THE GRAND CASE So bloudily disputed at this present in ENGLAND.
THe Principall, if not the onely Question, now debated by the Divine, Lawyer, Statesman, and Swordman is, whether or no, The Reason and Judgement of the King, be the supreme Reason and Judgement of the Kingdome in all Cases of great doubt, and publike concernment. If the Law have left all weighty and difficult matters to the meer understanding of the [Page 4] King, 'tis all one, as if all things were left to His meer will; and if so, then the King is absolved of all limits and conditions. No King can be more absolute; if it be confessed, that the King is not sole and supreme Judge.
The next Question is, Whether the King may chuse His own Councellours and Judges, at meer pleasure, or no. For if He may in time of Parliament, prefer the Councell of such Courtiers as He likes best, before the Common Councell of the Kingdom; and out of Parliament the judgement of illiterate, ungraded men, before that of His most learned, studied, sworn Judges; all Law of confining the King to other Reason and Judgement, [Page 5]then His own, is vain, and of no effect. But if the King be by intrudement of Law, as wel designed and necessitated to that Councell alwayes which is supreme, and most publike for the time being, and restrained from any other inferiour, and more private.
The next Question is, Whether the Law have allowed to the King such a latitude of Negative voyce, as to frustrate and annihilate whatsoever is adjudged by both Houses in Parliament, or by the Judges out of Parliament. For as God and Nature abhorre vacuities, and frustraneous acts; so certainly Law, which flows from the same Source must needs do the like. Nay, if the Kings right of Negation be maintained [Page 6]in all Cases, as well such as concern publike as private Affairs, and such as concern the Life, and Fortunes, and Liberties, and Consciences of such and such particular men, as well as those which concern His own intradoer, or domesticall Affairs, not onely all Law is made frustraneous, but utterly pernicious. For Nature must needs imprint this in us all, That a State may be more happy by subjecting it self to the boundlesse Arbitrary Law of one mans will, then to such a determinate Law as one man may obstruct and make frustrate at pleasure, but cannot open, and make vigorous. Our present misery shew [...] us this truth too plain, for were either the Kings will admitted, [Page 7]or the Judgements which the Houses have given concerning the the Militia of the Kingdom (and other differences at this time) for meer Law, This Nation could not be so torne, and grinded to dust in such an instant as it is.