THat one of these is necessary, principally, for the prevention of Forreign invasions, and intestine Dissentions destructive to all mens properties; there is no man of any capacity will deny, and as a se­condary end of Government for the due distribution of Justice between particular Persons, a people is next obliged to one of them, and those p [...]eceeding Grand Concernments being first pro­vided for: The last care of a Nation is to secure it self a­gainst the avarice and cruelty of their own Trustees, and to chuse that Government which most secures them from the last of these dangers, if it be not destructive to the a­fore mentioned ends of Government.

Now for the first of the [...]e, I mean the Protection of a Na­tion in danger, it is evident that a single person well chosen is the fittest, by reason that his Councels are most secret and sud­den for the prevention of eminent danger, and this hath been verified by the experience of Common-wealths, continually chusing single persons in such exigencies, and particularly the Romans, who though they had placed the Consular power in two, were compelled to chuse a Dictator, and give him an ab­solute unlimited power at such times; and at other ordinary times did (like other Common-wealths) trust their Armies to single persons. And if a single person hath this advantage a­gainst Forreigners, he hath the same against Seditions, and is better qualitifed for Conquests, as appears by the slow growth of the Roman power under a Common-wealth, and the quick progress of the Assyrian, Persian, Grecian, and Turkish Mo­narchies under their severall Emperors: And we may observe out of Six Walter Raleighs History of the world, that Hanni­bal, after he had by his many victories, made Rome almost stoop to Carthage, was compelled, (for want of power to command speedy supplyes) to quit the fruits of his victories, and see his Countrey ruined by the tedious and factious De­bates of an ill affected party to him in the Senate. And if we cast our eyes upon the two great Factions of the Presby­terians, and Independants in our Parliament in 1648. and remember how certainly they had brought us to a Warre but for the prevention of the Army, we may conclude the que­stion in point of security for a single person against any great Assembly, which will alwayes be subdivided, into Anabap­tists, Independants, Quakers, &c. and be easily misled by ambitious crafty ill men into destructive confusions, if they be unlimited in power, and time of sitting.

As for the Government of a smaller number the inconveni­encies will be the same in any number under a hundred, though not so frequent as in greater Assemblies, but an unlimited pow­er amongst equalls will divide them like petty Princes, through ambition and interest into factions, and confederacies, if they [Page 3]be not kept at unity by their apprehensions of their mighty neighbours, as the Venetians and Hollanders have alwaies been, and as the Romans hardly were, till they had ma­stered their greatest opposites, and then grew liable to sediti­ons, and usurpations among themselves so that either of th' a­fore mentioned numbers must give place to the single person for securing a Nation.

As for the distribution of Justice, there is little to be said to that, but that a single person is more like to make quick dispatches, then where there is a number of equalls to oppose, and debate, and he is more like to do justice as having a greater concernment of his own, and more eyes upon him then a number, who may lay the faults upon each other, and where the worst sort do commonly confederate to surprise the honest men with their prepared speeches for their own corrupt ends.

But to the last question: which of all these a people may best secure themselves against: I must give a divided answer, for the Armies of supreame Governours are the effects of ava­rice, or cruelty and all the three Governments, as they are single, and unlimited may practise both, but the single person if he be cruell, ungodly, or a fool, is like to commit rash acts of Tyranny to the destruction of those few that displease him, which the number of Governours commonly doth by the formality of a high Court of injustice, or by a martiall Law; but for the rapine of Governours, as we measure the generality of men by their interest, there must needs be more avarice, and more interests to maintaine at the charge of a Na­tion amongst a multitude of Governours then in a single per­son; and more Masters to please or displease must necessarily be more troublesome then one, when every one hath power to prejudice the poor that want friends, but they must most of them strive to redresse a grievance, which is very slowly effe­cted, if at all, against a member of an Assembly, that hath prepossessed his friends, (where his adversary cannot be heard) and who would unwillingly punish one of their own, if his adversary could be admitted to speak for himself, in their As­sembly.

To conclude, a perpetuall representative appeares to be more oppressive, and inconvenience, then any mortall Tyrant can be: But, whether there be any security from all usurpati­on in a mixt or ballancing power, is next to be enquired.

That a great Assembly will endeavour to perpetuate it self, is as certain, as it is, that all men naturally love the power to oblige, or punish; and this experience hath confirmed unto us, and it is as clear that they will never want pretences for it from reall or pretended dangers, at home, or abroad, or from busi­nesses depending before them, which they will take to them­selves as they are the supream judicature, either upon appeals from inferiour Courts, or out of their naturall love to power, or the avarice of many amongst them, and neither a co-ordi­nate smaller number called a Senate, or what you please, nor any endeavours of the scattered multitude, divided by their ig­norance, interest, or the influence of those in power, can hinder them from falling upon tedious debates to the obstruction of all justice, nor is their Tyranny like to have other period, but from their forementioned confusions, which a co-ordinate equall power will as certainly increase, as if two single per­sons were to raign at once: And if it be an inferiour power, it will be but a new delay of justice, without preventing the aforementioned inconveniencies, for the supream will have the last appeals of every dissatisfied person, besides all the com­plaints that shall be immediately addressed to them by any of their friends, and though all the supream Assembly or but a part of the members should submit to a new Annuall Ele­ction, what a perpetuall confusion or delay would there be in Causes long depending that either the new members must either vote in by chance, or hear the whole businesse over againe besides the distraction of forraign intelligence by their change: But some Commonwealths-men propose that the lesser As­sembly should onely debate, and the supream should onely judge, but I aske who shall stop the mouths of the supream power from debating before they give sentence, or if it were possible what blind judgments must they give, without the [Page 5]liberty of expressing, and clearing their doubts.

As for the numbers of 100, or 60, or what you please, it is presumed there will be some covetous, crafty ill men a­mongst them, who seeing they have no power to determine controversies, have no other way to get money, but by delay­ing every mans businesse, till they are quickned with bribes, and how easily this is done by Objections, raysing De­bates amongst Confederates (who when other Arts fail, can put off one businesse with another where many are de­pending) is not unknown to any knowing person that ever was a Member of any great Assembly.

By which I conclude, that two Assemblies, whether e­quall or subordinate, are more burthensome then one, and al­wayes dangerous, without an Umpire, or Negative, in a third estate to the unlimited Power of either, and if there be no security in that mixture, We are not to hope it in any.

For example, Two interessed contentious persons have seldome been known to decide a private Difference them­selves, but, if they engage their whole Estates to submit to an Arbitrator, they must then agree for a part, rather then lose the whole. If then it be granted that all per­sons that acquired power, will keep it as long as they can, and extend it as far as they dare, and that the greatest As­semblies are most incontroulable in this our present Mo­dellers of Common-wealths, can never hope to see their Dictates of Rotation, and mixture observed by one or two Estates, if they were the best, since there will alwayes be some Knaves in power, and many Fooles to be seduced by their specious pretences against their true Interests, and therefore they had as good trust the Nation with its own Liberty now, as be forced to it hereafter, since that is not best for a Nation that is so in it self, but what they are most agreed on: And those that oppose that, are invaders of all mens Liberties, and Properties, according to Com­mon-wealth [Page 6]Principles, and to Christs also, who hath said. That a Kingdome divided in it self cannot stand.

Therefore, if our Nation be more like to agree upon mending the Old Fabricke then erecting a New. I pre­sume all good Christians and true English men would consent to it, though they denied all former Contracts.