepisse, et Paparu in hoc successorem esse, It would be true [...]hat Peter had re­ceived somewhat of singularity, and that the Pope were in this his successor, but we know, saith he, quod Petrus nihil plus potestatis a Christo recepit aliis Apostolis, that Peter received no more power from Christ than the other Apostles, Nihil enim dictum est ad Petrum, quod etiam aliis dictum non sit, nonne sicut Petro dictum, Quodcunque ligaveris super terram, ita aliis, Quaecunque ligaveritis? For there was nothing said to Peter, which was not also said to the rest. As it was said to Peter, whatsoever thou shalt binde on earth, so was it not said to the rest, whatsoever ye shall binde? SoRelect. 2. de Pet. Eccl. Con­clus. 2. Franciscus a Victo­ria, about the year 1500. Quilibet Apostolus habebat potestatem Ecclesiasticum in [...]to Orbe, et ad omnes actus ad quos Petrus habuit, Every Apostle had power Ecclesiastical in the whole world, and to all [Page 98] acts to which Peter had, And he proves it by this, as well as other Texts, Whatsoever ye shall loose—

12. This is the common interpretation also of the Doctors of Paris. So it was of Adolphus Archbishop of Colen, and of the Bishops of his Province. Bin. Concil. Ann. 1549. They recite the promise made to St. Peter, I will give thee the Keyes of the Kingdome of heaven, Mat. XVI. and say, Quam promissionem non ad unum Petrum pertinere, sed in omnes Apostolos transmissam alio loco insinuat ubi dicit, Amen, dico vobis quaecunque alligaveritis— Which promise that it belongs not to Peter only, but was transmitted to all the Apostles, he insinuates in another place, where he saith, Verily I say to you, whatsoever ye shall binde on earth, and whatsoever ye shall loose on earth, Mat. XVIII. This Synod, and all the Decrees thereof, were ratified by Charles V. and injoyned to be observed in omnibus sui [...] punctis, clausulis, articulis, sententiis, & verborum expressionibus, in all the points, clauses, articles, sentences, and expressions of words; And this Adolphus saithChron. Ann. 1547. Surius, was so addicted to the Roman Church, that when the Pope had removed Hermannus out of that Bishoprick, he was placed in his stead.

13, For the second, Feed my sheep, (to omit again the an­cients, Ambros. de Dignit. Sacerd. c. 2. August. de Agone Christi­ano, c. 30. Theophyl. in Johan. c. XXI.) it appears by the Opuscu­lum of John Patriarch of Antioch, publikely pronounced in the Covent of the Friers Minors, to be subscribed by as many as were willing. In his answer to the several arguments for the Superiority of the Pope above General Councels (taken from some antients) he saith,Concil. Basil. Append. Fun­dātur super verbis dictis Petro a Christo, quae saene intellecta juxta jam dicta supra, non fundant Pa­pam Praesidentiam habere supra corpus universalis Ecclesiae; nec obstant [...]lla verba, Pasce [...]ves meas,— They are founded on the words spoken to Peter by Christ, which being understood aright, ac­cording to what was above said, are not a foundati­on for the Popes having any presidency ab [...]ve the body of the Ʋniversal Church; neither, saith he, doe those words, [Feed my sheep,] withstand; which if they be understood de pascuo spirituali, of spiritual feeding, that, saith he, is comprehended under the power of binding and loosing, quae data est Ecclesiae principaliter, which was given principally to the Church. AndDe Concord. Cathol. l. 2. c. 23. Cardinal Cusanus, who lived at the same time, makes them words of Precept, not of insti­tution [Page 99] of authority, and aequally spoken to all the Apostles, Et si Petro dictum est, Pasce oves tamen manifestum est quod illa pascentia est verbo et exemplo, though it were said to Peter, Feed my sheep, yet it is mani­fest, that that Feeding is by word and example. And so, saith he, ac­cording to St. Augustine in his glosse upon that word, omnibus idem est praeceptum, ibi, cuntes— the same is commanded all in that place, Goe into all the world, and preach— in the last of Matthew and Mark. Nihil reperitur Petro aliud dictum, quod potestatem impertit aliquam, ideo rectè dicimus omnes Apostolos in potestate cum Petro aequales, There is not found any thing else said to Peter, which imparts any p [...]wer, therefore we truely say that all the Apostles were aequal in power with Peter. Nay Bellarmine himself didDe Rom. Pon­tif. l. 2. c. 12. Edit. Ing [...]lstad. 1586. sometimes under­stand the words of Christ, Feed my sheep, confirm thy brethren, whatsoever thou shalt binde] to be said to all Pastors. And to this day theBaron. Anu. 34 n. 201. Rhe­mists Annot. in Mat. XVI. 19. See also the Dispatcher, Par 3. Sect. 2. greatest Advocates for the Papacy, say that no more was given in Feed my sheep, than was promised in, I will give thee the Keyes, so that all those that said that the words Mat. XVI. be­long to all the Apostles aequally, must be interpreted (on this ac­count) to apply [Feed my sheep] to them likewise.

14. One thing only more I shall offer on this head. Bellar­mine is under some considerable difficulty in supporting his Hy­pothesis in this matter, for inDe Rom. Pont. l. 1. c 9. one place he saith, Summa potestas Ecclesiastica non solum data est Petro, sed etiam aliis Apostolis, the Supreme Ecclesiastick power was not only given to Peter, but also to the other Apostles, andIbid. c. 11. again, Omnes fuerunt capita, & Pastores Ʋni­versae Ecclesiae, They were all heads, and Pastors of the Ʋniversal Church; andc. 12. again, Omnibus fuit collata summa potestas, the su­preme power was conferred on all. But in each place he brings in an adversative, which if it be observed, contradicts rather than excepts, Ib. c. 11. Sed ita tamen ut Petrus esset caput eorum, & ab illo pendo­retur, c. 12. cum quadam subjectione ad Petrum, but yet so as Pet [...]r should be the head of them, and that they should depend on him, with a kinde of subjection to Peter. Where if any shall say, that the supreme power, and headship given to all, and yet Peters being the head of all, and their depending on, and some kinde of subjection to Peter, is a kinde of contradictious subjected Supremacy, inferior headship, and unequal equality, I must not wrong the Cardinal so much as [Page 100] to conceal his [...], his way of answering and recon­ciling this difficulty (and that indeed is the only thing I de­signed for the Readers observation at this time) the way of escape is, Sed Petro ut ordinario Pastori cui perpetuò succederetur, aliis verò tanquam Delegatis quibus non succederetur, This was given to Peter as to an ordinary Pastor, who should be perpetually sueceeded to, but to others as to Delegates to whom none should succeed.

15. Here I shall not be so impertinent as to confront to him the suffrages of ancient Fathers, which, in perfect oppo­sition, affirm the Bishops in the Churches, to be the Successors of these Delegates, the other Apostles, which, he saith, were to have no successors; My present businesse leads me another way, to advertise the Reader, that Bellarmine was not the author of this artifice, Cajetane and Victoria had made use of this exquisite re­medy before, and being derived from them, it had the honour to come into the Councel of Trent; Only the unluckinesse of it was, that the Bishop of Granada in that Councel, made bold to deride them that said the supreme power was personal in the Apostles, and descended not to their successors, and then demands confident­ly,Hist. Concil. Trid. 13. Oct. 1562. Quo fundamento, qua authoritate, qua ratione in assertionem adeo audacem prorupissent, On what ground, what authority, what rea­son, they had broken out into an assertion so audacious, and sayes it was invented but fifty years before, (I desire S. W. will observe that.)

16. And this was not only the opinion of that Bishop, but soon after theIbid. paulo post. Bishop of Paris doth there expressely affirm, that Cajetane fifty years before did first devise it, to obtain a Cardinals Hat, that it was unknown to former ages, and at the first broaching i [...]nominiously censured by the Divines of Sorbon. Yet further, the Bishop of Granada refuted it from Scripture ap­positely, Christ, saith he, promised to all the Apostles, that he would be with them to the end of the world, which could not be under­stood of their own persons, but must be of their succession, and so it had been understood by all the Fathers and Schoolmen. The sameConcord. Ca­thol. l. 1. c. 11. Cu­sanus concludes from the words of St. Augustine ad Esitium de die Novissimo. The words, saith he, which Christ spake to the Apostles, must be understood of their successors, as that speech, Ye shall be hated [Page 101] by all, and ye shall be for witnesses to me, and behold I am with you alwayes to the end of the world, which who understands not that he promised to the Ʋniversal Church, which should continue, some dying, and others being born, to the end of the world, as also that is sayd to them (which belongs not to them, and yet is so said, as if it belonged to them alone) when ye see the abomination of desola­tion—and when ye see these things, know— From these words Cusanus inferres this consideration, quod verba Christi ad Apostolos, trahi debent ad Ecclesiam, that the words of Christ to the Apostles ought to be drawn to the Church, i. e. Not confi­ned to their p [...]rsons, but applyed to their Successors, And then what becomes of Bellarmines expedient, to reconcile his con­tradiction, or of S. W's Oral Tradition, and possession of this inter­pretation of Christs words to Peter. And let this serve for the confirming my first argument.

17. My second is, in consequence to that, drawn from the contestation about the superiority of authority and power of Ge­neral Councels above Popes. For I shall suppose it undenyable, that the supreme Pastorship vested in the Pope by Christs dona­tion to St. Peter (as S.W. maintains it) is not reconcileable with his being inferior, or subjected to any other person or persons in the Church, nor to the whole Church it self either diffused, or collected in the Representative, any more than a Prince by God immediately set over a people (I say, as the case here lies, not by man, but by God) shall be inferior to those, over whom he is set. And thereforeDe Concil. l. 2. c. 14. Bellarmine doth with great reason say, that to hold that a General Councel is supe­rior to the Pope, is to make the Pope as the Duke of Venice, or the General of an Army. AndAnalys. Fyd. l. 8. c. 7. Gregory de Valentiâ argues, that to give the supreme and infallible judgement to an Ʋniversal Coun­cel, is Pugnat cum Primatu— repugnant to the Primacy of St. Peter and the Bishop of Rome, for, saith he, if Councels should judge infallibly, the Pope himself were bound to accept their decrees, or there should be two su­preme powers in the Church, which is impossible.

18. And yet 'tis certain that Ʋniversal Councels have exer­cised authority over Popes, one while deposing Popes, and disposing of their Sees, as the Councel of Constance did lately [Page 102] three together, another while making Canons in opposition to their pretensions, witness that of Chalcedon, for the ( [...]) aequal priviledges of New to Old Rome, witnesse the XIII of the sixt Councel in Trullo made expressely and [...]— by name, in oppo­sition to a Roman Canon, but in complyance with an Apostolical; And though 'tis true the Romanists, as it is their interest,Canc. Tom. V. p. 8. and p. 311. reject those Canons, yet the seventh Councel, strongly pro­pugned by the Romanist, hath no higher au­thority to pretend to, than that of this sixt Councel, seeConc. Tom. V. p. 732. B. Act. VI. and accordingly asserts the Canons thereof, and cites the LXXXII. for their turn, which therefore founds an argu­ment (ad hominem, at least) from this Canon of that Council. And if some flatterers of the Popes have undertaken, and asser­ted their cause against Councels, yet (which is sufficient to our present argument) we know a very great number, if not much the greater, who were reputed true Catholike members even of the Roman Church, did constantly assert the power and au­thority of General Councels to be superior to that of the Bishop of Rome, to exercise authority over him, to give Lawes to him, and to censure him.

19. Of this number was the Pope himself,Quest. de Confi [...]m. Adrian VI. who was Bishop of Rome but seven years before Henry VIII. was acknowledged here Supreme. Of this wereIr. de authorit. Eccles. Petrus de Alliaco Cardinalis Cameracensis, De Concord. Cathol. l. 2. c. ult. Nicol. Cusanus Cardi­nalis, Ca. Significasti. extr. de electi­one. Panormitanus Cardinalis, Ibid. Florentinus Cardinalis, In Mat. 18. qu. 108. et in De­fensor. par. 2 c. 69. Alphonsus Tostatus Episcopus Abu­lensis; And, in the same time of Henry VIII.Tract. de Potest. Eccl. Joannes Major, and Jacobus Almainus. AndRelect. de Potest Papae et Con­cil. Propos. 3. Franciscus a Victoria, who stood at the same time doubtfull, gives us a large and fair account of the question, that there were two opinions of it, one of Tho­mas Aquinas, and many of his followers, and other Doctors learned both in Theology and Canon Law, that the Pope is above the Councel; the other the common opinion of the Parisians, and also [Page 103] of many other Doctors both in Theology and Canon Law, as Panor­mitane and others, that the Councel is above the Pope and his re­solution is, Puto utramque esse probabilem, I think that both are probable, and if so, then sure this on the Popes side was not by him taken to belong to him by any divine right, devolved to him by St. Peter. To the same purposeIn C. Novit. de Judiciis Notab. 3 num. 84. Navarre, There is, saith he, a great dissension between the Romans and the Parisians, to whom the Ecclesiastical power was more principally conferred by Christ, whether to the whole Church, or to St. Peter, the Roman pretension was favoured by St. Thomas, and Thomas a Vio, the Parisian by Panormitan, whom frequentius nostri sequuntur, our men more frequently follow, as Decius saith. This James Almain a Divine of the Sorbone, constantly defends, and answers Thomas a Vio in a full Tract, and so doth John Major, saying, that as Rome no man is permitted to maintain the Parisian Doctrine, and at Paris none suffered to assert the contrary. To this number must belong Sir Thomas More, whom the Romanist and parti­cularlySch. Disarm. p. 187. S. W. hath most confidence in, next the Bishop of Rochester, of any man in those times. His words are exp [...]ess in hisSee L. Cherb. Hen. VIII. p. 394. and Sir Thom. Mores works in the end. Letter to Cromwell (the Original of which is in Sir Ro­bert Cottons Library) that upon perusing the Kings book a­gainst Luther he disswaded him so much to exalt the Papal authority, lest it diminished his own, and though he denyed not the Pope a Primacy, yet he could not hold it such as that the au­thority derived to him thereby was to be preferred before a Gene­ral Councel. (Of Bishop Fisher I haveAnsw. to Sch. Disarm. p. 218. formerly spoken as to the point of the Primacy.) And that it stood as the re­ceived opinion of the Church of England, thus appears. The su­periority of the Councel above the Pope, being decreed by theSess. 4. & 5. Concilium oecu­menicum im­mediate a Chri­sto potestatem habet, eique subest Pontife [...] Romanus. Council of Constance ending Ann. 1418. Archbishop Chichley Registr. Hen. Chichl. summoned a Convocation of the Province of Canterbury to be holden Octav. Apost. Pet. et Pauli 1422. and recites, that whereas it was decreed in the holy Council of Constance, lately congregated with the Holy Ghost, that another General Council should be holden in May, 1423. Nos decretis— We resolving as far as belongs to our person, to obey the decrees of that said Council, and desiring that all our Suffragans and Prelates and Clergy of [Page 104] our Province of Canterbury would obey them— Then they met according to his summons, chose Procurators for the Church of England, raised a Taxe for the support of their charge, and that Council met at Pavia according to theConcil. Const. Sess. 44. decree of the Council of Constance. In that Council of Constance the English appeated, and asIn vit. Johan. XXIV. Platina tells us, affairs were carried by the Suffrages of five Nations, Italy, France, Germany, Spain, and England, and theApp. Concil. Basil. Orator from the Council of Basil to the King of England, saith, that in the Council of Constance this renowned and most learned Nation was present with honour to it. And in the Council of Basil, (by the interposition especially of those two famous Lawyers, Abbas Panormitanus, and Ludovi­cus Romanus, Legates from Alfonsus the great, King of Arra­gon) the same being decreed, and often urged, as was before at Constance, andConcil. Bas. Sess. 16. & 17. in Append. sworn to be observed by the Legates of the Pope Eugenius, after he had three years opposed it, as to this point, the English Church received it, as it had formerly in Constance. And the particular inclination of the King of England toward the Council of Basil appears by hisEp. Synod. Concil. Basil. Letter sent to Pope Eugenius, telling him that he intends to conform to them as he ought, and exhorting the Pope to promote the proceedings of the Council.

20. If we look out into France, we shall finde it most vi­gorouslyBinii Not. in Conc. Bitur. ex G [...]g [...]no. asserted in the Council of Bourges, Ann. 1438. Let the authority of the Council of Basil (say the Fathers) and the constancy of the decrees thereof be perpetual, which none, not even the Pope of Rome shall presume to take away or weaken. And the narration of the acting for the Pragmatick Sanction byDe Benefic. l. 5. c. 11. Duarenus saith as much. Charles VII. King of France, saith he, yielded to the Orators of the Council of Basil, that the decrees of the Council, should be received and defended in his Kingdome, having first assembled at Bourges a Synod of Nobles, Praelates, and other most learned and grave men, by whose auth [...] ­rity and counsel he was lead to receive and confirm the Decrees of that Synod, and set forth that noble Constitution, called ordinarily the Pragmatick Sanction, than which, saith he, nothing was more [Page 105] popular, nothing more rec [...]ived with the aplause of all good men, being usually styled the Palladium of France.

21. This Pius II. laboured hard with Lewis XI. to get re­pealed, Cardinal Balva acting earnestly for him, and obtaining the Kings command to the Parliament of Paris. But this was stre­nuously resisted, and the attempt very gravely and prudently repressed by the Court, and a book by them exhibited to the King, to convince him that nothing could be more destructive to France, than that he should grant the Popes desire in this matter, and to this he consented, though greatly devoted to reverence the Popes authority. Afterward the Council of Tours assembled by Lewis XII. and consisting ofGenebr. l. 4. Chronol. Omnium Episcoporum Galliae— all the Bishops of France, and many learned men, decreed that the Pragmatick San­ction w [...]s to beChronic. Massaei, An. 1510. kept throughout France. And when Francis I. in his distresse yieldeed to the abrogation of it, and ratified the Concordate in the Lateran Council, heConcordat. Quando ita fo­rebat ratio difficultasque tempo­ris, rerumque nos circumstan­tium necessitas. professeth he did it be­ing constrained by his necessity, and so Rebuffus, one sufficiently addicted to the Roman greatnesse, in his interpretation of the Concordat, makes theTemporis difficultas aliquando permittit non concedenda. Ca. Licet de seriis. Necessitas rerum circumstantium, quae non habet legem. l. 1. ff. de Offic. Cons. necessity of that King an excuse for the abrogation of the Pragmatick. Notwithstanding, this ab­rogation was protested against by the Ʋniversity of Paris, An. 1517. Mar. 27. in these words,Orthwinus Gratius fascic. rer. expetend. Bochell. l. 8. decret. Eccl. Gall. c. 4. Leo the tenth in a certain assembly in the City of Rome congregated we know not how, but not in the Spirit of the Lord, thought fit that these so wholesom Statutes should be abrogated, and going against the Catholike Faith, and the authority of the sacred General Councels, hath condemned the sacred Council of Basil, Therefore they appeal from their Lord the Pope not well advised, and from his infringing the sacred Council of Basil, and the Pragmatick Sanction, to the next Council that shall be lawfully and freely called.

22. The Germans stood after the same manner affected; whatsoever was done in the Councils of Constance and Basil, was done chiefly under the protection of the Emperor Sigismund. Af­terwardSabellic. and Onuphr. in vit. Jul. II. Maximilian I. joyned with L [...]wis XII of France, to [Page 106] call a General Council at Pisa, for reforming the enormities of Julius II. andR sc [...]ipt. Ca­ [...] V. ad Cri­ [...] [...]lement 7. Ann. 1525 Charles V. appealed from Clement VII to a G [...]neral Council.

23. In brief,Generat. 48. circa An. 1438. Nauclerus shewes how universal this opinion was of the authority of the Councils, the Germans, saith he, the King of France, and of England, favoured the Council of Basil with all their power, and the Council of Basil pronounces,In fine Sess. 45. Conclus. 5. Nec unquam aliquis peritorum, Never any skilfull man doubted but the Pope was subject to the judgement of General Councils in matters which concern the Faith. What he saith of the periti, skilfull, hath an eminent and signal truth in the Jurisperiti, the Lawyers and Canonists. Panormitan, as was said, in his Tract de Concil. Bas. where he demonstrates that the Councils power is above the Popes, that the Pope hath no power over a Council, but may be questioned, coerced, removed by it, so likewise Lud. Romanus, a most emi­nent person of his age, of whom Aeneas Sylvius (that was in that Council of Basil with him, and was after Pope)L. 1. de Act. Concil. Bas. saith, Vir non Româ tantum, sed coelo dignus, a person worthy not only of Rome but of Heaven, who affirms in his answers, that it isCons. 521. lawfull to appeal from the Pope to the Council, Cons. 522. that to the Pope dismissing the Council no obligation was due, thatCons. 523. he might be de­posed by the Council; see Card. Zabarell Cons. 150. Ancharanus Cons. 181. Felinus ad c. super literis, n. 21. de Rescript. Joh. Roias de haeret. n. 518. Fr. Marc. decis. 944. and others (noted in theP. 101. margin of Archbishop Chichleyes life) as long as they were per­mitted to deliver their mindes with freedome.

24. Thus then stood the opinion of the Princes of Europe, which continued communion with the Bishops of Rome, concern­ing the subjecting them to the authority of such Councils, as then in the title and style of the Western European Churches, were reputed General, and above an hundred years before Henry VIII. in their several Dominions, by the advise, sug­gestions, and assistance of National Synods, Peers and people, they proceeded in vigorous attempts to bring under Order and Reformation the usurpations of the Bishops of Rome, as appears by theOrthuin Gra­tius in fascic. [...]er. expetend. Schedule of enormities in the Pope and Court of Rome, &c. drawn up by Petrus de Alliaco Bishop of Cambray and Cardinal, [Page 107] by the appointment of Sigismund the Emperor, in the Councel of Constance, though the new Pope Martine V. delayed and evaded it. The like might be manifested in many other instances; see Theodoric a Niem in Nemore Ʋnionis, Tract. 5. and Quintinus He­duus Repetit. lection. de Aristocr. Christ. Civitat.

25. How the dissenting parties may be reconciled, so as to be one Church, and communion, is not easily set down,Concil. Bas. Epist. Synod. Martine V. with the consent of the whole Councel of Constance, by his Letters gave Order to all Bishops and Inquisitors, quod est de necessi­tate salutis credere Generale Concilium habere supremam authoritatem in Ecclesia, That it is of necessity to salvation to believe that a General Councel hath supreme authority in the Church. The Fathers of that Councel of Basil doe oft repeat, that it is de necessitate salutis, of necessity to salvation, and theyConcil. Bas. Sess. 33. call it Veritas Fidei Catholicae, Truth of Catholike Faith, and whosoever pertinaciously opposes it, censendus est haereticus, is to be deemed an heretick. Concil. Later. Sess. 11. Leo X. with his Laterane Councel first saith, that the Pope hath authority over all Councels, and afterwards addes, cum de necessitate salutis existat, seeing it is of necessity to salvation that all that believe in Christ should be subject to the Bishop of Rome. The difference indeed extreme­ly wide, and the Fathers of the society, and the Doctors of the Sorbon continue the contest betwixt these two Councels to this day.

26. The Jesuites earnest propugners of the superiority of the Pope, speak contemptibly of the authority of Councels without him, and give that vertue to the Popes sole direction, that by it every Plebeian may be rendred Infallible. But all this, both in the founta [...]n and streams is as earnestly oppugned by the Sorbonists, who will have a General Councel superior to the Pope; Neither hath the Jesuite reason to accuse the Church of England as Schismatical in this, any more than to accuse the Sorbonist. And on the other side, the Sorbonist hath more reason to forbear censure on the Church of England as Schismatical, than on the Jesuite, because a General Council (which is of so little weight with the Jesuite without the Pope) is ackowledged by us to be the supreme external, living determiner of Controversies, and we together with the C [...]uncel of Basil doe hold a Pope Schismatical, [Page 108] that pertinaciously opposeth, and divideth himself from a law­ful General Councel.

27. And if after all this, the Doctors of the Sorbon will have the Pope Ʋniversal Pastor, yet is not our argument hereby weak­ned, as farre as I now intend to presse it, viz. against the uni­versal acknowledgement of the supreme Pastorship, as from Christ to St. Peter, because neither do they so maintain his supreme pastor­ship, as de fide to be jure divino nor is their Doctrin of the superi­ority of Councels any way reconcileable with that stating, being utterly repugnant to the Papal Primacy, as Valentia told us.

28. The accord which the Sorbonist makes, is set down by Gerson in his Tractate called Concordia, Concord. Concl 3. quod plenitudo potestatis Ecclesiasticae sit in Pontifice, et in Ecclesia, in this manner, Est utrobique, & principaliùs in Ecelesia suo modo, The plenitude of power is on both sides, and more principally in the Church after her manner. And what is that manner? Why, saith he, Quadru­plici respectu, scil. indeviabilitatis, & indefectibilitatis, extensionis, regulationis et generalis obligationis, cui subjicitur etiam ipse Papa, tanquam Imperatrici Sponsae Regis summi, quae potest condere Canones, & definire etiamsi fuerit Papa praesens, In a fou [...]fold respect, to wit, of indeviability, and indefectibility of extension, of regulation, and of general obligation, to which even the Pope himself is subject, as to the Imperial Spouse of the supreme King, which can make Canons and define, although the Pope be present. But this as it is perfectly contradictory to the Supremacy of the Pope, as given to St. Peter by Christ, both over all the Apostles, and over the whole flock, soDe Concil. l. 2. c. 16. Bellarmine utterly rejecteth it, and will not allow the Church to have the Supremacy either formally, or suppletivè, or princi­pally, but places it absolutely and immediately in the Pope, and so is every one obliged to doe, that derives it from Christs dona­tion to St. Peter, which therefore the Sorbonist, for all his con­cord, and his titular acknowledgement, must still be presumed to deny, as placing the plenitude of Power principaliùs, more principally in the Church.

29. But beside these eager litigants on both sides, of whom we have hitherto spoken, and therein founded our argument, there is yet a third sort, and many no doubt there were, and [Page 109] are of it, viz. of the judgement of Navarre and Victoria fore­cited, that each opinion is probable, and no faith to be grounded in either (and that is as much to my purpose, as others contesting it on the Councels side) So we finde in the Synodical Epistle of the Synod of Basil, that when the contention was so fierce betwixt that Councel and Eugenius, some remained neuters, and advised the observing a neutrality of obedience. And Picus Mirandula Theorem. 4. de Fide et Ord. Credendi. goes farther, liquet varias— It appears that the Doctors have delivered divers sentences of the firmnesse of the judgement of Councels, and the Pope, nor, saith he, is there any thing that he knowes promulgated, by virtue of which we may be bound to believe either. To conclude, theSess. 34 et 41. Councel of Basil calls Eugenius Scismatick for not acknow­ledging their authority above bim, and denounces the censures of the Church against all that adhere to him, as favourers of schisme and haeresie. AndConcil. Late­ran. Sess. 11. Leo X. doth as much against all the Praelates of France, that maintain the Sanction made and injoyned at Basil.

30 Thus much may serve for a [...] of the contesting of this point, before, and about Henry VIII. his times (wherein only, and not in the resolution of either side, my second argu­ment is founded)

31. My third argument ariseth from the acknowledged supre­macy of Princes within their own Dominions. In this Kingdom of ours the case is clear, when Henry VIII began his Reign, the Lawes were fixed, and unrepealed, which asserted the Kings supreme authority in causes and over persons Ecclesiastical. The Papal usurpations growing exorbitant in the Reigns of King John and Henry III. produced a law for restraint thereof, in the XXV. year of Edward I. which was ratified in his XXXV. year. The incroachments of Rome continuing, the law was strengthned in the XXV. of Edward III. and again in the XXVII. and again in the XXXVIII. and the XII of Richard II. and afterwards moreCap. 5. expressely in the XVI. of his Reign, where complaining of processes and censures upon Bishops of England made by the Pope, because the Bishops made executions of the Kings comman­dements in his Courts, &c. they expresse the mischiefs hereupon growing, the open disinherison of the Crown, the destruction of the King, his Law and his Realm, that these things are against the [Page 110] Crown and Regality— And the Commons assert, that the Crown of England hath been so free at all times, that it hath been in subjection to no Realm, but immediately subject to God, and to none other—And as they oblige themselves to assist the King and his Crown in the cases aforesaid, to live and to dye, so every of the Lords temporal answered by himself, that the cases aforesaid are clearly in derogation of the Kings Crown, as was well known, and had been long time known, and that they will stand with the Crown—And the Bishops and Praelates did every one severally (after Protestation that it was not their minde to deny, or affirm, that the Bishop of Rome may not excommunicate Bishops, nor that he may make translation of Prelates, after the law of the Church) say, that if any Cen­sures made against any for the execution of the Commandments of the Kings Courts—that is against the Kings Crown, they will and ought to stand with the King in those cases, and in all other touching his Crown, as bound by their Leigeance. The Bi­shop of Rome, 'tis true, did much contend against these Sta­tutes, Walsingham Hist. An. 1374. Gregorie XI. wrote earnestly to Edward III. and said, to make such a law, as that of the Provisoes was nothing else but to divide Christs Church, to destroy Christian Religion (the Schisme and noxious effects which S. W. is now pressing on us, in the behalf of his successors) but the King rescinded them not. And though Martine V. wrote more sharply to Henry VI. yet the King kept up the force and execution of the laws, An. 1. Hen 7. fol. 10. Humfrey Duke of Glocester, Protector and Ʋncle to the King burnt the letters, and when that Pope made Archbishop Chichley Legate, Antiq. Brit. p. 284. he protested it was not his intention to ex­ercise without the Kings permission, the Legatine power, which he had received, not to derogate from the rights manners, l [...]ws, priviledges, liberties, and customes of the King and King­dome, in any thing, but to conserve, defend, and strengthen them. The instances are continued byCawdryes case. Sir Edward Coke through suc­ceeding times. And in the VII. of Henry VIII. it was re­solved by all theIbid. fol. 32. Judges, that Canons Ecclesiastical may be al­lowed, or refused by the consent or rejection of the King and his people. And in fine, the absolute Supremacy of the King was [Page 111] in the Articles against Cardinal Wolsey, asserted by all the Lords of the Counsil, L^d. Charbury Hen. VIII. p. 266, 274. Sir Thomas More Lord Chancellor first subscribing, and this in expresse opposition to theIbid. p. 266. Popes holi­nesse, and as used and injoyed without interruption for the space of above two hundred years by the Kings of these Realms.

32. And it is yet further observable, that although attempts and incroachments were oft made by the Popes against these Laws, yet it was the resolution of our Laws, that no right could thereby accrew to them, and that no prescription of time can be a bar to the Supreme Power, but that for the publick good it may revoke any Concessions, Permissions, or Priviledges, Thus 'twas declared inCh. 25. Parliament in Edward III. his reign, when reciting the Statute of Edward I. they say, The Statute hold­eth alway his force, and that the King is bound by his Oath to cause the same to be kept as the Law of his Realm.

33. And as thus it was in the Laws and practice of this Kingdome (which is sufficient to have been confronted to S. W's contrary suggestion) so it will be found in the more Ʋniversal Reason of all Nations. For if Supremacy be exa­mined according to the inseparable properties of it, the pre­tension or acknowledgement of it will appear incompetible to the Bishop of Rome in this or other Princes Dominions, by the Rules and practice of the Christian Church; For

34. First the Supreme Power gives force and power to all Laws, made in Convocations, and without assent thereof, though all in the Convention besides concurre, yet it hath not the vertue of a Law. De. Eccl. l. 3. c. 28. Johan. de Turrecremata distinguisheth betwixt honorary Presidency (such as would be allowed the Bishop of Rome) and authoritative, It is, saith he, the part of authoritative Presidency jus habere non modo dirigendi, sed re­gendi — to have right not only of directing, but ruling their actions, and of pronouncing sentence of affairs, out of his own judgement, though it be not approved by the greater part of the Coun­cel, yea though it be approved by none.

35. That this hath not been thought to belong to the Bi­shop of Rome, the fourth and fifth General Councels are instances: The fourth, that of Chalcedon, ordered Ecclesiastical Govern­ment [Page 112] without, and against the consent of Pope Leo and his Legates; And the fifth, atBaron. An. 553. n. 209. Constantinople, decreed a matter of Faith contradictory to the determination of Vigilius in his Apostolical constitution, subscribed by himself and sixteen other Bishops adhering to him; whereas a true Supreme power can not only invalidate a Law made by an Assembly, but also by a sole edict make a Law, unlesse it pleaseth to limit it self by taking in an admixtion of Assistants in Councel (which the Romanist acknowledgeth not of his Pope) But neither then can it (salvo contenemento) so debarre it self, that it should be over-ruled by plurality of voices, and thereby forced to con­sent to the major part. 'Tis the Civilians doctrine of Summuns Imperium, that it is of that nature,Grotii Apo­log c. 2. ut parte amissâ substan­tiam suam amittat, that by loosing a part, it loseth its substance, or essence.

36. Secondly, Though Supreme authority may limit it self in some particulars, yet can it not be restrained, and limitted by subjects; And yet 'tis evident the Bishops of Rome have been limited both by Councels and Princes, which assures us those are not his proper Subjects.

37. Thirdly, Supreme authority is the fountain of all Ju­risdiction, which must consequently be derived thence by emanation. Yet it is evident the Power of Ecclesiasticks is not thus derived from the Pope. Gerson de O­rigine Juris. The Power of Excommunication is the only coercive Ecclesiastical power, that is by divine Right, and this is not derived from the Bishop of Rome, but was con­ferred on all the Apostles together, Joh. XX. 23. and belongs to all Prelates as their Successors; and accordingly it is a re­ceived opinion among the Romanists, that Bishops have the power of binding and loosing Jure divino; De Justa Haer. pun. c. 24. Alphonsus a Ca­stro saith, that the opposite opinion is contrary to all the Doctors: L. 2. Disp. 152. c. 3. Gabriel Vasquez concurres with him, And this power, saith Alphonsus, given the Bishop by vertue of his consecration, is not only of Order, but Jurisdiction also, and it is no lesse then Schis­matical; not to acknowledge the power residing in every Bi­shop The Nicene Can. V. Canon being therein grounded, [...], that those that are [Page 113] cast out by any, are not be admitted by others. To whichEpist. 58. Sy­n [...]sius's suffrage is expresse, that if any neglects his authority [...] as the Bishop of a small City, and receives into communion Andronicus and the other, as if there were no necessity to obey a mean poor Cities Bishop, [...], Let that man know he causes a Schisme in the Church, which Christ would have to be one; And this unity proceeds from co-ordi­nation in this power of excommunicating; whereupon St. Cy­prian oft speaks of Episcopatus unus, the same office in so many several Bishops. In the exercise of this power there is indeed subordination according to Canons or Custome, but,Tom. V. dis. 2. Sect. 1. as Suarez saith, the censure of Excommunication, i. e. the actual exer­cise of that power, in any infliction of penalty, is not jure divino but humano, being ordered or temper'd according to the prudence of the Church, and so that makes no diffe­rence.

38. And so likewise the regulating or ligislative power Ec­clesiastical, in making Canons or Decrees, is co-ordinate also, all Bishops having their votes in it. Accordingly the Bishops of Rome and their Legates, were wont to sign Decrees as well as other Bishops, whereas in every polity, as the sameDe leg. l. 4. c. 4. Suarez affirms, the legislative power is constantly Su­preme. Ib. n. 17. it extends to Ʋniversality of subjects, to universa­lity of Actions, and in all these must have an immutability, quia nec augeri, nec minui potest, because it is capable neither of augmentation nor diminution.

39. Thus much I hope at this time (he shall have much moreAnsw. to the IV. Ground. anon) will satisfie S. W. of the truth of his first ground, or if not him, yet his less interested Reader, which hath not so unreconcileable a quarrel to written Testimonies, though these have not wanted the suffrage of Reason also, which is one sort of unwritten, for the evidencing matters of fact of elder times.

40. Secondly, then for the pretended self-evidence of his ground wherein doth that consist? why, saith he, it carries it in its own terms; what are its own terms, which are thus illustrious? The first pretenders to reform-found England actu­ally [Page 114] subject— But this is only his affirmation, by others denyed, and no shew of self-evidence in it. Yes, in that they pretended to reform, They could not be said to reform in this point of the Popes authority, if they had not found England actually subject to it; This he insists on over and over again, They could not be truly called the first Reformers from it, un­lesse before, that authority had been there acknowledged, and again, for the very word Reformation, which they pretend, argues that tenet was held before.]

41. But to this I answer, 1. that it is very strange a writer of Controversies, as S. W. desires to be esteemed, as also a great pretender to demonstration, and immediate connexion of terms, and a profest enemy to wordish testimonies even of Scri­pture it self, because they are subject to so many sorts of mis-understandings, should yet lay the foundation of all his im­pregnable fabrick, the whole weight of his first pretended demonstration, on the most uncertain unconsiderable use of the word Reformers, [they could not, saith he, be truly said the first Reformers, unlesse—] and [for the word Reformation, which they pretend, argues—] When 1. it appears not that they were at all called Reformers, and then what is become of his foun­dation? 2. in case they were called Reformers, it might be by others a nick-name imposed, and not by themselves, or 3. if by themselves, it might be assumed hypocritically, when they establisht and setled by a law, what before was more mo­destly and sparingly practiced, (Such Reformations we have heard of from Trent, and from other coasts) or else 4. they might be casually adopted to that title, when they neither looked for it, nor did any thing to deserve it. If any of these be affirmed by his adversary, or if not, because it is possible some one of these might be the truth, what then is become of his demon­stration? And truly if S. W. be as he intimates, a disciple of that great Master, P. 27. of whom he saith [it is worthy of him to write grounds] and consider that now they are some previous grounds, which he is proposing, he will have reason to think with others, that it must reflect on some body beyond him­self, that his first-ground should so very ill deserve that title, [Page 115] being but a Topical argument at most, drawn from a title or appellation, which seldome agrees to them on whom 'tis be­stowed, and certainly doth not signifie by nature, or by any such necessity from whence any can pretend to conclude demon­stratively.

42. Secondly, If we should pass over this, and acknow­ledge his demonstration valid, as far as it pretends, yet 'twill be far from inferring what it ought to inferre, the acknow­ledgednesse of the Papal power, in the modern notion of it, (for the Ʋniversal Pastorship and Vicarship of Christ, by him constituted in St. Peter) for they might reform from many other things in the point of the Popes authority without reforming from that.

42. But I shall not need exact thus much from it, above what in terminis it proposeth to perform: It is indeed farre from doing what it pretends to doe, far from demonstrating any the barest, meagerst conclusion: It will be visible; if taking it in the looser terms, wherein he hath (as to his own in­terests) most advantageously chosen to set it, we shall reduce it to Syllogistical form, thus,

44. In which processe, as it pretends to be demonstrative, if upon due examination, either of the propositions shall be found to fail of self evidence, 'tis certain his whole fabrick is demolished. But if beyond expectation both should prove to doe so. S. W. must even go for a Saint or Preacher in his own dialect, i. e. for a most sad unfortunate demonstrator, let the issue testifie of the justice of this intimation.

49. And at first view 'tis discernible, that there is no evidence in, or necessary connexion between the terms of the major proposition, i. e. between pretending Refor­mation [Page 116] in that point] and acknowledging that tenet was held before in England] or even that England was then acknowledged to be actually subject to the Popes authority. 'Tis on both sides granted, that the Pope assumed, or claimed this authority at that time, and I need not deny but some of the people, nay Praelates of England once acknowledged and willingly submitted to this claim, and in respect to one, or at least to both of these, the use of the word Reformation in that point might be very proper, without Englands being found actually subject to it, which is farre distant from either of these, yet is the one thing which the words of this ground exact.

46. In the former respect, the Popes assuming] that I hope doth not inferre that the Nation acknowledged his claim; The man that stood upon the Strand, first phansied, and then as­sumed that all the Ships in the Haven, and then in the Ocean were his, but sure this had no such influence on the mindes of the true owners, Pilots and Mariners, as irresistibly to work or infallibly conclude in all them an acknowledgement of his claim; Nor was it needfull they should set out any solemn manifests to vindicate their title against this Hypocondriack, their taking no notice of his dreams, was a sufficient refuta­tion of them, whilest they went no farther than his own phansie. But should the same man in one of his Paroxysmes, in the full tide of high phansie, have attempted to board one of the Ships, not as a Passenger, nor yet as a Conquerer, but as one that had the Original and unquestioned right of dominion over it, the true owners denying him admission, or (in case of entrance undiscerned) the telling him his mistake, that he was gone astray into another mans quarters, and shewing him the way home again, had been a very fair and charitative at­tempt of reforming and rectifying him, no man else in this case needing any reformation.

47. But when to this we adde, that some of the good peo­ple of England were seduced, and abused by this his claim, and withdrew part of their obedience from their lawfull supe­riors, to subject it to him, though this cannot be termed the subjection or acknowledgement of England, (for some are as distant [Page 117] from all, as a particular from an universal) yet here is a pro­per place for Reformation, to disabuse the seduced, and reduce them to the conscientious discharge of their unquestionable duty, as when Jehosophat, at a time when Judah was farre from any universal defection, (Asa his immediate predecessor having2 Chron. XV. 12, 13. entred them into a Covenant under pain of death to seek the Lord God of their Fathers) is yet reported to havech. XIX. 4. gone through the people from Beersheba to Mount Ephraim, to bring them back to the Lord God of their Fathers.

48. In this point 'tis of no force for S. W. to descend to the examination and balancing of the number of the seduced, what proportion it bare to the rest which were not seduced, 1. Be­cause what is thus to be examined, is not evident before, and perhaps will be as little clear after examination, and 2. it can be no ingredient in the self-evidence of this his first ground, which from the bare pretending to reform, concludes that England was acknowledged subject, and not from the number of those that yielded this subjection, and 3. 'tis not the great number of par­ticular men, that makes a nation, but either the whole col­lective body, or their legal Representatives, or the Kingdome speaking by its known establish'd Lawes. And I need not now inquire into each or any of these, whether they acknowledged what S. W. would have them, because 1. if it were not noto­rious that they did not, yet sure it is not evident that they did, (the least that will serve S. W's turn) or if it were, yet still it could not be inferred from the use of the word Reformation, and that is prejudice enough to the self-evidence of his major proposition, which is all we have now under consideration. So that unlesse S. W. will acknowledge his arguing guilty of that strange amphibology, that by [held in England] he meant either held only at Rome, or only by some particular persons in England, and then from thence assume to inferre the possessi­on, viz. that England was actually subject to it, as afterwards from the bare possession he inferres a right (three rare steps of severe discourse) he must acknowledge the feeblenesse of the con­nexion betwixt the terms of his major proposition, and that [Page 118] certainly is sufficient to supersede his conclusion, and praejudge the self-evidence of his ground.

49. Before I leave this, I shall ask S. W's opinion of one question, What if the Pope should attempt to reform, retrench the abuses of the Court or See of Rome, whether in Doctrine or Government, would that inferre the Church of Rome to have been formerly subject to that from which the change should be made? If it would, then either it was in error before, or must become erroneous by the change, and so neither way be infallible. There is but one thing possible for him to answer upon his principles, viz. that it is an impossible supposition. And if without considering whether the Reformation be to the better or to the worse, it be resolved impossible for the Pope to do it, then 'tis not the promise of Christ to his Vicar, by which he is become infallible, but the syllogisme of S. W., not the priviledge of the Paraclete (to which Tertullian imputed it,De Veland. Virgin. c. 1. quod disciplina dirigitur, quod intellectus reformatur, supposing, that the Apostles Creed remaining firm, caetera, admittunt novita­tem correctionis, other things are capable of Reformation) but the inmost nature of the thing, an impossibility of its being other­wise, whereby the certainty becomes as irrefragable, that the Church of Rome cannot amend, as that it cannot fall, nay, the former the greater certainty, being a part of S. W's self-evi­dent ground, whereas St. Paul supposes it possible that the whole Church of the Gentiles may be cut off, which is somewhat more then the Church of Rome only, and Mr. White being press'd with the possibility of the latter, thinks fit to wave that question, Apol. p. 114. contenting himself to have told my L. of F. that their Writers intend to prove her indefectibility, which differs much from having rigorously demonstrated it. Mean while, as that Miracle of wit had never a word to say to ano­ther parallel part of that Lords question concerning the possibi­lity of Schisme among the Churches now adhaering to Rome, but pass'd it over insensibly, so I will not importune S. W. in that matter, but content my self with having said thus much on the first part of his demonstration.

[Page 119]50. But what if the M nor prove as little self-evident, and so as feeble a supporter, as the Major hath shewed it self to be? What stability then shall be hoped for to the Conclusion? The Minor was this, They that disclaimed the Popes supreme authori­ty in England called themselves Reformers] But where is the [...] or self-evidence of this? Is this a principle, or a fact so notorious, as to be assented to as soon as proposed? certain­ly it hath no universal truth in it (and that is necessary to render it an ingredient in demonstration) for the Greek Church, which de­ny the Popes universal Pastorship, pretend not to have wrought any Reformation in this point, but to follow all their Ancestors in it, and then by this argument we are no more Scismaticks, than they.

51. I speak not now of the Greek Church of the last three hundred years, who I know are by the Pontificians concluded under the same guilt with us, but of the fourth age of the Chri­stian Church, when the Graecians were most flourishing in piety and learning. For Gregory IX sticks not to charge those Churches even in that age with schisme, because they acknowledged not the supremacy of the Bishop of Rome. Mat. Paris, Ann. 1237. It is in an Epistle of his to Germanus Archbishop of Constantinople, where he compares those Churches with the Schismatical and Rebellious ten Tribes of Israel, that divided themselves from the house of David, Prae­sumpta divisio Tribuum patenter signat Schisma Graecorum, & multitu­do abominationum Samariae diversas haereses multitudinis a veneratione veri Templi, Romanae scilicet Ecclesiae, et reverentiâ separatae. The division of the Tribes openly signifies the schisme of the Greeks, and the multitude of the abominations of Samaria, the divers heresies of the multitude which is severed from the veneration and reverence of the true Temple, the Church of Rome. Adding, to make the parallel com­plete, that whereas Chrysostome, and Nazianzene, and Cyril, and Basile the Great, were eminent in the assembly of the Revolters, this was the same height of the heavenly counsel, by which he would have Elias, and Elizaeus, and the sonnes of the Prophets, to live among the Idolaters. This was the liberal concession of a Pope, Platina in vit. Greg. IX. that Pope, who by the help of Raimundus his penitentiary compiled the De­cretal Epistles. But this by the way.

[Page 120]52. But neither hath his Minor any more particular limited truth, in relation to this our Nation. King Henry VIII. and the Houses of Parliament disclaimed the Popes supreme authority in England, and are the first that S. W. can probably accuse for doing so, but where did these style themselves Reformers? was Stephen Gardiner, in delivering and publishing his Latine Ora­tion De verâ Obedientiâ, and Dr. Bonner that praefixt the Prae­face to it, fit to be styled Reformers by themselves or others? Or they that put men afterwards to death upon the score of the Six Articles, did they call themselves Reformers, or would a Protestant of this age style them so, for burning those then, which believed, as he doth now? When Cardinal Poole had written his Book De unione Ecclesiasticâ, inveighing against the Kings supremacy, and soon after advised the King to redin­tegrate himself with the Pope, and accept the Councel then of­fered, he used this as an argument to inforce his advise, thatL. Cherbury, Hist. Hen. VIII. p. 350. thereby he might have the honour of being the cause of a Reforma­tion of the Church in doctrine and manners. That title then of Re­formation in those dayes had no propriety to the point of de­nying the Popes supremacy, nor was that express'd in other dia­lect, than of declaring the supremacy to be invested in the King— which sure in no wise concluded, that it had not been so in­vested) yielding him the title of Supremum caput Ecclesiae Angli­canae, which Bishop Fisher subscribing with this temperament, [quantum per Christi legem licet] was not sure beholding to that, for his rescue from the title of Reformer. The clear truth is, the word Reformation began with respect to doctrine and manners (as Cardinal Poole used it) and was frequently in the mouth of all Christian Princes, and Prelates too, in this notion, who de­sired and press'd long for a General Councel, peculiarly to this end of reforming and rectifying what was amisse in either of those respects, and no farther concerned the point of the Popes supremacy, than as that was conceived to be either un­justly assumed by him, or Tyrannically exercised;

53. The truth is, Leo the tenth with his Laterane Councel made at that time an exorbitant incroachment upon the au­thorities both of Councels and Princes, Conc. Later. Sess. 2. epressly defining the [Page 121] Papal supremacy, solum Romanum Pontifi [...]em authoritatem super omnia Concilia habere, that the Pope alone had authority over all Councels, and that it was de necessitate salutis, of necessity to salvation that all believers should be subject to the Pope, and reprobated the Councel of Basil as a Conventicle. And as when injuries grow to the highest pitch, they then invite a strenuous opposition (thus as was said, the unreasonable oppression of Innocentius the third, and Innocentius the fourth, and some other Popes, that pursued the Dictates of Gregory the seventh, caused Edward the first, Edward the third, and Richard the second to awaken, and main­tain their and their peoples rights, and in like manner the Schismes of Rome and Avinion, that pester'd the Church for fifty years, caused the Christian Princes and Churches to vindicate, and execute their authority in the Councel of Constance upon the Popes) so 'tis not strange, if so enormous an attempt of Leo the tenth met with a semblable opposition from a Prince of a known courage. Herein I shall appeal to S. W's acknowledged Master, Thomas de Albiis, if that Pope were not the Schismatick, when he wrote and defined against the sacred authority of Councels, and whether all they are not so too, who pursue the same at­tempt?

53. And then (to return to the point in hand) a complete Reformation being long desired both in capite & membris, in the Head and the members, the design of Reforming in this point of the Supremacy had respect to the former of these, and was to be acted by the Pope on himself, or by the Councel on the Pope, or by Soveraign Princes with the advise of their Clergy in their several Dominions, and so still only implies what he formerly assumed, not what had been formerly acknowledged his due by those who sought Reformation.

54. Here then we have a cleer and candid view of S. W's self evidencing and demonstrative faculty, his first ground (chief stone in the corner of his impregnable Fabrick, which all our [...], or engines of battery must never have the confidence to approach) 1. being considered as an affirmation, or asserti­on of a matter of fact, hath appeared to have no truth in it, in the sense wherein alone he is concerned to have it true; [Page 122] then 2. as a conclusion, assumed to be demonstratively inferred from two self-evident premisses▪ both of these (could a man with any charity suspect it) have proved discernibly false; And then why should not every proposition in the Alcoran set up for self-evident? when some one (which but half so much as two) false prolepsis would certainly be able to inferre it: The Reader therefore must needs be obliged to S. W.'s superabun­dant mercy, that having possess'd himself of this enormous gyantly faculty of concluding or atchieving any thing, whatso­ever he had pleased, that twice two were but three, or the like (for I shall beg but one false prolepsis, to inferre many millions of such) he hath used these powers so temperately, as to conclude no more from two such vast advantages, but that the Popes authority had once possession in England, distinguishing mean­while between possession and right, and rebuking me that IThe Dr. mista­king, and not distinguishing b [...]tween Posses­sion and right, p. 37. did not distinguish between them, a fault which if I had been guilty of, I should readily reform, and then leave him to make his advantage of it, which will sure be small, as long as he is so far from having proved the right, that he hath thus strangely and above once miscarryed, in attempting to prove the possession.

55. Yet in the strength of this thus deplorably improspe­rous onset, he makes no delay to set up his trophees, and prepare for the solemnest triumph, Hence, saith he, all the eva­sions of D. H. (no lesse than all) are concluded vain, who when we (the Romanist) plead that the Pope was found in possession of this au­thority in England, flies off presently and denyes it (who else would have call'd downright denying of the adversaries proposition, a flying off? but it now also appears, I had some small reason to deny it) saying he had no title to such an authority there; and mista­king and not distinguishing betwixt possession and right, saith, we beg the question, when we only take what is evident, that he was in pos­session, and thence inferre a right, till the contrary be proved.] How farre I now am, or formerly have been from mistaking in denying the right, and charging him of begging the question, when he hath no other way of inferring the right, but from the possession, and that by us was also denyed, and not formerly attempted to be [Page 123] proved by him, and now forsooth is proposed as a self-evi­dent ground, a principle taken for granted, which also being now pretended to be inferred from demonstrative premisses, both those premisses are demonstrably false, is, I shall now sup­pose, as manifest, as that the begging the question is the Eng­lish of petitio principii, or that the Latine of taking that for self-evident, which is so much lesse than so, as to have neither evidence nor truth in it. He hath now but one Reserve left, viz. to accuse me for ridiculous and senselesse, that I can charge that Elench upon an answerer, whose part it is not, to object or dispute. But it falls out unfortunately, that there is no place for that forlorn [...] at this time when he is a laying of self-evident grounds, for those being equivalent to principles, if they fail of the native evidence, and borrow none from his Armory that produced them, that Sophisme must be dasht out of Aristotles Elenchs, or S. W's processe will inevitably fall under it.

SECT. III.

1. HAving spent so much time in a large but necessary survey of his first ground, we shall reap some small fruit of it, in the brevity of the next. For the second ground being by him proposed in these terms, that This authority actually over England, and acknowledged there, was acknowledged likewise to be that of the Head of the Ʋniversal Church, and not of a Patriarchate only] and his Epiphonema affix'd to it, this, that this Ground is no lesse evident, than the former, by our ad­versaries confession, since that, i. e. the authority of the head of the Ʋniversal Church, above Patriarchs, and (as he addes in the close of the Paragraph) pretended to be instituted by Christ himself, is the authority they impugne as unlawfull, and from which they reformed, which last word implies the actual acknowledge­ment that Authority had before] the Answer is briefly this, that we have already superseded every the minutest part of this pretension, in what hath been so largely returned to the for­mer ground, having there shew'd him, 1. That the Popes pre­tended authority, as of an head of the Ʋniversal Church, and as constituted by Christ himself, was not actually over England, and acknowledged there (though it is true that the Pope did then pretend it, and some ill subjects owned, or at least seemed to own and submit to those his pretensions) 2. by the way, that the dignity of a Patriarch includes not any authority over more than the Province or [...] that belongs to him as a Primate or Metropolitane, and therefore inferres no kind of authority over all those that belong to the circuit of his Patriarchate; which shewes the impropriety of his speech, that speaking of an Authority over England (which is no part [Page 125] of the [...] of the Primate of Rome) he saith it was not of a Patriarchate only] as if that of a Patriarchate only, were some authority over all whose Patriarch he were, though not so great as that of the head of the Church, whereas indeed the word Patriarch, as it differs from Primate, or in relation to any that are not his peculiar [...], hath no connotation of authority or jurisdiction, but only of primacy of order and dig­nity. 3. That S. W's adversaries confession hath afforded him no advantage, their impugning the Papal pretensions as unlaw­full, no way implying the actual acknowledgement which that authority had before, and 4. that they that disclaimed the Popes pretended authority in England, did not call themselves Refor­mers, so that S. W. is farre from a severe, as that is more mo­derate than a rigorous demonstrator, in all that he pretends from that word [Reforming.]

2. All that can with any colour of right be yielded him in this processe, is, that this second Ground is no lesse evident then the first, and that he hath indeed by his adversaries confession, who withall assignes his reasons of believing, that neither hath the least evidence in it.

3. So happy is S. W. in building of bulwarks, so hugely prosperous in the art of praepossessing his Readers, he might sure have vindicated his old answers as successefully, and demo­lished all the Doctors Replies to his second and third part, from which he was diverted by this more inviting employment of laying of grounds, if he had maturely considered and timely foreseen the advantages he hath reaped by it.

SECT. IV.

1. HIS third Ground, like the continued attempts of re­building Jerusalem, falls presently under the unhap­py presages of the two former. It is but this, that the Papal authority actually over the Ecclesiastical affairs in England was held then as of Christs institution, and to have been derived to the Pope as he was successor to St. Peter.] This I took to be his meaning in his first Ground (it now appears I did not mistake or misrepresent him) and accordingly evidenced his self-evident ground to be not only infirm, but false, and that contrary­wise the whole Kingdome professed that the Bishop of Rome had no greater jurisdiction conferred on him by God in Scripture, in this Kingdome of England, than any other Bishop. If this had not real truth in it on our part, or if on his part any more force could be now given his pretension by a hand so able, and so liberal, as is that of S. W. this were now the season of it, and it were in reason to be expected from him at his more explicite proposal of his ground in these terms [held then as of Christs institution, and as derived to the Pope as he was succes­sor to St. Peter] but it is a little remarkable, how he hath ser­ved this third ground of his, or rather how he hath disserved the two former, by the very few words he hath here added concerning the evidence of this third. The truth, saith he, of [Page 127] this appears by the known confession of the then Roman Church, and the selfe same controversie perpetually continued till this day.]

2. This is all he hath produced to clear up the self-evidence of this ground. And the ambiguity of the phrase [the then Ro­man Church being removed, there will be no more colour of truth in this ground, than I acknowledged in the two former, when I refuted them. For either the phrase [the then Roman Church] must signifie what we vulgarly call by that name, the particular Church of Rome, as then it was, together with all those that acknowledged the authority, and submitted to the Bishop of Rome in all things, particularly in his assuming to be Christs sole Vicar by him authorized over the Christian Church of the whole world, or it must signifie in the more Catholike notion all the several Churches of Christendome, that then lived in communion with the Church of Rome, and neither voluntarily parted, nor were excommunicate, or separated from that, yet without any connotation of any such acknowledgement, or giving up their names to his Ʋniversal Pastorship.

3. If it be taken in the former sense, then I now acknow­ledge again what in answer to his first ground I willingly yielded, that this Papal authority in England, held then as of Christs institution—was confess'd by the then Roman Church; But what hath S. W. gained by this? nay what hath he advan­ced either by his first or second ground, if they were both granted him, viz. that the Popes authority, and that not as of a Patriarch only, but as of the head of the Ʋniversal Church was acknowledged, and acknowledged in England before the Reformation, meaning still by the word acknowledged, no more, than acknowledged by the Roman Church, the Bishop of Rome, and those that were marked by his signature, submitted to this his assumed power, for that is no more than that this pre­tended power of his was acknowledged by himself, and all o­thers (every where, and so consequently in England) that did acknowledge it. This therefore as I must in charity to S. W. believe was not his meaning, so I have reason to complain in behalf of his two former grounds, that having before with [Page 128] some confidence pretended the acknowledgednesse of the Papal power in England, indefinitely, his third ground should pretend to no more than the confession of the then Roman Church, which is interpretable to a sense thus farre removed from that of England indefinitely, or all England. This therefore I think was either the disserving his own grounds, or the Reader, that had but a shadow of grounds given him instead of grounds, for, such are all such as are proposed in such ambiguous terms, that he that hath taken them on trust, in the more obvious sense, shall lose them again, when he comes to build on them.

4. But if he take the phrase [the then Roman Church] in the second sense, 'tis then most manifest, that as his first and second, so now his third ground hath no shew of truth in it, for it is visible, in the matter of fact, that the then Church and King­dome of England, whilest it lived in communion with the Church of Rome, and neither voluntarily departed, nor was excommu­nicated by that Church, did yet protest their joynt and most con­stant perswasion, that this Papal authority over Ecclesiastical af­fairs in England was not held as of Christs institution, or derived to the Pope as successor to St. Peter (which is the direct contra­dictory to what is assumed in S. W's third ground) but contra­rywise that he had no greater power conferred on him by Christ in the Scripture (and there is no more pretended to by the Pope from God, then what is deduced by him out of Christs words set down in Scripture) than any other foraign Bishop had, and therefore that he that was born in England had no­thing to do with Rome.

5. So in the year 1534. the same with the date of the Ʋniversities answer, and two years before the extinguishing Act, the book De vera differentia Regiae et Ecclesiasticae potesta­tis, was written by the Bishops of London, Duresme, Winchester, &c. The first part of which clearly evidenceth their sense of these three things, 1. That the texts of the Gospels have no ap­pearance of conferring this supreme authority upon the Pope. 2. That the decrees and practices of the ancient Church, yea and of pious and modest Popes were expressely against it. 3. That this power is evidenced from Scripture to be intrusted to [Page 129] Princes in their own Kingdomes, and that in all sorts of causes. This then being the acknowledgement of those very times, to which his third ground belongs, he hath, it seems, acquired no great advantages by appealing to their confessions, as his first proof. But of this I have spoken more largely in Answer to his first Ground.

6. The other slender proof of his assertion is conformable; The truth, saith he, appears as by the known confession of the Ro­man Church, so by the self same controversie perpetually continued till this day.] I must ask, Betwixt whom continued? The Re­formed, I suppose on one side, but whom on the other side? All those that live and are allowed, as good Catholikes, to live in communion with the Church of Rom [...]?

7. That he must mean, if he doe not again avowedly betray the deceitfulnesse of all his three grounds. But in this sense his proof will it self want confirming: For it is not a principle indisputable, that all that defend the Popes power in the Church, hold it as of Christs institution, and derived to him, as he was successor to St. Peter. I haveAnsw. to Shism. Disarm. p. 237. elsewhere shewed from his Ordi­nary, theAnsw to Bp. of Derry, p. 69. Bishop of Chalcedon, at a time when he was defen­ding the Popes power, that he yet acknowledged, that whether the Bishop of Rome be St. Peters successor, jure divino, or humano, is no point of faith] and Bellarmines two concessions conclude no lesse, de Pontif. l. 4. c. 4. Non esse de fide, divino & immuta­bili praecepto Romae sedem Petri esse constitutam, & forte non est de jure divino Romanum pontificem Petro succedere. That it is no point of Faith that Peters See was by divine immutable law setled at Rome, and perhaps it is not of divine right that the Bishop of Rome succeeds Peter. And he cannot but know 'tis the com­mon opinion of the Doctors of Paris, (who sure defend the Popes power against those of the Religion, who deny it) that the Pope hath not universal jurisdiction jure divino; I suppose he may have heard of the no small collection of Catholike Writers made by Melchier Goldastus, in his three Volumes De Monarchia, which will shew him, that all that live in the com­munion of the Bishop of Rome, and acknowledge his power in the Church, doe not yet acknowledge the divine right to [Page 130] supreme Pastorship, and this will not be refuted, or lose any part of its truth by suggesting that Goldastus himself was not of that number. And he may also remember the Tracts, and proofs of the liberties of the Gallican Church not long since published, and not be wholly ignorant also, by whom they were published.

8. But instead of these looser references, I shall adde to what hath here lately been said of the judgement and practice of the Gallican Church, (witness'd by the Pragmatick Sanction) these two or three instances. The former out of Bochellus, Ann. 1484. That whereas by ancient custome of France, a [...] Legate of the Pope, nor Rescript or Mandate of his might be re­ceived, but by consent of the most Christian King, and unlesse he did exhibite his Letters of Delegation by the Kings Procurate to be viewed and allowed by the Court of Parliament, limited so as no diminution arise to Regal right, immunity of the Church, or authority of Lawes; Contrary to this Law, Cardinal Balva, entring France as Legate, without advertising the King, the Kings Procu­rator entred action against him, the Court of Parliament decreed that he should be accused by two Advocates, and interdicted him the exercise of his Legatine power. Is this reconcileable with their belief or acknowledgement, that the supreme universal pastor ship (including France as well as England) was by Christs insti­tution derived to the Pope as successor to St. Peter? The second is that of theMassaei Chron. Ann. 1510. Councel of Tours, which concluded and decreed that Lewis XII. might not only with safety of conscience contemne Bullas abusivas injustasque, the abusive and unjust Bulls of Ju­lius II. but he might withdraw himself from his obedience. So when the Pope laboured with Lewis XI. to have the Pragmatick Sanction abrogated, the Court of Paris exhibited to the King aPro lib. Eccl. Gall. adversus Roman. Aulam Defensio Paris. Cur. in Duareni Append. defense of the Gallican liberties branched into many Arti­cles, the third to this sense, that the King their supreme Lord the chief Founder and Defender and Keeper and Vindicater of the Churches when their rights are violated, hath power to convocate the Praelates and other the like Ecclesiastical persons of his dominions, to obviate their attempts and beginnings who shall have dared to indeavour any thing against this liberty. The fourth, that in these [Page 131] Assemblies anciently indicted by the Kings authority many things are recorded to have been excellently constituted, and not without great deliberation of the Princes of the blood, and the Ecclesiastical Order, &c. obviating the vexations, molestations and injuries which were of­fered by the Court of Rome to the great damage of the people, and these Constitutions were of great authority. The sixth, that these Consti­tutions being long observed, when the Court of Rome in processe of time attempted many things against the liberty of the Gallican Church, Charles VI. by the advise of his Nobles, Praelates, Colledges, Ʋniver­sities, Ann. 1408. set out a Constitution which vindicated the Church to the ancient liberty, and was published solemnly, and recorded in the Acts of the Court of Parliament. The ninth, that decree was made by the Court of Paris against Papal exactions. The tenth, that soon after, that decree was confirmed by the Kings Edict, and published in Court, Ann. 1408. May 15. Whereupon the Pope sending out his Bulls of Excommunication against the King and Kingdome, Theodoric a Niem in Nemore Ʋnion. Tract. 6. the Ʋni­versity of Paris caused it to be torn in pieces, and declared the Pope Be­nedict himself to be an heretick, scismatick, and disturber of the peace, (in which particularDe Monarch. Franc. n. 140, 141, 142. Carolus Molinaeus addes from the acts of the Court of Paris that two officers of the Popes, which brought with them his Bulls of Excommunication, See the life of Archb. Chichley, p. 15. were dress'd in paper Milres, and carted through the City ignominiously) which will hard­ly be competible with the acknowledgement of the divine right of his supreme universal pastorship. The like instances are not hard to be found in other Kingdomes. When Pius II. sent his Legate Cardinal Cusanus into Austria, Paralipom. Abbat. Ʋrsperg. Cum venisset— When he came to his own Church of Brixia on the Alpes, and would have disposed of that, according to the ancient right af the Popes, Sigismund Duke of Austria permitted not that any such custome should be brought into Ger­many.

9. In like manner, when theParalip. Alb. Ʋrsp. Princes of Germany represented to Maximilian the Emperor ten grievances in matters Ecclesiasti­cal, the Emperor for redresse of these called a Councel at Triers and Coloine, Ann. 1512. There it was decreed necessary that the Emperors and Princes should consider of means for redresse of those grievances. WhereuponOrthuin Gra­tius Fascic. Rer. Expet. Maximilian set forth a decree, That though of his clemency he had tolerated the Pope and Clergy herein, [Page 132] as did his Father Frederick, yet because by that favour the service of God had fallen to decay, it appertain'd to his duty that Religion decay not, that the worship and service of God be not diminished. And im­mediately Maximilian withGalli successu rerum elati Ca­sare & Cardi­nalibus authori­bus Pontificem ad Concilium — citant. Onuph. in vit. Julii II. Lewis XII. of France with some Car­dinals called a Councel at Pisa.

10. But I shall now carry him a little higher (that he may have the fairer prospect of this matter) to the practice of some of the ancient Popes themselves. 1. Pope Julius who was willing enough not only to defend, but to take advantage to exalt his power, and accordingly took upon him in case of division among Bishops, to absolve Athanasius, and was therein opposed by the Oriental, not only Eusebian, or Semiarian, but Catholike Bishops, (who in the Councel of Antioch See Socrates, l. 2. c. 11. Sozomen l 3. c. 3. & Julius's Epist. in Athanas. c. 1. resol­ved that Julius's absolution was not to be ad­mitted) doth yet in his Epistle written on that occasion defend the right of his act by [...]— Ep. Jul. p. 741. A. [...]. Ib. B. [...]— Ib. p. 753. C. anci­ent custome especially, and by the Canon of Nice (which yet 'tis plain would not justifie it) and not by pretense of any divine authority, or in any such dialect, that could signifie or intimate his praetension, that from St. Peter this belonged to him, which sure he would have done, and thereby have silenced all Ca­tholike opposers, if thus it had then been be­lieved by them, or even by himself, to have belonged to him. For the injustice of their dealing with Atha­nasius, and with him he saith in the close of the Epistle, P. 753. D: [...]— Pauls ordinances are not thus, the Fathers have not thus delivered, 'tis a new course, this that they have taken, and again, [...]— What things we have received from the blessed Apostle Peter those we signifie to you. But in the debate of the question of right of the Popes drawing a business to himself from the Oriental Bishops, he pretends not to justifie his act from any divine right or su­preme jurisdiction devolved to him from St. Peter, but only from the authority of the Nicene Canon, and ancient custome, and that not for any Papal right in him, but upon the score of [Page 133] appealing from one Councel to another, and yet neither of these truly appliable in that cause, which made it more necessary to have appealed to his supreme Pastorship, flowing from Christs donation to St. Peter, if he could with any opinion or appea­rance of justice have praetended to it.

11. So in that African Councel where St. Augustine was pre­sent, and the Popes praetensions were disputed, and his power in their Churches denyed, he made no such challenge from Christs donation to St. Peter, but from the Canons of Nice, which yet were so farre from justifying his praetensions, (no such Canon being found upon examination) that if he could have thought that other pleadable, he would certainly have discerned cause to make use of it.

12. In that businesse of the Africans, heretofore largely in­sisted on, these farther passages are considerable (beside those many which I then offered him, Answ. to Schis. Disarm. ch. VI. Sect. 13. and to which I have yet received never a word of Re­ply from him) 1. That at the first Pope Melchiades had never had cognisance of the Africans affairs, had they been able to accord them themselves, and had it not been by the Africans own per­mission and allowance brought to him for a brotherly not autho­ritative decision, pergant ad fratres & collegas nostros transmarina­rum Ecclesiarum Episcopos, Aug. Ep. 162. and so no act of autho­rity or jurisdiction in him, for that depends not on allowance of the Subjects. 2. That the same Augustine much doubts whether Melchiades with his Collegues ought to usurp to themselves this judgement, which had before been determined by seventy Africans, Ibid. An forte non debuit— by this his doubt assuring us, that if he had done it without their allowance, it had been u [...] ­questionably an usurpation. 3. That the Pope did not exercise that powerNec ipse usur­pavit. himself, but had Bishops joyned to sit Judges with him. 4. That theRogatus enim Imperator judi­ces misit Episco­pos, qui cum eo sederent, &c. Aug. Ib. Emperor sent or commissionated those Bishops to sit with him. 5. That this was no usurpation in the Emperor (as it must be, if the Pope were by Christs law above the Emperor Ʋniver­sal Pastor) but, if we will believeEp. 162. Ad cujus curam, de qua rationem Deo redditurus est, res illa maxim [...] pertinebas. St. Augustine, that which belonged to his office, of the discharge of which he was to give account unto God.

[Page 134]13. Adde to this 3. that other instance of Pope Leo in the great cause of the [...] in the Councel of Chalcedon, of which we haveAnsw. to Schis. Disarm p. 96. formerly inlarged, and shewed, 1. That that General, and one of the four general Councels acknowledged the Pope no such primacy or supremacy of jurisdiction at all, but defined the Bishop of Constantinople should have aequal priviledges with him, 2. That the Pope interprets the injury done in that Councel to have been a breach against the Nicene Canons and dispositions of Ecclesiastical affairs, without mention of any o­ther. 3. That through the Epistles written on that occasion he deduces not his primacy from St. Peter. 4. That he takes no no­tice of any injury done to himself in that Councel, but only to the Bishop of Alexandria and Antioch, and other Metropolitanes. 5. That the deducing the dignity of the Roman See from the greatnesse of that Imperial City, which was more than preten­ded by that Councel, was never so much as quarrel'd at by the Popes Legates in that controversie, which sure is a competent praejudice to the deducing it from St. Peter.

14. Adde 4. that of Gregory so vulgarly known in his Epistle to Eulogius Bishop of Alexandria, telling him that he had prohibited him to call him Ep. ex Reg. l. VII. Indict. 1. c. 30. Ʋniversal Father, that he was not to doe it, that reason required the contrary, that it was derogatory to his brethren, that this honour had by a See again l. IV. Indict. 13. c. 72. et 76. Councel, that of Chalcedon, been offered to his praedecessors, but refused, and never used by any. A manifold testimony that this did not in his opinion belong to him by the law of Christ, for then 1. according to Christs own pro­nouncing, Joh. XIII. 13. Ye call me Master and Lord, ye do well, for so I am, they should do well who gave that title to him, and he also that took it to himself, 2. it could have been derogatory to none, 3. reason could not have forbid it, 4. he could not have averted it with an absit, recedant (any more than Peter could the sufferings of Christ) without even fighting against God.

15. Much lesse could he have toldL. VII. Ep. 30. Fidenter di­co quia quisquis se Ʋniversum Sacerdotem vo­cat, vel vecari desiderat— Mauritius, that whosoe­ver (not only if the Bishop of Constantinople, but whosoever) calls himself Ʋniversal Priest, or desires to be so called (either, or both) in elatione suâ Antichristum praecurrit, is a fore-runner of [Page 135] Antichrist by his pride. And again to the Empresse, l. IV. Ep. 34. In hac ejus superbia quid aliud nisi propinqua jam Antichristi esse tempora designatur, his pride was an indication of Antich [...]ists ap­proaching. And to John himselfe he sets it higher, that 'tisQuis, rogo, in hoc tam perverso (before s [...]ulto ac superbo) vocabulo nisi ill [...] ad imitandum proponitur, qui despectis Angelorum legionibus s [...]cum socialiter constitutis, ad cul­men conatus est singularitatis erum­pere, ut et nulli subesse, et solus praeesse videretur. Greg. Ep. ex Reg. l. 4. Ep 38. imitating none but the Devil, Who I pray in this perverse foolish proud title is proposed for imi­tation, but he that despising the Legions of Angels which were socially created with him, endeavoured to break out to the top of singularity, that he might seem to be under none, and above all. And so on at large, making it to be the transcribing of Luci­fers act of arrogance to assume to be Ʋniversal Pastor. And again,Ibid. that the King of pride is at hand, and the destruction of Priests prepared, be­cause they cervici militant elationis, qui ad hoc positi fuerant, ut ducatum praeberent humilitatis, God, saith he, having decreed to resist the proud, and humble him whosoever exalts himself, Ibid. Ep. 32. elsewhere he calls it blasphemiae nomen, the name of blasphemy, andIbid. Ep. 40. again, that to consent to that wicked title is fidem perdere, to destroy the faith. And that S. W. may not have so ill an opinion of Gregory, as to imagaine that he should declaim against this as Antichristian and diabolical in another, that he might have the monopoly of it himself, besides that what was cited from his Epistle to Eulogius, looked on it only in respect of h [...]mself, he may also hear him in the application speaking in the first person plural, and so including himself,Ibid. Quid ergo nos Episcopi dicimus, What then say we Bishops, who have received our place of honour from the humility of our Redeemer, and yet imitate the pride of his enemy, and again, that the Councel of Chalcedon had offe­red it to the See of Rome, butNullus un­quam tali voca­bulo appellari voluit, nullus sibi hoc temera­rium nomen arripuit. Ibid. none of his Ancestors would re­ceive it, andIb. Ep. 32. elsewhere, that he pleads not his own cause, but the cause of God, of the whole Church, of the lawes, the venerable Coun­tels, the commands of Christ, which are all disturbed with the inven­tion of this proud pompatick style of Ʋniversal Bishop, thatVece dominicâ sancto et omnium Apostolorum Petro principi Aposto [...]o totius Ecclesiae cura commissa est, et tamen Universalis Apostolus non vocatur. Ibid. the care of the whole was by Christ committed to the chief of the Apostles, St Peter, [Page 136] and yet he is not called Ʋniversal Apostle, which shewes evidently that whatever title belonged to Peter, yet not that of Ʋniver­sal Pastor, and that Princeps Apostolorum was not so to be under­stood.

16. From the same Gregories confession we have it, that the whole matter of Ecclesiastical judicature is to be concluded in this manner according to the words of the Novelle, Greg. Ep. ex Reg. l. XI. Ep. 54. that if any complaint be made against a Bishop by any, the cause shall be judged before his Metrorolitane, secundum sanctas regulas et nostras leges, according to the Canons and ours, i. e. (for they are the words of the Emperors Novelle) the Imperial lawes, If the party stand not to his judgement, the cause is to be brought to the Archbishop or Pa­triarch of that Dio [...]cese, et ille secundum Canones et Leges ei praebeat finem, he shall give it a conclusion (a finally conclusive determina­tion) according to the Canons and Lawes aforesaid. Here then is the last appeal to the Archbishop or Patriarch of the [...], and as yet no notice taken of the Bishop of Rome, unlesse in his own Patriarchate, which is absolutely exclusive of of his univer­sal jurisdiction, only now he addes, which I must not conceal, Si dictum fuerit quia nec Metropolitanum hahuerit nec Patriarcham, dicendum est, quia a sede Apostolica, quae omnium Ecclesiarum caput est, causa haec audienda ac dirimenda fuerat. Here then is the place for the Popes cognisance and decision to interpose, according to his opinion, viz. in this one single forlorn case, that the plaintiffe hath neither Metropolitane nor Patriarch, and then Ex­ceptio firmat regulam in non exceptis, this one exception of those incognite corners of the world (which where they lie, I leave S. W. to discover) that have a Bishop but no Metropolitane or Patriarch, confirms his rule as far as Britain, which certainly hath been alwayes esteemed one of the six Dioeceses of the West, and hath had a Metropolitane, more than one, and a Primate or Patriarch, the Archbishop of Canterbury (acknowledged by the Pope himself to be such, alterius Orbis Apostolicus et Patriarcha, saith Ʋrbane II. ofGuil. Malmes­bur. de Gest. Pontif. Angl. p. 223. Anselme) and so by this Novelle of the Empe­rors cited and approved by Gregory, it is most evident that in his time, and his opinion, the Pope had neither by divine law, nor humane, nor by his own praetending, any such universal jurisdiction.

[Page 137]17. The same Gregory, sure more then in complement, ad­dresses himself to Mauritius, in the style of Ego indignus pietatis vestrae famulus, and in the greatest expression of subjection, Ego haec dominis m [...]is loquens, quis sum nisi pulvis et vermi [...], his unwor­thy servant, nothing but dust and ashes, in Comparison, and re­lation to him, and having declaimed against a law of the Em­perors, that Souldiers should not become Monastikes, saith,L. 2. Indict. 11. Ep. 61. Ego jussioni subjectus eandem legem per diversas terrarum partes transmitti feci— I being subject to the Imperial command, have caused publication of the law, though he took it to be impious, only adding, because the law is not agreeable to the law of God, Ecce per subjectionis meae paginam serenissimis Dominis nuntiavi, Behold, I have written to my Lords of it. Thus 'tis sure the Edict of Wenceslaus the Emperor, understood his language, affirming, Nostrum jus patronatus, ne vitium ingratitudinis incurrerent, plures antiquitus summi Pontifices agnoverunt, Augustos Dominos appellantes, et eis in re et nomine reverentiam tanquam suis Patronis exhibentes, ut diffuse in Registro Magni Gregorii habetur— Many of the Popes anciently have acknowledged our right of Patronage, that they might not incurre the crime of ingratitude, calling us their Imperial Lords, and both in deed and words performing reverence to the Emperors as to their Patrons, citing those Epistles of Gregory in many places throughout, and referring to other testimonies.

18. Adde 5. that of Pope Agatho in hisIn Sextâ Syn. Act. 4 [...]. Letters sent to the Emperor concerning a General Councel to be holden at Constan­tinople, who there plainly declareth and confesseth his Pri­macy to extend [...], Concil. t. 5. p. 60. B. [...]— Ib. F. vid. et p. 64. E. & 65. B. onely to the Bishops of the West, and not to the East, and so as it is evident that at that time the Bishops of Rome, neither by the words of Scripture, nor by the consent of the whole Catholike Church, had any such Ʋniversal Primacy as he now requireth.

[Page 138]19. I shall conclude with that ancient resolution at the ordaining of Paulinus Archbishop of York by Justus, the third Archbishop of Canterbury after Augustine, cited by our Britannicae Antiquitates out of Radulphus de Diceto, and briefly set down in the Abbreviationes Chron. of the said Radulphus; Sicut Cantia subjicitur Romae, quod ex eâ fidem accepit, ita Eboracum subjicitur Cantuariae quae eo praedicatores misit, as Kent is subjected to Rome, because it received the Faith from it, so is York to Canterbury, which sent Preachers thither, making theSicut— prima fuit in fide, prima sit in ho­nore, Radul. de Dis. Ibid. reception of the faith from Rome, and not any title from Christ to St. Peter, the onely ground of any kinde of subjection to it, and then (to omit many other observations, which that passage would suggest) that is distant enough from S. W's only tenure, the divine right of Ʋniversal Pastorship, on the account whereof he utter­ly rejects that other of receiving the Faith from Rome, as we have formerly seen. From all these, let the Reader now judge, if there were ever such a layer of self-evident grounds, as S. W. hath thus farre acquitted himself to be.

SECT. V.

1. HIS fourth ground, that this actual power the Pope then had in England had been of long continuance, and setled in an ancient possession] is necessarily lyable to all the feeblenesse of the three former, amass'd together, and so is incomparably inefficacious to support S. Ws praetensions. For, remembring from the former discoveries, what was the utmost that the power the Pope then had in England, amounted to, a power by himself assumed to be divine and over the whole Church of Christ, but not so acknowledged by the Nation, nor by S. W. attempt­ed to be proved with the least probability, that it was thus acknowledged, it followes that if it were true, or in liberality granted, that the actual power which the Pope then really had in England, (and no greater) had been of long continuance and settled in an ancient possession, it would never stand S W. in the least stead. For still it might be but a Patriarchal power, and that is not the power of the Ʋniversal Pastor, or it might be but a power extorted from some one, or more Kings, or by them voluntarily granted, or but permitted and winked at, without any formal concession, and all such personal acts or indulgences of Kings are temporary, and revocable by themselves, and no way [Page 140] binding to their successors, and none of these hath so much as a praetense to divine institution. Nay on the contrary, theMolina de Just. Tract. 2. disp. 69. et 74. Ro­manists themselves confesse, that those things which are intrin­secally due and proper to the Prince, as to punish offenders, to make them subj [...]ct to his lawes, for subjects to appeal to him from inferior Judges, paying Tributes, and the like, cannot by any other, by possession of never so long time, be praescribed. These, saithIn Authent. Hoc amplius c. de fid. Com­miss. et Felinus Rubric. de Prae­script. Baluus, are incommunicable, sacra individua, they cannot beAlex. in l. Filiae quam de lib. Imola in Rubr. de verbo Oblig. usurped, or praescribed, or aliened, or absolutely exerci­sed by any other than by them who bear the supreme Majesty. And if so indefinitely, then chiefly in the most considerable matters, those of religion, which most pertain to the end of Government, publike good and happinesse. And accordingly they acknowledge also, that it is the duty of the Prince, to command, and exact the observation of divine law, and of the Canons of the Church, that he only can make them obliging under exterior penalties, mulcts, imprisonment, exile, as when Justinian de­creed the Canons of the Code, Novell. 131. [...], to be observed as lawes, i. e. so as might constrain the unwilling. And as theTwelfth Ground. p. 52. suggesting these to be derived from the Church, or Pope, as acts of obedience in Princes, and execution of the Churches com­mands, is but a begging the quaestion, so it shall, when we come to the 12^th Ground, be further examined. Meanwhile the very possibility of any or all of these, is enough to keep his contra­ry affirmation from being a ground, which cannot be such, un­lesse either it be by some prosyllogisme demonstrated to be true, or else the contrary be impossible.

2. For the truth of it, that, he saith, is evinced, but by what medium? Why, saith he, both from our Adversaries grant, the evidence of the fact it selfe, and even by the carriage of St. Austin the Monk. What [even the carriage of St. Austin the Monke] will evince, shall anon be considered. At the present let us examine the eviction from the adversaries grant, the evidence of the fact.

3. But doth the adversary grant indeed, that the Popes Ʋniversal Pastorship, as held by divine right from Christs grant to St. Peter, had been of long continuance and setled in ancient possession in England? Nay, doth not S. W. know, that the adversary doth not grant it? [Page 141] and that the evidence of the fact is so farre from being on his side, that 'tis on the c [...]trary? Hath he never heard of the Statutes of the Kingdome before the Reign (that sure is before the praetended Reformation) of Henry VIII. which are compe­tently to the prejudice of this Papal praetension, and can he dream that his adversaries will grant so much to their own preju­dice, what is so much contrary to their own senses also? From a small piece printed lately at Bruges, De Antiqua Ecclesia Bri­tanicae libertate, besides the evidence that his adversary denyes, what he here pretends him to grant, he shall finde in the mar­gin in one place a collection of many Statutes of the former times, which may in part help to illuminate him in the point of his adversaries eoncession, and evidence of the fact, I shall give him them, with addition of some more.

4. In the first year of Henry VII. Fol. 18. we read, The King is a mixt person, having Ecclesiastical as well as temporal jurisdicti­on, In the same year Fol. 20. The Pope cannot erect any priviledge of Sanctuary in England.

In the same year, fol. 23.25. the Act of King Kenulphus in ex­empting the Abbate of Abingdon from Episcopal jurisdiction, was judged regular and lawfull.

In the 6th of Hen. 7.13. Ʋnion to a Priory cannot be without the Kings consent.

In the second of Richard III. fol. 22. Excommunications and Sen­tences of the Bishop of Rome are of no force in England.

In the twelfth of Edward IV. fol. 16. A Legate landing in England was obliged to take Oath that he would attempt nothing to the derogation of the rights of the King or Crown.

Under Henry VI. his nonage, when his Ʋnkle was made a Cardinal and sent Legate by Martine the fifth, the Kings Atturney Ri. Cawdray made protestation against him, that none was to come as Legate from the Pope, or enter the Kingdom without the Kings appointment, and this by singular priviledge of our Kings, who had enjoyed this right from all memory. On which that Cardinal publikely promised conformity. Yet that this priviledge was not so singular to our Kings, but that in like manner it be­longed to others, particularly to the King of France, see Ludo­vicus [Page 142] Servinus hisAux. Ploid. vol. 4. Plea before the Parliament of Paris, An. 1590. when Cardinal Cajetane was sent Legate to Henry IV.

In the same Kings Reign not only theVit. Henr. C [...]ichley p. 86. Clergy refused obe­dience to the Popes Mandate for mony and disposal of the Arch­bishoprick of York, to Ri: Fleming, but the Popes Messenger Jo. Opizanus, for acting against the Kings Laws, in getting mony for the Pope, was cast into prison.

So in the Reign of Henry V. when Pope Martine, whilst the King was busied in the affairs of France, had assumed some powers which were interdicted by the Laws of Edward III. and Richard II. theVid. vit. Hen. Chichle Arch. Cant. p. 56. Bishop of Lichfield and Dean of York, the Kings Legates in the Councel of Constance, were sent to him for redress, which they had promise of in some things; And at the same time other Ambassadors were dispatcht to demand that he med­dle not with disposing of those Benefices in England, which both by pacts, and jure Regio belong to the Kings disposal, and for divers other things, with instructions, upon the Popes refusal to profess, Regem in iis singulis jure suo usurum, that the King will use his own right in each of them, and to make publick protestation there­of before the Congregation of Cardinalls.

Vit. Arch. Chic. p. 78. 80.In his Reign also, the design of sending a Legate from Rome, though it were the Kings own Brother, was opposed, as appears by Archbishop Chichle's Letter to the King, and the consequent of it, the desisting from that enterprise whilst that King lived.

In the second of Henry IV. 'twas enacted, That the Popes Collectors had by vertue of their Bulls no authority or jurisdiction in England, but that the Archbishops and Bishops of England are the Kings spirituall Judges.

In the eleventh of the same King, fol. 37. The Pope cannot alter the Laws of England.

In the same year fol. 69.76. the Judges pronounce with one voice, that the foregoing Statutes were only declarative of the common custom of England, and not introductory of any new Law.

In the Reign of Richard II. Ch. 5. 'Twas enacted, That be­cause the King of England, holds the Crown immediatly from God, therefore if any man shall follow in the Court of Rome any translation of suit, or excommunication, he shall incur the loss of [Page 143] his Goods, and forfeit the Kings protection.

In the sixth of the same King (M. 6. R. 2. Rot. 8. en lescheg.) The Pope on complaint of the Bishop of Coventry, of one Moses a Pryor there, ordained, that there should be no more Pryor there, Mes que serra, but that he or it should be ad mensam (perhaps it should be ad mentem) Episcopi. Ʋpon which the Pryor and Covent as­saulted the Bishop, and beat him, and brake his head with a Cross: And afterward an Assise was brought, and it was held that the disso­lution of the Pope was not good.

In the sixteenth of Edward the third, the excommunication of the Archbishop of Canterbury is judged valid, notwithstanding the Popes sentence to the contrary.

In the seventeenth of the same King, fol. 23. The King by his Soveraign power exempted the Archdeacon of Richmund from Episcopall Jurisdiction, as also all Colledges or Monasteries foun­ded by the King are exempt by the same Law.

In the twenty fifth of the same King, it was enacted. The Pope had no right in England to confer any Archbishoprick, or Bishopricks,

In the twenty seventh of the same King, fol. 84. The King, as supreme Ordinary, praesents by lapse.

In the same year, whosoever shall by citation, or impleading draw any of the Subjects of the King of England out of the King­dome, shall incur the loss of all his goods, which our Law calls incurring a Praemunire.

In the thirty third of the same King, fol. 103. Kings being annoynted with Oyle are capable of Spirituall jurisdiction.

In the same Kings Reign, the dissolution of the Order of Tem­plars by the Pope was not good, untill confirmed by the King. Wal­singham 59. and 46. Ed. 3.28.

In this Kings Reign, I refer the Reader to Peter Cassiodor's complaintGoldasl. mo­narch fo. 1. De tyrannide pontificum Romanorum in jura regni & Eeclesiae Anglicanae. Of the Tyranny of the Popes on the Rites of the Realm and Church of England.

In the fourth of Edward 1. One that had brought a Bull de­rogatory to the right of the Crown, was therefore condemned to banishment, and the Fact adjudged to have the nature of Treason.

In the Reign of Henry the third, the Lords and Commons complain of the great sums carryed hence into Italy, above four hundred thousand pounds yearly. Epist. Angl. ad Innocent. which sure was mentioned by them as a gravamen, and usurpation, and is not by me designed to be further argumentative; yet may, by the way, mind us, what may possibly incite and accend so much zeal in dispatching their Missaries at this time, to re­duce this stray Island to the fold of their universall Pastor, and interpret in part, the affectionatness of S.W.'s harangues, so fre­quently interlaced to his dear Countrymen, there being other motives imaginable to found zeal, beside the deemed certainty of his faith.

5. Henry II. saith Mat. Paris, An. 1164. gave out Orders to be observed by the Archbishop, Thomas Becket, and Bishops, ta [...] ­quam avita, i. e. received under his Grandfather Henry I. and his Praedecessors, These Surius interprets, ab avo Regis institutas, en­acted by his Grandfather, but that is a deceit, for Mat. Paris saith, they were the Institutes of his Praedecessors. And

6. William Rufus telling Anselme, that he had promised to keeep all the Customes of England, commands him thereupon, that he should not make any appeal to the Pope, (Guil. Malmsb. de Gest. Pontif. Angl. l. 1.) and Eadmer an Acquaintance of An­selmes, affirms, that the King required of him to promise the same under Oath. de vit. Ansel. l. 2. On which occasions, that es­pecially of Henry II. Stapleton (de tribus Thomis, in Thom. Cantuar.) cryes out, Quid aliud hic Henricus secundus tectè postulavit, quam quod Henricus VIII completâ jam malitiâ aperte sibi usurpavit, ut supremum Ecclesiae caput in Anglia esset? what difference was there betwixt that demand of Henry II. and the more open usurpation of Henry VIII. when he assumed to be head of the Church in England? And again, Quid hoc aliud rursum est, nisi ut Rex Angliae sit apud suos Papa? What is this other then to make the King of England Pope among his own Subjects? A com­petent testimony of the practice from the mouth of an Ene­my, and irrefragable to him, that concludes the right from the possession.

Novel 132.7. Thus 'tis not only resolved in the Novells, that the King [Page 145] hath supreme power over Nihil nin per­viuns ad inqui­sitionem Ma [...]e­stati extitit Imperatoriae, quae communem in omnes homi­nes moderatio­nem & princi­patum p [...]rcipit. all persons in all, and so Ecclesiasticall affairs, and by our own Law, that the King hath no aequall, asL. 1. Bracton saith, speaking of the Pope, and Archbishops, and o­ther Praelates, and giving this reason, for else the King might lose his praecept and authority of commanding, because an ae­quall hath no rule over an aequall. But the matter is yet more clear by another Argument whichL.V. de ex­ception. c. 15. Sect. 3. Bracton gives, taken from the practice of the Courts in England; That when an Ecclesia­sticall Judge hath received a Prohibition from the King, superse­dere debet, in omni çasu, He is in all causes bound to supersede, at least till in the Kings Court it be resolved to whom the Juris­diction belongs, because if the Ecclesiasticall Judge might re­solve of this question, whether it were his Jurisdiction or no, he would in all cases indifferently proceed, notwithstanding the Kings prohibition.

8, In summe, 'tis among the Laws of Edward the Confessor, Chap. 10. that the King is appointed Gods Vicegerent to rule the Kingdome and people of the Lord, and above all, the holy Church.

This concurrence of our ancient Laws in this matter minds me ofJoan. Quint. Heduus Juris­consult. & Lu­tetiae Professor publicus in Re­pet. lectione de Christianae Ci­vitatis Aristo­cratia, defendit Aristocratiam Christianae Ci­vitatis, qua descriptio Pon­tificii & Regii Imperii conti­netur. Possevin. Joannes Quintinus Heduus, who flourished at the same time when Henry VIII. abrogated the Papal praetensions in England, and was also of the Roman Communion, and attributed much to that See. He layes for his ground. In solo principe omnis est potestas. All power is in the Prince alone, and from a learned Lawyer Lotharius asserts, Principem esse fontem omnis jurisdictionis, that the Prince is the fountain of all Jurisdiction: citing the C. Quando vult Deus, Caus. 23. qu. 4. Thence he saith, the Reason is, why it is lawfull for the Prince sometimes to determine those things which concern the Church, least the honour of the Mother (the Church) should in any thing be violated. If any thing, saith he, be an Ecclesiasticall matter, that of convoca­ting Councels is certainly one, and yet 'tis the opinion of many lear­ned men, that the Emperor may call a General Councel, so oft as he sees the Pope and Cardinals be noted of any suspicion, and neglect to do their duty, either for want of skill, or out of sinister intention, or peradventure of both, or when there is any schisme. He puts a par­ticular case, The Pope calls the Bishops to Rome, or to some o­ther [Page 146] place, the King forbids them to go, or commands them to come to his Court or Councel. The Bishops must, saith he, obey the Kings precept, and not only in this, but in any other matter whatso­ever, beside sin; for he that doth not observe his bounden fidelity to the King, whether Bishop, Priest, or Deacon, he ought to be ejected from his degree. This he proves by many Canons, and concludes his opinion to be, when the King calls together the Praelates to a Councel, and to reform the State of the Church, they are bound to obey, yea though the Pope forbid it. But this by the way.

10. 'Twere not difficult further to pursue this through the series of times, and evidence it out of our Histories of almost each former Age from the beginning of Christianity in this Island, to those daies of the extinguishing Act: But for a fair view of that, I refer the Reader to our learned Countryman, Sir Roger Twisden, in his Historicall vindication of the Church of England, in point of Schisme, who hath of late fully and satisfa­ctorily performed that part.

11. All that I shall here further insert concerning our own Affairs, I shall choose to transcribe out of two of our first pie­ces, which the Bishops set out on this subject, in King Henries dayes (the former, two years before, the latter in the yeare of the exterminating Act) that it may at once appear, that not the luxuriant enormous will of the Prince, but the dispas­sionate judgment of the Praelates, and the conviction of solid reason, usherd in this (change in the outward face of things, or rather) vindication of the intrinsick Rites, and Liberties of the Anglicane Church, that extinguishing Act being, as hath been sayd, from a competent Authority, not introductory of a new Law, but only declaratory of ancient custome, which had prevailed through all times, and was refreshed and revived, as often as occasion demanded.

12. In the same year then, as hath been said, with the deci­sion of the Ʋniversities forementioned, An. 1534. was written the Book, De vera differentia—where besides what was even now mentioned thence, 'tis punctually demonstrated, that those powers which by S.W. are supposed to have been of long continuance and settled in an ancient possession in the Papacy, [Page 147] were acknowle [...]gedly vested in the Kings of England. Their proofs I have elsewhere pointed at, I shall now more largely set them down.

13. First from the Statute of Appeals, and the method of them from Bishop to Archbishop, & postremo ad Regem, in the last resort to the King, ut praecepto ipsius in Curiâ Archiepiscopi con­troversia terminetur, ita quod non debit ulterius procedere sine con­sensu Regis, That by his Commission the Controversie may be ended in the Archbishops Court, so that there may be no further proceeding without the consent of the King. 2. By the Statute against any Bishop or Archbishop, his going out of the Kingdome without the Kings licence, and giving security, that neither in going nor stay­ing perquirant malum vel damnum Regi vel Regno, they will cause any damage to King or Kingdome. (Either of which, what a destructive influence it must have on all foreign, and so Papal authority, is most visible.) 3. By the Example of Thurstan Archbishop of York, who when he obtained the Kings licence to go to the Councel called by Calixtus, he was required first to take Oath, give faith (and so did) that the would not receive E­piscopall benediction from the Pope. (Another clear evidence that the Kings power over Ecclesiasticks, 1. In imposing Oathes on them, 2. In prohibiting them all acknowledgment of Papal jurisdiction, was then in full force against the Popes praeten­sions.) 4. By our Kings, Canutus, Ethelred, Edgar, Edmund, Aethelstane, Ina, Alfred, making of Laws in Ecclesiastical mat­ters, the severals whereof are there recited. 5. By their au­thority of investing of Bishops. 6. By the exemptions from all Episcopall authority given by them, as they pleased, for exam­ple, by William the Conqueror to the Abbate of Battaile, by him instituted. 7. By the Letter and Protestation of that King to the Pope, that if he did not reform the abuses, which he min­ded him of, he would himself take a course to do it, with a Torpescere non valemus, quin (ut tenemur) tanta discrimina pro viribus evitemus. We cannot be so sluggish as not to do our utmost (as we are obliged) to avert so great dangers. 8. By the Oration of King Edgar to his Clergie, requiring them to cause a Reformation by the conjunction of his and their power. [Page 148] Episcopali censura et Regia authoritate, committing the matter to so many Bishops, as are there named. 9. by the Letters of the Parliament to the Pope, when he took upon him to dispose of the Kingdome of Scotland, which our King claimed. This cer­tainly (being the work of the Bishops at that time) was another large testimony of the acknowledgement of the Kingdome at that time (which is somewhat more than of his present adver­saries) And the force of it was so great, and the truth so ge­nerally acknowledged then, that Stephen Gardiner one of the composers of it, in an Oration of his, soon after delivered on this matter,De Ver. Obed. p. 731. 18. makes no scruple to say, Omnes planè constantission consensu in hoc convenerunt docti pariter atque indocti, viri atque foemi­nae nihil ei cum Româ esse negotii quem Anglia genuit, All are most constantly agreed, learned and unlearned, men and women, that he that is born in England hath nothing to do with Rome, nothing which can be claimed from him by any tenure of right humane or divine by Christ in Scripture or out of Scripture.

14. That Oration of his De vera Obedientiâ, written Ann. 1536. the year of that Extinguishing Act, is the other piece which even now I mention'd, the Penman whereof being farre from a Reformer, living and dying an eminent persecuter of such, his name possibly may adde some weight to his observa­tions; From oneP. 726. Paragraph of that Oration, the Book being not in every mans hands, I shall give the Reader a [...] of the whole discourse, and a representation of the intire truth in this matter.

15. To this very objection then, that we have now before us, that the Bishop of Rome had been by our Princes acknowledged the head of the Ʋniversal Church, honours given, submissions perfor­med to him, his authority acknowledged, so that if right be judged by fact, the advantage will be on the Popes side, he accommodates this answer, that in those times and passages which seem most to derogate from the right and authority of our Princes, some light of the truth was yet alwayes discernible, by which he that will look close, and carefully, shall easily finde that the acknow­ledgements that were made them, were not solid, and intire, and built on any foundation of right, but specious rather than true, [Page 149] acts of civility, not of duty, andHonoris fae­nerati potius quam soluti argumenta. arguments that the honour was lent for advantages, not paid them for any obligation. For if our Princes had been resolved that the Bishop of Rome was Christs Vicar on earth whom all were bound to obey, and without whose intervention nothing could be firm or valid, or if the Popes them­selves had been really thus perswaded, 'tis not to be imagined, that they would have used humane arts and policies, yea and plain terrors, and associations of secular force to gain this power in this Kingdome (but have made their appeals to the solid t [...]sti­mony of divine truth, if they had any such to produce) or that the Princes, such especially who after their death were ho­noured as Saints, would by facts openly have diminish'd that their authority, which by words and titles they so acknow­ledged; Had they believed that the administration and care of the whole world was committed to the Pope by God, with what confidence could they have made so manyQuamvis corona Angliae et jura ejusdem coronae ipsumqua regnum fuerunt ab omni tempore retro acto adeo lib [...]ra, ut nec Dominus summus Pontifex nec aliquis extra regnum se intromittere debeat, de eisdem— Act. Dep. Rich. II. M. S. citat. ab Ad. Reutero p. 4. Decrees, contrary and derogatory to this principle, expressing their dislike of his fatherly care; disclaiming the exercise of his piety, and for­bidding him to meddle with their affairs, or have inspection of them, whom they deemed to be set in the Watch Tower by God for this purpose? Besides, the doing this had been strangely irregular, it being not in the power of Inferiors to make Lawes for, or against their Superiors, or to restrain them in their administrations, and yet this our Princes (not passionately in their Courts, but) on ma­ture advise in their Parliaments frequently did, making lawes against the Popes interposition in such or such things, to which also the Popes were so farre from expressing any dislikes, or re­turning their rebukes, that they took no least notice of them, but liberally commended the actors for their faith and obedience, imitating the subtlest Merchants, when they have made any very circumventing advantageous bargain, they sit down content­edly with halfe, and presse not rigorously for all, esteeming it perfect gain, whatsoever they can get by such arts, when they know nothing is due to them. 'Twas from the benefit they re­ceived [Page 150] by it, not from any opinion of his being the Vicar of Christ, that our Princes allowed him any authority in their Realms, and thatSalvis nobis & haered [...]bus nost [...]is justitiis, libertatibus, & regalibus nostris. Instrum. Concession. et obli­gation. à Joanne a Rege fact. ap. Guil. Paris. cum moderamine, so as they could relieve themselves from suffering any considerable dammage by it, and could cast it out when they pleased, their authority being but precarious, Forasmuch as the King hath or­dained these things to the honour of God and holy Church, and for the Common-wealth, and for the reme­dy of such as be grieved, he would not that any other time it should turn in praejudice of himselfe or of his Crown, but that such rights as ap­pertain to him, should be saved in all points. Stat. Edwardi I. in his 3d year, Westm. 1. cap. 48. tit. Concess. fact. Eccles. semper sine praejud. Coron. as long as the Princes judged it best for their own interests, and as soon as they thought fit to stand on their certain right, the Popes autho­rity was presently retrench'd; till then, they prudentially dissembled, and took no notice of his usurpations, and satisfied themselves, that they, as well as he, were the gainers by it. Thus it was for the main, and if there were any singular instances, which seemed contrary to this, yet the concessions of weak, and master'd, or deluded, or temerarious, or negli­gent Princes can have no force to praejudge the powers which are given to Kings by God. They called them Fathers, and heads, and dig­nified them with many titles, but this was no prejudice to their Monarchick prerogatives; Again, the ancient Church of Rome was for the lustre of their sanctity, and amplitude of power, not only of great name in the Western Church, and particularly in ours, but of eminent authority, in the sense, that Cicero useth authority, when in giving of testimonies, he attributes authority to men of parts and wealth, not that they are alwayes in the right, but because the multitude are willing to be lead by such, and do not easily distrust them; But for any Divinely establish'd autho­rity, the Pope neither hath, nor hath had among us any more, than any other Bishop. What Princes have done for their interests, or from the necessities of their affairs, or through ignorance, or circumvention, or on any such other respect, can be no preju­dice to the truth, or to the native rights of the Diadem vested in them by God, and therefore if it were the custome at any or all times to advise with the Bishop of Rome in governing the Church, and to do nothing without consulting him, and if [Page 151] Princes permitted their Subjects to repair to him, this was far from freeing their Subjects from their own jurisdiction, which being committed to them by God, could not without violation of the Paternal care due to their Subjects, be abdicated by them. As on the other side, when they had no need of the Pope, when his interpositions grew inconvenient, the Prince might as safely, and without violation of religion dismisse him, as a Lord may do his Chaplain, (they are his own words) whom he had formerly received, and hired to officiate in his Family, e­specially if he discerned him to assume beyond his bounds, to exact subjection from him and his Family.

16. Thus farre that Great Bishop, who professing that he had formerly sworn to defend the Papal power and authority, and since to have been convinced with the evidence of the con­trary, may be an example to others to do the like, on the con­viction of his reasons, nor can it much prejudice his testimo­ny (if we stood on that, as we doe not, but on the truth of his observations, and the evidence that S.W's adversaries doe not grant what he would have them) that in Queen Maries dayes he returned to the Papacy again; Whatsoever he thought of the Original right praetended from St. Peter, he might think it law­full for the Queen by Act of State to set up the Popes power in some degree, and then when it was so, account it his duty to submit to it.

17. Meanwhile it may be added, ex abundanti, that what in that Oration he maintained, is in very full accord with the de­clared judgement and practice of other Nations through all times; Alciat, whomAn. 534. Baronius justly styles doctissimum, most learned, resolves it in general,Cod. Rubric. de sacros: Eccl. §. 3. Nemini dubium esse quin in pri­mitiva Ecclesia de rebus et personis Ecclesiasticis jus dicerent Impera­tores, that no man doubts but in the Primitive Church the Emperors had jurisdiction over Ecclesiastical matters and persons.

18. Matthias Corvinus King of Hungary punished Bishops and Priests, when they offended, &c. Laurence Roborella the Popes Le­gate not disallowing it. Ant. Bonfin. Rer. Hungar. Decad. IV. l. 1. & 3.

[Page 152]19. Charles the great, Capitular. l. 1. Praef. desires that no man will think he took too much upon him, that in Ecclesiastical matters and persons he took care to correct what was amisse, defending himself by the example of Josias. The ninth Councel of Toledo, c. 1. c. filiis. 16. q. 7. admonishes the Curators of the goods of the Church, that if a Minister fraudulently imbecille any of them, he complain to the Bishop, but if the Bishop be the offender, to the Metropolitane, if the Metropolitane, to the King. And many the like, which I shall not now (extra orbitam) insist on.

20. And thus much to his first mediums of eviction, his ad­versaries grant, and the evidence of the fact it self, of the ancient possession and long continuance of Papal power through the Reigns of our former Kings, that the Reader may discern the di­stance betwixt S. W's self-evident grounds, and plain matters of fact.

21. It remains, that I take notice of his other medium of eviction, the carriage of St. Austin the Monk, and the Abbat of Bangor, express'd, saith S. W. in that counterfeited testimony alledged by D^r H. whence we see it was the Doctrine St. Austin taught the Saxons.] But it would even move ones compassion to think, how many frustrations he will here meet with also, in this at­tempt of eviction.

22. For 1. how can he evince that Monks carriage from a testimony, which the same time that he appeals to it, he charges of being counterfeit? Can he think fit to found Principles on the quick-sand, and praetend to evince demonstratively, when he confesses his medium not only to be fallible, but fallacious, and actually counterfeited? 'Tis not enough to say that D^r H. alledges it, and so that ad hominem it is convincing, for an argument ad hominem is at most but a probable argument, and so cannot be sufficient for the evincing of a ground or self-evident principle (which mankinde, and not only hic homo is concerned in) espe­cially when 'tis used by him that doth not himself believe it, but on the contrary charges it for counterfeit, when he thus produces it for evincing. This is still the same rate of demonstra­ting, that we have oft minded him of, [...], scien­tifical falsely so called, a testimony acknowledgedly counterfeit, [Page 153] yet sit to be a medium of a severe, if not rigorous demonstra­tion.

23. But then 2. I may be allowed to think that there is no truth in his Epithet, and that that testimony was not counter­feited, having had the leisure particularly to examine and inva­lidate all the suggestions of so learned a man as Mr. H. T. is commended to be by no meaner a person than Thomas de Abbiis, very elaborately and pompously offered, in a peculiar discourse, against that one testimony. And as if there had ne­ver pass'd any such thing, or at least as if some kinde of reply had been made to it, this can yet obtain no more then a fastidious mention of [that counterfeited testimony] I desire S. W. will for once so farre take notice of the rules of common justice a­mong men, that the brand of counterfeit be not affix'd ad libitum to whatever comes in his way, unlesse he be at leisure to prove his charge, or be resolved to take a fit opportunity to prove it, and if in order thereto he will in some earnest reflect on that businesse betwixt H.T. the Romanist and me, he shall soon finde who was the gainer by it, it being visible in the entrance, how safe I stood, and how firm the conclusion which I inferr'd from that testimony, it being no other but a matter of fact, of known truth, and no more but what, from all sorts of wri­ters that ever dealt in that subject, I except not Baronius him­self, is notorious, and confess'd by the Romanists, viz. that the Britans, those of Bangor particularly, denyed to yield obe­dience to the Pope, upon Austins demand of it.

24. Whether S. W's conclusion be of this kinde, that it can receive benefit by this testimony, if it be valid, and no praejudice, in case it be counterfeit, let us next consider, and in order to this, I will be good natured, and afford him this ods, that what pass'd for utterly invalid (because counterfeit) when urged against him, shall be of full force and validity, as farre as it can be argumentative against me, which I mean for an essay how happy S. W. would be, if he might have all the gains, and none of the inconveniences of his own wishes.

25. What then was this carriage of Austin the Monk, and the Abbate of Bangor, as it isTr. of Schis. p. 111. there set down? Why, that [Page 154] when Augustine required subjection to the Pope and Church of Rome, the Abbot answered, Notum sit vobis— Be it known unto you that we are all subject and obedient to the Church of God and the Pope of Rome, but so as we are also to every pious and good Christian, viz. to love every one in his degree and place, in perfect charity, and to help every one by word and deed, to attain to be the Sonnes of God, and for other obedience I know none due to him, whom you call the Pope, and as little do I know by what right he can challenge to be Father of Fathers, or (as it isSee App. to H. T. p. 184. better ren­dred from a due punctation of the Welsh) and any other obe­dience than that, I acknowledge not to be any mans, or to belong to any man, whom ye name Pope or Father of Fathers, to chal­lenge and require. As for us we are under the rule of the Bishop of Gaerlegion upon Ʋske, who is to overlook and govern us under God.

26. Now with this testimony let us, in the name of truth and sobriety, compare S. W's conclusion, which he saith is evinced by the carriage of St. Austin and that Abbot, express'd in this testimony: The Conclusion is, that this actual power the Pope then had in England, had been of long continuance and setled in an ancient possession.] But from what part of this testimony can that be drawn? sure not from the Abbots telling him they are all subject to the Church of God and Pope of Rome, for that subjection is express'd to be no other than what he payd to eve­ry pious and good Christian, and then every good Christian by this argument is aequally instated in this power. No more sure will it be inferred from his denying him all other power, but this. It remains then necessarily, that it be inferred from Augustines requiring the Abbates subjection to the Pope, or it cannot be evinced from this testimony. But 1. doth Augustine the Monk his requiring it, when it was as roundly denyed him, and never afterwards granted him, evince the possession thereof? Doth he possesse what he never had, and is finally rejected from his claim of it?

27. But saith S. W. Hence we see it was the Doctrine Austin taught the Saxons. In good time, Austin taught it the Saxons, therefore the Pope was setled in an ancient possession of it. [Page 155] The argument is of force the quite contrary way, the Abbate of Bangor refused it, and in the name of the whole British Church renounced all such right as he praetended, therefore in­fallibly he had it not. Doth not the Ʋniversal Pastorship in­clude the British as well as the Saxons, and can then the teach­ing it the Saxons conclude him possess'd of it among the Britans, when 'tis evident he is not possess'd of it? Doth not a particu­lar negative destroy an universal affirmative? if then he were not possess'd of this power over the Britans, he was not at that time, nor had [...]ver been (as farre as can from that, I shall adde, or from any other unsuspected testimony appear) possess'd of an Ʋniversal Pastorship, or acknowledged to be possess'd of it in this Kingdome. Such evictions are S. W's, which un­avoidably evince the direct contrary to the conclusion he pro­jected from them.

28. But let us for once endeavour to forget the difference betwixt Ʋniversals and Particulars, and take the Saxons, those few that were then converted by Austin, to be this whole Na­tion, what hath S. W. gained toward his unimproveable con­clusion by this great liberality? All that he praetends to is but Austins teaching it. But 1. the testimony is for no more then p [...]tens subjectionem Ecclesiae Romanae, demanding or requiring sub­jection to that Church, which differs from teaching, and can ne­ver be any seeming proof of possession.

29. Secondly, subjection to the Roman Church doth not ne­cessarily import that supereminent power of headship of the Ʋniversal Church, and that as derived to him from Christ as to St. Peters successor. This is the least that can serve S. W's praetensions, and teaching or requiring subjection indefinitely can never come home to that, any more than the Abbates answer did, that they were all obedient and subject to him, which we know signified the quite contrary. S.W. must pardon me this strictnesse, that I allow him no more, than the testimony (his only proof) exacts, for besides that this strictnesse, were it never so great, is no more then is necessary to a demonstrator (and such the layer of grounds assumes to be) the Records from Bede, and such other Historians, as the Romanist most depends [Page 156] on in this matter, amount to no more than this, that Austin finding the Britans to retain some practises different from the Roman usages, as in the celebrating of Easter, &c, laboured to conform them to the Roman way, under the title of Catholike peace, and so to bring all to an uniformity, but the Britans con­stant to their own Traditions, were not moved with the men­tion of the authority of the Roman Church or Pope; so Bede sets down his speech to them, In multis quidem nostrae consue­tudini imò universalis Ecclesiae contraria geritis, In many things you doe contrary to our custome, yea to the custome of the Ʋniversal Church (where by the way, some difference there is betwixt our i. e. the Roman, and the Ʋniversal Church. And so in the Popes answer to his third Interrogatory, he tells Austin, that if he found any thing that might be more acceptable to God, Sive in Romana, sive in Gallia­rum, seu in qualibet Ecclesia ali­quid invenisti quod plus omnipotenti Deo posset placere, sollicitè eligas & in Anglorum Ecclesia— infun­das. Bed. l. 1. c. 27. whether in the Church of Rome or of France, or any other Church, he should infuse it into the Church of England) and then all that is thence conclusible is, that the practice of the Church of Rome being consonant to the rest of the whole Church, was used by Austine as an argument to draw the Britans to the like practice, but sure that differs much from his teaching his Supremacy of power by divine right.

30. And this is yet more manifest, for the difference still continuing among them (what difference? Why, that the Britans would notBed. l. 2. c. 2. priscis abdicare moribus, leave their old customes) Austine in fine demands their accord with him but in these three particulars,Ʋt Pascha suo tempore celebretis, ut ministerium baptizandi juxta morem Romanae sanctae Ecclesiae & Apostolicae Ecclesiae compleatis, ut Genti Anglorum una nobiscum prae­dicetis. Bed. Ibid. the time of cele­brating Easter, the ministring baptisme ac­cording to the manner of the Roman Church and the Apostolike Church (which again one would not take for the same, being so seve­red) and the preaching the word of God toge­ther with them, adding expressely, Caetera quae agitis quamvis moribus nostris contraria aequanimiter cuncta tole­rabimus, Other things which ye doe, though contrary to our man­ners, we will bear them all patiently. Where it is most manifest, [Page 157] that Austin presses not, nor demands a subjection to the Papal authority, as that signifies jurisdiction, but subjection to, or rather complyance with a few customes of the Roman, being also the practises of the rest of the Church, to which the British thought they had no reason to yield, knowing that they were not under the Popes juris­diction.

25. One thing more is here to be observed, that Austin be­ing now Archbishop of Canterbury expected to have the Bri­tans acknowledge him as their Archbishop, but as Baleus tells us,Dionou [...]s—fortiter tuebatur Me­nevensis Arbhiepiscopi in Ecclesia­rum suarum rebus ratam jurisdicti­onem, concludens non esse in Britan­norum commodum futurum in com­munionem admittere vel Romano­rum fastum vel cognitam Anglo-Saxonum tyrannidem. Balaus. the Britans thought it not for their profit to admit either the pride of Rome, or the known tyranny of the Anglo-Saxons, and strongly defended the jurisdiction of the Archbishop of St. Davids in the affairs of their Churches, so Bede expressely addes, Neque illum pro Archiepiscopo habituros esse respon­debant, they answered, that they would not have him for their Archbishop. All which is very remote from inferring the Popes possession of England at that time; yea, if he were yielded to be possess'd of all that Austin did but petere, demand, or desire, yet it would yield S. W. no more advantage toward inferring the long continuance, and settlednesse in possession, than the Pope hath here had ever since he was disclaimed, for the British Bishops have all that time been subjected to the Bishop of Canterbury, the Successor of that Austin. This I suppose is not enough to satisfie S. W's appetite, and yet from the most favourable representment of this history, there is not a crumb more to be had for him; not the least newes of Ʋniversal Pastorship by divine right here so much as praetended to, (and for the title of conversion from Rome, besides that this is peculiar to the Saxons, and the Britans are not concern'd in it, S. W. disclaims building any thing on that title) and this cannot appear strange to any, that remembers this was in the time of that Gregory, who disclaimed that wicked, fastuous, monstrous, blasphemous, Anti­christian, [Page 158] Luciferian title of Ʋniversal Pastorship, which therefore 'tis not soberly imaginable that Austine should challenge for him, much lesse that he was thus anciently settled in this possession. Thus much for his fourth Ground, exact in nothing, but its conformity with the other three, All aequally capable of, and furnished with his demonstrative evictions.

SECT. VI.

1. HIS fifth Ground, that No possession ought to be disturbed without sufficient motives and reasons, and consequently it is it self a title, till those reasons invalidate it, and shew it null,] is long since, as farre as it is appliable to our quaestion, dis­appointed and invalidated, not only by the evidences formerly produced, for an Original right to an [...], or independency from all forain jurisdiction, parallel to that of the Africans, and consequent to that, the unlawfullnesse of all intrusions, and the oblig [...]tion of reducing unjust p [...]ssessions to what it was [...], from the beginning, by the force of the Ephe­sine Canon, in case of the Cypriots, but now farther by con­sidering, what power it is, which is by S. W. pretended to have been in possession so long, viz. that of Ʋniversal Pastor­ship by divine right, which till he hath proved demonstratively to have been in possession among us, he must no longer assume; and I shall flatter my self that I have abundantly evinced in the four former Sections, that he hath yet been very far from all appearance of thus p [...]oving it.

2. Had the four former grounds been solidly evinced, had this of Ʋniversal Pastorship approved it self to have been really in possession, the one acknowledged Doctrine for many hundred years, and the Scepters of this and all other King­domes willingly subjected to it, as to the undoubted Scepter of Christ, there might then be a season for the fifth ground, though still there would be just place also for Writs of error, [Page 160] and right once evidenced (as soon it would be) must have the deference from unjust, though aged possession, especially when the mindes of men were the possession, and pride on one side, and error on the other, the evil Spirits (little better than Devils) that possesse it, for sure humility and truth can never be forbid­den by the most inveterate contrary custome to return jure postliminii to their due habitations.

3. But when the possession it self, as it is by S. W. stated, is the [...], the first thing that is supposed, but not duely evidenced by him, and all the slight offers of proof for that already shewn to be uneffectual (for which I referre the Rea­der to the four [...]ormer Sections) 'tis visible that there is no farther consideration due from me to this his fifth ground; which having a generall truth in it, till it be applyed to our hypothesis, and so being in thesi by me most willingly, and se­curely granted to his first demand, is yet by S. W. beyond all the former, whose wants were more visible and importu­nate, allowed a liberal proportion of proofs from Nature: Morality, Policy, Common Law; but all these pains, as now appears, misplaced by him, like the charity which the Phari­see was warned of, the calling in only of his rich neighbours to his Feast; It had been well if in complyance with that Text, any of the four former, the poor, the maimed, the lame, and the blinde, had been thought capable of it.

4. Briefly therefore, I cannot affixe any probable sense to this proposition in thesi, wherein I have any concernment to deny, or question it; All the question is of the hypothesis; I shall never praetend the disturbing of any sort of possessions without sufficient motives or reasons. I, as readily as he could wish, acknowledge possession it self a title, till reasons are pro­duced to invalidate it, and farther, I have no dislike to his proofs, but discern reason to conclude, that that part of S.W. which wrote this Paragraph, is very well inabled to demon­strate a truth, and consequently that his former faileurs have not with any justice been imputable to him, who had sagaci­ty enough to invent, but to the matter, which was too barren to yield arguments, other than Topical or Sophistical. Only I [Page 161] cannot say of him, as Zeno of himself, that he sometims wanted opinions, but never arguments, for if I may judge by these five proposals of so many grounds, I must resolve he hath more opinions than arguments, conclusions, then praemisses, five grounds, but no tolerable mediums of eviction, save for one of them.

5. All that I have to resist in his descant on this fifth ground, is his Corollary, that I was very little advised in stating the questi­on rightly and clearly, Sch. p. 10. Where I tell him that the mo­tives are not worth heeding in this controversie, but only the truth of the matter of fact.] For the rebuke in this Corollary of his, the reason he assignes, is, [for the matter of fact, to wit, that there was then an actual government, and that we broke from it, being evident to all the world, and confess'd by the Protestants themselves, if there be no reasons to be examined, I am convinced to be a Schismatick so flatly and plainly, that it is left impossible even to plead a defense.

6. But he was certainly told long since, and need not be now reminded, that we do not confesse any breach on our part, that we still are where we ever were, under our lawfull Pastors, of whom the Primate of England residing at Canter­bury, is the chief, whom the Pope hath himself look'd on,Quasi compa­rem velut alte­rius Orbis Apo­stolicum et Pa­triarcham. Capgrav. in vit. Anselmi. as it were his Compeer, and Patriarch of this other little world, from whom having never separated, nor from our immediate supe­riors under him, we have no need to consider causes of divi­sions or breaches of that kinde, which as upon mature advise we know they cannot be just, so we are without all scruple per­swaded that we have not been guilty of them, nor can, save by one of these three wayes, either by casting off our Bishops, or calling in and submitting to some foraign power, or separating from other sister Churches, who are not before hand with us herein to cut us off from their Communion.

7. In managing this part of his cause, where truth wholly destitutes him, 'tis strange to see, what arts he resorts to, one while pressing me to change my method, and insist on the causes of our separation, when I assure him of the deliberate choice of this part of my method, and (which he of all men [Page 162] hath no praetense to complain of) my perfect concurrence with him in an unextorted profession, that no cause can justifie a separation (and that therefore we have much rather chosen to preserve our selves from this guilt, than to incurre first, and then palliate it, to injoy innocence, than to forecast and study Apologies) Another while telling us, that the breach is visible to all the world, and by us confess'd, when he knowes that all the magnifying glasses in the world cannot help any the sharpest sight to see what is not, and that there is nothing we more deny, than what he saith we confesse, viz. that we have ever broken off from any; Our lot having constantly been that which Christ foretold the earlyest Christians, to be cast out of the Synagogue, in which we had else remained, and now to have the [...] from those that have cast us out, and so made it impossible for us to be guilty of what they charge us; Let him but take notice, what I insist on this third time, that we confesse no breach on our part, but are ready, if yet they please to redintegrate secundum Canones, and that if herein we are proved liable, we shall contentedly fall under the guilt, and entertain no advocate to plead our causes, and he will be forced to confesse his Corollary had as much injustice, as I willingly acknowledge his fifth ground (considered, as here it is, only in thesi) to have truth in it.