CHAP. I. Of the state of men without Civill Society.

I. THe faculties of Hu­mane The Intro­duction. nature may be reduc'd unto four kinds; Bodily strength, Experi­ence, Reason, Pas­sion. Taking the beginning of this following Doctrine from these, we will declare in the first place what manner of inclinations men who are endued with these faculties bare towards each other, and whether, and by what fa­culty they are born, apt for Society, and so preserve themselves against mutuall vio­lence; then proceeding, we will shew what [Page 3] advice was necessary to be taken for this bu­sinesse, and what are the conditions of S [...] ­ciety, or of Humane Peace; that is to say, (changing the words onely) what are the fundamentall Lawes of Nature.

II. The greatest part of those men who That the beginning of mutuall society is from f [...]ar. have written ought concerning Common-wealths, either suppose, or require us, or beg of us to believe, That Man is a Crea­ture (*) born sit for Society: The Greek, call him [...]; and on this foun­dation they so build up the Doctrine of Ci­vill Society, as if for the preservation of Peace, and the Government of Man-kind there were nothing else necessary, then that Men should agree to make certaine Cove­nants and Conditions together, which thems [...]lves should then call Lawes. Which Axiom, though received by most, is yet certainly False, and an Errour proceeding from our too slight contemplation of Hu­mane Nature; for they who shall more narrowly look into the Causes for which Men come together, and delight in each others company, shall easily find that this happens not because naturally it could hap­pen no otherwise, but by Accident: For if by nature one Man should Love another (that is) as Man, there could no reason be return'd why every Man should not equally Love every Man, as being equally Man, or why he should rather frequent those whose Society affords him Honour or Profit. We doe not therefore by nature seek Society for its own sake, but that we may receive some Honour or Profit from it; these we desire Primarily, that Secondarily: How by what [Page 4] advice Men doe meet, will be best known by observing those things which they doe when they are met: For if they meet for Traffique, it's plaine every man regards not his Fellow, but his Businesse; if to discharge some Office, a certain Market­friendship is begotten, which hath more of Jealousie in it then True love, and whence Factions sometimes may arise, but Good will never; if for Pleasure, and Recreation of mind, every man is wont to please him­self most with those things which stirre up laughter, whence he may (according to the nature of that which is Ridiculous) by com­parison of another mans Defects and Infir­mities, passe the more currant in his owne opinion; and although this be sometimes innocent, and without offence; yet it is manifest they are not so much delighted with the Society, as their own Vain glory. But for the most part, in these kind of meet­ings, we wound the absent, their whole life, sayings, actions are examin'd, judg'd, con­demn'd; nay, it is very rare, but some present receive a fling before they part, so as his reason was not ill, who was wont al­wayes at parting to goe out last. And these are indeed the true delights of Society, unto which we are carryed by nature. (i. e.) by those passions which are incident to all Creatures, untill either by sad experience, or good precepts, it so fall out (which in many never happens) that the Appetite, of present matters, be dul'd with the memory of things past, without which, the discourse of most quick and nimble men, on this sub­ject, is but cold and hungry.

[Page 5] But if it so happen, that being met, they passe their time in relating some Stories, and one of them begins to tell one which concernes himselfe; instantly every one of the rest most greedily desires to speak of himself too; if one relate some wonder, the rest will tell you miracles, if they have them, if not, they'l fein them: Lastly, that I may say somewhat of them who pretend to be wiser then others; if they meet to talk of Philosophy, look how many men, so many would be esteem'd Masters, or else they not only love not their f [...]llowes, but even persecute them with hatred: So clear is it by experience to all men who a little more narrowly consider Humane affaires, that all free congress ariseth either from mutual po­verty, or from vain glory, whence the parties met, endeavour to carry with them either some benefit, or to leave behind them that same [...] some esteem and honour with those, with whom they have been con­versant: The same is also collected by rea­son out of the definitions themselves, of Will, Good, Honour, Profitable. For when we voluntarily contract Society, in all manner of Society we look after the object of the Will, i. e. that, which every one of those, who gather together, propounds to himselfe for good; now whatsoever seemes good, is pleasant, and relates either to the senses, or the mind, but all the mindes pleasure is ei­ther Glory, (or to have a good opinion of ones selfe) or referres to Glory in the end; the rest are Sensuall, or conducing to sensu­ality, which may be all comprehended un­der the word Conveniencies. All Society [Page 6] therefore is either for Gain, or for Glory, (i. e.) not so much for love of our Fellowes, as for love of our Selves: but no society can be great, or lasting, which begins from Vain Glory; because that Glory is like Honour, if all men have it, no man hath it, for they consist in comparison and precel­lence; neither doth the society of others advance any whit the cause of my glorying in my selfe; for every man must account himself, such as he can make himselfe, with­out the help of others. But though the be­nefits of this life may be much farthered by mutuall help, since yet those may be better attain'd to by Dominion, then by the so­ciety of others: I hope no body will doubt but that men would much more greedily be carryed by Nature, if all fear were re­moved to obtain Dominion, then to gaine Society. We must therefore resolve, that the Originall of all great, and lasting Soci­eties, consisted not in the mutuall good will men had towards each other, but in the (*) mutuall fear they had of each o­ther.

Born sit] Since we now see actually a con­stituted Annota­tion. Society among men, and none living out of it, since we discern all desirous of con­gresse, and mutuall correspondence, it may seeme a wonderfull kind of stupidity, to lay in the very threshold of this Doctrine, such a stumbling block before the Readers, as to deny Man to be born sit for Society: Therefore I must more plainly say, That it is true indeed, that to Man, by nature, or as Man, that is, as soone as he is born, Solitude is an enemy; for In­fants have need of others to help them to live, [Page 7] and those of riper years to help them to live well, wherefore I deny not that men (even na­ture compelling) desire to come together. But civill Societies are not meer Meetings, but Bonds, to the making whereof, Faith and Com­pacts are necessary: the Vertue whereof to Children, and Fooles, and the Profit whereof to those who have not yet tasted the miseries which accompany its defects, is altogether un­known; whence it happens, that those, because they know not what Society is, cannot enter into it; these, because ignorant of the benefit it brings, care not for it. Manifest therefore it is, that all men, because they are born in Infancy, are born unapt for Society. Many also (perhaps most men) either through defect of minde, or want of education remain unfit during the whole course of their lives; yet have they Infants, as well as those of riper years, an humane nature; where­fore Man is made sit for Society not by Nature, but by Education: furthermore, although Man were born in such a condition as to desire it, it followes not, that he therefore were Born sit to enter into it; for it is one thing to desire, ano­ther to be in capacity [...]it for what we desire; for even they, who through their pride, will not stoop to equall conditions; without which there can be no Society, do yet desire it.

The mutuall fear] It is objected: It is so Annota­tion. improbable that men should grow into civill Societies out of fear, that if they had been a­fraid, they would not have endur'd each others looks: They presume, I believe, that to fear is nothing else then to be affrighted: I compre­hend in this word Fear, a certain foresight of future evill; neither doe I conceive flight the sole property of fear, but to distrust, suspect; [Page 8] take heed, provide so that they may not fear, is al­so incident to the fearfull. They, who go to Sleep, shut their Dores, they who Travell carry their Swords with them, because they fear Theives. Kingdomes guard their Coasts and Frontiers with Forts, and Castles, Cities are compast with Walls, and all for fear of neighbouring Kingdomes and Townes; even the strongest Armies, and most accomplish [...] for Fight, yet sometimes Parly for peace, as fearing each o­thers power, and lest they might be overcome. It is through fear that men secure themselves, by flight indeed, and in corners, if they think they cannot escape otherwise, but for the most part by Armes, and Defensive Weapons; whence it happens, that daring to come forth, they know each others Spirits; but then, if they fight, Civill Society ariseth from the Victory, if they agree, from their Agreement.

III. The cause of mutuall fear consists partly in the naturall equality of men, partly That men by nature are all e­quall. in their mutuall will of hurting: whence it comes to passe that we can neither expect from others, nor promise to our selves the least security: For if we look on men full­grown, and consider how brittle the frame of our humane body is, (which perishing, all its strength, vigour, and wisdome it selfe perisheth with it) and how easie a matter it is, even for the weakest man to kill the strongest, there is no reason why any man trusting to his own strength should conceive himself made by nature above others: they are equalls who can doe equall things one against the other; but they who can do the greatest things, (namely kill) can doe e­quall things. All men therefore among [Page 9] themselves are by nature equall; the inequa­lity we now discern, hath its spring from the Civill Law.

IV. All men in the State of nature have a Whence the wil of mis­chieving each other ariseth. desire, and will to hurt, but not proceeding from the same cause, neither equally to be condemn'd, for one man according to that naturall equality which is among us, per­mits as much to others, as he assumes to himself (which is an argument of a tempe­rate man, and one that rightly values his power) another supposing himselfe above others, will have a License to doe what he lists, and challenges Respect, and Honour, as due to him before others, (which is an Argument of a fiery spirit:) This mans will to hurt ariseth from Vain glory, and the false esteeme he hath of his owne strength; the others, from the necessity of defending himselfe, his liberty, and his goods against this mans violence.

V. Furthermore, since the combate of The discord from com­parison of wits. Wits is the fiercest, the greatest discords which are, must necessarily arise from this Contention; for in this case it is not only odious to contend against, but also not to consent; for not to approve of what a man sai [...]h is no lesse then tacitely to accuse him of an Errour in that thing which he speak­eth; as in very many things to dissent, is as much as if you accounted him a fool whom you dissent from; which may appear hence, that there are no Warres so sharply wag'd as between Sects of the same Reli­gion, and Factions of the same Common-weale where the Contestation is: Either concerning Doctrines, or Politique Pru­dence. [Page 10] And since all the pleasure, and jol­lity of the mind consists in this; even to get some, with whom comparing it, may find somewhat wherein to Tryumph, and Vaunt it self; its impossible but men must declare sometimes some mutuall scorn and contempt either by Laughter, or by Words, or by Gesture, or some signe or other; then which there is no greater vexation of mind; and then from which there cannot possibly arise a greater desire to doe hurt.

VI. But the most frequent reason why From the Appetite many have to the same thing. men desire to hurt each other, ariseth hence, that many men at the same time have an Appetite to the same thing; which yet ve­ry often they can neither enjoy in common, nor yet divide it, whence it followes that the strongest must have it, and who is strongest must be decided by the Sword.

VII. Among so many dangers therefore, The defini­tion of Right. as the naturall lusts of men do daily threa­ten each other withall, to have a care of ones selfe is not a matter so scornfully to be lookt upon, as if so be there had not been a power and will left in one to have done o­therwise; for every man is desirous of what is good for him, and shuns what is evill, but chiefly the chiefest of naturall evills, which is Death; and this he doth, by a certain impulsion of nature, no lesse then that whereby a Stone moves down­ward: It is therefore neither absurd, nor reprehensible; neither against the dictates of true reason for a man to use all his en­deavours to preserve and defend his Body, and the Members thereof from death and sorrowes; but that which is not contrary [Page 11] to right reason, that all men account to be done justly, and with right; Neither by the word Right is any thing else signified, then that liberty which every man hath to make use of his naturall faculties according to right reason: Therefore the first foun­dation of naturall Right is this, That every man as much as in him lies endeavour to protect his life and members.

VIII. But because it is in vaine for a A right to to the end gives also a right to the means. man to have a Right to the end, if the Right to the necessary meanes be deny'd him; it followes, that since every man hath a Right to preserve himself, he must also be allowed a Right to use all the means, and do all the actions, without which he cannot preserve himself

IX. Now whether the means which he is By the right of na­ture every man is judge of the means which tend to his pre­servation. about to use, and the action he is perfor­ming, be necessary to the preservation of his Life, and Members, or not, he himself, by the right nature, must be judg; for say ano­ther man, judg that it is contrary to right reason that I should judg of mine own perill: why now, because he judgeth of what concerns me, by the same reason, because we are equall by nature, will I judge also of things which doe belong to him; there­fore it agrees with right reason (that is) it is the right of nature that I judge of his opinion, (i. e.) whether it conduce to my preservation, or not.

10. Nature hath given to every one a By right of nature all men have equall right to all things. right to all (That as it was lawfull for every man in the (*) bare state of nature, or be­fore such time as men had engag'd them­selves by any Covenants, or Bonds, to doe [Page 12] what hee would, and against whom he thought fit, and to possesse, use, and enjoy all what he would, or could get. Now be­cause whatsoever a man would, it therefore seems good to him because he wills it, and either it really doth, or at least seems to him to contribute toward his preservation, (but we have already allowed him to be judge in the foregoing Article whether it doth or not, in so much as we are to hold all for ne­cessary whatsoever he shall esteeme so) and by the 7. Article it appeares that by the right of Nature those things may be done, and must be had, which necessarily conduce to the protection of life, and members, it fol­lowes, that in the state of nature, To have all, and do all is lawfull for all. And this is that which is meant by that cōmon saying, Nature hath given all to all, from whence we understand likewise, that in the state of nature, Profit is the measure of Right.

In the meere state of Nature] This is thus Annotation to be understood: What any man does in the bare state of Nature is injurious to no man; not that in such a State he cannot offend God, or break the Lawes of Nature; for Iujustice against men presupposeth Humane Lawes, such, as in the State of Nature there are none: Now the truth of this proposition thus conceived is suffici­ently demonstrated to the mindfull Reader in the Articles immediately foregoing; but be­cause in certaine cases the difficulty of the con­clusion makes us forget the premises, I will contract this Argument, and make it most e­vident to a single view; every man hath right to protect himself, as appears by the seventh Ar­ticle. The same man therefore hath a right to [Page 13] use all the means which necessarily conduce to this end by the eight Article: But those are the necessary means which he shall judge to be such by the ninth Article. He therefore [...]ath a right to make use of, and to doe all whatsoever he shall judge requisite for his preservation: wherefore by the judgement of him that doth it, the thing done is either right, or wrong; and therefore right. True it is therefore in the [...]are State of Nature, &c but if any man pre­tend somewhat to tend necessarily to his preser­vation, which yet he himself doth not confident­ly believe so, he may offend against the Lawes of Nature, as in the third Chapter of this Book is more at large declar'd It hath been objected by some: If a Sonne kill his Father, doth he him no injury? I have answered, That a So [...]ne cannot be understood to be at any time in the State of Nature, as being under the power and command of them to who [...] he ownes his protection as soon as ever he is born, namely either his Fathers, or his Mothers, or his that nourisht him, as is demonstrated in the ninth Chapter.

XI. But it was the least benefit for men The right of all to all is unprofi­table. thus to have a common Right to all things; for the effects of this Right are the same, almost, as if there had been no Right at all; for although any man might say of every thing, This is mine, yet could he not enjoy it, by reason of his Neighbour, who having equall Right, and equall power, would pre­tend the same thing thing to be his. The state of men with­out Society is a state of War.

XII. If now to this naturall proclivity of men, to hurt each other, which they derive from their Passions, but chiefly from a vain esteeme of themselves: You adde, the [Page 14] right of all to all, wherewith one by right in­vades, the other by right resists, and whence arise perpetuall jealousies and suspicions on all hands, and how hard a thing it is to pro­vide against an enemy invading us, with an intention to oppresse, and ruine, though he come with a small Number, and no The defini­tion of War, and Pace. great Provision, it cannot be deny'd but that the naturall state of men, before they entr'd into Society, was a meer War, and that not simply, but a War of all men, a­gainst all men; for what is WAR, but that same time in which the will of contesting by force, is fully declar'd either by Words, or Deeds? The time remaining, is termed PEACE.

XIII. But it is easily judg'd how disagree­able War is an adversary to mans preserva­tion. a thing to the preservation either of Man-kind, or of each single Man, a perpe­tuall War is: But it is perpetuall in its own nature, because in regard of the e [...]uality of those that st [...]ive, it cannot be ended by Victory; for in this state the Conquerour is subject to so much danger, as it were to be accounted a Miracle, if any, even the most strong should close up his life with many years, and old age. They of Ame­rica are Examples hereof, even in this pre­sent Age: Other Nations have been in former Ages, which now indeed are become Civill, and Flourishing, but were then few, fierce, short-lived, poor, nasty, and destroy'd of all that Pleasure, and Beauty of life, which Peace and Society are wont to bring with them. Whosoever therefore holds, that it had been best to have continued in that state in which all [Page 15] things were lawfull for all men, he contra­dicts himself; for every man, by naturall necessity desires that which is good for him: nor is there any that esteemes a war of all against all, which necessarily adheres to such a State, to be good for him, and so it happens that through feare of each other we think it fit to rid our selves of this conditi­on, and to get some fellowes; that if there needs must be war, it may not yet be against all men, nor without some helps.

XIV. Fellowes are gotten either by con­straint, That by the right of na­ture it is lawfull for any man to compell him whom he hath in his power to give him caution for his fu­ture obedi­ence. or by consent; By Constraint, when after fight the Conqueror makes the con­quered serve him either through feare of death, or by laying fetters on him: By con­sent, when men enter into society to helpe each other, both parties consenting without any constraint. But the Conqueror may by right compell the Conquered, or the stron­gest the weaker, (as a man in health may one that is sick, or he that is of riper yeares a childe) unlesse he will choose to die, to give caution of his future obedience. For since the right of protecting our selves ac­cording to our owne wills proceeded from our danger, and our danger from our equa­lity, its more consonant to reason, and more certaine for our conservation, using the present advantage to secure our selves by taking caution; then, when they shall be full growne and strong, and got out of our power, to endeavour to recover that power againe by doubtfull fight. And on the other side, nothing can be thought more absurd, then by discharging whom you al­ready have weak in your power, to make [Page 16] him at once both an enemy, and a strong one. From whence we may understand likewise as a Corollarie in the naturall state of men, That a sure and irresistible power confers the right of Dominion, and ruling over those who cannot resist; insomuch, as the right of all things, that can be done, adheres essentially, and immediately unto this om­nipotence hence arising.

XV. Yet cannot men expect any lasting preservation continuing thus in the state of nature (i. e.) of War, by reason of that equa­lity of power, and other humane faculties they are endued withall. Wherefore to seek Peace, where there is any hopes of obtain­ing it, and where there is none, to enquire out for Auxiliaries of War, is the dictate of right Reason; that is, the Law of Nature, as shall be shewed in the next Chapter.

CHAP. II. Of the Law of Nature concer­ning Contracts.

I. ALL Authors agree not concerning That the Law of na­ture is not an agree­ment of men, but the Dictates of Reason. the definition of the Naturall Law, who notwithstanding doe very often▪ make use of this terme in their Writings. The Method therefore, wherein we begin from definitions, and exclusion of all equivoca­tion, is only proper to them who leave no place for contrary Disputes; for the rest, if any man say, that somwhat is done against the Law of Nature, one proves it hence, because it was done against the generall A­greement of all the most wise, and learned Nations: But this declares not who shall be the judg of the wisdome and learning of [Page 19] all Nations: Another hence, That it was done against the Generall consent of all Man-kind; which definition is by no means to be admitted; for then it were impossible for any but Children, and Fools, to offend against such a Law; for sure, un­der the notion of Man-kind, they compre­hend all men actually endued with Reason. These therefore either doe Naught against it, or if they doe Ought, it is without their joint accord, and therefore ought to be ex­cus'd, but to receive the Lawes of Nature from the Consents of them, who oftner Break, then Observe them, is in truth un­reasonable: besides, Men condemne the same things in others, which they approve in themselves; on the other side, they pub­lickly commend what they privately con­demne; and they deliver their Opinions more by Hear-say, then any Speculation of their own; and they accord more through hatred of some object, through fear, hope, love, or some other perturbation of mind, then true Reason. And therefore it comes to passe, that whole Bodyes of people often doe those things by Generall accord, or Contention, which those Wri­ters most willingly acknowledge to be a­gainst the Law of Nature. But since all doe grant that is done by RIGHT, which is not done against Reason, we ought to judg those Actions onely wrong, which are re­pugnant to right Reason, (i. e.) which con­tradict some certaine Truth collected by right reasoning from true Principles; but that Wrong which is done, we say it is done against some Law: therefore True Reason is [Page 20] a certaine Law, which (since it is no lesse a part of Humane nature, then any other fa­culty, or affection of the mind) is also ter­med naturall. Therefore the Law of Na­ture, that I may define it, is the Dictate of right (*) Reason, conversant about those things which are either to be done, or o­mitted for the constant preservation of Life, and Members, as much as in us lyes.

Right Reason.] By Right Reason in the Annota­tion. naturall state of men, I understand not, as ma­ny doe, an infallible faculty, but the act of rea­soning, that is, the peculiar and true ratiocina­tion of every man concerning those actions of his which may [...]r redound to the dammage, or benefit of his neighbours. I call it Peculiar, be­cause although in a Civill Government the rea­son of the Supreme (i. e. the Civill Law) is to be received by each single subject for the right; yet being without this Civill Government, (in which state no man can know right reason from false, but by comparing it with his owne) every mans owne reason is to be accounted not onely the rule of his owne actions which are done at his owne perill, but also for the measure of ano­ther mans reason, in such things as doe concerne him. I call it True; that is, concluding from true principles rightly fram'd, because that the whole breach of the Lawes of Nature consists in the false reasoning, or rather folly of those men who see not those duties they are necessarily to performe toward others in order to their owne conservation; but the Principles of Right rea­soning about such like duties are those which are explained in the 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7. Articles of the first Chapter.

[Page 21] II. But the first and fundamentall Law That is the fundamen­tall Law of Nature to seek Peace where it may be had, and where not, to de­fend our▪ selves. of Nature is, That Peace is to be sought after where it may be found; and where not, there to provide our selves for helps of War: For we shewed in the last Article of the foregoing Chapter, that this precept is the dictate of right reason; but that the Dictates of right reason are naturall Lawes, that hath been newly prov'd above; But this is the first, because the rest are deriv'd from this, and they direct the wayes either to Peace, or self-defence.

III. But one of the Naturall Lawes de­riv'd The first special Law of Nature is, That our Rights to all things ought not to be re­tain'd. from this fundamentall one is this, That the right of all men, to all things, ought not to be retain'd, but that some certain rights ought to be transferr'd, or relinquisht: for if every one should retain his right to all things, it must necessarily follow, that some by right might invade; and others, by the same right, might defend themselves against them, (for every man, by naturall necessi­ty, endeavours to defend his Body, and the things which he judgeth necessary towards the protection of his Body) therefore War would follow. He therefore acts against the reason of Peace, (i. e.) against the Law of Nature, whosoever he be, that doth not part with his Right to all things.

IV. But he is said to part with his right, What it is to quit our right, what to convey [...] it. who either absolutely renounceth it, or con­veys it to another. He absolutely renoun­ceth it, who by some sufficient Signe, or meet Tokens, declares that he is willing that it shall never be lawfull for him to doe that again, which before, by Right, he might have done; but he conveys it to another, [Page 22] who by some sufficient Signe, or meet To­kens, declares to that other, that he is wil­ling it should be unlawfull for him to resist him, in going about to do somewhat in the performance where he might before, with Right, have resisted him; but that the conveyance of Right consists meerly in not resisting, is understood by this, that before it was convey'd, he, to whom he convey'd it, had even then also a right to all, whence he could not give any new Right: But the resisting Right he had, before he gave it, by reason whereof the other could not freely enjoy his Rights, is utterly abolisht: Who­soever therefore acquires some Right in the naturall state of men, he onely procures himself security, and freedome from just molestation in the enjoyment of his Primi­tive Right: As for example, if any man shall sell, or give away a Farme, he utter­ly deprives himself only from all Right to this Farme, but he does not so from others also.

V. But in the conveyance of Right the The will of the receiver must neces­sarily be declar'd be­fore the right be convey'd. will is requisite not onely of him that con­veys, but of him also that accepts it. If ei­ther be wanting, the Right remaines: for if I would have given what was mine, to one who refus'd to accept of it, I have not therefore either simply renounc'd my Right, or convey'd it to any man; for the cause which mov'd me to part with it to Words con­vey not, ex­cept they relate to the time pre­sent. this Man was in him onely, not in o­thers too.

VI. But if there be no other Token ex­tant of our will either to quit, or convey our Right, but onely Words; those words [Page 23] must either relate to the present, or time past; for if they be of the future onely, they con­vey nothing: for example, he that speaks thus of the time to come, I will give to morrow, declares openly that y [...]t he hath not given it; so that all this day his right remains, and abides to morrow too, unlesse in the interim he actually bestowes it: for what is mine, remains mine till I have parted with it. But if I shall speak of the time present, suppose thus; I doe give, or have given you this to be received to mor­row, by these words is signified that I have already given it, and that his Right to receive it to morrow, is conveyed to him by me to day.

VII. Neverthelesse, although words a­lone Words of the future suffice to convey, if other testi­monies of our will be not wanting. are not sufficient tokens to declare the Will; if yet to words relating to the future, there shall some other signes be added, they may become as valid, as if they had been spoken of the present: If therefore, as by reason of those other signes, it appear, that he that speaks of the future, intends those words should be effectuall toward the per­fect transferring of his Right, they ought to be valid; for the conveyance of right depends not on words, but (as hath been instanc'd in the 4. Article) on the declaration of the Will.

VIII. If any man conveigh some part In matters of free gift words of the fi [...]ure [...]onveigh no Right. of his right to another, and doth not this for some certain benefit received, or for some compact, a conveighance in this kind is called a Gift, or free Donation. B [...]t in free donation those words onely oblige us which signifie the p [...]esent, or the time past; [Page 24] for if they respect the future, they oblige not as words, for the reason given in the fore-going Article: It must needs therefore be, that the Obligation arise from some other tokens of the Will: But, because whatso­ver is voluntarily done, is done for some good to him that wils it; there can no other token be assigned of the Will to give it, ex­cept some benefit either already receiv'd, or to be acquir'd; but is suppos'd, that no such benefit is acquired, nor any compact in being; for if so, it would cease to be a free gift: It remains therefore, that a mu­tuall good turne without agreement be ex­pected; but no signe can be given, that he, who us'd future words toward him who was in no sort engag'd to return a be­nefit, should desire to have his words so understood, as to oblige himselfe thereby. Nor is it suitable to Reason, that those who are easily enclined to doe well to o­thers, should be oblig'd by every promise, testifying their present good affection: And for this cause, a promiser in this kind, must be understood to have time to deli­berate, and power to change that affection as well as he to whom he made that pro­mise, may alter his desert. But he that de­liberates, is so farre forth free, nor can be said to have already given: But if he pro­mise often, and yet give seldome, he ought to be condemn'd of levity, and be called not a Donour, but Doson.

IX. But the act of two, or more, mu­tually The defini­tion of Con­tract, and Covenant. conveighing their Rights, is call'd a Contract. But in every Contract, either both parties instantly performe what they [Page 25] contract for, insomuch as there is no trust had from either to other; or the one per­formes, the other is trusted, or neither per­forme. Eeither both parties performe pre­sently, there the Contract is ended, as soon as 'tis performed; but where there is cre­dit given either to one, or both, there the party trusted promiseth after-performance; and this kind of promise is called a CO­VENANT.

X. But the Covenant made by the party In Cove­nants we passe away our Rights by words signifying the future. trusted with him, who hath already perfor­med, although the promise be made by words pointing at the future, doth no les [...]e transfer the right of future time, thē if it had been made by words signifying the present, or time past: for the others performance is a most manifest signe that he so understood the speech of him whom he trusted, as that he would certainly make performance also at the appointed time; and by this signe the party trusted knew himselfe to be thus understood, which, because he hindred not, 'twas an evident token of his Will to per­forme. The promises therefore which are made for some benefit received (which are also Covenants) are Tokens of the Will; that is, (as in the foregoing Section hath been declared) of the last act of delibera­ting, whereby the liberty of non-perfor­mance is abolisht, and by consequence are obligatory; for where Liberty ceaseth, there beginneth Obligation.

XI. But the Covenants, which are Covenants in the state of nature are in vain, and of none effect, not so in Civill Govern­ment. made in contract of mutual [...] trust, neither party performing out of hand, if there (*) arise a just suspicion in either of them, [Page 26] are in the state of nature invalid: for he that first performes by reason of the wicked disposition of the greatest part of men stu­dying their owne advantage, either by right, or wrong, exposeth himself to the per­verse will of him with whom he hath Con­tracted; for it suites not with reason, that any man should performe first, if it be not likely that the other will not make good his promise after; which, whether it be pro­bable, or not, he that doubts it, must be judge of, as hath been shewed in the fore-going Chapter in the 9. Article. Thus, I say, things stand in the state of nature, but in a Civill State, when there is a power which can compell both parties, he that hath contracted to perform first, must first performe; because, that since the other may be compell'd, the cause which made him fear the others non-performance, cea­seth.

Arise] For, except there appear some new Annotation cause of fear, either from somewhat done, or some other token of the Will not to performe from the other part, it cannot be judg'd to be a just fear; for the cause which was not suf­ficient to keep him from making Compact, must not suffice to authorize the breach of it, being made. That no man can make Com­pacts with Beasts, nei­ther with God with­out Revela­tion.

XI. But from this reason, that in all Free-gifts, and Compacts, there is an accep­tance of the conveighance of Right requi­red: it followes, that no man can Compact with him who doth not declare his accep­tance; and therefore we cannot compact with Beasts, neither can we give, or take from them any manner of Right, by reason [Page 27] of their want of speech, and understanding. Neither can any man Covenant with God, or be oblig'd to him by Vow, except so far forth as it appeares to him by Holy Scrip­tures, that he hath substituted certaine men who have authority to accept of such like Vowes and Covenants, as being in Gods stead.

XIII. Those therefore doe vow in vain, Nor yet Vow to God. who are in the state of nature, where they are not tyed by any Civill Law, (except by most certain Revelation the Will of God to accept their Vow, or Pact, be made known to them) for if what they Vow, be contrary to the Law of Nature, they are not tyed by their Vow, for no man is tyed to perform an unlawfull act, but if what is vowed, be commanded by some Law of nature, it is not their Vow, but the Law it self which ties them; but if he were free be­fore his vow, either to doe▪ it, or not doe it, his liberty remaines, because that the openly declar'd Will of the obliger is re­quisite to make an obligation by Vow, which in the case propounded is suppos'd not to be: Now I call him the Obliger to whom any one is tyed, and the Obliged him who is tyed.

XIV. Covenants are made of such Compacts oblige not beyond our utmost en­deavours. things onely as fall under our deliberation, for it can be no Covenant without the Will of the Contractor, but the Will is the last act of him who deliberates; Wherefore they on [...]ly concerne things possible, and to come; no man therefore, by his Compact, obligeth himself to an impossibility. But yet, though we often Covenant to doe▪ such things as [Page 28] then seem'd possible when we promis'd them, which yet afterward appear to be impossible, are we therefore freed from all obligation? the reason whereof is, that he who promiseth a future, incertainty receives a present benefit; on condition, that he re­turn another for it: for his Will, who per­formes the present benefit hath simply be­fore it; for its object, a certain good valu­able with the thing promised; but the thing it selfe not simply, but with condition if it could be done; but if it should so happen, that even this should prove impossible, why then he must perform as much as he can. Covenants therefore oblige us not to perform just the thing it selfe covenanted for, but our utmost endeavour; for this onely is, the things themselves are not in our po­wer.

XV. We are freed from Covenants two In what manner we are freed from Com­pacts. wayes, either by performing, or by being forgiven: By performing, for beyond that we oblig'd not our selves. By being for-gi­ven, because he whom we oblig'd our selves to by forgiving, is conceiv'd to return us that Right which we past over to him; for, forgiving, implies giving: that is, by the fourth Article of this Chapter, a convey­ance of Right to him to whom the gift is made.

XVI. Its an usuall question, Whether Promises forc'd from us through feare of death are not valid in the state of nature. Compacts extorted from us, through fear, do oblige, or not: For example, If to redeeme my life, from the power of a Robber, a pro­mise to pay him 100 [...]. next day; and that I will doe no act whereby to apprehend, and bring him to Justice, whether I am tyed to [Page 29] keep promise, or not? but though such a Promise must sometimes be judged to be of no effect, yet it is not to be accounted so, because it proceeded from fear, for then it would follow that those promises which re­duc'd men to a civill life, and by which Lawes were made, might likewise be of none effect, (for it proceeds from fear of mutuall slaughter, that one man submits himselfe to the Dominion of another:) And he should play the fool finely, who should trust his captive covenanting with the price of his redemption. It holds u­niversally true, that promises doe oblige when there is some benefit received; and that to promise, and the thing promised, be lawfull: But it is lawfull, for the redemp­tion of my life, both to promise, and to give what I will of mine owne to any man, even to a Thief. We are oblig'd therefore by promises proceeding from fear, ex­cept the Civill Law forbid them, by vertue whereof, that which is promised becomes unlawfull.

XVII. Whosoever shall contract with A latter Compact contradict­ing the for­mer is in­valid. one to doe, or omit somewhat, and shall after Covenant the contrary with another; he maketh not the former, but the latter Contract unlawfull: for, he hath no longer Right to doe, or to omit ought, who by former Contracts hath conveyed it to ano­ther; wherefore he can conveigh no Right by latter Contracts, and what is promised, is promis'd without Right: He is therefore tyed onely to his first Contract; to break which is unlawfull.

XVIII. No man is oblig'd by any A promise not to resist him that prejudices my Body is invalid. [Page 30] Contracts whatsoever not to resist him who shall offer to kill, wound, or any other way hurt his Body; for there is in every man a certain high degree of fear, through which he apprehends that evill which is done to him to be the greatest, and therefore by na­turall necessity he shuns it all he can, and 'tis suppos'd he can doe no otherwise: When a man is arriv'd to this degree of fear, we cannot expect but be will provide for himself either by slight, or fight. Since therefore no man is tyed to impossibilities, they who are threatned either with death, (which is the greatest evill to nature) or wounds, or some other bodily hurts, and are not stout enough to bear them, are not obli­ged to endure them. Farthermore, he that is t [...]ed by Cont [...]act is trusted, (for Faith on­ly is the Bond of Contracts) but they who are brought to punishment, either Capitall, or more gentle, are f [...]ttered, or strongly guarded, which is a most certain signe that they seem'd not sufficiently bound from non resistance by th [...]ir Contracts. Its one thing if I promise thus: If I doe it not at the day appointed, kill me. Another thing if thus: If I doe it not, though you should offer to kill me, I will not resist: All men, if need be, contract the first way; but there is need sometimes. This second way, none, neither is it ever needfull; for in the meer state of nature, if you have a mind to kill, that state it selfe affords you a Right; insomuch as you need not first trust him, if for breach of trust you will af­terward kill him. But in a Civill State, where the Right of life, and death, and of [Page 31] all co [...]po [...]all punishment is with the Su­preme; that same Right of killing cannot be granted to any private person. Neither need the Supreme himselfe contract with any man patiently to yeeld to his punish­ment, but onely this, that no man offer to def [...]nd others from him. If in the state of nature, as between two Realmes, there should a Contract be made, on condition of killing, if it were not perform'd, we must presuppose another Contract of not killing before the appointed day. Where­fore on that day, if there be no performance, the right of Warre returnes; that is, an hostile state, in which all things are law­full, and therefore resistance also. Lastly, by the contract of not resisting, we are ob­lig'd of two Evills to make choice of that which seemes the greater; for certaine Death is a greater evill then Fighting; but of two Evi [...]ls it is impossible not to chuse the least: By such a Compact therefore we should be tyed to impossibilities, which is contrary to the very nature of com­pacts.

XIX. Likewise no man is tyed by any The Com­pact of self­accusation is invalid. Compacts whatsoever to accuse himself, or any other, by whose dammage he is like to procure himselfe a better life, wherefore neither is a Father oblig'd to bear witnesse against his Sonne, nor a Husband against his Wife, nor a Sonne against his Father; nor any man against any one, by whose meanes he hath his subsistance; for in vain is that testimony which is presum'd to be corrupted from nature; but although no man be tyed to accuse himself by any com­pact, [Page 32] yet in a publique tryall he may, by torture, be forc'd to make answer; but such answers are no testimony of the fact, but helps for the searching out of truth; insomuch as whether the party tor [...]u [...]'d his answer be true, or false, or whether he an­swer not at all, whatsoever he doth, he doth it by Right.

XX. Swearing is a speech joyned to a The desini­tion of an [...]ath. promise, whereby the promiser declares his renouncing of Gods mercy, unlesse he per­form his word; which definition is contai­ned in the words themselves, which have in them the very essence of an Oath, to wit, so God help me, or other equivalent, as with the Romans, Doc thou Jupiter so destroy the de­ceiver, as I slay this same Beast: neither is this any let, but that an Oath may as well sometimes be affirmatory, as promissory; for he that confirmes his affirmation with an Oath, promiseth that he speaks truth. But though in some places it was the fashi­on for Subjects to Swear by their Kings; that custome took its Originall hence, That those Kings took upon them Divine Honour; for Oathes were therefore intro­duc'd that by Religion, and consideration of the Divine Power men might have a greater dread of breaking their Faiths, then that wherewith they fear men, from whose eyes their actions may lie hid. The Swea­ring must be conceiv'd in that fa­shion which he uses, who takes it.

XXI. Whence it followes, that an Oath must be conceived in that forme which he useth, who takes it; for in vain is any man brought to Swear by a God whom he beleeves not, and therefore neither feares him. For though by the light of nature it [Page 33] may be known that there is a God, yet no man thinks he is to Swear by him in any other fashion, or by any other name then what is contain'd in the precepts of his own proper, that is, (as he who Swears imagines) the true Religion.

XXII. By the definition of an Oath we Swearing addes no­thing to the Obligation which is by Compact. may understand, that a bare Contract ob­ligeth no lesse, then that to which we are Sworn; for it is the contract which binds us, the Oath relates to the Divine punish­ment, which it could not provoke, if the breach of contract were not in its selfe un­lawfull; but it could not be unlawfull if the Contract were not obligatory. Further­more, he that renounceth the mercy of God obligeth himselfe not to any punish­ment, because it is ever lawfull to depre­cate the punishment howsoever provok'd, and to enjoy Gods Pardon if it be granted. The onely effect therefore of an Oath is this, To cause men who are naturally in­clin'd to break all manner of faith, through fear of punishment, to make the more Conscience of their words and actions.

XXIII. To exact an Oath, where the An Oath is not to be prest but where the breach of Contract can either be kept pri­vate, or not be punisht but from God alone. breach of contract, if any be made, cannot but be known, and where the party com­pacted, withall wants not power to punish, is to do some what more then is necessary unto self-defence, and shewes a mind desirous not so much to benefit it selfe, as to prejudice another. For an Oath, out of the very form of swearing, is taken in order to the pro­vocation of Gods anger, that is to say, of him that is Omnipotent against those who therefore violate their Faith, because they [Page 34] think, that by their own strength they can escape the punishment of men; and of him that is Omniscient against those, who there­fore usually break their trust, because they hope that no man shall see them.

CHAP. III. Of the other Lawes of Nature.

I. ANother of the Lawes of Nature is, The second Law of na­ture to per­form Con­tracts. to performe Contracts, or to keep trust; for it hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter that the Law of Nature com­mands every man, as a thing necessary, to obtain Peace; to conveigh certain rights from each to other, and that this (as often as it shall happen to be done) is called a Contract: But this is so farre forth onely conducible to peace, as we shall performe our selves, what we contract with others, shall be done, or omitted; and in vaine would Contracts be made, unlesse we stood to them. Because therefore, to stand to our Covenants, or to keep faith, is a thing neces­sary for the obtaining of peace, it will prove by the second Article of the second [Page 37] Chapter to be a precept of the naturall Law.

Neither is there in this matter, any ex­ception That Faith is to be kept with all men with­out excep­tion. of the persons, with whom we Con­tract, as if they keep no faith with others; or hold, that none ought to be kept, or are guilty of any other kind of vice: for he that Contracts, in that he doth contract, denies that action to be in vaine, and it is against reason for a knowing man to doe a thing in vain; and if he think himself not bound to keep it, in thinking so, he affirms the Contract to be made in vain: He therefore, who Contracts with one with whom he thinks he is not bound to keep faith, he doth at once think a Contract to be a thing done in vaine, and not in vaine, which is absurd. Either therefore we must hold trust with all men, or else not bargain with them; that is, either there must be a declared Warre, or a sure and faithfull Peace.

III. The breaking of a Bargain, as also Injury de­fin'd. the taking back of a gift, (which ever con­sists in some action, or omission) is called an INJURY: But that action, or omis­sion, is called unjust, insomuch as an injury; and an unjust action, or omission, signifie the same thing, and both are the same with breach of Contract and trust: And it seemes the word Iniury came to be given to any action, or omission, because they were with­out Right; he that acted, or omitted, ha­ving before conveyed his Right to some o­ther. And there is some likenesse between that, which in the common course of life we call Injury; and that, which in the Schools is usually called Absurd. For even as [Page 38] he, who by Arguments is driven to deny the Assertion which he first maintain'd, is said to be brought to an Absurdity; in like manner, he who through weaknesse of mind does, of omits that which before he had by Contract promis'd not to doe, or o­mit, cōmits an Injury▪ and falls into no lesse contradiction, then he, who in the Schools is reduc'd to an Absurdity. For by con­tracting for some future action, he wills it done; by not doing it, he wills it not done, which is to will a [...]thing done, and not done at the same time, which is a contradiction. An Injury therefore is a kind of absurdity in conversation, as an absurdity is a kind of injury in disputation.

IV. From these grounds it followes, that an (*) injury can be done to no man but An injury can onely be done to him with whom we Contract. him with whō we enter Covenant, or to whō somewhat is made over by deed of gift, or to whom somwhat is promis'd by way of bargain, and therefore damaging and inju­ring are often disjoyn'd: for if a Master command his Servant, who hath promis'd to obey him, to pay a summe of money, or carry some present to a third man; the Ser­vant, if he doe it not, hath indeed damag'd this third party, but he injur'd his Master onely. So also in a civill government, if any man offend another, with whom he hath made no Contract, he damages him to whom the evill is done, but he injures none but him to whom the power of go­vernment belongs: for if he, who receives the hurt, should expostulate the mischief; and he that did it, should answer thus, What art thou to me? Why should I rather doe [Page 39] according to yours, then mine owne will, since I do not hinder, but you may do your own, and not my mind? In which speech, where there hath no manner of pre-con­tract past, I see not, I confesse, what is re­prehensible.

Injury can be done against no man] Annota­tion. The word injustice relates to some Law: In­jury to some Person, as well as some Law. For what's unjust, is unjust to all; but there may an injury be done, and yet not against me, nor thee, but some other; and sometimes against no private person, but the Magistrate only; some­times also neither against the Magistrate, nor any private man, but onely against God; for through Contract, and conveighance of Right, we say, that an injury is done against this, or that man. Hence it is (which we see in all kin [...] of Govern [...]ent) that what private men con­tract between themselves by word, or writing, is rel [...]ast againe at the will of the Obliger. But those mischiefes which are done against the Lawes of the Land, as theft, homicide, and the like, are punisht not as he wills, to whom the hurt is done, but according to the will of the Ma­gistrate; that is, the constituted Lawes.

V These words just, and unjust, as also The di­stinction of Justice into that of men and actions. justice, and injustice, are equivocall; for they signifie one thing when they are attributed to Persons, another when to actions: When they are attributed to Actions, Just signifies as much as what's done with Right, and unjust, as what's done with injury: he who hath done some just thing is not therefore said to be a just Person, but guiltlesse, and he that hath done some unjust thing, we doe not therefore say he is an unjust, but guilty [Page 40] man. But when the words are applyed to Persons; to be just, signifies as much as to be delighted in just dealing, to study how to doe righteousnesse, or to indeavour in all things to doe that which is just; and to be unjust, is to neglect righteous dealing, or to think it is to be measured not according to my contract, but some present benefit; so as the justice or injustice of the mind, the in­tention, or the man, is one thing; that of an action, or omission, another; and in­numerable actions of a just man may be unjust, and of an unjust man, just: But that man is to be accounted just, who doth just things because the Law commands it, un­just things only by reason of his infirmity; and he is properly said to be unjust who doth righteousness for fear of the punishment an­next unto the Law, and unrighteousnesse by reason of the iniquity of his mind.

VI. The justice of actions is common­ly distinguisht into two kinds; Commuta­tive, The di­stinction of commuta­tive and distribu­tive Ju­stice exa­min'd. and Distributive, the former whereof they say consists in Arithmeticall, the lat­ter in Geometricall proportion, and that is conversant in exchanging, in buying, sel­ling, borrowing, lending, location, and conduction, and other acts whatsoever be­longing to Contracters, where, if there be an equall return made, hence they say springs a commutative justice: But this is busied about the dignity, and merits of men; so as if there be rendred to every man [...] more to him who is more worthy, and lesse to him that deserves lesse, and that proportionably, hence they say ariseth distributive justice: I acknow­ledge [Page 41] here some certaine distinction of e­quality; to wit, that one is an equality simply so called, as when two things of e­quall value are compar'd together, as a pound of silver with twelve ounces of the same silver; the other is an equality, secun­dum qu [...]d, as when a 1000. pound is to be divided to an hundred men, 600. pounds are given to 60. men, and 400. to 40. where there is no equality between 600. and 400. but when it happens, that there is the same inequality in the number of them to whom it is distributed, every one of them shall take an equall part, whence it is called an equall distribution: But such like equality is the same thing with Geometricall proportion. But what is all this to Justice? for neither, if I sell my goods for as much as I can get for them, doe I injure the buyer, who sought, and desir'd them of me? neither if I di­vide more of what is mine to him who de­serves le [...]se, so long as I give the other what I have agreed for, do I wrong to either? which truth our Saviour himself, being God, testifies in the Gospell. This there­fore is no distinction of Justice, but of e­quality; yet perhaps it cannot be deny'd, but that Justice is a certain equality, as consisting in this onely▪ that since we are all equall by nature, one should not arro­gate more Right to himselfe, then he grants to another, unlesse he have fairly gotten it by Compact. And let this suffice to be spoken against this distinction of Justice, although now almost generally receiv'd by all, lest any man should conceive an injury to be somewhat else, then the [Page 42] breach of Faith, or Contract, as hath been defin'd above.

VII. It is an old saying, Volenti non No injury can be done to him that is willing. fit iniuria (the willing man receives no in­jury) yet the truth of it may be deriv'd from our Principles. For grant, that a man be willing that that should be done, which he conceives to be an injury to him; why then that is done by his will, which by Contract was not lawfull to be done; but he being willing that should be done, which was not lawfull by Contract, the Contract it self (by the 15 Article of the foregoing Chapter) becomes void: The Right there­fore of doing it returnes, therefore it is done by Right; wherefore it is no in­jury.

VIII. The third precept of the Naturall The third Law of na­ture of in­gratitude. Law, is, That you suffer not him to be the worse for you, who out of the confidence he had in you, first did you a good a turn; or that you accept not a gift, but with a mind to endeavour, that the giver shall have no just occasion to repent him of his gift. For without this he should act without reason that would conferre a benefit where he sees it would be lost; and by this meanes all beneficence, and trust, together with all kind of benevolence would be taken from among men, neither would there be ought of mutuall assistance among them, nor any commencement of gaining grace and favour; by reason whereof the state of Warre would necessarily remain, contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature: But because the breach of this Law is not a breach of trust, or contract, (for we sup­pose no Contracts to have pass'd among [Page 43] them) therefore is it not usually termed an iniury, but because good turns and thankes have a mutuall eye to each other; it is called INGRATITUDE.

IX. The fourth precept of Nature, is, The fourth Law of na­ture, that every man render him­self usefull. That every man render himself usefull unto others: which, that we may rightly un­derstand, we must remember that there is in men, a diversity of dispositions to enter into society, arising from the diversity of their affections, not unlike that which is found in stones, brought together in the Building, by reason of the diversity of their matter, and figure; for as a stone, which in regard of its sharp and angular form takes up more room from other stones then it fils up it selfe, neither because of the hardnesse of its matter cannot well be prest together, or easily cut, and would hinder the build­ing from being fitly compacted, is cast away, as not fit for use: so a man, who for the harshness of his disposition in retaining superfluities for himself, and detaining of necessaries from others; and being incor­rigible, by reason of the stubbornnesse of his affections, is commonly said to be use­lesse, and troublesome unto others. Now, because each one not by Right onely, but even by naturall necessity is suppos'd, with all his main might, to intend the procure­ment of those things which are necessa­ry to his own preservation; if any man will contend on the other side for superflui­ties, by h [...]s default there will arise a Warre, because that on him alone there lay no necessity of contending, he therefore acts against the fundamentall Law of Nature: [Page 44] Whence it followes (which wee were to shew) that it is a precept of nature; That every man accommodate himselfe to others. But he who breaks this Law may be called uselesse, and troublesome. Yet Cicero oppo­seth inhumanity to this usefulnesse, as having regard to this very Law.

X. The fift precept of the Law of nature The fift Law of nature of merciful­nesse is: That we must forgive him who repents, and asketh pardon for what is past; having first taken caution for the time to come. The pardon of what is past, or the remission of an of­fence, is nothing else but the granting of peace to him that asketh it, after he hath warr'd against us, & now is become penitent. But Peace granted to him that repents not, that is, to him that retains an hostile mind, or that gives not caution for the futures that is, seeks not peace, but oportunity, is not properly peace but feare, and therefore is not commanded by nature. Now to him that will not pardon the penitent, and that gives future caution, peace it selfe it seems is not pleasing; which is contrary to the na­turall Law.

XI. The sixth precept of the naturall The sixth Law that punishments onely re­gard the future. Law is, That in revenge and punishments we must have our eye not at the evill past, but the future good. That is: It is not lawfull to inflict punishment for any other end, but that the offender may be corrected, or that others warned by his punishment may become better. But this is confirmed chiefly from hence, that each man is bound by the law of nature to forgive one another, provided he give caution for the future, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Arti­cle. [Page 45] Furthermore, because revenge, if the time past be onely considered, is nothing else but a certain triumph, and glory of minde, which points at no end, (for it con­templates onely what is past; but the end is a thing to come) but that which is directed to no end is vain; That revenge therefore which regards not the future, proceeds from vaine glory, and therefore without reason. But to hurt another without reason introduces a warre, and is contrary to the fundamentall Law of Nature; It is therefore a precept of the Law of nature, that in revenge wee look not backwards but forward. Now the breach of this Law, is commonly called CRUELTY.

XII. But because all signes of hatred, The seventh Law of na­ture against slander. and contempt provoke most of all to braw­ling and fighting, insomuch as most men would rather lose their lives, (that I say not their Peace) then suffer slander, it followes in the seventh place, That it is prescribed by the Law of nature, that no man either by deeds, or words, cou [...]tenance, or laughter, doe declare himselfe to hate, or scorne another. The breach of which Law is called Re­proach. But although nothing be more fre­quent then the scostes and jeers of the pow­erfull against the weak, and namely of Judges against guilty persons, which neither relate to the offence of the guilty, nor the duty of the Judges, yet these kind of men do act against the Law of nature, and are to be esteemed for contumelious.

XIII. The question whether of two The eight Law a­gainst pride men be the more worthy, belongs not to the naturall, but civill state, for it hath [Page 46] been shewed before, Chap. 1. Art. 3. that all men by nature are equall, and therefore the inequality which now is, suppose from riches, power, nobility of kindred, is come from the civill Law. I know that Aristotle in his first book of Politiques affirmes as a foundation of the whole politicall science, that some men by nature are made worthy to command, others onely to serve, as if Lord and Master were distinguished not by consent of men, but by an aptnesse, that is, a certain kind of naturall knowledge, or ig­norance; which foundation is not onely against reason (as but now hath been shew­ed) but also against experience: for nei­ther almost is any man so dull of understan­ding as not to judge it better to be ruled by himselfe, then to yeeld himselfe to the go­vernment of another; neither if the weaker and stronger doe contest, have these ever, or after the upper hand of those. Whether therefore men be equall by nature, the equa­lity is to be acknowledged, or whether une­quall, because they are like to contest for do­minion, its necessary for the obtaining of Peace, that they be esteemed as equall, and therefore it is in the eight place a precept of the Law of nature, That every man be ac­counted by nature equall to another, the contra­ry to which Law is PRIDE.

XIV. As it was necessary to the conser­vation The ninth Law of humility. of each man, that he should part with some of his Rights, so it is no lesse necessary to the same conservation, that he retain some others, to wit the Right of bodily protecti­on, of free enjoyment of ayre, water, and all necessaries for life. Since therefore many [Page 47] common Rights are retained by those who enter into a peaceable state, and that many peculiar ones are also acquired, hence ari­seth this ninth dictate of the naturall Law, to wit, That what Rights soever any man chal­lenges to himselfe, he also grant the same as due to all the rest: otherwise he frustrates the equality acknowledged in the former Arti­cle. For what is it else to acknowledge an equality of persons in the making up of so­ciety, but to attribute equall Right and Power to those whom no reason would else engage to enter into society? But to ascribe equall things to equalls, i [...] the same with giving things proportionall to proportionals, The observation of this Law is called MEEKNES, the violation [...], the breakers by the Latines are styled Im­moditi & immodesti.

XV. In the tenth place it is commanded by The ele­venth law, of things to be had in common. the Law of nature, That every man in dividing Right to others, shew himselfe equall to either party. By the foregoing Law we are forbid­den to assume more Right by nature to our selves, then we grant to others. We may take lesse if we will, for that sometimes is an argument of modesty. But if at any time matter of Right be to be divided by us unto others, we are forbidden by this Law to fa­vour one more or lesse then another. For he that by favouring one before another, ob­serves not this naturall equality, reproaches him whom he thus undervalues: but it is declared above, that a reproach is against the Lawes of Nature. The observance of this Precept is called EQUITY; the breach, Respect of Persons. The Greeks in one word term it [...].

[Page 48] XVI. From the foregoing Law is col­lected The 11. law, of things to be had in common. this eleventh. Those things which can­not be divided, must be used in common, (if they can) and (that the quantity of the matter permit) every man as much as he lists, but if the quantity permit not, then with limitation, and proportionally to the number of the users: for otherwise that equality can by no means be observed, which we have shewed in the forgoing Article to be commanded by the Law of Nature.

XVII. Also what cannot he divided, nor The 12. law, of things to be divided by▪ lot. had in common, it is provided by the Law of nature (which may be the twelfth Pre­cept) that the use of that thing be either by turns, or adjudged to one onely by lot, and that in the using it by turns, it be also decided by lot who shall have the first use of it; For here also regard is to be had unto equality: but no other can be found, but that of lot.

XVIII. But all lot is twofold; arbi­trary, The 13. law, of birth-right and first possession. or naturall; Arbitrary is that which is cast by the consent of the Contenders, and it consists in meer chance (as they say) or fortune. Naturall is primogeniture (in Greek [...], as it were given by lot) or first possession. Therefore the things which can neither be divided, nor had in com­mon, must be granted to the first posses­sour, as also those things which belonged to the Father are due to the Sonne, unlesse the Father himselfe have formerly con­veighed away that Right to some other. Let this therefore stand for the thirteenth Law of Nature.

XIX. The 14 Precept of the Law of The 14. law, of the safety of those who are Media­tors for Peace. nature is, That safety must be assured to the [Page 49] Mediators for Peace. For the reason which commands the end, commands also the means necessary to the end. But the first dictate of Reason is Peace; All the rest are means to obtain it, and without which Peace cannot be had. But neither can Peace be had without mediation, nor mediation without safety; it is therefore a dictate of Reason, that is, a Law of nature, That we must give all security to the Mediators for Peace.

XX. Furthermore, because, although The 15. law, of ap­pointing an umpire. men should agree to make all these, and whatsoever other Lawes of Nature, and should endeavour to keep them, yet doubts, and controversies would daily arise con­cerning the application of them unto their actions, to wit, whether what was done, were against the Law, or not, (which we call, the Question of Right) whence will follow a fight between Parties, either sides suppo­sing themselves wronged; it is therefore necessary to the preservation of Peace (be­cause in this case no other fit remedy can possibly be thought on) that both the disa­greeing Parties refer the matter unto some third, and oblige themselves by mutuall compacts to stand to his judgement in deci­ding the controversie. And he to whom they thus refer themselves is called an Ar­biter. It is therefore the 15. Precept of the naturall Law, That both parties disputing concerning the matter of right submit them­selves The 16. law, that no man must be judge in his owne cause. unto the opinion and judgement of some third.

XXI. But from this ground, that an Arbiter or Judge is chosen by the differing Parties to determine the controversie, we gather, that [Page 50] the Arbiter must not be one of the Parties: for every man is presumed to seek what is good for himselfe naturally, and what is just, onely for Peaces sake, and accidentally; and therefore cannot observe that same equality commanded by the Law of nature so exactly as a third man would do: It is therefore in the sixteenth place contained in the Law of nature, That no man must be Judge or Ar­biter in his own cause.

XXII. From the same ground sollowes The 17. law, that Arbiters must be without all hope of re­ward from the parties whose cause is to be iudged. The 10. law, of wit­nesses. in the seventeenth place, That no man must be Judge who propounds unto himself any hope of profit, or glory, from the victory of either part: for the like reason swayes here, as in the foregoing Law.

XXIII. But when there is some contro­versie of the fact it selfe, to wit, whether that bee done or not, which is said to bee done, the naturall Law wills, that the Arbi­ter trust both Parties alike, that is, (because they affirm contradictories) that hee be­lieve neither: He must therefore give cre­dit to a third, or a third and fourth, or more, that he may be able to give judge­ment of the fact, as often as by other signes he cannot come to the knowledge of it. The 18. Law of nature therefore injoynes Arbiters, and Iudges of fact, That where firm and certain [...]ignes of the fact appear not, there they rule their sentence by such witnesses, as seem to be indifferent to both Parts.

XXIV. From the above declared defi­nition The 19. law, that no contract is to be made with the judge. of an Arbiter may be furthermore understood, That no contract or promise must paste between him and the parties whose Iudge he is appointed, by vertue whereof he may be en­gaged [Page 51] to speak in favour of either part, nay, or be oblig'd to judge according to equity, or to pronounce such sentence as he shall truly judge to be equall. The Judge is indeed hound to give such sentence as he shall judge to be equall by the Law of Nature re-counted in the 15. Article. To the obligation of which Law nothing can be added by way of Compact. Such compact therefore would be in vain. Besides, if giving wrong judge­ment, he should contend for the equity of it, except such Compact be of no force, the Controversie would remain after Judgement given, which is contrary to the constitution of an Arbiter, who is so chosen, as both parties have oblig'd themselves to stand to the judgement which he should pronounce. The Law of Nature therefore commands the Judge be to dis-eng [...]g'd, which is its 19 precept.

XXV. Farthermore, forasmuch as the The 20. Law, a­gainst Gluttony, and such things as hinder the use of Reason. Lawes of Nature are nought else but the dictates of Reason, so as, unlesse a man endeavour to preserve the faculty of right reasoning, he cannot observe the Lawes of Nature, it is manifest, that he, who know­ingly, or willingly, doth ought, whereby the rationall faculty may be destroyed, or weak­ned, he knowingly, and willingly, breaks the Law of nature: For there is no diffe­rence between a man who performes not his Duty, and him who does such things willingly, as make it impossible for him to doe it. But they destroy and weaken the reasoning faculty, who doe that which di­sturbs the mind from its naturall state; that which most manifestly happens to [Page 52] Drunkards and Gluttons: we therefore sin in the 20 place against the Law of Nature by Drunkennesse.

XXVI. Perhaps some man, who sees all these precepts of Nature deriv'd by a certain The rule by which a man may presently know whe­ther what he is about to act, be against the law of na­ture, or not. artifice from the single dictate of Reason advising us to look to the preservation, and safegard of our selves, will say, That the de­duction of these Lawes is so hard, that it is not to be expected they will be vulgarly known, and therefore neither will they prove obliging: for Lawes, if they be not known, oblige not, nay, indeed are not Lawes. To this I answer, it's true, That hope, fear, anger, ambition, covetous­nesse, vain glory, and other perturbations of mind, doe hinder a man so, as he cannot at­taine to the knowledge of these Lawes, whilst those passions prevail in him: But there is no man who is not somettmes in a quiet mind; At that time therefore there is nothing easier for him to know, though he benever so rude and unlearn'd, then this on­ly Rule, That when he doubts, whether what he is now doing to another, may be done by the Law of Nature, or not, he con­ceive himselfe to be in that others st [...]ad. Here instantly those perturbations which perswaded him to the fact, being now cast into the other scale, disswade him as much: And this Rule is not onely easie, but is Anciently celebrated in these words, Quod tibi [...]ieri non vis, alteri nè feceris: Do not that to others, you would not have done to your self.

XXVII. But because most men, by The lawes of nature oblige only in the court of Conscience. reason of their perverse desire of present [Page 53] profit, are very unapt to observe these Lawes, although acknowledg'd by them, if perhaps some others more humble then the rest should exercise that equity and usefulnesse which Reason dictates, those not practising the same, surely they would not follow Reason in so doing; nor would they hereby procure themselves peace, but a more certain quick destruction, and the keepers of the Law become a meer prey to the breakers of it. It is not therefore to be imagin'd, that by Nature, (that is, by Rea­son) men are oblig'd to the (*) exercise of all these Lawes in that state of men wherein they are not practis'd by others. We are oblig'd yet in the interim to a readinesse of mind to observe them whensoever their observation shall seeme to conduce to the end for which they were ordain'd. We must therefore conclude, that the Law of Nature doth alwayes, and every where ob­lige in the internall Court, or that of Con­science, but not alwayes in the externall Court, but then onely when it may be done with safety.

The exercise of all these Lawes] Nay Annota­tion. among these Lawes some things there are, the o­mission whereof (provided it be done for Peace, or Self-preservation) seemes rather to be the fulfilling, then breach of the Naturall Law; for he that doth all things against those that doe all things, and plunders plunderers, doth e­quity; but on the other side, to doe that which in peace is an handsome action, and becomming an honest man, is dejectednesse, and poornesse of spirit, and a betraying of ones self in the time of War. But there are certain naturall Lawes, [Page 54] whose exercise ceaseth not even in the time of War it self; for I cannot understand what drankennesse, or cruelty (that is, Revenge which respects not the future good) can ad­vance toward peace, or the preservation of any man. Briefly, in the state of nature, what's just, and unjust, is not to be esteem'd by the Actions, but by the Counsell, and Conscience of the Actor. That which is done out of necessity, out of endeavour for peace, for the preservation of our selves, is done with Right; otherwise every damage done to a man would be a breach of the naturall Law, and an injury against God.

XXVIII. But the Lawes which oblige The Lawes of Nature are some­times bro­ken by an act agree­able to those Lawes. Conscience, may be broken by an act, not onely contrary to them, but also agreeable with them, if so be that he who does it be of another opinion: for though the act it self be answerable to the Lawes, yet his Consci­ence is against them.

XXIX. The Lawes of Nature are immu­table, and eternall: What they forbid, can The Lawes of Nature are immu­table. never be lawfull; what they command, can never be unlawfull: For pride, ingratitude, breach of Contracts, (or injury) inhumanity, contum [...]ly, will never be lawfull; nor the contrary vertues to these ever unlawfull, as we take them for dispositions of the mind, that is, as they are considered in the Court of Conscience, where onely they oblige, and are Lawes. Yet actions may be so diversi­fied by circumstances, and the Civill Law, that what's done with equity at one time, is guilty of iniquity at another; and what suits with reason at one time, is contrary to it another. Yet Reason is still the same, [Page 55] and changeth not h [...]r end, which is Peace, and Defence; nor the meanes to attaine them, to wit, those vertues of the minde which we have declar'd above, and which cannot be abrogated by any Custome, or Law whatsoever.

XXX. It's evident by what hath hither­to He who en­deavours to fulfill the Lawes of Nature, is just. been said, how easily the Lawes of Nature are to be observ'd, because they require the endeavour onely, (but that must be true and constant) which who so shall performe, we may rightly call him JUST. For he who tends to this with his whole might, namely, that his actions be squar'd accor­ding to the precepts of Nature, he shewes clearly that he hath a minde to fulfill all those Lawes, which is all we are oblig'd to by rationall nature. Now he that hath done all he is oblig'd to, it a Just Man.

XXXI. All Writers doe agree that the The natu­rall Law is the same with the morall. Naturall Law is the same with the Morall. Let us see wherefore this is true. We must know therefore, that Good and Evill are names given to things to signifie the in­clination, or aversion of them by whom they were given. But the inclinations of men are diverse, according to their diverse Constitutions, Customes, Opinions; as we may see in those things we apprehend by sense, as by tasting, touching, smelling; but much more in those which pertain to the common actions of life, where what this man commends, (that is to say, calls Good) the other undervalues, as being Evil; Nay, very often the same man at diverse times, praises, and dispraises the same thing. Whilst thus they doe, necessary it is there [Page 56] should be discord, and strife: They are therefore so long in the state of War, as by reason of the diversity of the present ap­petites, they mete Good and Evill by di­verse measures. All men easily acknow­ledge this state as long, as they are in it, to be evill, and by consequence that Peace is good. They therefore who could not agree concerning a present, doe agree concer­ning a future Good, which indeed is a work of Reason; for things present are ob­vious to the sense, things to come to our Reason only. Reason declaring Peace to be good, it followes by the same reason, that all the necessary means to Peace be good also, and therefore, that Modesty, Equity, Trust, Hu­manity, Mercy (which we have demonstrated to be necessary to Peace) are good Man­ners, or habits, (that is) Vertues. The Law therefore, in the means to Peace, commands also Good Manners, or the practise of Vertue: And therefore it is call'd Morall.

XXXII. But because men cannot put off Whence it comes to passe, that what hath been said concerning the Law, is not the same with what hath been deli­vered by Philoso­phers con­cerning the Vertues. this same irrationall appetite, whereby they greedily prefer the present good (to which, by strict, consequence, many unfore-seen­evills doe adhere) before the future, it happens, that though all men doe agree in the commendation of the foresaid vertues, yet they disagree still concerning their Na­ture, to wit, in what each of them doth consist; for as oft as anothers good action displeaseth any man, that action hath the name given of some neighbouring vice; likewise the bad actions, which please them, are ever entituled to some Vertue; whence it comes to passe that the same Action is prais'd by these, and call'd Vertue, and [Page 57] dispraised by those, and termed vice. Nei­ther is there as yet any remedy found by Philosophers for this matter; for since they could not observe the goodnesse of actions to consist in this, that it was in order to Peace, and the evill in this, that it related to discord, they built a morall Philosophy wholly estranged from the morall Law, and uncon­stant to it self; for they would have the na­ture of vertues seated in a certain kind of mediocrity betweene two extremes, and the vices in the extremes themselves; which is apparently false: For to dare is commen­ded, and under the name of fortitude is ta­ken for a vertue, although it be an extreme, if the cause be approved. Also the quantity of a thing given, whether it be great, or little, or between both, makes not liberali­ty, but the cause of giving it. Neither is it injustice, if I give any man more, of what is mine own, then I owe him. The Lawes of Nature therefore are the summe of Morall Philosophy▪ whereof I have onely delive­red such precepts in this place, as appertain to the preservation of our selves against those dangers which arise from discord. But there are other precepts of rationall nature, from whence spring other vertues: for tem­perance also is a precept of Reason, because intemperance tends to sicknesse, and death. And so fortitude too, (that is) that same fa­culty of resisting stoutly in present dangers, (and which are more hardly declined then overcome) because it is a means tending to the preservation of him that resists.

XXXIII. But those which we call the The Law of nature is not proper­ly a law, but as it is delivered in holy Scripture. Lawes of nature (since they are nothing else [Page 58] but certain conclusions understood by Rea­son, of things to be done, and omitted; but a Law to speak properly and accurately, is the speech of him who by Right commands somewhat to others to be done, or omitted) are not (in propriety of speech) Lawes, as they proceed from nature; yet as they are delivered by God in holy Scriptures, (as we shall see in the Chapter following) they are most properly called by the name of Lawes: for the sacred Scripture is the speech of God commanding over all things by greatest Right.

CHAP. IV. That the Law of Nature is a Divine Law.

I. THE same Law which is Naturall, The natu­rall, and morall law [...] divine. and Morall, is also wont to be called Divine, nor undeservedly, as well because Reason, which is the law of Nature, is given by God to every man for the rule of his actions; as because the precepts of living which are thence derived, are the same with those which have been delivered from the divine Majesty, for the LAWES of his heavenly Kingdome, by our Lord Iesus Christ, and his holy Prophets and Apostles. What therefore by reasoning we have understood above concerning the law of nature, we will endeavour to confirme the same in this Chapter by holy writ.

[Page 59] II. But first we will shew those places in Which is confirmed in Scrip­ture in ge­nerall. which it is declared, that the Divine Law is seated in right reason. Psalm 37. 31, 32. The [...] mouth of the righteous will be exercised in wisdome, and his tongue will be talking of Iudgement: The law of God is in his heart. Jerem. 31. 33. I will put my law in their in­ward parts, and write it in their hearts. Psal. 19. 7. The law of the Lord is an undefiled law, converting the soule. ver. 8. The Com­mandement of the Lord is pure, and giveth light unto the eyes. Deuteron. 30. 11. This Commandement which I command thee this day, it is not hidden from thee, neither is it far of, &c. vers. 14. But the word is very nigh unto thee, in thy mouth, and in thine heart; that thou maist doe it. Psal. 119. 14. Give me un­derstanding, and I shall keep thy law. vers. 105. Thy word is a lamp unto my feet, and a light unto my paths. Proverbs 9. 10. The know­ledge of the holy is understanding. John 1. 1. Christ the Law-giver himselfe is called the word. vers. 9. The same Christ is called the true light that lighteth every man that cometh in the world. All which are descriptions of right reason, whose dictates, we have shew­ed before, are the lawes of nature.

III. But that which wee set downe Specially in regard of the fun­damentall law of na­ture in seeking of peace. for the fundamentall law of nature, namely, that Peace was to be sought for, is also the summe of the divine law, will be manifest by these places. Rom. 3. 17. Righteousnesse, (which is the summe of the law) is called the way of Peace. Psal. 85. 10. Righteousnesse and Peace have kissed each other. Matth. 5. 9. Blessed are the Peace-makers, for they shall be called the children of God. And after Saint [Page 60] Paul in his 6. Chapter to the Hebrewes, and the last verse had called Christ (the Le­gislator of that law we treat of) an High-Priest for ever after the order of Melehize­deck; he addes in the following Chapter, the first verse, This Melchizedeck was King of Salem, Priest of the most high God, &c. vers. 2. First being by interpretation King of Righte­ousnesse, and after that also King of Salem, which is, King of peace. Whence it is cleare, that Christ the King in his Kingdome pla­ceth Righteousnesse and Peace together. Psal. 34. 13. Eschue evill and doe good, seek peace and ensue it. Isaiah 9. 6, 7. Unto us a child is born, unto us a Sonne is given, and the go­vernment shall be upon bis shoulder, and his name shall be called Wonderfull, Counsellour, the mighty God, the everlasting Father, the Prince of peace. Isaiah 52. 7. How beautifull upon the mountaines are the feet of him that bringeth good tidings, that publisheth peace, that bringeth good tidings of good, that publi­sheth salvation, that saith unto Sion, thy God reigneth? Luke 2. 14. In the Nativity of Christ, the voice of them that praised God saying, Glory be to God on high, and in earth peace, good will towards men. And Isaiah 53. 5. The Gospell is called the chastisement of our peace. Isay 59. 8. Righteousnesse is called the way of Peace. The way of peace they know not, and there is no judgement in their goings. Micah 5. 4, 5. speaking of the M [...]ssias, he saith thus, Hee shall stand and food in the strength of the Lord, in the Majesty of the name of the Lord his God, and they shall abide, for now shall he be great unto the end of the earth; And this man shall be your Peace, &c. [Page 61] Prov. 3. 12. My sonne forget not my law, but let thine heart keep my Commandements, for length of dayes, and long life, and peace, shall they adde to thee,

IV. What appertains to the first law of Also in regard of the first law of na­ture in abo­lishing all things to be had in common. abolishing the community of all things, or con­cerning the introduction of meum & tuum, We perceive in the first place how great an adversary this same Community is to Peace, by [...]hose words of Abraham to Lot, Gen. 13. 8. Let there be no strife I pray thee, between thee and me, and between thy heard-men, and my heard-men, for we be bretbren. Is not the whole land before thee? Separate thy selfe I pray thee from me. And all those places of Scripture by which we are forbidden to trespasse upon our neighbours, as, Thou shalt not kill, thou shalt not commit adultery, thou shalt not steal, &c. doe confirm the law of distinction between Mine, and Thinc; for they suppose the right of all men to all things to be taken away.

V. The same precepts establish the se­cond Also the second law of nature, concerning faith to be kept. law of nature of keeping trust: for what doth, Thou shalt not invade anothers right, import, but this? Thou shalt not take possession of that, which by thy contract ceaseth to be thine; but expressely set down, Psal. 15. vers. 1. To him that asked, Lord who shall dwell in thy Taberna [...]l [...]? It is answered, vers. 5. He that sweareth unto his neighbour, and dis­appointeth him not; and Prov. 6. 1. My sonne if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou have stricken thy hand with a stranger, Thou art snared with the words of thy mouth. Also of the third law, of thank­fulnesse.

VI. The third Law concerning grati­tude is proved by these places, De [...]t. 25. 4. [Page 62] Thou shalt not muzzle the Oxe when he tread­eth out the corn; which Saint Paul 1. Cor. 9. 9. interprets to be spoken of men, not Oxen onely. Prov. 17. 13. Who so rewardeth evill for good, evill shall not depart from his house. And Deut. 20. 10, 11. When thou comest nigh unto a city to fight against it, then pro­claim peace unto it. And it shall be if it make thee answer of peace, and open unto thee, then it shall be that all the people that is so [...]nd there­in, shall be tributaries unto thee, and they shall serve thee. Proverbs 3. 29. Devise not evill against thy neighbour, seeing he dwelleth se­curely by thee.

VII. To the fourth Law of accommoda­ting Also the fourth law, of rendring our selves usefull. our selves, these precepts are conforma­ble, Exod. 23. 4, 5. If thou meet thine ene­mies Oxe, or his Ass [...] going astray, thou shalt surely bring it back to him again; if thou see the Asse of him that hateth thee lying under his burden, and wouldest forbear to help him, thou shalt surely help with him, vers. 9. Also, thou shalt not oppresse a stranger. Prov. 3. 30. Strive not with a man without a cause, if he have done thee no harme. Prov. 15. 18. A wrathfull man stirreth up strife, bus he that is slow to an­ger, appeaseth strif [...]. 18. 24. There is a friend that sticketh closer then a brother. The same is confirmed, Luke 10. By the Parable of the S [...]maritan, who had compassion on the Jew that was wounded by theeves, and by Christs precept, Matth. 5. 39. But I say unto you, that ye resist not evill, but whosoever shall smite thee on the right cheek, turn to him the Also of the fifth law, concerning mercy. other also, &c.

VIII. Among infinite other places which prove the fifth law, these are some. [Page 63] Matth. 6. 14. If you forgive men their trespas­ses, your heavenly Father will also forgive you [...] but if you forgive not men their trespasses, nei­ther will your Father forgive your trespasses. Math. 18. 21. Lord how oft shall my Bro­ther sinne against me, and I forgive him? till seven times? Jesus saith unto him, I say not till seven times, but till seventy times seven times: that is, toties quoties.

IX. For the confirmation of the sixth Also of the sixth law, that punish­ment onely looks at the future. law, all those pla [...]es are pertinent which command us to shew mercy; such as Mat. 5, 7. Blessed are the mercifull, for they shall obtain mercy. Levit. 19. 18. Thou shalt not avenge, nor bear any grudge against the children of thy people. But there are, who not onely think this law is not proved by Scrip­ture, but plainly disproved from hence, that there is an eternall punishment reserved for the wicked after death, where there is no place either for amendment, or example. Some resolve this objection by answering, That God, whom no law restrains, refers all to his glory, but that man must not doe so; as if God sought his glory, (that is to say) pleased himselfe in the death of a sinner. It is more rightly answered, that the institu­tion of eternall punishment was before sin, and had regard to this onely, that men might dread to commit sinne for the time to come.

X. The words of Christ prove this se­venth, Also of the seventh law, concerning slander. Matth. 5. 22. But I say unto you, That whosoever is angry with his brother without a cause, shall be in danger of the judgement, and whosoever shall say unto his Brother Racha, shalt be in danger of the Counsell, bi [...] whosoe­ver [Page 64] shall say, thou foole, shall be in danger of hell fire. Prov. 10. 18. Hee that uttereth a slander is a foole. Prov. 14. 21. Hee that de­spiseth his neighbour, finneth. 15. 1. Grievous words stir up anger. Prov. 22. 10. Cast out the scorner, and contention shall goe out, and re­proach shall cease.

XI. The eighth law of acknowledging Al [...]o of the eighth, a­gainst pride equality of nature, that is, of humility, is established by these places. Mat. 5. 3. Blessed are the poor in spirit, for theirs is the King­dom of heaven. Prov. 6. 16, 19. These six things doth the Lord hate, yea seven are an abomination unto him: A proud look, &c. Prov. 16. 5. Every one that is proud is an abo­mination unto the Lord, though hand joyne in hand, he shall not be unpunished. 11. 2. When pride cometh, then cometh shame, but with the lowly, is wisdome. Thus Isay 40. 3. (where the comming of the Messias is shewed forth, for preparation towards his Kingdome) The voyce of him that cryed in the wildernesse, was this: Prepare ye the way of the Lord, make strait in the de [...]art a high way for our God. Every valley shall be exalted, and every mountain, and hill, shall be made low; which doubtlesse is spoken to men, and not to mountains.

XII. But that same Equity which we Al [...]o of the ninth, of equity. prov'd in the ninth place to be a Law of Nature, which commands every man to allow the same Rights to others they would be allow'd themselves, and which containes in it all the other Lawes besides, is the same which Moses sets down, Levit. 19. 18. Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self; and our Saviour calls it the summe of the morall Law, [Page 65] Mat. 22. 36. Master, which is the great Com­mandement in the Law? Jesus said unto him, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind; this is the first and great Commandement, and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self. On these two Commande­ments hang all the Law and the Prophets. But to love our neighbor as our selves, is nothing else, but to grant him all we desire to have granted to our selves.

XIII. By the tenth Law respect of persons Also the 10. against respect of Persons. is forbid; as also by these places following, Mat. 5. 45. That ye may be children of your Fa­ther which is in Heaven; for he maketh the sun to rise on the Evill, and on the Good, &c. Collos. 3. 11. There is neither Greek, nor Jew, circumcision, nor uncircumcision, Barbarian, or Scythian, bond, or free, but Christ is all, & in all. Acts 10. 34. Of a truth, I perceive, that God is no respecter of Persons. 2 Chron. 19. 7. There is no iniquity with the Lord our God, nor re­spect of persons, nor taking of gifts Ecclus. 35. 12. The Lord is Judge, and with him is no respect of Persons. Rom. 2. 11. For Also of the 11. Law, Of having those things in common which can­not be di­vided. there is no respect of persons with God.

XIV. The eleventh Law, which commands those things to be held in common which cannot be divided, I know not whether there be any expresse place in Scripture for it, or not; but the practise appears every where in the common use of Wels, Wayes, Rivers, sa­cred things, &c. for else men could not live.

XV. We said in the twelf [...]h place, that Also of the 12. Of things to be divided by Lot. it was a Law of Nature, That where things could neither be divided, nor possess'd in cōmon, they should be dispos'd by lot, which is con­firm'd [Page 66] as by the example of Moses, who by Gods command, Numb. 6. 34. divided the severall parts of the land of promise unto the Tribes by Lot: So Acts 1. 24. by the ex­ample of the Apostles, who receiv'd Mat­thias, before Justus, into their number, by casting Lots, and saying, Thou Lord, who know­est the hearts of all men, shew whether of these two thou hast chosen, &c. Prov. 16. 33. The lot is cast into the lappe, but the whole dispo­sing thereof is of the Lord. And which is the thirteenth Law the Succession was due un­to Esau, as being the First-born of Isaac, if himself had not sold it, (Gen. 25. 30.) or that the Father had not otherwise ap­pointed.

XVI. Saint Paul writing to the Corin­thians, Also of ap­pointing a Judge. Epist. 1. Chap. 6. reprehends the Corinthians of that City for going to Law one with another before infidell Judges who were their enemies, calling it a fault, that they would not rather take wrong, and suffer themselves to be defrauded; for that is against that Law, whereby we are comman­ded to be helpful to each other. But if it happen the Controversie be concerning things ne­cessary, what is to be done? Therefore the Apostle, Ver. 5. speaks thus, I speak to your shame. Is it so that there is not one wise man among you, no, not one that shall be able to judge between his brethren? He therefore, by those words confirmes that Law of Nature which we call'd the fifteenth, to wit, Where Controversies cannot be avoided, there by the consent of Parties to appoint some Ar­biter, and him some third man; so as (which is the 16 Law) neither of the Par­ties [Page 67] may be judge in his own Cause.

XVII. But that the Judge, or Arbiter, Also of the 17. Law, That the Arbiters must re­ceive no reward for their Sen­tence. must receive no reward for his Sentence, (which is the 17. Law) appears, Exod. 23. 8. Thou shalt take no gift; for the gift blindeth the wise, and pervert [...]th the words of the righteous. Ecclus. 21. 29. Presents and gifts blind the eyes of the wise. Whence it followes; that he must not be more oblig'd to one part then the other, which is the 19. Law, and is also confirm'd, Deut. 1. 17. Ye shall not respect persons in Judgment, ye shall hear the small as well as the great; and in all those places which are brought against re­spect of Persons.

XVIII. That in the judgement of Fact, Also of the 18. concer­ning Wit­nesses. witnesses must be had, (which is the 18. Law) the Scripture not only confirmes, but requires more then one, Deut. 17. 6. At the mouth of two witnesses, or three witnesses, shall he that is worthy of death be put to death. The same is repeated, Deut. 19. 15.

XIX. Drunkennesse, which we have therefore in the last place numbred among Also of the 20. Law, against Drunken­nesse. the breaches of the Naturall Law, because it hinders the use of right Reason, is also forbid in sacred Scripture for the same reason. Prov. 20. 1. Wine is a mocker, strong drink is raging, whosoever is deceived thereby is not wise. And Chap. 31. 4, 5. It is not for Kings to drink wine, lest they drink, and forget the Law, and pervert the judgement of any of the afflicted: but that we might know that the malice of this vice consisted not formally in the quantity of the drink, but in that it destroyes Judgement and Reason, it followes in the next Verse, [Page 68] Give strong drink to him that is ready to pe­rish, and wine to those that be heavy of heart. Let him drink, and forget his poverty, and re­member his misery no more. Christ useth the same reason in prohibiting drunkenesse, Luk. 21. 34. Take heed to your selves, lest at any time your hearts be overcharg'd with s [...]rset­ting and drunkennesse.

XX. That we said in the foregoing Also in re­spect of that which hath been said, that the Law of Nature is eternall. Also that the Lawes of Nature doe pertain to Consci­ence. Chapter, The Law of Nature is eternall, is also prov'd out of the fifth of S. Matth. 18. Verily I say unto you, till Heaven and Earth passe, one jot, or one tittle, shall in no wise passe frō the Law, and Psal. 119. v. 160. Every one of thy rightcous judgements endureth for ever.

XXI. We also said, That the Lawes of Nature had regard chiefly unto Conscience; that is, that he is just, who by all possible endeavour strives to fulfill them. And al­though a man should order all his actions (so much as belongs to externall obedi­ence) just as the Law commands, but not for the Lawes [...]ake, but by reason of some punishment annext unto it, or out of Vain glory, yet he is unjust. Both these are pro­ved by the Holy Scriptures. The first, Esay 55. 7. Let the wicked forsake his way, and unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lod, and he wil have mercy up­on him, and to our God, for he will abundantly pardon. Ezek. 18. 31. Cast away from you all your transgressions where by you have trans­gressed, & make you a new heart, and a new spi­rit; for why will you die O house of Israel? By which, and the like places, we may suffici­ently understand that God will not punish their deeds whose heart is right. The second [Page 69] out of the 29. of Isay 13. The Lord said, For­asmuch as this people draw near me with their mouth, and with their lips doe honour me, but have removed their heart far from me, there­fore I will proceed, &c. Mat. 5. 20. Except your righteousnesse shall exceed the righteous­nesse of the Scribes and Pharisees ye shall in no case enter into the Kingdom of Heaven; and in the following verses our Saviour explains to them how that the commands of God are broken, not by Deeds only, but also by the Will; for the Scribes and Pharises did in outward act observe the Law most exactly, but for Glories sake onely; else they would as readily have broken it. There are innu­merable places of Scripture in which is most manifestly declar'd that God accepts Also that the lawes of nature are easily observ'd. Lastly in respect of the Rule by which a man may presently know whe­ther what he is about to act be a­gainst the law of na­ture, or not. The law of Christ is the law of nature. the Will for the Deed, and that as well in good, as in evill actions.

XXII. That the Law of Nature is easily kept, Christ himself declares in the 11. Chapter of Saint Matthew 28, 29, 30. Come unto me, &c. Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me, &c. for my yoke is easie, and my burthen light.

XXIII. Lastly, the Rule by which I said any man might know whether what he was doing, were contrary to the Law, or not, to wit, what thou wouldst not be done to, doe not that to another, is almost in the self same words delivered by our Saviour, Mat. 7. 12. Therefore all things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, do you even so to them.

XXIV. As the law of nature is all of it Divine, so the Law of Christ by conversion, (which is wholly explain'd in the 5, 6, [Page 70] and 7. Chapter of S. Matthewes Gospell) is all of it also (except that one Commande­ment of not marrying her who is put away for adultery, which Christ brought for ex­plication of the divine positive Law, against the Jewes, who did not rightly interpret the Mosaicall Law) the doctrine of Nature: I say the whole Law of Christ is ex­plain'd in the fore-named Chapters, not the whole Doctrine of Christ; for Faith is a part of Christian Doctrine, which is not commprehended under the title of a Law; for Lawes are made, and given, in reference to such actions as follow our will, not in order to our Opinions, and Belief, which being out of our power, follow not the Will.

CHAP. V. Of the causes, and first begin­ing of civill Government.

IT is of it selfe manifest, that the actions of men That the Lawes of nature suf­fice not for the co [...]ser­vation of Peace. proceed from the will, and the will from hope, and feare, insomuch as when they shall see a greater good, or lesse evill, likely to happen to them by the breach, then observation of the Lawes, they'l wittingly violate them. The hope therefore, which each man hath of his security, and self-preservation, consists in this, that by force or craft he may disappoint his neighbour, either openly, or by strata­gem. Whence we may understand, that the naturall lawes, though well understood, doe not instantly secure any man in their pra­ctise, and consequently, that as long as there is no caution had from the inva [...]ion of o­thers, there remains to every man that same primitive Right of selfe-defence, by such means as either he can or will make use of (that is) a Right to all things, or the Right of warre; and it is sufficient for the fulfil­ing of the naturall law, that a man be prepa­red in mind to embrace Peace when it may be had.

[Page 75] II. It is a fond saying, That all lawes That the Lawes of nature, in the state of nature, are silent. are silent in the time of warre, and it is a true one, not onely if we speak of the civill, but also of the naturall lawes, provided they be referr'd not to the mind, but to the actions of men, by the third Chapter, Act. 29. and we mean such a war as is of all men against all men; such as is the meer state of nature; although in the warre of nation against na­tion a certain mean was wont to be obser­ved. And therefore in old time there was a manner of living, and as it were a certain oeconomy, which they called [...], li­ving by Rapine, which was neither against the law of nature, (things then so standing) nor voyd of glory to those who exercised it with valour, not with cruelty. Their cu­stome was, taking away the rest, to spare life, and abstain from Oxen fit for plough, and every instrument serviceable to husban­dry, which yet is not so to he taken, as if they were bound to doe thus by the law of nature, but that they had regard to their own glory herein, left by too much cruelty, they might be suspected guilty of feare.

III. Since therefore the exercise of the That the security of living ac­cording to the Lawes of nature, consists in the agree­ment of many. naturall law is necessary for the preservation of Peace, and that for the exercise of the naturall law security is no lesse necessary, it is worth the considering what that is which affords such a security: for this matter no­thing else can be imagined, but that each man provide himselfe of such meet helps, as the inv [...]sion of one on the other may bee rendered so dangerous, as either of them may think it better to refrain, then to med­dle. But first it is plain, that the con­sent [Page 76] of two or three cannot make good such a security; because that the addition but of one, or some few on the other side, is suffi­cient to make the victory undoubtedly sure, and hartens the enemy to attacque us. It is therefore necessary, to the end the security sought for may be obtained, that the num­ber of them who conspire in a mutuall as­sistance be so great, that the accession of some few to the enemies party may not prove to them a matter of moment suffici­ent to assure the victory.

IV. Farthermore, how great soever the number of them is who meet on selfe-de­fence, That the agreement of many is not constant enough to preserve a lasting Peace. if yet they agree not among them­selves of some excellent means whereby to compasse this, but every man after his own manner shall make use of his endeavours, nothing will be done; because that divided in their opinions they will be an hinderance to each other, or if they agree well enough to [...]ome one action through hope of victory, spoyle, or revenge, yet afterward through diversity of wits, and Counsels, or emula­tion, and envy, with which men naturally contend, they will be so torne and rent, as they will neither give mutuall help, nor de­sire peace, except they be constrained to it by some common feare. Whence it fol­lowes, that the consent of many, (which con­sists in this onely, as we have already defi­ned in the foregoing section, that they di­rect all their actions to the same end, and the common good) that is to say, that the so­ciety proceeding from mutuall help onely, yeelds not that security which they seek for, who meet, and agree in the exercise of the [Page 77] above-named lawes of nature; but that some­what else must be done, that those who have once consented for the common good, to peace and mutuall help, may by fear be re­strained, le [...]t afterward they again dissent, when their private Interest shall appear dis­crepant from the common good.

V. Aristole reckons among those ani­mals Why the govern­ment of some bruit creatures stands firm in concord alone, and not so of men. which he calls Politique, not man on­ly, but divers others; as the Ant, the Bee, &c. which though they be destitute of rea­son, by which they may contract, and sub­mit to government, notwithstanding by consenting, (that is to say) ensuing, or eschewing the same things, they so direct their actions to a common end, that their meetings are not obnoxious unto any sedi­tions. Yet is not their gathering together a civill government, and therefore those ani­mals not to be termed politicall, because their government is onely a consent, or ma­ny wills concurring in one object; not (as is necessary in civill government) one will. It is very true that in those creatures, living only by sense and appetite, their consent of minds is so durable, as there is no need of any thing more to secure it, and (by consequence) to preserve peace among them, then barely their naturall [...]nclination. But among men the case is otherwise. For first among them there is a contestation of honour and pre­ferment; among beasts there is none: whence hatred and envy, out of which arise sedition and warre, is among men, among beasts no such matter. Next, the naturall appetite of Bees, and the like creatures, is conformable, and they desire the common [Page 78] good which among them differs not from their private; but man scarce esteems any thing good which hath not somewhat of eminence in the enjoyment, more then that which others doe possesse. Thirdly, those creatures which are voyd of reason, see no defect, or think they see none, in the admi­nisttation of their Common-weales; but in a multitude of men there are many who supposing themselves wiser then others, en­deavour to innovate, and divers Innovators innovate divers wayes, which is a meer di­straction, and civill warre. Fourthly, these brute creatures, howsoever they may have the use of their voyce to signify their affe­ctions to each other, yet want they that same art of words which is necessarily requi­red to those motions in the mind, whereby good is represented to it as being better, and evill as worse then in truth it is: But the tongue of man is a trumpet of warre, and sedition; and it is reported of Pericles, that he sometimes by his elegant speeches thun­dered, and lightened, and confounded whole Greece it selfe. Fiftly, they cannot distinguish between injury and harme; Thence it happens that as long as it is well with them, they blame not their fellowes: But those men are of most trouble to the Republique, who have most leasure to be idle; for they use not to contend for pub­lique placcs before they have gotten the vi­ctory over hunger, and cold. Last of all, the consent of those brutall creatures is na­turall, that of men by compact onely, (that is to say) artificiall; it is therefore no mat­ter of wonder if somewhat more be need­full [Page 79] for men to the end they may live in peace. Wherefore consent, or contracted so­ciety, without some common power whereby particular men may be ruled through feare of punishment, doth not suffice to make up that security which is requisite to the exer­cise of naturall justice.

VI. Since therefore the conspiring of ma­ny That not onely con­sent, but union also is required to establish the peace of men. wills to the same end doth not suffice to preserve peace, and to make a lasting de­fence, it is requisite that in those necessary matters which concern Peace and selfe-de­fence, there be but one will of all men. But this cannot be done, unlesse every man will so subject his will to some other one, to wit, either Man or Counsell, that whatsoever his will is in those things which are necessary to the common peace, it be received for the wills of all men in generall, and of every one in particular. Now the gathering to­gether of many men who deliberate of what is to be done, or not to be done, for the common good of all men, is that which I call a COUNSELL.

VII. This submission of the wils of all those What Un [...] ­on is. men to the will of one man, o [...] one Counsell, is then made, when each one of them obli­geth himself by contract to every one of the rest, not to resist the will of that one man, or counsell, to which he hath submitted himselfe; that is, that he refuse him not the use of his wealth, and strength, against any o [...]hers whatsoever (for he is supposed still to retain a Right of defending himselfe against violence) and this is called UNI­ON. But we understand that to be the will of the counsell, which is the will of the major [Page 80] part of those men of whom the Counsell consists.

VIII. But though the will it self be not vo­luntary, In union, the Right of all men is trans­ferred to one. but only the beginning of voluntary actions (for we will not to will, but to act) and therefore falls least of all under deli­beration, and compact; yet he who sub­mits his will to the will of an other, con­veighs to that other the Right of his strength, and faculties; insomuch as when the rest have done the same, he to whom they have submitted hath so much power, as by the terrour of it hee can conforme the wills of particular men unto unity, and con­cord.

IX. Now union thus made is called a City, What civill society is. or civill society, and also a civill Person; for when there is one will of all men, it is to be esteemed for one Person, and by the word (one) it is to be knowne, and distinguished from all particular men, as having its own Rights and properties: insomuch as nei­ther any one Citizen, nor all of them to­gether (if we except him whose will stands for the will of all) is to be accounted the City. A CITY therefore (that we may define it) is one Person, whose will, by the compact of many men, is to be received for the will of them all; so as he may use all the power and faculties of each particular person, to the maintenance of peace, and for common defence.

X. But although every City be a civill What a ci­vill Per­son is. Person, yet every civill Person is not a City; for it may happen that many Citizens, by the permission of the City, may joyne to­gether in one Person, for the doing of certain [Page 81] things. These now will be civill Persons, as the companies of Merchants, and many other Convents; but Cities they are not, because they have not submitted themselves to the will of the company simply, and in all things, but in certain things onely de­termined by the City; and on such terme [...] as it is lawfull for any one of them to con­tend in judgement against the body it selfe of the sodality, which is by no means al­lowable to a Citizen against the City: such like societies therefore are civill Persons sub­ordinate to the City.

XI. In every city, That Man, or Coun­sell, What it is to have the supreme power, what to be subject. to whose will each particular man hath subjected his will (so as hath been de­clared) is said to have the SUPREME POWER, or CHIEFE COM­MAND, or DOMINION; which power, and Right of commanding, consists in this, that each Citizen hath conveighed all his strength and power to that man, o [...] Counsell; which to have done (because no man can transferre his power in a naturall manner) is nothing else then to have parted with his Right of resisting. Each Citizen, as also every subordinate civill Person, is called the SUBJECT of him who hath the chiefe command.

XII. By what hath been sayed, it is suf­ficiently Two kinds of Cities, naturall, and by in­stitution. shewed, in what manner, and by what degrees many naturall persons, through desire of preserving themselves, and by mu­mutuall feare, have growne together into a civill Person, whom we have called a City; But they who submit themselves▪ to another for feare, either submit to him whom they [Page 82] feare, or some other whom they confide in for protection; They act according to the first manner who are vanquished in warre, that they may not be slain; they according to the second, who are not yet overcome, that they may not be overcome. The first man­ner receives its▪ beginning from naturall power, and may be called the naturall be­ginning of a City; the latter from the Counsell, and constitution of those who meet together, which is a beginning by institution. Hence it is, that there are two▪ kinds of Ci­ties, the one naturall, such as is the paternall, and despoticall; the other institutive, which may be also called politicall. In the first▪ the Lord acquires to himselfe such Citizens as he will, in the other the Citizens by their own wills appoint a Lord over themselves, whether he be one man, or one company of men endued with the command in chiefe. But we will speak in the first place of a City politicall or by institution, and next of a City naturall.

CHAP. VI. Of the right of him, whether Counsell, or one Man onely, who hath the supreme pow­er in the City.

I. VVE must consider first of all There can no Right [...]e attributed to a multi­tude consi­dered out of civill soci­ety, nor any action to which they have not given their particular consents. what a (*) multitude of men (gathering themselves of their owne free wills into society) is, namely, that it is not any one body, but many men, whereof each one hath his owne will, and his peculiar judgment concerning all things that may be propos'd. And though by particular Contracts each single man may have his own Right, and Propriety, so as one may say This is mine, the other, That is his; yet will there not be any thing of which the whole multitude, as a Person distinct from a single man, can rightly say, This is mine, more then anothers. Neither must we a­scribe any action to the multitude, as it's [Page 85] one, but (if all, or more of them doe agree) it will not be an Action, but as many acti­ons, as Men. For although in some great Sedition, it's commonly said, That the People of that City have taken up. Armes; yet is it true of those onely who are in Armes, or who consent to them. For the City, which is one Person, cannot take up Armes against it selfe. Whatsoever there­fore is done by the multitude, must be un­derstood to be done by every one of those by whom it is made up; and that he, who being in the Multitude, and yet consented not, nor gave any helps to the things that were done by it, must be judg'd to have done nothing. Besides, in a multitude not yet reduc'd into one Person, in that manner as hath been said, there remaines that same [...]te of nature in which all things belong to all men, and there is no place for Meum & Tu­um, which is call'd Dominion, and Pro­priety, by reason that that security is not yet extant which we have declar'd above to be necessarily requisite for the practise of the Naturall Laws.

Multitude, &c.] The Doctrine of the Annota­tion. power of a City over it's Citizens, almost wholly depends on the understanding of the dif­ference which is between a multitude of men ruling, and a multitude ruled: For such is the nature of a City, That a multitude, or company of Citizens, not onely may have command, but may also be subject to command, but in diverse senses; which difference I did beleeve was clearly enough explained in this first Article; but by the objections of many against those things which follow, I discern otherwise; wherefore it [Page 86] seemed good to me, to the end I might make a fuller explication, to adde these few things.

By Multitude, because it is a collective word, we understand more then one, so as a multitude of me [...] is the same with many me [...]; The same word, because it is of the singular number, sig­nifies one thing, namely, one multitude; but in neither sense can a multitude be understood to have one will given to it by nature, but to either a severall; and therefore neither is any one acti­on whatsoever to be attributed to it: Where­fore a Multitude cannot promis [...], contract, ac­quire Right, conveigh Right, act, have, possesse, and the like, unlesse it be every one apart, and Man by Man; so as there must be as many promises, compacts, rights, and actio [...]s, as Men. Wherefore a Multitude is no naturall Person; but if the same Multitude doe Contract one with another, that the will of one man, or the agreeing wills of the major part of them, shall be received for the will of all, then it becomes one Person; for it is endu'd with a will, an [...] therefore can doe voluntary actions, such as ar [...] Commanding, making Lawes, acquiring and transferring of Right, and so [...]orth; and it is oftner call'd the People, then the Multitude. We must therefore distinguish thus. When we say the People, or Multitude, wills, commands, or doth any thing, it is understood that the City which Commands, Wills and Acts by the will of one, or the concurring wills of more, which cannot be done, but in an Assembly▪ But as oft as any thing is said to be done by a Multitude of Men, whether great, or small, without the will of that man, or assembly of men, that's understood to be done by a subjected People, that is, by many single Citizens to­gether, [Page 87] and not proceeding from one Will, but from diverse wills of diverse men, who are Citizens, and Subjects, but not a City.

II. Next, we must consider that every The begin­ning of a City is the Right of the major part a­greeing. one of the Multitude (by whose meanes there may be a beginning to make up the City) must agree with the rest, that in those matters which shall be propounded by any one in the Assembly, that be received for the will of all which the major part shall approve of; for otherwise there will be no will at all of a Multitude of Men, whose Wills and Votes differ so variously. Now if any one will not consent, the rest not­withstanding shall among themselves con­stitute the City without him: Whence it will come to passe, that the City retaines its primitive Right against the Dissen­tour, that is, the Right of War, as against an Enemy.

III. But because we said in the forego­ing That every man retains a right of protecting himself ac­cording to [...]is owne judgement, as long as he is not secured. Chapter, the sixth Article, That there was requir'd to the security of men, not onely their Consent, but also the Subjecti­on of their wills in such things as were ne­cessary to Peace and Defence; and that in that Union, and Subjection, the nature of a City consisted; We must discerne now in this place, out of those things which may be propounded, discuss'd and stated in an Assembly of men, (all whose wills are contain'd in the will of the major part) what things are necessary to Peace, and com­mon defence: But first of all, it is necessary to Peace, that a man be so farre forth pro­tected against the violence of others, that he may live securely, that is, that he may have [Page 88] no just cause to fear others, so long as he doth them no injury. Indeed, to make men altogether safe from mutuall harmes, so as they cannot be hurt, or injuriously kill'd, is impossible, and therefore comes not within deliberation, but care may be had there be no just cause of fear; for security is the end wherefore men submit themselves to others, which if it be not had, no man is suppos'd to have submitted himselfe to ought, or to have quitted his Right to all things, before that there was a care had of his security.

IV. It is not enough to obtain this se­curity, That a co­ [...]r [...]ive po­ [...]er is [...] ­cessary for security. that every one of those who are now growing up into a City, do [...] covenant with the rest, either by words, or writing, Not to steal, not to kill, and to observe the like Lawes; for the pravity of humane dispo­sition is manifest to all, and by experience too well known how little (removing the punishment) men are kept to their duties, through conscience of their promises. We must therefore provide for our security, not by Compacts, but by Punishments; and there is then sufficient provision made, when there are so great punishments appointed for every injury, as apparently it prove a greater evill to have done it, then not to have done it: for all men, by a necessity of nature, chuse that which to them appears to be the lesse evill.

V. Now the right of punishing is then What the Sword of Justice is. understood to be given to any one, when every man Contracts not to assist him who is to be punished. But I will call this Right, The Sword of Justice. But these kind of [Page 89] contracts men observe well enough, for the most part, till either themselves, or their n [...]ar friends are to suffer.

VI. Because therefore for the security of That the Sword of Justice be­longs to him who hath the chiefe com­mand. particular men, and, by consequence for the common peace, it is necessary that the right of using the Sword for punishment, be transferred to some Man or Counsell, that Man or Counsell is necessarily understod by Right to have the supreme power in the City. For he that by Right punisheth at his own discretion, by Right compells all men to all things which he himselfe wills; then which a greater command cannot be ima­gined.

VII. But in vain doe they worship peace That the Sword of Warre be­longs to him also. at home, who cannot defend themselves against forrainers; neither is it possible for them to protect themselves against forrai­ners, whose forces are not united; and there­fore it is necessary for the preservation of par­ticulars, that there be some one Counsell, or one man, who hath the Right to arm, to ga­ther together, to unite so many Citizens in all dangers, and on all occasions, as shall be needfull for common defence against the certain number, and strength of the enemy; and again, (as often as he shall finde it ex­pedient) to make peace with them. We must understand therefore, that particular Citi­zens have conveighed their whole Right of Warre, and Peace, unto some one Man or Counsell; And that this right (which we may call [...]he Sword of Warre) belongs to the same Man, or Counsell, to whom the Sword of Justice belongs; for no Man can by Right compell Citizens to take up armes, and be [Page 90] at the expences of Warre, but he who by Right can punish him who doth not obey. Both Swords therefore, as well this of War, as that of Justice, even by the constitution it selfe of a City, and essentially, doe be­long to the chiefe command.

VIII. But because the right of the Sword is nothing else but to have power by The power of Judica­ture belongs to him. right to use the sword at his own will, it followes, that the judgement of its right use pertaines to the same party: for if the pow­er of judging were in one, and the power of executing in another, nothing would be done. For in vain would he give judge­ment, who could not execute his commands, or if he executed them by the power of ano­ther, he himselfe is not said to have the power of the Sword, but that other, to whom he is onely an Officer. All judgement there­fore in a City belongs to him who hath the swords, (i. e.) to him, who hath the su­preme authority.

IX. Furthermore, since it no lesse, nay it much more conduceth to Peace to pre­vent The Legislative power is his also. brawles from arising, then to ap­pease them being risen; and that all con­troversies are bred from hence, that the opinions of men differ concerning Meum & Tuum, just and unjust, profitable and unprofitable, good and evill, honest and disho­nest, and the like, which every man esteems according to his own judgement; it belongs to the same chiefe power to make some com­mon Rules for all men, and to declare them publiquely, by which every man may know what may be called his, what anothers, what just, what unjust, what honest, what disho­nest, [Page 91] what good, what evill, that is summa­rily, what is to be done, what to be avoyded in our common course of life. But those Rules and measures are usually called the civill Lawes, or the Lawes of the City, as be­ing the Commands of him who hath the su­preme power in the City. And the CIVILL LAWES (that we may define them) are nothing else but the commands of him who hath the chiefe authority in the City, for di­rection of the future actions of his Citi­zens.

X. Furthermore, since the affaires of That the naming of Magistrats and Offi­cers, belongs to him also. the City, both those of Warre, and Peace, cannot possibly be all administred by one man, or one Counsell, without Officers and subordinate Magistrates, and that it apper­tains to Peace, and common defence, that they to whom it belongs justly to judge of controversies, to search into neighbouring counsels, prudently to wage war, and on all hands warily to attend the benefit of the Ci­ty, should also rightly exercise their offices; it is consonant to reason, that they depend on, and be chosen by him who hath the chiefe command both in War, and in Peace.

XI. It is also manifest, that all volun­tary actions have their beginning from, and The Exa­mination of doctrines belongs to him like­wise. necessarily depend on the will, and that the will of doing, or omitting ought, depends on the opinion of the good and evill of the reward, or punishment, which a man conceives he shall receive by the act, or omission; so as the actions of all men are ruled by the opi­nions of each; wherefore by evident and necessary inference, we may understand that it very much concerns the interest of [Page 92] Peace, that no opinions or doctrines be de­livered to Citizens, by which they may ima­gine, that either by Right they may not obey the Lawes of the City, that is, the commands of that man, or Counsell, to whom the supreme power is committed, or that it is lawfull for to resist him, or that a lesse punishment re­maines for him that denies, then him that yeelds obedience. For if one command somewhat to be done under penalty of na­turall death, another forbids it under pain of eternall death, and both by their own Right, it will follow that the Citizens, al­though innocent, are not onely by Right punishable, but that the City it selfe is al­together disolved; for no man can serve two Masters: nor is he lesse, but rather more, a Master, whom we believe we are to obey for feare of damnation, then he whom we obey for feare of temporall death. It fol­lowes therefore, that this one, whether Man, or Court, to whom the City hath committed the supreme power, have also this Right, That he both (*) judge what opinions and doctrines are enemies unto peace, and also that he forbid them to be taught.

Judge what opinions, &c.] There is scarce any Principle, neither in the worship of God, Annota­tion. nor humane sciences, from whence there may not spring dissentions, discords, reproaches, and by degrees war it selfe; neither d [...]th this happen by reason of the falshood of the Principle, but of the disposition of men, who seeming wise to themselves, will needs appear such to all others▪ But though such dissentions cannot be hinde­red from arising, yet may they be restrained by the exercise of the supreme power, that they prove [Page 93] no hinderance to the publique peace. Of these kind of opinions therefore I have not spoken of in this place. There are certain doctrines where­with Subjects being tainted, they verily be­lieve that obedience may be refused to the City, and that by Right they may, nay ought, to op­pose, and fight against chiefe Princes, and dig­nities. Such are those, which whether directly, and openly, or more obscurely, and by conse­quence require obedience to be given to others beside them to whom the supreme authority is committed. I deny not, but this reflects on that power which many living under other govern­ment, ascribe to the chiefe head of the Church of Rome, and also on that, which elsewhere out of that Church, Bishops require in theirs, to be given to them; and last of all, on that liberty which the lower sort of Citizens under pretence of Religion doe challenge to themselves; for what civill war was there ever in the Christian world, which did not either grow from, or was nourisht by this Root? The judgement there­fore of doctrines, whether they be repugnant to civill obedience or not, and if they be repug­nant, the power of prohibiting them to be taught, I doe here attribute to the civill authority; for since there is no man who grants not to the Ci­ty the judgement of those things which belong to its Peace, and defence, an [...] it is manifest, that the opinions which I have already recited do relate to its Peace, it followes necessarily, that the exa­mination of those opinions, whether they be such, or not, must be referred to the City, that is, to him who hath the supreme authority. Whatsoe­ver he doth is unpuni­shable.

XII. Last of all, from this. considera­tion, that each Citizen hath submitted his Will to his who hath the Supreme Command [Page 94] in the City, so as he may not employ his strength against him; it followes mani­festly, that whatsoever shall be done by him who commands, must not be punisht; for as he who hath not power enough, can­not punish him naturally; so neither can he punish him by Right, who by Right hath not sufficient power.

XIII. It is most manifest by what hath That be hath an ab­solute do­minion granted him by his Citizens, and what proportion of obedience is due unto him. been said, That in every perfect City (that is, where no Citizen hath Right to use his faculties, at his owne discretion, for the preservation of himselfe, or where the Right of the private Sword is excluded) there is a Supreme power in some one, greater then which cannot by Right be conferr'd by men, or greater then which no mortall man can have over himself. But that power, greater then which cannot by men, be conveigh'd on a man, we call (*) ABSOLUTE: for whosoever hath so submitted his will to the will of the City, That he can, unpunisht, d [...]e any thing, make Lawes, judge Controversies, set Penalties, make use, at his own pleasure, of the strength, and wealth of men, and all this by Right, truly he hath given him the greatest domi­nion that can be granted. This same may be confirm'd by experience in all the Ci­ties which are, or ever have beene; for though it be sometimes in doubt, what Man, or Counsell, hath the Chief Command, yet ever there is such a Command, and al­wayes exercis'd, except in the time of Se­dition, and Civill War, and then there are two Chiefe Commands made out of one: Now those seditious persons who dispute [Page 95] against absolute Authority, doe not so much care to destroy it, as to conveigh it on others; for removing this power, they together take away Civill Society, and a confusion of all things returnes. There is so much obedience joyn'd to this absolute Right of the Chief Ruler, as is necessarily requir'd for the Government of the City, that is to say, so much as that Right of his may not be granted in vaine. Now this kind of obedience, although for some rea­sons it may sometimes, by Right, be de­ny'd, yet because a greater cannot be per­form'd, we will call it SIMPLE. But the obligation to performe this growes not immediately from that Contract by which we have conveigh'd all our Right on the City, but mediately from hence, That, without obedience, the Cities Right would be frustrate, and by consequence there would be no City constituted. For it is one thing if I say, I give you Right to Command what you will; another, if I say, I will doe whatsoever you Command; and the Command may be such, as I would rather die then doe it; forasmuch therefore as no man can be bound to will being kill'd, much lesse is he tyed to that, which to him is worse then death: if therefore I be commanded to kill my self, I am not bound to doe it; for though I deny to doe it, yet the Right of dominion is not fru­strated, since others may be found, who being commanded, will not refuse to doe it; neither doe I refuse to doe that which I have contracted to doe. In like manner, if the Chief Ruler command any man to kill [Page 96] him, he is not tyed to doe it, because it can­not be conceiv'd that he made any such Covenant; nor if he command to execute a Parent, whether he be innocent, or guilty, and condemned by the Law, since there are others, who, being commanded, will doe that, and a Son will rather die, then live infamous, and hated of all the world. There are many other cases, in which, since the Commands are shamefull to be done by some, and not by others, Obedience may, by Right, be perform'd by these, and re­fus'd by those; and this, without breach of that absolute Right which was given to the Chief Ruler. For in no case is the Right taken away from him, of slaying those who shall refuse to obey him. But they who thus kill men, although by Right given them from him that hath it, yet if they use that Right otherwise then right Reason re­quires, they sin against the Lawes of Na­ture, (that is) against God.

Absolute] A popular state openly challen­geth Annota­tion. absolute dominion, and the Citizens op­pose it not, for in the gathering together of many men, they acknowledge the face of a City; and even the unskilfull understand, that matters there are rul'd by Counsell. Yet Monarchy is no lesse a City, then Democra [...]y, and absolute Kings have their Counsellours, from whom they will take advice, and suffer their power, in matters of greater consequence, to be guided, but not recall'd. But it appears not to most men how a City is contain'd in the Person of a King; and therefore they object against Ab­solute Command: First, that if any man had such a Right, the condition of the Citizens [Page 97] would be miserable: For thus they think, He will take all, spoil all, kill all; and every man counts it his onely happinesse that he is not al­ready spoil'd and kill'd. But why should he doe thus? not because he can; for unlesse he have a mind to it, he will not doe it. Will he, to please one, or some few, spoil all the rest? First, though by Right, that is, without injury to them, he may doe it, yet can he not doe it justly, that is, without breach of the Naturall Lawes, and injury against God. And therefore there is some security for Subjects in the Oaths which Princes take. Next, if he could just­ly doe it, or that he made no account of his Oath, yet appeares there no reason why he should desire it, since he findes no good in it. But it cannot be deny'd but a Prince may sometimes have an inclination to doe wickedly; but grant then that thou hadst given him a power which were not absolute, but so much onely as suffic'd to defend thee from the injuries of others, which, if thou wilt be safe, is ne­cessary for thee to give; are not all the same things to be feared? for he that hath strength enough to protect all, wants not sufficiency to op­presse all. Here is no other difficulty then, but that humane affaires cannot be without some in­convenience. And this inconvenience it self is in the Citizens, not in the Government; for if men could rule themselves, every man by his own command, that's to say, could they live ac­cording to the Lawes of Nature, there would be no need at all of a City, nor of a common co­ercive power. Secondly, they object, That there is no Dominion in the Christian world Abso­lute; which indeed is not true, for all Monar­chies, and all other States, are so; for although [Page 98] they, who have the chief Command, do [...] not all those things they would, and what they know profitable to the City, the reason of that is not the defect of Right in them, but the considerati­on of their Citizens, who busied about their private interest, and carelesse of what tends to the publique, cannot sometimes be drawn to per­forme their duties without the hazard of the City. Wherefore Princes sometimes forbear the exercise of their Right, and prudently remit somewhat of the act, but nothing of their Right.

XIV. Neither can any man give somewhat to himselfe; for he is already That he is not tied to observe the Lawes of the City. suppos'd to have what he can give himself; nor can he be oblig'd to himselfe, for the same Party being both the obliged, and the Obliger, and the Obliger having power to release the obliged, it were meerly in vain for a man to be obliged to himselfe, because he can release himself at his own plea­sure; and he that can doe this, is already actually free. Whence its plaine, that the City is not tyed to the Civill Lawes; for the Civill Lawes are the Lawes of the City, by which, if she were engag'd, she should be engag'd to her selfe. Neither can the City be oblig'd to her Citizen, because, if he will, he can free her from her obliga­tion; and he will, as oft as she wills, (for the will of every Citizen is in all things comprehended in the will of the City) the City therefore is free when she pleaseth, that is, she is now actually free; but the will of a Councell, or one who hath the Su­preme Authority given him, is the will of the City; he therefore containes the wills of all particular Citizens: Therefore neither is [Page 99] he bound to the Civill Lawes (for this is to be bound to himself) nor to any of his Ci­tizens.

XV. Now because (as hath been shewn That no man can challenge a propriety in ought a­gainst him who hath the Supreme Power. above) before the constitution of a City all things belong'd to all men, nor is there that thing which any man can so call his, as any other may not, by the same Right, claime as his own, (for where all things are com­mon, there can be nothing proper to any man) it followes, that (*) propriety receiv'd its beginning when Cities receiv'd theirs, and that that onely is proper to each man which he can keep by the Lawes, and the power of the whole City, (that is) of him on whom its chief command is conferr'd. Whence we understand, that each particu­lar Citizen hath a propriety, to which none of his fellow-Citizens hath Right, because they are tyed to the same Lawes; but he hath no propriety in which the Chief Ruler (whose Cōmands are the Lawes, whose wi [...]l contains the will of each man, and who, by every single person, is constituted the Su­preme Judge) hath not a Right. But al­though there be many things which the City permits to its Citizens, and therefore they may sometimes goe to Law against their Chief; yet is not that action belong­ing to Civill Right, but to Naturall Equity; neither is it concerning what (*) by Right he may do [...] who hath the Supreme Power, but what he hath been willing should be done, and therefore he shall be judge himself, as though (the equity of the cause being well understood) he could not give wrong judg­ment.

[Page 100] Propriety receiv'd its beginning, &c.] Annota­tion. What's objected by some, That the propriety of goods, even before the constitution of Cities, was found in Fathers of Families, that objecti­on is vaine, because I have already declar'd, That a Family is a little City: For the Sonnes of a Family have a propriety of their goods granted them by their Father, distinguisht in­deed from the rest of the Sons of the same Fa­mily, but not from the propriety of the Father himself; but the Fathers of diverse Families, who are subject neither to any common Fa­ther, nor Lord, have a common Right in all things.

What by Right he may doe, &c.] As Annota­tion. often as a Citizen is granted to have an action of Law against the Supreme, i. e. against the City, the question is not in that action, whe­ther the City may, by Right, keep possession of the thing in controversie, but whether by the Lawes formerly made she would keep it; for the Law is the declared will of the Supreme: since then the City may raise money from the Citizens under tow Titles, either as Tribute, or as Debt, in the former case there is no action of Law allowed; for there can be no question whe­ther the City have Right to require Tribute: in the latter it is allowed, because the City will take nothing from its Citizens by fraud, or cunning, and yet if need require, all they have, openly; and therefore he that condemnes this place, saying, That by this doctrine it is casie for Princes to free themselves from their Debts, he does it impertinently.

XVI. Theft, Murther, Adultery, and all It is known by the civill Laws what theft, mur­ther, adul­tery, and injurie are. injuries are forbid by the Lawes of nature, but what is to be called Theft, what Mur­ther, [Page 101] what Adultery, what injury in a Citi­zen, this is not to be determined by the na­turall, but by the civill Law: for not every taking away of the thing which another possesseth, but onely another mans goods is the [...] but what is ours, and what anothers, is▪ a question belonging to the civill Law. In like manner, not every killing of a man is Murther, but onely that which the civill Law forbids; neither is all encounter with women Adultery, but onely that which the civill Law prohibits. Lastly, all breach of promise is an injury, where the promise it selfe is lawfull, but where there is no Right to make any compact, there can be no con­veighance of it, and therefore there can no injury follow, as hath been said in the se­cond Chapter, Artic. 17. Now what we may contract for, and what not, depends whol­ly upon the civill Lawes. The City of La­ced [...]mon therefore rightly ordered that those young men who could so take away certain goods from others as not to be caught, should [...]oe unpunisht; for it was nothing else, but to make a Law that what was so acquired should be their own, and not another. Right­ly also is that man every where s [...]ain, whom we kill in warre, or by the necessity of selfe-defence. So also that copulation which in one City is Matrimony, in another will be judged Adultery. Also those contracts which make up Marriage in one Citizen, doe not so in another, although of the same City; because that he who is forbidden by the Ci­ty (that is by that one man, or Councell, whose the supreme power is) to contract ought, hath no Right to make any contract, and there­fore [Page 102] having made any, it is not valid, and by consequence, no Marriage. But his con­tract which received no prohibition, was therefore of force, and so was Matrimony: neither addes it any force to any unlawfull contracts, that they were made by an Oath, (*) or Sacrament, for those adde nothing to the strenghning of the contract, as hath been said above Chap. 2. Artic. 22. What therefore Theft, what Murther, what Adultery, and in generall what injury is, must be known by the civill Lawes, that is, the commands of him who hath the supreme authority.

That they were made by an Oath or Sa­crament, Annotation &c.] Whether Matrimony bee a Sacrament (in which sense that word is used by some Divines) or not, it is not my pu [...]pose to dispute: Onely I say, that the legitimate con­tract of a man and woman to live together, i. e. granted by the civill Law, whether it be a Sa­crament, or not, is surely a legitimate Marri­age; but that copulation which the City hath prohibited is no marriage, since it is of the es­sence of Marriage to be a legitimate contract. There were legitimate marriages in many pla­ces, a [...] among the Jewes, the Grecians, the Romans, which yet might be dissolved; but with those who permit no such contracts, but by a Law that they shall never be broke, Wedlock cannot be dissolved, and the reason is, because the City hath commanded it to be indissoluble, not because Matrimony is a Sacrament. Where­fore the ceremonies which at weddings are to be performed in the Temple, to blesse, or (if I may say so) to consecrate the husband and wife, will pe [...]haps belong only to the office of Clergy-men, all the rest, namely who, when, and by what [Page 103] contracts Marriages may be made, pertains to the Lawes of the City.

XVII. This same supreme command, and The opinion of those who would constitute a City, where there should not be any one endued with abso­lute power. absolute power, seems so harsh to the greatest part of men, as they hate the very naming of them; which happens chiefly through want of knowledge, what humane nature, and the civill Lawes are, and partly also through their default, who when they are invested with so great authority, abuse their power to their own lust. That they may therefore avoyd this kind of supreme authority, some of them will have a City well enough con­stituted, if they who shall be the Citizens convening, doe agree concerning certaine Articles propounded, and in that convent agitated and approved; and doe command them to be observed, and punishments pre­scribed to be inflicted on them who shall break them: to which purpose, and also to the repelling of a forraign enemy, they ap­point a certain and limited return, with this condition, that if that suffice not, they may call a new convention of estates. Who sees not in a City thus constituted, that the As­sembly who prescribed those things had an absolute power? If therefore the Assembly continue, or from time to time have a cer­tain day, and place of meeting, that power will be perpet [...]all. But if they wholly dis­solve, either the City dissolves with them, and so all is returned to the state of War, or else there is some where a power left to pu­nish those who shall transgresse the Lawes, whosoever, or how many soever they be that have it, which cannot possibly be without an absolute power: for he that by right hath this [Page 104] might given, by punishments to restrain what Citizens he pleaseth, hath such a pow­er, as a greater cannot possibly be given by any Citizens.

XVIII. It is therefore manifest, that The notes of supreme authority. in every City there is some one man, or Coun­cell, or Court, who by Right hath as great a power over each single Citizen, as each man hath over himselfe considered out of that ci­vill state, that is, supreme and absolute, to be limited onely by the strength and forces of the City it selfe, and by nothing else in the world: for if his power were limited, that limitation must necessarily proceed from some greater power; For he that prescribes limits, must have a greater power then he who is confin'd by them; now that confi­ning power is either without limit, or is a­gain restrained by some other greater then it selfe, and so we shall at length arrive to a power which hath no other limit, but that which is the terminus ultimus of the forces of all the Citizens together. That same is called the supreme command, and if it bee committed to a councell, a supreme councell, but if to one man, the supreme Lord of the City. Now the notes of supreme command are these, To make and abrogate Lawes, To de­termine War and Peace, to know, and judge of all controversies, either by himselfe, or by Judges appointed by him; to elect all Ma­gistrates, Ministers, and Counsellors. Lastly, if there be any man who by Right can doe some one action which is not lawfull for any Citizen or Citizens to doe beside himselfe, that man hath obtained the supreme power: For those things which by Right may not [Page 105] be done by any one or many Citizens, the City it selfe can onely doe: He therefore that doth those things useth the Cities Right, which is the supreme power.

XIX. They who compare a City and If the City be compared with a man, hee who hath the supreme command, is in order to the City, a [...] the hu [...] soule is to the man, By Chap. [...]. Artic. 1. its Citizens, with a man and his members, almost all say, that he who hath the supreme power in the City, is in relation to the whole City, such as the head is to the whole man; But it appeares by what hath been already said, that he who is endued with such a power, (whether it be a man, or a Court) hath a relation to the City, not as that of the head, but of the soule to the body. For it is the soule by which a man hath a will, that is, can either will, or nill; so by him who hath the supreme power, and no otherwise, the Ci­ty hath a will, and can either will or nill. A Court of Counsellors is rather to be compa­red with the head, or one Counsellor, whose only Counsell (if of any one alone) the chief Ruler makes use of in matters of greatest moment: for the office of the head is to counsell, as the soules is to command.

XX. For asmuch as the supreme command That the supreme power can­not by Right be dissol­ved by their consents, by whose co [...] ­pacts it was co [...] ­tuted. is constituted by vertue of the compacts which each single Citizen, or subject, mu­tually makes with the other; but all con­tracts, as they receive their force from the contractors, so by their consent they lose it again, and are broken; perhaps some may inferre hence, that by the consent of all the subjects together, the supreme authority may be wholly taken away. Which inference if it were true, I cannot discerne wha [...] danger would thence by Right arise to the supreme Commanders. For since it is supposed, that [Page 106] each one hath obliged himselfe to each o­ther, if any one of them shall refuse, whatso­ever the rest shall agree to doe, he is bound notwithstanding; neither can any man without injury to me, doe that which by contract made with me, he hath obliged himselfe not to doe. But it is not to be ima­gined that ever it will happen, that all the subjects together, not so much as one ex­cepted, will combine against the supreme power, wherefore there is no feare for Ru­lers in chiefe, that by any Right they can be despoyled of their authority. If notwith­standing it were granted, that their Right de­pended onely on that contract which each man makes with his fellow-citizen, it might very easily happen, that they might be robbed of that Dominion under pretence of Right; for subjects being called either by the com­mand of the City, or seditiously flocking to­gether, most men think that the consents of all are contained in the votes of the greater part; which in truth is false; for it is not from nature that the consent of the major part should be received for the consent of all, nei­ther is it true in tumults, but it proceeds from civill institution, and is then onely true, when that Man or Court which hath the supreme power, assembling his subjects, by reason of the greatnesse of their number, al­lowes those that are elected a power of spea­king for those who elected them, and will have the major part of voyces, in such mat­ters as are by him propounded to be discust, to be as effectuall as the whole. But we can­not imagine that he who is chiefe, ever con­vened his subjects with intention that they [Page 107] should dispute his Right, unlesse, weary of the burthen of his charge, he declared in plain termes, that he renounces and aban­dons his government. Now because most men through ignorance esteem not the con­sent of the major part of Citizens only, but even of a very few, provided they be of their opinion, for the consent of the whole City, it may very well seem to them, that the supreme authority may by right be abrogated, so it be done in some great Assembly of Ci­tizens by the votes of the greater number; But though a government be constituted by the contracts of particular men with par­ticulars, yet its Right depends not on that obligation onely, there is another tye also toward him who commands; for each Ci­tizen compacting with his fellow, sayes thus, I conveigh my Right on this Party, upon condition that you passe yours to the same; by which means▪ that Right which every man had before to use his faculties to his own ad­vantage, is now wholly translated on some certain man, or Councell, for the common benefit; wherefore what by the mutuall con­tracts each one hath made with the other, what by the donation of Right which every man is bound to ratifie to him that com­mands, the government is upheld by a dou­ble obligation from the Citizens, first that which is due to their fellow citizens, next that which they owe to their Prince. Where­fore no subjects how many soever they be, [...]an with any Right despoyle him who bears the chiefe Rule, of his authority, even with­out his own consent.

CHAP. VII. Of the three kindes of Govern­ment, Democraty, Aristo­craty, Monarchie.

I. VVE have already spoken of a There are three kinds of Govern­ment onely. Democraty, Aristocra­ty, and Mo­narchy. City by institution in its Ge­nus; we will now say somewhat of its [Page 110] species. As for the difference of Cities, it is taken from the difference of the Persons, to whom the Supreme Power is committed; this power is committed either to one Man, or Councell, or some one Court consisting of many men. Furthermore, a Councell of many men, consists either of all the Citi­zens, (insomuch as every man of them hath a Right to Vote, and an interest in the ordering of the greatest affaires, if he will himselfe) or of a part onely; from whence there arise three sorts of Government: The one, when the Power is in a Councell, where every Citizen hath a right to Vote, and it is call'd a DEMOCRATY. The other, when it is in a Councell, where not all, but some part onely have their suffra­ges, and we call it an ARISTOCRA­TY. The third is that, when the Su­preme Authority rests onely in one, and it is stiled a MONARCHY. In the first, he that governes is called [...], The PEOPLE. In the second, the NO­BLES. In the third, the MO­NARCH.

II. Now, although Ancient Writers of Politiques have introduc'd three other Oligarchie is no state of a City distinct from Ari­stocratie; neither is Anarchie any state at all. kindes of Government opposite to these, to wit, Anarchy or confusion to Democraty, Oligarchy, that is, the command of some few, to Aristocracy, and Tyranny to Monarchy, yet are not these three distinct formes of Government, but three diverse Titles given by those who were either displeas'd with that present Government, or those that bare Rule. For men, by giving names, doe usually, not onely signifie the things [Page 111] themselves, but also their own affections, as love, hatred, anger, and the like, whence it happens that what one man calls a De­mocraty, another calls an Anarchy; what one counts an Aristocraty, another esteemes an Oligarchie; and whom one titles a King, another stiles him a Tyrant; so as we see these names betoken not a diverse kinde of Government, but the diverse opinions of the Subjects concerning him who hath the Supreme Power. For first, who sees not that Anarchy is equally opposite to all the forenam'd Formes? For that word signi­fies that there is no Government at all, that is, not any City. But how is it possible that no City should be the species of a City? Farthermore, what difference is there be­tween an Oligarchie, which signifies the Command of a few, or Grand [...]s, or an Aristocraty, which is that of the Prime, or Chief Heads, more then that men differ so among themselves, that the same things seeme not good to all men? whence it hap­pens, that those persons, who by some are look'd on as the best, are dy others esteem'd to be the worst of all men.

III. But men, by reason of their passi­ons, That a Ty­ranny is not a diverse state from alegitimate Monarchy. will very hardly be perswaded that a Kingdome, and Tyranny, are not diverse kindes of Cities, who though they would rather have the City subject to one, then many, yet doe they not beleeve it to be well govern'd unlesse it accord with their judge­ments: But we must discover by Reason, and not by Passion, what the difference is between a King, and a Tyrant: but first, they differ not in this, That a Tyrant hath [Page 112] the greater power, for greater then the Su­preme cannot be granted; nor in this, That one hath a limited power, the other not; for he, whose authority is limited, is no King, but his Subject that limits him. Lastly, neither differ they in their manner of ac­quisition; for if in a Democraticall, or Ari­stocraticall Government some one Citizen should, by force, possesse himself of the Su­preme Power, if he gain the consent of all the Citizens, he becomes a legitimate Monarch; if not, he is an Enemy, not a Tyrant. They differ therefore in the sole exercise of their command, insomuch as he is said to be a King, who governs wel, and he a [...] Tyrant that doth otherwise. The case therefore is brought to this passe, That a King legitimate­ly constituted in his Government, if he seeme to his Subjects to Rule well, and to their liking, they afford him the appellation of a King, if not, they count him a Tyrant: Wherefore we see a Kingdome, and Tyran­ny, are not diverse Formes of Govern­ment, but one and the self-same Monarch hath the name of a King given him in point of Honour, and Reverence to him, and of a Tyrant in way of contumely, and reproach. But what we frequently finde in bookes said against Tyrants, took its origi­nall from Greek, and Roman Writers, whose Government was partly Democrati­call, and partly Aristocraticall, and there­fore not Tyrants onely, but even Kings were odious to them.

IV. There are, who indeed doe think it That there can no mixt state be form'd out of these fore-nam'd kindes of Govern­ment. necessarily, That a Suprem [...] Command should be somewhere extant in a City; [Page 113] but if it should be in any one, either Man, or Councell, it would follow (they say) that all the Citizens must be slaves. Avoiding this condition, they imagine that there may be a certaine Form of Government com­pounded of those three kinds we have spoken of, yet different from each particular, which they call a mixt Monarchie, or mixt Aristocraty, or mixt Democraty, according as any one of these three sorts shall be more eminent then the rest: For example, if the naming of Magistrates, and the arbi­tration of War, and Peace, should belong to the King, Judicature to the Lords, and contribution of Monies to the People, and the power of making Lawes too altogether, this kind of State would they call a mixt Monarchie forsooth. But if it were possi­ble that there could be such a State, it would no whit advantage the liberty of the subject; for as long as they all agree, each single Citizen is as much subject as possibly he can be; but if they disagree, the State returns to a Civill War, and the Right of the private Sword, which certainly is much worse then any subjection whatso­ever: (*) But that there can be no such kind of Government hath been sufficiently demonstrated in the foregoing Chapter, Artic: 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11, 12.

But that there can be no such kinde of Annota­tion. Government] Most men grant, That a Go­vernment ought not to be divided, but they would have it moderated, and bounded by some limits. Truly it is very reasonable it should be so; but if these men, when they speak of mode­rating, and limiting, do understand dividing it, [Page 114] they make a very fond distinction. Truly, for my part, I wish that not onely Kings, but all other Persons endued with Supreme Authority would so temper themselves as to commit no wrong, and onely minding their charges contain themselves within the limits of the naturall, and divine Lawes: But they who distinguish thus, they would have the chief power bounded, and restrain'd by others; which, because it cannot be done, but that they who doe set the limits, must needs have some part of the power, where­by they may be enabled to doe it, the Go­vernment is properly divided, not modera­ted.

V. Let us see a little now in the consti­tuting That De­mocraty, except it have cer­tain times and places of meeting prescrib'd, is dissolv'd. of each Form of Government, what the constitutours doe. Those who met together with intention to erect a City, were almost in the very act of meeting a Democraty; for in that they willingly met, they are suppos'd oblig'd to the observa­tion of what shall be determin'd by the major part: which, while that convent lasts, or is adjourn'd to some certain dayes, and places, is a clear Democraty; for that convent, whose will is the will of all the Citizens, hath the Supreme Authority; and because in this Convent every man is suppos'd to have a Right to give his voice, it followes, that it is a Democraty by the defini­tion given in the first Article of this Chap. But if they depart, and break up the Con­vent, and appoint no time, or place, where, and when they shall meet again, the publick weal returns to Anarchy, and the same state it stood in before their meeting, that is, to the state of all men warring against all. [Page 115] the People therefore retains the supreme power no longer then there is a certain day and place publiquely appointed, and known, to which whosoever will, may resort. For except that be known and determined, they may either meet at divers times, and places, that is in factions, or not at all; and then it is no longer [...], the People, but a dissolute multitude, to whom we can neither attribute any Action, or Right: Two things therefore frame a Democratie, whereof one (to wit the perpetuall prescription of Convents) makes [...], the People, the other (which is a plurality of voyces) [...] or the power.

VI. Furthermore, it will not be suffici­ent In Demo­cratie, the Intervals of the times of conve­ [...]ing must be short, or the admi­nistration of the go­vernment committed to some one. for the People, so as to maintain its su­premacy, to have some certain known times, and places of meeting, unlesse that either the intervals of the times be of lesse distance, then that any thing may in the mean time happen whereby (by reason of the defect of power) the City may be brought into some danger, or at least that the exercise of the supreme authority be, during the intervall, granted to some one man, or Councell. For unlesse this be done, there is not that wary care, and heed taken for the defence and Peace of single men which ought to be, and therefore will not deserve the name of a Ci­ty, because that in it for want of security, every mans Right of defending himselfe at his own pleasure, returns to him again.

VII. Democraty is not framed by con­tract of particular Persons with the People, but by mutuall compacts of single men each with other. But hence it appears in the first place, that the Persons contracting, must be [Page 116] in being before the contract it selfe, but the People is not in being before the constituti­on of government, as not being any Per­son, but a multitude of single Persons; wherefore there could then no contract passe between the People and the Subject. Now, if after that government is framed, the sub­ject make any contract with the People, it is in vain, because the People contains within its will, the will of that subject to whom it is supposed to be obliged; and therefore may at its own will and pleasure disengage it selfe, and by consequence is now actually free. But in the second place, that single Persons doe contract each with other may be inferred from hence, that in vain sure would the City have been constituted, if the Citizens had been engaged by no contracts to doe, or omit what the City should com­mand to be done or omitted. Because there­fore such kind of compacts must be under­stood to passe as necessary to the making up of a City, but none can be made (as is already shewed) between the Subject and the People, it followes, that they must be made between single Citizens, namely that each man contract to submit his will to the will of the major part, on condition that the rest also doe the like, as if every one should say thus, I give up my Right unto the Peo­ple for your sake, on condition, that you al­so deliver up yours, for mine.

VIII. An Aristocraty, or Councell of By what acts an A­ristocraty is framed. Nobles endued with supreme authoritie, re­ceives its originall from a Democraty, which gives up its Right unto it, where we must understand that certain men distinguisht [Page 117] from others, either by eminence of title, blood, or some other Character, are pro­pounded to the People, and by plurality of voyces are elected, and being elected, the whole Right of the People, or City, is con­veigh [...]d on them, insomuch as whatsoever the People might doe before, the same by Right may this Court of elected Nobles now doe; which being done, it is clear that the People, considered as one Person, (its su­preme authority being already transferred on these) is no longer now in being.

IX. As in Democraty the People, so in an In an Ari­stocraty the Nobles make no contract, nor are they obliged to any citizen, or to the whole Peo­ple. Aristocraty the Court of Nobles is free from all manner of obligation; for seeing subjects not contracting with the People, but by mu­tuall compacts among themselves, were tyed to all that the People did, hence also they were tyed to that act of the People in resign­ing up its Right of government into the hands of Nobles. Neither could this Court, although elected by the People, be by it ob­liged to any thing; for being erected, the People is at once dissolved, as was declared above, and the authority it had as being a Person utterly vanisheth. Wherefore the ob­ligation which was due to the Person must also vanish, and perish together with it.

X. Aristocraty hath these considerations, The No­bles must necessarily have their set meet­ings. together with Democraty; First, that without an appointment of some certain times, and places, at which the Court of Nobles may meet, it is no longer a Court, or one Person, but a dissolute multitude without any su­preme power; Secondly, that the times of their assembling cannot be disjoyned by long intervalls, without prejudice to the su­preme [Page 118] power, unlesse its administration be transferred to some one man: Now the rea­sons why this happens, are the same which we set down in the fifth Article.

XI. As an Aristocratie, so also a Monarchy By what acts a Mo­narchy is framed. is derived from the Power of the People, transferring its Right, (that is) its Authori­tie on one man: Here also we must under­stand, that some one man, either by name, or some other token, is propounded to be taken notice of above all the rest, and that by a plurality of voyces the whole Right of the People is conveighed on him, insomuch as whatsoever the People could doe before he were elected, the same in every Respect may he by Right now doe, being elected; which being done, the People is no longer one Person, but a [...]u [...]e multitude, as being only one before by vertue of the supreme com­mand, whereof they now have made a con­veyance from themselves on this one Man.

XII. And therefore neither doth the That the Monarch is by compact obliged to none, for the autho­ritie he hath recei­ved. Monarch oblige himselfe to any for the com­mand he receives, for he receives it from the People; but as hath been shewed above, the People, as soon as that act is done, ceaseth to be a Person, but the Person vanishing, all obligation to the Person vanisheth. The sub­jects therefore are tyed to perform obedi­ence to the Monarch, by those compacts on­ly by which they mutually obliged them­selves to the observation of all that the Peo­ple should command them, (that is) to obey that Monarch, if he were made by the People.

XIII. But a Monarchy differs as well A Monarch is ever in the readier capacity to exercise all those acts which are requisite to well go­verning. from an Aristocraty, as a Democratie, in this chiefly, that in those there must be certain [Page 119] set times and places for deliberation, and consultation of affaires, that is, for the actu­all exercise of it in all times, and places; For the People, or the Nobles not being one na­turall Person must necessarily have their meetings. The Monarch who is one by na­ture, is alwayes in a present capacity to ex­ecute his authority.

XIV. B [...]cause we have declared above What kind of sin that is, and what sort of men are guilty of it, when the City performs not its of­fice to the Citizens, not the Ci­tizens to­wards the City. in the 7. 9. and 12. Articles, that they who have gotten the supreme command are by no compacts obliged to any man, it necessarily followes, that they c [...]n doe no injury to the subjects; for injury according to the defi­nition made in the third Article of the third Chapter, is nothing else but a breach of contract: and therefore where no con­tracts have part, there can be no injury. Yet the People, the Nobles, and the Monarch may diverse wayes transgresse against the other Lawes of nature, as by cruelty, iniquity, con­ [...]umely, and other like vices, which come not under this strict, and exact notion of injury. But if the subject yeeld not obedience to the supreme, he will in propriety of speech be said to be injurious as well to his fellow sub­jects, because each man hath compacted with the other to obey, as to his chief Ruler in resuming that Right, which he hath gi­ven him, without his consent. And in a Democraty, or Aristocracy, if any thing be de­creed against any Law of nature, the City it selfe (i. e.) the civill Person sinnes not, but those subjects only by whose votes it was decreed for sinne, is a consequence of the naturall expresse will, not of the politi­call, which is artificiall; for if it were other­wise, [Page 120] wise, they would be guilty, by whom the de­cree was absolutely disliked: But in a Mo­narchie, if the Monarch make any decree against the Lawes of nature, he sins himselfe, because in him the civill will and the natu­rall are all one.

XV. The people who are about to make A Monarch made with­out limita­tion of time may elect his successors. a Monarch, may give him the supremacy either simply without limitation of time, or for a certaine season, and time determined; if sim­ply, we must understand that he who re­ceives it, hath the selfe▪ same power which they had, who gave it, on the same grounds: therefore that the People by Right could make him a Monarch, may he make another Monarch: insomuch as the Monarch to whom the command is simply given, receives a Right not of possession onely, but of succes­sion also, so as he may declare whom hee pleaseth for his successor.

XVI. But if the power be given for a Of limited Monarchs. time limited, we must have regard to some­what more then the bare gift onely: First, whether the People converghing its autho­rity, left it selfe any Right to meet at certain times, and places, or not. Next, if it have reserved this power, whether it were done, so as they might meet before that time were expired, which they prescribed to the Monarch. Thirdly, whether they were contented to meet onely at the will of that temporary Monarch and not otherwise. Suppose now the People had delivered up its power to some one man for term of life one­ly; which being done, let us suppose in the first place, that every man departed from the Counsell without making any order at all [Page 121] concerning the place where (after his death) they should meet again to make a new ele­ct on. In this case it is manifest by the fifth Article of this Chapter, that the People cea­seth to be a Person, and is become a disso­lute multitude, every one whereof hath an equall, to wit, a naturall Right to meet with whom he lists at divers times, and in what places shall best please him; nay, and if he can, engrosse the supreme power to him­selfe, and settle it on his own head. What Monarch soever therefore hath a command in such a condition, he is bound by the Law of nature (set down in the Article of the third Chapter of not returning evill for good) prudently to provide, that by his death the City suffer not a dissolution, either by appointing a certain day, & place, in which those subjects of his who have a mind to it may assemble themselves, or else by nomina­ting a successor: whether of these shall to him seem most conducible to their common benefit. He therefore who on this foresaid manner hath received his command during life, hath an absolute power, and may at his discretion dispose of the succession. In the next place, if we grant that the people depar­ted not from the election of the temporary Monarch, before they decreed a certain time and place of meeting after his death, then the Monarch being dead, the authority is confirmed in the people, not by any new acts of the subjects, but by vertue of the former Right, for all the supreme com [...]and (as Domi­nion) was in the People, but the use, and ex­ercise of it was only in the temporary Monarch, as in one that takes the benefit, but hath not [Page 122] the Right. But if the People after the electi­on of a temporarie Monarch, depart not from the Court before they have appointed cer­tain times, and places to convene, during the time prescribed him (as the Dictators in ancient times were made by the People of Rome) such an one is not to be accounted a Monarch, but the Prime Officer of the Peo­ple; and if it shall seem good, the People may deprive him of his office even before that time, as the People of Rome did, when they conferred an equall power on Minutius Master of the horse, with Quintus Fabius Maximus, whom before they had made Di­ctator. The reason whereof is, that it is not to be imagined, that, whether Man or Coun­sell who hath the readiest, and most immedi­ate power to act, should hold his command on such termes as not to be able actually to execu [...]e it; for command is nothing else but a Right of commanding, as oft as nature allowes it possible. Lastly, if the People having declared a temporary Monarch, depart from the Court on such termes, as it shall not be lawfull for them to meet with­out the command of the Monarch, we must understand the People to be immediately dissolved, and that his authority who is thus declared, is absolute; forasmuch as it is not in the power of all the subjects to frame the City a new, unlesse he give consent who hath now alone the authority. Nor matters it, that he hath perhaps made any promise to assem­ble his Subjects on some certain times, since there remains no Person now in being, but at his discretion, to whom the promise was made. What we have spoken of these [Page 123] four cases of a People electing a Temporary Monarch will be more clearly explain'd by comparing them with an absolute Monarch, who hath no heir apparent; for the People is Lord of the subject in such a manner as there can be no Heir but whom it self do [...]h appoint. Besides, the spaces between the times of the subjects meeting may be fi [...]ly compar'd to those times wherein the Mo­narch sleepes, for in either the Acts of com­manding ceases, the Power remaines: Far­thermore, to dissolve the convent, so as it cannot meet againe, is the death of the People; just as sleeping, so as he can never wake more, is the death of a man: As therefore a King, who hath no Heir, going to his rest, so as never to rise again, (i. e.) dying, if he commit the exercise of his Re­gall Authority to any one till he awake, does by consequence give him the Succession; the People also electing a Temporary Monarch, and not reserving a power to convene, delivers upto him the whole Dominion of the Coun­try: Furthermore, as a King going to sleep for some season, entrusts the administra­tion of his Kingdome to some other, and waking takes it again; so the people having elected a Temporary Monarch, and with all retaining a right to meet at a certain day, and place, at that day receives its supre­macy again. And as a King who hath committed the execution of his Authority to another, himself in the mean while wa­king, can recall this commission againe when he pleaseth; so the People, who during the time prescribed to the Temporary Mo­narch, doth by Right convene, may if they [Page 124] please, deprive the Monarch of his Autho­rity. Lastly, the King, who commits his Authority to another while himself sleeps, not being able to wake againe till he whom he entrusted, give consent, loses at once both his power, and his life; so the people, who hath given the Supreme Power to a temporary Monarch in such sort as they cannot assemble without his command is absolutely dissolv'd, and the power re­maines with him whom they have chosen.

XVII. If the Monarch promise ought to A Monarch retaining his Right of Govern­ment, can­not by any promise whatsoever, be conceiv'd to have parted with his Right to the means ne­cessary to the exercise of his Au­thority. any one, or many subjects together, by consequence whereof the exercise of his power may suffer prejudice, that Promise or Compact whether made by Oath, or with­out it, is null: for all Compact is a convey­ance of Right, which by what hath been said in the fourth Article of the second Chapter, requires meet, and proper signes of the Will in the conveyer. But he who sufficiently signifies his will of retaining the end, doth also sufficiently declare that he quits not his Right to the means necessary to that end. Now he who hath promis'd to part with somewhat necessary to the Su­preme Power, and yet retaines the Power it selfe, gives sufficient tokens, That he no otherwise promis'd it then so farre forth as the power might be retain'd without it▪ Whensoever therefore it shall appear that what is promis'd cannot be perform'd without prejudice to the power, the promise must be valued as not made, (i. e.) of no effect. my what Beanes a Subject is freed from his sub­jection.

XVIII. We have seen how Subjects, [Page 125] nature dictating, have oblig'd themselves by mutuall Compacts to obey the Supreme Power. We will see now by what meanes it comes to passe that they are releas'd from these bonds of obedience. And first of a [...]l this happens by rejection, namely, if a man cast off, or forsake, but conveigh not the Right of his Command on some other; for what is thus rejected, is openly expos'd to all alike, catch who catch can; whence again, by the Right of nature, every sub­ject may heed the preservation of himselfe according to his own judgement. In the second place, If the Kingdome fall into the power of the enemy, so as there can no more opposition be made against them, we must understand that he, who before had the Supreme Authority, hath now lost it: For when the Subjects have done their full indeavour to prevent their falling into the enemies hands, they have fulfill'd those Contracts of obedience which they made each with other, and what, being con [...]uer'd, they promise afterwards, to avoid death, they must, with no lesse endeavour, labour to performe. Thirdly, in a Monarchy, (for a Democra [...]y, and Aristocraty cannot fail) if there be no successour, all the subjects are discharg'd from their obligations; for no man is suppos'd to be tyed he knows not to whom, for in such a case it were im­possible to perform ought. And by these three wayes all subjects are restor'd from their civill subjection to that liberty, which all men have to all things, to wit, naturall, and salvage, (for the naturall state hath the same proportion to the Civill, I mean li­berty [Page 126] to subjection, which Passion hath to Reason, or a Beast to a Man:) Further­more, each subject may lawfully be freed from his subjection by the will of him who hath the Supreme Power, namely, if he change his soile, which may be done two wayes, either by permission, as he, who gets license to dwell in another Country; or Command, as he, who is Banisht: In both cases he is free from the Lawes of his former Country, because he is tyed to ob­serve those of the latter.

CHAP. VIII. Of the Rights of Lords over their Servants.

I. IN the two fore-going Chapters we What Lord and Ser­vant are. have treated of an institutive, or fram'd Government, as being that which receives its originall from the consent of many, who by Contract and Faith mutually given, have oblig'd each other. Now followes, what may be said, concerning a naturall Government, which may also be call'd, Ac­quired, because it is that which is gotten by power, and naturall force. But we must know in the first place by what means the Right of Dominion may be gotten over the Persons of men. Where such a Right is gotten, there is a kind of a little Kingdome; for to be a King, is nothing else b [...]t to have Dominion over many Persons; and thus a Great Family is a Kingdom, & a Little King­dome a Family. Let us return again to the state of nature, and consider men as if but even now sprung out of the earth, and suddainly (like Mushromes) come to full maturity without all kind of engagement to each other: There are but three wayes only whereby one can have the Dominion over the Person of ano [...]her; whereof the first is, if by mutuall Contract made between [Page 128] themselves (for Peace, & self-defences sake) they have willingly given up themselves to the Power and Authority of some man, or Councel of Men, & of this we have already spoken. The 2d is, If a man taken Prisoner in the Wars, or overcome; or else distrust­ing his own forces, (to avoid Death) promi­ses the Conquerour, or the stronger Party, his Service, i. e. to do all whatsoever he shall command him; in which Contract the good which the vanquisht, or inferiour, in strength doth receive, is the grant of his life, which by the Right of War in the na­turall st [...]te of men he might have depriv'd him of, but the good which he promises, is his service and obedience. By vertue there­fore of this promise, there is as absolute service and obedience due from the van­quisht, to the vanquisher, as possibly can be, excepting what repugns the Divine Lawes; for he who is oblig'd to obey the Commands of any man before he knowes what he will command him, is simply, and without any restriction tyed to the perfor­mance of all Commands whatsoever. Now he that is thus tyed, is call'd a SERVANT, he to whom he is tyed, a LORD. Thirdly, there is a Right acquir'd over the Person of a Man, by Generation; of which kind of acquisition somewhat shall be spoken in the following Chapter.

II. Every one that is taken in the War, The di­stinction of Servants unto such as upon trust enjoy their natu­rall liberty; or Slaves, and such as serve, being imprison'd or settered. and hath his life spar'd him, is not suppos'd to have Contracted with his Lord, for every one is not trusted with so much of his na­turall liberty, as to be able, if he desir'd it, either to flie away, or quit his service, or [Page 129] contrive any mischief to his Lord. And these serve indeed but within P [...]isons, or bound within Irons, and therefore they were call'd not by the common name of Servant onely, but by the peculiar name of Slave, even as now at this day un serviteur, and un serf, or un esclave have diverse signi­fications.

The obligation therefore of a Servant The obliga­tion of a Servant a­riseth from that free­dome which is granted him by his Lord. to his Lord aris [...]th not from a simple grant of his life, but from hence rather, That he keeps him not bound, or imprison'd, for all obligation derives from Contract; but where's no trust, there can be no Contract, as appears by the 2. Chap. Artic. 9. where a Compact is defin'd to be the promise of him who is trusted. There is therefore a confidence and trust which accompanies the benefit of pardon'd life, whereby the Lord affords him his corporall liberty; so that if no obligation, nor bonds of Contract had happen'd, he might not onely have made his escape, but also have kill'd his Lord, who was the preserver of his life.

IV. Wherefore such kind of Servants Servants that are bound are not obliged to their Lord by any Con­tract. a [...] are restrain'd by imp [...]isonm [...]nt, o [...]bonds, are not comprehended in that definition of Servants given above, because those serve not for the Contracts sake, but to the end they may not suffer; and therefore if they flie, or kill their Lord, they offend not a­gainst the Lawes of Nature, for to bind any man is a plain signe, that the binder supposes him that is bound not to be suf­ficiently tyed by any other obligation.

V. The Lord therefore hath no less Domi­nion Servants have no propriety in their goods against their Lord. over a Servant that is not, then over one [Page 130] that is bound, for he hath a Supreme Power over both, and may say of his Serva [...]t no lesse then of another thing, whether ani­mate, or inanimate, This is mine; whence it followes, that whatsoever the Servant had before his servitude, that afterwards be­comes the Lords; and whatsoever he hath gotten, it was gotten for his Lord: for he that can by Right dispose of the Person of a man, may surely dispose of all those things which that Person could dispose of. There is therefore nothing which the Servant may retaine as his own against the will of his Lord; yet hath he, by his Lords distributi­on, a propriety, and Dominion over his own goods, insomuch as one Servant may keep, and defend them against the invasion of his fellow Servant, in the same manner as hath been shewed before, that a subject hath no­thing properly his owne against the will of the Supreme Authority, but every subject hath a propriety against his fellow sub­ject.

VI. Since therefore both the Servant The Lord may sell his Servant, or alienate him by Te­stament. himself, and all that belongs to him are his Lords, and by the Right of Nature every man may dispose of his owne in what man­ner he pleases; the Lord may either sell, lay to pledge, or by Testament conveigh the Dominion he hath over his Servant, ac­cording to his own will and pleasure.

VII. Farthermore, what hath before The Lord cannot be injurious to his Ser­vant. been demonstrated concerning subjects in an institutive Government, namely, that he who hath the Supreme Power can doe his subject no injury; is true also concerning Servants, because they have subjected their [Page 131] will to the will of the Lord; wherefore, whatsoever he doth, it is done with their wills, but no injury can be done to him that willeth it.

VIII. But if it happen that the Lord He that i [...] Lord of the Lord, is Lord also of the Ser­vants. either by captivity, or voluntary subjection doth become a Servant or Subject to an­other, that other shall not onely be Lord of him, but also of his Servants, Supreme Lord over these, immediate Lord over him. Now because not the Servant only, but also all he hath are his Lords; therefore his Ser­vants now belong to this man, neither can the mediate Lord dispose otherwise of them then shall seeme good to the Supreme. And therefore, if sometime in civill Govern­ments, the Lord have an absolute power over his Servants, that's suppos'd to be de­riv'd from the Right of Nature, and not constituted, but slightly pass'd over by the Civill Law.

IX. A servant is by the same manner freed By what meanes ser­vants are freed. from his servitude, that a Subject in an in­stitutive government, is freed from his sub­jection; First, if his Lord enfranchize him, for the Right which the servant transferred to his Lord over himselfe, the same may the Lord restore to the servant again. And this manner of bestowing of liberty is called MANUMISSION; which is just as if a City should permit a Citizen to con­veigh himselfe under the jurisdiction of some other City. Secondly, if the Lord cast off his servant from him, which in a City is banishment; neither differs it from Manumis­sion in effect, but in manner onely: for there, liberty is granted as a favour, here, [Page 132] as a punishment: In both, the Dominion is renounced. Thirdly, if the servant be taken prisoner, the old servitude is abolished by the new; for as all other things; so servants also are acquired by warre, whom in equity the Lord must protect, if he will have them to be his. Fourthly, the servant is freed for want of knowledge of a successour, the Lord dying (suppose) without any Testament, or Heire, for no man is understood to be ob­liged, unlesse [...]e know to whom he is to per­form the obligation. Lastly, she servant that is put in bonds, or by any other means deprived of his corporall liberty, is freed from that other obligation of contract, for there can be no contract where there is no trust, nor can that faith be broken which is not given, but the Lord who himselfe serves another, cannot so free his servants, but that they must still continue under the power of the supreme, for, as hath been shewed before, such servants are not his, but the supreme Lords.

X. We get a right over irrationall Crea­tures The Domi­nion over beasts is by the Right of nature. in the same manner, that we doe over the Persons of men, to wit, by force and na­turall strength; for if in the state of nature it is lawfull for every one, by reason of that warre which is of all against all, to subdue, and also to kill men as oft as it shall seem to conduce unto their good, much more will the same be lawfull against [...]rutes; namely at their own dis [...]retion, to reduce those to servitude which by a [...]t may be tamed, and [...]tted for use, and to persecute and destroy the rest by a perpe [...]uall warre, as da [...]gerous and no [...]ious. Our D [...]mi [...]io [...] therefore over [Page 133] beasts, hath its originall from the right of na­ture, not from divine positive Right: for if such a Right had not been before the publi­shing of the sacred Scriptures, no man by right might have killed a beast for his food, but he to whom the divine pleasure was made manifest by holy Writ; a most hard condition for men indeed whom the beasts might devoure without injury, and yet they might not destroy them: Forasmuch there­fore as it proceeds from the right of nature, that a beast may kill a man; it is also by the same Right, that a man may slay a beast.

CHAP. IX. Of the right of Parents over their children, and of here­ditary Government.

I. SOcrate [...] is a man, and therefore a living Paternact Dominion riseth not from gene­ration. creature, is a right seasoning, and that most evident, because there is nothing need­full to the acknowledging of the truth of the consequence, but that the word Man, be understod, because a living creature is in the definition it selfe of a Man, and every one makes up the proportion which was desired, namely this, Man is a living Creature; And this, Sop [...]roniscus is Socrates his Father, and therefore his Lord, is perhaps a true infe­rence, but not evident, because the word Lord is not in the definition of a Father: wherefore it is necessary to make it more evident, that the connexion of Father and Lord be somewhat unfolded. Those that have hitherto endeavoured to prove the Do­minion of a Parent over his children, have brought no other argument then that of ge­neration, as if it were of it selfe evident, that what is begotten by me, is mine; just as if a man should think, that because there is a triangle, it appeares presently without any farther discourse, that its angles are equall to two Rights. Besides, since Domi­nion (that is) supreme power is indivisible, insomuch as no man can serve two Masters, but two Persons male and female, must con­c [...]rre in the act of generation, its impossi­ble that Dominion should at all be acquired by generation onely. Wherefore we will with the more diligence in this place, en­quire [Page 136] into the original of paternal Government.

II. Wee must therefore returne to the Dominion over In­fants be­longs to him who who first hath the [...] in his pow­er. state of nature, in which, by reason of the equality of nature all men of riper yeares are to be accounted equall; There by right of nature the Conqueror is Lord of the con­quered: by the Right therefore of nature, the Dominion over the In [...]ant first belongs to him who first hath him in his power, but it's manifest that [...] who is newly born is in the Mothers power before any others, insomuch as she may rightly, and at her own wil, either breed him up, or adventure him to fortune.

III. If therefore she breed him (because Dominion over In­fants is ori­ginally the Mothers. the state of nature is the state of warre) she is supposed to bring him up on this condi­tion, that being grown to full age he become not her enemy; (which is) that he obey her. For since by naturall necessity w [...] all desire that which appears good unto us, it cannot be understood that any man hath on such termes afforded life to another, that he might both get strength by his years, and at once become an enemy; but each man is an enemy to that other whom he neither obeys nor commands. And thus in the state of nature, every woman that bear [...] children, becomes both a Mother, and a Lord. But what some say, that in this case, the Father by reason of the preeminence of sexe, and not the Mother, becomes Lord, signifies no­thing, for both reason shewes the contrary, because the inequality of their naturall for­ces is not so great, that the man could get the Dominion over the woman without warr [...], and custome also contradicts not; for wo­men, namely Amazo [...]s, have in former times [Page 137] waged war against their adversaries, and dis­posed of their children at their own wils, and at this day in divers places, women are inve­sted with the principall authority. Neither doe their husbands dispose of their children, but themselves; which in truth they do by the right of [...]ture; fo [...]asmuch as they who have the su­preme power, are not tyed at all (as hath bin shewed) to the civill lawes. Adde also that in the state of nature it cannot be known who is the Father, but by the testimony of the Mother; the child therefore is his whose the Mother will have it, and therefore hers; Wherefore originall Dominion over chil­dren belongs to the Mother, and among men no lesse then other creatures: The birth followes the belly.

IV. The Dominion passes from the Mo­ther The expo­sed Infant is his that preserves him. to others, divers wayes, first, if she quit and forsake her Right by exposing the child. He therefore that shall bring up the childe thus exposed, shall have the same Dominion over it, which the Mother had. For that life which the Mother had given it (not by get­ting, but nourishing it) she now by exposing, takes from it; Wherefore the obligation al­so which arose from the benefit of life, is by this exposition made voyd. Now the pre­served, oweth all to the preserver, whether in regard of his education as to a Mother, or of his service, as to a Lord; for although the Mother in the state of nature, where all men have a right to all things. may recover her sonne again (namely by the same Right that any body else might doe it) yet may not the So [...]n [...] rightly transferre himselfe again unto his Mother.

[Page 138] V. Secondly, if the Mother be taken pri­soner, The sonne of a Sub­ject and chiefe, is his that com­mands. her Sonne is his that took her, because that he who hath Dominion over the Person, hath also Dominion over all belonging to the Person, Wherefore over the Sonne also, as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chap­ter, in the fifth Article. Thirdly, if the Mo­ther be a subject under what government soever, he that hath the supreme authority in that government, will also have the Domi­nion over him that is born of her, for he is Lord also of the Mother; who is bound to obey him in all things. Fourthly, if a woman for societie sake give her selfe to a man on this condition; that be shall bear the sway; he that receives his being from the contribu­tion of both Parties, is the Fathers, in regard of the command he hath over the Mother; but if a woman bearing rule shall have chil­dren by a Subject, the children are the Mo­thers: for otherwise the woman can have no children without prejudice to her autho­rity. And universally, if the society of the male and female be such an union, as the one have subjected himselfe to the other, the children belong to him or her that commands. In such a conjunction of male and female, as neither hath the command­ing power over the other, the children are the Mo­thers, ex­cept by pact, or civill law, it be otherwise determined.

VI. But in the state of nature, if a man, and woman contract so, as neither is subject to the command of the other, the children are the Mothers for the reasons above given in the third Article, unlesse by pacts it be otherwise provided. For the Mother may by pact dispose of her Right as she lists, as heretofore hath been done by the Ama­zons, who of those children which have been begotten by their neighbours, have by pact allowed them the males, and retained the [Page 139] females to themselves; but in a civill go­vernment, if there be a contract of marri­age between a man and woman, the children are the Fathers; because in all Cities, viz. constituted of Fathers, not Mothers govern­ing their families, the domesticall command belongs to the man, and such a contract, if it be made according to the civill Laws, is called MATRIMONY; but if they agree only to lye together, the children are the Fa­thers, or the Mothers variously, according to the differing civill Lawes of divers Cities.

VII. Now because by the third Article Children are no lesse subject to their Pa­rents, then servants to their Lords, and subjects to their City. the Mother is originally Lord of her Children, and from her the Father, or some body else by derived Right, it is manifest that the Children are no lesse subject to those by whom they are nourisht, and brought up, then Ser­vants to their Lords, and Subjects to him who beares the Supreme Rule, and that a Parent cannot be injurious to his Sonne as long as he is under his power. A Son also is freed from subjection on the same man­ner as a subject and servant are. For eman­cipation is the same thing with manumission, and abdication with banishment.

VIII. The enfranchised son, or released Of the ho­nour due to Parents and Lords. servant, doe now stand in lesse fear of their [...]ord and Father being deprived of his natu­rall and lordly power over them, and (if regard be had to true and inward Honour) doe Honour him lesse, then before. For Ho­nour (as hath been said in the section a­bove) is nothing else but the estimation of anothers power; and therefore he that hath least power, hath alwayes least Honour. But it is not to be imagin'd that the enfranchiser [Page 140] ever intended so to ma [...]ch the enfranchised with himself, as that he should not so much as acknowledge a benefit, but should so carry himself in all things, as if he were be­come wholly his equall; It must therefore be ever understood, That he who is freed from subjection, whether he be a servant, sonne, or some colony, doth promise all those externall signes, at least whereby Superiours used to be Honour'd by their inferiours. From whence it followes, That the pre­cept of honouring our Parents, belongs to the law of nature, not onely under the title of Gratitude, but also of Agreement.

IX What then, will some one demand, Wherein liberty doth consist, and the diffe­rence be­tween sub­jects and servants. is the difference between a sonne, or between a subject, and a servant? Neither doe I know that any W [...]iter hath fully declared what liberty, and what slavery is. Com­monly to doe all things according to our own phancies, and that without punish­ment, is esteem'd to be liberty; not to be able to doe this, is judg'd bondage; which in a Civill Government, and with the peace of mankind cannot possibly be done, because there is no City without a Com­mand, and a restraining Right. LIBERTY, that we may define it, is nothing else but an absence of the lets, and hinderances of motion, as water shut up in a vessell is therefore not at liberty, [...]ecause the vessell hinders it from running out, which the vessell being broken, is made free. And every man hath more or lesse liberty, as he hath more or lesse space in which he employes himself: as he hath more liberty, who is in a large, then he that is kept in a close prison. And a man may [Page 141] be free toward one part, and yet not toward anothert as the traveller is bounded on this, and that side with hedges, or stone walls, lest he spoyle the vines, or corne, neighbou­ring on the high way. And these kinde of le [...]s are externall, and absolute; in which sense all Servants, and Subjects are free, who are not fetter'd and imprisoned. There are others which are arbitrary, which doe not absolutely hinder motion, but by accident; to wit, by our own choyce, as he that is in a ship is not so hindered, but he may cast him­selfe into the Sea, if he will: and here also the more wayes a man may move himselfe, the more liberty he hath, and herein consists civill liberty; for no man, whether subject, sonne, or servant, is so hindred by the pu­nishments appointed by the City, the Fa­ther, or the Lord, how cruell soever, but that he may doe all things, and make use of all meanes necessary to the preservation of his life and health: for my part therefore I can­not finde what reason a meer servant hath to make complaints, if they relate onely to want of liberty, unlesse he count it a [...]misery to be restrained from hurting himselfe, and to receive that life, (which by warre, or misfortune, or through his own idlenesse was forfeited) together with all manner of sustenance, and all things necessary to the conservation of health, on this condition on­ly, that he will be rul'd: for he that is kept in by punishments layd before him, so as he dares not let loose the reines to his will in all things; is not opprest by servitude, but is governed and sustained. But this privi­ledge free subjects and sonnes of a family, [Page 142] have above servants, (in every goverment, and family, where servants are) that they may both undergoe the more honourable offices of the City or family, and also enjoy a larger possession of things superfluous. And herein layes the difference between a f [...]ce subject, and a servant, that he is FREE indeed, who serves his City onely; but a SERVANT is he who also serves▪ his fellow subject: all other liberty is an exem­ption from the Lawes of the City, and proper only to those that bear Rule. There is the same Right in an here­ditary, which there is in an in­stitutive govern­ment.

X. A Father, with his sonnes and scr­vants growne into a civill Person by vertue of his paternall jurisdiction, is called a FAMILY. This family, if through mul­tiplying of children, and acquisition of ser­vants, it becomes numerous, insomuch as without casting the uncertain dye of warre, it cannot be subdued, will be termed an Hereditary Kingdome; which though it differ from an institutive Monarchy, being acquired by force in the original, & manner of its con­stitution; yet being constituted, it hath al the same properties, and the Right of authority is every where the same, insomuch as it is not needfull to speak any thing of them apart.

XI. It hath been spoken, by what Right The que­stion con­cerning the Right of succession, belongs onely to Monarchy. supreme authorities are constituted. Wee must now briefly tell you by what right they may be continued. Now the Right by which they are continued, is that which is called the right of SUCCESSION. Now because in a Democratie, the supreme autho­rity is with the People, as long as there be any subjects in being, so long it rests with the same Person; for the People hath no [Page 143] Successour. In like manner in an Aristocra [...]y, one of the Nobles [...]ying, some other by the rest is substituted in his place, and there­fore except they all dye together, which [...] suppose will never happen, there is no suc­cession. The Querie therefore of the Right of Succession takes place onely in an ab­solute Monarchy. For they who exercise the supreme power for a time onely, are them­selves no Monarchs, but Ministers of state.

XII. But first, if a Monarch shall by Te­stament A Monarch may dispose of the com­mand of his govern­ment by Te­stament. appoint one to succeed him, the Person appointed shall succeed; for if he be appointed by the People, he shall have all the Right over the City which the People had, as hath been shewed in the 7. Chap. Art. 11. but the People might choose him, by the same Right therefore may he choose ano­ther; but in an hereditary Kingdome there are the same Rights as in an institutive; wherefore, every Monarch may by his will make a successour.

XIII. But what a man may transferre on another by Testament, that by the same Or give it away, or sell it. Right may he yet living, give, or sell away▪ To whomsoever therefore he shall make over the supreme power, whether by gift, or sale, it is rightly made. A Monarch dying with­out Testa­ment, is ever under­stood to will, that a Monarch should suc­ceed him.

XIV. But if living, he have not decla­red his will concerning his successour by Te­stament, not otherwise, it is supposed, First, that he would not have his Government re­duced to an Anarchy, or the state of warre, (that is) to the destruction of his subjects; as well because he could not doe that with­out breach of the Lawes of nature, where­by he was obliged to the performance of all [Page 144] things necessarily conducing to the preser­vation of Peace, as also because if that had been his will, it had not been hard for him to have declared that openly. Next, because the Right passeth according to the will of the Father, we must judge of the successour according to the signes of his will. It is un­derstood therefore, that he would have his subjects to be under a Monarchicall Govern­ment rather then any other, because he him­selfe in ruling, hath before approved of that state by his example, and hath not af­terward either by any word or deed con­demned it.

XV. Furthermore, because by naturall And some one of his [...] children. necessity all men wish them better from whom they receive glory, and honour, then others; but every man after death receives honour and glory from his children, sooner then from the power of any other men: hence we gather, that a father intends bet­ter for his children, then any other persons. It is to be understood therefore, that the will of the father, dying without Testament, was, that some of his children should suc­ceed him, yet this is to be understood with this prov [...]so, that there be no more appa­rent tokens to the contrary: of which kind, after many successions, custome may be one, for he that makes no mention of his succes­sion, is supposed to consent to the customes of his Realme.

XVI. Among children the Males car­ry the preheminence, in the beginning per­haps, And a male rather then female. because for the most part (although not alwayes) they are [...]itter for the admini­stration of [...] matters, but specially [Page 145] of wars; but afterwards, when it was grown a custome, because that custome was not contradicted; and therefore the will of the Father, unlesse some other custome or signe doe clearly repugne it, is to be interpreted in favour of them.

XVII. Now because the Sonnes are And of the males, the eldest ra­ther then the yonger. equall▪ and the power cannot be divided, the eldest shall succeed; for if there be any difference by reason of age, the eldest is sup­posed more worthy, for nature being judge, the most in years (because usually it is so) is the wisest. But other judge there cannot be had. But if the Brothers must be equally valued, the succession shall be by lot, but pri­mogeniture is a naturall lot, and by this the eldest is already prefer'd, nor is there any that hath power to judge, whether by this, or any other kind of lots the matter is to be decided. Now the same reason which con­tends thus for the first-born sonne, doth no lesse for the first born daughter.

XVIII. But if he have no children, then the And his Brother if he want issue before all others. command shall pass to his Brothers & Sisters, for the same reason, that the children should have succeeded if he had had them: for those that are nearest to us in nature, are suppo­sed to be nearest in benevolence; and to his brothers, sooner then his sisters, and to the elder sooner then the yonger; for the reason is the same for these which it was for the children.

XIX. Furthermore, by the same reason In the same manner that men succeed to the power, doe they al­so succeed to the Right of Successi­on. that men succeed to the power, doe they also succeed to the Right of succession: for if the first-born dye before the Father, it will be judged, that he transferred his Right of suc [Page 146] cession unto his children, unlesse the Father have otherwise decreed it, and therefore the Nephewes will have a fairer pretence to the succession, then the Uncles. I say all these things will be thus, if the custome of the place (which the Father by not contradi­cting, will be judged to have con [...]ented to) doe not hinder them.

CHAP. X. A comparison between 3. kinds of government, accord­ing to their severall inconveniences.

[Page 148] I. VVHat Democraty, Aristocraty, and A compa­ring the state of nature with the civill. Monarchy are, hath already been spoken, but which of them tends most to the preservation of the subjects Peace, and pro­curing their advantages, we must see by comparing them together; but first let us set forth the advantages, and disadvantages of a City in generall, lest some perhaps should think it better, that every man be left to live at his own will, then to constitute any civill society at all. Every man indeed out of the state of civill government hath a most en­tire, but unfruitfull liberty; because that he who by reason of his own liberty acts all at his own will, must also by reason of the same liberty in others, suffer al at anothers wil; but in a constituted City, every subject retains to himselfe as much freedom as suffices him to live well, and quietly, & there is so much taken away from others, as may make them not to be feared. Out of this state, every man hath such a Right to all, as yet he can enjoy nothing in it, each one securely en­joyes his limited Right; Out of it, any man may rightly spoyle, or kill one another; in it, none but one. Out of it we are prote­cted by our own forces; in it, by the power of all. Out of it no man is sure of the fruit of his labours; in it, all men are. Lastly, out of it, there is a Dominion of Passions, war, fear, poverty, slovinlinesse, solitude, barbarisme, ignorance, cruelty. In it, the Dominion of reason, peace, security, riches, decency, soci­ety, elegancy, sciences, and benevolence.

II. Aristotle in his seventh book, and The gains and losses of the fourteenth Chapter of his Politiques saith, that there are two sorts of governments, [Page 149] whereof the one relates to the benefit of the Ruler, the other to that of the Subjects; as if where Subjects are severely dealt wi [...]h, there were one, and where more mildly, there were another form of government; which opini­on may by no means be subscribed to, for all the profits and disprofits arising from government are the same, and common both to the Ruler, and the Subject; The Dammages which befall some particular subjects through misfortune, folly, negli­gence, sloth, or his own luxury, may very well be severed from those which concern the Ruler, but those relate not to the go­vernment it selfe, being such as may hap­per in any form of government whatsoever. If these same happen from the first institu­tion of the City, they will then be truly cal­led the inconveniencies of government, but they will be common to the Ruler with his subjects, as their benefits are common; but the first and greatest benefit, Peace, and de­fence, is common to both, for both he that commands, and he who is commanded, to the end that he may defend his life, makes use at once of all the forces of his fellow-subjects; and in the greatest inconvenience that can befall a City, namely the slaugh­ter of subjects, arising from Anarchy, both the Commander, and the Parties comman­ded, are equally concerned. Next, if the Ru­ler levie such a summe of vast monies from his subjects, as they are not able to maintain themselves, and their families, nor conserve their bodily strength, and vigour, the dis­advantage is as much his, as theirs, who with never so great a stock, or measure of [Page 150] riches, is not able to keep his authority or his riches without the bodies of his subjects; but if he raise no more then is sufficient for the due administration of his power, that is a benefit equall to himselfe and his subjects, tending to a common Peace, and defence; nor is it imaginable which way publick trea­sures can be a grievance to private subjects, if they be not so exhausted, as to be wholly deprived from all possibility to acquire, even by their industry, necessaries to sustain the strength of their bodies, and mindes; for even thus the grievance would concern the Ruler, nor would it arise from the ill institu­tion, or ordination of the government, (be­cause in all manner of governments sub­jects may be opprest) but from the ill ad­ministration of a well established govern­ment.

III. Now that Monarchy of the soresaid The praise of Monar­chy. forms, of Democraty, Aristocraty, and Monar­chy, hath the preheminence, will best appear by comparing the conveniences and incon­veniences arising in each one of them. Those arguments therefore that the whole universe is governed by one God; that the Ancients pre­ferr'd the Monarchicall state before all others, ascribing the Rule of the Gods to one Jupiter; that in the beginning of affairs, and of Nati­ons, the decrees of Princes were held for Laws; that paternall government instituted by God himselfe in the Creation, was Monarchicall; that other governments were compacted * by the artifice of men out of the ashes of Monarchy, after it had been ruined with sedi­tions; and that the people of God were un­der the jurisdiction of Kings, although I [Page 151] say these do [...] hold forth Monarchy as the more eminent to us, yet because they doe it by examples and testimonies, and not by solid reason, we will passe them over.

Compacted by the artifice of men, &c.] Annotation It seems the Ancients who made that same fa­ble of Prometheus pointed at this. They say, that Prometheus having stolne fire from the Sunne, formed a man out of clay, and that for this deed he was tortured by Jupiter with a perpetuall gnawing in his liver, which is, that by humane invention (which is signified by Pro­metheus) Laws and Justice were by imitation taken from Monarchy, by vertue whereof (as by fire removed from its naturall orbe) the mul­titude (as the durt and dregs of men) was as it were quickned and formed into a civill Person, which is termed Aristocraty, or Democraty; but the Authour▪ and Abettors being found, who might securely and quietly have lived under the naturall jurisdiction of Kings, doe thus smart for it, that being exposed still to alteration, they are tormented with perpetuall cares, suspitions, and dissentions.

IV. Some there are who are disconten­ted The go­vernment of one can­not be said to be evill in this re­spect, name­ly because one hath more power then all the rest. with the government under one, for no other reason, but because it is under one; as if it were an unreasonable thing that one man among so many, should so farre excell in power, as to be able at his own pleasure to dispose of all the rest; these men sure, if they could, would withdraw themselves from un­der the Dominion of one God. But this ex­ception against one is suggested by envie, while they see one man in posaession of what all desire: for the same cause they would judge it to be as unreasonable, if a few com­manded, [Page 152] unlesse they themselves either were, or hoped to be of the number; for if it be an unreasonable thing that all men have not an equall Right, surely an Aristocraty must be unreasonable also; but because we have shewed that the state of equality is the state of warre, and that therefore inequali­ty was introduc'd by a generall consent; this inequality whereby he, whom we have vo­luntarily given more to; enjoyes more, is no longer to be accompted an unreasonable thing. The inconveniences therefore which attend the Dominion of one man, attend his Person, not his Ʋnity. Let us therefore see whether brings with it the greater grievan­ces to the subject, the command of one man, or of many.

V. But first, we must remove their opini­on Rejection of their opi­nion, who say that a Lord with his servants cannot make a City. who deny that to be any City at all, which is compacted of never so great a number of servants under a common Lord. In the 9. Artic. of the 5. Chapter, a City is defined to be one Person made out of many men, whose will by their own contracts is to be esteemed as the wills of them all, insomuch as he may use the strength and faculties of each single Person for the publick Peace and safety; and by the same article of the same Chapter, One Person is that, when the wills of many are contained in the will of one, but the will of each servant is contained in the will of his Lord, as hath been declared in the 5. Article of the 8. Chapter, so as he may employ all their forces and faculties according to his own will, and pleasure; it followes therefore that that must needs be a city, which is constituted by a Lord, and [Page 153] many servants; neither can any reason be brought to contradict this which doth not equally combat against a City constituted by a Father, and his Sonnes; for to a Lord who hath no children, servants are in the na­ture of sonnes; for they are both his honour, and safeguard; neither are servants more subject to their Lords, then children to their Parents, as hath been manifested above in the 5. Article of the 8. Chapter.

VI. Among other grievances of supreme The exacti­ons are more grie­vous under command of the peo­ple, then under the Monarch. authority one is, that the Ruler, beside those monies necessary for publick charges, as the maintaining of publick Ministers, building, and defending of Castles, waging warres, honourable sustaining his own houshold, may also, if he will, exact others through his lust, whereby to enrich his sonnes, kindred, favourites, and flatterers too. I confesse this is a grievance, but of the number of those which accompany all kindes of government, but are more tolerable in a Monarchy then in a Democraty; for though the Monarch would enrich them, they cannot be many, because belonging but to one, but in a Demo­craty, look how many Demagoges, (that is) how many powerfull Oratours there are with the people (which ever are many, and daily new ones growing) so many Children, Kins­men, friends, & Flatterers, are to be rewarded; for every of them desire not onely to make their families as potent, as illustrious in wealth, as maybe, but also to oblige others to them by benefits for the better strength­ning of themselves. A Monarch may in great part satisfie his Officers and Friends, because they are not many, without any cost [Page 154] to his Subjects, I mean, without robbing them of any of those Treasures given in for the maintenance of War, and Peace; In a Democraty; where many are to be satisfied, and alwayes new ones, this cannot be done without the Subjects oppression. Though a Monarch may promote unworthy Persons, yet oft times he will not doe it; but in a Democraty all the popular men are therefore suppos'd to doe it, because it is necessary; for else, the power of them who did it would so encrease, as it would not onely become dreadfull to those others, but even to the whole City also.

VII. Another grievance is, that same Innocent Subjects are lesse obnoxious to punish­ment under a Monarch then under the People. perpetuall fear of death which every man must necessarily be in, while he considers with himself that the Ruler hath power not onely to appoint what punishments he lists on any Transgressions, but that he may also in his wrath, and sensuality, slaughter his innocent Subjects, and those who never offended against the Lawes. And truly this is a very great grievance in any forme of Government wheresoever it happens: (for it is therefore a grievance because it is; not, because it may be done) but it is the fault of the Ruler, not of the Government; For all the acts of Nero are not essentiall to Monarchie; yet Subjects are lesse often undeservedly condemn'd under one Ruler, then under the People: For Kings are onely severe against those who either trouble them with impertinent Counsells, or oppose them with reproach­full words, or controule their Wills; but they are the cause that that excesse of power [Page 155] which one Subject might have above ano­ther becomes harmlesse; wherefore some Nero or Caligula reigning, no men can undeservedly suffer, but such as are known to him, namely Courtiers, and such as are remarkable for some eminent Charge, and not all neither, but they onely who are possessed of what he desires to enjoy; for they that are offensive, and contumelious, are deservedly punisht; whosoever there­fore in a Monarchy will lead a retired life, let him be what he will that Reignes, he is out of danger: for the ambitious onely suffer, the rest are protected from the injuries of the more potent: but in a popular Dominion there may be as mane Nero's, as there are Oratours who sooth the People; for each one of them can doe as much as the People, and they mutually give way to each others appetite (as it were by this secret pact, Spare me to day, and Ile spare thee to morrow) while they exempt those from punishment, who to satisfie their lust, and private hatred, have undeservedly slain their fellow-sub­jects. Furthermore, there is a certain limit in private power, which if it exceed, it may prove pernicious to the Realme, and by reason whereof it is necessary sometimes for Monarchs to have a care that the com­mon-weale do thence receive no prejudice. When therefore this power consisted in the multitude of Riches, they lessened it by di­minishing their heaps, but if it were in po­pular applause, the powerfull party without any other crime laid to his charge, was ta­ken from among them. The same was usu­ally practised in Democraties; for the Athe­nians [Page 156] inflicted a punishment of ten yeares banishment on those that were powerfull, meerly because of their powers, without the guilt of any other crime, and those who by liberall gifts did seek the favour of the com­mon people, were put to death at Rome, as men ambitious of a Kingdome. In this De­mocraty and Monarchy were eaven; yet dif­fer'd they much in same, because fame de­rives from the People, and what is done by many, is commended by many: and there­fore what the Monarch does, is said to be done out of envie to their vertues, which if it were done by the People, would be ac­counted Politie.

VIII. There are some who therefore Single Persons have no lesse liber­ty under a Monarch, then under the People. imagine Monarchy to bee more grievous then Democraty, because there is lesse liber­ty in that, then in this. If by liberty they mean an exemption from that subjection which is due to the Lawes (i e.) the com­mands of the People, neither in Democraty, nor in any other state of government what­soever, is there any such kind of liberty. If they suppose liberty to consist in this, that there be few lawes, few prohibitions, and those too such, that except they were forbid­den, there could be no Peace; then I deny that there is more liberty in Democraty then Monarchy; for the one as truly consisteth with such a liberty, as the other: for al­though the word liberty, may in large, and ample letters be written over the gates of any City whatsoever, yet is it not meant the Subjects, but the Cities liberty, neither can that word with better Right be inscri­bed on a City which is governed by the [Page 157] people, then that which is ruled by a Monarch; but when private men or subjects demand liberty, under the name of liberty, they ask not for liberty, but dominion, which yet for want of understanding, they little consider; for if every man would grant the same liber­ty to another, which he desires for himselfe, as is commanded by the law of nature, that same naturall state would return again, in which all men may by Right doe all things, which if they knew, they would abhor, as being worse then all kind of civill subjecti­on whatsoever; but if any man desire to have his single freedome, the rest being bound, what does he else demand but to have the Dominion? for who so is freed from all bonds, is Lord over all those that still continue bound. Subjects therefore have no greater liberty in a Popular, then in a Monarchicall State, That which deceives them, is the equall participation of command, and publique places; for where the Authority is in the People, single subjects doe so far forth share in it as they are parts of the People ruling; and they equally partake in publique Offices so far forth as they have equall voices in choosing Magistrates, and publique Ministers. And this is that which Aristotle aim'd at, himself also, through the custome of that time, mis-calling Do­minion liberty, in his sixth Book, and second Chapter of Poli. In a popular State there is liberty by supposition; which is a spe [...]ch of the vulgar, as if no man were free out of this State. From whence, by the way, we may collect, That those Subjects, who in a Monarchy deplore their lost liberty, doe onely sto­mack [Page 158] this, that they are not receiv'd to the steerage of the Common-weal.

IX. But perhaps for this very reason It is no dis­advantage to the Sub­jects that they are not all admit­ted to the publique deliberati­ons. some will say, That a Popular State is much to be preferr'd before a Monarchicall; be­cause that, where all men have a hand in publique businesses, there all have an oppor­tunity to shew their wisedome, knowledge, and eloquence, in deliberating matters of the greatest difficulty and moment, which by reason of that desire of praise which is bred in humane nature, is to them who excell in such like faculties, and seeme to themselves to exceed others, the most de­lightfull of all things; but in a Monarchy, this same way to obtain praise, and honour, is shut up to the greatest part of Subjects; and what is a grievance, if this be none? Ile tell you: To see his opinion whom we scorne, preferr'd before ours; to have our wisedome undervalued before our own fa­ces; by an uncertain tryall of a little vaine glory, to undergoe most certaine enmities (for this cannot be avoided, whether we have the better, or the worse) to hate, and to be hated, by reason of the disagreement of opinions; to lay open our secret Coun­sells, and advises to all, to no purpose, and without any benefit; to neglect the affaires of our own Family: These, I say, are grie­vances. But to be absent from a triall of wits, although those trialls are pleasant to the Eloquent, is not therefore a grievance to them, unlesse we will say, that it is a grievance to valiant men to be restrai­ned from fighting, because they delight in it.

[Page 159] X. Besides, there are many reasons why Civill deli­berations are unadvi­sedly com­mitted to many, by reason of the unskil­fulnesse of most men. deliberations are lesse successefull in great Assemblies, then in lesser Councells; whereof one is, that to advise rightly of all things conducing to the preservation of a Common-weal, we must not onely under­stand matters at home, but Forraign Af­faires too; at Home, by what goods the Country is nourished, and defended, and whence they are fetched; what places are fit to make Garrisons of; by what means Souldiers are best to be raised, and main­tained; what manner of affections the Sub­jects bear toward their Prince, or Gover­nours of their Country, and many the like: Abroad, what the power of each neighbouring Country is, and wherein it consists; what advantage, or disadvantage we may receive from them; what their dispositions are both to us-ward, and how affected to each other among themselves, and what Counsell daily passeth among them. Now, because very few in a great Assembly of men understand these things, being for the most part unskilfull (that I say not incapable) of them, what can that same number of advisers with their imper­tinent Opinions contribute to good Coun­sells, other then meer letts and impedi­ments?

XI. Another reason why a great Assem­bly By reason of their E­loquence. is not so [...]it for consultation is, because every one who delivers his opinion holds it necessary to make a long continued Speech, and to gain the more esteem from his Au­ditours, he polishes, and adornes it with the best, and smoothest language, now the [Page 160] nature of Eloquence is to make Good and Evill, Profitable and Unprofitable, Honest and Dishonest, appear to be more or lesse then in­deed they are, and to make that seem just, which is unjust, according as it shall best suit with his end that speaketh. For this is to perswade; and though they reason, yet take they not their rise from true Principles, but from vulgar received opinions, which, for the most part, are erroneous; neither en­deavour they so much to fit their speech to the nature of the things they speak of, as to the Passions of their mindes to whom they speak, whence it happens that opinions are delivered not by right reason, but by a cer­tain violence of mind. Nor is this fault in the Man, but in the nature it selfe of Elo­quence, whose end (as all the Masters of Rhetorick teach us) is not truth (except by chance) but victory, and whose property is not to inform, but to allure.

XII. The third reason why men advise By reason of Faction. lesse succefully in a great convent is, be­cause that thence arise Factions in a com­mon-weal, and out of Factions, Seditions, and Civill War; for when equall Ora­tours doe combat with contrary Opinions, and Speeches, the conquered hates the Conquerour, and all those that were of his side, as holding his Counsell, and wise­dome in scorne: and studyes all meanes to make the advise of his adversaries pre­judiciall to the State, for thus he hopes to see the glory taken from him, and restored unto himself: farthermore, where the Votes are not so unequall, but that the conque­red have hopes by the accession of some [Page 161] few of their own opinion at another sitting to make the stronger Party, the chief heads do call the rest together, they advise a part how they may abrogate the former judg­ment given, they appoint to be the first and earliest at the next convent, they determine what, and in what order each man shall speak, that the same businesse may again be brought to agitation, that so what was con­firmed before by the number of their then present adversaries, the same may now in some measure become of no effect to them, being negligently absent, and this same kind of industry and diligence which they use to make a people, is commonly called a faction; but when a faction is inferiour in votes, and superiour, or not much inferiour in power, then what they cannot obtain by craft, and language, they attempt by force of armes, and so it comes to a civill warre. But some will say, these things doe not necessarily, nor often happen; he may as well say, that the chief Parties are not necessarily desirous of vain glory, and that the greatest of them seldom disagree in great matters.

XIII. It followes hence, that when the By reason of the un­setlednesse of the Laws. legislative power resides in such convents as these, the Laws must needs be inconstant, and change, not according to the alterati­on of the state of affaires, nor according to the changeablenesse of mens mindes, but as the major part, now of this, then of that facti­on, do convent; insomuch as the Laws do flote here, and there, as it were upon the waters.

XIV. In the fourth place, the counsels For want of secrecy. of great assemblies have this inconvenience, that whereas it is oft of great consequence, [Page 162] that they should be kept secret, they are for the most part discovered to the enemy be­fore they can be brought to any effect, and their power, and will, is as soon known abroad, as to the People it selfe commanding at home.

XV. These inconveniences which are These in­convenien­ces do ad­here to De­mocraty, forasmuch as men are naturally delighted with an opinion of wit. found in the deliberations of great assem­blies do so farre forth evince Monarchy to be better then Democraty, as in Democraty affairs of great consequence are oftner trusted to be distrust by such like Committees, then in a Monarchy, neither can it easily bee done otherwayes; for there is no reason why every man should not naturally rather minde his own private, then the publique businesse, but that here he sees a means to declare his elo­quence, whereby he may gain the reputa­tion of being ingenuous, and wise, and re­turning home to his friends, to his Parents, to his wife, and children, rejoyce, and tri­umph in the applause of his dexterous beha­viour: As of old all the delight Marcus Ca­riclanus had in his warlike actions, was, to see his praises so well pleasing to his Mo­ther. But if the People in a Democraty would bestow the power of deliberating in matters of Warre, and Peace, either on one, or some very few, being content with the nomina­tion of Magistrates, and publique Ministers, that is to say, with the authority without the ministration, then it must be confest, that in this particular, Democraty and Mo­narchy would be equall.

XVI. Neither do the conveniencies or in­conveniences The inco n­veniences of govern­ment pro­ceeding from a King who is a childe. which are found to be more in one kind of government then another, arise [Page 163] from hence, namely, because the government it self, or the administration of its affairs, are better committed to one, then many; or on the other side, to many, then to some few; for Government, is the power, the administrati­on of it, is the act, now the power in all kind of government is equall; the acts only dif­fer, that is to say the actions, and motions of a common-weale, as they flow from the de­liberations of many, or few, of skilfull, or impertinent men. Whence we understand, that the conveniences, or inconveniences of any government, depend not on him in whom the authority resides, but on his Offi­cers, and therefore nothing hinders, but that the common-weale may be well governed, although the Monarch be a woman, or youth, or infant, provided that they be fit for af­faires, who are endued with the publique Offices, and charges; And that which is said, Woe to the land whose King is a childe, doth not signifie the condition of a Monar­chy to be inferiour to a Popular state, but contrariwise, that by accident it is the grie­vance of a Kingdome, that the King being a childe, it often happens, that many by am­bition, and power, intruding themselves in­to publique counsels, the government comes to be administred in a Democraticall man­ner, and that thence arise those infelicities which for the most part accompany the Do­minion The power of Gene­ralls is an argument of the ex­cellency of Monarchy. of the People.

XVII. But it is a manifest sign, that the most absolute Monarchy is the best state of government, that not onely Kings, but even those Cities which are subject to the people, or to Nobles, give the whole [Page 164] command of warre to one only, and that so absolute, as nothing can be more (wherein by the way this must be noted also, that no King can give a Generall greater authority over his army, then he himselfe by Right may exercise over all his subjects) Monarchy therefore is the best of all governments in the Camps. But what else, are many Com­mon-wealths, then so many Camps streng­thened with armes, and men against each other, whose state (because not restrained by any common power, howsoever an un­certain peace, like a short truce, may passe between them) is to be accounted for the state of nature, which is the state of War.

XVIII. Lastly, since it was necessary The best state of a Common-weale, is that where the subjects are the Ru­lers inheri­tance. for the preservation of our selves to be sub­ject to some Man, or Councell, we cannot on better condition be subject to any, then one whose interest depends upon our safety, and welfare; and this then comes to passe when we are the inheritance of the Ruler; for every man of his own accord endeavours the preservation of his inheritance. But the Lands, and Monies of the Subjects are not onely the Princes Treasure, but their bodies, and wildy minds; which will be easily granted by those who consider at how great rates the Dominion of lesser Coun­tries is valued, and how much easier it is for men to procure mony, then money men; nor doe we readily meet with any example that shewes us when any subject, without any default of his own, hath by his Prince been despoiled of his life, or goods, through the sole licenciousnesse of his Authority.

[Page 165] XIX. Hitherto we have compared a Aristocraty is so much better by how much it approa­ches nearer to Monar­chie, the worse by how much it is more distant from it. Monarchicall, with a Popular State; we have said nothing of Aristocracy; we may con­clude of this, by what hath been said of those, that, that which is hereditary, and content with the election of Magistrates; which transmits its deliberations to some few, and those most able; which simply imi­tates the government of Monarchs most, and the People least of all, is for the Subjects both better, and more lasting then the rest.

CHAP. XI. Places and Examples of Scri­pture of the Rights of Go­vernment agreeable to what hath beene said before.

I. VVE have in the 6. Chapter, and The begin­ning of in­stitutive Govern­ment from the consent of the People. the 2. Article, so derived the Originall of institutive, or politicall Go­vernment from the consent of the Multi­tude, that it appears they must either all consent, or be esteem'd as Enemies. Such was the beginning of Gods Government over the Jewes instituted by Moses, If ye will obey my voice induced, &c. Ye shall be unto me a Kingdome of Priests, &c. And Moses came, and called the Elders of the People, &c. And all the people answered, and said: All that the Lord hath spoken we will do, Exod. 19. ver. 5, 6, 7, 8. Such also was the beginning of Moyses his power under God, or of his Vicegerency. And all the people saw the thun­derings and lightenings, and the noyse of the Trumpet, &c. And they said unto Moyses, speak thou unto us, and we will hear. Exod. 20. 18, 19. The like beginning also had Sauls Kingdome. When yee saw that Nahash King of the children of Ammon came out against you, yee said unto me, nay, but a King shall raign over us, when the Lord your God was your King; Now therefore behold the King whom yee have chosen▪ and whom yee have desired. 1 Sam. 12. 12. But the major part only consenting, and not all (for there were certain Sons of Belial, who said, How shall this man save us? and they dispised him, 1 Sam. 10. 27.) those [Page 167] who did not consent were put to death as Enemies; And the people said unto Sa­muel, Who is he that said, shall Saul reign over us? Bring the men that we may put them to death. 1 Sam. 11. 22.

II. In the same 6. Chapter, the 6. and The power of judica­ture, and determi­nation of warres, de­pend on the will of the supreme Officer. 7. Articles, I have shewed, that all Judgment and Wars depend upon the will and plea­sure of him who beares the Supreme Au­thority; that is to say, in a Monarchy, on a Monarch, or King; and this is confirmed by the Peoples owne judgement. Wee also will be like all the Nations, and our King shall JUDGE us, and goe out before us, and fight our BATTELS. 1 Sam. [...]. 20. And what pertaines to Judgements, and all other matters, whereof there is any controversie, whether they be Good, or Evill, is confirmed by the testimony of King Solomon. Give therefore thy Servant an understanding heart to JUDGE thy People, that I may discerne between GOOD and EVILL, 1. Kings 3. 9. And that of Ab­solom, There is no man deputed of the King to heare thee. 2. Sam. 15. 3.

III. That Kings may not be punished They who have the supreme authority, are by Right unpunisha­ble. by their subjects, as hath been shewed a­bove in the sixth Chapter, and the twelfth Article, King David also confirmes, who, though Saul sought to stay him, did notwith­standing refrain his hand from killing him, and forbad Abishai, saying, Destroy him not; for who ca [...] stretch forth his hand against the Lords Anointed, and be innocent? 1 Sam. 22. v. 9. And when he had cut off the skirt of his gar­ment, The Lord forbid (saith he) that I should doe this thing unto my Master the Lords [Page 168] Anointed, to stretch forth mine hand against him. 1 Sam. 24. 7. And commanded the Amaleki [...]e, who for his sake had slain Saul, to be put to death. 2 Sam. 1. 15.

IV. That which is said in the 17. Chap­ter That with­out a su­preme pow­er, there is no govern­ment [...]ut confusion. of Judges, at the 6. verse. In those dayes there was no King in Israel, but every man did that which was right in his own eyes (as though where there were not a Monarchy, there were an Anarchy or confusion of all things) may be brought as a testimony to prove the ex­excellency of Monarchy above all other forms of government, unlesse that by the word King may perhaps be understood, not one man onely, but also a Court, provided that in it there reside a supreme power, which if it be taken in this sense, yet hence it may follow, that without a supreme and absolute power (which we have endeavou­red to prove in the sixth Chapter) there will be a liberty for every man to doe what hee hath a minde, or whatsoever shall seem right to himselfe; which cannot stand with the preservation of mankinde, and therefore in all Government whatsoever, there is ever a supreme power understood to be somewhere existent.

V. We have in the 8. Chapter, the 7. and 8. Article, said, that Servants must yeeld That ser­vants and sonnes, owe their Lords and Parents simple obe­dience. a simple obedience to their Lords, and in the 9. Chapter, Article 7. that Sonnes owe the same obedience to their Parents. Saint Paul sayes the same thing concerning Servants, Servants obey in all things your Masters accor­ding to the flesh, not with eye service, as men­pleasers, but in singlenesse of heart, fearing God. Colos. 3. 22. Concerning Sonnes, Children [Page 169] obey your Parents in all things, for this is well pleasing unto the Lord. Colos. 3. 20. Now as wee by simple obedience understand ALL THINGS which are not con­trary to the Lawes of God; so in those ci­ted places of Saint Paul, after the word ALL THINGS, we must suppose, excepting those which are contrary to the Lawes of God.

VI. But that I may not thus by peece▪ The abso­lute power of Princes proved by most evi­dent testi­monies of the Scrip­ture, as w [...]ll new as old. meale prove the right of Princes, I will now instance those testimonies which altogether establish the whole power, (namely that there is an absolute and simple obedience due to them from their subjects) And first out of the new Testament. The Scribes and Pharis [...]es sit in Moyses seat; all therefore, whatsoever they bid you observe, that observe, and do [...]. Mat. 23. 2. Whatsoever they bid you, (sayes he) observe, that is to say, obey sim­ply. Why? Because they sit in Moyses seat; namely, the civill Magistrates, not Aaron, the Priests. Le [...] every soule be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God, the powers that be are ordained of God; whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God, and they that resist shall receive to themselves damnation. Rom. 13. 1. Now because the powers that were in Saint Pauls time were ordained of God, and all Kings did at that time require an ab­solute entire obedience from their sub­jects, it followes that such a power was ordained of God. Submit your selves unto every ordinance of man for the Lords sake, whether it bee to the King as supreme, or unto Governours, as unto them that are [Page 170] sent by him, for the punishment of wicked doers, and for the praise of them that doe well, for so is the will of God. 1 Pet. 2. 13. Again Saint Paul to Titus, Put them mind to bee subject to Principalitiies and Powers, to obey Magistrates, &c. Chap. 3. vers. 1. What Principalities? Was it not to the Principalities of those times, which required an absolute obedience? Further­more, that we may come to the example of Christ himselfe, to whom the Kingdome of the Jewes belonged by hereditary Right, derived from David himselfe; He when he lived in the manner of a subject, both paid tribute unto Caesar, and pronounced it to be due to him. Give unto Caesar (saith he) the things which are Caesars, and unto God, the things which are Gods. Mat. 22. 21. When it pleased him to shew himselfe a King, he re­quired entire obedience Goe (said he) into the village over against you, and straightway yee shall finde an Assetyed, and a Colt with her, loose them, and bring them unto me; and if any man say ought unto you, yec shall say the Lord hath need of them. Mat. 14. 2. This he did therefore by the right of being Lord, or a King of the Jewes. But to take away a subjects goods on this pretence onely, be­cause the Lord hath need of them, is an abso­lute power. The most evident places in the old Testament are these, Goe thou near, and heare ALL that the Lord our God shall say, and speak thou unto us all that the Lord our God shall speak unto thee, and we will hear it, and doe it. Deut. 5. 27. But under the word all, is con­tained absolute obedience. Again to Joshua. And they answered Joshua saying, ALL [Page 171] that thou commandest us, we will doe, and whithersoever thou sendest us, we will goe; ac­cording as we hearkened unto Moyses in ALL things, so will we hearken unto thee, onely the Lord thy God be with thee, as he was with Moyses; whosoever hee be that doth rebell against thy Commandement, and will not hear­ken unto thy words in ALL that thou com­mandest him, he shall be put to death. Joshua 1. 16, 17, 18. And the Parable of the Bram­ble. Then said all the trees unto the Bramble, Come thou, a [...]d reign over us; And the Bram­ble said unto the trees, If in truth yee anoint me King over you, then come and put your trust in my shadow; and if not, let sire come out of the Bramble, and devoure the Cedars of Leba­non. Juages 9. vers. 14, 15. The sense of which words is, that we must acquiese to their sayings, whom we have truly consti­tuted to be Kings over us, unlesse we would chuse rather to be consumed by the fire of a civill warre. But the Regall authority is more particularly described by God him­selfe, in the 1. Sam. 8. vers. 9. &c. Shew them the Right of the King that shall reign over them, &c. This shall be the Right of the King that shall reign over you; he will take your Sons, and appoint them for himself, for his Chariots, and to he his horsemen, and some shall runne before his Chariots, &c. And he will take your daughters to be confectionaries, &c. And he will take your vineyards, and give them to his Servants, &c. Is not this power absolute? And yet it is by God himself styled the KINGS RIGHT; neither was any man among the Jewes, no not the High Priest himselfe, exempted from this obedience. For when the King (namely [Page 172] Solomon) said to Abiathar the Priest, Get thee to Anathoth unto thine [...]wn fields, for thou art worthy of death, but I will not at this time put thee to death, because thou [...]arest the Ark of the Lord God before David my fa­ther, and because then hast been afflicted in all wherein my Father was afflicted. So Solomon thrust out Abiathar from being Priest unto the Lord. 1 Kings. 2. 26. It cannot by any argument be proved, that this act of his displeased the Lord; neither read we, that either Solomon was reproved, or that his Person at that time was any whit lesse ac­ceptable to God.

CHAP. XII. Of the internall causes, tending to the dissolution of any Government.

I. HItherto hath been spoken by what That the judgement of good and evill be­longs to private Persons, is a seditious opinion. causes, and Pacts, Common-weals are constituted, and what the Rights of Princes are over their subjects; Now we will briefly say somewhat concerning the causes which dissolve them, or the reasons of seditions. Now as in the motion of na­turall bodies, three things are to be consi­dered, [Page 174] namely, internall disposition, that they be susceptible of the motion to be produced; the externall Agent, whereby a certain and determined motion may in act be produ­ced; and the action it selfe: So also in a Common-weale where the subjects begin to raise tumults, three things present them­selves to our regard; First the Doctrines and the Passions contrary to Peace, wherewith the mindes of men are [...]itted and disposed; next their quality and condition who solli­cite, assemble, and direct them already thus disposed, to take up armes, and quit their allegiance; Lastly, the manner how this is done, or the faction it selfe: But one, and the first which disposeth them to sedition, is this, That the knowledge of good and [...]vili be­longs to [...]ach single man. In the state of na­ture indeed, where every man lives by equall Right, and have not by any mutuall Pacts submitted to the command of others, we have granted this to be true, nay in the first Chapter, Article 9. that the civill Lawes were the Rules of good and evill, just and unjust, honest and dishonest; that therefore what the Legislator commands, must be held for good, and what he forbids for evill; and the Legislator is ever that Person who hath the supreme power in the Common-weale, that is to say, the Monarch in a Mo­narchy. We have confirmed the same truth in the eleventh Chapter, Article 2. out of the words of Solomon; for if private men may pursue that as good, and [...]n that as evill which appears to them to be so, to what end serve those words of his? Give therefore unto thy servant an understanding [Page 175] heart to judge thy People, that I may discern between good and evill. Since therefore it belongs to Kings to discerne betweene good and evill, wicked are those, though usuall sayings, that be onely is a King who does righteously, and that Kings must not be obeyed, unlesse they command us just things, and many other such like. Before there was any government, just and unjust had no being, their nature onely being relative to some cōmand, and every action in its own nature is indifferent; that it becomes just, or un­just, proceeds from the right of the Magi­strate: Legitimate Kings therefore make the things they command, just, by comman­ding them, and those which they forbid, unjust, by forbidding them; but private men while they assume to themselves the knowledge of good and evill, desire to be even as Kings, which cannot be with the safety of the Common weale. The most ancient of all Gods commands is, Gen. 2. 15. Thou shalt not eat of the tree of knowledge of good and evill; and the most ancient of all diabolicall tentations, Chap. 3. vers. 5. Yee shall be as Gods, knowing good and evill; and▪ Gods first expostulation with man, vers. 11. Who told thee that thou wert naked? Hast thou eaten of the tree, whereof I cōmanded thee that thou shouldest not [...]at? As if he had said, how comest thou to judge that naked­ness, wherein it seemed good to me to create thee, to be shamefull, except thou have arro­gated to thy selfe the knowledge of good and evill?

II. Whatsoever any man doth against That sub­jects doe sin in obeying their Prin­ces, is a se­ditious opi­nion. his conscience is a sinne, for he who doth [Page 176] so, contemns the Law. But we must distin­guish; That is my sinne indeed, which committing, I doe beleeve to be my sinne, but what I beleeve to be another mans sin, I may sometimes doe that without any sin of mine; for if I be commanded to doe that which is a sin in him who commands me, if I doe it, and he that commands me be by Right, Lord over me, I sinne not; for if I wage warre at the Commandement of my Prince, conceiving the warre to be unjust­ly undertaken, I doe not therefore doe un­justly, but rather if I refuse to doe it, arro­gating to my selfe the knowledge of what is just and unjust, which pertains onely to my Prince. They who observe not this distincti­on, will fall into a necessity of sinning, as oft as any thing is commanded them, which either is, or seems to be unlawfull to them: for if they obey, they sin against their con­science, and if they obey not, against Right. If they sin against their conscience, they de­clare that they fear not the paines of the world to come; if they sinne against Right, they doe as much as in them lyes, abolish humane society, and the civill life of the present world. Their opinion therefore who teach, that subjects sinne when they obey their Princes commands, which to them seem unjust, is both erroneous, and to be reckoned a­mong those which are contrary to civill obedience; and it depends upon that origi­nall errour which we have observed above in the foregoing Article; for by our taking upon us to judge of good and evill, we are the occasion, that as well our obedience, as disobedience, becomes sin unto us.

[Page 177] III. The third seditious doctrine springs That Ty­rannicide is lawfull, is a seditious opinion. from the same root, That a Tyrannicide is law­full; Nay, at this day it is by many Divines, and of old it was by all the Philosophers, Plato, Aristo [...]ls, Cicero, Seneca, Plutarch, and the rest of the maintainers of the Greek, and Roman Anarchies, held not only unlaw­full, but even worthy of the greatest con­tempt. And under the title of Tyrants, they mean not onely Monarchs, but all those who bear the chief rule in any Govern­ment whatsoever; for not Pisistratus onely at Athens, but those thirty also who succee­ded him, and ruled together, were all called Tyrants. But he, whom men require to be put to death as being a Tyrant, commands either by Right, or without Right; if with­out Right, he is an enemy, and by Right to be put to death; but then this must not be called the killing a Tyrant, but an enemy: if by Right, then the divine interrogation takes place, Who hath told thee that he was a Tyrant, hast thou eaten of the tree whereof I commanded thee that thou shouldest not eat [...] For why doest thou call him a Tyrant, whom God hath made a King, except that thou being a private Person, usurpest to thy self the knowledge of good and evill▪ But how pernicious this opinion is to all govern­ments, but espcially to that which is Monar­chieall, we may hence discerne, namely, that by it every King, whether good or ill, stands exposed to be condemned by the judge­ment, and slain by the hand of every [...]r­therous villain.

IV. The fourth adversary opinion to That even they who have the Supreme power are subject to the Civill Lawes, is a seditious Opinion, Civill Society, is theirs, who hold, That [Page 178] they who bear Rule are Subject also to the Civill Lawes; which hath been sufficiently proved before not to be true in the 6. Chap. Ar [...]ic. 14. from this Argument, That a City can neither be bound to it self, nor to any sub­ject; not to it selfe, because no man can be obliged except it be to another; not to any Subject, because the single wills of the Sub­jects are contained in the will of the City, insomuch, that if the City will be free from all such obligation, the Subjects will so too; and by consequence she is so; But that which holds true in a City, that must be supposed to be true in a man, or an assembly of men, who have the Supreme Authority, for they make a City, which hath no being but by their Supreme Power. Now that this Opinion cannot consist with the very being of Government, is evi­dent from hence, that by it the knowledge of what is Good and Evill, that is to say, the definition of what is, and what is not a­gainst▪ the Lawes, would return to each single Person: Obedience therefore will cease as oft as, any thing seemes to be com­manded contrary to the Civill Lawes, and together with it, all coercive jurisdiction, which cannot possibly be without the de­struction of the very essence of Govern­ment; Yet this Errour hath great props, Aristotle, and others; who, by reason of humane infirmity, suppose the Supreme Power to be committed with most security to the Lawes onely; but they seem to have lookt very shallowly into the nature of Go­vernment, who thought that the constrain­ning Power, the interpretation of Lawes, [Page 179] and the making of Lawes, (all which are powers necessarily belonging to Govern­ment) should be left wholly to the Lawes themselves. Now although particular Sub­jects may sometimes contend in judge­ment, and goe to Law with the Supreme Magistrate, yet this is onely then, when the question is not what the Magistrate may, but what by a certain Rule he hath declared he would doe; As, when by any Law the Judges sit upon the life of a Subject, the question is not whether the Magistrate could by his absolute Right deprive him of his life; but whether by that Law his will was that he should be deprived of it; but his will was, he should, if he brake the Law, else, his will was he should not: This thetefore, that a Subject may have an acti­on of Law against his Supreme Magistrate, is not strength of Argument sufficient to prove that he is tyed to his own Lawes. On the contrary, it is evident, that he is not tied to his owne Lawes, because no man is bound to himself. Lawes therefore are set for Titius, and Caius, not for the Ruler: however, by the ambition of Lawyers, it is so ordered, that the Lawes, to unskilfull men seeme not to depend on the Authority of the Magistrate, but their Prudence.

V. In the fifth place, That the Supreme That the Supreme Power may be divided is a sediti­ous opinion. Authority may be divided, is a most fatall Opinion to all Common-weales. But di­verse men divide it diverse wayes. For some divide it so as to grant a Supremacy to the Civill Power in matters pertaining to Peace, and the benefits of this life, but in things concerning the salvation of the Soul [Page 180] they transfer it on others; Now, because justice is of all things most necessary to Sal­vation, it happens, that Subjects measu­ring justice, not as they ought, by the Ci­vill Lawes, but by the precepts and do­ctrines of them, who in regard of the Ma­gistrate, are either private men, or stran­gers, through a superstitious fear dare not perform the obedience due to their Princes, through fear falling into that which they most feared: Now what can be more per­nicious to any state, then that men should, by the apprehension of everlasting tor­ments, be deterred from obeying their Prin­ces, that is to say, the Lawes, or from being just? There are also some who divide the Supreme Authority so as to allow the power of War, and Peace, unto one, (whom they call a Monarch) but the right of raising Monies they give to some others, and not to him: But because monies are the sinewes of War, and Peace, they who thus divide the Authority, doe either really not divide it at all, but place it wholly in them, in whose power the money is, but give the name of it to another, or if they doe really divide it, they dissolve the Government: for neither upon necessity can War be wa­ged, nor can the publique Peace be preser­ved without Money.

VI. It is a common doctrine, That faith That faith and holiness are not ac­quired by study and reason, but are ever su­pernaturally infused and inspired, is a seditious Opinion. and holinesse are not acquired by study, and naturall reason, but are alwayes supernaturally infused, and inspired into m [...]n: which, if it were true, I understand not why we should be commanded to give an account of our faith; or why any man, who is truly a [Page 181] Christian, should not be a Prophet; or lastly; why every man should not judge what's fit for him to doe, what to avoid, rather out of his own inspiration, then by the precepts of his Superiours, or right Reason. A return therefore must be made to the private knowledge of Good and Evil; which cannot be granted without the ruine of all Governments. This Opinion hath spread it self so largely through the whole Christian world, that the number of Apo­states from natural reason is almost become infinite, and it sprang from sick-brained men, who having gotten good store of Holy Words by frequent reading of the Scri­ptures, made such a connexion of them usually in their preaching, that their Ser­mons signifying just nothing, yet to un­learned men seemed most divine; for he whose non-sense appears to be a Divine speech, must necessarily seeme to be inspired from above.

VII. The seventh Doctrine opposite That single Subjects have any propriety, or absolute Dominion over their own goods, is a sediti­ous Opinion. to Government, is this, That each subject hath an absolute Dominion over the goods be is in possession of. That is to say, such a propriety as excludes not only the right of all the rest of his fellow-subjects to the same goods, but also of the Magistrate himself, which is not true; for they who have a Lord over them, have themselves no Lordship, as hath been proved, Chap. 8. Artic. 5. Now the Ma­gistrate is Lord of all his Subjects, by the constitution of Government. Before the yoke of Civill Society was undertaken, no man had any proper Right; all things were common to all men; tell me therefore, how [Page 182] gottest thou this propriety but from the Magistrate? How got the Magistrate it, but that every man transferred his Right on him? and thou therefore hast also gi­ven up thy Right to him; thy Dominion there­fore, and Propriety, is just so much as he will, and shall last so long as he pleases; even as in a Family, each Son hath such proper goods, and so long lasting, as seeme good to the Father. But the greatest part of men who professe Civill Prudence, reason otherwise; we are equall (say they) by nature; there is no reason why any man should by better Right take my goods from me, then I his from him; we know that mony sometimes is needfull for the defence and maintenance of the publique; but let them, who require it, shew us the present necessity, and they shall willingly receive it. They who talk thus, know not, that what they would have, is already done from the beginning in the very constitution of Government, and therefore speaking as in a dissolute multitude, and yet not fashi­shioned Government, they destroy the frame.

VIII. In the last place, it's a great Not to know the difference between a People and a Multitude prepares to Sedition. hindrance to Civill Government, especially Monarchicall, that men distinguish not enough between a People and a Multitude. The People is somewhat that is one, having one will, and to whom one action may be attributed; none of these can properly be said of a Multitude. The People rules in all Governments, for even in Monarchies the People Commands; for the People wills by the will of one man; but the Multitude are [Page 183] Citizens, that is to say, Subjects. In a Democraty, and Aristocraty, the Citizens are the Multitude, but the Court is the People. And in a Monarchy, the Subjects are the Multitude, and (however it seeme a Paradox) the King is the People. The common sort of men, and others who little consider these truthes, do alwayes speak of a great number of men, as of the People, that is to say, the City; they say that the City hath rebelled against the King (which is im­possible) and that the People will, and nill, what murmuring and discontented Sub­jects would have, or would not have, under pretence of the People, stirring up the Citi­zens against the City, that is to say, the Multitude against the People. And these are almost all the Opinions wherewith Subjects being tainted doe easily Tumult. And forasmuch as in all manner of Go­vernment Majesty is to be preserv'd by him, or them who have the Supreme Au­thority, the crimen laesae Majestatis naturally cleaves to these Opinions.

IX. There is nothing more afflicts the Too great a Tax of Money, though never so just and necessary, disposeth men to Sedition. mind of man then Poverty, or the want of those things which are necessary for the preservation of life, and honour; and though there be no man but knowes that riches are gotten with industry, and kept by fruga [...]ty, yet all the poor commonly lay the blame on the Evill Government, excusing their own sloth, and luxury, as if their private goods forsooth were wasted by pub­lique exactions; But men must consider, that they who have no patrimony, must not onely labour that they may live, but fight [Page 184] too, that they may labour, Every one of the Jewes, who in Esdras his time built the Walls of Jerusalem, did the work with one band, and held the Sword in the other. In all Government we must conceive that the hand which holds the Sword is the King, or Supreme Councell, which is no lesse to be sustained, and nourisht, by the Sub­jects care and industry, then that where­with each man procures himself a private fortune; and that Custom [...]s, and Tributes, are nothing else but their reward who watch in Armes for us, that the labours and endeavours of single men may not be mo­lested by the incursion of enemies; and that their complaint, who impute their poverty to publick Persons, is not more just, then if they should say that they are become in want by paying of their d [...]bts: But the most part of men consider nothing of these things, for they suffer the same thing with them who have a disease they call an Incubus, which springing from Gluttony, it makes men believe they are invaded, opprest, and stifled with a great weight: Now it is a thing manifest of it selfe, that they who seeme to themselves to be burthened with the whole load of the Common-weal, are prone to be Seditious; and that they are affected with change, who are distasted at the present st [...]e of things.

X. Another noxious disease of the Ambition disposeth men to Se­dition. mind is theirs, who having little employ­ment, want Honour and Dignity. All men naturally strive for Honour, and Prefer­ment, but cheifly they who are least trou­roubled [Page 185] with caring for necessary things; for these men are invited by their vacancy sometimes to disputation among themselves concerning the Common-weal, sometimes to an easie reading of Histories, Politiques, Orations, Poems, and other pleasant Books, and it happens, that hence they think themselves sufficiently furnisht both with wit, and learning, to administer matters of the greatest consequence. Now because all men are not what they appear to them­selves, and if they were, yet all (by reason of the multitude) could not be received to publique Offices, its necessary that many must be passed by. These therefore con­ceiving themselves affronted, can desire nothing more, partly out of envy to those who were preferred before them, partly out of hope to overwhelm them, then ill successe to the publique Consultations; and there­fore its no marvell if with greedy appe­tites they seek for occasions of innovati­ons.

XI. The hope of overcomming is also to be So doth the hope of suc­cesse. numbred among other seditious inclinati­ons; for let there be as many men as you wil, infected with opinions repugnant to Peace, and civill Government, let there be as many as there can, never so much wounded and torne with aff [...]onts, and calumnies, by them who are in Authority, yet if there be no hope of having the better of them, or it appear not sufficient, there will no sediti­on follow; every man will dissemble his thoughts, and rather content himself with the present burthen, then hazard an hea­vier weight; There are four things necessa­rily [Page 186] requisite to this hop [...]. Numbers, Instru­ments, mutuall trust, and Commanders. To resist publique Magistrates without a great number, is not Sedition, but Desperation. By Instruments of war I mean all manner of armes, munition, and other necessary pro­vision, without which Number can doe no­thing, nor Arms neither without mutuall trust; Nor all these without union under under some Commander, whom of their own accord, they are content to obey; not as being engaged by their submission to his command (for we have already in this very Chapter, supposed these kind of men not to understand, being obliged beyond that which seems right and good in their own eyes) but for some opinion they have of his vertue, or military skill, or resemblance of humours. If these [...]our be near at hand to men grieved with the present state, and mea­suring the justice of their actions by their own judgements, there will be nothing wanting to sedition and confusion of the Realme, but one to stirre up and quicken them.

XII. Salust his Character of Cataline, Eloquence alone with­out wisdom is the onely faculty needfull to raise se­ditions. (then whom there never wa [...] a greater Ar­tist in raising seditions) is this, That he had great eloquence, and little wisdome; he se­parates wisdome from eloquence, attribu­ting this as necessary to a man born for commotions, adjudging that as an instru­ctresse of Peace, and quietnesse. Now, eloquence is twofold. The one is an ele­gant, and cleare expression of the con­ceptions of the mind, and riseth partly from the contemplation of the things themselves, [Page 187] partly from an understanding of words ta­ken in their own proper, and definite signi­fication; the other is▪ a commotion of the Passions of the minde (such as are hope, fear, anger, pitty) and derives from a meta­phoricall use of words fitted to the Passions: That forms a speech from true Principles, this from opinions already received, what nature soever they are of. The art of that is Logick, of this Rhetorick, the end of that is truth, of this victory. Each hath its use, that in deliberations, this in exhortations; for that is never disjoyned from wisdome, but this almost ever. But that this kind of pow­erfull eloquence, separated from the true knowledge of things, that is to say, from wisdome, is the true character of them who sollicite, and stirre up the people to inno­vations, may easily be gathered out of the work it selfe which they have to doe; for they could not poyson the people with those absurd opinions contrary to Peace and civill society, unlesse they held them themselves, which sure is an ignorance greater then can well befall any wise man, for he that knows not whence the Lawes derive their power, which are the Rules of just and unjust, honest and dishonest, good and evill, what makes and preserves Peace among men, what de­stroyes it, what is his, and what anothers, Lastly, what he would have done to him­selfe (that he may doe the like to others) is surely to be accounted but meanly wis [...]; but that they can turn their Auditors out of fools into madmen; that they can make things to them who are ill-affected seem worse, to them who are well-affected seem evil; that [Page 188] they can enlarge their hopes, lessen their dangers beyond reason: this they have from that sort of eloquence, not which explains things as they are, but from that other, which by moving their mindes, makes all things to appear to bee such as they in their mindes prepared before, had already conceived them.

XIII. Many men who are themselves How the folly of the common people, and the elo­quence of ambiti­ous men, concurre to the dissolu­tion of a Common-weale. very well affected to civill society, doe through want of knowledge, cooperate to the disposing of subjects mindes to sedition, whilst they teach young men a doctrine conformable to the said opinions in their Schooles, and all the people in their P [...]l­pits: now they who desire to bring this dis­position into Act, place their whole endea­vour in this, First, that they may joyn the ill affected together into faction and conspira­cy; next, that themselves may have the greatest stroke in the faction: They gather them into faction, while they make them­selves the relators, and interpretors of the counsels and actions of single men, and nominate the Persons and Places, to assem­ble and deliberate of such things whereby the present government may be reformed, according as it shall seem best to their inte­rests. Now to the end that they themselves may have the chief rule in the faction, The faction must be kept in a faction, that is to say, they must have their secret meetings apart with a few, where they may order what shall afterward be propounded in a general meeting, and by whom, and on what subject, and in what order each of them shall speak, and how they may draw the [Page 189] powerfullest, and most popular men of the faction to their side: and thus when they have gotten a faction big enough, in which they may rule by their eloquence, they move it to take upon it the managing of affaires, and thus they sometimes oppresse the Com­mon-wealth, namely where there is no other faction to oppose them, but for the most part they rend it, and introduce a civill warre, for folly and eloquence concurre in the subversion of government in the same man­ner (as the [...]able hath it) as heretofore the daughters of Palias King of Thessaly, con­spired with Medea against their father; They going to restore the decrepit old man to his youth again, by the counsell of Medea, they cut him into peeces, and set him in the fire to boyle, in vain expecting when he would live again; So the common people through their folly (like the daughters of Palias) desiring to renew the ancient government, being drawne away by the eloquence of am­bitious men, as it were by the witchcraft of Medea, divided into faction, they consume it rather by those flames, then they re­forme it.

CHAP. XIII. Concerning the duties of them who bear Rule.

I. BY what hath hitherto been said, The Right of supreme authority is distin­guisht from its ex [...]r [...]ise. the duties of Citizens and Subjects in any kind of government whatsoever, and the power of the supreme Ruler over them are apparent; but we have as yet said no­thing of the duties of Rulers, and how they ought to behave themselves towards their Subjects; We must then distinguish be­tween the Right, and the exercise of supreme authority, for they can be divided; as for ex­a [...]ple, when he who hath the Right, either cannot, or will not be present in judging trespasses, or deliberating of affaires▪ For Kings sometimes by reason of their age can­not order their affaires, sometimes also though they can doe it themselves, yet they judge it fitter, being satisfied in the choyce of their Officers and Counsellors, to exer­cise their power by them. Now where the Right and exercise are severed, there the go­vernment of the Common-weale, is like the ordinary government of the world, in which [Page 192] God, the mover of all things, produceth na­turall effects by the means of secondary causes; but where he, to whom the Right of ruling doth belong, is himselfe present in all judicatures, consultations, and pub­lique actions, there the administration is such, as if God beyond the ordinary course of nature, should immediately apply him­self unto all matters; we will therefore in this Chapter summarily and briefly speak somewhat concerning their duties who ex­ercise authority, whether by their own or others Right. Nor is it my purpose to de­scend into those things, which being di­vers from others, some Princes may doe, for this is to be left to the Politicall Practices of each Common-weale.

II. Now all the duties of Rulers are contained in this one sentence, The safety The safety of the Peo­ple is the supreme Law. of the people is the supreme Law; for although they who among men obtain the chiefest Dominion, cannot be subject to Lawes properly so called, that is to say, to the will of men, because to be chief, and subject, are contradictories; yet is it their duty in all things, as much as possibly they can, to yeeld obedience unto right reason, which is the naturall, morall, and divine Law; But because dominions were constituted for Peaces sake, and Peace was sought after for safeties sake, he, who being placed in autho­rity, shall use his power otherwise then to the safety of the people, will act against the reasons of Peace, that is to say, against the Lawes of nature; Now as the safety of the People dictates a Law by which Princes know their duty, so doth it also teach them [Page 193] an art how to procure themselves a benefit; for the power of the Citizens, is the power of the City, that is to say, his that bears the chief Rule in any state.

III. By the people in this place we un­derstand, It is the duty of Princes to respect the common benefit of many, not the peculiar interest of this, or that man. not one civill Person, namely the City it selfe which governs, but the multi­tude of subjects which are governed; for the City was not instituted for its own, but for the subjects fake; and yet a particular care is not required of this or that man; for the Ruler (as such) provides no otherwise for the safety of his people, then by his Lawes, which are universall; and therefore he hath fully discharged himselfe, if he have throughly endeavoured by wholesome con­stitutions, to establish the welfare of the most part, and made it as lasting as may be; and that no man suffer ill, but by his own de­fault, or by some chance which could not be prevented; but it sometimes conduces to the safety of the most part, that wicked men doe suffer,

IV. But by safety must be understood, By safety is understood all manner of benefits. not the sole preservation of life in what con­dition soever, but in order to its happines. For to this end did men freely assemble themselves, and institute a government, that they might, as much as their humane condi­tion would afford, live delightfully. They therefore who had undertaken the admini­stration of power in such a kinde of govern­ment, would sinne against the Law of na­ture (because against their trust who had committed that power unto them) if they should not study, as much as by good Laws could be effected, to furnish their subjects [Page 194] abundantly, not only with the good things belonging to life, but also with those which advance to delectation. They who have ac­quired Dominion by arms, doe all desire that their subjects may be strong in body and mind, that they may serve them the better, wherefore if they should not endea­vour to provide them, not only with such things whereby they may live, but also with such whereby they may grow strong and lusty, they would act against their own scope and end.

V. And first of all, Princes doe beleeve Query, Whether it be the duty of Kings to provide for the sal­vation of their sub­jects soules, as they shall judge best in their own c [...]n­sciences. that it mainly concerns eternall salvation, what opinions are held of the Deity, and what manner of worship he is to be adored with; which being supposed, it may be de­manded, whether chief Rulers, and whoso­ever they be, whether one or more, who ex­ercise supreme authority, sin not against the Law of nature, if they cause not such a do­ctrine, and worship, to be taught and pra­ctised (or permit a contrary to be taught and practised) as they beleeve necessarily con­duceth to the eternall salvation of their sub­jects? It is manifest that they act against their conscience, and that they will, as much as in them lies, the eternall perdition of their subjects; for if they willed it not, I see no reason why they should suffer, (when being supreme they cannot be compelled) such things to be taught and done, for which they beleeve them to be in a damna­ble state. But we will leave this difficulty in Wherein the safety of the Peo­ple consists. suspence.

VI. The benefits of subjects respecting this life only, may be distributed into foure [Page 195] kindes. 1. That they be defended against forraign enemies. 2. That Peace be pre­served at home. 3. That they be enrich't as much as may consist with publique se­curity. 4. That they enjoy a harmelesse li­berty; For supreme Commanders can con­ferre no more to their civill happinesse, then that being preserved from forraign and ci­vill warres, they may quietly enjoy that wealth which they have purchased by their own i [...]dustry.

VII. There are two things necessary That disco­verers are necessary for the de­fence of the People. for the Peoples defence; To be warned, and to be forearmed; for the state of Common-wealths considered in themselves, is natural, that is to say, hostile; neither if they cease from fighting, is it therefore to be called Peace, but rather a breathing time, in which one enemy observing the motion and coun­tenance of the other, values his security n [...]t according to the Pacts, but the forces and counsels of his adversary; And this by na­turall Right, as hath been shewed in the se­cond Chapter, 10. Artic. from this, that contracts are invalid in the state of nature, as oft as any just fear doth intervene; It is therefore necessary to the defence of the City, First, that there be some who may as near as may be, search into, and discover the counsels and motions of all those who may prejudice it; for discoverers to Ministers of State, are like the beames of the Sunne to the humane soule, and we may more truly say in vision politicall, then naturall, that the sensible, and intelligible Species of out­ward things, not well considered by others, are by the ayre transported to the soule, [Page 196] (that is to say to them who have the Su­preme Authority) and therefore are they no lesse necessary to the preservation of the State, then the rayes of the light are to the conservation of man; or if they be com­pared to Spiders webs, which extended on all sides by the finest threds, doe warn them, keeping in their small holds, of all outward motions; They who bear Rule can no more know what is necessary to be commanded for the defence of their Sub­jects without Spies, then those Spiders can when they shall goe forth, and whether they shall repair, without the motion of those threds.

VIII. Farthermore, its necessarily requi­site To have Souldiers, Armes, Garrisons, and Money, in readiness in times of Peace, is necessary for the Peoples de­fence. to the peoples defence, that they be fore-armed. Now to be fore-armed is to be furnisht with Souldiers, Armes, Ships, Forts and Monies, before the danger be instant; for the listing of Souldiers, and taking up of Armes after a blow is given, is too late, at least if not impossible. In like manner, not to raise Forts, and appoint Garrisons in convenient places, before the Fromiers are invaded, is to be like those Country Swains (as Demosthenes said) who ignorant of the art of Fencing, with their Bucklers guarded those parts of the body where they first f [...]lt the smart of the strokes. But they who think it then seasonable enough to raise Monies for the maintenance of Souldiers, and other Charges of War, when the dan­ger begins to shew it self, they consider not surely how difficult a matter it is to wring suddainly out of close▪ fisted men so vast a proportion of Monies; for almost all men, [Page 197] what they once reckon in the number of their goods, doe judge themselves to have such a right and propriety in it, as they con­ceive themselves to be injured whensoever they are forced to imploy but the least part of it for the publique good. Now a sufficient stock of monies to defend the Country with Armes, will not soon be raised out of the treasure of Imposts, and Customes; we must therefore, for fear of War, in time of Peace hoord up good summs, if we intend the safety of the Common-weal. Since therefore it necessarily belongs to Rulers for the Subjects safety to discover the Ene­mies Counsell, to keep Garrisons, and to have Money in continuall readinesse, and that Princes are by the Law of Nature bound to use their whole endeavour in pro­curing the welfare of their Subjects, it followes, that its not onely lawfull for them to send out Spies, to maintain Souldiers, to build Forts, and to require Monies for these purposes, but also, not to doe thus, is unlawfull. To which also may be added, whatsoever shall seeme to conduce to the lesning of the power of forraigners whom they suspect, whether by sleight, or force. For Rulers are bound according to their power to prevent the evills they suspect, lest peradventure they may happen through A right instruction of Subjects in civill doctrines is necessary for the pre­serving of Peace. their negligence.

IX. But many things are required to the conservation of inward Peace, because many things concur (as hath been shewed in the foregoing Chapter) to its perrurba­tion. We have there shewed, that some things there are which dispose the minds of [Page 198] of men to sedition, others which move and quicken them so disposed. Among those which dispose them, we have reckoned in the first place certaine perverse doctrines. Its therefore the duty of those who have the chief Authority; to root those out of the mindes of men, not by commanding, but by teaching; not by the terrour of penalties, but by the perspicuity of reasons; the Lawes whereby this evill may be withstood are not to be made against the Persons erring, but against the Errours themselves. Those errours which in the foregoing Chapter we affirmed were inconsistent with the quiet of the Common-weal, have crept into the mindes of ignorant men, partly from the Pulpit, partly from the daily discourses of men, who by reason of little employment, otherwise, doe finde leasure enough to study; and they got into these mens mindes by the teachers of their youth in publique schooles. Wherefore also, on the other side, if any man would introduce sound Doctrine, he must begin from the Academies: There, the true, and truly de­monstrated foundations of civill Doctrine are to be laid, wherewith young men being once endued, they may afterward both in private and publique instruct the vulgar. And this they will doe so much the more cheerfully, and powerfully, by how much themselves shall be more certainly convin­ced of the truth of those things they profess, and teach; for seeing at this day men receive propositions, though false, and no more intelligible, then if a man should joyne together a company of termes [Page 199] drawn by chance out of an urne, by reason of the frequent use of hearing them; how much more would they for the same reason entertain true doctrines suitable to their own understandings, and the nature of things? I therefore conceive it to be the duty of Supreme Officers to cause the true elements of civill Doctrine to be written, and to command them to be taught in all the Colledges of their severall Dominions.

X. In the next place we shewed that Equall di­stribution of publique burthens conduceth much to the preservati­on of peace. grief of mind a [...]ising from want did dispose the Subjects to Sedition, which want, al­though deriv'd from their own luxury, and sloth, yet they impute it to those who go­vern the Realm, as though they were drai­ned and opprest by publique Pensions. Notwithstanding it may sometimes happen that this complaint may be just, namely, when the burthens of the Realm are une­qually imposed on the Subjects; For that which to all together is but a light weight, if many withdraw themselves, it wil be very heavy, nay, even intollerable to the rest: Neither are men wont so much to grieve at the burthen it self, as at the inequality. With much earnestnes therefore men strive to be freed from taxes, & in this conflict the lesse happy, as being overcome, do envy the more fortunate. To remove therefore all just com­plaint, its the interest of the publique quiet, and by consequence it concernes the duty of the Magistrate, to see that the publique bur­thens be equally born. Furthermore, since what is brought by the subjects to publick use, is nothing else but the price of their bought Peace, its reason good, that they who equally share in the peace, should also [Page 200] pay an equall part either by contributing their Monies, or their labours to the Com­mon-weal; now it is the Law of Nature (by the 15. Article of the 3. Chapter) that every man in distributing right to others, doe carry himself equall to all; wherefore Rulers are by the naturall Law obliged to lay the burthens of the Common-weal equally on their Subjects.

XI. Now in this place we understand an equality, not of Money, but of Burthen, that is to say, an equality of reason between the Burthens, and the Benefits. For al­though Its naturall equity that Monies be [...]axt accor­ding to what every man speuds, not to what [...]e posses­eth. all equally enjoy Peace, yet the benefits springing from thence, are not equall to all; for some get greater pos­sessions, others lesse; and againe, some consume lesse, others more. It may therefore be demanded whether Subjects ought to contribute to the publique, ac­cording to the rate of what they gain, or of what they spend, that is to say, whether the persons must be taxt, so as to pay con­tribution according to their wealth, or the goods themselves, that every man contri­bute according to what he spends. But if we consider, where Monies are raised ac­cording to wealth, there they who have made equall gain, have not equall posses­sions, because that one preserves what he hath got by frugality, another wastes it by luxury, and therefore equally rejoycing in the benefit of Peace, they doe not equally sustaine the Burthens of the Common-weal: and on the other side, where the goods themselves are taxt, there every man, while he spends his private goods, in the very act of consuming them he undiscer­nably [Page 201] payes part due to the Common-weal, according to, not what he hath, but what by the benefit of the Realm he hath had; it is no more to be doubted▪ but that the former way of commanding monies is a­gainst equity, and therefore against the duty of Rulers, the latter is agreeable to reason, and the exercise of their authority.

XII. In the third place, we said that It conduces to the pre­servation of peace, to de­presse the ambitious. that trouble of minde which riseth from ambition was offensive to publique Peace. For there are some who seeming to them­selves to be wiser then others, and more sufficient for the managing of affaires then they who at present doe govern, when they can no otherwise declare how profitable their vertue would prove to the Common-weale, they shew it, by harming it; but be­cause ambition and greedinesse of honours cannot be rooted out of the mindes of men, its not the duty of Rulers to endeavour it; but by constant application of rewards, and punishments, they may so order it, that men may know that the way to honour is, not by contempt of the present government, nor by factions, and the popular ayre, but by the contraries. They are good men who observe the Decrees, the Lawes and Rights of their Fathers; if with a constant order we saw these adorned with honours, but the factions punisht, and had in contempt by those who bear command, there would be more ambition to obey, then withstand; notwithstanding it so happens sometimes, that as we must stroke a horse by reason of his too much fiercenesse, so a stiffe neckt subject must be flatter'd for fear of his pow­e [...]; [Page 202] but as that happens when the rider, so this, when the Commander is in danger of falling. But we speak here of those, whose authority aund power is intire. Their duty (I say) it is to cherish obedient subjects, and to depresse the factious all they can; nor can the publique power be otherwise preserved, nor the subjects quiet without it.

XIII. But if it be the duty of Princes And to dis­solve facti­ous. to restrain the factious, much more does it concern them to dissolve and dissipate the factions themselues. Now I call a faction, a multitude of subjects gathered together, either by mutuall contracts among them­selves, or by the power of some one, without his or theirs who bear the supreme Rule: A faction therefore is as it were a City in a City; for as by an Union of men in the state of nature a City receives its being, so by a new union of subjects, there ariseth a faction. According to this definition, a mul­titude of subjects who have bound them­selves simply to obey any forreign Prince, or Subject, or have made any Pacts, or Leagues of mutuall defence between them­selves against all men, not excepting those who have the supreme power in the City, is a faction. Also favour with the vulgar if it be so great, that by it an Army may be rais'd, except publique caution be given, either by hostages, or some other pledges, contains faction in it; The same may be said of pri­vate wealth, if it exceed, because all things obey mony. Forasmuch therefore as it is true, that the state of Cities among them­selves is naturall, and hostile, those Princes who permit factions, doe as much as if they [Page 203] received an enemy within their walls, which is contrary to the subjects safety, and there­fore also against the Law of nature.

XIV. There are two things necessary Lawes whereby gaining arts are cherisht, and great ex­pences re­strained, do [...] conduce much to the enriching of the sub­ject. to the enriching of Subjects, Laobur and thrife; there is also a third which helps, to wit the naturall increase of the earth, and wa­ter, and there is a fourth too, namely the Militia, which sometimes augments, but more frequently lessens the subjects stock. The two first are only necessary. For a City constituted in an Island of the Sea, no greater then will serve for dwelling, may grow rich without sowing, or fishing, by merchandize, and handicrafts only; but there is no doubt if they have a territory, but they may be richer with the same number, or equally rich, being a greater number; but the fourth, namely the Militia, was of old reckoned in the number of the gaining Ar [...]s, under the notion of Booting or taking prey; and it was by mankind, (disperst by families) before the constitution of civill so­cieties, accounted just and honourable; for preying, is nothing else but a warre waged with small forces; And great Common-weales, namely that of Rome, and Athens, by the spoyles of warre, forraigne tribute, and the territories they have purchased by their armes, have sometimes so improved the Common-wealth, that they have not onely not required any publique mo­nies from the poorer sort of subjects, but have also divided to each of them both mo­nies and lands. But this kind of increase of riches, is not to be brought into rule and fa­shion: For the Militia in order to profit, [Page 204] is like a Dye wherewith many lose their estates, but few improve them. Since there­fore there are three things only, the fruits of the earth and water, Labour and Thrif [...], which are expedient for the enriching of subjects, the duty of Commanders in chief, shall be conversant onely about those three. For the first, those lawes will be usefull which coun­tenance the arts that improve the increase of the earth, and water, such as are husban­dry, and fishing. For the second, all Lawes against idlenesse, and such as quicken indu­stry, are profitable; the ar [...] of Navigation (by help whereof the commodities of the whole world, bought almost by labour only, are brought into one City) and the Mecha­nicks, (under which I comprehend all the arts of the most excellent workmen) and the Mathemacicall sciences, the fountains of na­vigatory and mechanick employments, are held in due esteem and honour. For the third, those lawes are usefull, whereby all inordinate expence, as well in meats, as in clothes, and universally in all things which are consumed with usage, is forbidden. Now because such lawes are beneficiall to the ends above specified, it belongs also to the Office of supreme Magistrates, to establish That more ought not to be deter­mined by the Lawes, then the benefit of Prince and Subjects require. them.

XV. The liberty of subjects consists not in being exempt from the Lawes of the City, or that they who have the supreme power cannot make what Laws they have a mind to; but because all the motions and actions of subjects, are never circumscribed by Lawes, nor can be, by reason of their vari­ety; it is necessary that there be infinite ca­ses, [Page 205] which are neither commanded, nor pro­hibited, but every man may either doe, or not doe them, as he lifts himselfe. In these, each man is said to enjoy his liberty, and in this sense liberty is to be understood in this place, namely, for that part of naturall Right, which is granted and left to Subjects by the civill Lawes. As water inclosed on all hands with banks, stands still and corrupts; having no bounds, it spreds too largely, and the more passages it findes, the more freely it takes its current; so subjects, if they might doe nothing without the commands of the Law would grow dull, and unwildly, if all, they would be disperst, and the more is left undetermined by the Lawes, the more liberty they enjoy. Both extremes are faulty, for Lawes were not invented to take away, but to direct mens actions, even as nature ordained the banks, not to stay, but to guide the course of the streame. The mea­sure of this liberty is to be taken from the subjects, and the Cities good; wherefore in the first place it is against the charge of those who command, and have the authority of making lawes, that there should be more lawes then necessarily serve for good of the Magistrate, and his Subjects; for since men are wont commonly to debate what to do, or not to do, by naturall reason, rather then any knowledge of the Lawes, where there are more Lawes then can easily be re­membred, and whereby such things are for­bidden, as reason of it selfe prohibites not of necessity, they must through ignorance, without the least evill i [...]tention, fall with­in the compasse of Lawes, as gins laid to [Page 206] entrap their harmelesse liberty, which su­preme Commanders are bound to preserve for their subjects by the Lawes of nature.

XVI. It is a great part of that liberty which That grea­ter punish­ments must not be infli­cted, then are prescri­bed by the Lawes. is harmlesse to civill government, and neces­sary for each subject to live happily, that there be no penalties dreaded, but what they may both foresee, and look for; and this is done, where there are either no punishments at all defined by the Lawes, or greater not required then are defined; where there are none defined, there he that hath first bro­ken the Law, expects an in definite or arbi­trary punishment, and his feare is supposed boundlesse, because it relates to an unboun­ded evill; now the Law of nature com­mands them who are n [...]t subject to any ci­vill Lawes, (by what we have said in the third Chapter, Artic. 11.) and therefore supreme Commanders, that in taking re­venge and punishing, they must not so much regard the past evill, as the future good, and they sin, if they entertain any other measure in arbitrary punishment, then the publique benefit; but where the punish­ment is defined, either by a Law prescribed, as when it is set down in plain words, that he th [...]t shall doe thus, or thus, shall suffer so and so; or by practice, as when the penalty, (not by any Law prescribed, but arbitrary from the beginning) is afterward determi­ned by the punishment of the first delin­quent (for naturall equity commands that equall transgressors be equally punished) there to impose a greater penalty then is defined by the Law, is against the Law of nature. For the end of punishment is not to [Page 207] compell the will of man, but to fashion it, & make it such as he would have it who hath set the penalty. And deliberation is nothing else but a weiging, as it were in scales, the conveniencies, and inconveniencies of the fact we are attempting; where, that which is more weighty, doth necessarily according to its inclination prevaile with us. If there­fore the Legislator doth set a lesse penalty on a crime, then will make our feare more considerable with us, then our lust; that ex­cesse of lust above the feare of punishment, whereby sinne is committed, is to be attri­buted to the Legislator (that is to say) to the supreme, and therefore if he inflict a greater punishment, then himselfe hath de­termined in his Lawes, he punisheth that in another, which he sinned himselfe.

XVII. It pertaines therefore to the Subjects must have right resto­red to them against cor­rupt Judges harmlesse and necessary liberty of subjects, that every man may without feare, en­joy the rights which are allowed him by the Lawes; for it is in vain to have our own distinguisht by the Lawes from anothers, if by wrong judgement, robbery, theft, they may bee again confounded; but it falls out so, that these doe happen where Judges are corrupted; for the fear where­by men are deterred from doing evill, ari­seth not from hence, namely, because pe­nalties are set, but because they are execu­ted; for we esteeme the future by what is past, seldome expecting what seldome hap­pens. If therefore Judges corrupted either by Gifts, Favour, or even by pitty it self, do often forbear the execution of the Penal­ties due by the Law, and by that meanes [Page 208] put wicked men in hope to passe unpunisht: honest Subjects encompast with murthe­rers, theeves and knaves, will not have the liberty to converse freely with each other, nor scarce to stirre abroad without hazard; nay, the City it self is dissolved, and every mans right of protecting himself at his own will returnes to him. The Law of Nature therefore gives this precept to Supreme Commanders, that they not onely doe righteousnesse themselves, but that they also by penalties cause the Judges, by them appointed, to doe the same; that is to say, that they hearken to the complaints of their Subjects; and as oft as need requires, make choice of some extraordinary Judges, who may hear the matter debated concerning the ordinary ones.

CHAP. XIV. Of Lawes and Trespasses.

I. THey who lesse seriously consider the How Law differs from Counsell. force of words, doe sometimes con­found Law with Counsell, sometimes with Covenant, sometimes with Right. They confound Law with Counsel, who think, that it is the duty of Monarchs not onely to give ear to their Counsellours, but also to obey them, as though it were in vaine to take Counsell, unlesse it were also followed. We must fetch the distinction between Counsel, and Law, from the difference between Counsell, and Command. Now COUN­SELL is a precept in which the reason of my obeying it, is taken from the thing it self which is advised; but COMMAND is a precept in which the cause of my obedience depends on the will of the Commander. For it is not properly said, Thus I will, and thus I Command, except the will stand for a Rea­son; Now when obedience is yielded to the Lawes, not for the thing it self, but by reason of the advisers will, the Law is not a Counsell, but a Command, and is defined thus, LAW is the command of that Person (whether Man, or Court) whose precept con­taines in it the reason of obedience; as the Precepts of God in regard of Men, of Ma­gistrates in respect of their Subjects, and [Page 211] universally of all the powerfull in respect of them who cannot resist, may be termed their Lawes; Law and Counsell therefore differ many ways; Law belongs to him who hath power over them whom he adviseth, Counsell to them who have no power. To follow what is prescribed by Law, is duty, what by Counsell, is free-will. Counsell is directed to his end that receives it, Law, to his that gives it. Counsell is given to none but the willing, Law even to the un­willing. To conclude, the right of the Counsellour is made void by the will of him to whom he gives Counsell, the right of the Law-giver is not abrogated at the pleasure of him who hath a Law imposed.

II. They confound Law, and Covenant, How it differs from a Covenant. who conceive the Lawes to be nothing else but certain [...], or forms of li­ving, determined by the common consent of men: Amongst whom is Aristotle, who defines Law on this manner, [...] that is to say, Law is a speech limited ac­cording to the common consent of the City, de­claring every thing that we ought to doe; which definition is not simply of Law, but of the Civill Law; for it is manifest that the Divine Lawes sprang not from the con­sent of men, nor yet the Lawes of Nature; for if they had their originall from the con­sent of men, they might also by the same consent be abrogated; but they are un­changeable. But indeed that's no right de­finition of a Civill Law; for in that place a City is taken either for one civill person, [Page 212] one will, or for a multitude of men who have each of them the liberty of their pri­vate wills; if for one person, those words, common consent, are ill placed here, for one person hath no common consent; neither ought he to have said, (declaring what was needfull to be done) but commanding; for what the City deolares, it commands its Subjects. He therefore by a City under­stood a multitude of men declaring by common consent (imagine it a writing confirm'd by Votes) some certain formes of living; but these are nothing else but some mutuall contracts which oblige not any man (and therefore are no Lawes) before that a Supreme Power being consti­tuted which can compell, have sufficient remedy against the rest, who otherwise are not likely to keep them. Lawes therefore, according to this definition of Aristotle, are nothing else, but naked, and weak contracts, which then at length, when there is one who by right doth exercise the Supreme Power, shall either become Lawes, or no Lawes, at his will and pleasure: Wherefore he confounds Contracts with Lawes, which he ought not to have done; for Contract is a promise, Law a command. In Contracts we say, I will do this; In Lawes, Doe this. (*) Contracts oblige us, Lawes vie us fast, being obliged. A Contract obligeth of it self, The Law holds the party obliged by vertue of the universall Contract of yeelding obedience; Therefore in Contract its first de­termined what is to be done, before we are obliged to doe it; But in Law we are first obliged to performe, and what is to be [Page 213] done, is determined afterwards. Aristotle therefore ought to have defined a civill law thus, A civill law is a speech limited by the will of the City, commanding every thing be­hoofefull to be done, which is the same with that we have given above in the 6. Chap. art. 9. to wit, that the civill lawes are the command of him (whether man, or Court of men) who is endued with supreme power in the city, concerning the future actions of his Subjects.

Contracts oblige us.] To be obliged, Annotation and to be tyed being obliged, seems to some men to be one, and the same thing, and that therefore here seems to be some distinction in words, but none indeed. More cleerly therefore, I say th [...], That a man is obliged [...]y his con­tracts, that is, that he ought to performe for his promise sake; but that the Law tyes him being obliged, that is to say, it compells him to make good his promise, for fear of the punishment ap­pointed by the Law.

III. They confound Lawes with Right, How it differs from Right. who continue still to doe what is permitted by divine Right, notwithstanding it be for­bidden by the civill Law: That which is prohibited by the divine Law, cannot bee permitted by the civill, neither can that which is commanded by the divine Law, be prohibited by the civill, notwithstanding that which is permitted by the divine Right, that is to say, that which may be done by di­vine Right, doth no whit hinder why the same may not be forbidden by the civill Lawes; for inferiour Lawes may restrain the liberty allowed by the superiour, although they cannot enlarge them: now naturall li­berty is a Right not constituted, but allowed [Page 214] by the Lawes. For the Lawes being remo­ved, our liberty is absolute; This is first re­strained by the naturall, and divine Lawes, the residue is bounded by the civill Law, and what remains may again be restrained by the constitutions of particular Towns, and Societies; There is great difference there­fore between Law, and Right. For Law is a setter, Right is freedome, and they differ like contraries.

IV. All Law may be divided, first accor­ding The division of lawes into divine and hu­mane, and of the di­vine into naturall and posi­tive, and of the naturall into those lawes of single men, and those of Nations. to the diversity of its Authors into Di­vine and humane, the Divine, according to the two wayes whereby God hath made known his will unto men, is twofold, natu­rall (or morall) and positive; naturall is that which God hath declared to all men by his eternall word borne with them, to wit, their naturall Reason; and this is that Law which in this whole book I have endeavoured to unfold; Positive is that, which God hath revealed to us by the word of Prophesie, where­in he hath spoken unto men as a man: Such are the Lawes which he gave to the Jewes concerning their government, and divine worship, and they may be termed the Di­vine civill Lawes, because they were peculiar to the civill government of the Jewes, his peculiar people. Again, the naturall Law may be divided into that of Men, which alone hath obtained the title of the I aw of nature, and that of Cities, which may be called that of Nations, but vulgarly it is termed the Right of Nations. The precepts of both are alike, but because Cities once instituted doe put on the personall proprieties of men, that Law, with speaking of the duty of single [Page 215] men, we call naturall, being applyed to whole Cities, and Nations, is called the Right of Nations. And the same Elements of naturall law, and Right, which have hither­to been spoken of, being transferred to whole Cities and Nations, may be taken for the Elements of the lawes, and Right of Nations.

V. All humane law is civill. For the The divi­sion of hu­mane, that is to say, ci­vill lawes, into secular and sacred. state of men considered out of civill society, is hostile, in which, because one is not sub­ject to another, there are no other Lawes, beside the dictates of naturall reason, which is the divine Law. But in civill government the City onely, that is to say, that man, or Court, to whom the supreme power of the City is committed, is the Legislator, and the Lawes of the City are civill. The civill Lawes may be divided according to the di­versity of their subject matter, into sacred, or secular; sacred are those which pertain to Re­ligion, that is to say, to the ceremonies, and worship of God (to wit what Persons, things, places, are to be consecrated, and in what fashion, what opinions concerning the Dei­ty are to be taught publiquely, and with what words, and in what order supplicati­ons are to be made, and the like) and are not determined by any divine positive Law. For the civill sacred Lawes are the humane Lawes (which are also called Ecclesiasticall) concerning things sacred; but the secular under a generall notion, are usually called the civill Lawes.

VI Again, the civill Law (according to Into distri­butive and vindicative the two offices of the Legislator, whereof one is to judge; the other to constrain men [Page 216] to acquiesce to his judgements) hath two parts; the one distributive, the other vindi­cative, or penall. By the distributive it is, that every man hath his proper Right, that is to say, it sets forth Rules for all things, where­by we may know what is properly ours, what another mans; so as others may not hinder us from the free use and enjoyment of our own; and we may not interrupt others in the quiet possession of theirs; and what is lawfull for every man to doe or omit, and what is not lawfull. Vindicative is that whereby it is defined what punishment shall be inflicted on them who break the Law.

VII. Now distributive, and vindicative, Distribu­tive and vindicative are not two Species of the Lawes. are not two severall Species of the Lawes, but two parts of the same Law. For if the Law should say no more, but (for example) whatsoever you take with your net in the Sea, be it yours, i [...]s in vain; For although another should take that away from you which you have caught, it hinders not, but that it still remains yours; for in the state of nature where all things are common to all, yours, and others, are all one, insomuch as what the Law defines to be yours, was yours even before the Law, and after the Law ceases not to bee yours, although in ano­ther mans possession. Wherefore the Law doth nothing, unlesse it bee understood to bee so yours, as all other men be for­bidden to interrupt your free use, and se­cure enjoyment of it at all times, according to your own will, and pleasure. For this is that which is required to a propriety of goods, not that a man may be able to use them, but to use them alone, which is done [Page 217] by prohibiting others to be an hinderance to him. But in vain doe they also prohibit any men, who doe not withall strike a fear of punishment into them; in vain therefore is the Law, unlesse it contain both parts, that which forbids iujuries to be done, and that which punisheth the doers of them. The first of them which is called distributive, is Pro­hibitory, and speaks to all, the second which is styled vindicative, or paenary, is mandatory, and onely speaks to publique Ministers.

VIII. From hence also we may understand, All Law is supposed to have a Pe­nalty an­next to it. that every civill Law hath a penalty annexed to it, either explicitly, or implicitly; For where the penalty is not defined, neither by any writing, nor by example of any one who hath suffered the punishment of the trans­gressed Law, there the penalty is understood to be arbitrary, namely, to depend on the will of the Legislator, that is to say, of the supreme Commander. For in vain is that Law which may be broken without pu­nishment.

IX. Now because it comes from the ci­vill Lawes, both that every man have his The Pre­cepts of the Decalogue of honou­ring Pa­rents, of murther, adultcry, these, false witnesse, are the ci­vill Lawes. proper Right, and distinguisht from anothers, and also that he is forbidden to invade a­nothers Rights, it followes, that these Pre­cepts (Thou shalt not refuse to give the honour defin'd by the Lawes unto thy Parents: Thou shalt not kill the man whom the Lawes forbid thee to kill: Thou shalt avoid all copulation for­bidden by the Laws: Thou shalt not take away anothers goods against the Lords will: Thou shalt not frustrate the Laws and Judgements by false testimony) are Civill Law [...]s. The na­turall Lawes command the same things but [Page 218] implicitly; for the law of nature (as hath been said in the 3. Chap. Art. 2.) commands us to keep contracts, and therefore also to performe obedience when we have covenan­ted obedience, and to abstaine from ano­thers goods when it is determin'd by the civill Law what belongs to another; but all Subjects (by the 13. Art. of the 6. Chap.) do covenant to obey his commands who hath the supreme power, that is to say the the civfll Lawes, in the very constitution of government, even before it is possible to break them; For the Law of nature did ob­lige in the state of nature, where first (be­cause nature hath given all things to all men) nothing did properly belong to ano­ther, and therefore it was not possible to in­vade anothers right; next, where all things were common, and therefore all carnall copulations lawfull; Thirdly, where was the state of▪ Warre, and therefore lawfull to kill; Fourthly, where all things were de­termined by every mans own judgement, and therefore paternall respects also: Lastly, where there were no publique judgements, and therefore no use of bearing witnesse, either true, or false.

X. Seetng therefore our obligation to observe those▪ aws, is more ancient then the It is not possible to command ought by the civill Law, con­trary to o [...]e Lawes of nature. promulgation of the Laws themselves, as be­ing contained in the very eonst [...]t [...]tion of the City, by the vertue of the naturall Law which forbids breach of Covenant, the Law of nature commands us to keep all the civill Laws; for where we are [...]tyed to obe­dience, before we know what will be com­manded us, there we are universally tyed to [Page 219] obey in all things; whence it followes, that no civil Law whatsoever, which tends not to a reproach of the Dei [...]y (in respect of whom, Citie [...] themselves have no right of their own, and cannot be said to make Lawes) can possibly be against the Law of nature; for though the Law of nature forbid theft, adultery, &c. yet if the civill Law com­mand us to invade any thing, that invasion is not theft, adultery, &c. For when the I acedemonians of old permitted their youths by▪ a certaine Law, to take away other mens goods, they commanded that these goods should not bee accounted o­ther mens, but their own who took them; and therefore such surreptions were no thefts. In like manner, copulations of hea­then Sexes, according to their Lawes, were lawfull marriages.

XI. Its necessary to the essence of a It is essen­tiall to a Law, that both it and the Legi­slator be knowne. Law, that the Subjects be acquainted with two things, First, what man or Court hath the supreme power, that is to say, the Right of making Lawes. Secondly, what the Law it self sayes; for he that neither knew either to whom or what he is tyed to, cannot obey, and by consequence is in such a condition, as if he were not tyed at all. I say not that it is necessary to the essence of a Law, that either one, or the other be per­petually known, but onely that it be once knowne; and if the Subject afterward for­get either the Right he hath who made the Law, or the Law it self, that makes him no less [...] tyed to ohey, since he might have re­membred Whence the Legislator is knowne. it, had he had a will to obey.

XII. The knowledge of the Legislator de­pends [Page 220] on the Subject himselfe; for the right of making Lawes could not be conferr'd on any man without his owne consent, and covenant, either exprest, or suppos'd; ex­prest, when from the beginning the Citi­zens doe themselves constitute a forme of governing the City, or when by promise they submit themselves to the Dominion of any one; or suppos'd at least, as when they make use of the benefit of the Realme, and Lawes, for their protection and con­servation against others; for to whose Do­minion we require our fellow Subjects to yeeld obedience for our good, his Domini­on we acknowledge to be legitimate by that very request; and therefore ignorance of the power of making Lawes, can never be a sufficient excuse; for every man knowes what he hath done himselfe.

The knowledge of the lawes depends on the Promulga­tion and in­terpretation are necessa­ry to the knowledge of a Law. Legislator, who must publish them, for o­therwise they are not Lawes; for Law is the command of the Law-maker, and his com­mand is the Declaration of his Will; it is not therefore a Law, except the will of the Law-maker be declar'd, which is done by promulgation. Now in promulgation two things must be manifest, whereof one is, that he or they who publish a Law, either have a right themselves to make Lawes, or that they doe it by authority deriv'd from him or [...]hem who have it; the other is the sense of the Law it selfe. Now, that the first, namely publisht Lawes proceed from him who hath the supreme command, cannot be manifest (speaking exactly and philo­sophically) to any, but them who have re­ceived [Page 221] them from the mouth of the Com­mander, the rest beleeve, but the reasons of their beliefe are so many, that it is scarce possible they should not believe. And truly in a Democratical City where every one may be present at the making of Laws if he will, he that shall be absent, must beleeve those that were present; but in Monarchies and Aristocraties, because its granted but to few to be present, and openly to heare the com­mands of the Monarch or the Nobles, it was necessary to bestow a power on those few of publishing them to the rest; And thus we beleeve those to be the Edicts and Decrees of Princes, which are propoūded to us for such, either by the writings, or voices of them, whose office it is to publish them; But yet when we have these causes of beliefe, that we have seen the Prince, or supreme Coun­cell constantly use such Counsellors, Secre­taries, publishers, and scales, and the like ar­guments for the declaring of his will; that he never took any authority from them; that they have bin punisht who not giving credit to such like promulgations have transgrest the Law; not onely he who thus believing shall not obey the Edicts and Decrees set forth by them is every where accus'd, but he that not believing, shall not yield obedi­ence, is punisht; for the constant per­mission of these things is a manifest signe enough, and evident declaration of the Commanders will; provided there be no­thing contain'd in the Law, Edict or De­cree, derogatory from his supreme power: For it is not to be imagin'd that he would have ought taken from his power by any of [Page 222] his Officers as long as he retaines a will to governe. Now the sense of the law, when there is any doubt made of it, is to be taken from them to whom the supreme authority hath committed the knowledge of causes, or Judgements; for to judge is nothing else then by interpretation to apply the lawes to parti­cular cases; now we may know who they are that have this Office granted them, in the same manner, as we know who they be that have authority given them to publish Laws.

XIV. Againe the civill law according to The civill Law divi­ded into written and unwritten. its two fold manner of publishing, is of two sorts, written & unwritten; By written, I un­derstand that which wants a voice, or some other signe of the will of the [...]egislator that it may become a Law: For all kind of Laws are of the same age with mankinde, both in nature, and time, and therefore of more antiquity then the invention of letters, and the Art of writing; wherefore not a wri­ting, but a voice is necessary for a written law, this alone is requisite to the being, that to the Remembrance of a Law; for we reade, that before letters were found out for the help of memory, that Lawes contracted in­to Meetre, were wont to be sung. The un­written is that which wants no other pub­lishing then the voice of nature, or naturall reason, such are the lawes of nature. For the naturall Law although it be distinguisht from the civill, for as much as it commands the Will, yet so farre forth as it relates to our actions it is civill; for▪ example, this same, Thou shalt not covet, which onely ap­pertaines to the minde, is a naturall Law onely, but this, Thou shalt not invade, is both [Page 223] naturall and civill; for seeing it is im­possible to prescribe such universall Rules, whereby all future contentions which per­haps are infinite, may be determined, its to be understood that in all cases not men­tioned by the written lawes, the law of [...]atu­rall equity is to be followed, which com­mands us to distribute equally to equals; and this by the vertue of the civill law, which also punisheth those who knowingly and willingly doe actually transgresse the lawes of nature.

XV. These things being understood, it appeares first, That the Lawes of Nature, although they were describ'd in the Books That the naturall laws are not written laws, nei­ther are the senten­ces of law­yers, or cu­stome, laws of them­selves, but by the con­sent of the supreme power. What the word Sin▪ taken in its largest sense signifies. of some Philosophers, are not for that rea­son to be termed Written lawes: and that the Writings of the Interpreters of the Lawes, were no Lawes, for want of the Supreme Authority; nor yet those orations of the Wise, (that is to say) Judges, but so farre forth as by the consent of the Supreme power they part into custome, and that then they are to be received among. the Written lawes, not for the Customes sake (which by its own force doth not constitute a Law) but for the Will of the Supreme Comman­der, which appeares in this, that he hath suffer'd his Sentence, whether equall, or un­equall, to passe into custome.

XVI. Sinne, in its largest signification, comprehends every deed, word and thought, against right reason: for every man by rea­soning seeks out the meanes to the end which he propounds to himselfe. If there­fore he reason right (that is to say, begin­ning from most evident principles, he [Page 224] makes a discourse out of consequences con­tinually necessary,) he will proceede in a most direct way; otherwise hee'l goe a­stray, that is to say, he will either doe, say, or endeavour. somewhat against his proper end, which when he hath done, he will in­deed in reasoning be said to have erred, but in action and will to have sinned, for sin fol­lowes errour, just as the Will doth the under­standing: And this is the most generall acception of the word, under which is con­tain'd every imprudent action, whether a­gainst the Law, as to overthrow another mans house, or not against the Law, as to build his owne upon the Sand.

XVII. But when we speak of the Lawes, The defini­tion of Sin. the word Sinne is taken in a more strict sense, and signifies not every thing done a­gainst right reason, but that onely which is blameable, and therefore is call'd malum culpae, the evill of fault; but yet if any thing be culpable it is not presently to be term'd a sinne, or fault, but onely if it be blameable with reason. We must therefore enquire what is to be blameable with reason, what a­gainst reason. Such is the nature of man, that every one calls that good which he de­sires, and evill which he eschewes; and therefore through the diversity of our af­fections, it happens that one counts that good, which another counts evill; and the same man what now he esteem'd for good, he immediately looks on as evill; and the same thing which he calls good in himselfe, he tearmes evill in another; for we all mea­sure good and evill by the pleasure or paine we either feele at present, or expect hereaf­ter; [Page 225] Now seeing the prosperous actions of enemies (because they increase their ho­nours, goods, and power) and of equalls, (by reason of that strife of honours which is among them) both seeme and are irke­some, and therefore evill to all; and men use to repute those evill, that is to say, to lay some fault to their charge from whom they receive evill; its impossible to be de­termined by the consent of single men whom the same things doe not please and displease, what actions are, and what not to be blam'd. They may agree indeed in some certaine generall things, as that theft, adultery, and the like are sinnes, as if they should say that all men account those things evill to which they have given names which are usually taken in an evill sense; but we demand not whether theft be a Sinne, but what is to be term'd theft, and so concern­ing other in like manner, For as much therefore as in so great a diversity of censu­rers, what is by reason blameable, is not to bee measur'd by the reason of one man more then another, because of the equality of humane nature, and there are no other reasons in being, but onely those of parti­cular men, and that of the City, it followes, that the City is to determine what with reason is culpable: so as a fault, that is to say, a SINNE, is that, which a man do's, omits, sayes, or wills, against the reason of the City, that is, contrary to the Lawes. The diffe­rence be­tweene a sinne of in­firmitie and malice.

XVIII. But a man may doe somewhat against the Lawes through humane infir­mity, although he desire to fulfill them, and yet his action as being against the Lawes, [Page 226] i [...] rightly blam'd, and call'd a Sinne: But there are some, who neglect the Lawes, and as oft as any hope of gain and impunity doth appear to them, no conscience of con­tracts and betrothed faith can withhold them from their violation. Not only the deeds, but even the mindes of these men are against the Lawes. They who sinne onely through infirmity, are good men even when they sinne; but these even when they doe not sin, are wicked; for though both the action, and the mind be repugnant to the Lawes, yet those repugnancies are distin­guisht by different appellations, for the irre­gularity of the action is called [...], un­just deed; that of the mind [...], and [...], injustice, and malice; that is, the in­firmity of a disturbed soule, this the pravity of a sober mind.

XIX. But seeing there is no sin which Under what kind of sin A [...]h [...]isme is contained. is not against some Law, and that there is no Law which is not the command of him who hath the supreme power, and that no man hath a supreme power which is not be­stowed on him by our own consent; in what manner will he be said to sinne, who either denies that there is a God, or that he governs the world, or casts any other re­proach upon him? for he will say, that he never submitted his will to Gods will, not conceiving him so much as to have any being. And granting that his opinion were erroneous, and therefore also a sin, yet were it to be num­bred among those of imprudence or ignorance, which by right cannot be punished. This speech seems so farre forth to be admitted, that though this kind of sin be the greatest and [Page 227] most hurtful, yet is it to be refer'd (*) to sins of imprudence; but that it should be excu­sed by imprudence or ignorance, is absurd. For the Atheist is punisht either immedi­ately by God himselfe, or by Kings consti­tuted under God; not as a Subject is pu­nished by a King, because he keeps not the Lawes, but as one enemy by another, be­cause he would not accept of the Lawes; that is to say, by the Right of warre, as the Giants warring against God: For whosoever are not subject either to some common Lord, or one to another, are enemies among themselves.

(Yet is it to be referred to sins of impru­dence) Annotation. Many find fault that I have referr'd Atheisme to imprudence, and not to injustice; yea by some it is taken so, as if I had not decla­red my selfe an enemy bitter enough against Atheists: They object farther, that since I had elsewhere said that it might be knowne there is a God, by naturall reason, I ought to have ac­knowledged that they sin at least against the Law of nature, and therefore not only guilty of impru­dence, but injustice too; but I am so much an enemy to Atheists, that I have both diligently sought for, and vehemently desired to find so [...]e Law whereby I might condemne them of inju­stice; but when I found none, I enquired next what name God himselfe did give to men so de­tested by him. Now God speaks thus of the A­theist: The fool hath said in his heart, there is no God. Wherefore I placed their sinne in that rank which God himselfe referres to; next, I shew them to be enemies of God. But I con­ceive the name of an enemy to be sometimes somewhat sharper, then that of an unjust man. Lastly, I affirme that they may under that no­tion [Page 228] be justly punishe both by God, and supreme Magistrates, and therefore by no meanes excuse or extenuate this sinne. Now that I have said that it might be known by naturall reason that there is a God, is so to be understood, not as if I had meant that all men might know this, ex­cept they think that because Archimedes by na­turall reason found out what proportion the cir­cle hath to the square, it followes thence, that every one of the vulgar could have found out as much. I say therefore, that although it may be knowne to some by the light of reason that there is a God, yet men that are continually engaged in pleasures, or se [...]king of riches and honour, also men that are not wont to reason aright, or cannot do it, or [...]are not to doe it, lastly, fools, in which number are Atheists, cannot know this.

XX. Seeing that from the vertue of the What the sinne of Treason is. Covenant whereby each Subject is tyed to the other to perform absolute and universall obedience (such as is defined above Chap. 6. art. 13.) to the City, that is to say, to the Soveraign power, whether that be one man or Councel, there is an obligation derived to observe each one of the civill Lawes, so that that Covenant contains in it self all the Laws at once; it is manifest that the subject who shall renounce the generall Covenant of obedience, doth at once renounce all the Lawes; which trespasse is so much worse then any other one sinne, by how much to sinne alwayes, is worse then to sinne once; And this is that sin which is called TREA­SON; and it is a word or deed whereby the Citizen, or Subject, declares that he will no longer obey that man or Court to whom the supreme power of the City is en­trusted, [Page 229] and the Subject declares this same will of his by deed, when he either doth, or endeavours to do violence to the Soveraigns Person, or to them who execute his com­mands, of which sort are Traytors, Regi­cides, and such as take up armes against the City, or during a warre, flye to the ene­mies side; and they shew the same will in word, who flatly deny that themselves or other subjects are tyed to any such kind of obedience, either in the whole, as he who should say that wee must not obey him (keeping the obedience which we owe to God intire) simply, absolutely, and uni­versally; or in part, as he who should say, that he had no Right to wage warre at his own will, to make Peace, list souldiers, levie monies, electing Magistrates, and publique Ministers, enacting Lawes, deciding con­troversies, setting penalties, or doing ought else, without which the State cannot stand, and these and the like words and deeds are Treason by the naturall, not the civill Law. But it may so happen, that some action which before the civill Law was made, was not Treason, yet will become such, if it be done afterwards. As if it be declared by the Law, that it shall be accounted for a sign of renouncing publique obedience (that is to say for Treason) if any man shall coyn mo­nies, or forge the Privi [...] Seale, he that after that Declaration shall doe this, will be no lesse guilty of Treason then the other, yet he sinnes lesse, because he breakes not all the Laws at once, but one Law only; for the Law by calling that Treason which by nature is not so, doth indeed by Right set a more odi­ous [Page 230] name, and perhaps a more grievous punishment on the guilty persons, but it makes not the sinne it selfe more grievous.

XXI. But that sinne which by the Law Treason breaks not the civill, but the na­turall Law. of nature is Treason, is a Transgression of the naturall, not the civill Law, for since our obligation to civill obedience, by vertue whereof the civill Lawes are valid, is before all civill Law, and the sin of Treason is na­turally nothing else but the breach of that obligation; it followes that by the sin of Treason, that Law is broken which prece­ded the civill Law, to wit, the naturall, which forbids us to violate Covenants, and be­trothed [...]aith. But if some Soveraign Prince should set sorth a Law on this manner, Thou shalt not rebell, he would effect just no­thing: For except Subjects were before obliged to obedience, that is to say, not to rebell, all Law is of no force; now the obli­gation which obligetto what we were be­fore obliged to, is superfluous.

XXII. Hence it followes, that Rebels, And there­fore is pu­nisht not by the Right of Sove­raignty, but by the Right of Warre. Obedience not rightly distinguisht into Active and Passive. Traytors, and all others convicted of Treason, are punisht not by civill, but naturall Right, that is to say, not as civill Subjects, but as Enemies to the Government, not by the Right of Soveraignty, and Dominion, but by the Right of Warre.

XXIII. There are some who think that those acts which are done against the Law, when the punishment is determined by the Law it selfe, are exp [...]ated, if the punish­ed willingly undergoe the punishment; and that they are not guilty before God of breaking the naturall Law (although by breaking the civill Lawes, we break the na­turall [Page 231] too, which command us to keep the civill) who have suffered the punishment which the Law required, as if by the Law, the fact were not prohibited, but a punish­ment were set instead of a price, whereby a licence might be bought of doing what the Law forbids; by the same reason they might inferre too, that no transgression of the Law were a sin, but that every man might enjoy the liberty which he hath bought by his own perill. But we must know that the words of the Law may be understood in a twofold sense, the one as containing two parts (as hath been declared above in the se­venth Art.) namely, that of absolutely pro­hibiting, as, Thou shalt not doe this; and re­venging, as, he that doth this, shall be punisht; The other, as containing a condition, for example, Thou shalt not doe this thing, unlesse thou wilt suffer punishment; and thus, the Law forbids not simply, but conditionally. If it be understood in the first sense, he that doth it, sins, because he doth what the Law forbids to be done, if in the second, he sins not, because he cannot be said to doe what is forbidden him, that performs the condi­tion; For in the first sense, all men are for­bidden to doe it; in the second, they only who keep themselves from the punishment. In the first sense, the vindicative part of the Law obligeth not the guilty, but the Magi­strate to require punishment; in the second, he himselfe that owes the punishment is ob­liged to exact it, to the payment whereof, if it be capitall, or otherwise grievous, he can­not be obliged. But in what sense the Law is to be taken, depends on the will of him [Page 232] who hath the Soveraignty. When there is therefore any doubt of the meaning of the Law, since we are sure they sinne not who doe it not, it will be sin if we doe it, howso­ever the Law may afterward be explained; for so to doe that which a man doubts whe­ther it be a sin or not, when he hath free­dome to forbear it, is a contempt of the Lawes, and therefore by the 28. Art. of the third Chapter, a sin against the Law of na­ture. Vain therefore is that same distinction of obedience into Active and Passive, as if that could be expiated by penalties consti­tuted by humane decrees, which is a sinne against the Law of nature, which is the Law of God; or as [...]though they sinned not, who sinne at their own perill.

CHAP. XV. Of the Kingdome of God, by Nature.

I. WEE have already in The Pro­position of the follow­ing contents the foregoing Chap­ters, proved both by reason, and testimo­nies of holy Writ, that the estate of nature, that is to say, of absolute liberty, such as is theirs, who neither govern, nor are gover­ned, is an Anarchy, or hostile state; that the precepts whereby to avoyd this state, are the Lawes of nature; that there can be no [Page 237] civill government without a Soveraigne; and that they who have gotten this Sove­raigne command must be obey'd simply, that is to say, in all things which repugne not the Commandments of God: There is this one thing only wanting to the com­plete undestanding of all civill duty, & that is, to know which are the Laws and Com­mandments of God; for else we cannot tell whether that which the civill power com­mands us, be against the Lawes of God, or not; whence it must necessarily happen, that either by too much obedience to the civill authority, we become stubborne against the divine Majesty; or for feare of sinning against God, we runne into disobeditnce against the civill power: To avoid both these rocks, its necessary to know the Di­vine Lawes; now because the knowledge of the Lawes, depends on the knowledge of the Kingdome, we must in what fol­lowes, speak somewhat concerning the Kingdome of God.

II. The Lord is King, the earth may be Over whom God is said to raign. glad thereof, saith the Psalmist, Psal. 97. v. 1. And againe the same Psalmist, Psal. 99. v. 1. The Lord is King, be the People never so unpatient, he s [...]teth betweene the Cherubins, [...]e the Earth never▪ so unquiet, to wit, whe­ther men will, or not, God is THE King over all the Earth, nor is he mov'd from his Throne, if there be any who deny ei­ther his existence, or his providence. Now although God governe all men▪ so by his power, that none can doe any thing which he would not have done, yet this, to speake properly, and accurately, is not to reigne, [Page 238] for he is sayed to reigne, who rules not by acting, but speaking, that is to say, by pre­cepts and threatnings; And therefore we account not inanimate, nor irrationall bo­dies, for Subjects in the Kingdome of God, although they be subordinate to the Divine power; because they understand not the com­mands, and threats of God; nor yet the Atheists, because they beleeve not that there is a God, nor yet those who beleeving there is a God; doe not yet beleeeve that he rules these Inferiour things; for even these, although they be govern'd by the power of God, yet doe they not acknowledge any of his Commands, nor stand in awe of his threats. Those onely therefore are suppos'd to belong to Gods Kingdome, who ac­knowledge him to be the Governour of all things, and that he hath given his Commands to men, and appointed punishments for the transgressours; The rest, we must not call Subjects, but Enemies of God.

III. But none▪ are said to governe by commands, but they who openly declare them The word of God three fold, Reason, Re­velation, Prophesy. to those who are govern'd by them, for the Commands of the Rulers are the Lawes of the Rul'd, but lawes they are not, if not perspicuously publisht, in so much as all excuse of Ignorance may be taken away. Men indeed publish their Lawes by word or voice, neither can they make their will universally knowne any other way; But Gods lawes are declar'd after a threefold manner: first, by the tacit dictates of Right reason, next, by immediate revelation, which is suppos'd to be done either by a superna­turall voice, or by a vision or drcame, or di­vine [Page 239] inspiration: Thirdly, by the voice of one man whom God recommends to the rest, as worthy of beliefe, by the working of [...]rue miracles; Now he whole voice▪ God thus makes use of to signifie his will unto others, is called a PROPHET. These three manners may be term'd the threefold word of God, to wit the Rationall word, the sensi­ble word, and the word of Prophecy: To which answer, the three nanners whereby we are said to heare God, Right reasoning, sense, and faith. Gods sensible word hath come but to few; neither hath God spoken to men by Revelation except particularly to some, and to diverse diversely; neither have any Lawes of his Kingdome beene publisht on this manner unto any people.

IV. And according to the difference The King­dome of God two-fold: Na­turall and Prophe­tique. which is between the Rationall word and the word of Prophecy, we attribute a two-fold Kingdome unto God: Naturall, in which he reignes by the dictates of right reason, and which is universall over all who acknowledge the Divine power, by reason of that rationall nature which is common to all; and Propheticall, in which he rules also by the word of Prophecy, which is pe­culiar, because he hath not given positive Lawes to all men, but to his peculiar people, and some certaine men elected by him.

V. God in his naturall Kingdome hath a The Rigbt whereby God go­verns is seated in his omn p [...] ­te [...]e. Right to rule, and to punish those who break his Lawes, from his sole irresistable power; for all Right over others is either from nature, or from Contract. How the Right of governing springs from Contract, we have already shewed in the 6. Chapter. [Page 240] And the same Right is derived from nature, in this very thing, that it is not by nature taken away; for when by nature all men had a Right over all things, every man had a Right of ruling over all as ancient as na­ture it selfe; but the reason why this▪ was abo­lisht among men, was no other but mutuall fear, as hath been declared above in the second Chapter, the 3. art. reason namely dictating that they must foregoe that Right for the preservation of mankinde, because the equality of men among themselves ac­cording to their strength and naturall pow­ers was necessarily accompanied with warre, and with warre joynes the destruction of mankinde. Now if any man had so farre exceeded the rest in power, that all of them with joyned forces could not have resisted him, there had been no cause why he should part with that Right which nature had gi­ven him; The Right therefore of Domini­on over all the rest, would have remained with him, by reason of that excesse of pow­er whereby he could have preserved both himselfe and them. They therefore whose power cannot be resisted, and by conse­quence God Almighty, derives his Right of Soveraignty from the power i [...] selfe. And as oft as God punisheth, or slayes a sinner, although he therefore punish him because he sinned, yet may we not say that he could not justly have punisht or killed him al­though he had not sinned. Neither, if the will of God in punishing, may perhaps have regard to some sin antecedent, doth it there­fore follow, that the Right of afflicting, and killing, depends not on divine power, but on [...]si [...]s.

[Page 241] VI. That question made famous by The same proved from Scri­pture. the disputations of the Antients, why evill things befell the good, and good things the evill, is the same with this of ours, by what Right God dispenseth good and evill things unto men, and with its difficulty, it not only staggers the faith of the vulgar concerning the divine providence, but also of Philoso­phers, and which is more, even of holy men. Psal. 73. v. 1, 2, 3. Truly God is good to Israel, even to such as are of a clean heart; but as for me, my feet were almost gone, my steps bad well nigh slipt. And why? I was grieved at the wicked, I do [...] also see the ungodly in such pro­sperity. And how bitterly did Job expostu­late with God, that being just, he should yet be afflicted with so many calamities? God himselfe with open voyce resolved this dif­ficulty in the case of Job, and hath confirm­ed his Right by arguments drawn not from Jobs sinne, but from his own power. For Job and his friends had argued so among themselves, that they would needs make him guilty, because he was punisht; and he would reprove their accusation by arguments fetcht from his own innocence: But God when he had heard both him and them, refutes his expostulation, not by condemning him of injustice, or any sin, but by declaring his own power, Job. 38. v. 4. Where wast thou (sayes he) when I laid the foundation of the earth, &c. And for his friends, God pro­nounces himself angry against them, Job. 42. v. 7. Because they had not spoken of him the thing that is right, like his servant Job. A­greeable to this is that speech of our Savi­ours in the mans case who was born blind, [Page 242] when, his Disciples asking him whether he or his Parents had sinned, that he was born blind, he answered, John 9. v. 3. Neither hath this man sinned, nor his Parents, but that the works of God should be manifest in him; for though it be said, Rom. 5. 12. That death entred into the world by sinne, it followes not, but that God by his Right might have made men subject to diseases, and death, although they had never sinned, even as he hath made the other animalls mortall, and sickly, although they cannot sinne.

VII. Now if God have the Right of The obliga­tion of yeelding obedience unto God, proceeds from hu­mane in­firmity. Soveraignty from his power, it is manifest, that the obligation of yeelding him obedi­ence lyes on men by reason of their * weak­nesse; for that obligation which rises from Contract, of which we have spoken in the second Chapter, can have no place here, where the Right of Ruling (no Covenant passing between) rises only from nature. But there are two Species of naturall obliga­tion, one when liberty is taken away by cor­porall impediments, according to which we say that heaven and earth, and all Crea­tures, doe obey the common Lawes of their Creation: The other when it is taken away by hope, or fear, according to which the weaker despairing of his own power to re­sist, cannot but yeeld to the stronger. From this last kinde of obligation, that is to say from fear, or conscience of our own weak­nesse (in respect of the divine power) it comes to passe, that we are obliged to obey God in his naturall Kingdome; reason dictating to all, acknowledging the di­vine power and providence, that there is [Page 243] no kicking against the pricks.

(By reason of their weaknesse) If this shall seem hard to any man, I desire him with a Annotation silent thought to consider, if there were two Omnipotents, whether were bound to obey; I be­leeve he will confesse that neither is bound: if this be true, then it is also true what I have set down, that men are subject unto God because they are not omnipotent. And truly our Saviour admonishing Paul (who at that time was an enemy to the Church) that he should not kick against the pricks, seems to require obedience from him for this cause, because he had not power enough to resist.

VIII. Because the word of God ruling by The Lawes of God in his naturall Kingdome, are those which are above set down in the second and third Chapters. nature onely, is supposed to be nothing else but right reason, and the Laws of Kings can be known by their word only, its mani­fest that the Laws of God ruling by nature alone, are onely the naturall Lawes, name­ly those which we have set down in the se­cond and third Chapters, and deduced from the dictates of reason, Humility, Equity, Ju­stice Mercy, and other Morall vertues be­friending Peace, which pertain to the dis­charge of the duties of men one toward the other, and those which right reason shall dictate besides, concerning the honour and worship of the Divine Majesty. We need not repeat what those Naturall Laws, or Mo­rall vertues are, but we must see what ho­nours, and what divine worship, that is to say, what sacred Lawes, the same naturall reason doth dictate.

IX. Honour, to speak properly, is no­thing What ho­nour and worship are. else but an opinion of anothers power joyned with goodnesse, and to honour a man, [Page 244] is the same with highly esteeming him, and so honour is not in the Party honoured, but in the honourer; now three Passions do necessary follow honour thus placed in opinion; Love, which referres to goodnesse; hope, and feare, which regard power. And from these arise all outward actions, wherewith the power­full are appeased, and become Propitious, and which are the effects, and therefore also the naturall signes of honour it selfe. But the word honour is transferred also to those out­ward effects of honour, in which sense, we are said to honour him, of whose power we te­stifie our selves, either in word, or deed, to have a very great respect; insomuch as ho­nour is the same with worship Now WOR­SHIP is an outward act, the sign of in­ward honour; and whom we endeavour by our homage to appease, if they be angry, or howsoever to make them favourable to us, we are said to worship.

X. A [...]l signes of the mind are either words Worship consists ei­ther in at­tributes, or in acti­ons. or deeds, and therefore all worship consists either in words or deeds; now both the one and the other are referred to three kindes; whereof the first is Praise, or publique decla­ration of goodnesse; The second, a publique de­claration of present power, which is to magnify [...]; The third, is a publique declara­tion of happinesse, or of power, secure also for the future, which is called [...]. I say, that all kindes of honour may be discerned, not in words only, but in deeds too; but we then praise, and celebrate in words, when we doe it by way of Proposition, or Dogmati­cally, that is to say by Attributes, or Titles, which may be termed praysing, and cele­brating, [Page 245] categorically, and plainly, as when we declare him whom we honour to be liberall, strong, wise; And then, in deeds, when it is done by consequence, or by hypothesis, or supposition, as by Thanksgiving, which sup­poseth goodnesse; or by Obedience, which supposeth power; or by Congratulation, which supposeth happinesse.

XI. Now whether we desire to praise a man And there is one sort naturall, and another arbitrary. in words, or deeds, we shall find some things which signify honour with all men, such as among attributes, are the generall words of vertues and powers, which cannot be taken in ill sense, As Good, Faire, Strong, Just, and the like; and among actions, Obedi­ence, Thanksgiving, Prayers, and others of that kinde, by which an acknowledge­ment of vertue and power is ever under­stood: Others, which signify honour, but with some, and scorne with others, or else neither; such as in Attributes, are those words which according to the diversity of opinions, are diversly referred to vertues or vices, to honest or dishonest things; As that a man slew his enemy, that he fled, that he is a Philosopher, or an Orator, and the like, which with some are had in honour, with others in contempt. In deeds, such as depend on the custome of the place, or prescriptions of civill Lawes, as in saluting to be bare­headed, to put off the shoes, to bend the bo­dy; to petition for any thing standing, pro­strate, kneeling, forms of ceremony, and the like. Now that worship which is alwayes, and by all men accounted honourable, may be called Naturall, the other, which followes places, and customes, Arbitrary.

[Page 246] XII. Furthermore, worship may be en­joyned, One com­manded, another vo­luntary. [...] to wit by the command of him that is worshiped, and it may▪ bee voluntary, namely such as seems good to the worship­per: If it be enjoyned, the actions expressing it, do not signify honour, as they signify actions, but as they are enjoyned: for they sig­nify obedience immediately, obedience power; insomuch as worship enjoyned consists in obe­dience, voluntary is honourable onely in the nature of the actions, which if they doe signify honour to the bebolders, it is worship, if not, it is Reproach. Again worship may be either publique or private, but publique, respe­cting each single worshipper, may not be voluntary, respecting the City it may; for seeing that which is done voluntarily, de­pends on the will of the Doer, there would not one worship be given, but as ma­ny worships as worshippers, except the will-of all men were united by the command, of one; but Private worship may be voluntary, if it be done secretly, for what is done openly is restrained, either by Lawes, or through modesty, which is contrary to the nature of a voluntary action.

XIII. Now that we may know what the scope and end of wopshipping others is, we What the end or aim of worship i [...]. must consider the cause why men delight in worship: And we must grant what we have shewed elsewhere, that Joy consists in this, that a man contemplate vertue, strength, science, beauty, friends, or any power what­soever, as being, or as though it were his own, and it is nothing else but a Glory, or Triumph of the mind conceiving it selfe honoured, that is to say, lov'd and fear'd, [Page 247] that is to say, having the services and assi­stances of men in readinesse. Now because men beleeve him to be powerfull whom they see honoured (that is to say) esteemed powerfull by others, it falls out that honour is increased by worship, and by the opinion of power, true power is acquired; His end therefore who either commands, or suffers himself to be worshipt, is, that by this meaus he may acquire as many as he can, either through love, or fear, to be obedient unto him.

XIV. But that we may understand what manner of Worship of God naturall What the naturall Lawes are concerning Gods at­tributes. [...] reason doth assigne us, let us begin from his Attributes: where, first it is manifest, that existence is to allowed him; for there can be no will to honour him, who, we think, hath no being. Next, those Philosophers who said, that God was the World, or the worlds Soul, (that is to say, a part of it) spake unworthily of God, for they attribute nothing to him, but wholly deny his being. For by the word God we understand the Worlds cause; but in saying that the World is God, they say, that it hath no cause, that is as much, as there is no God. In like man­ner, they who maintain the world not to be created, but eternall; because there can be no cause of an eternall thing, In denying the world to have a Cause, they deny also that there is a God. They also have a wretched apprehension of God, who im­puting idlenesse to him, doe take from him the Government of the world, and of man­kind; for say they should acknowledge him omnipotent, yet if he minde not these in­feriour things, that same thred bare Sen­tence [Page 248] will take place with them, Quod supra nos, nihil ad nos; What is above us, doth not concern us; and seeing there is no­thing for which they should either love, or fear him, truly he will be to them as though he were not at all. Moreover in Attributes which signifie Greatnesse, or Power, those which signifie some finite, or limited thing, are not signes at all of an honouring mind: for we honour not God worrhily▪ if we ascribe lesse power, or greatnesse to him then possible we can; but every finite thing is lesse then we can, for most easily we may alwayes assigne and attribute more to a finite thing; No shape therefore must be assigned to God, for all shape is finite; nor must he be said to be conceived, or comprehended by imagination, or any o­ther faculty of our soul; for whatsoever we conceive is finite: And although this word Infinite signifie a conception of the mind, yet it followes not, that we have any con­ception of an infinite thing: For when we say that a thing is infinite, we signifie no­thing really, but the impotency in our owne mind, as if we should say we know not whether, or where it is limited: Neither speak they honourably enough of God, who say we have an Idea of him in our mind; for an Idea is our conception, but con­ception we have none, except of a finite thing: Nor they, who say that he hath Parts, or that he is some certaine in [...]ire thing, which are also attributes of finite things: Nor that he is in any place; for no­thing can be said to be in a place, but what hath bounds and limits of its greatnesse on [Page 249] all sides: Not that he is moved, or▪ is at rest; for either of them suppose a being in some place: Nor that there are more Gods, be­cause not more infinites. Farther more con­cerning attributes of happinesse, those are un­worthy of God which signify sorrow (unlesse they be taken not for any Passion, but by a Me [...]onomy for the effect) such as Repen­tance, anger, Pity: Or Want, as Appetite, Hope, Concupiscence, and that love which is also called lust, for they are signes of Poverty, since it cannot be understood, that a man should desire, hope, and wish for ought, but what he wants and stands in need of: Or any Passive faculty; for suffering belongs to a limited power, and which depends upon another. When we therefore attribute a will to God, it is not to be conceived like unto ours, which is called a rationall desire; for if God desires, he wants, which for any man to say, is a con [...]lie; but we must suppose some resemblance which we cannot con­ceive. In like manner when wee attribute fight and other acts of the senses to him, or knowledge, or understanding, which in us are nothing else but a tumult of the minde rai­sed from outward objects pressing the Or­ganes, wee must not think that any such thing befalls the Deity; for it is a signe of power depending upon some other, which is not the most blessed thing. He therefore who would not ascribe any other titles to God, then what reason commands, must use such as are either Negative, as infinite, eternall; incomprehenfible, &c. or superla­tive, as most good, most great, most powerfull, &c. or Indefinite, as good, just, strong, Crea­t [...]ur, [Page 250] King, and the like, in such sense, as not desiring to declare what he is (which were to circumscribe him within the narrow limits of our phantasie) but to confesse his own admiration, and obedience, which is the property of humility, and of a minde yeelding all the honour it possibly can doe. For Reason dictates one name alone, which doth signify the nature of God (i. e.) Existent, or simply, that he is; and one in order to, and in relation to us, namely God, under which i [...] contained both King, and Lord, and Father.

XV. Concerning the outward actions What those actions are, whereby, naturally we do give worship. wherewith God is to be worshipped (as also concerning his Titles) its a most generall command of Reason, that they be s [...]gnes of a mind yeelding honour; under which are contained in the first place, Prayers.

For Prayers are the signes of hope, and hope is an acknowledgement of the divine power, or goodnesse.

In the second place, Than [...]giving; which is a signe of the same▪ affection, but that prayers go [...] before the bene [...]it, and thanks follow it.

In the third, [...], that is to say oblati­ons and sacrifices, for these are thanksgivings.

In the fourth, not to s [...]re by any other; For a mans Oath▪ is an Imprecation of his wrath against him if he deceive, who both knowes whether he doe, or not, and can punish him if he doe, though he be never so powerfull▪ which only belongs to God: for if there vvere any man from whom his subjects malice could not lye hid, [...]nd whom [Page 251] no humane power could resist, plig [...] ­ted faith would suffice without swearing, which, broken, might be punisht by that Man; and for this very reason [...] would be no need of an Oath.

In the fifth place, To speak w [...]ily of God; for that is a sign of fear, and feare is an acknowledgement of power. It followes from this precept: That we may not take the name of God in vain, or use it rashly; for eithe [...] are inconsiderate. That we [...] must not swear where there is no [...]eed; for that is in vain; but need there is none, unlesse it be between Cities to avoyd or take away contention by force, which necessarily must arise, where there is no faith kept in pro [...]ses, or in a Ci­ty, for the better certainty of Judicature. Also, That we must not di [...]ute of the Divin [...] [...]ure: For it is supposed that all things in the naturall Kingdom of God are enquired into by reason only, that is to say, out of the Prin­ciples of naturall Science; but we are so far off by these to attain to the knowledge of the nature of God, that we cannot so much as reach to the full understanding of all the qua [...]ties of our own bodies, or of any other Creatures. Wherefore there comes nothing from these disputes, but a rash imposition of names to the divine Majesty, according to the small measure of our conceptions. It followes also (which belongs to the Right of Gods Kingdome) that their speech, is inconsiderate, and rash, who say, That this, or that, do [...]h not stand with divine justice; for even men count it an affront that their children should dispute their Right, or measure their justice otherwise then by [Page 252] the rule of their Commands.

In the sixth▪ Whatsoever is offered up in prayers, thanksgivings, and sacrifices, must in its kind be the best, and most [...]ning honour; namely, Prayers must not be rash, or light, or vulga [...], but beautifull, and well composed.

For though it were absurd in the Hea­then to worship God in an image, ye [...] was it not against reason to use Poetry, and Musick, in their Churches.

Also Oblations must be clean, and Presents sumptuous and such as are significative either of submission, or gratitude, or commemo­rative of benefits received; for all these pro­ceed from a desire of honouring.

In the seventh. That God must be worship [...] not privately onely, but openly, and publiquely in the sight of a [...] men; because that worship is so much more acceptable, by how much it be­gets honour, and esteem in others (as hath been declared before in the 13. a [...].) unlesse others therefore see it, that which is most pleasing in our worship, vanisheth.

In the last place That we use our best c [...] ­deavour to keep the Lawes of Nature. For the undervaluing of our Masters command, exceeds all other affronts whatsoever; as on the other side, Obedience is more acceptable then all other sacrifices. And these are prin­cipally the naturall Lawes concerning the worship of God, those I mean which Reason dictates to every Man; but to whole C [...]es, every one whereof is one Person, the same naturall Reason farther command [...] an uni­formity of publique worship. For the actions done by particular Persons, according to their private Reasons, are not▪ the Cities [Page 253] actions, and therefore not the Cities wor­ship; but what is done by the City, is un­derstood to be done by the command of of him, or them who have the Soveraignty, wherefore also together with the consent of all the subjects, that is to say, Uniformly.

XVI. The naturall Lawes set down in In the na­turall king­dom of God the City may ap­point what worship it pleaseth. the foregoing Article concerning the divine worship, only command the giving of natu­rall signes of honour; but we must consider that there are two kindes of signes, the one naturall, the other done upon agreement, o [...] by expresse, or tacite composition. Now be­cause in every language, the use of words, and names, come by appointment, it may also by appointment be altered; for that which depends on, and derives its force from the will of men, can by the will of the same men agreeing be changed again, or abolisht. Such names therefore as are attribu­ted to God by the appointment of men, can by the same appointment be taken away; now what can be done by the appointment of men, that the City may doe; The City therefore by Right (that is to say, they who have the power of the whole City) shall judge what names or appellations are more, what lesse honourable for God, that is say, what doctrines are to be held and profest concerning the nature of God, and his ope­rations. Now actions doe signify not by mens appointment, but naturally, even as the effects are signes of their causes, whereof some are alwayes signes of scorn to them before whom they are committed, as those, whereby the bodies uncleannesse is disco­vered, and whatsoever men are ashamed to [Page 254] doe before those whom they respect; Others are alwayes signes of honour, as [...]o draw near, and discourse decently and humbly, to give way, or to yeeld in any matter of private benefit: In these actions the City can after nothing, but there are infinite others, which, as much as belongs to honour, or reproach, are indifferent; now these, by the institution of the City, may both be made signes of honour, and being made so, doe in very deed become so. From whence we may understand, that we must obey the City in whatsoever it shall command to be used for a sign of honouring God, that is to say, for Worship; provided it can be institu­ted for a sign of honour, because that is a sign of honour, which by the Cities com­mand is us'd for such.

XVII. We have already declared which God ruling by nature onely, the City, that is say, that man or Court which un­der God hath the Soveraign­ty, is the Interpreter of all the Lawes. were the Laws of God, as wel sacred as secu­lar, in his government by the way of Nature onely. Now because there is no man but may be deceived in reasoning, and that it so falls out, that men are of different opini­ons concerning the most actions, it may be demanded farther, whom God would have to be the Interpreter of right Reason, that is to say, of his Lawes. And as for the Secular Lawes, I mean those which concern justice, and the carriage of men towards men, by what hath been said before of the constitu­tion of a City, we have demonstratively shewed it agreeable to reason, that all Judi­cature belongs to the City, and that Judica­cature is nothing else but an Interpretation of the Laws, and by consequence, that every­where Cities, that is to say, those who have, [Page 255] the Soveraign power, are the Interpreters of the Lawes, As for the Sacred Lawes, we must consider what hath been before demonstra­ted in the fifth Chap. the 13. art. that every Subject hath transferr'd as much right as he could on him, or them, who had the supreme authority: but he could have transferred his right of judging the manner how God is to be honoured, and therefore also he hath done it; That he could, it appeares hence, that the manner of honouring God before the constitution of a City was to be fetcht from every mans private Reason; but every man can subject his private Reason to the Rea­son of the whole City: Moreover, if each Man should follow his own reason in the worshipping of God, in so great a diver­sity of worshippers, one would be apt to judge anothers worship uncomely, or im­pious; neither would the one seem to the other to honour God: Even that there­fore which were most consonant to reason, would not be a worship, because that the na­ture of worship consists in this, that it be the sign of inward honour; but there is no sign but whereby somewhat becomes known to others, and therefore is there no sign of ho­nour but what seems so to others; Again, that's a true sign which by the consent of men becomes a sign, therefore also that is honourable, which by the consent of men, that is to say, by the command of the City, becomes a sign of honour. It is not there­fore against the will of God, declared by the way of reason onely, to give him such signs of honour as the City shall command; wherefore Subjects can transferre their [Page 256] Right of judging the manner of Gods wor­ship on him or them who have the Soveraign power; nay, they must doe it, for else all manner of absurd opinions, concerning the nature of God, and all ridiculous ceremo­nies which have been used by any Nations, will bee seen at once in the same City, whence it will fall out, that every man will beleeve that all the rest doe offer God an af­front; so that it cannot be truly said of any that he worships God; for no man wor­ships God, that is to say, honours him outwardly, but he who doth those things, whereby hee appeares to others for to ho­nour him. It may therefore bee conclu­ded, that the Interpretation of all Lawes, as well Sacred, as Secular, (God ruling by the way of nature only) depends on the au­thority of the City, that is to say, that man, or councell, to whom the Soveraign power is committed, and that whatsoever God com­mands, he commands by his voyce. And on the other side, that whatsoever is comman­ded by them, both concerning the manner of honouring God, and concerning secular assaires, is commanded by God himselfe. Certain doubts re­moved.

XVIII. Against this, some Man may demand, first, Whether it doth not follow, that the City must be obeyed if it com­mand us directly to affront God, or forbid us to worship him? I say, it does not fol­low, neither must we obey; for to affront, or not to worship at all, cannot by any Man be understood for a manner of worship­ping; neither also had any one, before the constitution of a City, of those who ac­knowledge God to rule, a Right to deny [Page 257] him the honour which was then due unto him; nor could he therefore rransfer a Right on the City of commanding any such things. Next, if it be demanded whe­ther the City must be obeyed if it com­mand somewhat to be said, or done, which is not a disgrace to God directly, but from whence by reasoning disgracefull conse­quences may be derived: as for example, if it were commanded to worship God in an image, before those who account that honourable? Truly it is to be (*) done. For Worship is instituted in signe of Ho­nour, but to Worship him thus, is a signe of honour, and increaseth Gods Honour among those who do so account of it; Or if it be commanded to call God by a name which we know not what it signifies, or how it can agree with this word, God? That also must be done, for what we do for Honours sake, (and we know no better) if it be taken for a signe of Honour, it is a signe of Honour, and therefore if we refuse to doe it, we refuse the enlarging of Gods Honour. The same judgement must be had of all the Attributes and Actions about the meerly rationall Worship of God which may be controverted, and dispu [...]ed; for though these kind of commands may be sometimes contrary to right reason, and therefore sins in them who command them, yet are they not against right reason, nor sins in Subjects, whose right reason in points of Controversie is that, which sub­mits its selfe to the reason of the City. Lastly, if that Man, or Councell, who hath the Supreme Power, command himselfe to [Page 258] be Worshipt with the same Attributes, and Actions, where with God is to be Worshipt, the question is, whether we must obey? There are many things which may be com­monly attributed both to God, and Men; for even Men may be Praised, and Magni­fied; and there are many actions whereby God, and Men, may be Worshipt; But the significations of the Attributes, and Actions, are onely to be regarded: Those Attributes therefore, whereby we signify our selves to be of an opinion, that there is any man endued with a Soveraignty indepen­dent from God, or that he is immortall, or of in [...]inite power, and the like, though commanded by Princes, yet must they be abstained from; as also from those Actions signifying the same, as Prayer to the ab­sent; to aske those things which God alone can give, as Rain, and Fair weather; to offer him what God can onely accept, as Oblations, Holocausts; or to give a Wor­ship, then which a greater cannot be given, as Sacrifice; for these things seeme▪ to tend to this end, that God may not be thought to rule, contrary to what was sup­posed from the beginning; but genuflecti­on, prostration, or any other act of the body whatsoever, may be lawfully used even in civill Worship; for they may signifie an acknowledgment of the civill power onely; for Divine Worship is distinguisht from civill, not by the motion, placing, habit, or gesture of the Body, but by the declaration of our opinion of him whom we doe Wor­ship▪ as if we cast down our selves before any man, with intention of declaring by [Page 259] that Signe that we esteeme him as God, it is Divine Worship; if we doe the same thing as a Signe of our acknowledgment of the civill Power, it is civill Worship. Nei­ther is the Divine Worship distinguished from Civill by any action usually understood by by the words [...] and [...] where­of the former marking out the Duty of Servants, the latter their Destiny, they are words of the same action in degree. Annotation▪

Truly it is to be done] We said in the 14. Article of this Chapter, That they who attributed limits to God, transgrest the natu­rall Law concerning Gods Worship▪ now they who worship him in an Image, assigne him li­mits, wherefore they doe that which they ought not to doe, and this place seemes to contradict the former. We must therefore know first, that they who are constrained by Authority, doe not set God any boonds, but they who command them; for they who worship unwillingly, doe worship in very deed, but they either stand or fall there, where they are commanded to stand or fall by a lawfull Soveraign; Secondly, I say it must be done, not at all times, and every where, but on supposition that there is no other rule of worshipping God beside the dictates of humane reason; for then the will of the City stands for Reason: but in the Kingdome of What is sin in the natu­rall King­dom of God, and what Treason against the divine Ma­jesty. God by way of Covenant, whether old, or new, where idolatry is expressely forbid, though the City commands us to worship thus, yet must we not do it; which, if he shall consider, who concei­ved some repugnancy between this, and the 14. Article, will surely cease to think so any longer.

XIX. From what hath been said may be gathered, that God reigning by the way of [Page 260] naturall reason onely, Subjects doe sinne, First, if they break the morall Laws, which are unfolded in the second and third Chap­ters. Secondly, if they break the Lawes, or commands of the City in those things which pertain to Justice. Thirdly, if they worship not God, [...]. Fourthly, if they confesse not before men, both in words, and deeds, that there is one God most good, most great, most blessed, the Supreme King of the World, and of all worldly Kings, that is to say, if they doe not worship God. This fourth sinne in the naturall Kingdome of God, by what hath been said in the foregoing Chapter, in the second Article, is the sinne of Trea­son against the Divine Majesty; for it is a denying of the Divine Power, or Atheisme; for sinnes proceed here, just as if we should suppose some man to be the Soveraign King, who being himselfe absent, should rule by his Vice-Roy, against whom sure they would transgresse who should not obey his Vice-Roy in all things, except he usurpt the Kingdome to himself, or would give it to some other, but they who should so absolutely obey him, as not to admit of this exception, might be said to be guilty of Treason.

CHAP. XVI. Of the Kingdome of God under the Old Covenant.

I. MAnkind, from conscience of its own Superstiti­on posses­sing for­raign Na­tions, God [...]nstituted the true Re­ligion by the means of Abraham. weaknesse, and admiration of na­turall events, hath this, that most men be­leeve God to be the invisible Maker of all invisible things, whom they also fear, con­ceiving that they have not a sufficient pro­tection in themselves; but the imperfect use they had of their Reason, the violence of [Page 263] their Passions did so clowd them, that they could no [...] rightly worship him. Now the fear of invisible things, when it is sever'd from right reason is superstition. It was there­fore almost impossible for men without the the speciall assistance of God to avoyd both Rocks of Atheisme and Superstition: for this proceeds from fear without right rea­son, that, from an opinion of right reason, with­out feare.

Idolatry therefore did easily fasten upon the greatest part of men, and almost all na­tions did worship God in Images, and re­semblances of finite things; and they wor­shipt spirits, or vain visions, perhaps out of fear calling them Devills. But it plea­sed the Divine Majesty (as we read it writ­ten in the sacred history) out of all man­kind to call forth Abraham, by whose means he might bring men to the true worship of him, and to reveal himselfe supernaturally to him, and to make that most famous Co­venant with him and his seed, which is cal­led the old Covenant, or Testament; He there­fore is the head of true Religion; he was the first that after the Deluge taught, that there was one God, the Creatour of the Universe; And from him the Kingdome of God by way of By th [...] Co­venant be­tween God, and Adam, all dispute is forbid­den concer­ning the commands of superiors Covenants, takes its beginning. Joseph. An­tiq. Jewes. lib. 1. cap. 7.

II. In the beginning of the world God reigned indeed, not onely naturally, but al­so by way of Covenant, over Adam, and Eve, so as it seems he would have no obedience yeelded to him, beside that which naturall Reason should dictate; but by the way of Co­venant, that is to say, by the consent of men [Page 264] themselves. Now because this Covenant was presently made void, nor ever after renew­ed, the originall of Gods Kingdom (which we treat of in this place) is not to be taken thence. Yet this is to be noted by the way, that by that precept of not eating of the tree of the knowledge of good and evill (whether the judicature of good and evill, or the eating of the fruit of some tree were forbid­den) God did require a most simple obedi­ence to his commands, without dispute whether that were good, or evill, which was commanded; for the fruit of the tree, if the Command be wanting, hath nothing in its own nature, whereby the eating of it could be morally evill, that is to say, a sinne. The man­ner of the Covenant between God and Abraham.

III. Now the Covenant between God and Abraham, was made in this manner. Gen. 17. v. 7, 8. I will establish my Covenant between me and thee, and thy seed after thee in their ge­nerations, for an everlasting Covenant, to be a God unto thee, and to thy seed after thee. And I will give unto thee, and to thy seed after thee, the Land wherein thou art a stranger, all the Land of Canaan, for an everlasting possession, and I will be their God. Now it was neces­sary to institute some sign whereby Abra­ham and his seed should retain the memory of this Covenant; wherefore Circumcision was added to the Covenant, but yet as a sign onely. vers. 20. This is my Covenant which yee shall keep between me and thee, and thy seed af [...]er thee, every man-child among you shall be circumcised, and ye shall circumcise the flesh of your foreskin, and it shall be a token of the Co­venant between me and you. It is therefore Co­venanted,▪ that Abraham shall acknowledge [Page 265] God to be his God, and the God of his seed, that is to say, that he shall submit him­selfe to be governed by him, and that God shall give unto Abraham the inheritance of that Land wherein he then dwelt, but as a Pilgrim, and that Abraham for a memoriall sign of this Covenant, should take care to see himselfe, and his male seed circum­cised.

IV. But seeing that Abraham even before In that Co­venant is contained an acknow­ledgement of God, not simply, but of him who appeared unto Abra­ham. the Covenant acknowledged God to be the Creatour and King of the world, (for he never doubted either of the being, or the Providence of God) how comes it not to be superfluous, that God would purchase to himself with a price, and by contract, an obe­dience which was due to him by nature, namely by promising Abraham the Land of Canaan, upon condition that he would re­ceive him for his God, when by the Right of nature he was already so? By those words therefore, To be a God unto thee and to thy seed after thee, wee understand not that Abraham satisfied this Covenant by a bare acknowledgement of the power, and Do­minion which God had naturally over men, that is to say, by acknowledging God inde­finitely, which belongs to naturall reason, but he must definitely acknowledge him, who said unto him, Gen. 12. v. 34. Get thee out of thy Country, &c. Gen. 13. v. 14. Li [...]t up thine eyes. &c. who appear'd unto him, Gen. 18. v. 1. in the shape of three celestiall men, and Gen. 15. v. 1. In a vision; and vers. 13. In a dream, which is matter of faith. In what shape God appeared unto Abraham, by what kinde of sound he spake to him, is not [Page 286] exprest, yet it is plain that Abraham be­leeved that voyce to be the voyce of God, and a true Revelation; and would have all his to worship him, who had so spoken unto him, for God the Creatour of the world, and that his faith was grounded on this, not that he beleeved God to have a be­ing, or that he was true in his promises, that which all men beleeve, but that he doub [...]ed not him to be God, whose voice, and pro­mises he had heard, and that the God of Abraham signified not simply God, but that God which appeared unto him, even as the wor­ship which Abraham owed unto God in that notion, was not the worship of reason, but of Religion, and Faith, and that, which not reason, but God had supernaturally revealed.

V. But we read of no Lawes given by God to Abraham, or by Abraham to his fa­mily, The Lawes to which Abraham was tyed, were no other, but those of na­ture, and that of Cir­cumcision. Abraham among his own was the Inter­preter of the word of God, and of all Lawes. either then, or after, secular, or sacred (excepting the Commandement of Circum­cision, which is contained in the Covenant it selfe) whence it is manifest, that there were no other Lawes, or worship, which Abraham was obliged to, but the Lawes of nature, rationall worship, and circumcision.

VI. Now Abraham was the Interpreter of all Lawes, as well sacred as secular, among those that belonged to him, not meerly na­turally, as using the Lawes of nature onely, but even by the form of the Covenant it selfe, in which obedience is promised by Abraham not for himselfe onely, but for his seed also; which had been in vain, except his children had been tyed to obey his Com­mands: And how can that be understood, which God sayes Gen. 18. vers. 18. 19. (All [Page 267] the Nations of the earth shall be blessed in him; for I know him, that he will command his children, and his houshold after him, and they shall keep the way of the Lord to doe justice, and judgement) unlesse his children and his houshold were supposed to be obli­ged to yeeld obedience unto his Com­mands.

VII. Hence it followes, that Abrahams Abrahams subjects could not sin in obey­ing him. subjects could not sinne in obeying him, provided that Abraham commanded them not, to deny Gods Existence, or Providence, or to doe somewhat expresly contrary to the honour of God. In all other things, the word of God was to be fetcht from his lips only, as being the Interpreter of all the Lawes, and words of God. For Abraham alone could teach them who was the God of Abraham, and in what manner he was to be worshipped. And they who after Abrahams death were subject to the Soveraignty of Isaac or Iacob; did by the same reason obey them in all things without sin, as long as they acknowledged, and profest the God of Abraham to be their God; for they had sub­mitted themselves to God simply, before they did it to Abraham, and to Abraham before they did it to the God of Abraham; againe, to the God of Abraham before they did it to Isaac: In Abrahams subjects therefore, To deny God was the only Treason against the Divine Majesty, but in their posterity it was also Treason to deny the God of Abraham, that is to say, to worship God otherwise then was instituted by Abraham, to wit, in Ima­ges (*) made with hands, as other Nations did, which for that reason were called Idola­tors. [Page 268] And hitherto subjects might easily e­nough discern what was to be observed, what avoyded in the Commands of their Princes.

[In Images made with hands] In the 15. Annotation Chap. 14. Article, There wee have shewed such a kinde of worship to be irrationall; but if it be done by the command of a City to whom the written word of God is not known, nor received, we have then shewed this worship in the 15. Chap. art. 18. to be rationall. But where God reigns by way of Covenant, in which it is expresly warned not to worship thus, as in the Covenant made with Abraham, there, whether it be with, or without the Command of the City, it is ill done.

VIII. To goe on now, following the Gods Co­venant with the Hebrewes at Mount Sinai. guidance of the holy Scripture, The same Covenant was renewed, Gen. 26. vers. 3, 4. with Isaac, and Gen. 28. vers. 14. with Iacob, whote God stiles himselfe not simply God, whom nature doth dictate him to be, but distinctly the God of Abraham and Isaac, afterward being about to renew the same Covenant, by Moysos, with the whole People of Israel, Exod. 3. v. 6. I am saith h [...] the God of thy Father, the God of Abraham, the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. After­ward when that People, not only the freest, but also the greatest enemy to humane sub­jection, by reason of the fresh memory of their Ae gyptian bondage, abode in the wildernesse near mount Si [...]ai, that anti­ [...]t Covenant was propounded to them all to be renewed in this manner, Exod. 19. ver. 5. Therefore if yee will obey my voice indeed, and keep my Covenant, (to wit, that Cove­nant which was made with Abraham, Isaac, [Page 269] and Iacob) then shall yee be a peculiar Treasure unto me, above all People; for all the earth is mine, and yee shall be to me a Kingdome of Priests, and an holy Nation. And all the Peo­ple answered together, and said, All that the Lord hath spoken, will we doe, vers. 8.

IX. In this Covenant, among other things, we must consider well the appellati­on From thence Gods government was called a Kingdom. of Kingdom not used before; for although God both by nature & by Covenant made with Abraham, was their King, yet owed they him an obedience and worship only naturall, as being his subjects; & religious such as Abra­ham instituted, as being the Subjects of Abra­ham, Isaac, & Iacob, their naturall Princes; For they had received no word of God beside the naturall word of right reason, neither had any Covenant past between God and them, otherwise then as their wils were included in the will of Abraham, as their Prince; But now by the Covenant made at mount Sinai, the consent of each man being had, there be­comes an institutive Kingdome of God over them. That Kingdom of God so renowned in Scriptures and writings of Divines, took its beginning from this time, and hither tends that which God said to Samuel, when the Israelites asked a King, 1. Sam. 8. 7. Yhey have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me, that I should not reign over them; and that which Samuel told the Israelites, 1. Sam. 12. 12. Yee said unto me, nay, but a King shall reign over us, when the Lord your God was your King, and that which is said, Jer. 31. vers. 31. I will make a new Covenant, &c. Although I was an husband unto them; And the doctrine also of Judas Galil [...]us, [Page 270] where mention is made in Ioseph. Antiq. of the Iewes, 18. Book, 2. Chap. in these words. But Judas Galilaeus was the first authour of this fourth way of those who followed the study of wisdome. These agree in all the rest with the Pharisees, excepting that they burn with a most constant desire of liberty, beleeving God alone to be held for their Lord and Prince, and will soo­ner endure even the most exquisite kinds of tor­ments, together with their kins folks, and dearest friends, then call any mortall man their Lord.

X. The Right of the Kingdome being What lawes were by God given to the Jewes. thus constituted by way of Covenant, let us see in the next place, what lawes God pro­pounded to them; now those are knowne to all, to wit, the Decalogue, and those other, as well judiciall as▪ ceremoniall lawes, which we find from the 20. Chap. of Exodus to the end of Deuteronomie, and the death of Moyses. Now of those lawes deliver'd in generall by the hand of Moyses, some there are which oblige naturally, being made by God, as the God of nature, and had their force ever before Abrahams time; others there are which oblige by vertue of the Co­venant made with Abraham, being made by God as the God of Abraham, which had their force even before Moyses his time, by reason of the former Covenant; but there are others which oblige by vertue of that Covenant onely which was made last with the people themselves, being made by God, as being the Peculiar King of the Israelites. Of the first so [...]t are all the Precepts of the Decalogue which pertaine unto manners, such as, Honour thy Parents, thou shalt not Kill, thou shalt not commit Adultery, thou shalt not [Page 271] Steale, thou shalt not [...]eare false witnesse, thou shalt not Covet; For they are the Lawes of n [...]e; Also the precept of not taking Gods name in vaine, for it is a part of natu­rall worship, as hath beene declar'd in the foregoing Chap. Art. 15. In like manner the second Commandement of not wor­shipping by way of any Image made by themselves; for this also is a part of na­turall Religion, as hath beene shewed in the same Article. Of the second sort is the first Commandment of the Decalogue, Of not having any other Gods; for in that consists the essence of the Covenant made with Abraham, by which God requires no­thing else, but that he should be his God, and the God of his seede: Also the Precept of keeping holy the Sabbath; for the Sanctifi­cation of the seventh day is instituted in memoriall of the six dayes Creation, as ap­peares out of these words, Exod. 31. ver. 16, 17. It is a perpetuall Covenant, (meaning the Sabbath) and a signe betweene me, and the Children of Israel for ever, for in sixe dayes the Lord made Heaven, and Earth; and on the seventh day he rested, and was refreshed. Of the third kind are the Politique, judiciall and Ceremoniall lawes, which onely belong'd to the Jewes. The lawes of the fi [...]st and second sort written in Tables of stone, to wit the Decalogue, was kept in the Ark it selfe. The rest written in the volume of the whole Law, were laid up in the side of the Arke. Deut. 3. ver. 26 For these retaining the faith of Abraham might be chang'd, those could not.

XI. All Gods Lawes are Gods Word; [Page 272] but all Gods Word is not his Law. I am the What the word of God is, and how to be knowne. Lord th [...] God which brought thee out of the Land of Aegypt, is the word of God [...] is no Law: Neither is all that which for the better deolaring of Gods Word is pro­nounc't, or written together with it, in­stantly to be taken for Gods Word: For, Thus saith the Lord, is not the voice of God, but of the Preacher or Prophet; All that, and onely that, is the word of God which a true Prophet hath declar'd God to have spoken. Now the writings of the Prophets comprehendng as well those things which God, as which the Prophet himselfe speaks, are therefore called the word of God, be­cause they containe the word of God. Now because all that, and that alone, is the Word of God which is recommended to us for such, by a true Prophet, it cannot be knowne what Gods Word is, before we know who is the true Prophet; nor can we be­leeve Gods Word, before we beleeve the Prophet. Moyses was beleev'd by the Peo­ple of Israel for two things, His Miracles, and his Faith; for how great, and most evident Miracles soever he had wrought, yet would they not have trusted him, at least he was not to have beene trusted, if he had call'd them out of Aegypt to any other worship then the worship of the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob their Fathers. For it had beene contrary to the Covenant made by themselves with God. In like manner two things there are, to wit, supernaturall Prae­diction of things to come, which is a mighty miracle, and Faith in the God of Abraham their deliverer out of Aegypt, which▪ God [Page 273] propos'd to all the Jews to be kept for marks of a true Prophet. He that wants either of these is no Prophet, nor is it to be receiv'd for Gods word which he obtrudes for such. If Faith be wanting, he is reject­in these words, Deut. 13. ver. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. If there arise among you a Prophet, or a drea­mer of dreams, and giveth thee a signe, or a wonder, and the signe or the wonder come to passe, whereof he spake unto thee, saying, Let us goe after other Gods, &c. That Prophet, or that dreamer of dreames shall be put to death. If Praediction of events be wanting, he is condemn'd by these, Deut. 18. ver. 21, 22. And if thou say in thine heart, how shall we know the word which the Lord hath not spoken? When a Prophet speaketh in the name of the Lord, if the thing follow not, nor come to passe, that is the thing which the Lord hath not spoken, but the Prophet hath spoken it pre­sumptuously. Now, that that is the word of God which is publisht for such by a true Prophet, and that he was held to be a true Prophet among the Jewes, whose faith was true, and to whose praedictions the events answer'd, is without controversie; but what it is to follow other Gods, and whe­ther the events which are affirm'd to an­swer their praedictions, doe truly answer them, or not, may admit many controver­sies, specially in praedictions which obscure­ly, & aenigmatically foretell the Event such, as the praedictions of almost all the Pro­phets are, as who saw not God apparently like unto Moyses, but in darke speech [...]s, and in figures. Numb. 12. ver. 8. But of these we cannot judge otherwise then by the way of [Page 274] naturall reason; because that Judgment de­pends on the Prophets interpretation, and on its proportion with the Event.

XII. The Jewes did hold the booke of What was held for the written word of God among the Jewes. the whole Law which was called Deuterono­mie, for the written word of God, and that onely, (forasmuch as can be collected out of sacred history) untill the Captivity, for this booke was deliver'd by Moyses himselfe to the Priests to be kept, and layd up in the side of the Ark of the Covenant, and to be copyed out by the Kings; and the same a long time after by the authority of King Josiah acknowledg'd againe for the Word of God. 2 Kings 23. ver. 2. But it is not ma­nifest when the rest of the books of the Old Testament were first receiv'd into Ca­non, but what concernes the Prophets, Isaiah and the rest, since they foretold no other things then what were to come to passe, either in or after the Captivity, their writings could not at that time be held for Prophetique, by reason of the Law cited a­bove. Deut. 18. ver. 21, 22. Whereby the Israelites were commanded not to account any man for a true Prophet but him whose Prophecies were answer'd by the events; And hence peradventure it is that the Jew [...] esteem'd the writings of those whom they slew when they Prophesied; for Prophetique afterward, that is to say, for the word of God.

XIII. It being known what Lawes The power of interpre­ting the word of God, and [...]he supreme civil power were united in Moyses while he lived. there were under the old Covenant, and that Word of God receiv'd from the beginning; we must farthermore consider with whom the authority of judging, whether the wri­tings of the Prophets arising afterward, [Page 275] were to be receiv'd for the Word of God, that is to say, whether the Events did an­swer their praedictions or not, and with whom also the authority of interpreting the Lawes already receiv'd, and the written Word of God, did reside; which thing is to be trac't through all the times, and severall changes of the Commonwealth of Israel. But it is manifest that this power during the life of Moyses, was intirely in himselfe; for if he had not been the Interpreter of the Lawes and Word, that office must have be­long'd either to every private person, or to a congregation, or Synagogue of many, or to the High-Priest, or to other Prophets. First, that that office belong'd not to private men, or any Congregation made of them, appeares hence, that they were not admit­ted, nay they were prohibited, with most heavy threats, to heare God speake, otherwise then by the means of Moyses; for it is writ­ten, Let not the Priests and the people break through to come up unto the Lord, lest he break forth upon them. So Moyses went downe unto the people, and spake unto them. Exod. 19. 24, 25. It is farther manifestly, and ex­presly declar'd, upon occasion given by the Rebellion of Core, Dathan and Abiram, and the two hundred and fifty Princes of the Assembly, that neither private men, nor the Congregation should pretend that God had spoken by them, and by Consequence that they had the right of interpreting Gods Word; for they contending, that God spake no lesse by them then by Moyses, argu [...] thus, Yee take too much upon you, seeing all the Congregation are holy, every one of them, [Page 276] and the Lord is among them; wherefore then lift yee up your selves above the Congregation of the Lord? Numb. 16. ver. 3. But how God determin'd this controversie is easily understood by the 33. and 35. verses of the same Chapter, where Corah, Dathan, and Ahiram went downe alive into the Pit, and there came out fire from the Lord, and con­sumed the two hundred and fifty men that of­fer'd Incense. Secondly, that Aaron the high Priest had not this authority, is mani­fest by the like controversie betweene him (together with his Sister Miriam) and Moyses; For the Question was, whether God spake by Moyses only, or by them also, that is to say, whether Moyses alone, or whe­ther they also were interpreters of the Word of God. For thus they said, Hath the Lord indeed spoken onely by Moyses? Hath he not also spoken by us? Numb 12. ver. 2. But God reprov'd them, and made a distinction betweene Moyses and other Prophets, say­ing, If there be a Prophet among you, I the Lord will make my self [...] knowne unto him in a vision, and will speake unto him in a dreame: My Servant Moyses is not so, &c. For with him will I speake mouth to mouth, even appa­rently, and not in darke speeche [...], and the Simi­litude of the Lord shall he behold, wherefore then were yee not afraid to speake against my Servant Moyses? Ibid. ver. 6, 7, 8. Lastly, that the interpretation of the Word of God as long as Moses liv'd, belong'd not to any other Prophets whatsoever, is collected out of that place which we now cited concer­cerning his eminency above all others, and out of naturall reason, for as much as it be­longs [Page 277] to the same Prophet who brings the Commands of God to unfold them too; but there was then no other Word of God, beside that which was declar'd by Moyses; and out of this also, that there was no other Prophet extant at that time, who Prophe­sied to the people, excepting the 70. Elders who Prophesied by the Spirit of Moyses; and even that Joshu [...]h, who was then Moyses his Servant, his successour afterward, beleev'd to be injuriously done, till he know it was by Moyses his Consent, which thing is manifest by Text of Scripture, And the Lord came downe in a clowd, &c. and tooke of the spirit that was upon Moyses, and gave it unto the 70. Elders. Numb. 11. ver. 25. Now after it was told that they Prophesied, Joshuah said unto Moyses, Forbid them my Lord: But Moyses answered, Why enviest thou for my sake? Seeing therefore Moyses alone was the Messenger of Gods Word, and that the authority of interpreting it pertain'd neither to private men, nor to the Synagogue, nor to the High Priest, nor to other Pro­phets, it remaines, that Moyses alone was the Interpreter of Gods Word, who also had the supreme power in civill matters; and that the conventions of Corah with th [...] rest of his complices against Moses, and Aaron, and of Aaron with his Sister against Moyses, were rais'd, not for the salvation of their soules, but by reason of their ambition, and desire of Dominion over the People.

XIV. In Joshuahs time the interpreta­tion They were also united in the High Priest du­ring the life of Joshuah. of the Lawes, and of the Word of God, be­long'd to Ele [...]zar the High Priest, who was also under God, their absolute King; which [Page 278] is collected first of all out of the Covenant it selfe, in which the Common-wealth of Israel is called a Priestly Kingdome, or as it is recited in the 1 Pet. 2. 9. A Royall Priest­hood, which could in no wise be sayd, unlesse by the institution and Covenant of the Peo­ple, the regall power were understood to be­long to the High Priest. Neither doth this repugne what hath beene said before, where Moyses, and not Aaren, had the Kingdome under God; since it is necessary that when one man institutes the forme of a future Common-wealth, that one should governe the Kingdome which he institutes, during his life, (whether it be Monarchie, Aristo­craty, or Democraty) and have all that power for the present, which he is bestowing on others for the future; Now, that Eleazar the Priest, had not onely the Priesthood, but also the Soveraignty, is expressely set downe in Joshuahs call to the administration; for thus it is written. Take thee Joshuah the Son of Nun, a man in whom is the Spirit, and lay thine hand upon him, and set him before Elea­zer the Priest, and before all the Congregation, and give him a charge in their sight, and thou shalt put some of thine honour upon him, that all the Congregation of the Children of Israel may be obedient, and he shall stand before Eleazar the Priest, who shall aske Counsell for him af­ter the judgment of Urim, before the Lord, at his word shall they goe out, and at his word shall they come in, and all the Children of Israel with him, even all the Congregation. N [...]m. 27. v [...]r. 18, 19, 20, 21. where to aske Counsell of God for whatsoever is to be done, (that is) to interpret Gods word, and in the name of God [Page 279] to Command in all matters, belongs to Eleazar; and to goe out, and to come in at his word; that is to say, to obey, belongs both to Joshua [...], and to all the People. Its to be observ'd also, that that speech, Part of thy glory; clearely denotes that Joshuah had not a power equall with that which Moyses had. In the meane time it is manifest, that even in Ioshuahs time, the Supreme power and authority of interpreting the word of God, were both in one Person.

XV. After Ioshuahs death follow the times of the Iudges untill King Saul, in They were also united in the High Priest, un­till King Sauls time. which it is manifest that the right of the Kingdome instituted by God, remained with the High Priest; for the Kingdome was by Covenant Priestly, that is to say, Gods go­vernment by Priests; and such ought it to have been untill that form with Gods con­sent were changed by the people themselves, which was not done, before that requiring a King God consented unto them, and said unto Samuel, Hearken unto the voyce of the people in all that they say unto thee; for they have not rejected thee, but they have rejected me that I should not reign over them. 1. Sam. 8. 7. The supreme civill power was therefore Rightly due by Gods own institution to the High-Priest; but actually that power was in the Prophets, to whom (being raysed by God in an extraordinary manner) the Isra­elites (a people greedy of the Prophets) sub­mitted themselves to be protected, and judg­ed, by reason of the great esteem they had of Prophecies; The Reason of this thing, was, because that though penalties were set, and Judges appointed in the institution of [Page 280] Gods priestly Kingdome, yet, the Right of inflicting punishment, depended wholly on private judgement, and it belonged to a dissolute multitude, and each single Person, to punish or not to punish according as their private zeale should stirre them up. And therefore Moyses by his own command pu­nisht no man with death; but when any man was to be put to death, one or many stirred up the multitude against him or them, by divine authority, and saying, Thus saith the Lord. Now this was conformable to the nature of Gods peculiar Kingdome. For there God reignes indeed where his Lawes are obeyed, not for fear of men, but for fear of himselfe; and truly, if men were such as they should be, this were an excellent state of civill government, but as men are, there is a coercive power (in which I com­prehend both right and might) necessary to rule them; and therefore also God from the beginning prescribed Lawes by Moyses for the future Kings. Deut. 17. vers. 14. and Moy­ses foretold this in his last words to the peo­ple, saying, I know that after my death ye will utterly corrupt your selves, and turn aside from the way that I have commanded you, &c. Deut. 31. 29. when therefore according to this prediction there arose another generation who knew not the Lord, nor yet the works which he had done for Ispael, the children of Israel did evill in the sight of the Lord, and served B [...]laam, Iud. 2. 10, 11. to wit, they cast off Gods government, that is to say, that of the Priest, by whom God ruled, and afterward, when they were overcome by their enemies, and opprest with bondage, they looked for [Page 281] Gods will, not at the hands of the Priest any more, but of the Prophets. These therefore actually judged▪ Israel, but their obedience was rightly due to the High Priest; Although therefore the Priestly Kingdome after the death of Moyses, & Ioshuah, was without power, yet was it not without Right. Now that the interpretation of Gods word did belong to the same High Priest, is manifest by this, That God, after the Tabernacle, & the Ark of the Covenant was consecrated, spake no more in mount; Sinai, but in the Tabernacle of the Covenant, from the propitiatory which was between the Cherubims, whether it was not lawfull for any to aproach except the High Priest; If therefore regard be had to the Right of the Kingdome, the supreme civill power, and the authority of interpreting Gods word, were joyned in the High Priest; If we consider the fact, they were united in the Prophets who judged Israel; For as Iudges, they had the civill authority, as Prophets, they interpreted Gods word, and thus every way hitherto these two powers continued in­separable.

XVI. Kings being once constituted, its They were united in the Kings untill the Captivity. no doubt but the civill authority belonged to them, for the Kingdome of God by the way of Priesthood, (God consenting to the request of the Israelites) was ended, which Hierom also marks speaking of the books of Samuel, Samuel (sayes he) Eli being dead, and Saul slain, declares the old Law abo­lisht; Furthermore the Oaths of the new Priesthood, and new Soveraignty in Zadok, and David, do testifie▪ that the Right where­by the Kings did rule, was founded in the [Page 282] very concession of the People. The Priest could▪ Rightly doe whatsoever every man could rightly doe himselfe; for the Israelites granted him a Right to judge of all things, and to wage warre for all men; in which two are contained all Right whatsoever can be conceived from man to man. Our King (say they) shall judge us, and goe out before us, and fight our battails, 1. Sam. 8. 20. Iudicature therefore belonged to the Kings, but to judge is nothing else then by interpreting to apply the▪ facts to the Lawes; to them therefore belonged the interpretation of Lawes too: and because there was no o­ther written word of God acknowledged beside the Law of Moyses, untill the Cap­tivity, the authority, of interpreting Gods word, did also belong to the Kings; Nay, forasmuch as the word of God must be taken for a Law, if there had been ano­ther written word beside the Mosaicall Law, seeing the interpretation of Lawes belonged to the Kings, the interpretation of it must also have belonged to them. When the book of Deuteronomie (in which the whole Mo­saicall Law was contained) being a long time lost, was found again, the Priests in­deed asked Counsell of God concerning that book, but not by their own authority, but by the Commandement of Iosiah, and not immediately neither, but by the meanes of Holda the Prophetesse; whence it appears that the authority of admitting books for the word of God, belonged not to the Priest; neither yet followes it that that au­thority belonged to the Prophetesse, be­cause others did judge of the Prophets whe­ther [Page 283] they were to be held for true, or not; for to what end did God give signes, and tokens to all the People, whereby the true Prophets might be discerned from the false, namely, the event of predictions, and con­formity with the Religion [...]stablisht by Moyses, if they might not use those marks? The authority therefore of admitting books for the word of God belonged to the King, & thus that book of the Law was approved, and received again by the authority of King Iosiah, as appears by the fourth book of the Kings, 22. 23. Chap. where it is reported that he gathered together all the severall de­grees of his Kingdome, the Elders, Priests, Prophets, and all the people, and he read in their cares all the words of the Covenant, that is to say, he caused that Covenant to be acknow­ledged for the Mosaicall Covenant [...], that is to say, for the word of God, and to be again re­ceived, and confirmed by the Israclites; The civill power therefore, and the power of discerning Gods word from the word of men, and of interpreting Gods word even in the dayes of the Kings was wholly belonging to themselves. Prophets were sent not with au­thority, but in the form, and by the Right of Proclaimers, and Preachers, of whom the hearers did judge; and if perhaps these were punisht who did not listen to them plainly, teaching easie things, it doth not thence follow, that the Kings were obliged to fol­low all things which they in Gods name did declare, were to be followed: for though Iosiab the good King of Iudah were slain because he obeyed not the word of the Lord from the mouth of Neobo King of Aegypt, [Page 284] that is to say, because he rejected good Counsell though it seemed to come from an enemy, yet no man I hope will say that Iosiah was by any bond either of divine, or humane Lawes obliged to beleeve Pharoah Neobo King of Aegypt, because he said that God had spoken to him. But what some man may object against Kings, that for want of learning, they are seldome able enough to interpret those books of antiquity in the which Gods word is contained, and that for this cause it is not reasonable that this office should depend on their authority, he may object as much against the Priests, and all mortall men, for they may erre; and although Priests were better instructed in nature, and arts then other men, yet Kings are able enough to appoint such interpreters under them; and so, though Kings did not themselves interpret the word of God; yet the office of interpreting them might depend on their authority; and they who therefore refuse to yeeld up this authority to Kings, because they cannot practise the office it selfe, doe as much as if they should say that the authority of teaching Geometry must not depend upon Kings, except they themselves were Geometricians. We read that Kings have prayed for the People, that they have blest the people, that they have consecrated the Temple, that they have commanded the Priests, that they have removed Priests from their office, that they have constituted o­thers: Sacrifices indeed they have not of­fered, for that was hereditary to Aaron, and his sonnes; but it is manifest, as in Moyses his life time, so throughout all ages from [Page 285] King Saul to the captivity of Babylon, that the Priesthood was not a Maistry, but a Mi­nistry.

XVII. After their returne from Ba­bylonian The same were united in the Priests af­ter the Captivity. bondage, the Covenant being re­newed, and sign'd, the Priestly Kingdome was restor'd to the same manner it was in from the death of Ioshuah to the begin­ning of the Kings; excepting that it is not expresly set downe that the return'd Jewes did give up the Right of Soveraignty either to Esdras (by whose directions they ordred their State) or to any other, beside God himselfe. That reformation seemes rather to be nothing else then the bare promises, and vowes of every man to observe those things which were written in the booke of the Law; notwithstanding, (perhaps not by the Peoples intention) by virtue of the Co­venant which they then renewed, (for the Covenant was the same with that which was made at Mount Sinai) that same state was a Priestly Kingdome, that is to say, the supreme civill authority, and the sacred were united in the Priests; Now, howso­ever through the ambition of those who strove for the Priesthood, and by the inter­position of forraigne Princes, it was so trou­bled till our Saviour Iesus Christs time, that it cannot be understood out of the histories of those times, where that authority resided; yet it's plaine, that in those times, the pow­er of interpreting Gods Word was not severed from the supreme civill power.

XVIII. Out of all this, we may ea­sily Among the Jewes the deniall of the Divine providence, and Idola­try, were the onely Trea­sons against the Divine Majesty: in all other things they ought to obey their Prin­ces. know how the [...]ewes in all times [...]om Abraham unto Christ were to behave them­selves [Page 296] in the Commands of their Princes; for as in Kingdomes meerly humane men must obey a subordinate Magistrate in all things, excepting when his Commands containe in them some Treason, so in the Kingdome of God the I [...]we [...] were bound to obey their Princes, Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Moyses, the Priest, the King, every one du­ [...]ng [...]heir time in all things, except when their commands did containe some treason against the Divine Majesty. Now treason against the Divine Majesty was, first the deniall of [...]is divine providence, for this was to deny God to be a King by nature; next, Ido­latry, or the worship not of other (for there is but one God) but of strange Gods, that is to say, a worship though of one God, yet under other Titles, Attributes, and Rites, then what were establisht by Abraham, and Moyses, for this was to deny the God of Abraham to be their King by Covenant made with Abraham, and themselves; in all other things they were to obey; and if a King or Priest having the Soveraign au­thority, had commanded somewhat else to be done which was against the Lawes, that had been his sinne, and not his sub­jects, whose duty it is, not to dispute, but to obey the Commands of his superiours.

Of the Kingdome of God by the new Covenant.

I. THere are many cleare prophesies ex­ta [...]t The Pro­phesies of Christs dignity. in the old Testament concerning our Saviour Jesus Christ, who was to restore the Kingdome of God by a new Covenan [...], partly foretelling his regall Dignity, partly his Humility and Passion. Among others concerning his Dignity, these; God blessing Abraham, [...]akes him a promise of his sonne Isaac, and [...]ddes, And Kings of People shall be of him, Gen 17. vers. 15. Jacob blessing his sonne Judah▪ The Scepter (quoth be) shall not depart from Judah, Gen. 49. vers. 10. G [...]d to Moyses, A Prophet (saith he) will I raise them up from among their brethren like unto thee, and will put my words in his mouth, [Page 290] and he shall speak unto them all that I shall command him, and it shall come to passe, that whosoever will not bearken unto my words, which he shall speak in my name, I will require it of him, Deut. 18. vers. 18. Isaias, The Lord himselfe shall give thee a signe, Behold a Virgin shall conceive, and bear a Sonne, and shall call his name Emanuel, Isai 7. v. 14. The same Prophet, Unto us a child is born, unto us a Sonne is given, and the government shall he upon his shoulders; and his name shall be called Wonderfull, Counsellour, the mighty God, the Everlasting Father, the Prince of Peace, Isai 9. vers. 9. And again, There shall come forth a Rod out of the stemme of Jesse, and a branch shall grow out of his roots; the spirit of the Lord shall rest upon him, &c. he shall not judge▪ after the sight of his eyes, neither reprove after the hearing of his cares, but with righteousnesse shall he [...]udge the poor, &c. and he shall smite the earth with the rod of his mouth, and with the breath of his lips shall he slay the wicked, Isay 11. vers. 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. Furthermore in the 51, 52, 53, 54, 56, 60, 61, 62. Ch. of the same Isay, there is almost nothing else contained but a description of the coming, and the works of Christ. Jeremias, Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a new Covenant with the house of Israel, and with the house of Judah, Jerem. 31. 31. And Baruch, This is our God. &c. Afterward did he shew himselfe upon earth, and conversed with men, Baruch 3. vers. 35, 37. Ezekiel, I will set up one Shepheard over them, and he shall feed them, even my Servant David, And I will make with them a Covenant of Peace, &c. Ezek. 24. vers. 2, 3, 25. Daniel, I saw in [Page 291] the night visions, and behold one like the Sonne of man came with the clouds of heaven, and came to the anti [...]ut of dayes, and they brought him near before him, and there was gi­ven him Dominion, and Glory, and a King­dome, that all People, Nations, and Languages should serve him, his Dominion is an everla­sting Dominion, &c. Dan. 7. vers. 13, 14. Haggai, Yet once it is a little while, and I will shake the Heaven, and the Earth, and the Sea, and the drye Land, and I will shake all Nations, and the desire of all Nations shall come, Haggai 2. v. 8. Zachariah, Under the type of Joshuah the High Priest: I will bring forth my servant the Branch, &c. Zach. 3. v. 8. And again, Behold the man whose name is the Branch, Zach. 6. v. 12. And again, Rejoyce greatly O Daughter of Sion, Shout O Daugh­ter of Jerusalem, behold thy King cometh to thee, he is just, having salvation, Zach 9. v. 9. The Jewes moved by these, and other Pro­phesies, expected Christ their King to be sent from God, who should redeem them, and furthermore bear rule over all Nations. Yea this Prophesie had spread over the whole Roman Empire (which Ve­spasian too, though falsly, interpreted in fa­vour of his own enterprises) That out of Ju­dea should come he that should have dominion.

II Now the Prophesies of Christs Humility and Passion, amongst others are these. Isa 53. The Pro­phesies of Christs Hu­mility and Passion. v. 4 He hath born our grieses, and carried our sorrowes; yet we did esteem him stricken, smit­ten of God, & afflicted, and by and by, He was appressed, he was afflicted, yet he opened not his mouth; He is brought as a Lamb to the slaugh­ter, and as a sheep before her Shearer is dumb, so [Page 292] opened he not his mouth, &c. vers. 7. And again, He was cut out of the Land of the li­ving, for the transgression of my People was be stricken, &c. vers. 8. Therefore will I di­vide him a portion with the great, and be shall divide the spoyle with the strong, because he hath poured ou [...] hi [...] soule unto death, and he was numbred with the transgressours, and he [...] the sinne of many, and made intercession for the transgressours, vers. 12. And that of Zachery, He is lowly, riding upon an Asse, and upon a Cols the foale of an Asse. Zach. 9. vers. 9.

III. In the reign of Ti [...]rius Caesar, JE­SUS That Jesus was the Christ. our Saviour a Galil [...]n began to preach, the sonne (as was supposed) of Jo­seph, declaring to the people of the Jewes, that the Kingdome of God expected by them, was now come, and that himselfe was a King, that is to say, THE CHRIST: Explaining the Law, choosing twelve Apo­stles, and seventy Disciples, after the number of the Princes of the Tribes, and seventy Elders (according to the pattern of Moyses) to the Ministry; teaching the way of salvati­on by himselfe and them; purging the Tem­ple, doing great signes, and fulfilling all those things which the Prophets had fore­told of Christ to come, That this man, ha­ted of the Pharisees, (whose false doctrine and hypocriticall sanctity he had reproved) and by their means, of the People accused of unlawfull seeking for the Kingdome, and crucified, was the true CHRIST, and King promised by God, and sent from his father to renew the new Covenant between them and God, both the Evangelists doe shew (describing his Genealogie, nati­vity, [Page 293] life, doctrine, death, and resurrection) and by comparing the things which he did, with those which were foretold of him, all Christians doe consent to.

IV. Now from this, That CHRIST That the Kingdom of God by the new Covenant was not the Kingdome of Christ, as Christ, but as God. was sent from God his Father to make a Covenant between him and the people, it is manifest, that though Christ were equall to his Father according to his nature, yet was he in [...]erior according to the Right of the King­dom; for this office to speak properly, was not that of a King, but of a Vice-roy, such as Moy­ses his Government was; for the Kingdom was not his, but his Fathers; which CHRIST himselfe signified when he was baptized as a subject, and openly profest, when he taught his Disciples to pray, Our Father, Thy Kingdome come, &c. And when he said, I will not drink of the blood of the grape, untill that day when I shall drink it new with you in the Kingdome of my Father, Mat. 26. ve [...]. 29. And Saint Paul. As in Adam all die, so in Christ shall all be made alive; but every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits▪ afterward they▪ that are Christs, who beleeved in his coming; Then cometh the end when he shall have d [...]live­red up the Kingdom to Goa even his Father, &c. 1. Cor. 15. vers. 22, 23, 24. The same not­withstanding is also called the Kingdome of Christ: for both the Mother of the sonnes of Ze [...]die petitioned Christ, saying, Grant that these my two sonnes may fit, the one on thy right hand, the other on thy left, in thy King­dome, Mat. 20. vers. 21. And the Theef on the Cross, Lord remember when me thou comest in­to thy Kingdom, Luke 23. vers. 42. And Saint Paul, For this know yee, that no whormon­ger, [Page 294] &c. shall enter into the Kingdome of God, and of Christ, Ephes. 5. ver. 5. And elsewhere, I charge thee before God, and the Lord Iesus Christ, who shall judge the quick and dead at his appearing, and his Kingdome, &c. 2 Tim. 4. ver. 1. And the Lord shall deli­ver me from every evill worke, and will pre­serve me unto his heavenly Kingdome, ver. 18. Nor is it to be marvelled at, that the same Kingdome is atttibured to them both, since both the Father, and the Son, are the same God, and the new Covenant concerning Gods Kingdome, is not propounded in the Name of the FATHER, but in the name of the FATHER, of the SON, and of the HOLY-GHOST, as of one God.

V. But the Kingdome of God, for re­stitution whereof CHRIST was sent That the Kingdome of God by the [...] Covenant is heavenly, and begins from the day of Iudgement. from God his Father, takes not its begin­ning before his second comming, to wit, from the day of Judgement, when he shall come in Majesty accompanied with his Angels: For it is promis'd the Apostles, that in the Kingdome of God, they shall judge the twelve tribes of Israel. Ye which have followed me in the regeneration, when the Soune of man shall sit in the Throne of his glo­ry, ye also shall sit upon twelve Thrones judging the twelve tribes of Israel, Mat. 19. ver. 28. which is not to be done till the day of judge­ment; CHRIST therefore is not yet in the throne of his Majesty, nor is that time when CHRIST was conversant here in the world call'd a Kingdome, but a regenera­tion, that is to say a renovation, or restitu­tion of the Kingdome of God, and a calling of them who were hereafter to be receiv'd [Page 295] into his Kingdome; And where it is said, When the Son of man shall come in his glory, and all the holy Angels with him, then shall he set upon the throne of his glory, and before him shall be gathered all Nations, and he shall se­parate them one from another, as a Shepheard di­videth his Sheep from the Goates, Mat. 25. ver▪ 31. We may manifestly gather, that there will be no locall separation of Gods Subjects from his Enemies, but that they shall live mixt together untill CHRISTS second comming; which is also confirm'd by the comparison of the Kingdome of heaven, with wheat mingled with Darnell, and with a net containing all sorts of fish: But a multitude of men, Enemies and Subjects, living promis [...]uously together, cannot properly be term'd a Kingdome. Besides, the Apostles, when they askt our Saviour, Whether he would at that time when he ascended into heaven, restore the Kingdome unto Israel? did openly testifie, that they then, when CHRIST ascen­ded, thought the Kingdome of God not to be yet come. Farthermore, the words of CHRIST, My Kingdome is not of this world; And, I will not drinke, &c, till the Kingdome of God come: And, God hath not sent his Son into the World, to judge the World, but that the World through him might be sav'd. And, If any man heare not my words, and keepe them, I judge him not; for I came not to judge the World, but to save the World. And, Man, who made me a judge or divider betweene you? And the very Appellation of the Kingdome of Heaven testifies as much. The same thing is gathered out of the [Page 296] words of the Prophet Jeremiah, speaking of the Kingdome of God by the new Cove­nant, They shall teach no more every man his Neighbo [...]r, sayi [...]g, [...] the Lord, for they shall all k [...] me [...] the least of them, to the greatest of the [...], saith the Lord, [...]er. [...]4. which cannot be understood of a King­dome in this World. The Kingdome of God therefore, for the restoring whereof CHRIST came into the world, of which the Prophets did Prophesie, and of which praying wee say, Thy Kingdome come, (if it must have Subjects locally separated from Enemies, if judicature, if Majesty, ac­cording as hath beene foretold,) shall be­gin from that time, wherein God shall se­parate the Sheep from the Goats, wherein the Apostles shall judge the twelve Tribes of Israel; wherein CHRIST shall come in Majesty, and glory; wherein lastly, all men shall so know God, that they shall not need to be taught, that is to say, a [...] CHRIST his second comming, or the day of Judgement; But if the King­dome of God were now already restor'd, no reason could be rendered why CHRIST having compleated the work for which he was sent, should come againe, or why we should pray, Thy Kingdome come.

V I. Now, although the Kingdome of The go­vernment of Christ in this world was not a Soveraign­ty, but Counsell, or a govern­ment by way of do­ctrine, and perswasion God by CHRIST to be establisht with a new Covenant, were Heavenly, we must not therefore thinke, that they, who beleeving in CHRIST would make that Covenant, were not so to be govern'd here on the Earth too, as that they should persevere in their faith, and obedience [Page 297] proms [...]'d by that Covenant. For in vaine had the Kingdome of heaven beene pro­mis'd, if we were not to have been led into it; but none can be led, but those who are directed in the way. Moyses, when he had instituted the Priestly Kindome, himselfe though he were no Priest, yet rul'd, and conducted the People all the time of their P [...]reg [...]ination untill their entrance into the promis'd Land; In the same manner is it our Saviours office (whom God in this thing would have like unto Moyses) as he was sent from his Father, so to governe the future Subjects of his heavenly King­dome in this life, that they might attaine to, and enter into that, although the King­dome were not properly his, but his Fathers. But the government whereby CHRIST rules the faithfull ones in this life, is not properly a Kingdome, or Dominion, but a Pastorall charge, or the Right of teaching, that is to say, God the father gave him not a power to judge of Me [...]m and T [...]m as he doth to the Kings of the Earth; no [...] a Co­ercive power, nor legislative; but of shewing to the world, and teaching them the way, and knowledge of Salvation, that is to say, of Preaching, and declaring what they were to doe, who would enter into the King­dome of Heaven. That CHRIST had receiv'd no power from his father to judge in Questions of Me [...]m and T [...]um, that is to say, in all Questions of Right among those who beleev'd no [...], those words above cited doe sufficiently declare: Man, who made me a judge, or divider betweene you? And it is confirm'd by reason; for seeing [Page 298] CHRIST was sent to make a Covenant between God and men, and no man is ob­ [...]'d to performe obedience before the [...]ontract be made, if he should have judg'd [...] Questions of Right, no man h [...]d been [...]ed to obey his sentence. But that the dis­ [...]erning of Right was not committed to CHRIST in this world, neither a­mong the faithfull, nor among infidels, is apparent in this, that that Right without all controversie belongs to▪ Princes as long as it is not by God himselfe derogated from their authority; But it is not derogated be­fore the day of Judgement, as appeares by the words of Saint Paul, speaking of the day of Judgement, Then commeth the end when he shall have delivered up the Kingdome to God even the Father, when he shall have put downe all rule, and all authority, and power, 1 Cor. 15. ver. 24. Secondly, the words of our Sauiour reproving Jamos, and Iohn, when they had said, VVilt thou that we call for Fyer from Heaven, that it may consume them (namely the Samaritans, who had de­nyed to receive him going up to Jeru­salem) and replying, The Son of Man is not come to destroy soules, but to save them; And those words, Behold I send you as Sheep among VVolves; Shake off the dust of your Feet, and the like; And those words, God seut not his Son into the world, to judge the world, but that the world through him might be sav'd; and those, If any man heare my words, and keep them not, I judge him not, for I ca [...]e not to judge the world, &c. doe all shew, that he had no power given him, to condemne or punish any man. We reade [Page 299] indeed that the Father judgeth no Man, but hath committed all judgement to the Son, but since that both may, and must be under­stood of the day of future judgement, it doth not at all repugne what hath beene sayed before. Lastly, that he was not sent to make new Lawes, and that therefore by his Office, and mission, he was no Legisla­tour properly▪ so called, nor Moyses nei­ther, but a bringer and Publisher of his Fathers Lawes, (for God only, and nei­ther Moyses, nor CHRIST, was a King by Covenant) is collected hence, that he sayed, I came not to destroy (to wit the Lawes before given from God by Moyses, which he presently interprets) but to fulfill; And, He that shall break one of the least of these Commandements, and shall teach men so, he shall be called least in the Kingdome of Heaven. CHRIST therefore had not a Royall, or Soveraigne power committed to him from his Father in this world, but consiliary, and doctrinal [...] onely; which himselfe signifies, as well then when he calls his Apostles, not Hunters, but Fish­ers of men; as when he compares the Kingdome of God to a graine of mustard seed, and to a little Leaven hid in meale.

VII. God promis'd unto Abraham What the Promises of the new Covenant are on both parts. first, a numerous seed, the possession of the Land of Canaan, and a blessing upon all Nations in his seed, on this Condition, that he, and his seed should serve him; next un­to the seed of Abraham according to the flesh, a Priestly Kingdome, a Government most free, in which they were to [...]e Sub­ject to no humane power, on this Con­dition, [Page 300] that they should serve the God of Abraham on that fashion which Moyses should teach. Lastly, both to them, and to all Nations, a heavenly, and eternall King­dome, on Condition that they should serve the God of Abraham, on that man­ner which Christ should teach. For by the new, that is to say, the Christian Covenant, it's covenanted on mens part, to serve the God of Abraham, on that manner which JESUS should teach▪ On Gods part, to pardon their [...], and bring them into his [...]stiall Kingdome. We have already spo­ken of the quality of the heavenly King­dome above in the 5. Article; but it is usually call'd, sometimes the Kingdome of Heaven, sometimes the Kingdome of Glory, sometimes the life Eternall. What's required on mens part, namely to serve God as CHRIST should teach, contain [...]s two things, Obedience to be performed to God, (for this is to serve God) and Faith in JESUS, to wit, That we beleeve JE­SUS TO BE THAT CHRIST who was promis'd by God: for that only is the cause why his Doctrine is to be follow­ed, rather then any others. Now in holy Scriptures, Rep [...]ntance is often put in stead of Obedience, because Christ teacheth every where, that with God the Will is taken for the de [...]d▪ but Repentance is an infallible sign of an obedient mind. These things be­ing understood, it will most evidently ap­pear out of many places of sacred Scripture, that those are the Conditions of the Chri­stian Covenant which we have nam'd, to wit, giving remission of sins, and eternall life [Page 301] on Gods part, and Repenting, and Belee­ving in JESUS CHRIST, on Mens part. First, the words, The Kingdom of God is at hand: Repent yee and beleeve the Gospell, Mark 1. 15. contain the whole Covenant: In like manner those, Thu [...] it is written, and thus i [...] [...] Christ to suffer, and to rise from the dead the third day; and that repen­tance, and r [...]mission of s [...]nne [...] should be prea­ched in his Name among all Nations, begin­ing a [...] Jerusalem, Luke 24. vers. 46, 47. And those▪ Repent and be converted, that your sin [...] may be: bl [...]tted ou [...], when the timos of refreshing shall come, &c. Acts 3. vers. 19. And some­times one part is expresly propounded, and the other understood, as here, He that belee­veth in the Sonne, hath everlasting life; He that beleeveth not the Sonne, shall not see life, but the wrath of God abideth on him, Iohn 3. vers. 36. Where Faith is exprest, Repentance not men­tioned; and in CHRISTS preaching, Repent, for the Kingdome of heaven is at hand, Mat. 4. 17. Where Repentance is exprest, Faith is understood. But the parts of this new Con­tract a [...] most manifestly, and formally set down there, where a certain Ruler bar­gaining as it were for the Kingdom of God, asketh our Saviour, Good Master, what shall I do [...] to inher it eternall life, Luke 18. v. 18. But CHRIST first propounds one one part of the price, namely observation of the Commandements, or obedience, which when he answered that he had kept, he adjoynes the other, saying, Yet lackest thou one thing; Sell all that thou last, and di­stribute to the poor, and thou shalt have Trea­sune in Heaven, and come, follow me, v. 22. This [Page 302] was matter of Faith. He therefore not gi­ving sufficient credit to CHRIST, and his heavenly Treasures, went away sorrow­full. The same Covenant is contained in these words: Hee that beleeveth, and is bap­tized, shall be saved, he that beleeveth not, shall be damned, Mark 16. vers. 15, 16. Where Faith is exprest, Repentance is supposed in those that are baptized; and in these words, Except a man be born again of water, and the Holy Ghost, he cannot enter into the Kingdome of Heaven, Iohn 3. vers. 5. Where to be born of water, is the same with regeneration, that is to say, Conversion to CHRIST. Now that Baptisme is required in the two places cited just before, and in divers others, we must understand, that what Circumcision was to the old Covenant, that Baptisme is to the new: Seeing therefore, that was not of the Essence, but served for a memoriall of the old Covenant, as a Ceremony or signe (and was omitted in the wildernesse) in like manner this also is used, not as pertain­ing to the Essence, but in memory, and for a signe of the New Covenant which wee make with God; and provided the will be not wanting, the Act through necessity may be omitted; but Repentance and Faith, which are of the Essence of the Covenant, are alwayes required. There are no Lawes added by Christ, be­side the in­stitution of the Sacra­ments.

VIII. In the Kingdome of God after this life there will be no Lawes; partly be­cause there is no roome for Lawes, where there is none for sinne; partly because Laws were given us from God, not to direct us in Heaven, but unto Heaven Let us now there fore enquire what Laws CHRIST) esta­blisht [Page 303] not himselfe, for he would not take upon him any Legislative authority, as hath been declared above in the sixth Article, but) propounded to us for his Fathers. Wee have a place in Scripture, where he contracts all the Lawes of God publisht till that time, into two Preceps, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thine heart, with all thy soul, and with all thy minde, this is the greatest, and first Commandement. And the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy Neighbo [...]r as thy selfe. On these two Commandements hangs all the Law, and the Prophets, Mat. 22. vers. 37, 38, 39, 40. The first of these was given be­fore by Moyses in the same words, Deut. 6. vers. 5. And the second even before Moyses, for it is the naturall Law, having its begin­ing with rationall nature it selfe; and both together is the summe of all Lawes: for all the Lawes of divine naturall worship, are contained in these words, Thou shalt love God; and all the Lawes of divine worship due by the old Covenant, in these words, Thou shalt love thy God, that is to say God, as being the peculiar King of Abraham, and his seed; and all the Lawes naturall, and ci­vill, in these words, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy selfe; for he that loves God and his neighbour, hath a minde to obey all Lawes, both divine, and humane. But God requires no more then a minde to obey. Wee have another place, where CHRIST interprets the Lawes, name­ly, the [...]ifth, sixth, and seventh entire Chapters of Saint Mutthewes Gospell. But all those Lawes are set down, either in the Decalogue, or in the morall Law, or are con­tained [Page 304] in the faith of Abraham, as that Law of not putting away a wife is contained in the faith of Abraham: for that same, Two shall be one flesh, was not delivered either by CHRIST first, or by Moyses, but by Abraham, who first publisht the Crea­tion of the world. The Lawes therefore which CHRIST contracts in one place, and explaines in another, are no o­ther then those to which all mortall men are obliged, who acknowledge the God of Abraham. Beside these, we read not of any Law given by CHRIST, beside the institution of the Sacraments of Baptisme, and the Eucharist.

IX. What may be said then of these That these and the like forms, Re­pent, be baptized, keep the Comman­dements, are not Lawes. kinde of Precepts, Repent, Be Baptized, Keep the Commandements, Beleeve the Gospell, Come unto me, S [...]ll all that thou hast, give to the poor, follow me, and the like? We must say that they are not Lawes, but a calling of us to the faith, such as is that of Isa▪ Come, buy wine, and milk without monie, and with­out Price, Isai 55. ve [...]s. 1. neither if they come not, doe they therefore sinne against any Law, but against prudence onely; nei­ther shall their infidelity be punisht, but their former sinnes. Wherefore Saint John saith of the unbeleever, The wrath of God abideth on him; he saith not, The wrath of God shall come upon him; And, He that beleeveth not, is already judged; he saith not, shall be judged, but is already judged. Nay it cannot be well conceived, that remission of sinnes should be a benefit arising from faith, unlesse we understand also on the other side, that the punishment of sinnes is an hurt proceeding from infidelity.

[Page 305] X. From hence, that our Saviour hath It belongs to the civill authority to define what the sinne of in­justice is. prescribed no distributive Lawes, to the Subjects of Princes, and Citizens of Cities, that is to say, hath given no rules whereby a Subject may know, and discerne what is his owne, what another mans, nor by what form [...], words, or circumstances, a thing must be given, delivered, invaded, possest, that it may be known [...]y Right to belong to the Receiver, Invader, or Possessour, we must ne­cessarily understand that each single subject (not only with unbeleevers, among whom CHRIST himselfe denyed himselfe to be a judge and distributer, but even with Christians) must take those rules from his City, that is to say, from that Man, or Coun­cell, which hath the supreme power; It fol­lowes therefore, that by those Lawes, Thou shalt not kill, Thou shalt not commit adultery, Thou shalt not steal [...], Honour thy Father and Mother, nothing else was commanded, but that Subjects, and Citizens, should abso­lutely obey their Princes in all questions concerning Meum & Tuum, their own and others Right; for by that Precept, Thou shalt not kill, all s [...]ughter is not prohibited; for he that said, Thou shalt not kill, said also, Whosoever doth work upon the Sabbath, shall be put to death, Exod 35. vers. 2. No, nor yet all slaughter the cause not being heard; for he said, Slay every man his Brother, and every man his Companion, and overy man his Neigh­bour, Ex [...]. 32. v. 27. And there fell of the Peo­ple about three thousand men, v. 28. Nor yet all slaughter of an innocent Person; for Iephte vowed, Whosoever cometh forth, &c. I will offer him up for a burnt offering unto the [Page 306] Lord, Jud. 11. vers. 31. and his vow was accepted of God. What then is forbidden? Onely this: that no man kill another, who hath not a Right to kill him, that is to say, that no man kill, unlesse it belong to him to doe so. The Law of CHRIST therefore concerning killing, and conse­quently all manner of hurt done to any man, and what penalties are to be set, commands us to obey the City only▪ In like manner, by that Precept, Thou shalt not commit adul­tery, all manner of Copulation is not forbid­den, but only that of lying with another man [...] wife, but the judgment which is another mans wife, belongs to the City, and is to be determined by the rules which the City prescribes: This precept therefore com­mands both male and female to keep that faith intire which they have mutually gi­ven, according to the statutes of the City. So also by the precept, Thou shalt not steal, all manner of invasion, or secret surreption is not forbidden, but of another mans only: The subject therefore is commanded this only, that he invade not, nor take away ought which the City prohibits to be inva­ded or taken away; and universally not to call any thing murder, adultery, or theft, but what is done contrary to the civill Lawes. Lastly, seeing CHRIST hath com­manded us to honour our Parents, and hath not prescribed, with what Rites, what ap­pellations, and what manner of obedience they are to be honoured, it is to be supposed that they are to be honoured with the will indeed, and inwardly, as Kings and Lords over their Children, but outwardly, not be­yond [Page 307] the Citties permission, which shall as­sign to every man (as all things else, so also) his honour; But since the nature of justice consists in this, that every Man have his own given him, its mauifest, that it also be­longs to a Christian City to determine what is justice, what injustice, or a sinne against justice; Now what belongs to a City, that must be judged to belong to him or them who have the Soveraigne power of the City.

XI. Moreover, because our Saviour It belongs to civill authority to define what con­duces to the Peace and safety of the City. hath not shewed Subjects any other Lawes for the government of a City beside those of nature, that is to say, beside the Com­mand of obedience, no Subject can private­ly determine who is a publique friend, who an enemy, when Warre, when Peace, when Truce is to be made, nor yet what Subjects, what authority, and of what men, are com­modious, or prejudiciall to the safety of the Common-weale. These, and all like mat­ters therefore are to be learned, if need be, from the City, that is to say, from the So­neraign powers.

XII. Furthermore, all these things, to build Castles, Houses, Temples; to move, It belongs to the civill authority to judge (when need requires) what defi­nitions and what infe­rences are true. carry, take away mighty weights; to send securely over Seas; to contrive engines, ser­ving for all manner of uses; to be well ac­quainted with the face of the whole world, the Courses of the Starres, the seasons of the yeare, the accounts of the times, and the nature of all things; to understand perfectly all naturall and civill Rights; and all manner of of Sciences, which (comprehen­ded under the Title of Philosophy) are ne­cessary [Page 308] partly to live, partly to live well; I say, the understanding of these (because CHRIST hath not delivered it) is to be learnt from reasoning, that is to say by making necessary consequences, having first taken the beginning from experience; but mens reasonings are sometimes right, sometimes wrong, and consequently that which is concluded, and held for a truth, is sometimes truth, sometimes errour; now, errours even about these Philosophicall points doe sometimes publique hurt, and give occasions of great seditions, and inju­ries: It is needfull therefore, as oft as any controversie ariseth in these matters contra­ry to publique good, and common Peace, that there be some body to judge of the rea­soning, that is to say, whether that which is inferred, be rightly inferred or not, that so the controversie may be ended; But there are no rules given by CHRIST to this purpose, neither came he into the world to teach Logick. It remaines therefore that the Iudges of such controversies be the same with those whom God by nature had insti­tuted before, namely those who in each City are constituted by the Soveraign. More­over, if a controversie be raised of the ac­curate and proper signification (i. e.) the definition of those names or appellations which are commonly us'd, in so much as it is needfull for the peace of the City, or the distribution of right, to be determin'd, the determination will belong to the City; for men by reasoning doe search out such kind of definitions in their observation of di­verse conceptions, for the signification [Page 309] whereof, those appellations were us'd at divers times, and for divers causes; but the decision of the question whether a man doe reason rightly, belongs to the City. For Example. If a woman bring forth a Child of an unwonted shape, and the Law forbid to kill a man, the question is, whe­ther the Childe be a man. It is demanded therefore what a man is. No man doubts, but the City shall judge i [...], and that with­out taking an account of Aristotles defini­tion, that man is a rationall Creature. And these things (namely Right, Politie, and naturall Sciences) are Subjects concerning which CHRIT denies that it belongs to his Office to give any Praecepts, or teach any thing, beside this onely, that in all Controversies about them, every single Subject should obey the Lawes, and deter­minations of his City. Yet must we re­member this, that the same Christ as God could not onely have taught, but also com­manded what he would. It belongs to the Office of Christ to teach mora­lity, not as a speculation, but as a Law; to forgive sins, and to teach all things whereof there is no science pro­perly so call'd.

XIII. The summe of our Saviours Office was to teach the way, and all the meanes of Salvation, and aeternall life; but Iustice and civill obedience, and observation of all the naturall Lawes is one of the meanes to Salvation; now these may be taught two wayes; one, as Theorems by the way of naturall reason, by drawing Right and the natural Lawes from humane Prin­ciples, and contracts; and this Doctrine thus deliver'd is subject to the censure of civill powers: The other, as Lawes, by di­vine authority, in shewing the will of God to be such; and thus to teach, belongs [Page 310] onely to him to whom the Will of God is supernaturally knowne, that is to say, to Christ. Secondly, it belong'd to the Office of Christ to forgive sinnes to the Penitent, for that was necessary for the Salvation of men who had already sinn'd; neither could it be done by any other; for remission of sinnes followes not Repentance naturally, (as a Debt) but it depends (as a free gift) on the will of God supernaturally to be re­veal'd. Thirdly, it belongs to the Office of Christ to reach all those Commandements of God, whether concerning his worship, or those points of faith which cannot be un­derstood by naturall reason, but onely by revelation, of which nature are those that he was the Christ; that his Kingdome was not terrestriall, but celestiall; that there are re­wards, and punishments after this life; that the soule is immortall; that there should be such, and so many Sacraments, and the like.

XIV. From what hath beene sayed in A distin­ction of things tem­porall from spirituall. the foregoing Chapter, it is not hard to di­stinguish betweene things Spirituall, and Temporall, for since by Spirituall, those things are understood; which have their founda­tion on the authority, and Office of CHRIST, and unlesse CHRIST had taught them, could not have beene known, and all other things are temporall, it fol­lowes, that the definition, and determina­tion of whats just, and unjust, the cogni­zance of all controversies about the meanes of Peace, and publique defence, and the Ex­amiuation of doctrines, and books in all manner of rationall science, depends upon the [Page 311] temporall Right, but those which are mysteries of faith, depending on CHRIT his word, and authority onely, their judgements be­long to spirituall Right; But it is reasons inquisition, and pertaines to temporall Right to define what is spirituall, and what tem­porall, because our Saviour hath not made that distinction; For although Saint Paul in many places distinguish betweene spiri­tuall thiugs, and carnall things, and calls those things spirituall, which are of the spirit, to wit, the word of wisdome, the word of knowledge, saith, the gift of healing, the working of miracles, Prophesie, divers kindes of tongues, interpretation of tongues, Rom. 8. 5. 1 Cor. 12. 8, 9. All supernaturally inspi­red by the Holy Ghost, and such as the carnall man understands not, but he only who hath known the mind of CHRIST, 2. Cor. 2. 14, 15, 16. And those things carnall which be­long to worldly wealth, Rom. 15. 27. And the men carnall men, 1 Cor. 3. vers. 1, 2, 3. yet hath he not defined, nor given us any rules whereby we may know what proceeds from naturall reason, what from supernaturall inspiration.

XV. Seeing therefore it is plain that our Saviour hath committed to, or rather not The word of God many wayes taken. taken away from Princes, and those who in each City have obtained the Soveraignty, the supreme authority of judging & determine­ing al manner of cōtroversies about temporal matters, we must see henceforth to whom he hath left the same authority in matters spirituall. Which because it cannot bee known, except it be out of the word of God, and the Tradition of the Church, we must en­quire [Page 312] in the next place what the word of God is, what to interpret it, what a Church is, and what the will and command of the Church, To omit that the word of God is in Scripture taken sometimes for the Sonne of God, it is used, three manner of wayes, First, most pro­perly for that which God hath spoken; Thus whatsoever God spake unto Abraham, the Patriar [...]hs, Moses, and the Prophets, our Saviour to his Disciples, or any others, is the word of God. Secondly, whatsoever hath been uttered by men on the motion, or by Command of the Holy Ghost; in which sense we acknowledge the Scriptures to be the word of God. Thirdly, in the New Testament indeed the word of God most frequently signifies the Doctrine of the Gospell, or the word concerning God, or the word of the Kingdome of God by CHRIST: as where it is said that CHRIST preach't the Gospell of the Kingdome, Mat. 4. vers. 23. Where the Apo­stles are said to preach the word of God, Acts 13. vers. 46. Where the word of God is called the word of life, Acts 5. vers. 20. The word of the Gospell, Acts 15. vers. 7. The word of faith, Rom. 10. vers. 8. The word of truth, that is to say, (adding an interpretation) The Gospel of salvation, Eph. 1. 13. And where it is called the word of the Apostles; For Saint Paul sayes, If any man obey not our word, &c. 2. Thess. 3. vers. 14. which places cannot be otherwise meant then of the do­ctrine Evang [...]licall. In like manner where the word of God is said to be sowen, to en­crease, and to be multiplied, Acts 12. vers. 24. and Chap. 13. vers. 49. it is very hard to [Page 313] ceive this to be spoken of the voye [...] of God, or of his Apostles; but of their doctrine, ea­sie. And in this third acception is all that doctrine of the Christian faith which at this day is preacht in Pulpi [...]s, and contained in the hooks of divines, the word of God.

XVI. Now the sacred Seripture is All things contained in Scrip­ture, belong not to the Canon of christian faith. intirely the word of God in this second ac­ception, as being that which we acknow­ledge to be inspired from God; and innu­merable places of it, in the first: and seeing the greatest part of it is conversant either in the prediction of the Kingdome of Hea­ven, or in prefigurations before the incar­nation of CHRIST, or in Evangeli­zation, and explication after, The sacred Scripture is also the word of God, and therefore the Canon and Rule of all Evan­gelicall Doctrine, in this third signification, where the word of God is taken for the word concerning God, that is to say, for the Gospel. But because in the same Scriptures we read many things Politicall, Historicall, Morall, Physicall, and others which nothing at all concern the Myste [...]ies of our faith, those pla­ces although they contain true doctrine, and are the Canon of such kind of doctrines, yet can they not be the Canon of the My­steries of Christian Religion.

XVII. And truly it is not the dead The word of a lawfull Interpreter of Scrip­tures, is the word of God. voyce, or letter of the word of God, which is the Canon of Christian doctrine, but a true and genui [...]e determination; For the minde is not governed by Scriptures, unlesse they be understood. There is need there­fore of an Interpreter to make the Scrip­tures Canon, and hence followes one of [Page 314] these two things, that either the word of the Interpreter is the word of God, or that the Canon of Christian doctrin is not the word of God: The last of these must necessarily be false; for the rule of that doctrine which cannot be knowne by any humane reason, but by divine revelation only, cannot be lesse then divine; for whom we acknowledge not to be able to discern whether some do­ctrin be true or not, its impossible to account his opinion for a rule in the same doctrine. The first therefore is true, That the word of an Interpreter of Scriptures, is the word of God.

XVIII. Now that Interpreter whose The autho­rity of in­terpreting Scriptures, is the same with that of determi­ning con­troversies of faith. determination hath the honour to be held for the word of God, is not every one that translates the Scriptures out of the Hebrew, and Greek tongue, to his Latine Auditors in Latine, to his French, in French, and to o­ther Nations in their mother tongue; for this is not to interpret. For such is the nature of speech in generall, that although it deserve the chiefe place among those signes whereby we declare our conceptions to others, yet cannot it perform that office alone without the help of many circumstances; For the li­ving voice hath its interpreters present, to wit, time, place, countenance, gesture, the Counsell of the Speaker, and himselfe un­folding his own meaning in other words as oft as need is. To recall these aids of in­terpretation, so much desired in the wri­tings of old time, is neither the part of an ordinary wit, nor yet of the quaintest, with­out great learning, and very much skill in antiquity; It sufficeth not therefore for in­terpretation of Scriptures, that a man under­stand [Page 315] the language wherein they speak▪ Neither is every one an authentique Inter­preter of Scriptures, who writes Comments upon them: For men may erre, they may also either bend them to serve their own ambition, or even resisting. draw them into bondage by their forestallings; whence it will follow that an erroneous sentence must be held for the word of God. But although this could not happen, yet as soon as these Commentators are departed, their Com­mentaries will need explications, and in processe of time, those explications, exposi­tions; those expositions new Commenta­ries without any end: so as there cannot in any written Interpretation whatsoeve be a Canon, o [...] Rule of Christian doctrine, whereby the Controversies of Religion may be determined. It remains, that there must bee some Canonicall Interpreter whose legitimate Office it is to end Con­troversies begun, by explaining the word of God in the judgements themselves, and whose authority therefore must be no lesse obeyed, then theirs who first recommended the Scripture it selfe to us for a Canon of faith; and that one, and the same Person be an Interpreter of Scripture, and a supreme Judge of all manner of doctrines.

XIX. What concerns the word Eccle­sia, or Church, originally it signifies the Divers sig­nifications of a Church. same thing that Concio, or a congregation does in Latin; even as Ecclesiastes, or Church-man, the same that concionator, or Preacher, that is to say, He who speaks to the Congregation: In which sense wee read in the Acts of the Apostles, of a [Page 290] Church confused, and of a Lawfull Church, Acts 19. vers. 32, 39. That, taken for a Concourse of people meeting in way of tu­mult; this, for a convocated Assembly. But in holy writ by a Church of Christians, is sometimes understood the Assembly, and sometimes the Christians themselves, al­though not actually assembled, if they be permitted to enter into the Congregation, and to communicate with them. For exam­ple. Tell it to the Church, Mat. 18. vers. 17. is meant of a Church assembled; for other­wise it is impossible to tell any thing to the Church▪ But Hee laid waste the Church, Acts 8. vers. 3. is understood of a Church not assembled. Sometimes a Church is taken for those who are baptized, or for the pro­fessors of the Christian [...]aith, whether they be Christians inwardly, or feignedly, as when we reade of somewhat said or writ­ [...]n to the Church, or said or decreed, or done by the Church; sometimes for the Elect onely, as when it is called holy, and without blemish, Ephes. 5. vers. 27. But the Elect, as they are militant, are not properly called a Church; for they know not how to assem­ble, but they are a future Church, namely in that day when sever'd from the repro­bate, they shall bee triumphant. Againe a Church may bee [...]ometimes taken (for all Christians collectively,) as when Christ is called the head of his Church, and the head of his body the Church, Eph. 5. vers. 23. Colos. 1. vers. 18. sometimes for its parts, as the Church of Ephe­sus, The Church which is in his house, the se­ven Churches, &c. Lastly, a Church as it is [Page 317] taken for a Company actually assembled, according to the divers ends of their meet­ing, signifies sometimes those who are met together to deliberate, and judge, in which sense it is also called a Councell, & a Synod; sometimes those who meet together in the house of prayer to worship God, in which signification it is taken in the 1 Cor. 14. vers. 4, 5. 23. 28. &c.

XX. Now a Church which hath perso­nall What a Church is to whom we attri­bute Rights, actions, and the like ap­pellations proper to a Person. Rights, and proper actions attributed to it, and of which that same must necessarily be understood, Tell it to the church, and, he that obeys not the church, and all such like [...]ormes of speech, is to be defin'd so, as by that word may be understood, A Multitude of men who have made a new Covenant with God in Christ, (that is to say, a multitude of them who have taken upon them the Sacrament of Baptisme) which multitude, may both lawfully be call'd together by some one into one place, and he so calling them, are bound to be present either in Person, or by others. For a multitude of men, if they cannot meet in assembly, when need requires, is not to be call'd a Person; For a Church can nei­ther speak, nor discerne, nor heare, but as it is a congregation. Whatsoever is spoken by particular men, (to wit, as many opini­ons almost as heads) that's the speech of one man, not of the Church; farthermore, if an assembly be made, and it be unlaw­full, it shall be considered as [...]ll. Not any one of these therefore who are present in a tumult shall be tyed to the decree of the rest, but specially if he dissent; and therefore [Page 318] neither can such a Church make any decree; for then a multitude is sayd to decree some­what, when every man is oblig'd by the decree of the major part. We must there­fore grant to the definition of a Church (to whith we attribute things belonging to a Per­son) not onely a possibility of assembling, but also of doing it lawfully. Besides, al­though there be some one who may lawfully call the rest together, yet if they who are called may lawfully not appeare (which may happen among men who are not sub­ject one to another) that same Church is not one Person. For by what Right they, who being call'd to a certaine time, and place, doe meet together, are one Church; by the same, others flocking to another place ap­pointed by them, are another Church. And every number of men of one opinion is a Church, and by Consequence there will be as many Churches as there are divers opini­ons, that is to say, the same multitude of men will at once prove to be one, and ma­ny Churches. Wherefore a Church is not one, except there be a certaine, and known, that is to say, a lawfull power, by meanes whereof every man may be oblig'd to be present in the Congregation, either him­selfe in person, or by Proxie; and that be­comes One, and is capable of personall fun­ctions, by the union of a lawfull power of convocating Synods, and assemblies of Christians; not by uniformity of Doctrine▪ and otherwise, it is a multitude; and Per­sons in the plurall, howsoever agreeing in opinions. A Christ [...] City is the same with a Christian Church.

XXI. It followes what hath beene [Page 319] already said by necessary connexion, that a City of Christian men, and a Church, is al­together the same thing, of the same men, term'd by two names, for two causes: For the matter of a City & a Church is one, to wit the same Christian men. And the forme which consists in a Lawfull power of assembling them is the same too; for 'tis manifest that every Subject is oblig'd to come thither, whither he is summon'd by his City. Now that which is call'd a City, as it is made up of men, the same, as it consists of Christians, is styled a Church.

XXII. This too is very cohaerent with Many Cities do [...] not con­stitute one church. the same points, If there he many Chri­stian Cities, they are not altogether personally one church: they may indeed by mutuall consent become one Church, but no other­wise, then as they must also become one City; For they cannot assemble but at some certaine time, and to some place ap­pointed. But Persons, places, and times, belong to civill Right, neither can any Subject or stranger lawfully set his foot on any place, but by the permission of the City, which is Lord of the place. But the things which cannot lawfully be done but by the permission of the City, those, if they be lawfully done, are done by the Cities authority. The Universall church is indeed one mysticall body, whereof CHRIST is the head, but in the same manner, that all men together acknowledging God for the Ruler of the world, are one Kingdome, and one C [...]ty, which notwithstanding is neither one Person, nor hath it one common action, or determination. Farthermore where it is [Page 320] said that CHRIST is the head of his body the Church, it manifestly appeares, that that was spoken by the Apostle of the Elect, who as long as they are in this world, are a Church onely in potentiâ, but shall not actually be so before they be separated from the reprobate, and gather'd together among themselves, in the day of Judge­ment. The Church of Rome of old was very great, but she went not beyond the bounds of her Empire, and therefore nei­ther was she Universall, unlesse it were in that sense, wherein it was also said of the City of Rome, Orbem jam totum victor Ro­manus habebat, when as yet he had not the twentieth part of it. But after that the civill Empire was divided into parts, the single Cities thence arising were so many Churches, and that power which the Church of Rome had over them, might perhaps wholy depend on the authority of those Churches, who having cast off the Emperours were yet content to admit the Doctours of Rome.

XXIII. They may be called Church-men Who are Clergy-men. who exercise a publique office in the Church. But of offices there was one a Mini­stery, another a Maistery; The office of the Ministers was to serve Tables, to take care of the temporall goods of the Church, and to distribute (at that time when all propri­ety of riches being abolisht, they were fed in common) to each man his portion; The Maisters according to their order, were called some Apostles, some Bishops, some Presbyters, that is to say, Elders; yet not so, as that by the name of Presbyter, the [Page 321] age, but the office might be d [...]stinguisht; For Timothy was a Presbyter although a young man; but because for the most part the Elders were receiv'd into the Maister­ship, the word, denoting age, was us'd to signifie the office. The same Maisters, according to the diversity of their employ­ments were called some of them Apostles, some Prophets, some Evangelists, some Pastors or Teachers. And the Apostolicall worke indeed was universall; the Prophe­ticall to declare their owne revelations in the Church; the Evangelicall to preach, or to be publishers of the Gospell among the infi­dels; that of the Pastors to teach, confirme, and rule the minds of those who already beleev'd.

XXIV. In the Election of Church-men The Electi­on of Church-men belongs to the Church, their conse­cration to the Pastors. two things are to be considered, the Electi­on of the Persons, and their consecration, or institution, which also is called ordina­tion. The first twelve Apostles CHRIST himselfe both elected, and ordain'd. After CHRISTS asc [...]nsion Matthias was elected in the roome of Judas the Trai­tour, the Church (which at that time con­sisted of a Congregation of about one hun­dred and twenty men) choosing two men: And they appointed two, Joseph and Matthias; but God himselfe by lot appro­ving of Ma [...]ias. And Saint Paul calls these twelve the first, and great Apostles, also the Apostles of the Circumcision. Afterward were added two other Apostles, Paul, and Barna­bas, ordain'd indeed by the Doctours, and Prophets of the Church of A [...]h, (which was a particular Church) by the imposition [Page 322] of hands, but elected by the command of the Holy Ghost. That they were both Apostles is manifest in the 13. of the Acts v. 2, 3. That they receiv'd their Apostleship from hence, namely because they were separated by command of the spirit for the work of God, from the rest of the Prophets, and Doctours of the Church of Antioch, Saint Paul him­selfe shewes, who calls himselfe for distin­ctions sake an Apostle separated unto the Go­spell of God, Rom. 1. ver. 1. But if it be demanded, further by what authority it came to passe that that was receiv'd for the com­mand of the Holy Ghost, which those Pro­phets and Doctours did say proceeded from him, it must necessarily be answer'd; by the Authority of the church of Antioch: for the Prophets & Doctours must be examined by the Church before they be admitted; For Saint John saith, Beleeve not every Spitit, but try the Spirits, whether they are of God, be­cause many false Prophets are gone out into the world; but by what Church, but that to which that Epistle was written? In like manner Saint Paul reprooves the Churches of Galatia, because they Judaized, Gal. 2. v. [...]4. although they seemed to doe so by the Authority of Peter, for when he had told them that he had reprehended Peter him­selfe with these words, If thou being a Iew, livest after the manner of Gentiles, and not as doe the Iewes, why compellest thou the Gen­tiles to live as do [...] the Iewes? Not long after he questions them, saying, This onely would I learne of you: Received ye the Spirit by the works of the Law, or by the hearing of faith? Gal. 3. ver [...]. Where it is evident, that it [Page 323] was Judaisme which he reprehended the Ga­lathians for, notwithstanding that the Apo­stle Peter compelled them to Judaize. Seeing therefore it belonged to the Church, and not to Peter, and therefore also not to any man, to determine what Doctors they should fol­low, it also pertained to the authority of the Church of Antioch to elect their Prophets and Doctors. Now because the Holy Ghost se­parated to himself the Apostles Paul & Bar­nabas, by the imposition of hands from Do­ctors thus elicted, its manifest, that imposition of hands, & consecration, of the prime Doctors in each Church, belongs to the Doctors of the same Church. But Bishops, who were also called Presbyters, although all Presbyters were not Bishops, were ordain'd somtimes by Apostles (for Paul & Barnabas when they had taught in Derbe, Lystra, and I [...]onium, ordai­ned Elders in every Church, Acts 14. v. 23.) sometimes by other Bishops, for Titus was by Paul left in Crete, that he should ordain Elders in every City, Tit. 1. v. 5. And Timothy was advised not to neglect the gift that was in him, which was given him by Prophesy with the laying on of the hands of the Presbytery, 1. Tim. 4. v. 14: And he had rules given him concerning the Election of Presbyters. But that cannot be understood otherwise, then of the ordination of those who were elected by the Church; for no man could constitute a Doctor in the Church, but by the Churches permission. For the duty of the Apostles themselves was not to command, but to teach; and although they who were recom­mended by the Apostles, or Presbyters, were not rejected, for the esteem that was had of [Page 324] the recommenders, yet seeing they could not be elected without the will of the Church, they were also suppos'd elected by the au­thority of the Church. In like manner Mini­sters, who are called Deacons, were ordained by the Apostles; yet elected by the Church; for when the seven Deacons were to bee ele­cted, and ordained, the Apostles elected them not, but look yee out, (say they) among you Brethren seven men of honest report. &c. And they chose Stephen, &c. And they set them before the Apostles, Acts 6. vers. 13. 6. It is apparent therefore by the custome of the Primitive Church under the Apostles, that the ordination, or consecration of all Church-men, which is done by prayer, and imposition of hands, belonged to the Apostles, and Doctors; but the Election of those who were to be consecrated, to the Church.

XXV. Concerning the power of bind­ing, The power of remit­ting sinnes to the peni­tent, and retaining those of the impenitent, belongs to the Pastors, but judge­ment of the repentance to the Church. and loosing, that is to say of remitting, and retaining of sinnes, there is no doubt, but it was given by Christ to the Pastors then yet for to come, in the same manner as it was to the present Apostles: now the Apostles had all the power of remitting of sins given them, which Christ himselfe had; As the Father hath sent me (sayes Christ) so send I you, John 20. vers. 21. and he addes, Whose soever sins yee remit, they are remitted, and whose soever sins ye retain, they are retained. vers. 23. But what binding and loosing, or remitting and retaining of sinnes, is, admits of some scruple. For first, to retain his sinnes who being baptized into remission of sins, is truly penitent, seems to be against the very Covenant it selfe of the new Testa­ment, [Page 325] and therefore could not be done by Christ himselfe, much lesse by his Pastors, and to remit the impenitent, seems to be against the will of God the Father, from whom Christ was sent to convert the world, and to reduce men unto obedience; Fur­thermore, if each Pastor had an authority granted him to remit and retain sinnes in this manner, all awe of Princes, and civill Magistrates, together with all kind of civill Government would be utterly destroyed. For Christ hath said it▪ nay even nature it [...]elfe dictates, that we should not feare them who slay the body, but cannot kill the soule, but rather feare him who can ca [...]t both soule and body into hell, Mat. 10. vers. 28. Neither is any man so mad as not to choose to yeeld obedience rather to them who can remit, and retain their sinnes, then to the powerfullest Kings. Nor yet on the other side, it is to be imagined, that remission of sinnes is nothing else but an exemption from Ecclesiasticall punishments; for what evill hath excom­munication in it, beside the eternall pains which are consequent to it? or what benefit is it to be received into the Church if there were salvation out of it? We must there­fore hold, That Pastors have power, truly, and absolutely to forgive sinnes, but, to the peni­tent, and to retain them, but, of the impenitent. But while men think that to Repent, is no­thing else but that every one condemn his Actions, and change those Counsels which to himselfe seem sinfull, and blameable, there is an opinion risen, that there may be repentance before any Confession of sinnes to men, and that repentance is not an ef­fect, [Page 326] but a cause of Confession, and thence, the difficulty of those who say that the sins of the penitent are already forgiven in Baptisme, and theirs who repent not, can­not be forgiven at al, is against Scripture, and contrary to the words of Christ, Whose soever sins ye remit▪ &c. We must therefore [...]o resolve this difficulty know in the first place, that a true acknowledgement of sin is Repentance, for he that knows he hath sinned, knows he hath erred, but to will an errour is impossi­ble, therefore he that knowes he hath sinned, wishes he had not done it, which is to re­pent. Farther, where it may be doubtfull, whether that which is done be a sin or not, we must consider, that repentance doth not precede confession of sins, but is subsequent to it: for there is no repentance but of sinnes acknowledged. The penitent therefore must both acknowledge the fact, and know it to be a sinne, that is to say, against the Law. If a man therefore think, that what he hath done, is not against the Law; its impossible he should repent of it. Before repentance therefore, its necessary there be an applica­cation of the facts unto the Law, but its in vain to apply, the facts unto the Law with­out an Interpreter; for not the words of the Law, but the sentence of the Law-giver is the rule of mens actions; but surely either one man, or some men are the Interpreters of the Law, for every man is not judge of his own fact whether it be a sin or not, where­fore the fact of which we doubt whether it be a sinne or not, must be unfolded before some man or men, and the doing of this is confession. Now when the Interpreter of the [Page 327] Law hath judged the fact to bee a sinne, if the sinner submit to his judgement, and resolve with himselfe not to do so any more, tis repentance; and thus, either it is not true repentance, or else it is not antecedent, but subsequent to confession. These things being thus explained, it is not hard to un­derstand what kinde of power that of bind­ing and loosing is; for seeing in remission of sinnes there are two things considerable, one the Judgement or Condemnation where­by the fact is judged to be a sinne; the o­ther, (when the Party condemned does acquiesce, and obey the sentence, that is to say, Repents) the remission of the sinne, or, (if he repent not) the Retention: The first of these, that is to say, the Judging whether it be a sinne or not, belongs to the Interpreter of the Law, that is, the Soveraign Judge▪ the second, namely Remission, or retention of the sinne, to the Pastor, and it is that con­cerning which the power of binding and loo­sing is conversant. And that this was the true meaning of our Saviour Christ in the institution of the same power, is apparent in the 18. of Mat. vers. 15, 16, 17, 18. thus, He there speaking to his Disciples, sayes. If thy Brother sinne against thee, goe, and tell him his fault betweene thee and him alone, (where we must observe by the way, that if thy Brother sinne against thee, is the same with, if he doe thee injury; and therefore Christ spake of those matters which belon­ged to the civill Tribunall) he addes, if he heare thee not (that is to say, if he deny that he hath done it, or if having confest the fact, he denies it to be unjustly done) take with [Page 328] with thee yet one or two, and if he refuse to heare them, tell it the Church. But why to the Church, except that she might judge whether it were a sinne or not? But if he refuse to hear the Church, that is, if he doe not submit to the Churches sentence, but shall maintain that to be no sin, which She Judges to be a sinne, that is to say, if he repent not (for certain it is that no man repents himselfe of that action which She conceives not to be a sinne) he saith not, Tell it to the Apostles, that we might know that the definitive sen­tence in the question, whether it were a sin or not, was not left unto them, but to the Church; but let him be unto thee (sayes he) as an Heathen, or Publican, that is, as one out of the Church, as one that is not baptized, that is to say, as one whose sinnes are retained. For all Christians were bapti­zed into remission of sinnes. But because it might have been demanded who it was that had so great a power, as that of withholding the benefit of Baptisme from the impeni­tent, Christ shewes that the same Persons to whom he had given authority to baptize the penitent into the remission of sinns, and to make them of heathen men, Christians, had also authority to retain their sins who by the Church should be adjudged to be im­penitent, and to make them of Christian men Heathens; and therefore presently subjoynes, Verily I say unto you, Whose soever sinnes yee shall binde upon Earth, they shall [...]ee bound also in Heaven, and whose soever sins yee shall loose upon Earth, they shall be [...]oosed also in Heaven: Whence we may understand, that the power of bind­ing, [Page 329] and loosing, or of remitting, and re­taining of sinnes, which is called in another place, the power of the keyes, is not diffe­rent from the power given in another place in these words, Goe, and teach all Nations, Baptizing them in the Name of the Father, and of the Sonne, and of the Holy Ghost, Mat. 28. ver. 19. And even as the Pastours cannot refuse to Baptize him whom the Church judges worthy, so neither can they retaine his sinnes whom the Church holds fitting to be absolv'd, nor yet remit his sinnes whom the Church pronounceth dis­obedient. And it is the Churches part to judge of the sinne, the Pastours, to cast out, or to receive into the Church those that are judg'd. Thus Saint Paul to the Church of Corinth, Do not ye judge, saith he, of those that are within? Yet he himself pronounc't the sentence of Excommunication against the incestuous Person, I indeed (saith he) as absent in body, but present in Spirit, &c.

XXVI. The act of retaining sinnes is What ex­communi­cation is, and on whom it cannot passe. that which is called by the Church Excom­munication, and by Saint Paul, delivering over to Satan, the word Excommunication, [...]ounding the same with [...], easting out of the Synagogue, seems to be borrowed from the Mosaicall Law, wherein they who were by the Priest ad­judged [...]eprous, were commanded to be kept a part out of the Camp, untill by the judgement of the Priest they were againe pronounc't cleane, and by certaine rights (among which the washing of the body was one) were purified, Levit. 13. ver. 46. From hence in processe of time it became a [Page 330] custome of the Jewes, not to receive those who passed from Gentilisme to Judaisme, (supposing them to be uncleane) unlesse they were first washed, and those who dis­sented from the Doctrine of the Synagogue, they cast out of the Synagogue; By resem­blance of this custome, those that came to Christianity, (whether [...]hey were Jewes, or Gentiles) were not receiv'd into the Church without Baptisme; and those that dissented from the Church were depriv'd of the Churches Communion. Now, they were therefore said to be deliver'd over to Satan, because all that was out of the Church, was comprehended within his Kingdome The end of this kind of Disci­pline was, that being destitute for a time of the grace▪ and spirituall priviledges of the Church, they might be humbled to salvati­on; but the effect in regard of secular mat­ters, that being excommunicated, they should not onely be prohibited all Congregations, or Churches, and the participation of the mysteries, but as heing contagious they should be avoided by all other Christians, even more then Heathen: for the Apostle allowed to accompany with Heathen, but with these not so much as to eate, 1 Cor. 5. ver. 10, 11. Seeing then the effect of Excommuni­cation is such, it is manifest in the first place, that a Christian city cannot be excommunicated, for a Christian City is a Christian Church, as hath been declar'd above in the 21. Art. and of the same extension; but a Church cannot be excommunicated; For either she must excommunicate her selfe, which is im­possible; or she must be excommunicated by [Page 331] some other Church, and this, either universall, or particular. But seeing an Universall Church is no Person, (as hath been prov'd in the 22. Artic.) and therefore neither acts, nor does any thing, it cannot excommunicate any man; and a particular church by excommuni­cating another Church doth nothing; for where there is not one common Congrega­tion, there cannot be any Excommunication. Neither if some one Church (suppose that of Jerusalem) should have excommunicated an other (suppose that of Rome) would it any more have excommunicated this, then her selfe: for he that deprives another of his Communion, deprives himselfe also of the Communion of that other. Secondly, No man can excommunicate the subjects of any absolute government all at once, or forbid them the use of their Temples, or their publique wor­ship of God; for they cannot be excommuni­cated by a Church which themselves doe constitute; for if they could, there would not onely not remain a Church, but not so much as a common-weale, and they would be dissolved of themselves; and this were not to be excommunicated, or prohibited: but if they be excommunicated by some other Church, that church is to esteem them as Heathen; but no christian Church by the doctrine of Christ, can forbid the Heathen to gather together, and Communicate among themselves, as it shall seem good to their Cities, especially if they meet to worship Christ, although it be done in a singular custome, and manner: therefore also not the excommunicated, who are to be dealt with as Heathen. Thirdly, a Prince who hath the Soveraign power, cannot [Page 332] be excommunicated; for by the doctrine of Christ, neither one, nor many subjects to­gether can in [...]erdict their Prince any pub­lique, or private places, or deny him en­trance into any Assembly whatsoever, or prohibit him the doing of what hee will within his own jurisdiction; for it is Trea­son among all Cities, [...]o [...]any one, or many subjects joyntly to arrogate to themselves any authority over the whole City; but they who arroga [...]e to themselves an authority over him who hath the supreme power of the City, doe arrogate the same authority over the City it selfe. Besides, a Soveraign Prince, if he be a Christian, hath this far­ther advantage, that the City whose Will is contained in His, is that very thing which we call a Church; the Church therefore excom­municates no man, but whom it excommu­nicates by the authrity of the Prince: but the Prince excommunicates not himselfe, his subjects therefore cannot doe it. It may be indeed that an Assembly of rebellious Ci­tizens or Traytors▪ may pronounce the sen­tence of excommunication against their Prince, but not by Right. Much lesse can one Prince be excommunicated by another, for this would prove not an excommunication, but a provocation to Warre by the way of affront: For since that is not one church which is made up of Citizens belonging to two absolute Cities, for want of power of lawfully assembling them, (as hath been declar'd before in the 22▪ Art.) they who are of one Church are not bound to obey an other, and therefore cannot be excommu­nicated for their disobedience. Now, what [Page 333] some may say, that Princes, being they are members of the Universall church, may also by the authority of the Universall church be excommunicated, signifies nothing: because the Universall church (as hath beene shewed in the 22. Art.) is not one Person, of whom it may be said that shee acted, decreed, deter­min'd excommunicated, absolv'd, and the like personall attributes, neither hath she any Governour upon Earth at whose command she may assemble, and deliberate: For to be guide of the Universall church, and to have the power of assembling her, is the same thing as to be Governour▪ and Lord over all the Christians in the world, which is granted to none, but God onely.

XXVII. It hath beene shewed above The inter­pretation of Scripture depends on the autho­rity of the Ci [...]y. in the 18. Art. that the authority of inter­preting the Holy Scriptures consisted not in this, that the interpreter might without pu­nishment, expound, and explicate his sen­tence & opinion taken thence, unto others, either by▪ writing, or by his owne voice; but, that others have a not Right to doe, or teach ought contrary to his sentence; in­somuch as the interpretation we speak of is the same with the power of defining in all manner of controversies to be determined by sacred Scriptures: Now we must shew that that power belongs to each Church, and depends on his, or their authority who have the Supreme command, provided that they be Christians; for if it depend not on the civill authority, it must either depend on the opinion of each private Subject, or some forraigne authority; but among o­the [...] reasons, the inconveniencies that must [Page 334] follow private opinions cannot suffer its dependance on them; of which this is the chiefe, that not onely all civill obedience would be taken away (contrary to Christ his praecept) but all humane society and peace would be dissolved (contrary to the Lawes of nature;) for seeing every man is his owne interpretet of Scripture, that is to say, since every man makes himselfe judge of what is pleasing and displeasing unto God, they cannot obey their Princes be­fore that they have judg'd whether their commands be conformable to the Word of God, or not; And thus either they obey not, or they obey for their owne opinions sake, that is to say, they obey themselves, not their Soveraigne; civill obedience there­fore is lost. Againe, when every man fol­lowes his owne opinion, it's necessary that the controversies which rise among them will become innumerable, and indetermi­nable; whence there will breed among men (who by their own naturall inclinations doe account all dissention an affront) first hatred, then brawles and warres, and thus all manner of peace and society would va­nish. We have farthermore for an example, that which God under the old Law required to be observed concerning the book of the Law, namely, that it should be transcribed, and publiquely us'd, and he would have it to be the Canon of Divine doctrine, but the controversies about it not to be determi­ned by private Persons, but onely by the Priests. Lastly, it is our Saviours Prec [...]pt, that if there be any matter of offence be­tween private Persons, they should hea [...] the [Page 335] Church. Wherefore it is the Churches duty to define controversies, it therefore belongs not to private men, but to the Church, to in­terpret Scriptures. But that we may know that the authority of interpreting Gods Word, that is to say, of determining all questions concerning God, and Religion, belongs not to any forraign Person whatsoever, we must consider first what esteem such a power car­ries in the mindes of the subjects, and their civill actions: for no man can be ignorant that the voluntary actions of men by a na­turall necessi [...]y, doe follow those opinions which they have concerning good, and evill, Reward, and Punishment; whence it happens that necessarily they would chuse rather to obey those by whose judgement they beleeve that they shall be eternally hap­py, or miserable. Now, by whose judge­ment it is appointed what Doctrines are ne­cessary to salvation, by their judgement doe men expect their eternall blisse, or perditi­dition; they will therefore yeeld them obe­dience in all things. Which being thus, most manifest it is that those subjects who believe themselves bound to acquiesce to a forraign authority in those Doctrines which are ne­cessary to salvation, doe not per se consti­tute a City, but are the subjects of that for­raign power. Nor therefore although some Soveraign Prince should by writing grant such an authority to any other, yet so, as he would be understood to have retained the civill power in his own hands, shall such a Writing be valid, or transferre ought ne­cessary for the retaining, o [...] good admi­nistration of his command; for by the [Page 336] 2. Chap. 4. art [...]. no man is said to transferre his Right, unlesse be give some proper sign, declaring his Will to transferre it; but he who hath openly declared his will to keep his Soveraignty, cannot have given a sufficient sign of transferring the means necessary for the keeping it. This kinde of Writing therefore will not be a sign of Will, but of Ignorance in the contractors. We must consider ne [...]t how absurd it is for a City, or Soveraign, to commit the ruling of his Sub­jects consciences to an enemy; for they are, as hath been shewed above in the 5. Chap. 6. artic. in an hostile state, whosoever have not joyn'd themselves into the unity of one Person. Nor contradicts it this truth that they doe not alwayes fight: (for tr [...]ces are made between enemies) It is sufficient for an hostile minde, that there is suspition, that the Frontiers of Cities, Kingdomes, Empires, strengthned with Garisons, doe with a fighting posture and countenance, though they strike not, yet as enemies mu­tually he hold each other. Lastly, how une­quall is it to demand that, which by the very reason of your demand, you confesse be­longs to anothers Right? I am the Inter­preter of Scriptures to you who are the Sub­ject of anothers Realme. Why? By what Covenants past between you and me? By Divine authority. Whence knowne? Out of holy Scripture. Behold the Book, read i [...] in vain, unlesse I may also interpret the same for my self; That interpretation there­fore doth by Right belong to me, and the rest of my private fellow-subjects; which we both deny: It remains therefore that in [Page 337] all christian Churches, that is to say, in all christian Cities, the interpretation of sacred Scripture depend on, and derive from the authority of that man, or Councell, which hath the Soveraign power of the City.

XXVIII. Now because there are A christian city must interpret Scriptures by clergy-men. two kindes of controversies, the one about spirituall matters, that is to say, questions of faith, the truth whereof cannot be searcht into by naturall reason, such are the questi­ons concerning the nature, and office of Christ, of rewards and punishments to come, of the Sa­craments, of outward worship, and the like: the other, about questions of humane science, whose truth is sought out by naturall reason, and Syllogismes, drawne from the Cove­nants of men, and definitions (that is to say, significations received by use, and common consent of words) such as are all questions of Right, and Philosophy; for example, when in matter of Right its questioned whether there be a Promise, and Covenant, or not? that is nothing else, but to de­mand, whether such words spoken in such a manner be by common use, and consent of the Subjects, a Promise or Covenant; which if they be so called, then it is true that a Contract is made, if not, then it is false: that truth therefore depends on the com­pacts, and consents of men. In like man­ner when it is demanded in Philosophy whether the same thing may entirely be in divers places at once; the determination of the question depends on the knowledge of the common consent of men about the sig­nification of the word entire: for if men when they say a thing is entirely [...]some­where [Page 338] doe signifie by common consent that they understand nothing of the same to be elsewhere, it is false that the same thing is in divers places at once: that truth there­fore depends on the consents of men, and by the same reason in all other questions concerning Right, and Philosophy: And they who doe judge that any thing can be determin'd, (contrary to this common con­sent of men concerning the appellations of things) out of obscure places of Scripture, doe also judge that the use of speech, and at once all humane society, is to be taken a­way; for he who hath sold an whole field, will say, he meant one whole ridg [...], and will retaine the rest as unsold; nay, they take away reason it selfe, which is nothing else but a searching out of the truth made by such consent. These kinde of questions therefore need not be determin'd by the City by way of interpretation of Scriptures, for they belong not to Gods Word, in that sense wherein the Word of God is taken for the Word concerning God, that is to say, for the Doctrine of the Gospell; neither is he who hath the Soveraigne power in the Church, oblig'd to employ any Ecclesiastical Doctours for the judging of any such kind of matters as these; but for the deciding of questions of Faith, that is to say, concerning God, which transcend humane capacity, we stand in need of a divine blessing (that we may not be deceiv'd at least in necessary points) to be deriv'd from CHRIST himselfe by the imposition of hands. For, seeing to the end we may attaine to aeternal Salvation, we are oblig'd to a supernatural Doctrine, & [Page 339] which therefore it lis impossible for us to understand, to be left so destitute, as that we can be deceiv'd in necessary points, is repugnant to aequity. This infallibility our Saviour Christ promis'd (in those things which are necessary to Salvation) to his Apostles untill the day of judgement; that is to say, to the Apostles, and Pastors suc­ceeding the Apostles who were to be con­secrated by the imposition of hands. He there­fore who hath the Soveraigne power in the City, is oblig'd as a Christian, where there is any question concerning the Mysteries of Faith, to interpret the Holy Scriptutes by Clergy-man lawfully ordain'd. And thus in Christian Cities the judgement both of spirituall and temporall matters belongs unto the civill authority: And that man, or councell who hath the Supreme power, is head both of the City, and of the Church; for a Church, and a Christian City is but one thing.

CHAP. XVIII. Concerning those things which are necessary for our entrance in­to the Kingdome of Heaven.

[Page 341] I. IT was ever granted that all authority The diffi­culty pro­pounded concerning the repug­naney of obeying God, and men, is to be remov'd by the distin­ction be­tweene the points ne­cessary, and not necessa­ry to Sal­vation. in secular matters deriv'd from him who had the Soveraigne power, whether he were one Man, or an Assembly of Men, that the same in spirituall matters depended on the authority of the Church, is manifest by the next foregoing proofs; and besides this, that all Christian Cities are Churches endu [...]d with this kind of authority: From whence a man though but dull of appre­hension may collect, that in a Christian City, (that is to say, in a City whose Soveraignty belongs to a Christian Prince, o [...] Councell) all power, as well spiritual, as secular, is united under Christ, and therefore it is to be obey'd in all things; but on the other side, because we must rather obey God then Men, there is a difficulty risen, how obedience may safely be yeelded to them, if at any time somewhat should be commanded by them to be done which CHRIST hath prohibited. The rea­son of this difficulty is, that seeing God no longer speakes to us by CHRIST, and his Prophets in open voice, but by the holy Scriptures, which by divers men are divers­ly understood, they know indeed what Princes, and a congregated Church doe command, but whether that which they doe command be contrary to the word of God, or not, this they know not, but with a wa­vering obedience between the punishments of temporall, and spirituall death, as it were sailing betweene Scilla and Cary [...]is, they often run themselves upon both: But they who rightly distinguish betweene the things necessary to Salvation▪ and those which are not necessary, can have none of this kind of [Page 342] doubt, for if the command of the Prince, or City be such, that he can obey it with­out hazard of his aeternnll Salvation, it is unjust not to obey them, and the Apostles praecepts take place: Servants in all things obey your Masters according to the flesh. Chil­dren obey your Parents in all things. Col. 3. v. 20, 22. And the command of CHRIST, The Scribes and Pharisees sit in Moyses chair, all things therefore whatsoever they com­mand you, that observe, and doe. Mat. 23. v. 2. On the contrary, if they command us to doe those things which are punisht with aeternall death, it were madnesse not rather to chuse to dye a naturall death, then by obeying, to dye eternally; and then comes in that which CHRIST sayes, Feare not them who kill the body, but cannot kill the Soule. Mat. 10. v. 28. We must see therefore what all those things are, which are necessary to Salvation.

II. Now all things necessary to Salva­tion All things necessary to Salvation are con­tain'd in Faith, and Obedience. are comprehended in two vertues, Faith, and Obedience: The latter of these if it could be perfect would alone suffice to preserve us from damnation; but because we have all of us beene long since guilty of disobedience against God in Adam, and besides we our selves have since actually sinned, Obedience is not sufficient without remission of sinnes; but this, together with our entrance into the Kingdome of Hea­ven is the reward of Faith, nothing else is requisite to Salvation; for the Kingdome of Heaven is shut to none but sinners, that is to say, those who have not perform'd due Obedience to the Lawes; and not to those neither, if they beleeve the necessary articles [Page 343] of the Christian Faith. Now, if we shall know in what points Obedience doth con­sist, and which are the necessary articles of the Christian Faith, it will at once be manifest what we must doe, and what abstaine from, at the commands of Cities, and of Princes.

III. But by Obedience in this place is What kind of Obedi­ence that is which is re­quir'd of us. signified not the fact, but the Will and de­sire wherewith we purpose, and endeavour as much as we can to obey for the future: in which sense the word Obedience is aequi­valent to Repentance, for the vertue of repen­tance consists not in the sorrow which ac­companies the remembrance of sinne; but in our conversion to the way, and full purpose to sinne no more, without which that sorrow is said to be the sorrow not of a Penitent but a desperate person: But be­cause they who love God cannot but desire to obey the divine Law, and they who love their Neighbours cannot but desire to obey the morall Law, which consists as hath beene shewed above in the 3. Chapter, in the prohibition of Pride, ingratitude, contu­mely, inhumanity, cruelty, injury, and the like offences, whereby our Neighbours are pre­judic't, therefore also Love or charity are aequivalent to Obedience. Justice also (which is a constant will of giving to every man his due) is aequivalent with it. But that Faith and Repentance are sufficient for Sal­vation, is manifest by the Covenant it selfe of Baptisme; for they who were by Peter converted on the day of Pentecost, demand­ing him what they should do? He answered, Repent, and he Baptiz'd over [...] one of you in the name of Jesus for the remission of your Sins. Act. 2. v. 38. There was nothing therefore to [Page 344] be done for the obtaining of Baptisme, that is to say, for to enter into the Kingdome of God, but to Repent, and beleeve in the Name of JESUS; For the Kingdome of Hea­ven is pro [...]is'd by the Covenant which is made in Baptisme▪ farthermore, by the words of CHRIST answering the Lawyer who a [...]k [...] him what [...]e should doe to inherit eternall life, Thou knowest the the Commandements, Thou shalt not Kill, Thou shalt not commit Adultery, &c. which refer to Obedience; and, Sell all that thou [...]ast, and come, and f [...]llow me, which relates to [...]aith, Luke 18. ver. 20. Mar. 10. ver. 18. And by that which is said, The just shall live by Faith, (no [...] every man, but the just) for Justice is the same disposition of Will which Repent [...] and Obedience are; And by the words of Saint Mark, The [...]ime is fulfil­led, and the Kingdome of God is at hand, Repent yee, and beleeve the Gospell, by which words is not obscurely signified that there is no need of other Vertues, for our entrance in­to the Kingdome of God, excepting those of Repentance and Faith: The Obedience therefore which is necessarily requir'd to Salvation is nothing else but the Will, or endeavour to obey, that is to say, of doing according to the Lawes of God, that is the morall Lawes, which are the same to all men, and the civill Lawes, that is to say, the commands of Soveraignes in temporall matters, and the Ecclesiasticall Lawes in spirituall; which two kinds of Lawes are divers in divers Cities, and Churches, and are knowne by their promulgation, and publique sentences.

[Page 345] IV. That we may understand what the What Faith is, and how distinguisht from pro­fession, from sci­ence, and from opini­on. Christian Faith is, we must define Faith in generall, and distinguish it from those o­ther acts of the minde wherewith common­ly it is confounded. The object of Faith uni­versally taken, namely for that which is be­leev'd, is evermore a proposition, (that is to say a speech affirmative, or negative) which we grant to be true: but because Propositi­ons are granted for divers causes, it falls out, that these kind of concessions are diversly called: But we grant Propositions some­times which notwithstanding we receive not into our mindes; and this either for a time, to wit, so long, till by consideration of the consequencies, we have well exa­min'd the truth of them, which we call sup­posing▪ or also simply, as through feare of the Lawes, which is to professe, or confesse by outward tokens; or for a voluntary com­pliance sake, which men use out of civility to those whom they respect, and for love of Peace to others, which is absolute yeeld­ing: Now the Propositions which we re­ceive for truth, we alwaies grant for some reasons of our owne, and these are deriv'd either from the Proposition it selfe, or from the [...]rson propounding; they are deriv'd from the Proposition it selfe, by cal­ling to minde what things those words which make up the Proposition doe by common consent usually signifie: if so, then the a [...]t which we give is called knowledge, or Science: but if we cannot remember what is certainly understood by those words, but sometimes one thing, some­times another seeme to be apprehended by [Page 346] us, then we are said to thinke; for exam­ple, if it be propounded that two and three [...]akes five; and by calling to minde the order of those numerall words, that it is so appointed by the common consent of them who are of the same language with us, (as it were by a certaine contract necessary for humane society) that five shall be the name of so many unities as are contain'd in two and three taken together, a man as­sents, that this is therefore true because two and three together, are the same with five. This assent shall be called knowledge, and to know this truth is nothing else but to acknowledge that it is made by our selves; For by whose will and rules of speaking the number .. is called two, ... is called three, & ..... is called five, by their will also it comes to passe, that this Proposi­tionis true, Two and three taken together makes five. In like manner if we remem­ber what it is that is called theft, and what injury, we shall understand by the words themselves, whether it be true that theft is an injury, or not. Truth is the same with a true Proposition, but the Proposition is true in which the word consequent, which by Lo­gicians is called the praedicate, embraceth the word antecedent in its amplitude, which they call the Subject, and to know truth is the same thing as to remember that it was made by our selves in the common use of words: Neither was it rashly, or unadvisedly said by Plato of old, that knowledge was memory: But it happens sometimes that words al­though they have a certaine, and defin'd signification by constitution, yet by vulgar [Page 347] use either to adorne, or deceive, they are so wrested f [...]om their owne significations, that to remember the conceptions for which they were first impos'd on things is very hard, and not to be maistered but by a sharpe judgement, and very great diligence. It happens too, that there are many words which have no proper, determin'd, and every where the same signification; and are understood not by their owne, but by vertue of other signes us'd together with them. Thirdly, there are some words of things unconceivable; of those things there­fore whereof they are the words, there is no conception; and therefore in vaine doe we seeke for the truth of those Propositions, which they make out of the words them­selves: In these cases, while by considering the definitions of words we search out the truth of some proposition, according to the hope we have of finding it, we thinke it sometimes true, and sometimes false; ei­ther of which apart is called thinking, and also beleeving; both together, doubting. But when our reasons for which we assent to some Proposition, derive not from the Pro­position it selfe, but from the person Propoun­ding, whom we esteeme so learned that he is not deceiv'd, and we see no reason why he should deceive us, our assent, because it growes not from any confidence of our owne, but from another mans knowledge, is called Faith: And▪ by the confidence of whom, we doe beleeve, we are said to trust them, or to trust in them. By what hath been said, the difference appeares first betweene Faith, and Profession; for that is alwaies [Page 348] joyn'd with inward asse [...] ▪ this not alwayes [...] That is an inward perswasion of the minde, this an outward obedience. Next, betweene Faith, and Opinion; for this de­pends on our own [...] reason, that on the good esteeme we have of another. Lastly betweene Faith and Knowledge; for this de­liberately takes a proposition broken, and chewed; that swallowes downe whole and enti [...]. The explication of words, whereby the matter enquir'd after is propounded, is conducible to knowledge; [...]ay, the onely way to [...], is by de [...]: but this is pre­judiciall to Faith; for those things which exceede humane capacity, and are propoun­ded to beleev'd, are never more evident by explication, but on the contrary more obscure, and harder to be credited. And the same thing befalls a man who endea­vours to demonstra [...] the mysteries of Faith by naturall reason, which happens to a sick man, who will needs chew before he will swallow his wholsome, but bi [...]r Pill [...], whence it comes to passe, that he presently brings them up againe, which perhaps would otherwise, if he had taken them well downe, have prov'd his remedy.

V. We have seene therefore what it is What it is to beleeve in Christ. to beleeve. But what is it to beleeve in CHRIST? Or what Proposition is that which is the object of our Faith in CHRIST? For when we say, I be­leeve in CHRIST, we signifie indeed Whom, but not What we beleeve. Now, to beleeve in CHRIST is nothing else but to beleeve that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, namely Hee, who accor­ding [Page 349] to the Prophesies of Moyses, and the Prophets of Israel, was to come▪ into this world to institute the Kingdome of God: And this sufficiently appeares out of the words of CHRIST himselfe to Martha: I am (saith he) the Resurrection and the life, HE THAT BELEEVETH IN ME, though he were dead, yet he shall live, and WHOSOEVER LIVETH, AND BELEEVETH IN ME, shall never dye. Beleevest thou this? She saith unto him, Yea Lord, I beleeve that THOU ART THE CHRIST the So [...] of God, which should come into the world. John 11. ver. 25, 26, 27. In which words we see that the question BELEEV­EST THOU IN ME? is expoun­ded by the answer, THOU ART THE CHRIST. To beleeve in CHRIST therefore is nothing else but to beleeve JESUS HIMSELFE saying that he is THE CHRIST.

VI. Faith and Obedience both necessarity That that article a­lone, that Iesus is the Christ, is necessary to Salvation, is prov'd out of the scope of the Evan­gelists. concurring to Salvation, what kinde of Obe­dience that same is, and to whom due, hath beene shewed above in the 3. Article: But now we must en [...]i [...]e what articles of Faith are requisite: And (*) I say, that to a Chri­stian there is no other article of Faith requisite as necessary to Salvation, but only this, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST. But we must distinguish (as we have al­ready done before in the 4. Article) be­tweene Faith, and Profession. A Profession therefore of more articles (if they be com­manded) may be necessary; for it is a part of our obedience due to the Lawes; but we [Page 350] enquire not now what Obedience, but what Faith is necessary to salvation. And this is prov'd first out of the scope of the Evan­gelists which was by the description of our Saviours life to establish this one Article; and we shall know that such was the scope, and counsell of the Evangelists, if we ob­serve but the History it selfe. Saint Matthew beginning at his Genealogy shewes that JESUS was of the linage of David, borne of a Virgin, Chap. 1. that He was adored by the Wise men as King of the Jewes; that Herod for the same cause sought to slay him, Chap. 2. That his Kingdome was Preacht both by John the Baptist, and Himselfe, Chap. 3, 4. That He taught the Lawes, not as the Scribes, but as one having authority, Chap. 5, 6, 7. That he cur'd dis­eases miraculously, Chap. 8, 9. That He sent his Apostles the Preachers of his King­dome throughout all the parts of Judea, to proclame his Kingdome, Chap. 10. That He commanded the Messengers sent from John to enquire whether he were the CHRIST or not, to tell him what they had seene, namely the miracles which were onely competible with CHRIST, Chap. 11. That he prov'd and declar'd his King­dome to the Pharisees, and others by argu­ments, parables and signes, Chap. 12. and the following Chapters to the 21. That He maintain'd himselfe to be the Christ against the Pharisees, That He was saluted with the title of King, when he entred into Jerusalem, Chap. 21. That he forewarn'd others of false Christs, and That He shewed in Parables what manner of Kingdome [Page 351] his should be, Chap. 22, 23, 24, 25. That He was taken, and accused for this reason, because He said He was a King; and that a Title was written on his Crosse, THIS IS JESUS, THE KING OF THE JEWES, Chap. 26, 27. Lastly, that after his resurrection, He told his Apostles that all power was given unto Him both in Heaven, and in Earth, Chap. 28. All which tends to this end, That we should beleeve Jesus to be the Christ. Such therefore was the Scope of Saint Matthew in describing his Gospell; but such as his was, such also was the rest of the Evangelists, which Saint Iohn sets down expresly in the end of his Gospel, These things (saith He) are written, that ye may know that Jesus is the Christ, the Sonne of the living God. Iohn 29. vers. 31.

I say, that to a Christian.] Although I Annotation conceive this assertion to be sufficiently proved by the following reasons, yet I thought it worth my labour to make a more a [...]ple explication of it, because I perceive that being somewhat new, it may possibly be distastfull to many Divines. First therefore when I say this Article, That Jesus is the Christ, is necessary to salvation; I say not that Faith onely is necessary, but I re­quire Justice also, or that Obedience which is due to the Lawes of God, that is to say, a Will to live righteously. Secondly, I deny not but the profession of many Articles, (provided that that profession be commanded by the Church) is also necessary to salvation; but seeing Faith is in­ternall, Profession externall, I say that the former onely is properly Faith; the latter a part of Obedience; insomuch as that Article [Page 352] alone sufficeth for inward beleefe, but is [...] sufficient for the outward profession of a Chri­stian. La [...]ly, even as if I [...]ad said that true and inward R [...]pentance of [...]innes was onely necessary to salvation, yet were it not to be held for a Pa­r [...], because we suppose Justice, Obedience, and a mind reformed in all manner of vertues to be contained in it: so when I say that the Faith of one Article i [...] sufficient [...] salvation, it may well be lesse wondred at, seeing that in it so ma­ny other Articles are contained▪ for these words, Jesus is the Christ, do signifie that Jesus was that Person whom God bad promised by▪ his Prophets, should come into the world to establish his Kingdom, that is to say, that Jesus is the Sonne of God, the Creatour of Heaven and Earth, born of a Virgin, dying for the sinnes of them who should beleeve in Him; that He [...] was Christ, that is to say a King; that He re­viv'd (for else He were not like▪ to reign) to judge the world, and to reward every one accor­ding to his works, for otherwise he cannot be a King; also that men shall rise again, for other­wise they are not like to come to judgement. The whole Symbol of the Apostles is therefore con­tained in this one Article; which notwithstand­ing I thought reasonable to contract thus, be­cause I found that many men for this alone, without the rest, were admitted into the King­dome of God, both by Christ, and his Apostles; as the Thief on the Crosse, the Eu [...]uch baptized by Philip, the two thousand men converted to the Church at once by Saint Peter. But if any man be displeased that I doe not judge all those eternally damned, who doe not inwardly assent to every Article defined by the Church (and yet doe not contradict, but if they be commanded, doe [Page 353] submit) I know not what I shall say to them▪ for the most evident Testimonies of Holy Writ which doe follow, doe wit [...]old me from alte­ring my opinion.

VII. Secondly, this is proved by the By the A­postles Sermons. preaching of the Apostles. For they were the Proclamers of his Kingdome, neither did Christ send them to preach ought but the Kingdome of God, Luke 9. vers. 2. Act. 15. vers. 6. And what they did after Christ his As [...]n [...]on may be understood by the accu­sation which was brought against them, They drew Jason (sa [...] Saint Luke) and cer­tain Brethren unto the Rulers of the City, [...]ry­ing, These are th [...] men that have turned the world upside down, and are come hither also, whom Jason hath received; and these all do con­trary to the decrees of Caesar, saying that there is another King, one Jesus. Acts 17. vers 6, 7. It appears also what the subject of the Apo­stles Sermons was, out of these words: Opening, and alleadging out of the Scriptures (to wit, of the old Testament) that Christ must needs have suffered, and risen again from the dead, and that THIS JESUS IS THE CHRIST. Acts 17. vers. 2, 3.

VIII. Thirdly, By the places in which the easinesse of those thing [...] which are re­quired By the ea­sinesse of christian Religion. by Christ to the attaining of salva­tion, is declared. For if an internall assent of the minde were necessarily required to the truth of all and each Proposition which this day is controverted about the Christi­an Faith, or by divers Churches is diversly defined, there would be nothing more dif­ficult then the Christian Religion; and how then would that be true, My yoke is easie, [Page 354] and my burthen light? Mat. 11. vers. 30. and that litle ones doe beleeve in Him? Mat. 18. vers. 6. and that it pleased God by the foolish­nesse of Preaching, to save those that beleeve? 1 Cor. 1. vers. 21. or how was the thiefe hanging on the Crosse sufficiently instru­cted to salvation? The confession of whose Faith was contained in these words, Lord remember me when thou comest into thy King­dome; or how could Saint Paul himselfe, from an enemy, so soon become a Doctor of Christians?

IX. Foutthly, by this, that that Article is the foundation of Faith, neither rests it By this, that it is the foun­dation of Faith. on any other foundation. If any man shall say unto you, Loe here is Christ, or He is there, beleeve it [...]ot, for there shall arise false Christs, and false Prophets, and shall shew great signes, and wonders, &c. Mat. 24. vers 23. Whence it followes, that for the Faiths sake which we have in this Article, we must not be­leeve any signes, and wonders. Although we, or an Augell from Heaven (saith the Apo­stle) should preach to you any other Gospel, then what we have preacht, let him be accursed. Gal. 1. 8. By reason of this Article therefore we might not trust the very Apostles, and Angels themselves (and therefore I con­ceive not the Church neither) if they should teach the contrary. Beloved, beleeve not every spirit, but try the spirits whether they are of God, because many false Prophets are gone out into the world, hereby know yee the spirit of God, every spirit that confesseth Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God, &c. 1 John 4. vers. 1, 2. That Article therefore is the measure of the Spitits whereby the authority [Page 355] of the Doctors, is either received, or reje­cted. It cannot be denied indeed, but that all who at this day are Christians, did learn from the Doctors, that it was Jesus who did all those things whereby he might be acknowledged▪ to be the Christ; yet it fol­lowes not that the same Persons beleeved that Article for the Doctors, or the Chur­ches, but for Jesus his own sake▪ for that Article was before the Christian Church, al­though all the rest were after it, and the Church was founded upon it, not it upon the Church. Mat. 16. vers. 18. Besides, this Ar­ticle, that Jesus is the Christ, is so funda­mentall, that all the rest are by Saint Paul said to be built upon it, For other foundation can no man lay, then that which is layd, which is Jesus Christ (that is to say, that Jesus is the Christ) now if any man build upon this foun­dation, gold, silver, precious stone, wood, hay, stubble; every mans work shall be made mani­fest; if a [...]y mans work abide which he hath built thereupon, he shall receive a reward; if any mans work shall be bu [...]nt, he shall suffer losse, [...]ut he himselfe shall be sa [...]ed. 1 Cor. 3▪ vers. 11, 12, 13. &c. From whence it plainly ap­pears, that by foundation is understood this Article, THAT JESUS IS THE CHRIST: For gold, and silver, precious stones, wood, hay, stubble (whereby the Doctrines are signified) are not built upon the Person of Christ; and also, that false Doctrines may be raised upon this founda­tion, yet not so, as they must necessarily be By the plai [...] words of Christ and his Apostles damned who teach them.

X. Lastly, that this Article alone is needfull to he inwardly beleeved, may be [Page 356] most evidently proved out of many places of holy Scriptures, let who will be the Inter­preter: Search the Scriptures, for in them yee think yee have eternall life; and they are they which testify of me. John 5. 39. But Christ meant the Scriptures of the old Testament only, for the new was then not yet written. Now, there is no other testimony concern­ing Christ in the old Testament, but that an eternall King was to come in such a place, that He was to be born of such Pa­rents, that He was to teach, and doe such things; whereby, as by certain signes, he was to be knowne▪ All which testify this one thing, that JESUS who was so born, and did teach, and doe such things, was THE CHRIST. Other Faith then was not required to attain eternall life, be­sides this Article. Whosoever liveth and be­leeveth in me, shall never dye. John 11. vers. 25. But to beleeve in Jesus (as is there ex­prest) is the same with beleeving that JE­SUS WAS THE CHRIST; He there­fore that beleeves that, shall never dye, and by consequence, that Article alone is ne­cessary to salvation. These are written that yee might beleeve that JESUS IS THE CHRIST the Sonne of God, and that be­leeving yee might have life through his name. Jo. 20. vers 31. Wherefore he that beleeves thus, shall have eternall life, and therefore needs no other Faith. Every spirit that con­fesseth that Jesus Christ is come in the flesh, is of God. 1 Jo. 4 v. 2. And Whosoever beleeveth that JESUS IS THE CHRIST, is born of God, 1 Jo. 5. vers. 1. And, Who is he that overcometh the world, but he that be­leeveth [Page 357] that IESUS is the Son of God? 1 Jo. v. 5. If therefore there be no need to beleeve any thing else, to the end a man may be of God, born of God, and [...] the world, then that IESUS IS THE CHRIST; that one Article then is sufficient to salva­tion. See, here is water, what doth [...]inder me to be baptiz [...]d? And Philip said, If thou be­leevest with all thine [...]e [...], thou m [...]ist. And he an [...]ered and sai [...], I beleeve that IE­SUS CHRIST is the [...] of God. Act [...] 8. vers. 36, 37. If then this Article being beleeved with the whole heart, (that is to say, with inward Faith) was sufficient for Baptisme, it is also sufficient for salva­tion. Besides these places there are innu­merable others which doe clearly, and ex­pres [...]y affirm the same thing. Nay, where­soever wee read that our Saviour com­mended the Faith of any one, or that he said, Thy Faith hath [...]ved thee, or that he healed any one for his Faiths sake; there the Proposition beleeved was no other but this, IESUS IS THE CHRIST, ei­ther directly, or consequently.

XI. But because no man can beleeve In this Ar­ticle is contained the Faith of the old Testament. IESUS TO BE THE CHRIST, who, when he knowes that by Christ is under­stood that same King who was promised from God by Moyses, and the Prophets, for to be the King, and Saviour of the world, doth not also beleeve Moyses, and the Pro­phets, neither can he beleeve these, who be­leeves not that God is, and that he governs the world; it is necessary that the Faith of God, and of the old Testament be contai­ned in this Faith of the new. Seeing there­fore [Page 358] that Atheisme, and the deniall of the Divine Providence, were the only treason against the Divine Majesty in the Kingdome of God by Nature, but Idolatry also in the Kingdome of God by the Old Covenant; now in this Kingdome wherein God rules by way of a new Covenant, apostasie is also ad­ded, or the renunciation of this article once receiv'd, that JESUS IS THE CHRIST: Truly other Doctrines, provided they have their determination from a lawfull Church, are not to be contradicted; for that is the sinne of disobedience, but it hath been ful­ly declar'd before that they are not needfull to be beleev'd with an inward Faith.

XII. Faith and Obedience have divers parts in accomplishing the salvation of a How Faith and Obedi­ence doe con [...]ur to Salvation. Christian; for this contributes the power, or capacity, that the Act, and either is said to justifie in its kinde. For Christ forgives not the sins of all men, but of the Penitent, or the Obedient, that is to say the just, I say not the guiltlesse, but the just; for justice is a Will of obeying the Lawes, and may be consistent with a sinner, and with Christ the Will to obey is Obedience; for not every man, but the just shall live by Faith: Obedience therefore justifies because it ma­keth just in the same manner as temperance maketh temperate, Prudence Prudent: Cha­stity chaste, namely essentially; and pu [...] a man in such a state, as makes him capable of pardon. Againe, Christ hath not pro­mis'd forgivenesse of sinnes to all just men, but only those of them w [...]o beleeve Hi [...] to be the Christ. Faith therefore just [...]fies in such a sense as a judge may be said to justifie who [Page 359] absolves, namely by the sentence which actu­ally saves a man; And in this acception of justification (for it is an aequivocall terme) Faith alone justifies, but in the o­ther, Obedience onely: but neither Obedi­ence alone nor Faith alone doe save us, but both together.

XIII. By what hath been said hitherto, In a Chri­stian City there is no contrariety be weene the Com­mand of God, and of the City. it will be easy to discerne what the duty of Christian Subjects is towards their Sove­raignes, who as long as they professe them­selves Christians cannot command their Subjects to deny Christ, or to offer him any contumely; for if they should com­mand this, they would professe themselves to be no Christians: For seeing we have shewed both by naturall reason, and out of holy Scriptures, that Subjects ought in all things to obey their Princes and Gover­nours, excepting those which are contrary to the command of God; and that the com­mands of God in a Christian City concer­ning temporall affairs, (th [...]t is to say, those which are to be discust by humane reason) are the Lawes and sentence of the City de­liver'd from those who have receiv'd autho­rity from the City to make Laws, and judge of controversies; but concerning spirituall matters, (that is to say those which are to be defin'd by the holy Scripture) are the Lawes, and sentences of the City, that is to say the Church (for a Christian City, and a Church (as hath beeen shewed in the foregoing Chapter in the 10. Arr. are the same thing) deliv'rd by Pastors law­fully ordain'd, and who have to that end authority given them by the City; it ma­nifestly [Page 360] followes, that in a Christian Common weale, Obedience is due to the Soveraign in all things, as well Spirituall, as Temporall, and that the same obedience even from a Christian subject is due in all tempo­rall matters to those Princes who are no Christians, is without any controversie; but in matters spirituall, that is to say those things which concern Gods worship, some christian Church is to be followed; for it is an hypothesis of the Christian Faith, that God speaks not in things supernaturall, but by the way of Christian Interpreters of holy Scriptures. But what? Must we resist Prince [...] when we cannot obey them? Truly no; for this is contrary to our civill Covenant. What must we doe then? Goe to Christ by Martyrdome; which if it seem to any man to be an hard saying, most certain it is that he beleeves not with his whole heart THAT IESUS IS THE CHRIST the Sonne of the living God (for he would then desire to be dissolved, and to be with Christ) but he would by a feigned Christian Faith elude that obedience which he hath contracted to yeeld up unto the City. The Do­ctrines which this day are con­troverted about Re­ligion, doe for the most part belong to the Right of Dominion.

XIV. But some men perhaps will won­der, if, (excepting this one Article, that IESUS IS THE CHRIST, which only is necessary to salvation in relation to internall faith) all the rest belong to obedi­ence, which may be performed, although a man doe not inwardly beleeve, (so he doe but desire to beleeve, and make an outward profession, as oft as need requires, of what­soever is propounded by the Church) how it comes about that there are so many Tenets [Page 361] which are all held so to concern our Faith, that except a man doe inwardly beleeve them, He cannot enter into the Kingdome of Heaven: But if he consider that in most controversies the contention is about hu­mane Soveraignty; in some, matter of gain, and profit; in others, the glory of Wits; he will surely wonder the lesse. The question about the propriety of the Church, is a question about the Right of Soveraignty; for, it being known what a Church is, it is known at once to whom the Rule over Christians doth be­long: for if every Christian City be that Church which Christ himselfe hath com­manded every Christiā subject to that city, to hear, then every subject is bound to obey his City, that is to say, Him, or them who have the supreme power, not only in temporall but also in spirituall matters; but if every Chri­stian City be not that Church, then is there some other Church more universall, which must be obeyed. All Christians therefore must obey that Church just as they would o­bey Christ if He came upon Earth. She will therfore rule either by the way of Monarchy, or by some Assembly: This question then concerns the Right of ruling. To the same end belongs the question concerning infallibility; for whosoever were truly, and internally be­leeved by all mankinde, that he could not erre, would be sure of all Dominion, as well temporall as spirituall, over all mankinde, unlesse himselfe would refuse it; for if he say that he must be obeyed in temporalls, be­cause it is supposed he cannot erre, that Right of Dominion is immediately gran­ted him. Hither also tends the priviledge of [Page 362] interpreting Scriptures. For he to whom it belongs to interpret the controversies ari­sing from the divers interpretations of Scri­ptures, hath authority also simply and ab­solutely to determine all manner of con­troversies whatsoever; but he who hath this, hath also the command over all men who acknowledge the Scriptures to be the Word of God. To this end drive all the disputes about the power of remining, and retaining sinnes; or the authority of excommunication. For every man, if he be in his wits, will in all things yeeld that man an absolute obedi­ence, by vertue of whose sentence he beleeves himselfe to be either saved, o [...] damned. Hi­ther also tends the power of instituting soci­eties; for they depend on him by whom they subsist, who hath as many subjects as Monks, although living in an Enemies City. To this end also refers the question concerning the Iudge of lawfull Matrimony; for he to whom that judicature belongs, to him also pertains the knowledge of all those cases which concern the inheritance, and succession to all the goods, and Rights, not of private men onely, but also of Soveraign Princes. And hither also in some respect tends the Virgin-life of Ecclesia [...]ticall Per­sons; for unmarried men have lesse cohe­rence then others with civill society: and be­sides, it is an inconvenience not to be sligh­ted, that Princes must either necessarily for­goe the Priesthood (which is a great bond of civill obedience) or have no hereditary Kingdome. To this end also tends the ca­nouization of Saints which the Hea [...]he [...] cal­led Apotheosis; for he that can allure for­raign [Page 363] subjects with so great a reward, may bring those who are greedy of such glory to dare, and doe any thing. For what was it but an honourable Name with posterity? which the Decii and other Romans sought after, and a thousand others who cast themselves upon incredible perils? The controversies about Purgatory, and indulgencies, are mat­ter of gain. The questions of Free-will, Iu­stification, and the manner of receiving Christ in the Sacrament, are Philosophicall. There are also questions concerning some Rites not introduced, bur left in the Church not suf­ficiently purged from gentilisme; but we need reckon no more. All the world knows that such is the nature of men, that dissent­ing in questions which concern their power, or profit, or preeminence of Wit, they slander, and curse each other. It is not therefore to be wondred at, if almost all tenets (after men grew hot with disputings) are held forth by some or other to be necessary to sal­vation, and for our entrance into the King­dome of Heaven; insomuch as they who hold them not, are not only condemned as guilty of disobedience (which in truth they are after the Church hath once defined them) but of Infidelity, which I have decla­red above to be wrong out of many evident places of Scripture; to which I adde this one of Saint Pauls, Let not him that eateth, despise him that eateth not, and let not him that eateth not, judge him that eateth; for God hath received him. One man esteemeth one day above another, another esteemeth every day alike. Let every man be fully perswaded in his own mind, Rom. 14. v. 3, 5.