SECT. I. THE PREFACE.

IF it be enquired, why any Reply at all, or why so late? I may say, I had determined not to be any more troublesome, and that there was no just cause why I should be, were it well weighed what was said on both sides: but I must once again beg leave to say something (the Importunity of Adversaries or the expectation of Friends enforcing it) by way of Answer to some Books not long since issued forth.

There are two especially which have drawn the eyes of many upon them; the one bears this title, Scripture and Reason pleaded for defensive Armes, by Divers Reverend and Learned Divines. Who by laying their heads together have not found out any more forceable Arguments or satisfying Answers, then they which went before them; but only some newcases of Resistance to amuse the Reader, and new instances to inforce former Rea­sons, [Page 2]and some popular amplifications to set off the old An­swers, thereby making the book swell to that bignesse it ap­pears in.

The other book bears this Title, A Treatise of Monarchie, by whom I know not: but surely the Author (however he looks not with a single eye upon what I had written, misconstruing it many times) doth with much ingenuity disclaime, and with no lesse reason confute severall Assertions of those Learned Di­vines, and other Writers of the Party; assertions that have very much help't forward this Rebellion: such as these, That the King is Universis minor. That the People, which make the King, are above Him, by the Rule, Quicquid efficit tale est magis tale. That the finall judgement of this State is in the two Houses. That the Christians in the Primitive times might have resisted, had they had force. These and the like he ingenuously disclaimes, but be­ing engaged he sets up his Rest upon a groundlesse fancy of such a mixture and constitution of this Monarchie, as mustinable the Houses to restrain the exorbitancies of the Monarch, by the Arms of the Kingdom: and to induce a beliefe of this, he has prefixed a discourse of Absolute, Limited, and Mixed Monarchies, so fra­med as is most applyable to his purpose.

He that wrote the Fuller Answer to my first Treatise had this conceit of Mixture, whereby he placed the Houses in the very Supremacy of power, and did thence (as one falshood being granted doth necessarily inferre another) conclude, that the Members of the Houses were the Kings Subjects divis [...]m, taken severally, not conjunctim, as they are gathered together in their Houses; for indeed how could they be His Subjects, and He their supreame Head, if they be fundamentally mixed or joyned with Him in the supremacie of power? The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, did see that this was repugnant to Law and Reason, and therefore doth acknowledge them to be subjects conjunctim, under the King as their Supreame Head, yet being engaged he holds the ground upon which that absurd assertion is raised, af­firming and endeavouring to prove, that the Mixture is in the su­premacie of power, pag. 40. How then will he make the King su­pream, and they His Subjects? for this; he gives the King Apicem potestatis, the top or Excellency of Power: that is, the King is [Page 3]the Crown or top of the head, but the two Houses must be our head too and our Soveraignes, if they be joyned with the King in the very Supremacy of power: and so the matter will be well mended. Again, The Full Answer, did from the same false sup­posed mixture inferre, that the finall Resolution of this States judgement resided in the two Houses, when the King refuseth to discharge His trust for the safety of the Kingdom; the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, did see and confesse, that it plainly overthrowes the Monarchy to place such judgement in the Hou­ses: Yet being ingaged, He gives them power to take the Armes of the Kingdom; but least they should seem Authoritatively to Iudge or command in that case, they must declare and make the appeale to the Community, as if there were no government, and as men are in Conscience convinced they are bound to give aid and assistance; so he pag. 8. 29. and elsewhere. A ready way to confusion; but of these and such like contradictory conceits of the Assertors of Resistance more below.

Of this Mixture there was not a little spoken in my Reply to the Full Answer: but this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, and Reverend Divin's take notice only of my first Treatise, Having therefore made some short Animadversions upon their Bookes as they came to my hand, I still wayted to meet with something directly against the Reply, but as yet have seen no­thing, besides two trifling Answers; the one a wild discourse by whom written I know not, but by such a flirting phansy, I am sure, that he who reads one part, will not cast away his time up­on the rest: the other by him that stiled himselfe Author of the Fuller answer, still like himselfe; if he can be but witty or fasten a seeming contradiction upon his Adversary it is enough; what he has materiall about the Mixture of Government (which is the whole businesse of his book) is more accurately delivered and urged by this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy; yet be­cause he is extreamly confident, I shall bestow a Section upon him below, and that is more then he deserves.

Therefore what the Reverend Divines, or the Author of this Tract of Monarchy have drawn from Scripture or Reason, to ju­stify their grounds of Resistance, I shall briefly examine, after that I have declared my intent at first, and my purpose now of proceeding in this Argument.

It was the intent of that first Treatise of mine, to resolve the Consciences of misled People, Touching the unlawfulnesse of Armes now taken up against the King: and because Conscience, if it re­solve for them, must conclude upon these premises (Subjects may take Armes against their Soveraigne for defence of Religion and Liberties, apparently in danger of Subversion. But such is the case now,) and must be certain of the truth of both of them, for if either of the premises be false or doubtfull, Conscience is mis­guided in the conclusion; therefore the whole Resolution of the case was to this purpose, as here it lyes ope to the sight in these two assertions.

First, Were the case so as they suppose, that is, Were the King, as they would have people believe, seduced to proceed in a way tending to the subversion of Religion and Liberties, it were not safe to bear part in the Resistance of Armes now used against him, there being no warrant for taking Armes upon such a case, but evidence against it both from Scripture and Reason. So that at the best the case can be even to them, that plead for resistance, no better indeed then doubtfull, and then Conscience according to its two Rules (what is not of Faith is Sin, and, in doubtfull cases, the SAFER WAY is to be chosen) will tell them they should forbeare and suffer, rather then resist, for they may be sure that is a SAFE WAY, were the King indeed what they suppose him to be.

Secondly, Seeing the case is not so as they suppose, nor is it so with the King as they would have the People believe, but most ap­parent, that He is constrained to take Armes for the defence of His just Rights, and the Protection of His Subjects; Every man may be clearly perswaded in Conscience that the Resistance now made is unlawfull and damnable, and that he is bound not only to forbear from resisting, but also to assist His Majesty in so just a cause.

The contrary Resolution (which concludes, That it is Lawfull upon such a case supposed to take Armes: & that the Case is now:) I doubt not to call a Blaspheaming of God and the King; Of God, in charging such an imputation upon his Word, as if it taught Subjects to take Armes for the defence of Religion and Liber­ties against their naturall Soveraigne: Of the King, in casting such aspersions upon His Majesty, as if He were seduced to the sub­version of Religion and Liberties.

Now although His Majesties Cause be justified not so much by the falshood of this their Principle and ground of Resistance (it is lawfull in such a Case to take Armes) as by the clearnesse of His innocency, He being farre from what they suppose or proclaime of him to be: Yet because the very seeds of Rebellion are sowne upon that ground, and there cannot want either made pretences to bring them forth, or Fears and Jealousies to cherish and ripen them; it is needfull to shew, that as Rebellion is not a plant of Gods sowing, so neither is that ground a Truth of His Laying.

The Author of the Fuller Answer, in his late Reply Pag 27. & 28. imputes the beginning of this controversie (whether Subjects upon such a Case may take Armes?) to my first unhappy and unchallenged Treatise (as he calls it) which has exposed the other party to a necessity of a Reply, and caused so much to be said, especially by Divines, in this sad and unwelcome subject. So he. These men are loath to bee called to account for what they say or doe, as if they were the very rule of Justice and Truth. They have Preached and Printed this seditious doctrine over and over, welneere a twelve month before that unhappy Treatise was published, thereby perswading the People into Armes, under pretence of defending their endangered Religi­on and Liberties; and now they thinke much it should be called in question or be made a Controversie. It had beene happy for them if they could have carried the matter so clearly without being put to a Reply; or if now being put to Answer, they could make others the Inc [...]ndiaries for the kindling of that fire which they have begun, and fomented with seditious doctrines, blowne over all the Kingdome. Surely if the Divines and Lawyers, that are of contrary judgement to them throughout the Kingdome, had in good time declared themselves herein, it would have gi­ven a seasonable and happy check to these seditious principles, and to the unhappy Rebellion that has been raised thereon; I for my part thought it concerned mee to examine a doctrine so much Preached and published, and could not think it possible that Conscience should be truly satisfied in the Conclusion, with­out being secured of the truth of both the Promises, of which this seditious doctrine is the first, That Subjects may take Armes [Page 6]against their Soveraigne for the defence of Religion and Liberties, when in danger of subversion: for which as then I could see no warrant that Conscience might rest on, no more can I now, but doe finde it a Doctrine destitute of Scripture and true Reason, as will be cleared in the processe of this book. For,

First, Upon the examination of places of Scripture, it wil ap­peare, that Gods People were continually under such Kings, a­gainst whom they might not resist, and that Gods word as it af­fords us no precept, so nor any just example for resistance, but much every way against it.

Secondly, Upon the Examination of Reason it will appeare, how inconsistent such a power of resistance in Subjects is with Government, and that (which seemes to be the reason of the Wisdome of God, putting his people under Kings without any power of Resistance) moe inconveniences and mischiefes would follow upon such a power placed in the People, then if they were left without it.

I must needs say it doth at first sight seeme unreasonable, that Subjects should be left without this Remedy, and I confesse my owne thoughts (according to that naturall inclination wee all have to Liberty) have been heretofore ready to suggest as much: till seeking warrant for conscience from Gods word, I could meet with none, but found Reason presently checked with that saying of our Saviour, Mat. 10.25. It is enough for the Disciple that he be as his Master. It is enough for us now, if by the denial of Resistance and Armes we can be in no worse condition then our Saviour was, and the Christians of the Primitive times, and Gods people were ever in.

Likewise when I expect the Adversaries should bring ex­presse Scripture (without which they professe not to attempt any thing of such moment) for commanding or allowing this supposed Duty of Resistance, I find them altogether failing, and in their Answers to places of Scripture, much disagreeing among themselves. So that indeed all their faith and perswasion here is resolved into an appearance of Reason, raised upon Aristotles grounds or Principles, laid for the framing of a government, and the meanes of restraining Tyranny.

Upon those grounds and Principles, Buchanan, and Iunius [Page 7]Brutus goe so farre as to the Deposing and taking away of an Exorbitant or Tyrannous Monarch, — The writers of these dayes though they will not seem to harbour such an intention, and the Author of the Treatise of Monarchie doth expresly pro­nounce it unlawfull; yet do they all agree to use what force they can against such a Monarch for the suppressing of his Ty­rannie, to give him battell in the field, and make him accessary to his own death, if he fall by their hand.

To cleare the way in the entrance of this Cause, I am called by the Learned Divines, and the Author of the treatise of Mo­narchie, in the first place to consider the severall Cases of Resi­stance, and the severall kinds of Governments and Monarchies.

SECT. II. Cases of Resistance.

THe Reverend and Learned Divines, (who plead for Defen­sive Armes) to shew what great paines they have taken for the satisfying, or rather troubling of the Consciences of the people, doe every where blame the Resolver as indiligent and carelesse. First in the explication of the Question pro­pounded, that he undertaking to resolve Conscience about Re­sistance, did not set down all possible Cases, which they by laying their heads together have found out. Then in the clea­ring of the 13. to the Rom. that he mainly insisting upon that place did not Analyse the Chapter, as they have done by brea­king it into so many pieces, as if they had meant to draw out so many points to preach upon, rather then arguments to di­spute by.

My Answer is, I did not intend that Treatise as a just Tractate of Resistance, but as a Resolution of a particular Case; and therefore did not undertake or endeavour to satisfie all doubts which every working braine (that ha's strained it selfe to the disturbance of this State and people) might raise concer­ning Resistance in generall, but to resolve the Consciences of misled People in relation to the resistance now made. Now [Page 8]because they must have things delivered in grosse to them, if we meane they should apprehend them, I did therefore think it sufficient, first, in the Explication of the Question to direct their thoughts upon the notorious Resistance then used, viz. by setting up a Militia, raising Armies every where, and using them in Battell against His Majesty, for unto that Resistance the Case propounded did relate, as was intimated SECT. I. and then in the clearing of the 13 to the Rom. it seemed suffi­cient to let the people understand, That the King was the Higher or Supream power in this Kingdom; that All under the higher power were forbidden to resist; that Tyranny and perse­cution were not sufficient causes of Resistance, which appea­red upon the consideration of those times; lastly, that the prohi­bition of Resistance concerned all times, because the Apostle's Reasons against it, being drawn from the institution of the Po­wer, and the end or benefit of it, are perpetuall and concerne all Governments. These few necessary particulars deduced out of the Apostle, I thought more fit to let the People understand, then to puzzle them with many needlesse termes of analyse and division.

And now let us consider the Cases propounded by the Plea­ders; amonst them all, that onely is pertinent which enquires, whether the resisting of a Captain of the Souldiery having his commission from the King, and comming to act any illegall commands with his bands of armed men, be a resisting of the King, and so forbidden? pag. 1. Ans. They might easily have answered themselves, who, I know, are perswaded that the resisting of Captains having Commission from the Houses, and comming to plunder or take away the Estates of Malignants, is a resisting of the Parliament; but more to this case presently. Onely let us consider their leading Cases first: What if it be doubted, say they, whether a King be distracted, or bewit­ched, or forced by such as have him Prisoner, or otherwise a command upon him; are Subjects bound from resisting His il­legall commands? pag. 2. Answ. If it be cleare that a King is so, I suppose it is cleare in Law what course is to be taken; but being doubted onely (as the case is put) and that perhaps up­on [Page 9]as little ground as some have endeavoured to make the People believe, their King is now held Prisoner by his Cava­leires, and forced to doe what he doth; then the Safer way is to be taken, which is to doe no more by way of resistance, then is Lawfull to doe, when it is cleare He is not Forced or distra­cted, and that will better appeare by the Case following: sup­pose it be certain a King is not forced or distracted, yet doing as bad as any distracted person can doe by commanding Tyranni­call Acts, why should His Subjects hands be bound frō resisting his followers, offering to act His Tyranny more then if he were forced or distracted? Pag. 2. Answ. This is needlesse and odious, and cannot concerne the Case in Question, but by refle­cting upon His Majesty, but put this case of any King so doing: I Answer. 1. There is much difference twixt habituate di­straction, and actuall extravagances or Tyrannicall attempts, for by that a Prince is not master of his Will, and is made un­fit to bear the Power (i.) the administration of it, but by these he is not so. 2. Because this falls in with the Case, as it is propounded in better termes by the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, whether the forceable resistance of inferiour Per­sons misimployed to serve the illegall destructive Commands of the Prince be unlawfull? pa. 51. I answer, if by those misim­ployed persons be understood, the Commanders and Souldiers of the Kings Armyes, I cannot see (nor any man else, I think) but the resisting of them by a contrary Militia or Armes raised by Subjects, is a resisting of the King and unlawfull; and unto this Resistance the Case, as I propounded it did relate, and ac­cordingly the first Resolution was, That were the King what they supposed him to be, there was no warrant for such resistance. But if by those misimployed persons be understood other in­struments of oppression in times of Peace before it come to Armes, such as the pleaders for defensive Armes doe suppose (in their last Case, pag. 2.) to have counterfeited the Kings Seal or Warrant, and by it to Spoyle and Murther all the Kings faithfull Subjects if they be not resisted; or such as the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, doth (in his instances pag. 57.) suppose indeed to have the Kings Seale or Warrant, where­with [Page 10]they might range through the Kingdome, wasting and spoyling, taxing and distraining, yea might destroy the Mem­bers of Parliament as they sit in their Houses, if they might not be resisted. Ans. For that of the counterfeited Seale, it is not to the purpose; if there be cause to doubt or suspect such a Seale, there are undoubted Ministers of Power and justice to makestay of it till it be made known above; as we see those dealt with, that bring counterfeit Briefes, and as some years a­goe, he that counterfeited a Commission for taking up Chil­dren for Virginia, was staid by authority and brought to Iustice. But suppose such instruments of oppression have indeed the Kings Seale, and Warrant to Taxe, Distreine, &c, May not private men resist such in their murthering assaults, and the Ministers of Power and Authority suppresse them in each County by Force? I answer. This is an enlarging of the Case, which concernes the present resistance as now it is underta­ken by Subjects with Armyes in the field. Yet for farther sa­tisfaction, and without prejudice to that which clearly con­vinceth the present resistance as unlawfull, I conceive it rea­sonable to say. First, if private men be suddainly assaulted in their Persons by such instruments, without any foregoing pre­tence or reason (as of Taxing, Distraining, Arresting) so that their life is imminently indangered, and no meanes of avoiding by slight, then is personall defence Lawfull; for such sudden assault carries no pretence of authority with it; but if such mis­imployed instruments come first to Taxe, Distraine, Arrest, (as it is supposed) private men ought not to resist, and so draw on the endangering of life, but to seek redresse above from Au­thority, and, if it may not be had, yet not to resist. Secondly, If the Ministers of Power in each County doe at first stay, re­strain, and commit such mis-imployed instruments, and so re­present the matter again to the King; if the two Houses of Parliament also, deale in like manner with those that by vir­tue of any such Warrant should notoriously trespasse upon them, this is not to resist; for here is only a desire of informing the King aright, not a will of contending with him, if he will not be of another mind. Now (as the pleaders for defensive [Page 11]Armes say pag. 2.) The Law supposing the King can doe no wrong supposeth wrong may be done in His name, and therefore teacheth the Ministers of Power and Iustice under him, to pre­sume such illegall Warrants and surreptitiously or by fraud procured, and so at first to make stay of such mis-imployed in­struments, and to bring the matter again to the knowledge of the King.

Secondly, Should a King be so obstinate, as to perfist in the maintenance of those illegall courses, and to that end imploy­ed the Militia or power of Armes, wherewith he is invested, it is neither Legall nor Reasonable, that the Ministers of pow­er under him, should pursue the opposition to the setting up of a Militia or contrary power, to the introducing of a Civill Warre. For though such Ministers of Power ought to use all faire and Lawfull means for the restraining of such mis-imploy­ed instruments, and it is not for me to set bounds how farre they may proceed in preserying the Kings Peace, by using that Pow­er against mis-imployed Persons, yet surely they cannot pro­ceed so farre as to a contestation of Power with Him whose Ministers they are, much lesse to a Levying of Warre, as at this day, and an apposing of Armies against Armies. This is the Re­sistance supposed in the Case, and in this Case to resist the Kings Forces is to resist Him.

SECT. III. Severall kinds of Monarchy.

IN the next place we are called to a consideration of the se­verall kinds of Monarchicall government, that it may ap­peare, whether in any of them this Resistance by force of Armes may find allowance or otherwise.

The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, observing there was but little pretence from Scripture, either by precept or Example, for Resistance, confesseth that the Kings, under which the People of God were in the Old and New Testa­ment, might not be resisted, and therefore layes all the defence of Resistance upon reason, drawn from the severall condition [Page 12]of an Absolute and of a Limited or Mixed Monarchy. For which purpose he spends the first part of his book, in clearing the poynt according to his own principles, and then comming to apply what he had said, touching Limited and Mixed Mo­narchyes, to the Government of this Land, he complaines of us Divines, that we plead for Absolutenesle of Monarchicall power in this Kingdome, never making any difference of Powers, but bringing proofes for Subjection and against Resi­stance from places of Scripture (a sore fault) and examples which concerne the manner of the government of Iudah, Is­raell, and the Romans: as if that which holds in our govern­ment, did alwaies hold in another, so he pag. 33. And then he endeavours to prove this Monarchy, to be so mixed, as that the Houses of Parliament be originally joyned with the Mo­narch in the Soveraign Power. Whence he thinks he has both an answer to places and examples taken out of Scripture, that they belonged to absolute Monarchies, are not appliable to ours; and also a demonstration of his conclusion for Resistance. viz. that by the Mixed condition of this Monarchy (as he phansyeth it) the two Houses are vested with power to re­straine with force of Armes the Exorbitances of the Mo­narch.

Ans. It was never my intent (nor was, I suppose, of other Divines) to plead for absolutenesse of Power in the King, if by absolutenesse of power be meant (as it should be) a power of Arbitrary command, but if by Absolutenesse of Power this Author means (as he doth sometimes) a Power not to be resi­sted or constrained by force of Armes raised by Subjects, such a power we plead for, and do say, That as those places and ex­amples out of Scripture did forbid resistance then, and shew, no warrant for it can be had either by precept or example out of Gods word, so doe they condemne resistance in this Go­vernment, though Limited, as shall be shewen.

We allow a distinction of Monarchies, and admit the Go­vernment of Kingdomes to be of divers Kinds, and acknow­ledge [Page 13]a Legall restraint upon the Power of the Monarch in this Kingdome; but when this Author has made all the ad­vantage he can of his Limited and mixed formes of Monarchy, it will not availe him for the Countenancing of Armes taken up by Subjects: for this will appeare to be truth, agreeable to Scripture and Reason. That [...]overnment is not the inven­tion of man, but the institution of God, whereby he rules men by men set over them in his stead; and though hee doth not now immediatly designe those his Vicegerents, but by other meanes, bee it by the choice of the People; yet have they their power not from the People, (to whom it belongs to bee governed, and doe by choosing a Governour, seeke a benefit safely) but from [...]od, by vertue of his institution of Govern­ment. Also, that the Governing Power, is one and the same, which God gives and settles upon the Person that is Supreme, and stands immediatly next to God, betweene Him and the People: onely that Power may bee Limited in the exercise of it, as the People by agreement at first, or by Petition af­ter can procure. Also, that where the Prince stands Supreme, and next to [...]od above all the People, there Subjects may not take Armes, and make forceable Resistance, notwithstanding he be exorbitant in the exercise and use of that Power, to the in­vasion of such Rights and Priviledges, as they enjoy by first compact, or after procurement.

The pleaders for resistance on the other side, do wilfully em­brace and rest upon the Opinion of Heathen writers, touching the beginning of Government, and the derivation of the Go­verning Power from the People, as if they had not Scripture (which the Heathen wanted) to give them better direction herein.

The Authour of the Treatise of Monarchy seemes to referre the beginning of Government to Gods ordinance, and to af­firme the power to be from God, Pag. 2. but in the processe of his booke, wee shall finde him deriving it indeed from the People, and Pag. 4. he concludes thus for both. They, which say that Soveraignes have their Power from God, speake in some sense truth, as also they Which say that originallie power is in the [Page 14]People, may in a sound sense be understood; and in these things we have D. Fernes consent in his discourse upon this Subject, Sect. 3. Answ. you had not his consent in your sense; for in that Sect. it was his intent to shew that the Governing Power, (i) such an Authority or sufficiency for command and coertion, was from God, though the designation of the Person be by choice of the People, and the limitations of that power in severall kinds of Monarchy be by their consent and agreement. Now if to de­signe the Person, or procure limitation of the power in the ex­ercise of it, bee in your sound sense to give the power, there's no great harme to us, or advantage to you: you must have the power originally from the people in another sense, or else you can make no pretence by it for your grounds of Resistance; and so you doe, when you tell us, Pag. 16. they sometime reserve a power to oppose or displace the Magistrate: sometime they make the Monarch Supreme, and then they divest them­selves of all Superiority, and have no power left to oppose him in Person, and Pag. 63. you call them Architectonicall powers, committing the power of Government and Armes, &c. This is the riddle of this governing power originally in the people, they are Architect. powers, but build upon foun­dations laid in the aire; they are invested with Superioritie, but none can tell over whom, besides themselves; they reserve a power, but such as they never had; for before Government established, they have not any power of a community or po­litique power, whereby a command may be laid upon others, but onely a naturall power of private Resistance, wherewith every one of them is in particular endued, which power they cannot use against the publique Magistrate, when once they have designed him.

Now let us take a neerer view of the formes of Monarchy spoken of by this Author, and make a few observations upon such particulars, as wil be of more necessary consideration, when we come to the examination of Scripture, of Reason, and of the Constitution of this Monarchy.

First, he tels us, Absolute Monarchy is when the Sove­raignty is so fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under [Page 15]God, but the Monarchs owne will: so it is when a People are absolutely resigned up or doe resigne up themselves to be gover­ned by one man, pag. 6. We allow this description, but must re­member it below, when this Author will tell us, the Israelitish Kings were absolute Monarchs, which will not appeare by this description, also when he tels us that to make a Monarch irresi­stible, is to make him absolute, for we see by this description it is not the denyall of resistance that makes a Monarch absolute, but the denyall of a Law to bound his will.

In the next place he tels us, He is a limited Monarch who hath a Law besides His owne will for the measure of His pow­er, pag. 12. This also is true. But he supposeth first, that this Monarch must be limited in the very power it selfe, not onely in the exercise of the power, for an absolute Monarch may stint himselfe, in the exercise of his power, and yet remaine absolute. Answ. True, if such a Monarch limit himselfe to such a Rule in such a case, reserving power to vary from it when hee shall see good cause: but if he that is Originally absolute and unlimited doe in some particular cases fixe a Law with promise not to va­ry from it, he is so farre forth, and onely so farre as concernes those cases, limited and not absolute. Secondly, hee supposes, such a Monarch must bee Radically (i.) Originally invested with such a measure of limited power, and that hee must have his bounds or limit [...] of power ab externo, not from the free de­termination of his own wil. pag. 12. yet at the beginning of the next page, hee tels us, that soeveraignty comes thus to bee desined to a rule, (i) to bee limited, either by Originall con­stitution, or by after condescent, when a Monarch, originally absolute, descends from His absolutenesse to a more mode­rate power. That which he has to salve it is, that this limiting by after condescent, is equivalent to that which is by Origi­nall constitution; for there is in it a change of title, and a resolu­tion in the Monarch to be Subject to in no other way, then according to such a Law, pag. 13. Answ. Where here is such a change of title as this man supposeth, it is done at once, and by expresse and notorious resignation of the Monarchs former title and power. But it is not necessary that an Absolute Mo­narch [Page 16]should come to a limited condition after that manner, for a Monarch that was unlimited at first, by degrees may li­mit and bind up his power, and give oath for greater security, that he will rule accordingly, and requires not to be subject to, but according to such limitations or Lawes; and so it will ap­peare that the pious Princes of this Land have anciently done. Only when it is said, they require not to be subject to but accor­ding, &c. it must be understood in regard of Active subjection, which they cannot expect, if they shall command against those Lawes, nor in regard of Passive subjection, as if they allowed their Subject to resist upon such commands; for it can scarce be imagined, that any Prince should condescend to a limited use of his power, and blinde himselfe by Oath not to transgresse the limits, hee should also have the bands of force and con­straint cast upon him, for the keeping of Him within those li­mits.

The other distinction, which most concernes the businesse in hand, is of Monarchy into simple, without any Mixture of A­ristocracy or Democracy, and Mixed, that has an allay from one or both of those. In the explication of which, that hee may lay convenient grounds for such a Mixture as he would make in this Monarchy, he tels us; if the composition bee of three, then must the soveraigne power be in all three Originally, and not one holding his power from the other, but all equally from the fundamentall constitution; His Reasons are. 1. Because else it would be no Mixture but a Derivation of Power to o­thers, which is seene in the most simple Monarchy. 2. Because the end of Mixture (which [...]s to keepe each state from exorbi­tancy) could not be obtained by a derivate power; for such a power cannot turne back, and set bounds to its beginning, so he, pag. 25.

Answ. We see by thi [...] where he will place the two Houses, in a Society of the Soveraigne Power, and that by Originall constitution, which will appeare but a phansy when wee come to examine it below; but for the grounding of it, hee supposes [Page 17]that Mixture must be in the very soveraigne power, and that o­riginally, or from the beginning of the government; neither of which is necessary: for I conceive that as Limitation in go­vernment, is in regard of a Law or Rule, which bounds the will of the Monarch for those particulars that Law concernes; and such limitation may be onely of the exercise of the power not of the power it selfe; so Mixtures is in regard of Persons joyned to the Monarch for certaine Acts and purposes; but that such Persons should have a share with the Monarch in the So­veraigne Power, is so farre from being necessary to that mix­ture which Monarchy will admit of, that indeed it cannot consist with that Supremacy which is supped to be in the Mo­narch, for it would make severall independent powers in the same State or Kingdome, which is most absurd. If therefore the concurrence and consent of such persons be required as ne­cessary to the exercise onely of the Soveraigne power in such or such Acts, it is sufficient to make a Mixture in the Govern­ment.

In like manner as it was said above of Limited Monarchyes, that it is not necessary they should bee so Originally, but may become such by after condescent, so may it be said of Mixed Mo­narchies. And it is cleare that in most Monarchies of Europe, which have beene parts or branches of the Roman Empire and by force of Armes broken off from it, the Monarch at first had absolute power, (like as the Roman Emperours had over their conquered Provinces) but by degrees have received Limitations to governe according to such and such Lawes, and have admit­ted Mixtures by a concurrence of such and such persons, whose consent should be requisite and necessary to some exercises of their soveraigne power.

Now to his Reasons I answer, Derivation of power is ei­ther upon substitute Officers and Ministers, which supply the absence of the Monarch in the execution of Power and Justice for him upon his People, and such derivation of Power is in the most simple Monarchy: or else it is upon such Persons or such an order of men, whose concurrence and consent is re­quired to certaine Acts of Monarchicall Power, and this [Page 18]makes a Mixture, though they have no share in the very pow­er, but concurre to the exercise of it only, and have not that neither Originally, but upon condescent of the Prince; yet have it certainly and irrevocably by Law setled upon them. Now if this Author will not call this a Mixture, because it is not Originally in the power it selfe, we cannot help it; we are sure it makes a large and reall difference in Government, and may obtain its end (the keeping of each State from exorbi­tancy) in that way it's intended to doe it in; which will give answer to his other Reason. For though a Derivative power can [...] bounds to the Soveraigne power, yet may it stand to [...] way, those bounds, which the sove­raig [...] power has set to it selfe, and made the Derivate power the keeper of. The Kings of the M [...]des and Persians were in most things absolute, yet in this had they bound themselves, not to alter a Decree made by the advice of the Septemviri, or the Princes and chiefe Counsellors of the Kingdome, as we see Dan. 6.14. and Est. 1.19. So may it be easily conceived in any other State; the Prince, though unlimited at first, may bind up his Power from such or such Acts, unlesse he has the con­sent of such Counsellors unto them; which consent and con­currence does not give them a share in the Soveraign power, but makes them as Bounders in the Exercise of it; nor does it imply in those Persons a power of forceable constraint, but on­ly of Legall and Morall restraint, as will appear in the fifth Section.

I will conclude this Section with a brief consideration of what he delivers concerning Monarchy by Conquest. First, If the Invasion, saith he, be made upon pretence of Title, and the Pretender doth prevaile, it is not conquest properly, but a vindi­cation of a Title, and then the government is such as the Title is by which he claimed, pag. 21. I will not dispute whether a people so standing out doe forfeit those Priviledges and Liber­ties they formerly enjoyed, or whether a Prince so forced to vindicate His Title [...]y subduing the People be not free from the former Limitations, to which Princes peaceably entring bound themselves, and whether He may not use such a People [Page 19]as a Conqueror? I should commend the Clemency and Piety of that Prince, that would not, but I doe not see the injustice, if he should so use them.

Secondly, He blames the Censure, which the Fuller An­swer gave of Conquest, that the title of it was such as Plunde­rers have, &c. and tells us, the Right of Conquest is such, as the precedent Warre is, if that he Lawfull so is the Conquest, yet is it not the Conquest that makes them Morally bound, but their own Consent in accepting of the Government, pag. 22. Well, but a forced consent will suffice, and such will scarce be wanting to a Conquest, and they that plead title of Conquest doe not divide it from such a forced consent of People, but from a free limiting election.

Thirdly, He grants that while their naturall Soveraigne is in being, the People cannot by consent devolve a Right to the Conquerour: But suppose they have not that tye upon them, may they perpetually stand out against the Conqueror, or ra­ther are they not bound to consent and yeeld to His yoake, af­ter they see they are wholly subdued, and he has setled a frame of Government among them? Hee tells us Conquest may give title and power to dispose of the Country, goods, and lives of the Conquered, but still it is in the Peoples choyce to come to a Morall condition of Subjection: if they will suffer the utmost of Violence from the Conquerour rather, then consent to any termes of Subjection, as Numantia in Spain, they dye or remain a free people, nor doe they resist Gods Ordinance, if at any time of ad­vantage, they use force to free themselves from so violent a pos­session: so he pag. 22. It is an uncontrouleable truth in Policy, that the consent of the People, either by themselves or their Ance­stors, is the only Mean in ordinary Providence, by which Sove­raignty is conferred upon any Person or Family; so he concludes pag. 23. Answ. That consent of People is the only meane, in your sense, may be an uncontrouleable truth in the Policy lately framed; but it is certain, that God has power to dispose of us in ordinary providence, without expecting our consents and choice; it is plain by Scripture, that Conquest is a Mean of translating Kingdoms and disposing of People in the way of or­dinary [Page 20]providence; it was so when God gave Egypt to Nebu­chadnezzar as an hire for his service done upon Iudah, so when the Ammonites and Edomites were subdued by David, of which see below, Sect. 6. against the Fuller Answer. Had these no right over those conquered Nations, but by expecting their consent? Yea, will he say, a Right to dispose of their Lands and Goods, and lives, but not to challenge their Morall Subjecti­on, Well, we doubt not but such Conquerors could force their consent; but I aske, were they not bound to yeeld it? is there no way for that providence, which translates Kingdoms, to discover it selfe, but by the consent of the Conquered People, that if they please to be obstinate, his providence shall give no Right? his setting up a King by Conquest over such a people shall be no institution o [...] Ordinance? this is good Policy but bad Divinity: I conceive it all [...] controuleable truth, that when the invading Prince has perfectly subdued a People (there being no present Soveraigne or apparent Heire of the Crown, to whom they are bound) as has setled & disposed all things and constituted a frame of Government, then I say provi­dence doth sufficiently discover it selfe, and such a people ought to submit, and consent, and take their Prince as set over them by the hand of Providence; so that, if they will persist finally to resist (as this Author saith they may) they resist the Ordinance of God. If he will not beleeve me, let him heare Calvin, who in his Instit. l. 4. c. 20. nu. 26, 27. doth inforce obedience to that Prince which is over us, by a reason drawn from that Provi­dence of God, which disposeth Kingdomes, and sets up over us what Kings he pleases, and from the example of Nebuchad­nezzar, Ier. 27.8. doth inferre; Cuicunqve ergo delatum fuisse regnum conslabit, ei serviendum esse ne dubitemus: But how shall we discover his providence and will herein? the next words tell us: Atque simul ac in Regium fastigium quempiam evebit Dominus, testatam nobis facit suam voluntatem, quòd regnare illum velit. So in his Comment upon 1 Sam. 26. Li­cet multi avaritiâ, ambitione, crudelitate invascrit regna & im­peria, tamen Dei voluntatem pluris esse, quam omnia illa, faci­endam sciamus; ac proinde nos illis ultro submittamus, quos Deus [Page 21]Reges nobis praefecit. This is very home against this Authors as­sertion, wherein he denyes Conquest to confer a Soveraignty, and will not suffer God in the ordinary way of Providence to dispose of a people without their own consents. But enough of this; We come now to make Application of what hath been said to the Particular Monarchy of this Land.

SECT. IV. Of the Constitution of this Monarchy.

BEfore we come to examine how this Author has stated [...]he poynt of Resistance in relation to the severall kinds of Monarchy, it will not be amisse to consider unto what kinde this Monarchy belongs; whether it be such a Limited Mixed Monarchy, as this man would have it, Originally and Funda­mentally, by the placing of Nobles and Commons, as sharers with the Monarch in the Soveraign power. It would be seeme the skilfull in the Law to speak to this point (if they could be induced to deliver what they know) but seeing there is enough in History and Reason, which speaks the Frame and beginning of this Monarchy otherwise, then this Author or others before him have sansyed: it will not be hard to say so much, as may (which was heretofore endeavoured in [...]y Reply) let Consci­ence see, it can have no plea for Resistance from the supposed grounds, upon which these men lay the platforme of this Mo­narchy.

I had twice occasion in my first Treatise to speak of the be­ginning of this Government, in the Armes of the Saxons and Normans, which was not (as this Author feignes, pag. 33. 34.) to prove our Kings Absolute; herein I challenge his ingenuity, if either I proposed this as a Conclusion to be proved, That our Kings are Absolute, or urged the entrance of the Saxons and Normans, as an argument to prove it by; but onely all adged it twice by way of Answer to what was spoken by them, touch­ing a right in the People by virtue of such a capitulating ele­ction at first, as they suppose to have given beginning to this Monarchy; in both which places I expressely intimated, those [Page 22]Conquests were not mentioned to win an Arbitrary power to the King, but onely to exclude Resistance and such a supposed e­lection.

The beginning of this English Monarchy, and the root of succession of the Monarchs we must fetch from the Saxons, and this Author bids us look so far back, when (to cut off the advantages that may be made against him from the Normans entrance) he tels us, pag. 35. that Duke William came upon the old limited Title, whereby the English Saxon Kings his Predeces­sors held this Kingdome.

How the Saxons entred upon the Kingdome is well known: they made themselves masters of this Kingdome by Armes, which although it doth not inferre our Kings are now Abso­lute, (an inference as farre from my intention as his) yet doth it plainly overthrow such an originall Mixture in the soveraign power, as this Author has phansyed: and herein (because I have spoken to this point, as occasion required, in the third Sect. of my Reply to the Full Answerer (who had the like conceit of such an Originall Mixture, though not so refined as this Author has given it us) I shall be the briefer in my Answer to this.

First, This Author saith, It was not a Conquest that the Saxons made, but an expulsion, pag. 35. Ans. This is neither true nor greatly materiall. Not true, for it cannot be imagined but a great part of the Brittaines remained under the Saxon yoake; so M. Cambden tells us, they were the fewer that fled towards Wales, and defended themselves against the Saxons in the West: his words are, Victi omnes in gentem, leges, nomen, linguam­que vincentium, praeter paucos, quos locorum asperitas in occi­dentali tractu tutata est, concesserunt. Camb, Britan. Saxon. Nor is it greatly materiall, for if we could imagine that the Brittaines were not brought under the yoke, but expelled, yet can we not imagine, that the Government of those Saxon Kings (being made such by the acclamation of their Souldiers, as when the Praetorian guard, or some Army abroad saluted a Roman Emperour) was at first any other, then is the govern­ment or command of Generalls over their Souldiers, that is [Page 23] unlimited; much lesse so Limited and Mixed, as this Author phansyeth it, who looking upon the Modell or Platforme of this Monarchy, pag. 44. 45. doth admire their Wisdome (as more then humane) that had the contriving of it; but can any one suppose such a Platforme laid, that considers the beginning of the Saxon Monarchy, or imagine such admirable Wisdome more than humane, in those rude and violent beginnings?

But he tells us in the second place, the Saxons planting themselves here under their Commanders, no doubt continued the freedome they had in Germany, and so changed their soyle not their government, pag. 35, but what proof to put this out of doubt? a conjecture out of Tacitus, that wrote of the Ger­mans some hundreds of years before this entrance of the Sax­ons; Among the Germans saith he, Nec Regibus aut infinita aut libera potestas. True, but we may see by those Authors, that M. Cambden alleadges for the Originall of these Saxons, that in probability these Suxons were not then among those people of Germany, that Tacitus speakes of, but did afterward break out of the Cimbrica chersonesus, into that part of Germany where now we find the Saxons, and into this Land; But why should we rest upon such dreames and uncertainties, as these men would put us upon? this is certain, that the Saxons being entred, and having vanquished the Brittaines did by degrees, as they could winne upon the Brittaines, raise seven King­domes or Monarchyes independant, yet so as that still one of them, the most powerfull, was Monarch of All, or King of all England, as M ^r Cambden and others shew out of Bede, till at length the King of the West Saxons, Egbert, vanquished the rest, and setled the Succession of the sole Monarchy in his Line, and those that should come after him.

Now would I fain know, how this Author, or any other of their best phansies can conceive, that such a Mixture, as joynes Nobles and Commons in the Soveraign power with the Mo­narch (for so they would have it) can possibly consist with such a beginning of Government? was it in them all seven? or could it consist with that solenesse or height of Monarchy which was still in one of them, and transferred from Kingdom [Page 24]to Kingdome, not by any fundamentall constitution, but by power, and the personall Prowesse of the Monarch? Or did Edgbert (that setled that condition of sole and chief Monarch upon his own successors by the subversion of the other King­domes) know any Subjects of His to be sharers with him in the Soveraigne power?

This Author indeed tryes what his phansy can doe, pag. 44. Where by six suppositions he endeavours to bring the Reader to an apprehension of the platforme of this Monarchy; When you have made these suppositions (saith he) in your mind, you have the very Modell and Platforme of this Monarchy, Pag. 45. So the Reader must rest upon his suppositions against the Cre­dit of all Histories and Chronicles; and those his suppositions begin thus pag. 44. Suppose a People (1.) Nobles and Commons set over themselves by publique compact one Soveraign, & resign up themselves to Him and His heires, to be governed by such and such fundamentall Lawes; then suppose them Covenanting with their Soveraign, that if cause be to constitute any other Lawes, he shall not doe it by His sole power, but they erserve at first, or afterwards it is granted them (which is all one) a hand of concurrence therein, that they will be bound by no Lawes, but what they joyne with him in the making of. and so he goes on with six suppositions; but first he must have a strong phansy that can conceive (as I said) this consistent with the begin­nings of the Saxon Government, as if it could be laid in such a platforme. Secondly, in giving us the briefe of this Platforme he still tells us that by the Admirable wisdome of the Archi­tects of this Government, the Nobles and Commons have their power and Authority, not depending on the Monarch, but radically their own, by fundamentall Mixture, so pag. 41. and elsewhere: but in the six suppositions wherein he would lay this platforme open to the view, he brings up the Houses to this power they have, by steps of time; and comming to make those suppositions, he speaks doubtingly of the Originall con­triving of this government, whether (saith he) done at once, or by degrees found out and perfected, pag. 44. but this contriving must be made at once and at first, when they chose the first [Page 25]King, or else they cannot have this power and Authority radi­cally their own. And we cannot imagine but Bede, and other Historians, would have observed such convention of Nobles and Commons (as this Author supposed) for the contriving of this Government, in which they demeaned themselves with such admirable wisdome; or if they could not tell us of such a convention of them at first, for the contriveing and be­ginning of the Government, they could not but observe some meetings of them after, for the use of this power in the mana­ging of the Government.

Assemblies doubtlesse there were for representing of grie­vances to the Monarch, and for giving advise in the redresse; and among the Orders, of which those Assemblies did ancient­ly consist, there were Procuratores cleri, the representatives of the Cleargy, (as I have heard good Lawyers affirme, and one of my former Answers had it in his Margin, though little to his advantage) but here we are call'd by this Authour to be­lieve or rather suppose an assembly consisting of Nobles and Commons, vested with part of the Soveraign power by orgi­nall constitution; when as neither he nor any other Author could bring any one Record for it above the Norman Con­quest; and those Histories or Chronicles, which mention the beginning of Parliaments as now they stand in Authority, doe not rise so high as those times; Now seeing the Parliament it selfe, 24 H. 8. c, 12. doth declare, that this Realme of England has beene ever accepted for an Empire, governed by one supream Head &c. and tells us, that Histories and Chronicles shew as much, why should these Chronicles be so many ages silent in the originall Constitution, by which this Anthor gives the two Houses their power from the beginning of this Monarchy, if either such a constitution ever was, or indeed could consist with this Empire, and this one supream head?

This Author tells us, pag. 36. that the Tryall by twelve men and other fundamentalls of Government, wherein the English freedom consists, were left untouched by the Conquerour. But why could not he tell us as well, that this power which he as­scribes to the two Houses was left untouched? he would if he [Page 26]could have made it appeare to have been before the Conquest; Mr. Cambden names the King before the Conquest, that first or­dained the tryall by twelve Men, but what Chronicle can doe as much for the other? the like originall to that of the tryall by twelve men, had other Liberties of the Subject, to wit by af­ter condescent of the Prince, and yet this Author calls that Tryall a fundamentall: and so it is, not of the Monarchy, but of the Subjects liberty, or, as he said, of the English freedome.

We need not after all this (which has been spoken of the beginning of the English Saxon Government (into which this Author saith Duke William succeeded, and in the same right of those Saxon Kings) seek advantage from the entrance of that Norman Conquerour▪ Yet this we can say (and it appeare [...] out of severall Authors cited by Mr. Cambd [...]n in his Britan. Norman) that the Conquerour invictoriae quasi Trophaeum, as a Trophy and memoriall of his Conquest, disposed of the Lands of the Conquered, changed, their tenure, abrogated what Eng­lish Lawes and Customes he pleased, and gave them what Lawes he thought good, and unto this the People were content to yeeld, which is more then can evidently be said by this Author for the stating of the Roman Emperours in a condition irresistable, as we shall see below upon the 13. to the Rom. as we can say this to the overthrow of their ground of resistance (that fundamentall mixture or joyning the Houses with the Monarch, as sharers, in the Soveraign power) so do we say, that what Limitations, Lawes, Priviledges, Customes, have been after procured by, or restored to the People, all those the King as He is sworn, so is He bound to observe, because of the Cath of God.

So that this Author speakes but his own Phansyes, when he concludes thus upon William the Conquerour. By granting the former Lawes and Government, he did equivalently put himselfe and his successours into the state of Legall Monarchs, and in that Tenure have all the kings of this Land held the Grown unto this day, when these men would rake up and put a Title of Conquest upon them, which was never made use of by him who is the root of their succession, pag. 37. How farre Duke William made use [Page 27]of his Title by Conquest, & how he granted the former Lawes and Government appeares, by that which was spoken even now out of M. Cambden, that is, he made use of it so farre forth as he pleased, and graunted what Lawes he pleased of the for­mer Government, and what new ones he pleased, those he im­posed on the people; and unto this they agreed, willingly or unwillingly it matters not, as is sometimes graunted by this Author. But by this he did equivalentlie put himselfe (saith he) and successors into the state of Legall Monarchs: He did so in a good sence, but not as this Author meanes it; for we know (by that which was observed above Sect. 3 concerning a Monarch originally unlimited, but falling off into a more moderate and limited condition) that his meaning is, that Duke William by graunting such Lawes did put himselfe in such a Condition, as if at first he had been limited so by the people, they reserving to themselves power of resisting his exorbitancies, which should be destructive of those Limitations and Lawes; this is a Legall Monarch in his sense: but we say he became a Legall Monarch, that is bound himselfe to rule according to such Lawes as he had graunted. Nor doe we rake up a Title of Con­quest for his Successors, or would have them any other then Legall Monarchs; but by that (which has been shewen, and cannot be denied) it appears, that the Root of Succession, whe­ther English or Norman, sprang up by conquest, and that the Priviledges and Powers, wherewith we see the Subject in­vested, were of an after spring, that is, of after agrement, or by condescent of the Monarch; which Powers & Priviledges, grants, Liberties, though not originall, yet are they irrevoca­ble, the Prince is bound, as was saide, to observe them because of the Oath of God. I will but adde M. Cambdens expression of the Monarchicall power. The Kings of this Land have pote­statem supremam & merum imperium, so he in his Britan. which as it excludes all Subjects from haveing share in the So­veraign power, for in that respect it is Merum imperium not mixtum; so doth it not exclude such limitations and mixtures as have been by after condescent, for the bounding of that Sove­raign power in the exercise and use of it.

But now this Author will endeavor, against the credit of History and Antiquiry, to reason us into a beliefe of such a frame as he has moulded this Monarchy in. First he would prove, That the Soveraignty of the King is radycally and funda­mentally Limited, not only in the use and exercise of it, but in the power it selfe, pag 31 then, That the Authority of this Land is Mixed in the very root and constitution of it. pag. 39.

This were an argument fit for a skilfull Lawyer to Labour in, yet soe much in consequence I can at first sight perceive in his prooses, that I dare pronounce them insufficient to cleare what he undertakes. His proo [...]es are either his owne reasons, or drawne from the Kings owne grants in his late expresses.

His reasons for the Limited condition of our Kings, are from the denomination of Leige and Legall Soveraigne, and from Proscription, which evinceth, that in all ages beyond record, the Lawes & Customes of this Kingdome have been the rule of Government. pag. 32 Answ. This proves that our Kings are limited in the use or exercise of their power, and noe more for neither that Denomination, nor any prescription can make us beleive that the Limitations of their power had any other begining, then from their voluntary and pious condescent to such or such moderations and allayes, which by constant usage and custome, or eise by expresse Lawes were made ever after inevitable and irrevocable by the Monarchs themselves; the Oath also of succeeding Monarchs, binding them to the obser­ving of such Lawes and Customes.

His reasons Iikewise for the mixed constitution of this Go­vernment doe prove a mixture, but not such as he would have, nor from the begining or first constitution of the Monarchy; they are these: 1 Because it is a Monarchy mixed with an A­ [...]istocracy in the Lords, and Democracy in the Commons, but the [...]e is no Mixture which is not in the root and supremacy of power, pag. 40. 2. Because it is a Monarchy where the Le­gis [...]tive power is in all three, and therfore mixed in the ve­ry root and essence of it, ibid. 3 Because it is a Monarchy in which three Estates are constituted to the end that the power of one should moderate and restraine from excesse the power of [Page 29]the other, and therefore mixed in the root and essence of it, ibid: the same reasons he uses, Pag. 43. to prove the Authority of both Houses to be no derived authority, but equally originall and fundamentall with that of the King; and saith, he cannot devise, what can reasonably be said in opposition to these Grounds proving a fundamentall mixture. Answ. And I must say, I cannot devise what sh uld move a man of reason, (as this Author seemes to be) so often to prosfesse as he doth, that he is convinced of such a fundamentall constitution of this Monarchy; for I cannot be convinced but his grounds are false supposalls.

For first, it is not necessary, the mixture should be in the root or Supremacy of power: but it is sufficient, if there be a concu [...] ­rence of Persons, whose consent is required to the exercise of that Supreame power, as was explained above, Sect. 3. when we spoke of mixture. Nay, if it must be in the Supremacy of power, as he will have it, how can he make the King the only Supream, and that one Head, to which the whole Body poli­tique is bound and united, as he grants, pag. 42.43. He cannot salve it with his Apex potestatis, which he there gives to the King, uniesle the King must be the Crowne or top of the head only; for they also must be our Head and our Soveraignes, if they be mixed or joyned with him in the Supremacy of power, as this Author would have it,

Secondly, the phrase of Legislative power, ascribed to the two Houses is satisfied and explained by that concurrence and consent of theirs in and to the exercise of the Supream power, as above; but I cannot be convinced, that it argues the power it selfe, which gives life to a Law, to be in them, but their assent to be requisite and necessary, so that without it no Law can be made; which is enough if men could be content. So when it is said, Be it enacted by the Authority of this Parliament: None denies, but to have such Vote or power of affenting is a great Authority, but not such as makes them sharers in the Suprema­cy of power, for then should they also be our Head and our So­veraignes, as was said above; before that phrase was used, we find it r [...]n thus, The King by the advice and assent of the Pre­lates, [Page 30]Earles, and Barons, and at the instance and request of the Commonalty has ordained. &c: which tells us plainly, where the fountaine of the ordaining or Legislative power is; & how that power is excited or stirred up to Act, by the instance and request of the Commons representing to the King the grievan­ces of his People; and that the efflux of that fountaine, or the exercise of that power is not soly in his Will, that is, comes not to the Act of ordaining without the consent of Lords and Commons.

Thirdly, to his third Reason I answer; The end of this mix­ture or concurrence is to restraine from excesse; but the restraint is morall and legall, not forcible by power of Armes, Parlia­mentary by way of assent or dissent to the ordaining power, not military by Armies in the Field; as will more clearly ap­peare by the next Section concerning resistance in mixed Mo­narchyes: Now such a morall restraint doth not argue the Mo­narchy mixed in the Root and first constitution, for the Houses may be vested with such a power afterward; but the Restraint that this Author intends is a forcible restraint by Armes, a meer phansy, for if the fundamentall Constitution had inten­ded them such a power, it would not have left a power in the Monarch to call them or dissolve them, which would make this pretended power of theirs altogether in effectuall, but would have left them continually existing and in being.

His proofes from the Kings owne Grants for the Radicall Limitation of this Monarchy are these, Pag. 31. His Majesty who best knowes by his Counsell the nature of his owne pow­er, saith, That the Law is the measure of his power, and in his Answer concerning the Militia, sayes, If more power shall be thought fit to be granted them, then by Law is in the Crown, &c. whereby it is granted, The King has no more power then by Law is in him: so he. Also for such a mixed Condition of this Monarchy as these men would have, they usually urge what His Majesty has graciously said in His Answer to the 19 Propo­sitions, That there is a power Legally placed in the two Houses, more then sufficient to prevent and restraine the power of Tyran­ny. To this purpose it is also, that some make advantage of the [Page 31]Kings speaking of Himselfe, as of one of the Three Estates.

Answer

1. It is well known, when the king was first forced to make his defence by writing, how few he had about Him, being drivē from his learned Counsell, or they one way or other kept from Him. Yet trusting to the justnesse of his Cause, & integrity of his own intentiōs, He returned such Answers as did for the present much sattisfie all reasonable people, and will one day (what ever advantage is now pickt out of them) be witnesses against those Troublers of our peace, that put him to his defence.

II. It is very unjust, that the gratious Expressions, which his Majesty has had of his Intentions and desires to rule and Command no otherwise then according to law, should be set upon the Rack and drawn out to his disadvantage, for the gain­ing of such a power to the Houses, as the law speakes not to be in them. If Trajan, fully purposing to rule Iustly, doth out of such Confidence give a Prefect his Commission and power, delivering him a Sword with these words, Hoc prome vtere sirecte impero, si male cotra me; If I Command aright, use this sword for me, if not against me. Shall it be concluded, that Officer might acordingly use his Sword against the Emperours? 'And if the King speake of himselfe as of One of the three Estates, shall any Subject diligently watch what fal's from Him, and return him his words again to his own disadvantage, (as Ben. hadads Messengers did 1. Kings, 20.33. Thy Brother Ben­hadad (your fellow States S ^r?

III. That which can fairely be gathered out of these ex­pressions as intended by his Majesty, doth not come up to these mens conclusions; the first and second speeches do shew, how tender he is of doing any thing he may not do by law, acknow­ledging his power is bounded and limited by Law; but it doth not follow, that his power or Soveraignty, wherein it is not limited by law, is not absolute and full; for so it is clearly, wheresoever a Monarchy, at first unlimited, doth afterward re­ceive Limits and Mixtures; of which Condition this Monarchy appeares to be by that which has been spoken in this Section.

So in his Answer to the 19. Prop. His Majesty acknowled­ges [Page 32] a power Legally in the Houses to restraine— which can not be extended beyond a Morrall, Parliamentary restraint; other­wise let them produce any law that inables the Houses to re­strain Tyranny by the Armes of the Kingdom; for as for their deductions from supposed Fundamentalls, we can deny them, as fast as they bring them, either as failing in thire Antecedents and false suppositions, or as altogether inconsequent. Also when this author of the Treatise of Monarchy doth in regard of that power, which is placed in the two Houses to restraine the ex [...]bitancies of the Monarch, so much admire the frame of this Government, as composed by more then Humane wise­dom pag. 44. Doe's he fall into this admiration for the placing of a power of restraint by forceable resistance? nothing admi­rable in that, were that the frame of this Government. That which is commendable indeed and admirable in the Limitati­ons and mixtures of this Government, is that Way of Legall, Morrall, or Parliamentary prevention and Restraint, which is established by law fo [...] our security.

Lastly when his Majesty hath spoken of himselfe, as of one of the three Estates, he has but spoken to them in their owne phrase (for they first stiled him so) and that usually in the point of his Negative Voyce; for every Bill comes to him in the third or last place, the Lords spirituall and Temporall, who in­deed are two of the three Estates, making a Concurrence in one Vote or Voice. But his Majesty did never use that phrase with any intent of diminution to his Supremacy or Headship; for properly the Prelates, Lords, and Commons, are the three Estates of this Kingdome, under his Majesty as their head.

Thus if we will trust our owne Eyes for what we read in History and Chronicle, or stand to Reason for the cleare Infe­rences which may be drawne from the knowne lawes of this Land, or use any ingenuity in the interpretation of His Maje­slies Gratious Expressions, We can never be perswaded that the begining of this Monarchy was such, as these men sup­pose, that is, so Limited and mixed radically and fundamentally, as these Authors and others have described it.

SECT. V. Of Resistance in relation to the severall kindes of MONARCHY.

VVE are now to consider, how this Author states the poynt of forceable Resistance in these severall kinds of Government, Which we shall find to be in away that lies very open to Rebellion.

First, He grants the person of the Monarch in all those se­verall kinds of Monarchy to be above the reach of all force or positive Resistance. This is true: but if this Author will allow as he doth, Subjects to rayse Armes, and with them to give battle to those that are about the Person of the Monarch, as his Guard, how shall His Person be secured from the Force and violence of the meanest hand? Nay the joyning of Battell with Him, as it is necessary consequence of Refistance by Armes, which must come to that, if it be pursued, so is it a direct Force intended and offered against His Person.

Secondly, Concerning an Absuolte Monarch, he resolves it thus.

If such a Monarch should so farre degenerate as apparently to seeke the destruction of the whole Community subject to him, then might such a community constreined by the last necessity resist by force of Armes against any instruments imployed to effect the same, pag 9. for such an intention cannot be the Act of a reaso­nable will, pag. 10. But first, if he meanes by the whole Com­munity, the whole body over which the power is placed, as he speakes, pag. 10 I grant it the Act of a most unreasonable will, but cannot conceive, how such an intention should fall into the mind of the worst Tyrant, as to leave himselfe no people to reigne over. Secondly, if he meanes by that community a cer­taine sort of people, as were the Iewes in the Kingdomes of Ahasnerus, and the Templars in these Westerne Kingdomes; the destruction of such a people may be the Act of a reasonable will; Haman makes a faire pretence and reason for the extir­pation of the Iewes, Est. 3.8. and Ahasuerus his decree was [Page 34]the act of a reasonable, though misguided will; but that such a Community, upon the knowledge of such an intention may take Armes, is not proved by this Author; for to prove it as he doth) by Davias example, who was but a particular man, is to shew that a Community may doe it because David in his owne particular might do it, and so to prove it by afferting a greater absurdity, viz. that a particular or private man may take Armes against an absolute Monarch. His other example he would prove it by, is the Revolt of the Ʋnited Provinces from the King of Spaine, who resolved to extirpate the whole people, pag. 10. But it is evident, the Spanish King intended the extirpation of the Protestants only; and as this Author [...]s told us here his opinion of the Revolt thereupon in the Ʋnited Provinces, so I would desire him to deliver his opinion of the Revolt and Rebellion of the Papists in Ireland upon their cer­taine knowledge that their extirpation was contrived here, this Author knowes by whom; I plead not for them but could wish that the assertions and practice of These times did not give them too much advantage; I could tell him the opinion and Resolution of the Iewes under Ahasuerus, that they would not take Armes for their defence till it was permitted them by the King, [...]st. 8.11. and the opinion of the Primitive Chri­stans, that they alowed not resistance, although the destruction of their whole Community was evidently attempted. This may be objected against his Resolution of the point, to make it doubtfull; I must needs say this Case of generall destruction and Extirpation (which some call extreme Necessity) is a very hard case; and whether [...]t will excuse a people, that in such ne­cessity shall take Armes, I dispute not, nor is it needfull I should: for it neither concernes the Cas [...], as now it stands be­tweene our King and his Subjects, He inviting them by all faire offers to return from their obstinate disloyalty, promising assuring them the Preservation of Religion Lawes, Liberties; and what not? Nor doth it concerne the Question now in hand which supposes not Extirpation of a People as cause of their Armes, but only Exorbitancies of the Prince tending to a sub­version of Religion and Liberties, which Exorbitancies, if [Page 35]they should be patiently born for the time that they shall cor­tinue, do not take away the being and subsistence of a people, as Extirpation doth; but only put them, for that time, under the inconveniences of arbitrary government; under which the people of God in the old Testament, and the Christians in the New, were left without remedy by forceable Resistance.

Againe, if any particular mans life be invaded without any plea or Reason for it, he thinkes that such a one may use for­ceable Resistance against any Agents in such assault of murder, and that it is justified by the fact of David, and rescue of Iona­than from the Causelesse cruell intent of Saul, pag. 10. The Rule here seemes to speak no more then a Personall defence against a Murthering assault, which was allowed above Sect. 2 provided that it be suddaine without any foregoing reason or pretence of Authority, and also inevitable: but in the Exam­ples he would inferre more then he speakes in the Rule; for he supposes the people would have rescued lonathan by force, i [...] Saul had persisted in his intent, and upon that false supposall, insinuates thus much, that if particular mens lives be sought after, others may interpose with Armes for their defence; and the Learned Divines doe expresly inferre from it, that Coun­tries may aslociate and bind themselves by oath not to suffer any of the impeached Members to be cut off: good doctrines these from Scripture, as we shall see when we come to that place. So in Davids Example he would insinuate that if par­ticular mens lives be sought after, they may raise and enter­tame Forces for their defence, as David did; but [...]f this seeme most absurd & dangerous (a [...] indeed it is) and if the Jsraelitish Kings were absolute (as this Author often grants) then must be acknowledge (what he accounts but one of my shifts, pag. 57.) that Davids example is not herein appliable, but in this way of defence, extraordinary. Of which more particularly below, when we come to places of Scripture, that concerne Davids behaviour towards Saul.

Lastly, he tells us, (which he should have done in the first place) that Subjects of an absolute Monarch must without resi­stance submit their estates, liberties, and persons to his will, [Page 36]so it carry any plea or shew of reason and equity, pag. 11. Ans. Here the way is open enough to Rebellion, for every man will be ready to thinke there is no reason or equity in the will of the Monarch, when he is oppressed by him; and if the plea or shew of reason and equity must be the barre to Resistance, it will lit­tle availe him to answer below, that the Roman Emperors might not be resisted, because they were absolute, for never was there lesse plea of Reason and Equity in the will of any Tyrants, then in theirs. But he will close up the way by tel­ling us, absolute Monarchy resolves all judgement into the will of the Monarch; so that if his will judicially censu [...]e it just it must be yeelded to as just, so he, pag. 11. But did not Saul cen­sure David is one affecting the Kingdome, and therefore wor­thy to dye, which was the act of a Reasonable will, though following a [...] ormed understanding; and did he not use a [...] [...]dicary processe in the Cause of Ionath [...]n, sen [...]e [...]cing him upon the tryall of Lots, why then were these examples brought, th [...] Author in the former page for Resistance, if such a will o [...] th [...] Monarch must be yeelded to? and why is there such a condition added in the Rule, so it carry any plea of reason and [...]? this is fast and loose; he that would have [...]rection for resistance is here left upon uncertaintie.

Let us proceed to Limited and mixed Monarchies. In such, he tells us, if the Exorbitancies of the Monarch be of lesse mo­ment, and not striking at the very being of the Government, they ought to be borne by publique patience, rather then to endanger the being of the State by a Contention betweene the head and the body. pag. 17. but if they be such as being suffered doe dissolve the frame of Government, and cannot be redressed by petition, then is prevention to be sought by resistance, pag. 18. and 29. Here I must first challenge the Ingeinuity of this Author, who citing my words pag. 49. taken out of my first Sect: (We may and ought to deny obedience to such commands of the Prince as are unlawfull by the Law of God, yea by the esta­blished Lawes of the Land) could give this censure upon them, here he sayes more then we say, yea, more then should be said; it is not universally true that we ought: considering, that the case [Page 37]was there put concerning exorbitancies, not of lesse moment, [...]ut tending to the subversion of Religion, Lawes, Liberties, [...]nd the question upon it was, whether upon such a case might we resist, and the explication of the word Resist was into a de­nying of Active obedience, and an using of forceable resistance. Now my saying was, that to such commands of the Prince we ought to deny obedience, but not use forceable resistance; they say (as he doth here) we ought also forceably to resist; and yet I say more then they say. Secondly, we would know who shall be Judge of the subversive Exorb [...]tances of the Monarch. He grants there can be no Authoritative Judge to determine it, for that would overthrow the Monarchy, pag. 17. This is in­genuous, and doth indeed sufficiently overthrow the conceit of the Full Ans [...]erer, placing the finall Resolution and Judge­ment of this State in the two Houses. But what then must be done? In a limited Monarchy, he tells us, the Fundamentall Lawes must judge & pronounce sentence in every mans Con­science, for in such a case as transcends the provision of the go­vernment, people are unbound and in state, as if they had no government, and the superiour Law of Reason and Conscience must be Judge; so he, pag. 18. This is a ready way to Anarchy and confusion: The people by this have liberty enough to con­ceive of their fundamentall Rights as they please, and of the Exorbitancies of their Prince, as may be most for their advan­tage, especially being upon such a case (which themselves may make) unbound and at liberty, as if they had no government. But these are fitting grounds for Resistance.

Likewise, in mixed Monarchyes, he tells us, the accusing and wronged side must make it evident to every mans Consci­ence; also the appeal must be to the Community, as if there were no government, and then as every man is convinced in Conscience, he is bound to give assistance, so, pag. 29. Here is good stuffe; not altogether so bad indeed as we see in the pra­ctice of these times, for here is no forcing of men to a Cove­nant, no forceable taking of their estates away, but a leaving of them to their Consciences: yet is this bad enough; for he supposes it as a thing possible, that two. Estates may make a [Page 38]consederacy against the third, pag. 28. therefore so oft as they shall combine and declare against the Monarch, the people are at liberty, as if there were no government, and then it seemes they have all the power againe in themselves, which they had at first according to these mens principles. Also in this contro­versy, saith he, the appeale is to be made to the Community (i.) the people; which though we have seen practised at this day in many Remonstrances, yet I thinke it was never given as a Rule before, it being in it selfe most unreasonable and disadvantagi­ous to the Monarch, for the people will be more ready to be­leeve their Representatives; and in the consequence most dan­gerous the high way to confusion, as will more sully appeare when we come to Reasons against this Resistance.

Lastly, we would know, what power there is in the com­munity to make resistance. He tells us, if the Monarch invade the power of the other Estates, or run a course tending to the dissolution of the constituted frame of Government, they ought to imploy their power to preserve the State from ruine; for that is the end why they have the power of restraint, and of providing for the publique safety, so pag. 28. but what power ought they to employ? any other then they are expresly invested with by Law? which is a Parliamentary, not Military power, a Legall restraining power, not a forceable constraint by Armes.

Yea bu [...], saith he, it is not only Lawfull for the other Estates to deny obedience to illegall proceedings of the Monarch, as private men may, but it is their duty, and they are bound to prvent dissolution of the established frame, pag. 28. He doth not say to prevent it by Armes, but he meanes so by opposing their duty of prevention, to the duty of private men in den [...]all of obedience. But we must consider that the duty of pri [...]e men is concerned when the Lawes come to execution, the du­cy of the publique States is seen, when the making or aboli­shing of Lawes is ta [...]en in hand; also we must consider that it is not the abuse of power in the execution of Law that dis­solves the established frame, but the abolishing of old and ma­king of new Lawes; whereupon we say, that the persons that [Page 39]make up those states taken out of their Assembly or Parliament, are but private men, and then have no more power to with­stand the illegall proceedings of the Monarch, then as private men by deniall of active obedience; in their Assembly or Par­liament, they have power of restraint by deniall or consenting, to prevent dissolution of the frame of Government, & indeed if they use that Legall restraining power, as they are bound in duty to doe, the Monarch cannot alter the established frame; he may perchance make some actuall invasions upon their Rights and Liberties (as they may often upon his Right and Prerogative) and runne a course in it selfe tending to subversi­on, but alter the frame or change the Lawes without their consent he cannot; and whether it be not better that such arbi­trary illegall Acts of a Monarch (which are transient and sixe no new frame of Government) should not for some time be borne with, then to seek remedy against them, by a Civill warre or contention of the body against the head, will appeare more fully when we come to Reasons against such Resistance.

I will conclude the examination of this part of his discourse, with the proof of this assertion; that Limitations and mixtures in Monarchy, doe not imply a forceable constraining power in Subjects (as he supposeth) for the preventing of the dissolution of the established Government, but only a Legall restraining power, as was even now insinuated: First such a power must be in them by reservation, and then it must be expresse in the constitution of the Government, and in the Covenant twixt the Monarch and the People. But then, I must say, I cannot be­lieve but such a condition is unlawfull and unreasonable, against the order of Government, which will have the soveraign power secured, unprofitable for King and People, a seminary of Iealousies and Seditions; we need not spend time about this, for it is confessed that in the constitution of this our govern­ment (to which all the contention relates) there is no Reser­vation or Law expresly enableing Subjects with such power of Armes. This Author acknowledges, pag. 63. that when the Houses by an Ordinance assume the Armes, wherewith the King is entrusted, and doe performe the Kings trust, such Or­dinance [Page 40]is not formally Legall ( [...].) there is no expresse con­stitution for it: yet is it Eminently Legall, justified by the intent of the Architects of this Government, when for these uses they committed the Armes to the King; so he.

Secondly, therefore let us see, whether it followes by im­plication upon the Limiting and Mixing of Monarchy. It is a­g [...]eed, that an Absolute Monarch is free from all forceable constraint by Armes, and so farre forth as he is absolute, from all [...]egall restraint of positive consti [...]utions; now in Limitati­ons and mixture there is only sought a Legall restraint upon the power of the Monarch; if any more were sought or im­plyed, it must follow, either from the Nature of Limitation, or from the danger and inconveniencies of exorbitancy of the Limited Monarch, o [...] from the consent and intention of the People choosing the Mon [...]arch.

But first, Limitation cannot inferre it, for an absolute Mo­narch is limited also, not by civill compact indeed, but by the Law of God, of Nature and Nations, which he cannot justly transgresse; if therefore an absolute Monarch, being exorbitant beyond his bounds, which the highest Lawes have set him, may not be resisted, how shall we think a limited Monarch may, for transgressing the bounds set him by civ [...]ll agreement?

Secondly, the inconveniencies of exorbitancy in Limited and mixed Monarchie cannot inferr a power of resistance by Armes, because the inconveniencies and evills (which are pretended as causes of resistance in such Monarchies) are the same in Absolute; for Limitations and Mixtures, are but [...]arres and s [...]itie, against injustice, cruelty and oppress [...]n, which are exorbitances also in absolute Monarchies, and evills that bring as much detriment and suffering to the Subject, as they doe in Limited Monarchyes; as for example, The imp [...]sing of Taxes, if it be done when necessity requires not, or [...] very un [...]qually in regard of Persons and estates, it is an injury and grievance even in an Absolute Monarchy; only when necessi­ty calls for such L [...]vies of Money, the Monarch (that is of a Li­mited and Mixed condition) is bound to take in the consent of others, to which the Absolute Monarch is nor bound. So in [Page 41]Tryalls for Life and Estate, an unjust sentence is an oppression in Absolute as well as Limited Monarchy, only the limited or Mixed Monarch is bond to passe sentence upon the verdict of twelve men, or the like, the Absolute is not. Suppose then a Prince in such a Limited or Mixed Monarchy should, when ne­cessity doth truly require, impose taxes, lay them equally, ex­pend them faithfully; and in tryalls for Life or Estate, should give right judgement without the verdictof twelve men, and in other poynts should rule most justly, though not according to forme, unto which he is limited by positive Law; here would be the main Rule of Government observed, justice, and the end of Government (for which those limits and Civill bounds were set him) obtained, peace and well-fare of the People; Will you then have such a Prince resisted by Armes, and the Kigndome embroyled in Civil Warre, because he ob­served not the forme, when he gives you the substance? Yea but this would be an ill procedent and very dangerous; true, there is danger, but no present evill; and what are the dan­gers or evill [...] feared? Cruelty, Oppression, which other Prin­ces might use, should they have such liberty; true, but these e­vills, when they are are evills in Absolute Monarchies, and for them resi [...]ance is not to be used there.

Thirdly, the consent and intention of the people choosing the Monarch cannot inferre: that a Limited Monarch may be resisted by Armes. This consent and intention of the People is made by these men, not only the Ordinary meane of con [...]er­ring the Power, but the very Measure of the Power it [...]elfe, and the Barre or inlet of resistance; for by that consent is suppo­sed, the people give what power they please, and reserve what they will. To which I say. 1. That the consent of the people, may be the mean of designing the person, and of ye [...]ld­ing subjection to him, who else could not challenge it, more then another man; also a mean of limiting that power in the exercise of it, according to agreement or procurement: but it is not the measure of the power it selfe, which in such a mea­sure is given of God to all Soveraignes, and is not according to the peoples will resistible or irresistible but according to the [Page 42]will of God above resistance; forseeing that people have not of themselves, out of government, the main power, the power of life and death, how can they give it either for government, or reserve it for resistance?

Secondly, That the intention of the People, in procuring Limitations of the Monarch's power, is, that they may be under a moderate use of the power; and what's their security for that? those limitations which the Monarch agrees upon Oath to observe; now this cannot infere resistance here, more then in absolute Monarchies: for when a people leaves a Monarch Absolute trusting to his prudence and moderation, they doe not intend he should oppresse them; yet is it granted, such in­tention cannot enable them to resist, in case he doe oppresse them. Now in agreeing for Limitations and set rules of Go­vernment, they gain a farther security of such moderate use of the power according to those limitations; for the observing of which, they have a tye upon their Monarch, not from a power of forceable resistance in themselves to constrain him by Armes if he exorbitate, but from His Oath or Covenant, and Gods vengeance thereupon, if he falsify it.

Thirdly, If the Architects (as this Author speaks) of a limited or mixed Monarchy, that is, the people setting up such a Mo­narch over them, did intend, that the states joyned with the Monarch should assume the Armes of the Kingdome to restrain his Exorbitancies, surely they would not have left it in his power to dissolve them, and so make all such power ineffectu­all. It appeares therefore, that by such mixtures and limitati­ons no more can be inferred, then a Legall or morall restraint upon the power of the Monarch. And all this, that hath been spoken against the power of Resistance or assuming the Armes of the Kingdome, inferred from the Limited condition of the Monarch, as it is good and conclusive in Monarchies originally limited, so is it much more in Monarchies, that have afterward received those Limitations and Mixtures, upon which this power of resistance and assuming the Armes of the Kingdome is inferred; as it appeares this Monarchy has done. And there­fore I conclude here, as I did premise in the second Section, [Page 45] Where the Prince stands supream, und next to God, above all the People, there Subjects may not by force of armes resist, notwith­standing he be exorbitant in the exercise and use of his Power to the invasion of such Rights and Priviledges, as they enjoy by first compact or after procurement. And this being cleared already from those shadowes of reasons (which could be pretended against it from the severall kinds of Monarchy) will farther ap­peare by that, which shall be said out of Scripture and Reason.

SECT. VI. A Refutation of His Answer, that first styled himselfe the Author of the Fuller Answer.

ALthough the substance of his discourse is already answered, by that which hath been said concerning Mixture and Supremacy, against the Author of the Treatise of Monar­chy, yet because he is extremely confident, and many times unfaithfull in his Reply's, I will briefly touch upon such passa­ges, as may seem most materiall, or any way availeable to abuse the unwary Reader.

It is his manner to gaine seeming advantages upon his Ad­versary by his own willfull mistakings; as in his Answer to the Preface; that which was spoken of some particular Members, the Con [...]aivers of this Revolt and Rebellion, is by him taken, and given out againe to the Reader, as spoken of all the Mem­bers of the Houses, that have by the cunning of those Few been drawne to Vote any thing in order to this Rebellion. Also, what was spoken of private houses, where those few Contri­vers held their close meetings (that it was Gods great forbea­rance, those houses did not breake downe, where the Consultati­ons have been oft held for the direction of these wayes) he renders as spoken of the Houses, where the Parliament sits & Consults. But let them all, that have been Leaders or followers in these perverse wayes, looke to it, and consider, how much they are concerned in that place of Esay, to which the allusion there was made; for every one that lookes neerly upon it, ( Esa. 30. vers. 10, 11, 12, 13.) will easily see, (what ever application [Page 44]this Author makes of it) who they are, that have silenced their Orthodoxe, and not long agoe admired Teachers, suffering none to speake right things, but smooth; such new unheard off doctrines as please them; who they are that doe trust in oppres­sion and perversenes, and doe stay thereon having no other way to uphold this Rebellion, but by perverse obstinacy, and horri­ble injustice exercised upon such, as have not yet cast off all Conscience of just and right, or caused the feare of the Holy one of Israel to cease from before them.

I would advise this Answere [...] to looke upon two places more of Esay, cap. [...]4. v. 4. where they that have been oppres­sed, shall say of Babylon, how hath the Golden City ceased? and v. 10. art thou become weake as we, art thou he [...] like unto us? and cap. 23. v. 8. where he may find [...] threatned against Tyre, the Crowning City, whose Merchants are Princes, and then I would desire him to consider, whether he [...] not cause to reflect upon that Golden, Crowning City, wherein he lives.

In his second Section also, he would seeme to gaine advan­tages upon his Adversary, by fastning upon him severall Con­tradictions or peices of non-sence, as he calls them; but they are indeed so many wilfull or grosse mistakes of his owne. The first he thus delivers, as in my word, It's better to be under the Arbitrary Government of One, that challenges not obedience but according to Law: so he repeates them and then descants, Ar­bitrary government, and yet according to Law. But the words run thus in my Reply; Every man will thinke it more reasonable to be under the Arbitrary government of One then of many: nay, under the government of One, that challenges not obedience as due, but according to Law, then of Many whose commands are Law unto us, as this Answerer makes them. In which the Comparison, as any man may see, is double, first between the Arbitrary government of One, and of many; then a fortiori, betweene the Legall government of One, and arbitrary Com­mands of Many.

The second Contradiction he thus expresses. The D ^r un­dertakes to satisfy Conscience, that the Parliament hath not this [Page 45]power, and yet saith, he does not undertake to set down, what power the Parliament hath. 'Tis true the D ^r did undertake the first, and might doe it without undertaking to set downe the extent of the power and priviledges of the Houses; tho e were the words, and where is the Contradiction? This Answerer may undertake to shew, the King has not such or such a power (as to make Lawes himselfe, or the like) yet will not I hope, undertake to set downe the extent of the Kings power and Prerogative; it was the very Instance there used, and the Red­dition of it was, so may we without offence conclude of the two Houses, that they have not such a power by the first constitation of this Government, &c. A particular Negative may be clea­red by him, that cannot shew the extent of the Vniversall Affirmative.

A third Contradiction or Nonsence he has found in these words. This Coordination is but to some Act or exercise of the supream Power, not in the power it selfe. I acknowledge the words, and doe thanke him, that he tooke notice of them for their sakes, who have mistaken that part of my Reply, as if I granted a Coordination of Subjects with His Majesty in the supream power but then I must blame his ignorance. that can­not recontile this (as he speakes) to any truce of Sence; for they that have written of Government and Policy, could have told him, that the concurrence and consent of such or such persons, required to some Acts of the supreame power, doth not al­wayes argue a communication of the Power; and the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy doth every where teach him to make a wide difference betweene the Power and the Exercise of it. Out of this mistake and ignorance of distinguishing be­tweene the Power it selfe and the Exercise of the Power, he runs away with it as a thing granted, that the Houses are coor­dinate with His Majesty in the very Supremacy of Power, so farre as the Legislative and ordaining goes, which is the prin­cipall, and that it remaines for him only to prove, they are coord [...] with His Majesty in the other Act of power, as [...] Em [...]assyes, appointing Officers, Iu [...]ges, &c. which h [...] undertakes in his fourth Section, where we shall m [...] wi [...] [Page 46]him. It was the worke of my third Section to speake of the beginnings of Government in this Land, and to shew they were inconsistent with his Conceit of the making of the first King, and the first Coalition of Government, as he call'd it. To which after some trifeling, he replyes in his third Section, pag. 17. If the D ^r thinkes the uncertainties of the British or Saxon Constitutions not fit to satisfy Conscience (as he speakes) how being uncertaine, can he satisfy Conscience (which is the title of his Boooke) that those Constitutions were not such? so he. Answ. 1. If those Constitutions be uncertaine, it satisfyes Conscience that it can have no warrant from them, which was the task of that book. 2, The uncertainties, which I said he runne Conscience upon, were in seeking the first King before the Saxons, for if we go no higher for the beginning of this English government (as indeed we should not) we have cer­tainly enough to satisfy Conscience, that this Government was not such in the first constitution, as this Answerer would make us believe.

But see him comming a pegge lower in the very next words. 'Tis enough that the Constitution of our present Government was such, at least from the beginning of it's being such; that by the same consent of the people, whereby the first such King was made, His Majesty, that now is, becomes such a King, that the same rea­son of state, which first contrived the Government (however sooner or leter) such as now it is, remaines still specifically the same in that, which the law places it in, the Councell of the Land to actuate and apply it. Answer, Nothing can be truer, then that the government was such from the time, that it be­ganne to be such, but he bore us in hand before, that it was such from the very first beginning of the Monarchy. & so he ought to prove it to be; for else it must become such by the consent of the King in being, condescending from unlimited condition to a more moderate way of Government by severall fixed laws; as was shewed above, when we spoke of Limitations and Mix­tures, Sect. 3. but can we think that while there was a King in being, the Councell of the Land had power to contrive and dis­pose of the frame of this Government, and that in a way so­prejudiciall [Page 47]to the King, as this Answerer would make it?

But he goes on. The truth is, the Doctor deales with us here­in at Papists usually doe with Protestants, if they cannot name the particular Raigne and yeere when such a Doctrine tooke it's first rise, however palpable it now be, we must believe there was no change at all: so if it be not assigned when such or such a part of the Governments Constitution began, however euident it be that it must have a beginning, because a being, we must confesse it to have no beginning at all. No Sir, the Doctor deales with you as Protestants doe with Papists upon that point; for as they shew the Doctrine of the Romish Church was not from the begin­ning, and because the yeere and age when every error crept in cannot be named, do thereupon conclude certainly, That those errours came not in at once but by degrees: so we require not the particular Raign and yeer when each constitution came in, but doe shew that the Government was not such from the be­ginning, and because the time cannot be shewn, when the Li­mitations and Constitutions came in, that made it such, we thereupon conclude, the Government did not become such at once, but by degrees, and by the after Condescent of Pious Princes. To that which was alledged out of the Preamble of a S [...]atute, 24 H. 8. c. 12. His poore shifts are, 1. That it is a piece of a preamble, not part of the Statute. Answer. What then? it speakes never a whit the lesse truth, nor ha's it the lesse authority, but (which is more) speakes an anciently sup­posed truth alwaies Confessed, and evident in Chronicles and Histories, that this is an Empire, Governed by one Supreame Head, &c.

II. That the Title speakes it an Act against appeales to Rome. Answer. It matters not what the occasion was, we [...] what it positively speakes touching the Kings Supremacy and Headship. So they miserably shift off the obligation, which the Oath of Supremacy ha's cast upon them, as if the Kings Su­premacy were asserted in it, in opposition to the Bishop of Rome, not in relation to the whole body politique; that if they deny the Popes Supremacy, they thinke they satisfie the Oath, [Page 48]what Subjects soever they joyne with His Majesty in the very Supremacy it selfe.

So in the third place he saith; that those words in the Sta­tute: To whom a body politique compact of all sorts and degrees of peopl [...], of the Spiritualty and Temporalty are bounden, &c. cannot properly be meant of the Parliament, but of the King­dome at large. Answer, If of the Kingdome at large, then is it true also of their Representatives, if of the Kingdome in it's defusive body, then of it's Collective. But I turne him over to the Authour of the Treatise of Monarchy, who sufficiently Confutes this idle assertion, and doth shew the Lords and Commons in their houses conjunctim are subjects, and the King their Head. And this is enough for his third Section.

In his fourth Section, he endeavours to prove, the Houses are Coordinate with His Majesty in all other Acts of Supreme power, as the Calling of Assemblies, holding Treaties, send­ing Embassies, appointing Judges, &c. His proofe is first by reason, because they are Coordinate with him in the Supream power of making lawes, which is the principall, and higher Cause to the Calling of Assemblies, Treaties, &c. Answer, This he takes for granted, that they are Coordinate with His Majesty in the Supream power of Ordaining, or making laws, which doth proceed (as I noted above upon his second Secti­on) from his mistake or ignorance in not distinguishing the Ex­ercise of the power, and the Power it selfe, for they may concur to that, and yet not have share in this.

Secondly, He would prove it by Records, from pag. 22. to 27. Answ. 1. In these we must trust his honesty, which we finde not very faithfull in repeating the words of the booke he undertakes to confute. 2. Were they truely alledged, they yeeld but an Argument a facto ad Ius, Parliaments have done this or that, therefore they have right to doe so; it will be a bad argument in the next age to conclude any thing right and just, because it was so ordained by the Houses of this last Par­liament.

III. Though some particulars cited by Him, might of right belong to them, yet how doth it prove, it was so originally and [Page 49]fundamentally, and not by after condescent of the Prince, as we find many immunities, rights, and liberties of the Subject to be? But for these Records he is beholden to M ^r Pryn's col­lections, who is said to be the Author of that booke, which beares this title, The Soveraigne power of Parliaments, or the treachery and disloyalty of Papists to their Soveraigne; To their Soveraigne? that is, to the two Houses, by the former part of the title — let him take heed, he proves them not good Sub­jects. But what shall we make of it? 'tis certaine, he fetches his testimonies from times of Popery, shewing what power Parliaments then have assumed and used against the Soveraigne, if he will give us leave to style the King so; but how he should thereby shew the disloyalty of Papists, and yet prove the So­veraign [...] power of Popish Parliaments, I cannot see, nor is it greatly materiall; for let all his instances be true, and his Re­cords faithfully alleadged, yet will the argument be inconse­quent, that from them shall conclude the Soveraigne power of Parliaments.

After his Records, this Answerer enters a discourse of his owne, touching the Mixture of this Government. That which concernes me in it, is pag. 28. The Dr in his former Treatise speakes of the excellent temper of the three Estates, and in his Reply acknowledges them as Fundamentals of Go­vernment; and if fundamentalls, how not all alike principall, and supream, he has not shewed in his Reply though provoked thereto; so he. Answ. 2. The D ^r did not any where call them Fundamentals of Government, but acknowledged the consti­tution was fundamentall, that provided that Temper, and pla­ced in the Houses that power which they have; this his mi­stake I told him of in my Reply, pag. 16. and shewed him the absurdity it leades him into, by Concluding thence, that the Houses are alike Principall or Supreme with His Majesty; an excellent argument to provoke an Adversary upon; but this Answerer seemes to have made his Reply to one Section, be­fore he had read the next, and when he was come to that, to forget what he had read or writ before.

In like manner he tells us presently after, that he had pro­ved, [Page 50]that the Finall Declaration and Resolution must remaine beyond all further debate in the Councell of the Kingdome, which by its number, trust, interest, is onely fit to manage it: to all which the D ^r hath not vouchsafed to say any thing, but that it wholly places the Supremacy in the two Houses, so he, pag. 31. Answ. If nothing else had been said, it had been enough, and so the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, doth sufficient­ly shew, that to place such a finall Resolution and declarative Judgement in the two Houses, doth make them supreame, and this no Monarchy; but there was more said, even the better part of three Sections was spent against that finall declarative judgement and Supply, which he places in the two Houses, & against his perswasions from their Interests, Number, Trust; shewing, how possible it is for them to lessen their number, to neglect their trust, to make the private Interest devoure the publique; I need say no more, these times speake sufficiently — But it seemes this Answerer (as I said above) wrote downe this, before he had throughly read those Sections, and when he came to them, either had forgot, that he had said, the Dr. vouchsafed to say nothing to his particulars; or else purpo­sed to make it seeme so, by answering nothing himselfe to that which the Dr. had said, touching that finall declarative Judge­ment and supply, which he places in the Houses.

But for this mixture of three Estates in the Supremacy of power, he has found a new Argument in the Kings Answer to the 19. Propositions; wherein His Majesty grants, That the Lords being trusted with a Iudicatory Power are an Excellent Skreene betwixt Prince and people — and that the power le­gally placed in the two Houses, is more then enough to restraine Tyranny. Upon this he makes a long descant, and propounds sixe Quere's. I will for brevity's sake, without any wrong to Him that proposes them, reduce them to these two. 1. for the Iudicatory power; How can such be in the Houses, and yet not the declarative power of Law? For this, as before, I must turne him over to the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, who will aske him, how can such a finall declarative power be in the Houses, and yet this be a Monarchy and the King Supream? [Page 51]and I must farther aske him, why doth he not place the finall Judgement onely in the Lords house, seeing that Judicatory power is only in that, & not in the House of Commons. 2. For the power of Armes; If the Houses have not such a power, how have they a power more then sufficient to restraine Tyranny? let the Dr. fairely resolve the Answerer in these plaine inferences out of His Majesties words, & erit mihi magnus Apollo, so he.

Answ. I must first tell him, Apollo was more honoured for his Art, then for his bow, for his Rules of healing, then force of wounding; so the morall restraints of Rules, & limiting Laws, and the obligation of an Oath, are more reasonable and pow­erfull for keeping the will of the Monarch within bounds, then the forcible constraint of Subjects Armes. But this Answerer thinks there can be no sufficient security for the people against the Tyranny of their Prince, unlesse they have him fast bound; is the tye of established Law nothing? the band of a Sacred oath nothing to restraine him, unlesse his Subjects have the ma­stering power? God himselfe thought lesse means of restraint sufficient for such security, as he was content his people should have under the Iraelitish and Roman Government; why should not greater be held sufficient for people under a Chri­stian Monarch?

Againe, when it was proved, that the Members of the Hou­ses were Subjects conjunctim, from their owne addresses to His Majesty, wherein they style themselves his Loyall Subjects: this Answerer replyes unto it, pag. 39. How weake is an argu­ment from formes of addresses in words against a reall Right? what Right? to the Supremacy? how reall that is, appears by all that has been said: but we may here returne him his owne Answer, to his inference from His Majesties words, how weake is the argument from formes of words against a reall right! against His knowne Supremacy and Headship? Nay, how unequall is it to take such large and gracious Expressions, issuing from the conscience of his owne intentions and desires altogether averse from tyranny, and stretch them on the rack of finister Constru­ction, to make them speake to his disadvantage? for indeed no other power is granted to be in the Houses to restraine Tyran­ny [Page 52]then a Legall, Morall, Parliamentary power, not forceable and military. See above towards the end of the fourth Secti­on, where these and other. Expressions of His Majesty were objected and vindicated.

Now to his fifth Section: It was his Rule, Coordinates doe supply one the others failings; and thereupon he inferred, If the King refuse, the Lords and Commons may supply. This was re­torted upon him in my Reply: If the Commons stand out and refuse, then may the King and Lords by his rule of Coordina­tion, supply, and command all. He answers, No qu [...]stion they may supply, as farre as their representation and trust reaches, that is for themselves, not for the Commons of England whom they doe not represent. Answ. Doth this man know or heed what he saith? doth not he make the safety of the Kingdome the Cause and end of such supply, when one of the Coordinates stand out? and now he tells us the King and Lords may supply for themselves (i. e.) they may save themselves, if they can, but they have nothing to doe with the Commons, whom they doe not represent: but can the safety of the Kingdome be pro­vided for by this supply, unlesse they also be commanded by the Coordinate parts, which are to make the supply? and will he upon better thought's deny, that in order to that end (the safety of the Kingdome) the King and Lords also are entrusted for the whole people of England?

Againe, this supply cannot be effectuall without a Iudicato­ry power, but that power we find onely in the Lords, not Com­mons house, as he himselfe cited it above out of the Kings words; well then, must they exercise this Judicatory power up­on themselves only, and not upon those that the Commons re­present? or can the Commons by themselves supply? that's a­gainst his own rule of Coordination: but if he will forget that, us he does, yet will he not thinke, they can make the supply without a Judicatory power. I will adde to this, what he has at the very end of this Sect. where we finde him as considerate as before: In order to his former rule, Coordinates supply one anothers failings, he had said in his first Treatise, that he won­alted, we cannot see the King is Ʋniversis minor, when as we [Page 53]may easily reckon, that of three, one is lesse then all three. Upon this I call'd him again to his reckoning, telling him that, if the King and Lords concurre and the Commons refuse, it is easy to reckon that of three one is lesse then two, repeating his words so, not for any advantage, but meerly to make him speake sense; he because he cannot answer the retortion, complaines of wilfull and grosse mistake of his words, which were, saith he, that of three one is lesse then all three (i. e.) a part then the whole. But is that your meaning of Rex est Ʋniversis minor (i. e.) the King alone is lesse then the King, Lords and Commons toge­ther? who cannot see that the Comparison is between the King and the other two? and that in your rule of three Coordinates, if one refuse, there remaines but two to make the supply; and that thereupon you should have said (if you would speake sence) that of three one is lesse then two? I have heard Children, when their disorderly Babies have beene taken from them and presently returned them again in frame and order, complain­ing, because they received them not, as they parted with them; so doth this Answerer of the putting his words into sense.

Let us now see, how in the same Section he answers for the Kings danger at Keinton Battell. A [...] in the making of Lawes (saith he) the King presence or absence alters not the case, so in the executing of the Lawes against Delinquents, the Kings pre­sence can no more hinder then his command.— Answ. His pre­sence or absence does not indeed in the making Lawes, but his Consent is all, which he may give either present or absent, but will you for the Executing of the Lawes take armes without his consent, and use them too against him personally present? or wil you say, that your giving him battell at Keinton, was an executing of the Lawes against Delinquents? produce your Law that enables you to such a proceeding against your pretended delinquents. Nor were the hands of the Parliaments Army lifted up against the King more then Davids (whom the Doctor cites) who resisted his and the kings enemies, though about the kings person. ibid. Ans. It doth not appeare where David did make that resistance; but it is the unhappinesse of these men to ground all their resistance upon false suppositions; first [Page 54]they suppose David would have done it, then they positively set downe, that he did it, thence they conclude they may doe it, and acccordingly have done it, and much more.

The rest of this Section he thought good (neglecting what was rationall in mine) to spend in naming Delinquents in Yorkeshire, for whose apprehension and the bringing of them to Justice, the Parliament tooke Armes. Answ. All those ex­amples of Delinquents followed their putting of armed men into Hull, their seizing the Magazine there, their denying the King enterance, their denying eo bring Sir Iohn Hotham to Ju­stice; and in these, if any Delinquents were detained and pro­tected from their justice, as he complaines, he may read the carse of it: But these are matters of Fact, we are now upon the point of Reason.

In his sixt Section, he altogether neglects the cases, which were put him, upon his placing the finall resolution of this States judgement in the two Houses, and onely fastens upon that, which was spoken occasionally concerning Conquest. First, for his Answer touching the Ammonites subdued by Da­vid, That Abrahams posterity was entituled to their Land by God, Gen. 13.14. I would desire him to looke into, Deut. 34.4. (where the Lord gives Moses a sight of that promised Land, saying. This is the Land which I sware to Abraham, &c) and to examine, whether he can find the Land of the Ammonites in that prospect. And surely if the Ammonites had been of the Inhabitants of that Land, David would not have held league and frienship with them, as we see he does, 2 Sam. 10.

Next for Davids subduing of Edom, he answers, The Doctor himselfe confesseth they revolted from Judah. What then? had they been before under Iudah, and upon their Revolt subdued by David, then indeed it had been not a Conquest but a Redu­ction; but the Doctor confesses they revolted from Iehoram Ring of Judah, 2 Chro. 21. therefore they were justly subdued or reduced (that must be his inference) by David, 1 Chron. 18. doth he know what he saith? But God had given Israel (saith he) a speciall promise for it too, over Edom will I cast my shooe. Psal. 60.8. Answ. This Psalme was made upon that very [Page 55]expedition in which Edom was subdued, as appeares by the ti­tle of it; and were those words spoken by the Spirit of Prophe­cy, yet doe they not make a grant, but only speak the successe of that enterprise, which then was undertaken.

Nor had the Romans any right over Iudaea by Conquest, saith he, but by consent of the People Conquered; without which con­sent all his Momenta temporum, (he speaks of) to make a right or title, are like those Moments of the Papists Antiquitie to make a Truth. Ans. We finde the Iewes confederate with the Ro­mans 1. Mac. 8. and not long after, their Subjects, brought un­der by Pompey: we cannot think they changed their condition willingly, but that their consent was forced by the Conque­rour; Conquest then wil easily command that, which will give it Title in these mens opinion: And though no antiquity can make falshood Truth, yet are there Momenta temporum, when providence (which translates Kingdomes and can give Title to the Conquerour) doth discover it selfe; and then the Conquered People ought to consent to, and receive the Go­vernment which the Conquerour settles among them; [...]e a­bove at the end of the third Sect. where the Title of Conquest is examined.

There is nothing in his seventh Sect. worthy of the Rea­ders patience in hearing it refuted; onely hee makes shew of some Statutes, which truly I could not find, nor was there cause why I should bestow much time in seeking them, for a litle Logick will serve to discerne, that the words, he cites out of them, will not inferre any conclusions prejudiciall to his ad­versary.

His last and eight Section concernes Scripture; he mutters some thing in it, concerning Davids fighting against Saul, and the absolutenesse of the Iewish Kings; which shall be distinct­ly and largely considered in my next Section. And for the new Testament, he turnes his Reader over to the interpretation which the Reverend and learned Divines having given on the 13 ^th to the Romans, and which he so farre magnifies, that he beelieves the Doctor will not reply in haste; so he concluds his [Page 56]booke, and he shall see he had cause so to believe, when we come to the consideration of that place.

SECT. VII. Places of Scripture out of the Old Testament.

NOw wee come to the examination of what is alleadged out of Scripture in this cause, whereby it will appeare, that there can be no warrant derived thence for resistance, but that the Kings, we read of there, were such as might not be re­sisted, and that Gods people were alwayes under such. We be­gin with the Old Testament, and will be very briefe, pro­pounding only what is Materiall.

This has beene heretofore clearly proved by these two Ar­guments especially: 1. Because the Institution of the Israelitish kingdome was such, as doth plainly exclude resistance. 2. Be­cause so many Prophets, bitterly reproving those wicked Kings for sub [...]cision of Religion and Justice, did never call upon the Elders of the people for this duty of resistance. I shall open the first, and enforce it alittle more, and then answer what is brought against either.

In the first of Sam. c. 8 we have the institution of the King­dome; where Samuel is commanded to tell the people, Ius Regis the manner of the King v. 11. He will take your sonnes.— your daughters—your field, &c. And yee shall cry out in that day &c. As if he should have said, you desire a King, and doe not consider what power you put your selves under, such an one, as if he command you [...]d yours at pleasure, you must pa­tiently endure; this is the meaning of Ius Regis, which im­plyet not a Right of doing such unjust Acts, but a Security from resistance and force if he [...]oes them. Moses did shew the right and Manner of the King, what he should justly doe, Deut. 17. Samuel the right of the King, not in doing, but in being secure from the peoples force, if he did unjustly: Moses admonisheth the King of his duty, shewing what a good king ought to doe. Samuel endeavouring to disswade the People, shewes what they must patiently suffer from evill kings.

Many Authors might be alleadged (if need were) for this meaning of Ius Regis, I will name one without exception, Calvin in his Comment upon the place, and in his Institutions: He speaks to this purpose; Samuel, when he would shew the People what great things they should suffer under Kings, tells them, this shall be Ius Regis the manner of the King, He shall take your Sonnes, &c. not that their Kings could doe so Iure justly, for the Law did teach them all moderation and justice, sedjus in populum vocabatur, cui parere ipsi necesse esset, nec ob­sistere liceret, so he, Instit. l. 4. c. 20. nu. 26. And in his Com­ment upon the place, he doth sufficiently set out those, as Ty­rannicall Acts, but sheweth that for all that, Subjects ought not to resist, nec quicquam adversus Reges movere, licèt Tyran­nidem exerceaxt, & rapinis sint graves subditis, nullam (que) nec Dei nec aequi recti (que) rationem habeant, what more full? which also appeares by the 18. v. Ye shall crie out in that daie, &c. That they were left without this remedy of resistance, Calv. in his Instit. the place above cited, thus, Eo so proripiet licentiae Regum libido, quam cohibere vestrum non erit, quibus hoc restabit unum, lussa excipere ac dicto audientes esse; and a little after, non westrum esse, his malis mederi; hoc tantum esse reliquum, Domini opem implorare, there can be nothing spoken more plainly against the power of resistance in Subjects, then this. We have Adversaries confessing the same, the Author of the Fuller Answer acknowledged, those Kings of Jsrael might no [...] be resisted; and this Author of the Treatise of Monarchie con­fesseth, that the People there had no other means to help them­selves by, but cryes unto the Lord, so he, pag. 58.

By this appeares what little weight there is in the exception which the Pleaders for defensive Armes make to this place, This was (say they) a prediction of punishment, that should be­fall them for their impetuous asking of a King, not a prohibition of resistance, pag. 18. And in the same page, This prediction of punishment doth not prove, it was unlawfull, for them to defend their goods against their Kings Tyranny, but that it should be vaine to them, because if God would not heare their Cry, their defence would be to little purpose. Answ. The punishment fore­told [Page 58]is, that they should be thus and thus evill intreated by their Kings, and that without remedy: but that in all this there is nothing to prove it was unlawfull for them to resist such Kings, is a bare assertion against former proofes, which shew there was on the Kings part a Jus or right of security against such Violence. But to acknowledge, as they doe, that this prediction of punishment doth prove their defence would be vaine, i [...] God did not heare their Cry, is to confesse, that, when God suffers Kings to exercise Tyranny and Oppression upon the People, over whom he has set them, it is a scourge and pu­nishment from him upon that people for their sinne, and that it is vain for them to seek remedy by resistance; which is a most true and pious argument against resistance, as we shall shew, when we come to reasons against it.

A second exception is, that the Israelitish Monarchy was Absolute, and therefore excluded the resistance of Subjects; so this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy. The pleaders for De­fensive Armes, although they are against absolute Monarchy as unlawfull, and therfore doe not say this Monarchy set up over Gods people was such, yet doe they say, what was here fore­told or enjoyned to that people, cannot be a Law or punish­ment intended to other Nations under oppressing Kings, no more then that, which the Lord imposed on the Iewes and o­ther Nations in Nebuhcadnezars Time, their putting their neck under his yoake, Jer. 27. can prove that any Nation is bound to yeeld to a forraigne enemy invading them, so they pag. 18.

Ans I. Although this Monarchy of Israell were granted to be Absolute, and the instances brought should be peculiar to that people, not intended as Lawes, and Rules to other Nati­ons, yet do: they sufficiently prove what I intended in that part of my first Treatise, which was to shew that there was no Warrant for resistance from Scripture, which still gives us ex­amples of Kings set over Gods people, who might not be re­sisted.

II How the Author of the Treat of Monarchy can say the Israelites Kings were absolute Monarchs according to that de­scription of Absolutenesse; which he gave above, I cannot see: [Page 59]for he told us, that Absolute Monarchy is, when the Soveraign­ty is so fully in one, that it hath no limits or bounds under God but the Monarchs own will; It is true they were not so limi­ted, as some Kings are now; but we know, there was a fixed judiciall Law, which in many particulars secured the proprie­ty and liberty of that people, there were speciall limitations for their Kings, Deut. 17. There was also a standing great Coun­cell, the Saned [...]im, whose sentence in many things the King could not at his owne will and pleasure reverse, if we believe them that are skilfull in the Iewish Antiquities. Grotius in his first booke de Iure belli & pacis c. 3. places the Israelitish king­dome in a Middle condition between a meer absolute Monar­chy, and that which is altogether limited and conditionate, that is, those Hebrew Kings were in some things absolute, in some things Limited, which may be said of every Limited Mo­narchy at this day, that was at first unlimited; and is true of the Monarchy of this Land, where I cannot but conceive the Mo­narch is free, and (if you please) absolute in all such things, in which he is not expresly limited.

III. Instances drawn from that Monarchy against Resi­stance are forceable in this Monarchy, if we either consider what was now spoken against the meere absolutenesse of that Monarchy, or look back to the Reasons which were given in the end of the fist Section to prove that Monarchies are not therefore exposed to resistance, because they are limited.

IV. Calvin upon this place 1. Sam. 8. doth apply it to other Nations, even to all that are under Kings, who have not Epho­ri or Magistrates over them, to whom they are accountable, as the Lacedaemonian Kings had, but our Kings have not; his words are these, Ex quibus apparet, subditos Regibus, nec pos­se nec debere adversus ipsos quicquam movere, licet Tyrannidem exerceant, &c. and in his Instit. l. 4 c. 20. nu. 27. Hee expres­ly takes away the Objection, (That this, which is imposed upon the Jewes 1. Sam. 8. and Ier. 27. was peculiar to that Na­tion) shewing plainly it was not peculiare mandatum, but tells us thus much in Generall, cuicun (que) delatum est Regnum, ei ser­viendum, which being inferred from those places, doth imply, [Page 60]we must serve the King, as the People se [...]ved Nebuchadnezar, or their own Kings of Israel, viz. without resistance, for, for that purpose Calvin alleadges those examples. So that although this example doth not bind us to yeeld to a forraine enemy in­vading us, as the Pleaders needlesly replyed, yet doth it in Cal­vi [...]s judgement bind us, to yeeld obedience without resistance to that King, whom it appeares God has set over us.

In the next place let us consider the Rescue of Ionathan, urged by the Pleaders for Defensive Armes, pag. 11. It has been an­swered, that for this Rescue, they did not of themselves draw into Armes, but being present at Sauls command, did rescue Ionathan from Sauls intended violence, not by force of Armes, but of a loving importunate violence by way of inter­cession, set off with a Souldierly boldnesse. The pleaders te­ply. The violence was outragious enough, for Saul swore his death & they his life, what then? this was still but a Souldier­ly boldnesse of speech, But they make two collections thence. 1. That the people may sweare an Association, that not one of the Parliament shall be put to death, unlesse found guilty, notwith­standing any Proclamation. A good inference! as if the Com­manders of an Army doe agree among themselves to intercede for a fellow Souldier, (one not so innocent as Jonathan, but justly sentenced to death) and in that intercession be more im­portunately bold then they ought, & through that importuni­ty draw their King off from his resolution of executing that sentence: may I with any reason conclude thence that the se­verall Counties of his kingdome may enter an Association a­gainst him for the rescuing of any unjustly sentenced to death? 2. They collect from thence, That if Saul by himselfe, or others, had attempted Jonathans death, they would have actually resisted them even with Armes. Imagine they would have done so, you have but an uncertaine supposition to secure your resi­stance, and the heat of a Souldierly boldnesse to defend the fu­rious disposition of your spirit; how farre these Souldiers would have proceeded, I know not, but we shall see below, that the Christian Souldiers in Iulians Army would not pro­ceed so farre in the like case; and I dare say with Peter Mar­tyr, [Page 61]si ist a sedit [...]se fec [...]ri [...]t, quasi Jonathanum Regiper vim trep­turi, nullo modo possunt excusari: if they had proceeded to force, they could not have been excused. How impertinently and in­considerately the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy made use of this Rescue of Ionathan, was shewen above, Sect. 5. concer­ning resistance in absolute Monarchyes.

Now wee come to examine Davids demeanour towards Saul; in which his taking of Armes, and the use he made of them is considerable. The Answers, that were made to this objected example of David, did in generall insinuate thus much. That they, which now pretend it for the defence of their Armes, have done farre more then David did or inten­ded to doe, and that they have not warrant to doe so much, (i) that there is nothing alike in Davids Armes and Theirs. The particulars were these.

First that Davids purpose in having armed men about him, was meerely to secure his person against the cut-Thro [...]tes of Saul, that is, against his private Emissaries, such as were sent to take away Davids life, 1 Sam. 19.15 or against the surprize of ill minded people, among whom he should abide, such as the Zi­phites, who else might have carried David himselfe to Saul, as well as the newes of his being among them. The Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, page 51. and the Divines that plead for defensive Armes, pag 12. reply, that this is enough for the resistance they plead for. But who sees not a large difference betweene securing a mans selfe from suddaine surprizes of pri­vate Emissaries or close Enemies, and appearing in the Field with Armes against the Armies of the Prince? if a private Gentleman doe endeavour the former by more then ordinary retinue, no man will speake him guilty of the second; for the one is used but in order to an escape by flight, but the other is in order to a forceable constraint and finall contestation with the Prince, if he will not change his mind; which is the Cause of these Times, and the thing supposed in the Question: as we explained above, Sect. 2.

Secondly, we see that David did accordingly give place & fly as Saul pursued, using no violence against Saul, or his fol­lowers, [Page 62]when in his power. 1. Sam. 26. The pleaders for de­fensive Armes, reply, It was not wisdome in David to encoun­ter Saul, for he was not strong enough to doe it, page 12. Answ. so shall we see these Pleaders below finding the like wisdome in the primitive Christians, as if they forbore to resist, because they had not force enough: which wisdome do's foolishly charge the doctrine of the Gospell, even in the judgement of the Author of the Treat. of Monarchy. But might not David with his 600 men have encountred 3000 sleeping? he kenw that a sleep was upon them from the Lord, and if he with Abi­shai alone durst goe downe among them, what might hee not have done with 600 men? The Pleaders answer out of much compassion, That they which are upon the Defensive, ought not in cold blood to kill sleeping Enemies, or such waking, farther then appeares much advantagious to the Defence. pag. 12. But doe they hold to this practice? doe any of the Kings party sleeping or waking find this mercy? would they not thinke it much dis­advantagious to the Defence, to let whole companies of them escape as David did here? for heare what followes, If the kil­ling of as many, as they could that night, wouldhave given hopes of ending Saules pursuit and making Peace, then the Pleaders doubt not, but David would have done it: It's pitty David had not then such Counsellors about him as these; Abishai was too bloody in advising to have Saul himselfe killed, but these men would have councelled him to sl [...]ughter the Souldiers, and take Saul prisoner, and force him to other Conditions; so would they doe, if they had their King at the like advantage; and so if David would have done, he might have had hope of ending his troubles. If David would have used the meanes and practices of these dayes, if he would have proclaimed abroad what Saul was, and that he himselfe endeavoured only to reduce him to a Religious and just way of Government, and thereupon called in more forces, he might have quickly had an Army able to encounter & overmatch Saul in the open Field. But nothing is done by David to the countenancing of the Rebellious practi­ces of these dayes. He gives not an ill word out against Saul, he invites none into his ayd; he called not these men he had to­gether, [Page 63] clangore tubae, as Calvin observes; he did not use them for the suppressing of any of Sauls bad instruments, but hee leaves him to the hand of God, 1 Sam. 26.10. and them to the curse of God. v. 19. he tels Abner, that he and his Souldiers are worthy to dye, because they had not kept their master the Lords Anoynted more carefully, v. 16. How can our defen­ders now pretend Davids example for the lawfulnesse of their fighting against the bad instruments of Oppression, that are (as they say) about the Kings Person, when those, that were about Saul, are justly blamed for not carefully keeping and defending their master against any violence, that might come from some misguided hand of Davids men?

Thirdly, concerning Davids intent to defend Keilab, against Saul, it was answered that such an uncertain and improbable supposition was not warrant for Conscience. The Pleaders reply, that Davids second enquiry concerning the affection of the Keilites, and his going whither soever be could goe, as its said, 1 Sam. 23.11. doe plainly shew, it was his purpose to have stayed there, and that he was disappoynted of his purpose, pa. 12. Answ. 1. If David had at first such a purpose of defending the Towne against Saul we see he fell from it, as he did from his purpose against Nabal, 1 Sam. 25. and has I f [...]us in both an example of forbearance, no warrant to proceed to such extre­mities. II. He might enquire concerning the Keilites, not out of a purpose to defend the City against Saul, (for had hee had such a resclution, he could have mastered the Citizens and turn'd out the disaffected, as they doe now, that pretend his example) but for the more timely providing for his flight out of a City, (which as the text notes) had Gates and Barres; lest if he should stay till Saul drew neare, the Townesmen by trea­chery might hinder or impeach his flight, that be should not get cleare of the Towne till Saul had beguirt it. But his en­quiry & his going whither, he could goe, do shew he depended on immediate direction from God in all these actions, and there­fore his example not so imitable by these defendants; which gave occasion to a fourth Answer.

IIII. It was answered: That Davids example was extraor­dinary; [Page 64]he was Anoynted and designed by the Lord to suc­ceed Saul, and questionlesse had warrant for an extraordinary way of safeguarding his person. This concernes his having an Army about him for his guard; that as by the former parti­culars it was cleare, that those, which have now taken Armes, have done far more in the use of them, then David did or in­tended to doe; so by this last Answer it will appeare, that they may not doe so much, or that they may not pretend Davids exampl, for the ra [...]sing or having an Army. The Pleaders reply. 1. Then might every successour or Heire to the Crowne plead the like Authority in the like danger, pag. 13. Answer. Davids right to succeed did not authorize h [...]m, but his being designed for Sauls successour, as he was, makes it more then probable that he had speciall warrant from God (whose dire­ction we see was not wanting to him) for this way of safeguar­ding his person: also, that (as some Interpreters have obser­ved) seeing Sauls posterity was to give way to him, he might not come to the Crown, as one crept out of an hole or some lurking place, but accompanyed with a strength; for which he is cal'd back by the Prophet into the Land of Iudah, 1 Sam. 22.5. that the eyes of the people might be upon him, even while Saul lived.

II. They replie, Its a strange way of answering Scripture Examples, that such a thing is extraordinary, when no such thing can be gathered out of the Text. The ancient Rule holds good, Praxis Sanctorum est interpres praeceptorum: David did thus against Sauls violence, therefore this is an Interpretation of the honour due by the fifth Commandement. Answ. Beside the for­mer Reason, it is plaine in every passage how Dauid depen­ded upon extraordinary direction. Calvin, 1 Sam. 22.2. finds something extraordinary and peculiar in Davids receiving these men for his guard: Peculiare factum (saith he) in genera­lem regulam non trahendum; and shewes how ready men are to pretend this example of David, for the maintaining of a just cause by unlawfull meanes, saying, quare ego bonam & justam Causam agens, non uterer medijs qua so miloi offerunt? Where's now his praxis Sanctorum, to say David did this, therefore I [Page 65]may; nay David did not that against Saul, which these men pretend; and what David did, cannot be fellowed by another example to make it Praxin Sanctorum: whereas we have ma­ny examples of Kings as bad as Saul, and find the Saints living under them, never attempting any thing tending to resistance; there's praxis Sanctorum, imitable by us.

III. They reply, Davids unction ought rather to have strengthned his faith, but this was a disparagement to his faith and to Gods honour, that His Anoynted should be safeguarded for so long together onely by a way, which in all others had beene abominable,—this proves the meanes both lawfull and ordma­ry, pag. 13. Answ. Davids Unction did strengthen his faith, but under such means too, is it pleased God to vouchsafe him for the greater Corroboration, such a Guard of so many hun­dreds; God thought it no disparagement for his honour to bring out his people with the spoyles of Aegypt, and we must give him leave in the extraordinary dispensa [...]ns of his provi­dence, to take what way it pleases him; h [...] could have preserved David from Sauls fury, as he did Eliah from Ab [...]bs, which was after a more private way, but he thought more fit to let David be strengthned by the accession of much people, as a praeludium to their falling off from the house of Saul into him. Lastly, if this way of preservation by bends of armed men were ordinary (as these men will make it) then may one single Sub­ject, as David was, draw armed men together, be Captaine over them, and lead them up and down for his owne, & their preservation that do adhere unto him; which if they will not a low, then must there be in Davids example something more then ordinary.

And here I must challenge not onely the Reason of the Au­thor of the Treat of Monarchy, who cals it a shuffling Answer, to say Davids example was extraordinary, pag 5.7. but also his Ingenuity, who confesses that the people under the Israelitish Monarchy might not resist, and had no other me [...]nes to helpe themselves, but cryes to God, pag. 58. and yet urges the ex­ample of Ionathans rescue, of Davids raysing Forces, of his in­tent to defend Keilab, for the defending of armes taken up, [Page 66]and used by Subjects in making resistance. He deales with us herein, as the Popish writers doe in the point of Invocation of Saints, they acknowledge the Fathers of the Old Testament were not then in a condition to be invocated, yet doe they al­leadge Testimonies out of the old Testament for the proofe of that point to deceive the unwary.

Elisha [...]s example was altogether impertinent, yet from thence occasion was taken to speak of Personall defence, upon which these Pleaders ma [...]e a long and ted [...]ous Reply, page 14, 15, 16. The substance of which is delivered in the Reasons, which the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy makes for re­sistance [...] and therefore because this Reply of theirs, is no way strengthened by Elisha's example, but is altogother rationall, we will deferre the examination of what is materiall in it, to the last Section.

To conclude, It was a generall collection, but yet a very forcible Argument against resistance; that among so many Pro­phets, bitterly reproving wicked Kings for subversion of Re­ligion & justice, there was not one, that celld upon the Eiders of the pe [...]ple for this duty of making Resistance. The Pleaders reply, scarce like Reverend and learned Divines. That in the times of good Kings we find the Princes, Elders, and Nobles very Corrupt, who then can marvail if they were starke naught, where the King was maught, or why should it be expected, that the Pro­ [...]hets should call upon them to resist the King being on his side, and be [...]on theirs [...] pag 20. Answ. If it were the Duty of those El­ders and Princes (as these pleaders doe conceive it was) with force to oppose the exorbitances of those Kings, then was it the duty of those Prophets to admonish them of it; and the more cause had the Prophets to recall them to it, the further they were from it; the desperate condition of such Princes and El [...]ers might take away hope of prevailing, could not excuse the Prophe [...]s silence, and neglect. We conclude therefore, that the Scriptures of the Old Testament doe not give any Warrant by precept or example, for the Armes & Resistance of Subjects now against their Soveraigne.

SECT. VIII. Of Resistance sorbidden in the 13. to the Romanes.

IN the new Testament, that of the 13. to the Rom. is most considerable, the ful examination of which wil also [...] other places which may seeme to concerne the point in hand; lest Servants and Subjects, upon the doctrine of Christion Li­berty, should conclude themselves free from Masters and Go­ve [...]nors, who then were cruell for the most part and Tyran­nous, the Apostle doth often call servants to a continuance of their obedience, and here Subjects to the duty of subjection without Resistance: as likewise S. Peter doth, 1 Ep. cap. 2. The place is confiderable: first in it selfe, as it teaches the Institution and the End of Government; by that the Power and Authori­ty; by this the duties of Governors are seen, & from both the duty of Subjects in yeelding Subjection and forbearing Resi­stance is inferred. Secondly, [...] is considerable in relation to those times, as it is applyable to the then governing powers, and to the Christian Subjects, to whom S, Paul. then wrote; and thence we must conclude (if we will think S, Paul wrote pertinently, and meant that those he wrote to, should receive direction by what he commended to them) that however the Governours then were not answerable to the End of govern­ment, and were farre from the duties there specified, yet had they the Power and Authority, and those duties which are there enjoyned for the yeelding of Subjection, and forbearing of resistance, were to be performed by their Subjects then li­ving under them.

The Reverend Divines have written such for the explicati­on of this place, to bring it to their pu [...]pose, and have in seve­rall places of their book, e [...]forced the same things upon the Reader, to perswade or weary him. What they have ma [...] ­riall I shall examine.

First. They observe that it is Higher Powers in the plurall; not Higher Power, as the Doctor, say they, usually had it, and in this they suspect a great fraud, Page 3. & take it to be a dange­rous [Page 68]fallacy in the present question, as if the King only were not to be resisted, page 9. when as we may not resist the mea­nest Officer, not a Constable, arresting us, or distraining our goods, ibid, Answ, A dang [...]ous businesse. I promise you, and such an one, as it concerned these Learned Divines to give the Reader so often warning of as they do; but to answer the [...] once for all; The Higher power in the Singular was commonly used, not in alleadging the Text, as if it were so in the Apostle; but in the applying of it to the present case, which laying the Hypothesis or Question between the powers themselves in this poynt of Resistance or Armer, might very well allow the King to be deciphered by the Higher power, or the Supream, in relation or opposition to other Governours under Him, al­though they also be Higher powers, in respect of the people un­der them, and not to be resisted by their inferiours. It is but what themselves have expressed in the same page, 3. By Higher powers are meant All in Civill legall Authority, which in Saint Peters phrase, is of the King as supream, or Governours. for these are higher then the People, though lower then the King: the very same thing intended and spoken by me. But these men, when they have gotten a seeming advantage, and thinke the People cannot see the vanity of it, never know when to have done with it.

Secondly. They obseive, that it is Power in the abstract, which notes the Authority, wherewich the Person is invested, and not the person in the Concrete; lest that might be under­stood of his personal commands beyond or against his autho­rity, which the Apostle doth greatly prevent by using the word Power. So they page. 3. which is the ground-work of their disti [...]ction between Resisting the Personall Commands, and resisting the power of the Governour: but we shall see the Apostle gives no ground for it.

I suppose they have taken the hi [...]t of this their Cavil from Th [...]ophylact, or rather from Chrysostom's words upon this place, who [...], the Apostles speech is not [...] of particular Princes, but of the thing it selfe (i.e. of the Office, which words are nothing to [Page 69]the meaning of these men: for Chrys [...]stome, observing that the Prince then governing were not such, [...] the Apostle describes, v. 3.4.6. did therefore say the Apostle speaks of the Office not of them that bore it (i.e.) not of those individuall Persons then in power, who were farre from the performance of those duties; out if we look to the duty there required of Subjects in regard of Obed [...]ence and resistance, it was never i [...] Saint Chry­sostomes mind to think that the Apostle did not speake of that, as due to the Persons then Göverning. Well, to let the Com­mentator goe, let us looke into the Text, where it plainly appears, that it is the Apostles intent to shew the duty of Sub­jects, and for that purpose he speaks of the power it selfe, and of the Person that beares it, that is from the power which he shews to be of God, he enforces obedience to the Persons that are in power, yea with respect to the Persons then governing.

For first, Those words, the powers that are, doe plainly in­clude the Persons; because Power in the Abstract, cannot bee [...] existent, so as the Apostle speaks of it here, making it the object of obedience. Againe, those that he calls Powers in the first verse, he calls Rulers in the third, and the Ministers of God in the fourth v. And thou shalt have praise of the power, v. 3. What, can Power in the Abstract give Praise? or is tribute paid to the Power in the Abstract? In a word. The Power or Au­thority is the Reason why we yeeld Subjection and Obedience to any person, but the Person that bears the Power is the Ob­ject of our Subjection and obedience; and because he bears the Power and is set over us, we must not resist him, though he a­buse the Power.

Their third observation or Conceit (upon which their m [...]it. Answer to this place depends, and for which the Fuller Au­suerer has applauded them) is the restraint of Subjection en­joyned here, to Legall commands in Civill matters only: their words are, The things, about which the Authority and so the sub­jection in this place is conversant, are Civill matters belonging to the Second Table, betweene Man and Man; for then the Magi­strates commanded not for but against Religion and the first ta­ble; and therefore the Active subjection at least here required is [Page 70]limited to Civill Matters, or at least passive yeelding to the pet nalty of the Lawes, in case of not obeying actively; and neither active nor passive subjection farther, then to Legall Commands, so pag. 4. Ans. 1. How farre they extend those Civill matters, to which they will have this Subjection here confined, they have not distinctly skewen, whether to things onely of indif­ferency determined by the Roman Lawes, and belonging to the Second Table, in regard of the generall end of it, foras­much as they were so determined for the more convenient proceeding of Justice, and the better conserving of order and Peac [...]tor to thing also in themselves good or bad; for it is cer­tain the Roman Lawes also concerned these. There are indeed that say, by good workes, in the 3. v. are not meant workes M [...] ­rally but Civilly good, which is very answerable to these mens re [...]traint, whom it concerned to make the way they will goe in for Obedience, as narrow as they can, for that will leave the way for Resistance so much the Wider; only I must returne the blame of carlesnesse (which they would often cast upon mee) upon themselves, that making such a restraint, they would not more distinctly fix the bounds of it.

2. It is true, that the Apostle enjoynes them Subjection here to all Legall Commands in Civill matters, but it is not to be so restrained; for put the case, If they that were in Authori­ty, should command contrary to their owne Lawes in Morall things, or contrary to Religion & the first Table; were Chri­stians bound to obey? for active obedience the poynt is cleare, they were not bound: but were they bound then to suffer for not obeying actively? These Divines tell us the Subjection here enjoyned by the Apostle concernes onely Civill Matters, a thing of which there was lesse doubt; and so Christians are left altogether without direction, in regard of the other Matte [...]s, which more concerned them: unlesse they will take the despe­rate Resolution these men give, as we had it above, Neither active or passive Subjection is here required farther, then to Le­gall commands. So then, Christians, according to these Di­vines, were free and might resist, when they had such com­mands imposed on them; but can we think the Apostle should [Page 71]give them so lame an instruction, as to teach them Subjection only in Civill Matters, and leave them either without dire­ction what to doe in the other cases, or permit them to make the inference for resistance, as these men doe, contrary to the very practice of Saint Paul himselfe, and all the Apostles, and all the Christians of those primitive Times, who did yeeld pas­sive obedience under the illegall commands of the then govern­ing Powers.

But they endeavour to prove it; pag. 4. & 5. from the con­text by the inference, Whosoever therefore resists, &c. which is made, say they, from Gods ordaining the power; and if I be bound to be subject to Tyranny, or to suffer violence of a Ty­rant by vertue of the commandement here, then is Tyranny the Ordinance of God, and Magistrates have power ordained of God to use Tyrannous violence pag. 4. Answ. It followes of Active Subjection, not Passive; If I be bound actively to o­bey such commands of Tyranny, then would it be truly infer­red that Tyranny it selfe were the Ordinance of God; but if I be bound only to suffer patiently under the illegall commands of Tyranny, then doth it not follow, that Tyranny is theordi­nance of God, but that those Tyrants do beare the power or­dained of God, though abufing it sometimes for the just pu­nishment of those they are set over by God. I would also de­fire these Divines to consider, how finely they teach private men to resist, by arguing as they doe here, If I be bound to be subject to Tyranny, &c.

The like instances repeated over and over they have in the beginning of pag. 5. which are satisfied by the like Answer, but they enquire a little after in the same pag. Seeing the Do­ctor will not say, that the most pereusptory refusing to obey active­ly Tyrannous Commands is resistance, by what authority of Text or Context will he stretch the prohibition to the refusing to suf­fer Tyrannous Violence? Or how doth any resist unlawfully (though by Armes) when unlawfull violence is offered him, which God no where gave Authority to use against him, nor ever com­manded him to yeeld unto? Answ. 1. Seeing your Argument from those word words (the Ordinance God) would, if it were [Page 72]good, allow private mento resist, I pray you by what authority of Text or Context doe your Patrons forbid Resistance to be made by private men, but allow it to Magistrates or the infeti­or powers? is it from the consideration of those to whom the Apostle wrote, who had not then any Magistrates of their own profession among them? though that be no good ground to raise that distinction of private men and publique in the point of resistance (for the Apostles reasons against resisting of High­er powers doe concerne all times) yet will the consideration of those persons to whom, and of those times in which the A­postle wrote, give us authority to stretch the prohibition to the refusing to suffer Tyrannous violence; for we must conceive, that he gave them instruction which did neerely concerne them, which might in some reasonable manner direct them, which was agreeable to Saint Peters advice, 1 Ep. 2. cap. which was consonant to the practice of the Apostles, and all other Christians of those and the following primitive times; but the instruction that the Apostle here gives them cannot be such, unlesse it forbid the refusing to suffer under the Tyrannous violence of those times.

2. Answ. If he that resists by Armes, doth not resist un­lawfully (as you say) when unlawfull violence is offered him, which God no where gave authority to use against him, where hath God, I pray you, given authority to Parents or Masters to use unjust violence to their Children or Servants? yet is not their resistance unlawfull? for though God has not given those authority to doe it, yet has commanded these to suffer it, if done. The like may be said of Kings and Subjects; for has not God put Kings, Fathers, & Masters all in one Commandement & enjoyned this duty and reverence to them under one word, Honour? and S. Peter, next to the feare of God, has placed Ho­n [...]ur the King, and advises Christians to suffer though wrong­fully, under the then Tyrannous Governours, and froward Masters. Did not God put his People under this Subjection, when he put them under a King, 1 Sam. 8.? where this im­munity of their Kings from their resistance & forceable Coer­ [...]ion is called Ius Regis, not because God gave them power and [Page 73]right to use unjust and oppressing violence, but because if they did so, they were by the Law and Ordinance of God secured from the violence of the People, and reserved for the judge­ment and vengeance of God, that ordained them and set them over his people; as appeared above in the former Section.

But they goe on; and seeme to conceive, that by the pow­ers not to be resisted, the Doctor meanes onely the Supream, and those that Act his will; but denies the like security to sub­ordinate Magistrates, if they be Tyrannous, without any com­mand from the Supream pag. 6. Answ. The Doctor by main­taining, the Supream power might not be resisted by the Subor­dinate powers under Him, did not thereby imply, that these might be resisted; but still the higher spower is not to be resi­sted by those that are under it.

But if he say, that neither Supream nor Subordinate may be resisted, then may every meane. Officer ruine the whole neighbour­hood, and so the blessed Ordinance of God in Magistracy shall turne to the greatest Curse to mankind, so they pag. 6, Answ. There are superiour powers that can protect, so that if the subordi­nate power doe wrong, the complai [...]t lies still to the higher power; if the Supream or highest be engaged in the Violence, the redresse is to be sought by petition & suite, if not succeed, the complaint lyes to heaven, resistance is not the remedy.

They conclude; Therefore as the Apostle, in the following verses, doth banish Tyranny out of the context, describing, every where a righteous Magistrate: so is Tyranny banished out of the interpretation of this Text, which allowes him that is a Tyrant no security that he shall be endured, and not resisted even with Armet; though it doth secure a just ruling Prince from all resistance un­der the heavyest penalty of Damnation, pag. 6. Answ. It is true that the Apostle banishes Tyranny out of the duty of a Magi­strate by the following verses, but it is also true, that he bani­shesresistance out of the duty of Subjects by the former verses. He describes a rightcous Magistrate; but could he then exem­plity? were the Governours then such? If not such, as they were not then would this Text, according to the interpretation of these Divines, give but a lame direction to the Christians, [Page 74]how they should carry themselves towards the then unjust Governors; nor would this text, which forbids resistance, at al secure those Governors from their resistance; nay, I would faine see what any Jesuite can say or desire more from this text then that it gives a Tyrant no security, that he shall be endured. Lastly, if the penalty of Damnation laid upon the people, will secure a just ruling Prince from all resistance, as they tel us, why should not damnation laid upon every unjust oppressing Prince, secure the people from Tyranny? one would thinke it most equall that the Highest Power should have the greatest security, and so God in his wisdome thought fit, when he put his people under Kings without power of Resistance; as was she wen in the former Section, and will be a forceable reason against resistance, in the next Section.

Now let us consider this Text with application to those Times, and to the Powers then ruling; upon that considera­tion it was inferred, that Tyrannous & oppressing Princes are not to be resisted by Arms, & that the Apostles reasons taught us; that for the good which is generally received by Ruling powers, we must beare with them, though abusing their Au­thority, as the Emperours then did; which also took away their distinction of resisting not the power, but the abuse of the pow­er. These Divines in Answer to it, spend many pages, from page. 22. to 28. and againe, from 47. to 51. where, (after some thing said of small moment concerning the Kings Supremacy and the Roman Senate; page. 22.23, of which I have had, and shall have presently occasion to speake upon more weighty consideration brought by the Author of the Treatise of Mo­narchy) They tell us. First, The Doctors vaine Confidence will ap­peare in thinking he has made voyd the distinction of Refisting not the power, but the abuse of it; for when he grants that active obedience is to be denyed to the illegall Commands of the Prince, he distinguishes himselfe hetweene the Power and the abuse of it; and why may not wee distinguish upon the [...] in the se­cond verse, as well as he does upon the [...] in the first, so pag. 26. Answ, You cannot so well make the distinction in in regard of resistance, as it may in regard of subjection or Obedi­ence; [Page 75]for I can sever the power from the abuse of it, by de­nying my active obedience to the abuse or illegall command, & by yeelding my passive obedience under such a command; but by making resistance you cannot sever them, for you can­not resist the abuse, but by resisting of the power in him that beares it.

Secondly, they tell us, that the Apostles reasons forbid on­ly resistance to Legall Commands— and still they aske, doth the Apostle else know what he saith, when in his reasons [...]e tells us, Rulers are not a terrour to good workes, and he is the minister of God to thee for good? can this be said of the Empe­rors then? therefore the D ^rs sense must be renounced, and it must be said, the Apostle medles onely with Civill matters here, so pag. 47.48. Answ. That is, the Apostle medles with that, which did little concerne them, and gives them no in­struction in that which did most pr [...]sse them: the Tyrannous Commands and violences of the then Emperors: can we think he was well advised, if he had made them a discourse of Go­vernment, which they could make no use of, for the then ur­gent necessities? when therefore he saith, Rulers are not a terrour,— and they they are Ministers of God for good, &c. it was true of the then Rulers in regard of some Civill good which they did in some measure procure, (for S. Paul did often find reliefe in that Government, and was often rescued from the violence and cruelty of his Enemies, as we read in the Acts of the Apostles) though it was true also, that their Government was full of Tyranny and injustice: what shall we say then to these reasons of the Apostle, but that he forbids resistance un­der those Tyrannous Governours, and urges it from the end of government, which was for good, and which their Subjects did in regard of Civill matters in some sort enjoy under them? but we cannot thinke, that he medles with Civill matters on­ly, or forbids refistance to Legall commands only, unlesse we should also think, that the Apo [...]le left the Christians to infer from these reasons, as these Divines doe, that if Rule [...]s doe not accordingly minister for good, but are a terrour to good workes, they may and ought to be resisted, and that the Christians, had [Page 76]they had force, might have resisted, so they affirme, pag. 49. We see then the conclusion they are necessitated to by their interpretation of this place, in restraining the prohibition of resistance only to Legall-commands: which conclusion (be­ing so scandalous to Christian Religion, so opposite to the practice of the Apostles, and the expresse doctrine of those & after times) doth shew, that these Divines did not know what they said, when they inferred from the Apostles reasons, that Resistance only to Legall Commands is forbidden, and that Christians might have resisted.

Let them heare what Bucer saith upon the [...] be subject, the word, saith he, signifieth to be plenè sub imperio & in potestate, fully under the power of Rulers, and that the Apo­stle by that word gives us to understand opertere nostraomnia ponere in mans [...]orum, qui publicam potestatem gerunt, sed prop­ter Dominum, idèo quae Domino debemus, ea semper & ante om­nia praestand [...] sunt: interim tamen si magistratsu ob id nobis non res odō, sed ipsam etiam vitam conetur eripere, ferendum est, ne (que) potestati obluctandum; this is full, and forbids resistance under illegall commands and sufferings for obeying of God— Then upon the Apostles Reasons, He is the Minister of God to thee for good, &c. the same Bucer shewes, They are drawne from the good & benefit for which governmēt was ordained, which good is obtained [...] for the most part, and in some measure; the like saith Calvin upon the place—who perswading submission under Tyrannous Rulers concludes thus, Nulla ergò Tyrannis esse potest, qua non aliquâ ex parte subsi­dio sit ad tuendam hominum societatem, the like doth Peter Martyr upon the place.

Let them also read how the Author of the Treatise of M [...] ­narchy censures these Divines for their inferences from the Apostles reasons; that the Apostle, according to such a meaning, should have taught them a Doctrine of resistance rather, then subjection, and that the received Doctrine of the Saints in anci­ent and moderne times, could never find in that place of the Apo­stle such a licence for Christians, to use Armes in their defence, against the Tyranny of their Emperours, pag. 64. with severall [Page 77]reasons which shew the scandall of such Doctrine, pag. 66.

What then will this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, that pleades also for Resistance, answer to the Apostles prohi­bition of it? he grants they might not resist in that Monarchy, but affirme, that Subjects may in this; why? Because Religion then was no part of the Lawes, but here it is; Also because, that was an Absolute Monarchy & Soveraignty, this a limited and Mixed. So we have two exceptions of his as he dilivers them, pag. 59. 64. and 66.

His first exception is, Religion then was no part of the Lawes, and so its violation no subversion of Established government,— Herein we have Doctor Bilson consenting, who saith, That the su­perior power forbidden here to be resisted, is not the Princes will against his Lawes, but agreeing to his Lawes. I thinke the day it selfe is not more cleare. pag. 64. and 57. I doe concurre with Mr. Burrowes, professing against resisting of Authority, though abused: That if those who have power to make Lawes, make sinfull Lawes, and so give authority to any to force obe­dience, there must be either flying or passive Obedience, and pag. 66. In the case of the Armes now taken up, there is no need of those offensive Grounds which the Reverend Divines runne upon) Religion being now a part of our Nationall Law. So he. Answ. What Dr. Bilson and other of our Divines have writ­ten in favour of Resistance, they m [...]ane it of such States, as may by the known Lawes use forceable restraint against the exorbitances of the Monarch; and as they were willing after those motions of the Protestants in France, and the Low-Countries, to excuse as much as might be, so had they lived to have seen the Commotions and Rebellion of these daies, I make no doubt, but they would have spoken more cautelously; I am sure, the Homily against Rebellion speaks home, & will not admit such distinctions, that make way to the Resisting or Rebelling against evill Princes, which command against the Lawes and Religion, for of such it speakes.

But let us try the force of this exception; he professes with Mr. Burrowes against resisting of Authority, though abused; & with Doctor Bilson admits of Resisting the Princes will against [Page 78]the Lawes; this is fast and loose, for what is the Princes will a­gainst the Lawes, but abusing of Authority? It may be hee would salve at, as M. Burrowes seemed to doe, by telling us, that he means by Authority abused, the Authority, imployed in Making sinfull Lawes; for such Authority though abused, this Author acknowledges to be the Ordinance of God and not to be resisted, and disputes it against the Reverend Divines, pag. 64. 65. I agree with him; but further would have him shew why Authority abused in the Execution of Law, that is, in pursuing the Princes illegall will, should not be also the Ordi­nance of God and secured from resistance? Indeed there is a great difference betweene Resistance made against a Prince commanding according to Law, and that which is against a Prince commanding contrary to Law, but it doth not make the businesse as cleare as the day: nay it doth not at all satisfie him that will enquire—

First, concerning that government under which the Apostle lived; might Subjects then resist, If the Higher Powers com­manded contrary to Law, as they did often? we find that the Christian Orthodox Religion was part of the Lawes in Con­stantines and the suceeding times, and that Christians did not resist when Iulian persecuted them for it, nor did the Ortho­dox Christians resist when the Arrian Emperours endeavou­red to subvert the faith. If he reply, they were Absolute Em­perours, and that their Edicts made a change of the Law, by which such Religion was established: why then doth he, speaking of these absolute Emperours, distinguish the will of the Prince from the Law, and think to satifie us by telling us, Religion then was no part of the Law; when with one breath they could make any thing Law, and by another reverse it; ac­cording to this Authors acknowledgement of their absoute­nesse.

Secondly, Nor will this exception satisie him, that shall en­quire concerning this Government. 1. Whether the first Parliament in Q. Elizabeths Raigne might have resisted her, endeavouring to change the then established Popish Religion? Had those Popish Lords and Commons, which Q. Mary left, [Page 79]beene pleased to hold to that Religion which was then part of our Nationall Law, they might have taken the Armes of the Kingdome, and have used them in the defence of it, by the Rule of this Authour, and the pretences of the Armes now ta­ken up; I would very faine see, how they will make this as cleare as the day. 2. How can they be justified, that did at first take Armes, and doe still continue them (as themselves sticke not to professe) for the pulling downe of Episcopall Go­vernment (that I may not say, of the Church Liturgy and publique service too) which is, and alwaies hath been a part of the Law of this Nation? So little can this Authour satisfie us in this first exception, by saying, Religion was then no part of the Law, and therefore Christians might not resist, but now it is part of our Nationall Law, and therefore allowes the Resistance of these daies.

His other exception is; they were Absolute Monarchs, and therefore not to be resisted; He who reads Tacitus (saith he) cannot but see the Senate brought to a condition of basest servi­tude, and all Lawes and Lives depending on the will of the Prince;—They were become the sworne vassals of an absolute Lord, we the Subjects of a Liege or Legall Prince, pag. 59. Answ: This is the Sword to cut the knot when it cannot be untied: but the edge is easily taken off from it, by enquiring whether those first Roman Emperours had de jure such absolute power; and by considering, whether the Apostle had any respect to such absolutenesse of their power, in his reasons against resistance: and lastly, whether limitation of Power in the Soveraigne, doth inferre power of resistance in the Subject.

1. It cannot be cleared that those first Roman Emperours were so absolute de lure Legally, by such consent and surren­der of the People and Senate, as is required to the estating them in such an absolute condition, There seemes to be two Reasons inducing this opinion of their absolutenesse. 1. Be­cause they tooke upon them as absolute Lords. That cannot be denyed indeed, but it makes no right; nay, they crept into the power by degrees, which argues, they had it not by such con­sent [Page 80]as is pretended, but got it by practice. 2. Because of the Lex Regia, which this man doth not mention, but it is much spoken of to this purpose; for thereby it is conceived, that they were estated in such Absolute soveraignty: thus it runs, as Ʋl­pian gives it us, A Law, quâ populus ei (Principi) & in eum omne suum imporium & potestatem contulit. Tit. de Constitut-Principis. That there was such a Lex Regia, cannot be denied, but the Question is, when it was made, and what or how much is granted by i [...]? This has caused severall opinions a­mong the Civilians some thinking the people onely gave away their power, making the Prince their perpetuall Tribune. Some that the Senate also parted with their power. Some, that neither of them parted wholly with their power, but com­municated it so farre forth to the Prince in the administration of the Commonwealth, that they still kept the Summum impe­rium in themselves. This variety of opinion is unfit to make a certaine ground for Conscience, or to give interpretation to the Apostle, as if then be forbad Resistance, because those Empe­rours were Absolute.

I conceive it to be cleare that the draught of that Lex Re­gia appeares no where before Vespasians time; that the people had before parted with their power, but the Senate not whol­ly; therefore Augustus (to whom [...], the Principate was granted for life, as Srabo sai [...]h towards the end of his last booke) tooke upon him as Tribune of the people, and had it from ten yeeres to ten yeeres, as Al [...]iate shewes in a little Tract, de Magistratib. Civilibus. That the succeeding Empe­rours encroached by degrees upon the liberty and power of the Senate, making their way by seare and flattery; but had not that power, which by fits they assumed, from such a Covenant and Consent of the State, as is required, to make that Legem Regiam, as Connanus shewes out of Dion, Suetonius, and Taci­tus. Also that the Emperours though they were, for the more ready execution and ministration of the affaires of the Com­monwealth, sol [...]ti Legibus, which was first granted to Au­gustus, yet did they perquamdiu magnam potestatis partem cum Senatu communicare (as Hotoman shewes, de Constitutionib. [Page 81]Princip and cut of that power, which the Senate did still con­ceive to be in them, they declared Nero an Enemy to the State. Adde to this, that though we read not of Plebiscita after the be­ginning of these Emperours, yet we meet with Senatus Con­sulta; and of the power of the Senare in passing their Decrees, [...]acitus saith, They did it sometime inscio & absente Principe, but never indeed invito, against his will; Suetonius also tells us that Caligula intended to assume the Diade [...], which was a signe of that Regia potestas,and had been a profession that he would raigne absolutely: nec multum abfuit, quin speciem prin­cipatus, in Regni formam converteret, but he was disswaded from it by his friends, faith that Historian.

During these Times the Apostles lived and wrote; for I go not so low as Ʋespasian, unto whom that Lex Regia seems to be solemnly granted by a formall consent; and yet after that we find Pliny in his panegyricke tell the Emperour Trajan, sedem Principis tenes, ne sit Domixo locus: which shews, they had not resigned themselves up to the Emperour, as sworne vassals to an Absolute Lord, but had set a Prince over them for the readi­er dispatch of the affairs of the Common-wealth, which often suffered (and in those times more then ever) by the crossings and Divisions of the People and Senate. The forme of the Go­vernment was thereupon, I acknowledge, changed, and the Supremacy setled upon the Prince: yet may it, I conceive, from the former allegations be as well concluded, that the Se­nate had their share in the Supremacy with the Prince till Vespasians time, as that the two Houses are Originally Mixed or joyned with the King in the supreame or Soveraigne power, which this Author undertakes to prove.

2. It is to be considered that the Apostle in his reasons a­gainst resistance, has no respect to the Absolute or Limited con­dition of those Roman Emperours, nor to any consent or com­pact of the people, by which they should be made such, (for then he might have told them, If they resist they resist their owne Ordinances) but draws his reasons from the Ordinance of God, who sets up rulers, and from the End and Benefits of Govern­ment, which are Reasons, common to all Government, not to [Page 82]be eluded by saying, Ours are limited Monarchs, and therefore may be resisted; for those reasons tell us, that resistance against Him, that beares the Sword, (i.e.) against the Supreame power, (for that is signified by those words, as Musculus and Bucer shew out of Ʋlpian) is unlawfull in all governments.

3. As the Apostle had no respect to the Absolutenesse of Power in those Emperours, nor to the consent of the people, by which they are said to have such power, so neither indeed doth the limited condition of a Monarch inferre he may bete­sisted for his Exorbitancies more then an Absolute may for his, whether we consider the Exorbitancies of an Absolute M [...] ­narchy, which may be destructive of the publique, or look to the compact of the people (by which he is left Absolute) who did not thereby intend, he should oppresse and destroy them, or command and judge them beyond Reason and Equi­ty, as this Authour acknowledgeth, pag. 11. But it was proved more largely above at the end of the 5. Sect. That limitednesse of power in the Soveraigne, doth not inferre a power of Resi­stance in Subjects. So that absolutenesse of power in those first Roman Emperours is causelesly alleaged by this Author as the reason, why they might not be resisted.

This Authour concludes, All that can be justly inferred out of the Text, we grant, but can any living man hence collect, that therefore no resistance may be made to Fellow-subjects, executing destructive illegall Acts of the Princes Will in a Legall Monar­chy? Will he affirme that the Ordinance of God is resisted, and Damnation incurred thereby? Gods Ordinance is the power, and the person invested with the power, but here force is offered to neither, pag. 59. Answ. The Question is not put of making no resistance to fellow Subjects, but of such resistance, as is made against them under the command of their Soveraigne, by a contrary Army of Subjects, a resistance that undertakes a finall contestation with the Soveraign, to constrain him to be of ano­ther mind, as it was explained above, Sect. 2. Now if he meanes, this Resistance cannot be collected out of the Text, because it is made in a Legall Monarchy, then is it the same exception, which even now he made from the Absolutenesse of those Ro­man [Page 83]Monarchs; but if he means it cannnot be collected, because it is no resistance of Gods Ordinance, from whence the Apostle drawes his reason against resisting; then I say. 1. That when Subjects are drawn into Armes by the Soveraign, who has the power of the Sword, and doe act and move under his com­mand, to make opposition by a contrary army of Subjects is a resisting of the power, and a taking of the Sword without the Soveraigne, against the Ordinance of God, and a shedding of blood without warrant. 2. This exception seemes to be the same which was made by the pleaders above, where they ob­jected, If I be bound by the Ordinance of God, to suffer violence of a Tyrant, then is Tyranny the Ordinance of God. This was answered above, and is rejected by that Author of the Treatise of Monarchy: yet doth he in effect argue to the same purpose, as we shall meet with him presently, among the reasons of the next Section.

And thus much of the 13. to the Romaxs, in the asserting of which, it has been shewn against the Rev. Divines who plea­ded for defensive Armes, That forcible Resistance against the illegall and Tyrannous commands of the then ruling Empe­rours was here forbidden; and, That Christians, had they had force sufficient, might not resist. Also against the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy, That his exceptions from the Lawes being then against Religion, and from the Absolutenesse of those Emperours, were not sufficient to satisfie, or make us be­lieve, that therefore the Apostle forbad them to be resisted; for we find him to draw his reasons against Resistance, from that which is common to all Times and Governments, the Ordi­nance of God, the end and benefit of Government. There are many more places of Scripture usually brought, which may ve­ry aptly and powerfully perswade patience under evill Gover­nours, but I have chosen to insist onely upon such as are more pregnant and fi [...] to beare argument against the power of Re­sistance in Subjects.

SECT. IX. Reason against the Power of Resistance in Subjects.

IT is cleare, that (as it has been often insinuated above) if a Prince stands supreame and next under God above all the People, His Subjects may not proceed to such Resistance by armed Forces, as is supposed in the Question, and at this day practised to the utmost; It is also most manifest that our King is so, being expresly acknowledged the onely Supreame Head and Governour: and this might be sufficient Reason without more adoe, to conclude against Resistance. The adversaries not well knowing how to divide Supremacie and irresistibility, have vainly endeavoured to joyne the Houses as sharers in the su­pream or Soveraigne power, for which we had so much con­cerning Mixture above; and doe think to satisfie that Suprema­cy, they leave in the King, by yeelding his person to be above the violence of Resistance; but as for the Forces about his per­son, the armes of the Kingdome may be imployed against them, as against misimployed agents; and from the taking of those armes to make this resistance, they conceive they are not debarred by His being Supreaeme Head and Governour, but are enabled to it by a supposed reservation of the people, and by the necessity of the States preservation, requiring such a pow­er of resistance in Subjects, upon which grounds their Reasons for resistance doe mainly proceed. I shall therefore so frame this tryall of Reason, (to which we are now come) as it may best meet with the force of their Reasons and Exceptions.

I. It was the wisdome of God to put his people still under Kings, without power of resistance, as we found it in the two former Sections: and that wisdome of God should be to us in stead of the most forcible Reason, and silence all gainsaying pretences.

II. If this power of Resistance in Subjects were so necessa­ry for the preserving of Religion and Justice, as is pretended, certainly the word of God would have given direction for it; but as in the Old Testament, we no where finde the Prophets [Page 85]calling upon the Elders of the people sin th [...] supposed d [...]y of resistance, so in the New Testament we every where finde pa­tience in suffering for well doing no mended to [...]. This Au­thor of the Treat. of Monarchy, doth often admire the wise­dome of the Architects of this Government, that so provided for the safety of it, by placing such power of Armes and resi­stance in the two Houses: but we doe not find such a provision within that wisdome and care, which it pleased God to shew in the Government he put his people under; nor would we in­deed finde such a power of forcible resistance, provided in the constitution of this monarchy, when we examined it above.

III. From the Institution and Ordinance of God, which gives the power, according to the Apostles argument, who drawes his reason against resistance, not from any Compact of the people, but from the Ordinance of God, which cannot be E [...]uded by any reservation of the people (the pretended ground of resistance) but shewes the power given by it must be borne with, though abused, as then it was, when the Apostle gave his reasons against resistance.

IIII. To be Supream and next to God over the people, or to have the power of the sword, implyes a security from resi­stance; It is the Ius Regis which Calvin and most Authors ac­knowledge upon 1 Sam. 8.11. and is expressed, Prov. 30.31. A King, against whom there is no rising up. It is generally ac­knowledged, that Princes which be supreame are free from the Coactive power of the Law; It is apparent, that resistance cannot be made by Subjects, but by taking the power of the Sword which belongs to him that is supream. Lastly, it is evi­dent in reason, that if the two Houses be enabled to resist and constraine the Prince by force to his duty, then have they the power of the Lacedaemonian Ephori, which, as this Author of the Treatise of Monarchy acknowledges, does overthrow the Soveraignity of the Monarch.

The generall exception, which the Adversaries make to these two last Reasons, is, that they resist not the Soveraigne power, but only misimployed instruments and fellow Subjects executing his illegall commands. Answ. As if the Soveraignes [Page 86]could by himselfe execute his Commands without under Mini­sters of power; so that the resisting of them, acting by the pow­er which he has committed to them, is a resisting of him. And such a resistance, as is supposed in the Question, necessarily proceeds to an opposing of Him personally, in giving of Him Battell, and forcing of Him from His Right and Power to new grants of Security.

In particular, This Author of the Treat. of Monarchie, thus reasons from the Ordinance of God. To Resist such misimployed Instruments, is no resisting of the Ordinance of God; for it neither resists the Person of the Soveraigne, for we spake of resisting his Agents; nor His Power, for the measure of that in our Govern­ment is the Law, & therefore He cannot confer Authoritie to any beyond the Law, page 52. Answ. I would desire this Au­thor to looke againe upon the two Assertions of the Reverend Divines, which he rejects, page 63. They run thus, Those Govern urs, whether Supream or others, who under pretence of Authoritie from Gods Ordinance, disturb the quiet & peaceable life in Godlinesse and honesty, are far from being Gods Ordinance in so doing: also; This Tyranny not being Gods Ordinance, they which resist it even with Armes, resist not the Ordinance of GOD: and then to consider, whether those D [...]vines might not in de­sence of those Assertions answer, as he has done here, that to resist the misimployed Agents of Tyrants commanding against Law, is not to resist the Ordinance of God, for they cannot confer Authoritie to any against the Law; for my part I cannot con­ceive, how he can retaine his own Assertion, and reject theirs.

But to Answer him more particularly; He that beares the Sword (i. e) has the supreame power, gives power and Com­mission to under Ministers for executing of Justice and to other Officers for the Militia; If those therefore, though abusing the Power, be resisted by them who are under them, it is a resisting of the Power; and if these, in time of Warre and insurrection, being drawn together by the Soveraigne, and acting His Com­mands under Him, be opposed by contrary force and armes of Subjects, it is a resisting of the power lawfully placed in such persons, though illegally used and imployed; it is a taking and [Page 87]using of the sword to the shedding of blood with u Warrant.

The defence (which this Author makes, pag. 62) of their taking the sword without the Soveraign [...], and against his Com­man [...], is grounded upon that former groundlesse suppos [...]ll of their being joyned with the King in the Soveraign power it selfe; of which a [...]undantly in the 4th and 5th Sections above.

V. Because Obedience, Honour, and Su [...]j [...]ction, [...]ue to a Ponce are enjoyned, and th Contrary forbidd [...]n without any [...]stincti [...]n o [...] a Good or Bad P [...]ince; S [...]. Paul shewes, that h [...]ill must n [...]t he spoken of the worst Rulers, Act. 23. What is [...]aesars, [...]u [...] Saviour bids give unto Caesar, when he was as bad as m [...]ght be; and for this Cause pay you Tribute, and Honour, saith S. Paul, when the higher powers were extreme [...]y evnd. — This cannot consist with taking Armes against a Prince: for they that doe so, must speake evill of H [...]m, make Him appeare O [...] to His people, and will not, cannot let Caesar have what is His, His Revenues, Customes, Tribute, Armes, but w [...]ll tell Him, they are not His, but the King fomes, to use as the State shall thinke sit, when he abuseth them, And as the Scripture doth not, so not her doth our Law make any d [...]stinction of good [...]d bad Princes in this poynt; It enjoynes Honour, Subjecti­on, Allegiance, Customes, without any such distinction, and determin [...]s Insurrection, and Levying of Warre to be Treason, not onely against a good King, but indefinitely against any.

VI. It is good reason, that He which has the Supreame Trust next to God, should have the greatest security, but if the people have power of Armes upon such or such Cases, the strongest and last security is on their side. In other kinds of Go­vernment, we see the security is still upon the Governing Par [...]; Parents are secured from the force and violence of Chil­dren; and as unto the first Rule of Fathers, the Government of Kings did succeed, so unto Kings is Honour commanded under the Name of Fathers, that we might conceive the unnaturalnes of Warre and forcible Resistance against them. The Husband also, who is the head of the Wife, had the advantage on his part in the poynt of Divorce; He might give the Bill to her upon Jealousies and displeasure, she could not to H [...]m; This Liberty [Page 88]was permitted to good and bad Husbands equally, notwithstan­ding the occasion, that evill Husbands might take thereby to be unjust and cruell; as it is usually objected against this Ius Re­gis, or advantage of security on the Kings part.

VII. From the end and benefits of the Governing power, for the enjoying of which it is good reason wee should beare with the Exorbitancies of the power. The Divines, that plead for Defensive Armes, reply. This is as good a Reason, as if wee should say, God hath ordained Ministers to Preach, and admi­nister his Sacraments for the good of the people, that they may be saved, therefore be their Ministers never so carelesse, or per­verting the Word and Sacraments, the people may not seeke their Soules safety from some other, pag. 56. Answ. There's a great deale of difference betweene these two Reasonings, if we con­sider the Remedy which may be had against unfaithfull, scanda­lous Ministers; for first, as these Divines suppose forcible Re­sistance, to be the remedy against Exorbitant Princes, when the Good for which Government was ordained, cannot be recei­ved by them, so should they in this their Reasoning, have conclu­ded for a violent suppression of such Ministers, as an answerable Remedy against that mischiese. Indeed this Age hath seen the proceedings against both much alike, Ministers pull'd out of their Pulpits by the people, cast out of their Houses, spoyled of the benefit of their Livings, and Teachers drawne from the Lowest of the people, thrust into their places without any Le­gall processe; and it is openly professed, that these Armes are still held up to pull Bishops downe. These men forget what our Saviour said to the people, of the Scribes and Pharisees, They sit in Moses Chaire; what then? pull them downe? No: heare them, and doe what they teach you out of Moses.

As against their Pastors, so have they proceeded against their Prince, forgetting those many precepts and examples, which the Scripture gives us, of Obedience and subjection yeelded even to Tyrannous Kings; now if they will reason thus, God has ordained Rulers for good, therefore we may use force to constraine them to their duty, that we may receive that good by them: So, God has ordained Ministers for good, therefore [Page 89]we may violently suppresse them, and cast them out, if we can­not receive that good by them; then I confesse, one Reason is as good as another, but both bad enough.

Secondly therefore, we must consider there is a Remedy to be ha [...]against unfaithfull scandalous Ministers, by complaining to their Superiours, who set them over the people, and can displ [...]ce them; but the Remedy against Princes that Rule not well, is by complaint to God, that set them up, and can turne their Hearts; now if they will reason thus, Pastours are ordai­ned for good, therefore if they doe not minister unto that, we may use the remedy against them, which God and good Lawes have allowed; so Rulers are ordained for good, and if they doe not attend upon it, such r [...]medy may be used as God and good Lawes doe approve of; then I confesse, both Reasonings are good; but neither doth conclude for forcible Resistance.

Now if we will consider the force of this seventh Reason against Resistance, which is drawne from the end and benefits of Government, we shall find it, however the Reverend Di­vines make light of it, to be the same that the Apostle makes, v. 7. Render therefore, &c. wherefore? because they are the Ministers of God for good, &c. But who were they, to whom Tribute, and Honour, and Custome, was then to be rendered as due? Those Rulers that were then farre from those duties; yet, because Rulers, appointed for that end, Render therefore, &c. Calvin upon the place tells us, Loquitur denativo Magistratus officio, à quo tame [...]se non rarò degenerant, qui principatum tenent, nihilominus deferenda est us obedientia, quae principibus debetur. For whether we consider Government in generall, it does (as Bucer upon the place speakes) [...], for the most part ob­tame its end in some good measure: or any Government in particular, there is a benefic of protection from it beyond the particular injuries suffered by it; to this purpose Calvin upon the place, Quanquam ne sic quidem unquam abutuntur suâ po­test ne Pr [...]cipes bonos vexando, ut non in sua Tyrannide speciem al quam just [...] dominationis retineant; Nulla ergo Tyrannis esse pot [...]st, quae non aliqua ex parte subsidio sit ad tuendam hominum societate [...]. And P. Martyr shewes it by the rescue, defence, [Page 90]and protection, which S, Paul found through the benefit of the power, and by the appeal he made to Nero the worst of Tyrants; all which appeares by severall passages in the Acts of the Apostles.

VIII. This Power of Resistance in Subjects, would be a Remedy against the Exorbitancies of Princes, worse then the chsease, and more subver sive of a state, then if they were left without it. This the Wisedom [...] of Go [...], [...]he God of Order did forefee, who put his people und [...]r King, wit ont such p [...]wer of Resistance, as was above [...]. This both Reason and experience doth shew, that it is a remedy not to be managed without bringing greater danger; the being of such power in Subjects would be a continua [...]l Seminary of jealousies twixt Prince and People, for the using of it, they would not want pretences causelesly made, and in the using of it could not shew m [...]deration: they would not be content with the rece­vering of their Liberties, but seeke to lessen the Princes power for their farther secutity; they would not rest upon the Pri [...] ­ces promise for it, & then how would he upon theirs for obe­dience? they would feare his returne to exorbitancy, and be their violence would proceed to a deposing of H [...]; and what could be the issue but confusion through the continuance of the Mischiefes of Wa [...]te? The confideration of these times and of the persons that have had the managing of this forcible Resi­stance, shew [...]t to be a Remedy not to be used.

The author of the Trea [...]ise of Monarchy, replies. Jt is stronge that the Resistance of dest [...]uctive disorder sh [...]uld tend to the overthrow of Order, or be a remedy worse then the disease; It may for a time disturbe, as Physick doth the Naturall body, while it is in working, if the p [...]ccant humours make strong oppo­sition, but as this tends to health, so dath Resistance of disorder to Order pag. 6. Answ. It is not so strange, for there is Order under the greatest Tyranny, as was shewen in the former Rea­son, and in the exorbitances of P [...]inces, which in themselves tend to the subversion of the established Order, there is more Order, Law, and Justice, then in the use and effects of this Re­medy by resistance. Such lewd Remedies (as it is in the first [Page 91]part of the Homily against Rebellion) are farre worse then any other Maladies and d [...]sorders, that can be in the body of the Com­mon wealth.

Now to his simili [...]ude. In the applying of Physick, we look to the Medicine or remedy it selfe, and do not use the Sword to those parts of the body, which will onely admit of Fomenta­tions and Lenitives, and patience for the cure of them: nor doe we commit the applying of the physick to every hand and judgement, but the [...]and and judgement, by which this ph [...] ­sick of forcible R [...]si [...]ance i [...]tance is that of the people, for this Author tels us, in such a case the Appeale must be to the Community, and they must aid and assist, as they are in Consci­ence conviced. But how shall they be perswaded to use a mean, who wil be still applying and keeping this Physick working, when perchance the Houses, that cal'd them to the C [...]e, would have it cea [...]? doe we not see what Humours this physick hath s [...]irred in the body Politick? where there is any possi [...]i [...]ity, it is better to let Nature worke it cut, though we give it a longer time to [...]oe it in, then to thinke to helpe it by a poysonous purge.

But if any shall thinke, the Art and wisedome of the Houses can correct the malignity of the Remedy, or the rashnesse of the people, that are used in the application of it, I appeale from his judgement to these Times; when could bet­ter and more [...] successe of this Remedy be expected? by whom could it better be applyed and managed then by the Members of this late Parliament, so much extolled for their Religion, Prudence, and Equity? yet let the issue spe [...]k, what little good there is to be hoped for by the use of such mischic­vous remedies. The fourth part of the Homily, above cited, speaks thus. Peaceable King S [...]lomon was judged of God more meet to build his Temple (whereby the Ordering of Religion is meant) then His Father David, who had shed much blood in his warrs, though against the Lords Enemies: what Religion is it then, that such men, by such meanes would restore? Even as good a Religion as they are good Subiects, or as Rebellionis a good mean of redresse and reformation, being it selfe the grearest deformation [Page 92]that possible may be. But as the Truth of the Gospell being quietly and soberly taught, though it cost them their lives that doe teach it, is able to maintaine the true Religion, so hath a franticke Religion need of such furious mainteinance as is Rebellion.

IX.Lastly, therefore wee are taught to referre the Remedy to God, who has told us, that the hearts of Kings are in his hand, and he turnes them whithersoever he will, Pro. 21.1. to make us apply unto him for the turning of them. Hee shewes that he is the judge of the King, by that Conditionate covenant he makes with him, 2 Chron. c. 6. v. 16. Where the promises made to David for the continuance of his Kingdome, are re­peated with this condition, Yet so that thy Children walk in my Law, So also 2 Chro. 7.17. But the Covenant 'twixt King and People, 2 Sam. 5. is not Conditionate to render him obnox­ious to their judgement and force. To this purpose Nation, in his first Orat. against Iulian, shewing how that wicked Empe­rour was repressed through the Mercy of God, doth blame those, who being too much intent upon the present, cannot depend upon providence & expect the execution of the Coun­fell of God in his punishing of wicked Princes: P. Martyr in his Comment on the 13 to the Rom. shewing out of Dan. 4. that God translates and disposeth of Kingdoms, observeth this way of providence, that evill Princes are raised for the pu­nishment of the wickednesse of a People, sed postquam sic casti [...] gatt homines ad Deum redierint, ille mitiores Principes, & justi­ores provides, and accordingly, saith hee, wee find in History of Kings, that God did, Tyrannis semper miscere bonos aliquos & justos Principes, Calvin likewise upon the 13 to the Romanes tels us piously and judiciously, That an evill Prince is the scourge of God upon the Peoples sin, and therefore as we must acknowledge it is through our fault, that the great blessing of Magistracy is turned to our punishment, so must we neverthe­lesse reverence the Ordinance of Power, which wee shall easi­ly doe, si nobis ipsis quiequid mali in ipsa erit, impatemus, if we impute the abuse of the power, or the evil that we suffer by it, to our selves. I will conclude with the like advice, given us in the first part of the Homily against Rebellion, The heart of the [Page 93]Prince is in the hand of God, wherefore let us turne from our sinnes to the Lord, and he will turne the heart of the Prince to our Wealth: Else for Subjects, when they have deserved through their sins to have an evill Prince, then to Rebell against Him, were a double evill, by pro­voking God to plague them more.

The Reasons which the Author of the Treatise of Monarchy has brought for the power of Resistance i [...]. Subjects are such as follow.

First. Because to resist misimployed instruments acting or assisting to the performance of the destructive commands of the Prince, is no resisting of the Ordinance of power, because power cannot be conferred to any beyond the Law. So he pag. 52. How far this concernes the question, was shewen above un­der my third and fourth Reasons, where it was propounded and answered.

His second Reason. Because without such power of Resi­stance in the hands of Subjects all Limitation of Government is vaine; all formes resolve into Absolute and Arbitrary. pag. 53. Answ. Your Argument is inconsequent by your owne descrip­tions of Absolute and Limited Monarchy, which you drew from the consideration not of force or resistance, but of Law to set bounds to the Monarchs Will as was observed above, Sect. 3. So that the restraint of a limited Monarch is Legall and Morall, not forcible and military. Nor is there, by the Limi­tation of the Monarchs power, a power of Armes acquired to the people, but onely a Morall security sought after by the re­straint or bands of Lawes and Oath cast upon the Monarch: which makes not a vaine limitation of Government, but binds the conscience of the Monarch, and by his Conscience his hands are bound, more powerfully, then by a contrary power or force in the people, see above towards the end of the fifth Section, that Limitation of the Monarchs power inferres not a power of Resistance in Subjects.

He addes to the same Reason, If a Prince be taught, that hee may take, what he pleaseath, from His Subjects without being resi­sted, cases and reasons will soone be brought to perswade him, &c. pag. 53. Answ. He is not taught he may Lawfully doe so: but [Page 94]if Subjects be taught, that they may lawfully take Armes up­on such or such cases, and take from their fellow Subjects, what they please, to maintaine those Armes, pretences and cases will not be wanting, as at this day. In a word, some must bee finally trusted when all is done, and who may better challenge it then the Supreame Governour that stands next to God above the People, as was said above in the fourth Rea [...]on: and it were fit we should for the redresse of Evills in Government, trust God and depend upon his providence more, then these men would have us.

H [...]s third Reason. Eccause such power is due to a publicke State for its preservation, as is due to a particular person, pag. 55. Answ. The Proposition is not universally true, but is thus farre granted, such power is due to a State for its preservation, as is allowed by the just Lawes thereof; for as the body Naturall defends it selfe from outward force by its Law, so the body Po­litique by its Law. Now though a particular person by the Law of nature has power of selfe preserva [...]ion against the force of another private person, yet is this power yeelded up in re­gard of the Civill power (by the benefit of which particular persons have protection from the injuries of all other) and not to be used against persons indued with such power, against such persons illegally and suddainly assuiting a man, where t [...]e danger is imminent and unavoydable by flight, there was no more allowed in my first Treatise, then a meere personall d [...] ­fence, by warding of blowes without returning any: yet doth this Author complaine. The Doctor is so heavie a friend to the State, that he thinkes it not sit to allow it that Liberty, he gives every private man, pag. 55. As the Liberty which this Author allowes a State for its preservation, tends rather to its suoversion, so are there many differences between it, and the Liberty or power allowed to private men.

For first, That power of preservation which is allowed to a private man, against a private man, is against an our ward force, but this which is challenged for the State is by a Civill conten­tion of the body against the Head, or of other part of th [...] body against the Head, and another part of the body. 2. That de­fence, [Page 95]which was allowed against Ministers of Power in their unavoydable assaults, was without all off [...]nee, but this defence by Armies, which is challenged, for the State cannot be so. 3. That power of defence is such as nature hath endued every particular man with, and the law of the Society hath not forbidden so farre forth, as was said, to be used: but this is such a power as no Law enables Subjects to, a taking and using of the Sword without warrant, as hath bin often shewn. 4. Such neere personall defence is not destructive of Order, but this by the civill contention of the Head and body, is, as at this day.

The Pleaders for Defensive Armes, make a long reply to that which in my first Trea [...], was spoken, concerning this per­sonall defence, the substance of it is. First, though the body na­turall can doe nothing against, or without the guidance of the Head, yet the Body Politique can, being a company of Reasonable men, whose actions may be divided from their Head. Pag. 14.15. Answ. They are Reasonable men, but as they make up the bo­dy politique, the Law is their Reason, and they cannot move or act further then it directs them, nor can they divide them­selves from the Head, to which the Law joynes them, nor of themselves, performe the supreame Acts of Power belonging to the Head. 2. It is granted, the body Politique may defend it selfe against an outward force, then suppose the King imploy Danes or Irish, against the Kingdome, may we resist, Pag. 15. Answ. I de­termine nothing of their supposition, which I hope will never come to passe; but they should have considered, when the Doctor said, the Body politicke defends it selfe against an out­ward force, li [...]e as the body naturall doth, hee did not take the body politick divided from the Head, as it is in the ci­vill Contention. 3. The Doctor supposeth the Prince bent to subvert Religion, Liberties, Lowes, what greater destruction of Order can be feared by such antention or resistance. Pag. 15.16. Answ. What was meant by that supposition, hath bin often explained, the Prince bent, or seduced to subvert, (i. e.) doing many acts arbitra­rily, which of themselves tend to subversion, but indeed the Frame of Government & Laws cannot be subverted without the consent of the two Houses. It may happen, that actuall [Page 96]invasions may be made upon them; and it is plain, that such had better be borne with, and other lawfull and reasonable remedies sought, then to endeavour a forcible redresse by a Civill Contention, for under such actuall invasions, of the Subjects Rights, nay under the greatest Tyranny, there is more Order, Law, and Justice, then under such civill discords and Warres, as was fully evinced above, by the 7. and 8. Rea­sons.

The fourth Reason of the Author of the Treat. of Monarchy is grounded upon that false supposall of the two Houses being joyned with the King, in the very Soveraigne Power, pag. 55. which was at large examined above. His last reason is from the Power of inferiour Courts, where the Judge it to proceed to the Censure, and punishment of the Malefactor, notwithstanding the Kings Warrant to the contrary, much rather may the assaults of p [...]tvate men be resisted by the Parliament, pag. 56. Answ. The A [...]gument from the processe of inferiour Courts to sentence and punishment, or from the Parliaments power to resist and commit such private men assaulting them, is altogether in­consequent to prove their power to raise Armies, and by them to oppose the Forces of their Soveraigne, which is the resistance supposed in the Question, and condemned as unwar­rantable by al that hath hitherto bin spoken from the Consti­tution of this Governement, from Scripture, and from Rea­son.

And all this that hath bin spoken hitherto, belongs to the Resolution of the first Question, That it is not lawfull for Sub­jects, upon the supposed Ca [...]e of the Princes subv [...]rsive Exorbitan­ces, to take Armes and resist as at this day, The other should fol­low: that the Case supposed is not now, or, That they have no, those Causes for their Armes, which they pretend. But of this there hath bin so much said in so many Declarations, and Bookes, written to informe the world aright, that I need not be any longer troublesome, onely I would desire the Rea­der, upon their pretending the defence of the established Re­ligion and Lawes by these Armes, to consider;

First, that they cannot say, another Religion is commanded or enforced upon them, only they will say they fear a change, [Page 97]I would to God, that all offences, which the liberty of these unsetled times has produced, were taken out of the way: but was there ever any before these Times so desperare, as to maintaine, Subjects might fight against their Soveraigne, for a Religion they freely enjoy, only because they fear a prevailing of the Contrary? And if the Reader doe consider, that this Army (which pretends the defence of the Established Reli­gion) besides some Tr [...]es of Forreiners and Papists, and some Bands of unwilling Prest-men, has its chiefe strength from the prevalency of such Sects, as are condemned by Lawes of this Land, he may well cry out in the words of the Homily above cited, What Religion is it that such men would by such meanes maintaine? — A franticke Religion needes such furious Maintenances, as is Rebellion.

II. They cannot but say, that the continuance of the esta­blished Religion, and of the Governement of Church and State, together with a just Reformation of all abuses has bin offered, promised, protested for by their Soveraigne [...]. but this will not content them, unlesse the established Liturgy may be abolished, the Governement of the Church by Bi­shops, which has alwayes bin, may be no more, and the Power which by Law is his Majesties, put into their hands. And be­cause these are not granted, their Armes are continued, and for the mainteining of them, the Liberty and Property of their fellow Subjects is invaded. So that if the Question bee put, who are those misimployed fellovv Subjects, that these men pretend to fight against? It is plaine, they are such, as defend their Soveraignes Povver and Rights, the Established Religion and Governement of this Church and State, their ovvne property and Liberty: in a vvord, such, as vvill not change their Soveraigne, or the Established Frame of Govern­ment. The God of povver and Wisedome cast out all Coun­cels, and defeat all designes, that are against the restoring of our peace, and the continuance of the true Reformed Religi­on. Amen.