SUBSECT. 1. Salmasius his Opinion concerning the Power of Inferiour Judges, examined, and refuted.

THat we may in a methodick and square way, handle his opinion, and conveniently meet with these things which he replieth against our second Argument, we shall lay down his mind in these Propositions.

Propos. 1. The Jewish Sanhedrin had no power over the Kings of Israel, and Judah.

That he may establish this Proposition, he taketh this way to prove it: Firstly, The people of Israel (saith he) did seek a King to reign over them, after the manner of the Nations. But all the [Page 12] Kings of the Nations in these times were absolute, and not sub­ject to Law: Ergo. The Proposition he proveth from 1. Sam. 8. The Assumption he taketh for granted, saying, that the Assyrians, whose Monarchy was at that time, when the Israelites sought a King to reign over them, did not restrict their Kings within the bounds of Law. Therefore Artabanus Persa much commendeth that Law, whereby the Persians enacted, that the King should be honoured as the image of GOD. Plut [...]n vit. Themist. And Claudianus saith, that they gave alike obedience to cruell and tyrannous Kings. Yea, O­tades calleth Monarchy, that to which every thing is lawful, un­punishably. Herodot. lib. 3. Then seing the Persians succeeded to the Medes, and the Medes to the Assyrians, who reigned at that time when the Israelites did seek a King to reign over them, it appeareth that as the Persian Monarchy, so likewise the Assyrian and Median Monarchies, were of an absolute and arbitrary power. And Homer (who lived, as some imagine, about that time when the Israelites sought a King from Samuel to reign over them,) saith, that Kings are from Jupiter, and those do reign who get authority from the son of Saturn. Whom he also calleth [...], divine Kings, [...] trained up by Jupiter. Therefore Kings in Homer's time, were not subject to Law. Defens. Reg. cap. 2. and 5.

Ans. Both the Propositions of this Gentlemans Argument seem very strange to us. As for the first Proposition we do not deny it: for the people of Israel said to Samuel,—Now make us a King to judge us like all the Nations, 1. Sam. 8. But it doth not follow, Ergo, make us an absolute King, as the Nations about us have. 1. Because Moses, Deut. 17. by the Spirit of prophecie foretelleth their seeking of a King after the manner of the Nations. But it is e­vident, that Moses there doth onely prophesie of their seeking a King after the manner of the Nations, i.e. that as the Nations about had Kings over them, so they might have a King over them in like manner: for both Deut. 17. and 1. Sam. 8. the words are general. In neither of these it is said, Make us an absolute king after the maner of the Nations. The words admit a two-fold sense; and so they may either signifie, As other Nations have Kings, so make us a King. This sense we allow; or, as other Nations have absolute Kings, so make us an absolute King. This sense we deny; And so, this is a fallacy, either ab Homonymia, or à figura dictionis. (2.) We may as well [Page 13] conclude from these words, after the manner of the Nations, that the people of Israel did seek a non-absolute and regulated King: for at that time there were King of the Nations, who were regula­ted according to Law. We read, that Priamus was not only with­stood by his own subjects who did steal Helena, but also what he did in the matter of Helena's away-taking, was according to the advice and counsell of Senators, whom Paris with his Complices did over-awe, Dict. Cret. de bello Tro. lib. 1. And it is observable, that Agamemnon and Palamedes, though the Kings of Kings were subjected to Law. So storie Dictys Cretensis, Dares Phry­gius, Homer and Aristotle. Which was at that time, when the Jewes did seek a King to reign over them. Yea then the Egyptian Kings were subjected to Law. Diod. Sic. Rer. Ant. l. 2. c. 3. And it is also evident, that at this time the Athenian Monarchy was not absolute. So Heraclid. de polit. ΑΘΗΝ. Diod. Sic. lib. 5. c. 5. Moreover, we do not imagine, but there were many other Monar­chies at that time, which were not arbitrary and of an illimited power. We might prove this at length; if it were not both tedious and needlesse. But Salmasius himself acknowledgeth, that then all the Kingdoms of the Orient were of a limited power, regu­lated κατὰ νόμον. And for proof of this he citeth Aristotle, pol. lib. 3. c. 10. and 11. (3.) The people of Israel did seek a King under very fair pretences. They not only alleaged, that Samuel was unfit because of his years, to govern them, according to Law and reason, but also they pleaded for a King from the tyrannie of Sa­muel's sons, and their non-governing according to justice and equi­ty. Then tell me, would they ever have sought a King, that he might govern them according to his pleasure, whether to tyrannize over them, or not? Thus they should not onely have palpably con­tradicted themselves, but also they should have cut off from themselves these pretences, whereby they urged their pur­pose in seeking a King. (4.) To say, that the people of Israel did seek an absolute King, is to mil [...]tat directly against these ends which they propounded to Samuel, and set before their eyes in seeking a King. The ends are three. 1. To judge them. 2. To conduct them. 3. To fight for them, and defend them from their enemies. These three particular ends do abundantly evidence, that they did not seek a King to govern them, after the manner of the Nations, [Page 12] [...] [Page 13] [...] [Page 14] whether according to Law, or contrary to it, but that they sought a King to govern them, only according to Law and reason. I am sure, the second and third end imply no lesse. And if you say, that the first end may take along with it a judging, whether according or contrary to Law, we do easily obviat this difficultie. (1.) Because you shall not finde in Scripture, where judging is taken for an act of injustice and tyrannie. And the Holy Ghost in Scripture expound­eth judgment, calling it justice, 2. Sam. 8. (2.) Had the people of Is­rael sought a King to judge them, whether according to justice or injustice, then their arguments whereby they enforced their pur­pose in seeking a King, had been altogether uselesse. Samuel haply might have said to them, I see now ye do praevaricate in this mat­ter, your profession is altogether vain, in declaring your selves sen­sible of my weaknesse and inability for judging you according to justice and equity, and of the corruption and iniquitie of my sons, in perverting righteous judgment. Away (might Samuel have said) this is nothing but words. Whereas ye seek a King to judge you, whether according to Law or not, ye contradict your own pro­fession, and give your selves the lie to your face. Yea, Salmasius himself doth acknowledge, that they did not seek a King to tyran­nize over them, and to rule contrary to Law and reason, Def. Reg. c. 2. But mark how the man straight-wayes giveth himself the lie: For (saith he) they did not deprecat nor abominat an unjust King, wicked, violent, ravenous, and such-like as use to be among the Nations, though most wicked, Ibid. We demand at this Gentle­man, whether or not they did positively seek such a King as that, to reign over them? If he affirm it, then they sought a tyrannous King to reign over them. And so he belieth himself. If he deny it, then it followeth, that in even-down terms they sought no King but one who would judge them in righteousnesse. But this Roy­allist will have them positively to seek an absolute King to reign o­ver them. Then tell me, how can this agree with these preten­ces whereupon they sought a King, to wit, to reform their Commonwealth, and to banish corruption out of Judgment-seats? and because Samuel was not able to perform this (as they alled­ged) therefore they sought a King. But Samuel might have said to them in seeking an absolute King, ye seek a remedy worse then the disease. Such a King whom ye seek, having power to govern [Page 15] at randome, according to his pleasure, will not be a sit man to re­dresse the enormities of your Estate. He may well aggravat the burdens under which ye now groan, but he will not lessen them, and ease you of your burden. Be sure, ye will get few or no good Kings, but ye will have many bad, who having a vast power, will make you groan under their yoke. So then (might Samuel have said) ye can no wayes pretend a sense in you of the want of the exercise of righteous judgment, and of corruption and enormity in the Judges. Ye scorn your selves to enforce your purpose there­from in seeking a King, whenas in seeking an absolute King, ye forthwith give your selves the lie, and undermine your own grounds. Again, if positively (as is manifest from these ends above-written) they sought no King to reign over them, but such who would govern them according to Law and reason; then is it more then apparent, that positively they sought a regulated and non-absolute King to reign over them: for, as governing according to judgment and righteousnesse, is done according to Law and rea­son, so it can never absolutely be performed, unlesse the governing power be absolutely hemmed in by Law, and regulated thereby. Now, the absolute ends which the Israelites did set before their eyes in seeking a King, do resolve upon governing according to judgment and righteousnesse. And I would fain know of this man, how he can conclude this consequence,

The people of Israel did seek a King, to govern them according to judgment and righteousnesse:

Ergo, they did seek an absolute King, and did not deprecat the greatest of tyrants.

Verily the consequence, at least virtually, is repugnant to the An­tecedent: for, in so far as they seek a just and righteous King, fit to govern them according to Law and reason, in as far they abominat an absolute King, one in a capacity of tyrannizing over them. Thus you see, that the people of Israel do neither positively nor nega­tively, seek an unjust and tyrannous King to reign over them.

We hasten now to the Assumption. And we observe, that the man contradicteth himself in it: for he saith not onely, cap. 5. but also cap. 2. that there were many Kings of the Nations at that time subject to Law. And for proof of this, he citeth Aristotle, Pol. l. 3. c. 10. and II. Diod. Sic. l. 2. But as a man awaking out of [Page 16] his wine he recalleth to his memory, what hath escaped him, and laboureth to correct it. And so he addeth, that though Diodore storicth, that the Kings of Egypt were subjected to Law, yet do we never read (saith he) that ever any of them was cut-off and beheaded by the inferiour judges. And though Aristotle (quoth he) saith that all the Oriental Kings did govern [...], yet not withstanding they did rule with an absolute power, though more remisly then did other Kings. Def. reg. c. 5. & 8. Albeit this man doth not admit a plenary and full subjection of Kings to Law, yet nevertheless he is constrained by force of example, to acknow­ledge, that Kings were some way or other kept under the power and reverence of Law. And he cannot deny but Diodore storieth of a most wonderful subjection of the ancient Aegyptian Kings to Law. He telleth us, that they were subjected to Law in their eat­ing and drinking, lying and rising: yea, in preserving their health they were restricted to Law. And which (saith he) is more admi­rable, they had not power, to judge, to gather Money together, nor to punish anythrough pride or anger, or any other unjust cause. And yet (saith Diodore) they took not this in an evil part, but thought themselves happy to be subjected to Law. I trow, this is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet. He will have the King above Law, not subject to any Law. But the Egyptians will have their Kings under the Law, and subject to it. And though this immodest man doth say, That the Egyptians notwithstanding did not cut-off any of their Kings, yet catcheth he nothing thereby. (1) Because the Egyptian Kings, as Diodore telleth us, were most observant of the Laws. Therefore he saith, Plurimi regum, the greatest part of their ancient Kings lived blamelesly, and died honou­rably. Rer ant. l. 2. c. 3. But I beleeve that Law cannot strike against the innocent. 'Tis iniquity to kill a man, who deserveth not death. Diodore telleth us of three things, which made the ancient Egypti­an Kings to walk closely, and keep themselves within bounds. Firstly, their wayes were narrowly hedged-in by Law. Secondly, they were alwaies attended with the Sons of the Noble and Chief-Priests, whose eyes were alwayes fixed on them. Thirdly, Kings that walked not straightly, as nothing was proclaimed in their life­time to their praise, but to their discredit; so in their death they wanted the honor of solemn and sumptuous burials, which were [Page 17] given to good Kings, after their death. The fear of this, hedged-in their wayes, and made them stand in awe. (2) We deny not, but Diadore in that same place insinuates, there were many evil ancient Egyptian Kings. Yet we say not, tyrannous, as Salmasius would have it: for we do not think, that though many of their Kings were wicked in themselves, they got liberty to tyrannize over the People. The Egyptian Laws were more strict then that they would dispence such a liberty to any of their Kings. Diodore saith, they were tied to the Law no less then private men. And withal he saith, their Judges were most impartial, and could not be bought-by, ei­ther by favour or gain. Which maketh us imagine, that they hem­med-in the wayes of the most dissolute King amongst them, and did not give him liberty to tyrannize over the People. Therefore it is very observable that Amasis getting power in his hands, did ty­rannize over the Egyptians: Whose tyranny the Egyptians did tolerate, so long (as Diodore saith) as they wanted the opportunity of punishing him, till Actisanes King of Ethiopia came down into Egypt. And then (saith the story) the Egyptians called to mind old quarrels against Amasis, and falling from him to Actisanes, they unkinged him, and set-up Actisanes in his room, who governed them most gently and amicably. Rer. ant. l. 2. c. 1. (3) Let it be so, many of the Egyptian Kings in old did tyrannize over them, and they, notwithstanding, were not punished, and cut-off by the People and inferiour Judges. What then? That will never conclude their unwillingness and unreadiness to execute judgment on their tyrannous Kings, but that they wanted opportunity and power to do such a thing. So it went (as is said already) with the People and inferiour Judges under Amasis tyrannous yoke. But so soon as they got the opportunity, they verified the old Maxim, ‘Quod differtur, non aufertur.’ Yea, Diadore telleth us. That the People did withstand the Priests and those, who with-held honourable and solemn burials from the bad Egyptian Kings in old. Which affordeth us matter to aver, That if the inferiour Judges in Egypt did not execute judgment on their wicked and tyrannous Kings, it was not because they were unready to do so, but because the People were refractory thereto. No question, they would much more have withstood the off-cut­ting of their Kings, then the want of solemnities at their death: for [Page 18] what is it, I pray you, that draweth People on to act and engage for their Princes, but because they take them up in the notion of half-gods, and far above the reach of ordinary men? Whereupon they conclude, that both their Persons and Authority are altoge­ther inviolable. They dote so much upon them, that they think they should in no terms be resisted, far less cut-off and punished according to their deserts. This, daily experience teacheth. There­fore the People of Egypt would far more have withstood the inse­riour Judges in cutting-off their Kings, then in denying them sump­tuous and stately burials for their offences. (4) It is easie to belearn­ed from Diadore, that the Egyptians esteemed the want of honou­rable burials to their Kings more then any punishment could have been inflicted upon them. Know this, they were a most superstitious People, tainted with a world of blind zeal. And withall (as Dia­dort stor eth) the fear of the want of honourable and solemn burials provoked their Kings to live circumspectly, and keep themselves within bounds. Whereupon we conclude, That both King and People, thought no punishment more capitall, and more hurtfull to the King, then the want of an honourable buriall. And so the infe­riour Judges imagined, that in with-holding from tyrannous Kings sumptuous and stately burials, they executed more judgment upon them, then if they should have brought them to the Scaffold, and cause strike the heads from them. Therefore if Salmasius shall not admit the third Reason, (which though it be true in general, yet not in this particular case, as is most probable, though not demon­strative) he must needs confess, that the Prators of Egypt, not only in their apprehension, but also in the up taking both of the King and People, acted more against some tyrannous King or other, in depriving him of an honourable and sumptuous buriall after his death, then the Representative of England did in bringing King Charle: to the Scaffold, and causing his head to be cut-off.

As for that which Salmesius saith, alledging that Aristotle saith, that the Oriental Kings in old did not simply govern [...], ac­cording to Law. Well, let it be so. If they were any wayes sub­jected to Law, as Aristotle in even-down terms confesseth they were, it is far from Salmasius his cui quod libet licet. Qui legi­bus solutus ect. Yea, and (which is more) Aristotle saith, That the very government of the Heroes was [...], according to Law, [Page 19] and in some things their power was determinat, and not absolute. This is far from Salmasius his mind, who will have the King to be of an infinit and illimited power. The man would have a care, that he do not speak blasphemy and knoweth not of it. I take infinacy in power to be only proper to GOD. And 'tis not good to abuse it, in applying it to the creature. Howsoever, I heartily subscribe to what Aristotle saith concerning the Orientall Kings. I do not think but in old, as namely, in, and about the dayes of the Heroës, Kings, as Gods, were adored by men. But Salmasius must give me leave to say, that even then Kings were punished by the People. We read how the heroick Theseus was banished by the Athenians. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. l. 5. c. 5. Plut. in Thes. I do not deny, but as these Historiographers report, as likewise Hera­clid de Pol. Ath. Theseus before that time had restored liberty to the Subject, and had put Power in the People's hand. It is also reported, that Agamemnon the King of Kings, was thrust from his Charge, because he would not suffer his eldest Daughter to be fa­crificed to satisfie the fury of Diana, for the Roe which he killed feeding about her grove. Dict. Cret. l. 1. That of Theseus, and of Agamemnon were done about the time the Children of Israel did seek a king to reign over them. We might also here alledge exam­ples of other ancient kings, who were brought into subjection to the sentence of inferiour Judges. But we pass them as not beseeming the purpose in hand: for they are relative to after ages, of latter years then what Aristotle speaketh of. Yet we find one example or two more then what we have alledged already, answering to this purpose. It is reported that Sardanapalus, because of his beastliness and sensuality, was dethroned by his Subjects. Arist. Pol. l. 5. c. 10, Metasth. an. Pers. lib. Just. l. 1. Diod. Sic. l. 3. c. 7. Miltiades was incarcerated by the Athenians, and died in prison. Val. Max. l. 5. c. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit. Milt. Plut. in vit. Cim. Albeit he was not the Athenian king, yet was he their great Generall, and crow­ned king of Chersonesus. Herod. l. 6. Aem. Prob. in vit. Mil. It is needless to examplisie this any more; for afterward it shall be shewed by multiplied examples, how that kings in all ages have been brought to the Stage, and punished by the People.

Therefore Salmasius shall do well, not to imagine, that in old times all Kings were absolute, and the inferiour Judge did not sit [Page 20] upon the Bench against any of them. And for my self, I do not de­ny, but in old, Kings were of a vast and absolute power, though I cannot be moved to think that either all of them were absolute, or any of them so absolute as Salmasius dreameth of. But more of this afterward. And, I do also think, that the Assyrian Mo­narchy, coeteris paribus, was in it-self rather more, then lesse ab­solute, then either the Median, or the Persian; though by some accidental occurrents, as afterward shall appear, it was not. In­deed it had the first start of them, and was in the time wherein Royal Power was more in request then either before or after. This makes Aeschylus to call the king of the Argives, [...] a governour that may not be judged. at this time the Inachides did reign: whose kingdom began about the reign of Baleus, the eight king of the Assyrians. Herod. lib. 1. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 6. cap. 14. compared with Beros. ant. lib. 5. ARAL VII. BAL. VIII. MAM XVI. SPAR. XVII, and Xenoph. de aquiv. PHOR. And as for Homer, I do not doubt but the man idolized Kings. But in the interim you will be pleased to give me leave to say, that it follows not: Homer calleth kings, Divine, and such who are edu­cated and brought-up by Jupiter: Ergo Homer opinionateth, that they were absolute and subjected to none but to GOD. He tel­leth us, that Agamemnon, in a convention of the general Persons of the Army, was greatly upbraided. Iliad. 9. And yet he calleth him, a king begotten of Jupiter, and trained-up by him. And, it is very well known, that Agamemnon was not an absolute King over the Grecian Princes: for both Dict. Cret. lib. 1. and Dar. Phr. de exc. Tro. lib. report, that Agamemnon was put from his Office, and Palamedes chosen in his room. See also Arist. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. I stand not here to dispute at what time Homer lived, but leave it arbitrary to the Reader, either to follow Archil. lib. de temp. who saith, that he lived in his time, an. D. after the destruction of Troy. Or Herod. de vit. Hom. who saith, that he lived, CLXVIII after the Trojan battel. Yet one thing I may determine on, that Homer calieth those kings of the nations, who lived about the time where­in the People of Israel did seek a king to reign over them, [...]. And whatever be Homer's meaning in these words, yet I am not of another opinion, but do think that he was much, if not all the way for absolute Monarchy. The temper of his [Page 21] times did lead him that far on. But though I subscribe to this, yet wil it never therefrom follow, that all the Kings of the Nations at that time, when the People of Israel did seek a King to reign over them, were absolute & not subject to law. This we have made good already.

Secondly: Whileas Samuel taught the Jews, of what temper kingly-government is, lest afterward they should pretend ignorance of the power and right of the king, he plainly declareth unto them, That he might do any thing, without fear of punishment, not subject to any but to GOD. Salmas. def. reg. cap. 5. Friend, this is rather said, then proved. But afterward, nolis, velis, we shall evidence, That Samuel thought no such thing.

Thirdly: If Kings had been subjected to the Sanhedrin, and ought to have been arraigned before it, either to have been accused or condemned, then had there been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of the Jewes. But the latter is false: Ergo. This is Salmasius his great gun. And for proof of the Major he faith, The Judges of the people of Israel did judge, led forth their Armies, made Lawes, executed judgement, and did exercise all o­ther such-like functions which are exercised by Kings. Therefore unlesse the Kings of the Jewes had been unliable to the Sanhedrin, there had been no difference between the Judges and the Kings of Israel. The Assumption he maketh it good thus. It had been altogether in vain (saith he) to have changed the government of the Judges into the government of Kings, if they had been both one. Thus the difference had onely been in name, and not in reality, Def. Reg. cap. 5. But the man cap. 2. proveth the Assumption more largely and most pertinently. There (saith he) the Judges amongst the people of the Jews were subject to the Sanhedrin. And so he saith, the Judges amongst the Jews were called in the Hebrew [...] sophetim. Whence the Paenans derive the word Sufetes. Now, the Judges in the Senat of Carthage were called Sufetes. And Festus ob­serveth, that Sufetes in the Punick language signifieth and denotat­eth a Consul. And out of Caelidus he citeth these words: Senatus cen­suit referentibus Sufetis. So the Roman Consuls referred to the Senat, and the Senat judged of their refer. Therefore seing the Judges of Israel were but like Consuls who were subject to the Senat (as the case was amongst the Carthaginians and Romans,) [Page 22] they were not of a kingly power, but subject to the Sanhedrin, though they retained the government so long as they lived, whereas the Roman Consuls, and Carthaginian Sufetes, were only but yearly Magistrates. And this is further cleared from the Holy Ghost's contradistinguishing, Judg. 9. the government of Abimelech, ( who took upon him a kingly government) from the government of the rest of the Judges. Yea, the Israelites, Judg. 8. offered to Gideon that same power over them, which his son Abimelech usurped. This was a kingly government that they offered to him. Which Gideon refused. And yet neverthelesse he was a Judge. And consequently if both Judges and Kings amongst the people of Israel had one and the same power, not onely the people of Israel had offered to Gideon, no new power, but what he had before, but also Gideon had refused to enjoy that power which actually he did enjoy.

Ans. We heartily subscribe to the Minor, and do much cry-up Salmasius in the probation thereof. I wish the man were as so­lid and pertinent in all the rest, as in that. Yet I crave his leave to deny the Major. And I think, I have good reason to do so: for he only differenceth absolute Kings from Judges, imagining that none properly can be a King essenitally distinct from a judge, but he who is absolute and unlyable to the Law. He far mistaketh the point. It is one thing to be an absolute King, not subject to the Sanhedrin and Senat, and another thing to be a non-absolute King and subject to Law. And yet both are properly and univocally Kinge. The non­absolute King is essentially differenced from the Sophet or Sufet, the Judge, because he is major singulis, but minor universis in syuedrie. But the Judge is but of equal authority with the rest of his collegues in the Senat, though because of his eminencie and personall endow­ments, he may praeside and be as a leading man amongst the rest. Such was the case of the kings and Judges amongst the Jewes, as after ward shall be shewed. There are some accidentall differences also between the Judges amongst the people of the Jewes and their kings, as namely, 1. The Judges were in a most speciall, immediat, and extraordinary manner, designed and appointed by GOD himself, to govern his people. Kings were not so, if we look to them in an ordinary way, and for the most part. 2. The Judges of Israel had no hereditary power and government over them. Such had their kings. 3. The kings of Israel both in their ordination and after­ward, [Page 23] were attended with prodigall, sumptuous and Royall Digni­ties, which were denied to their Judges. And whereas Salmasi­us essentially distinguisheth Melech a king, from Sophet a Judge, because the one is of an absolute power, and the other is not, he shal do well to advert, that he lose not more this way then he gaineth: for so he putteth the essentiall frame of the king in an absolute and uncircumscribed power. But in our first argument against this, we have shewed the incongruity and absurdity thereof. Which after­ward shall more appear from what is spoken, as followeth.

Fourthly: There can be no example alledged in the Book of God, whereby is pointed-out the subjection of Kings to Law. We read not, that ever the Sanhedrin, or the people of the Jews did punish Kings for their faults. And yet many of their Kings were most guilty of many great and criminall faults, as namely David and Solomon. Def. Reg. cap. 5.

Ans. This argument is like the first. Both of them speak much de facto, but nothing de jure. This is a very bad consequence: The people of Israel sought an absolute King to reign over them, and did set-up such a King over them: Ergo the power of an absolute King is lawfull, and Kings de jure are not subject to Law. Friend, you break-off too soon. Though I should grant you the Antece­dent, yet before I can approve the validity of the consequence, you must prove the validity of their practice. You count your reckoning too soon, whileas you thus conclude: There is no practice in Scrip­ture holding-out to us that the Jewish Sanhedrin did ever execute judgement, on any of their Kings, who transgressed the Law, and did violate it: Ergo Kings are not subject to Law. What if I should grant the Antecedent? You have notwithstanding to prove the lawfulnesse of their non-executing judgement on their kings who transgressed, before I can at any time subscribe to the consequence. Philosophs know (though many Humanists do not) that à facto adjus non statim valet consequentia, Aye, they can tell you, that argumentum negativum nihil concludit. Well, as I deny your con­sequence, so I do not admit your Antecedent. I illustrate the vani­ty of it from examples in Scripture, both ordinary and extraordina­ry. Ordinary] Jehojadah in the face of the Assembly commanded to fall upon Athaliah, and kill her, 2 Kings 11.2 Chron. 23. And though you shall deny this practice as concluding any thing against [Page 24] your purpose, yet I pray you, what can you say of that practice in killing Amasiah? We have shewed elsewhere, that such a thing was done in a Publick and legall way. Extraordinary] The Pro­phets rebuked the Kings of Israel and Judah for their faults and transgressions. And what is rebuke but a degree of punishment? And so Kings not having immunity from the lesser degree of punish­ment, why are they not also lyable to the greater, according to their delinquency? Magis & minus non variant speciem. Yea, Jehu executing the purpose of the Lord on the house of Ahab, slew both the King of Israel and the King of Judah, 2 King. 9. and withall he caused cut-off all the sons of Ahab, 2 King. 10. O, but you will say, These practises of the Prophets and of Jehu were extraordina­ry. And then; It is a very bad Argument: The Apostles preached by the extraordinary instinct of the Spirit: Ergo Ministers, who have nothing but an ordinary spirit, should not preach. So, it doth not follow: The Prophets and Jehu acted against delinquent kings through an extraordinary call thereto: Ergo those, who have nothing but an ordinary call thereto, should not do so. It may be you will say, The People can have no ordinary call, to act against their kings. Be not mistaken. (1) Extraordinary things supply the room of ordinary things, whileas they are wanting. So Sa­muel killed Agag, because Saul, the ordinary Judge, was want­ing in his duty. 1 Sam. 15. (2) At least it followeth, that the same thing, which is done extraordinarily, may also be done lawfully in an ordinary way. Otherwise many absurdities and blasphemies should follow. (3) Datoun [...] oppositorum datur & alterum. And consequently seing there is an extraordinary call for punishing Kings, there is also an ordinary call for doing it. The reason of this is, because esse extraordinarioe vocationis is so called, and is so in it-self, because it standeth in opposition to esse ordina­ria vocationis, as we have shewed at length, curs. Philosophico­theolog. disp. 4. Sect. 6. And therefore there can be no extraordinary call for punishing Delinquent Kings, unlesse there be also an ordi­nary call for doing so. (4) Punishing of delinquent Kings either in it-self is sinfull and unlawfull, or not. If sinfull and unlawfull, then neither ordinarily, nor extraordinarily may Kings lawfully be pu­nished: for no sin can be committed by an extraordinary Divine pro­vidence. Otherwise God should extraordinarily sin. But we have [Page 25] shewed already, that Kings may be punished by vertue of an extra­ordinary call. And consequently, it is not a sin in it-self, to punish delinquent Kings. If lawfull and unsinfull, I see no reason why a thing which is in it-self lawfull and honest, may not lawfully be done, by ordinary as well as by extraordinary midses: for either the exercise of ordinary midses is in it self lawfull, or not. None, I am sure, will say, that the exercise of ordinary midses is unlawfull, Otherwise every thing that is done ordinarily, is done sinfully. Which to say, is absurd. And if you say that the exercise of them in it self is lawfull, then it is lawfull in it self by vertue of an ordina­ry call, to punish delinquent Kings. But if there be any fault and es­cape in the way and manner of imploying that cal that no whit hin­dereth, but the call in it self is lawfull and commendable: for such things are meerly extrinsecall to the nature of the call it-self. And ab extrinseco, ad intrinsecum, non est sequela. (5) Jehu and the Prophets, had no other reasons for them in speaking and acting by vertue of an extraordinary call against delinquent Kings, but what those may have in proceeding against them, by vertue of an ordina­ry call. They no otherwise proceeded against them by vertue of their extraordinary call, but as it was for the good of the LORD's People, and for executing Justice on their delinquency, that others might learn not to offend. But sure we are, such grounds are com­petent to an ordinary call, fo [...] proceeding against delinquent Kings. And 'tis an undoubted maxim, Idem est jus, ubi eadem est ratio juris.

I [...]st. That example concerning Athaliah (saith Salmasius) de­serveth not an answer: for (saith he) she usurped the kingdom, and killed the whole Royall Family. And so there was lesse exe­cuted against her, then she deserved. And with all according to the Jewish Lawes, it was not permitted to women to sway the Scepter, and sit on the Throne: for it is not said Deut. 17. Thou shalt set a Queen over thee, but a King over thee. Def. Reg. cap. 4.

Ans. That the example concerning Athaliah very much conclu­deth our purpose, we argue thus: Either Athaliah had the right and authority of a King, or not. If the had the right and authority of a King, ergo if the King be of an absolute power, and not subject to Law, then Athaliah was no more subject to Law then any o­ther King: for as Salmasius, and all Royallists will have it, the [Page 26] King is of an absolute power, and not subject to Law. And conse­quently, Athaliah being invested with the right of a Kingly power and authority, she was no more subject to Law, then any other of the Kings of Judah. Therefore if you say that Athaliah was in­vested with the right and authority of a King, you must either com­mend the practice of Jehojadah and the people in killing her, or else you must charge your opinion, and not imagine Kings to be abso­lute, and not subject to Law. If she had not the right and authority of a King then either because she usurped the Kingdom, and in­truded her-self upon it, contrary to the consent of the People, or because she did cut-off the righteous heirs of the Kingdom, and set up her-self in the Kingdom, or else because according to the Law women ought not to govern. Not the first, because according to the Doctrine of Royallists, conquest is a lawfull title to the Crown. But Athaliah conquered the Crown of Judah to her-self. What more I pray you, did she in intruding her-self upon the Kingdom of Judah, then unjust Conquerers do, in thrusting themselves in upon the kingdoms which they subdue? As she intruded her-self, without the free consent and election of the People, so do they. And yet Salmasius, with the rest of his Brethren, will have such Conquerers lawful heirs, and absolute kings over these kingdoms, which they subdue. Nor can you say the second, because conque­rers, who subdue other men's kingdoms, cut-off all those who by pretended blood-right, claim a title to the Crown. And yet Roy­allists will have such lawfull heirs, and absolute kings over these kingdoms, to which they have no title but the sword. Nor can you say the third, because all Royallists admit Royal birth, a just and absolute title to the Crown. But women no less then men may be and are of the Royall Off-spring. And consequently, if the do­ctrine of Royallists be true, and unless Salmasius will contradict himself, women may as lawfully govern as men: Therefore it doth not follow, that because Athaliah was a woman, she had not right to govern the People of the Jews, and reign over them. I confesse, by Royall birth she had no title to the Crown. But she conquered the Crown to her-self, and did reign six years with the consent of the People. But sure I am, Salmasius and all the Royallists, as they hold the consent of the People, as a necessary ingredient to make­up the lawfulness of the title to the Crown, so they maintain con­quest [Page 27] without all exception, to be a just and lawful title thereto. But what need I thus to stand? do not I know that Salmasius and the whole nation of Royalists will have the formall and essentiall being of the King to consist in an absolute and illimited power? But any person, whether man or woman, usurper or non-usurper, is capable of such a power, and may be invested therewith. And consequently, though Athaliah was but a woman, and an usurper, it doth not follow, that because she was such, therefore she was not of an absolute and arbitrary power. The greatest of Tyrants, and the worst of women, is capable of such a power. And the power is not changed, because of the change of the person, and of such and such qualifications in him. Such things are meerly extrinsecal to the nature of the power it-self. So then, if the King be formally a King, because he is of an illimited and arbitrary power; I see no reason why Athaliah did not reign as a King: for she was capable of such a power, wherein, according to the doctrine of Royallists, the essentiall frame of a King doth consist. And consequently, seing she did reign in stead of the King of Judah, and exercised his authority, there is no reason why she was not absolute and unsub­ject to Law, as well as he. Therefore Salmasius must either leave­off his opinion, and not imagine that the Kings of Judah were ab­solute and not subject to Law, or else he must cry-down the lauda­ble practice of Jehojadah, and of the People, in killing Athaliah. For shame he will not do this.

Propos. 2. Except the Lacoedemonian kingdom, there was no kingdom in old, wherein absolute and uncircumscribed Monarchy was not erected, though in some more remiss, and in others more intense.

For proof of this Salmasius sheweth, what was the condition of Monarchy in the Assyrian, Egyptian, Jewish, Median, Per­sian, Grecian, and Roman kingdoms. Of the Jewish kingdom we have spoken already, and more of it afterward in a more con­venient place. As for the Assyrian kingdom, together with the Me­dian, he proveth, that kings in them were absolute and un-subject to Law, because such was the condition of the kings of Persia. This he maketh good from Ottanes the Persian, [...] Mo­narchy to be that, to which every thing is lawful, unpunishably. Herod. lib. 3. Yea, Artabanus averreth, That no Law amongst the [Page 28] Persians was more commendable then that whereby they enacted, that the King should be honoured as the Image of God. Plut. in vit. Themist. And Claudian saith, That they gave a like obedience to cruel and tyrannous Kings. Therefore (saith Salmasius) seeing the Medians succeeded to the Assyrians, and the Persians to the Me­dians; it appeareth, that as the Kings of Persia, so the Kings of Assyria and Media, were absolute, and not subject to Law. And though the Egyptian Kings, before they were subdued by the Persi­ans, were hemmed-in by the bonds of Law in every thing that they did, yet notwithstanding, we never reade that at any time they brought any of their Kings upon the stage, and caused them to suf­fer for their Delinquencie. They did bear the yoke of two cruel ty­rants (Busiris and Cambyses) most patiently without reluctancie. Which Cambyses, because of his cruelty, the Jews called Nebucho­donozor. He desired in marriage his german sister: and so calling a Councel, be demanded at his Counsellors, if there was any Law in Persia which did permit such a marriage. They desirous to gra­tifie their King, told him, That they found a Law whereby the King of Persia was permitted to do any thing be pleased. Herod. lib. 3. As for the Grecian Empire, it is known (saith Salmasius) that Agamemnon had an absolute power over that Army, which be led on against the Trojans. And therefore he is called Rex Regum. And Aeschylus calleth the King of the Argives, [...], an uncensurable Governour. So Homer calleth the Grecian Kings, Kings made by Jupiter, reigning by, and holding their Crown of him. He calleth them, [...], divine Kings, trained-up by Jupiter, Philip saith, that the King hath equal pow­er with GOD, Diogenes, in lib. de Reg. writeth, that the King is just so in respect of the Commonwealth, as GOD is in respect of the Universe. And so, as GOD hath power over the whole world, in like manner the King hath power on earth. In like manner Ecphantas calleth it a thing proper to the King, to govern himself, and to be governed by none. Lastly, he stepeth-in to shew, how that the Roman Kings of old were of a vast and arbitrary power. Romu­lus (saith Tacitus) governed the Romans as he pleased. Pompo­nius writeth, that Kings at the begining of Rome had all po [...]er. Dio saith, they are unsubject to any Law. Plutarch and Justinian, will have the Laws subjected to them. Which maketh Severus and [Page 29] Attoninus to say, Licet legibus soluti simus, attamen legibus vivi­mus, Instit. lib. 2. tit. 17. Plinius in his Panegyricks saith to Tro­janus, that he subjecteth himself to the Laws And yet, as Dio saith, he had power to do every thing by himself, to command both him­self, and the Laws to do every thing that he would, and not do what he would not. And Salust saith, that to do every thing unpuni­shably, that is to be a King. Def. Reg. cap. 5.

Answ. I suppose, there is not plena enumeratio partium here. There were moe Kingdoms then what Salmasius hath reckoned­up. Howsoever I shall do my endeavour to find him out. And that I may take away the strength of all that he objecteth, and leave not so much as the ground-stone thereof, I lay down these following Conclusions.

Conclus. 1. Because of extraordinary heroicisme and gallantry of old, some were of a simply vast and absolute power, and in no­thing subject to Law.

This we make good from the condition of some Kings, both before and after the Flood. Before the Flood, the point is clear. About the 500 year of Noah's age, which was in the 1556. year of the world, Policy began to have some footing: for then men began to follow af­ter their own inventions & hearts desires; and so men then a-dayes being of huge strength, and undaunted courage, given to pleasure and renown, those amongst them, who by strength of hand could carry the pre-eminence and precedency over others, no less perfor­med it then endeavoured it. And Noah was five hundred years old,—Gen. 5. There were Giants in the earth in those dayes, and also after that when the sons of God came-in unto the daughters of men, and they bear [children] unto them, the same became mighty men, who [were] of old men of renown, Gen. 6. Hence mark these two things. 1. That in the 500. year of Noah's age there were men of a gigantine strength, mighty men, given to hard and war­like exploits, minding their own honour and renown. 2. That such men lived at random, not subject to law, nor under the com­mand of any. Their extraordinary valour and desire of renown led them on to rule, and not to be ruled. Therefore they took them wives of all which they chose, Gen. 6. Their awless and lawles living, maketh the Lord say, My Spirit shal not alwayes strive with man,Ibid. But the faithful Historian, Berosus, giveth us great clear­ness [Page 30] in this matter. He saith that before the Flood there was a City called Oenon, about Libanus, a receptacle of Giants, who did reign over the whole world, from the Occident to the Orient. These (saith he) considing in the vast strength and stature of their body, having found Arms and Engins of war, oppressed all and governed according to their pleasure. Antiq. lib. 1.

After the Flood the first King we read of, is Nimrod; of whom it is said. And Cush begat Nimrod,— [...] And the beginning (or the head) of his Kingdom was Babel and Erech,— Gen. 10. This Nimrod the holy Ghost calleth, a mighy one in the earth, or the mighty hunter before the Lord, Gen. 10. i.e. a man matchless, none like him in the earth for strength and gallantry. Because of this he erected a kingdom, despising the commandment of Noah, Beros. ant. lib. 4. and disdaining to be in subjection, whether to God or man Joseph. ant. Jud. lib. 1. cap. 5. his aspiring thoughts drew him on to build a Tower, that thereby he might get himself a name to secure himself both before God and man. Gen. 11. Phil. Jud. bibl. ant. lib. And Josephus in even-down termes telleth us, that he in­cited his followers to pride, and to the contemning of God, telling them that their happinesse did not depend from GOD, but from their own proper strength. Whereupon at last he tyrannized and governed at randome. Ant. Iud. lib. 1. cap. 5. To Nimrod suc­ceeded Belus, to Belus Ninus, and to Ninus Semiramis in the Kingdome of Assyria. Every one of which acted more then ano­ther for enlarging their Empire. They subdued all, and ruled over all, libidine dominandi. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Mnes. lib. 97. hist. Archil. lib. de temp. Fab. Pict. de aur. sec. &c. lib. 1. Metast lib. de judic temp. & annal. Persic. Herod. lib. 1. & 3. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 3. cap. 1, 2, &c. And as amongst the Assyrians, we find these four grand and matchlesse Heroes, who governed at random with­out any subjection to Law, so we find amongst other Nations some also of that same stamp. Amongst the Egyptians, Osiris, who succeeded to his Father, Chemesenuus in the Kingdom of Egypt, commanding the whole earth, except these Nations and Kingdoms that were under the Authority of Zames King of Assyria. In the eight year of whose reign, Osiris returned into Egypt, with triumph over all the Nations, beside what were under the ju­risdiction of the Assyrian Empire. And as Osiris did reign as an uni­versall [Page 31] Monarch, so did his son Hercules, who succeeded Osiris in the Kingdom, under the reign of Baleus, the eleventh King o­ver the Assyrians. Ber. ant. lib. 5. We read also of Simandius and Sesostris, two Egyptian Kings, who subdued the whole world Herod. lib 2. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 2. cap. 1. But it is very easie to prove from Berosus, that Simandius is Osiris, and Sesostris is Hercules. Amongst the Libyans, Dionysius was the great He­ros. Herodot, and Diodore report, that he subdued the world, and conquered many Kingdoms by battell. And Berosus saith, that Dionysius gave to Osiris the Kingdom of Egypt. Albeit Herodot and Diodore, opinionate him to be a Grecian, yet I rather incline to the judgment of Berosus, who saith he was begotten of Rhea, by Hammon, and became Jupiter to the Libyans, even as his mo­ther was the pretended Goddess of the Egyptians. Hesiodus, Mar­cianus, and other Grecian Writers, hold him as a God, and al­ledge him to have been begotten of Semele, by Jupiter. How­soever for valour and strength, he was a most extraordinary person, and swayed many Kingdomes by his Scepter. Amongst the Grecians we find namely two extraordinary Herees, Hercules and Alexander M. What great things were done by Hercules, and how he vanquished many Kings, and subdued many Kingdomes, is clear from many grave Writers, Hesiod. scut. Here. Pindar. od. 1. & 7 Sophot. Trach. Diod. rer. ant. lib. 5. cap. 2. Of him Herodot, Theo­critus, and others do write. The extraordinary valour and courage of Alexander, Justin, Plutarch, Q Curtius, and other grave Wri­ters do abundantly testifie. I need not to stand here in a particular and exact way, to prove that these Kings had an absolute immu­nity from Law, without all restriction and reservation. But to sa­tisfie the curious ear alittle therein, we shortly make it good thus. 1. These Kings came not to their Crowns, whether by election, or succession. At least all, that they commanded fell not to them, either of these wayes. They held the right to their Crown by their sword. And so over-ruling all by force and strength of hand, they could be tied to no Law by any civill sanction, but as they pleased voluntarily to subject their necks to the yoke of Law. But as they delighted to over-rule men, no question they have thought it their glory to be I kew [...]se above the Law it-self. I confesse it is very ga­therable both out of Berosus and Diodore, that Osiris, and Her­cules [Page 32] the Egyptian, did live according to the Lawes. Yet I do not think that it was by command, but according to their own free and voluntary resignation. That held true in them which the Re­man Emperours speak of themselves, Licet legibus [...]elu [...]i simus, attamen legibus vivimus. Instit. lib. 2. tit. 17. Indeed there is great difference between a Kingly power had by succession, and e­lection, and a Kingly power obtained by conquest and sword-right. In an elective and heriditary Crown, people have at least a Physi­call power, to binde the King to them by Oath and Covenant. But the case is far otherwise between a conquered people and the Con­querour. They have no power to tie him to them by Law. He may put them all to the edge of the sword, if he will. And it is in his own goodness whether to spare them, or square himself according to their Laws. Experience teacheth to-day what boundless power the Turk and the King of Spain have over those Kingdomes to which they have no title, but sword-right. Therefore it is no wonder though these grand and matchlesse Heroes had an arbitrary and boundlesse power over the Kingdomes, which they conquered by strength of hand. 2. The men themselves were esteemed and ho­noured as Gods. And so by proportion a GOD-like power was given unto them. Nimrod was called the Babylonian Saturn, and Dionysius the Libyan Jupiter. The Assyrians hold Belus and Ninus as Gods. The Egyptians worshipped Osiris and Hercules as Gods. So did the Grecians honour Dionysius and Hercules as Gods. And Alexander thought no shame to be called the son of Jupiter, and honoured as a God. And as Ninus was holden as Ju­piter, amongst the Assyrians, so Semiramis was holden by them as Junc, and worshipped as a Goddesse. And what God-like titles Semiramis caused put on and engrave upon the Pillar, she set upon Ninus, you may read it, Xenoph, de aquiv. You may [...]ead also some specious and stately titles on some of these Heroes Herod. lib. Diod. rer. ant. lib. 2. cap. 1. All which serve to point-out the bound­lesnesse of their power. And withall in terminis we have shewed already, that Nimrod's power was most vaste and absolute. And so it followeth that Belus, Ninus and Semiramis, who succeed­ed him were rather more then lesse absolute then he: for as every one of them enlarged their power beyond another, so all of them extended their power beyond what Nimrod's power did reach to. [Page 33] And of Belus, Berosus saith in expresse terms, Coepit libidi­ne dominandi torqueri,of Ninus,Omnibus bellum in­tulit, nulli parcens,quod esset in omnium desiderio, omni stu­die ad interitum quaeritabat.Hic omnium primus ex nostris regibus Babylonicum regnum propagavit,And of Semira­mis,haec antecessit militia, triumphis, divit [...]is, victoriis & imperio omnes mortales.Nemo unquam huic foemina com­parandus est virorum, tanta in ejus vitadicuntur, & scribuntur tum ad vituperationem, tum maxime ad collandationem magni­fieam. Ant. lib. 5. It is both needlesse and infinite labour for me to summe up the absolute and arbitrary actings of these grand Heroes. I passe them over in silence, and do remit the Reader to spend his brain a-little if he be curious, upon these Histories above cited. Where he shall find all made good that we speak of this purpose. 3. These Kings were not onely extraordinary men, and Kings, but also they were extraordinary Heroes. They were even extraordi­nary amongst extraordinary men, being the chiefest of all the He­roes. And so, seing other Kings and Heroes were of an absolute and arbitrary power, as afterward is shewed, much more they. 4. It cannot be denied but Alexander M. was of vaste and boundlesse power. 1. Because he commanded Darius to write to him not on­ly as to a King, but also as to his King. 2. He gloried to be called the son of Jupiter, and to be holden more then a man. 3. He des­pised Parmenio's counsell, and Darius his offer, disdaining that any should govern but he alone. Whereupon Menstree saith notably.

4. Whileas a seditious tumult was raised in his Army, upon his march toward the Occident, whereas no words would asswadge them, after a Speech had to his Army, he did leap as a Lion from the Bench, amongst the midst of them, and with his own hands, none daring to withstand him, took thirteen of his prime Incendiaries, and delivered them up to his Guard. All which demonstrate the absoluteness of Alexander's power. By undoubted consequence [Page 34] it followeth, that the rest of the foresaid Heroes were rather more then lesse absolute then he. 1. Because they were men, if not of greater courage, at least of greater strength then he. They lived in the flower of time, when strength and courage were most in vigour. Indeed, in this they had the start far before Alexander. 2. Because Alexander himself esteemeth it honour and power enough to imi­tate the wayes and carriages of Heroes who went before him. Ad Herculis imitationem me contuli, ad aemulandum Perseum me com­paravi. Volo Liberi patris, mei progenitoris, generisque mei pro­auctoris vestigia persequi. Plut. de fortu. Alex.

Conclus. 2. Without all controversie those who firstly erected Kingdoms, and planted Colonies, were of an absolute power, and altogether unsubject to Law.

For clearing the point, we shortly glance at some of these. In the tenth year of Nimrod, Comerus Gallus erected a Kingdom in Ita­ly, gathering a number of people together, over whom he ruled as King, Ber. ant. lib. 5. Hence Myrsilus saith, that the Tyrrhenians do affirm, themselves to have their arisal from Razenua, Janus Vady­mona's son. De Orig. It. & Tyr. lib. But Berosus cleareth it, how the Italians had their arisal from Janus his son, saying, that ha­ving left his daughter CranaHelerna, together with his son Cranus whose posterity, to differ from the Aboriginists he called them Razenues, after his son Cranus Razen [...]us. Long before this time Italy was inhabited by the posterity of Comerus Gallus, and his Colonies. Myrsilus also telleth us, that some do opinionate the Tyrrhenians to have their arisal from the Lydians, saying, that Atys King of Maonia, begotten by Hercules upon the virgin Omphalis, daughter to Jardana Queen of the Maeonians, begot two twins, to wit, Lydus and Tyrrhenus. But when-as one King­dom could not contain them both, Atys commanding his son Tyr­rhenus to go from him, he forthwith went toward the Septentrio­nal part of Taber, and there built Cities and Towns, calling them after his own name. But the Grecians mistake this very far. In­deed, Hercules the Egyptian came into Italy, and built Cities there, leaving his son Thuscus behind him to reign over them, Ber. ant. lib. 5. And as Myrsilus saith, the Thuscits onely worshipped Jupiter and Jun [...]. So O siris and Isis were called the parents of Her­cules the Egyptian. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Died. rer. ant. lib. 1. cap. 2. [Page 35] That the Italians had their arisal from the posterity of Noah, see M. Porc. Gat. ex lib. orig. fragm. Fab. Pict. de an. sac. &c. lib. 1. Sempron. de divis. Ita. &c. In the twelfth year of Nimrod, Ju­bal gathering a number of Colonies together, erected a Satrape in Celtiber, called Spain, and afterward planted other Colonies, called Samotes. In the fifteenth year of his reign, Oceanus and Cheme­se [...]uus, with their Colonies, erected a Kingdom in Egypt. In the eighteenth year, Gogus with his Colonies inhabited Arabia felix, Triton Libya, Japet Atlaa-Africk, Cur Aethiopia, and Ge­tulis Getulia. In the twenty fifth, Thuyscon, with his Colonies, erected a Kingdom at Sarmatia, and Masa, with the sons of I­ster, erected Colonies from the hill Adula unto Pontica Mesem­bria. In the thirty eighth, Saga with his Armenian Colonies pos­sessed all the region of Caspia, from Armenia unto Bactria, and Janus translated the Janean Colonies unto Hyrcania, as also the Janilians unto Mesopotamia. In the fourteenth, some Colonies of the sons of Gomer, erected a Kingdom in Bactria, and Ganges in India. In the third year of Belus, Tyras erected a Kingdom in Thracia, Arcadius in Arcadia, and Aemathia, or Macedonia. Yea, Phaëton, whom Porcius calleth the first of all the Grecians, erected a Kingdom in Italy, by emplacing Colonies therein, after he had abandoned Attica. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Porc. Cat. ex lib. orig. fragm. Janus erected Colonies in Arabia felix, calling them Janineans; and Camesennus in Italy, calling them Montan abori­ginists. An. Nin. 4. Yea Janus coming out of Africk unto Cel­tiber-Hispania, emplaced two Colonies, calling them Noëlans, and Noeglans. Bero [...]us also reporteth, that Dardanus being gifted by Ato, with a part of the Land of Maeonia, with his Colonies there erected the kingdom of Dardani. An. Ascat. 41. About which time Tyrrhenus planted the Tyrrhenians in Italy. Where also the Griphonians, and the Colonies of Phaëton were planted, together with the Colonies of Auson. An. Aral. 8, 9, 10. and 49. And Ar­matr. an. 20. Cydnus, and Eridanus erected the Kingdom of Ister in Italy. Ber. ant. lib. 5.

It shall not be amiss for us, here to use a distinction. Some of these forenamed Colonies were immediatly planted after the flood, about the 150. year thereafter. Such are these, who were plan­ted under the reign of Nimred, Belus, and Ninus, or there­about. [Page 36] Some of them were planted a long time after, while-as all the Countries round about, where they took up their residence, were afore-hand planted. So the Tyrrhenians, Griphenians, Dar­danians, Isterians, the Colonies of Phaëton and Auson, were plan­ted. Indeed, I may say, that the heads of the Colonies of both sorts, were absolute and of an arbitrary power. Yet I cannot ima­gine, but the absolu [...]eness of the heads of the first sort of Colonies was more intense then that of the other. 1. Because the heads of the first sort were holden and worshiped as gods. Thus Cur is cal­led the Saturn of Aethiopia, Chemesenuus the Saturn of Egypt. Xenoph. de aquiv. And it is observable, that all the first founders of Kingdoms, are called Saturns, and those, who immediatly suc­ceed to them, are called Jupiters. And consequently the first and primary erecters of Kingdoms being holden as gods, yea, as the chief gods, to us it is more then apparent, that such have been of a most intense and absolute power. They could not be honoured and esteemed as gods, unless a God-like power had been ascribed unto them. But we judge, that the after-planted Colonies, who came in upon other men's share, sheltering under their wings, and receiving places of abode from them, had no proper gods of their own, but honoured those as their gods, from whom they received the places of their residence and abode. So the Thuscits worshiped Juno and Jupiter, i. e. Isis and Osiris, who are Egyptian gods. These they worship, because Hercules, Osiris son, who is also called Jupiter, erected them, and gave them his son Thusous to reign over them. Yea, the Tyrrhenians do not worship Tyrrhenus, though he was their first King, but Janus who was the first planter of Italy, by whose Colonies Janus had planted there, Tyrrhenus was graci­ously received. And it is observable, that the chief Kingdoms which were first inhabited, as Assyria, Italy, Egypt, and E [...]hiopia, did honour and worship their first Kings and Planters, as great gods. And so, we do not think, but the first and primary Founders of o­ther Kingdoms, (as Mese and Getulis, who erected the Kingdom of the Masagets in India, as did Anamae [...]n the Kingdom of Mae­onia. An. Nim. 45.) were likewise holden by their People and Co­lonies as prime gods, to whom they did owe God-like worship and respect. Thence it is that Xenophon saith, Saturni dicuntur famili­arum nobilium Regum, qui urbes condiderunt senissimi. De aequiv. [Page 37] And as the first and primary Founders of Kingdoms are holden as Saturns, & primary gods, so their first-born are holden as Jupiters and Junoes, & the chiefest of their grand-children as Her [...]uleses. And so, as Xenophon saith, the secondary gods are multiplied according to the multiplication and diversity of the primary gods. So then, seing the primary Kingdoms, and first Colonies have their own pro­per gods, and the secondary Kingdoms, which were planted in after­times, the chief parts of the Continent being afore-hand planted by primary Colonies, had no proper gods, but such as were common, both to them, and the primary Colonies, or the first inhabitants: It is evident to us, that the heads and leaders of the secondary and after-Colonies, had no such absolute power as the heads and lea­ders of the primary Colonies. The power is proportioned according to the honour and respect people give to their Kings and Rulers. A primary honour, a primary power, a secondary honour a seconda­ry power. And consequently, the Kings of the primary Colonies being attended with a primary respect, whereas the Kings of the after-Colonies got but honour in a secondary way; no question, the power of the one was more intense, then the power of the other. 2. Because the heads of the after-Colonies being in after times, were neither men of such ancient descent and root, as the heads of the primary Colonies; nor do I think they were men of such cou­rage and strength as they. Strength and courage was the more in vigour, how much more they approached the youth and beginings of time. Time's youth declining, man's youth also faded. After-time, after-strength. And withall, after-Colonies coming in upon other men's lot, both the Law of courtesie and obligation (unlesse the primary Colonies by way of gratification, or else in simplicity, had past all claim of priviledge over them; of which we read nothing, neither is it probable) did tie them to hold one way or other of the former and primary inhabitants. This maketh nothing against the absolute power of their own proper Kings, though they honoured the first Kings of the primary Colonies, as gods. They might very well have acknowledged their own proper Kings, as their absolute Lords, though ascribing a divine and more intense honour and re­spect to the first Kings of the primary Colonies. This maketh us think, that the Thuscites (albeit Thuscus was their proper King) held Hercules the Egyptian, (though Hercules to the Egyptians) [Page 38] as Jupiter. Idem quoque qui unis populis est Hereules alieris est Ju­piter. They held of Heroules more then of Thuscus. Thuscus was their King, but they had their being and residence of Hercules. Whereupon we conclude, that the first of Kings were most abso­lute, of a more vaste and intense power then Kings of after­times and secondary Colonies. Yet we cannot deny but even such were absolute also, they being men of great valour and courage, and not onely such, but even those from whose conduct and means the being of their people did in a most special manner depend. They did not only govern them, as a people, but they made them a people. But not withstanding this, I cannot imagine that their power was so absolute, as that it admitted no restraint. And so in respect of them, I take Aristotle by the hand, who saith that in the dayes of the Heroes Kings were absolute, though some of them in some things were restricted. [...], Polit. lib. 3. cap. 11. I say some of them, because the first founders of Kingdoms and the grand Heroes wer absolute, without all restriction. But afterwards we shew, that Aristotle's meaning is concerning Heroes of the secon­dary rank, and such who in after-times erected Kingdomes and planted Colonies.

Moreover, as there were colonies planted in old, by way of do­nation, shelter and gratification, (as were the Griphcnians, the Tyrhenians, and the colonies of Phaeton and Auson) so colo­nies were planted by way of commission and subordination. So the Assyrian, Median, and Magogan, colonies were planted in Asia, together with the Moscits, who at one time erected their taber­nacle both in Asia and Europ. An Nimr. 45. This they did by ver­tue of a Commission which Assyrius, Me us, Magogus, and Mos­cus, their four chief leaders had from Nimrod. I can not imagine that such had a vaste and arbitrary power over their colonies: for what power they had over them was by way of Commission, and in subordination to the Assyrian Monarchy. But we shal not stand much to grant that even such had an absolute power over their co­lonies, though not so vast & intense as that of Nimroa's. 1.Because though the Princes of these colonies were subordinate to Nimrod, yet it is very likely that their Colonies had no power over them: for as the being and residence of these colonies did in a most special [Page 39] manner depend from the conduct and means of their Princes and leaders, so then a-dayes people did much adore Princely Govern­ment, and they knew very little then what it was to call consistories and exercise the Lawes, Xenophon telleth us, that Ninus was Iu­piter to the Assyrians. De aquiv. and so we conceive, that their Hercules hath been Assyrius, their first Prince and leader: for so by proportion Nimrod was their Coelum, Belus thir Saturn, Ninus their Iupiter, and consequently their Hercules behoved either to be Assyrius, or else Saturn's grand-child. Xenophon alleadgeth that the chiesest of Saturns grand-children are the Herculeses. But Belus had not a grand-child who succeeded to him in the Kingdom. And so we suppose that their Saturn's grand child being wanting, they have con serred the honor of Hercules upon their own native Prince. And what the Assyrian colonies did in that purpose, is most probable the rest of the foresaid colonies did the like also. And so they conserring a Divine honour upon their Princes and first leaders, no question they have given them all obedience and absolute subjection. And Ashur (whom Berosus calleth Assyrius) is reckoned up Gen. 10. as a very mighty and active Prince. 2. Because Hered though a precary and substitute King, yet was he not subject to Law & was declared un­answerable to any for the murder which he had committed against Aristobulus. I [...]s [...]ph. ant. lib. 15 cap. 4. I confesse this was by the means and vindication of him, of whom Herod in a precary and substitute way held the Kingdom. And why may we not think far rather, that the Princes of these Colonies though but Nimrod's deputies, were of an absolute and arbitrary power, though you should say, that they had it not because of themselves, but because of Nimrod. Howsoever I stand not much here, but let the Rea­der choose either of the parts he wil. And I onely put him in mind of this, that the Colonies of Gelnus and Eridanus were Commis­sionary and subordinative: for they erected a Kingdom in Istria, by ordors and Commission from Ligur. An. Armat. 20.

Furthermore observe, there were some Colonies planted by meer purchase. So Hercules the Egyptian planted the Thuscits, whom Berosus calleth Arnits, Libarnits and Musarnits. These he planted by his own power and conquest. So did Aeneas plant his Trojans in Italy, and Brutus his Trojans in England. Yea, Iolaus upon his own proper purchase planted a Colonie in Sardi­nia, [Page 40] calling it Iolaa. Dioa. lib. 5. cap. 2. And as for the Kings and heads of such Colonies, I see nothing against it but they have been of an absolute and arbitrary power: for as they planted their Co­lonies, without all obligation to the natives, so the beeing and re­sidence of their people did more intimately depend from their con­duct and means, then any of these sorts of colonies, we have spo­ken-of already, did depend from their Captains and leaders. And so, I think, cateris paribus, there was more reason for the absolutenes of the leading men of such colonies, then for the absolutene [...]e of the heads of any of the rest of the colonies spoken-of already. Here meer purchase carrieth the businesse, but there the businesse is car­ried-on by the free donation of others, and by lot, or land for the up-taking. Thus the colonies were the more oblidged to the con­duct and industry of their Leaders. Whereas in the plantation of Colonies according to this last sort, they are extremely engaged to the endeavour and conduct of their heads and overseers. This ma­keth me think the fondnesse of the people, in ascribing too much to their industry, hath made them devolve their whole power over upon their Kings, who by their conquest and purchase made them a people, and posessed them in land.

Conclus. 3. Personall endowments, and extraordinary gifts have drawn-on people to devolve an absolute and full power, with­out all reservation, upon some men.

We may make this good from the example of Noah. The Scrip­ture acquainteth us with his compleatnesse, how that there was none like him in his time, Gen. 5,6,7,8, and 9. Yea, Berosus talk­eth much to his praise and commendation, ant. lib. 1, 2, 3, 4. & 5. He holdeth him as a God, yea, as the first and chiefest of all Gods. So did the Italians, Myrs. de orig. Ital. M. Porc. Cat. ex lib. orig. frag. Fab. Pict. de aur. sac. &c. lib. 1. Sempr. de divis. It. &c. So do Archilochus, lib. de Temp. Xenophon, de aquiv. & Metasthenes, de judic. temp. & annal. Pers. lib. But for the clear up­taking of this matter, you shall observe with me, that in Noah's time, about the 131. or 150. year after the flood, the whole earth was divided. But before this time they were all of one minde, without all sedition and division. Then men conveniently lived without any Civill and Politick Government; for so they lived un­der Noah as under a common father, receiving the Law from his [Page 41] mouth, and withall every one of his posterity did know, how that nature had laid most strict and neer bonds of relation upon each one to other. Whence peace and piety were preserved amongst them, Gen. 8.9. and 10. Ber. ant. lib. 3. Ios. ant. Ind. lib. 2. cap. 4. and 5. Men then were given more to Piety then Policy. They were little, or rather nothing acquainted with the rules of complex Policy. They studied more to entertain simple ingenuity, and the ties of pure nature, then to rule one of them over another. Hence faith Archiloshus that 250. years after the flood, there was a gol­den age, in which Nature it self lived within the bounds of Law, without all politick sanction, ever and while Ninus and Semira­mus by force of Armes began to corrupt the way of Man's living. Lib. de temp. So faith Mnes. Phoen. Damasc. 97. histor. and likewise Ovid. Metam. lib. 1. But Fabius Pictor nobly storieth to this purpose, saying, That in the golden age, there was no Kingly Government, because then the desire of governing had not entered any man's breast. De aur. see. &c. lib. 1. In the interim observe, concerning the duration of this golden age there are different opini­ons. Some who alledge Ninus to have been the first that usurped authority and government, do reckon it to have lasted 250. years. So Mnes. bist. lib. 97. Xenoph. de aquiv. Por. Cat. ex. lib. orig­frag. Pict. de aur. sec. lib. 1. These again who alledge Nimrod to have been the first King, and erecter of government after the flood, alledge it to have endured 131. years. Beros. ant. lib. 4. Whom both Manetho and Metasthenes do follow. But Archilo­chus halteth between these two opinions. Yet we incline to the judgement of Berosus, and the Caldean Writers. Therefore seing immediatly after the Flood, 131. years, Noah was honoured by all as a common father; no question all power was devolved over upon him. And that not onely because of his paternall priviledge which he had over them all, but also because of his personall endowments, wherein he exceeded all his posterity at that time. Therefore nobly saith Fabius Pictor, that because those who commanded them, were just men and devouted to Religion, they were called and esteemed as Gods: for then (saith he) they did not depart from the Law, whether the governours or the governed. All then of their own accord, did hold that which is good, either without fear or constraint. Shamesastnesse governed the people, and Law [Page 42] the Princes. De aur. sec. lib. 1. But by the Princes he doth not understand Kings or politick Governours. As you may find it a­bove-written; he saith in terminis, that at that time there were none such. Therefore by Princes he understandeth the chief Fa­thers, and the heads of the chiefest Families; As Noah, his sons, and his sons sons. Whom indeed these E [...]hnick Writers, which before we have often already cited, call and hold as Gods. Philo-Judaus giveth us a very large and expresse Catalogue of these Princes and chief heads of Families at that time. Bibl. ant. lib. what can we say of Noah who was thesather of al, but that he was also the chief and head of all? Whereupon we need not fear to con­clude, but Noah then had a vast and absolute power. And this may be considered two wayes in respect of the object of his power. 1. In respect of good. And so I do not think but he had a power with­out al limitation, to order and govern every thing in an orderly and beseeming way. Firstly, because he was the common father of all, and by nature it-self had the precedency over them. Secondly, the case then was extraordinary: for at that time he was the only man who best knew how to order and govern affairs. Men at that time were little or nothing acquainted with Lawes and constitutions. Knowledge and Learning were but in their beginnings then. There­fore the ignorance of these times necessarily called them to take the word at Noah's mouth, who was extraoidinarily endowed with grace and knowledge from above. None like him in his time. All the rest weak and ignorant in respect of him. Therefore seing he had the precedency before all, not onely in respect of nature, but also in respect of gifts and graces, and not onely so, but likewise all stood in need at that time of information from him, no question all the reason in the world maketh for an absolute power in Noah, in respect of every good thing. Thence it is storied of him, that he went abroad from Country to Country planting Colonies, and or­dering things wherein GOD's honour and the peoples weal were concerned. 2. In respect of evill. Indeed I will not say that such a Saint of GOD as he, did take on him a power to rule at randome, and according to his heart's lust. I conceive indeed, he took upon him an absolute power, to govern according to Law, but not against Law. Neither did he take on him such a power, because he deligh­ted to govern, and to be above others. No verily. But because he [Page 43] was necessarily called to govern so. Both the precedency in respect of nature, and likewise in respect of gifts, as also the weakness and ignorance of the times, called him to over-rule all according to Law, with a vast and full power. His government was extraordi­nary, and by necessity. And therefore we can conclude no or­dinary government from it, (absolutely to govern according to Law) devolved-over upon the shoulders of one man, or of some few. Much lesse can there be concluded therefrom a power of governing contrary to Law, without all bounds of limitati­on. Albeit I make it no question, whether Noah took upon him an absolute power of governing, whether against, or according to Law; yet do I think it very probable that none at this time would have taken it upon them, to have judged him, accused him, or condemned him. 1. No question, drunkenness is punishable by Law: But we hear of none that did so much as rebuke him for it, but wicked Cham, who therefore derided him, and was therefore accursed. 2. He was the common father of all at that time. 3. Of all at that time he was the most reverend, wise, and eminent. 4. They knew little what it was to hold Affizes, and call Consisto­ries. All which move us to apprehend, that none at that time would have dared to judge him, even albeit he should have desired them. David far inferiour to him, wanting many priviledges over his Peo­ple which Noah had over his in the golden age, notwithstanding both his adultery and murder, was spared and over-leaped by the Sanhedrin. So Solomon was not judged by it, notwithstanding his idolatry and multiplication of wives & horses; which were punish­able, and inhibited by Law. And yet Solomon had no such priviled­ges over his people, as Noah had over his posterity. And I do verily beleeve, that the emency of David and Solomon, and because they were extraordinary persons, moved the Sanhedrin to spare them. Yea, it is to be considered, that such eminent men do not fal through a preposterous and malignant humour, but through an extraordi­nary desertion of God, for noble and high ends best known to God himself. No question, this hath been taken to heart by the Sanhe­drin. And this being conserred with the eminency and singularity of the men, hath carried the Sanhedrin by, from insticting punishment upon them. I shall not stand to dispute, whether they did this de jure, or not. But sure I am, as they did it de facto, so they-have [Page 44] been much moved thereto from pregnant considerations of the men's personal endowments. And for my self, though I think a Da­vid subject to Law, yet would I think it a great temptation to me, (though as Judge) to sentence such a man with death. The emi­nency of the man, and the way of his falling would put me to my second thoughts, albeit I should endeavour nothing therein but justice. Well, call it injustice in the Sanhedrin to have spared Da­vid and Solomon, yet would I not have you to wonder too much thereat. There is great difference between a David and an Ahab, a Solomon and a Jeroboam. Such are not all dayes men. And there­fore I must needs say, that as the Sanhedrin spared David and So­lomon, from thoughts of the singularity and eminency of the men; far more would Noah's posterity, in the golden age, have spared Noah, though in many things delinquent: for as the man was most eminent and singular, and could not have fallen but by an extraor­dinary desertion, and for most good and noble ends, so he had a priviledge from Nature above all in his time. Yea, in David, and Solomon's time, people were well seen in Laws and politick Con­stitutions. The Sanhedrin needed not to have spared David and Solomon through ignorance and want of skill. But it was far other­wise in the golden age in Noah's time. Then men were but Appren­tises, and spelling the first side of the Catechisme of Policy. Every thing was but in its beginnings, in its first rudiments. Let it be so, that de facto, and not de jure, in the golden age, Noah's posterity denied not to him an absolute and uncircumscribed power. I seek no more but that. And I may say, that though at that time de fa­cto, Noah should have had immunity from the exercise of Law a­gainst him, though much delinquent, yet shall I not think that e­ver Noah claimed such a priviledge to himself, as competent to him de jure, and according to the Law.

As for Noah's authority and power, after his posterity was di­vided into factions before we can determin upon it, you shall mark with me, immediatly after the golden age, that there were three di­vided and dist not parties. 1. The godly party. 2. The heroick party. 3. The politick party. The godly party was of the poste­rity of Shem. These followed Noah, and walked in his wayes. The heroick, and politick party were of the posterity of Ham and Ja­phet. And as the heroick party followed Nimrod, so the politick [Page 45] party followed Ham, whom the Chaldeans call Chemesenuus. No question, Noah immediatly after the golden age had a vast and ab­solute power over the godly, and those who walked in his wayes. You may learn the reasons of this from what is above-written. And as for the heroick, and politick party, it would seem probable, that they contemned Noah and slighted his Authority: for they walked contrary to his wayes, Gen. 10.11. It is known how that Ham (the head of the politick, yea and of the magical party) did mock Noah, Gen. 9. Beros. ant. lib. 3. Yea, Nimrod, the head of the heroick party, contrary to the mind and purpose of Noah, cau­sed Babel to be built, Gen. 10.11. Ber. ant. lib. 4. But notwith­standing this we may say, that at the most it concludeth that such were disobedient to Noah, and walked contrary to his will. But it will not conclude that such denied to Noah immunity from the Law. V. g. A prodigal and riotous son may work and act contrary to his father's will: But it doth not follow, ergo sach a child doth strike and punish his father. Nay, a debording child may act con­trary to his father's wil, and be so far from eclipsing his power over him, that he may in patience endure his correction over him. So we read that Ham did not repine against his father's reproving and cursing him, Gen. 10. Yea, Berosus storieth, that Noah did shut him out from his presence, and he did so accordingly, ant. lib. 3. And beside that he telleth us, that Noah, Nin. an. 19. gave him li­berty to stay beside him three years in Italy. But finding, how he did corrupt the Colonies there, he commanded him to be gone, and he did so. And yet at this time he was the Saturn of Egypt, a migh­ty King, and of great power, both in Egypt and in Italy. Ant. lib. 5. I think there is very good reason for it, to say, that Noah in so far had an absolute power over them, as that none of them in a direct and positive way would have acted against his command­ment, despising him as an enemy, and as one on whom they would and did execute their fury. The most we can call them, is disobedi­ent, but not rebels to Noah. They acted against his will, but not in despight of his will. They took not liberty from him, to do his will, though they took liberty to do their own will also. We can not think that the light of Nature was so far extinguished in them, that they did not honour him as their father. A debording son, as Esau, can entertain Isaac with Venison, though he walk not in his [Page 46] wayes. And I do not think, if they had not honoured him as their common father, unlesse they had been extraordinarily restrained, they had destroyed him and all his followers. Sure I am, they wan­ted not power to do so. The godly party was but an handful in respect of them. What then, I pray you, could be the ordinary mean of their restraint, but their natural respect and affection to­ward him? Nay, they honoured him so much, that they esteemed him their Coelum, their Sol, their Chaos, the semen mundi, yea, and the father, both of the greater, and lesser gods, Ber. ant. lib. 3.

And what we have spoken of Noah, the like also may be said of Adam. Before the Flood there was also a golden age 1556 years. Wherein men lived as under one common father, each of them knowing the intimate relations one to another, until Monarchy was erected, till the close of the 500 year of Noah's age, as is shewed already. Before which time Adam had died 626 years, and Seth 514 years. But so long as Adam lived, what superiority Noah had over his posterity in the golden age after the Flood, Adam had it rather in a more then leste measure then he. Adam was not onely their common father, but also he was their first and primary fa­ther.

As we have evinced the truth of this point, from examples in Scripture, so we may evidence it from examples in humane Histo­ries. V. G. The Mitylenians gave to Pittacus an absolute power of governing because of his personal endowments. Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. de Pit. Arist. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. The like power did the Athenians confer upon Solon, upon the same accompt, Diog. La. de Sol. Plut. in Sol. So it is alledged, that James 6. because of his pretended personal endowments, obtained an absolute power and a negative voice in Parliament. In the interim observe, That those who allow absolute Monarchy, because of personal endow­ments, do not imagine that Kings have an absolute power because they are Kings, but as they are such Kings, i. e. Kings not only in respect of station, but also in respect of qualification, exceeding all others. And so they conclude, that a King so qualified may very conveniently be entrusted with an absolute power: for they appre­hend, that though such a man have power above Law, yet will he not act against Law. And likewise they imagine, that such a man [Page 47] being in all respects above all men, both in respect of station, and qualification, can no wayes be inferiour to any man. Thus Ari­stotle inclineth to absolute Monarchy of this moulding, Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11, & 12.

Conclus. 4. Kings in old were of an absolute power, without the bounds of all restriction, by vertue of purchase and conquest.

So were the grand Heroes, as is shewed already. Hence was it, that Nebuchadnezzar, and the Kings of the Persians, had an ab­solute power over the People of the Jews.

Conclus. 5. Kings in old, by meer usurpation and tyranny, had an absolute power, without any circumscription.

So Pharaoh had an absolute power over the children of Israel, and the wicked Kings of Judah (at least of Israel) over their peo­ple. Thus Nebuchadnezzar had an absolute power, not only o­ver the people of the Jews, but also over all his subjects. Of whom it is said,— Whom he would be slew, and whom he would he kept alive; and whom he would he set-up, and whom he would he put­down, Dan. 5. After this manner Ahasuerus, and Artaxerxes, had an absolute power over the people of the Jews; though we deny not, but what either of them did act or intend against the Jewes, was by the mediation of evil Counsellours. So had Herod an abso­lute power, Matth. 2. Jos. Ant. lib. 15. Yet we deny not, but it was through other men's means more then his own, that he had a power to tyrannize and govern at random. The ten persecuting Kings, Dan. 7. Rev. 13. had an absolute power over the People of God. But moe examples of Tyrants you may read, Judg. 1. and 9.2 Sam. 21. Mat. 27. Luke 23. & Act. 12. In the books of A­pocrypha, as Tob. 1. Jude 2. & 3.1 Macc. 10.2 Mac. 4. 14. & c. See also Beros. Ant. lib. 1. Diog. La. lib. 6. Plut. de Dionys. Brus. lib. 6. cap. 21. Arist. Pol. lib. 5. cap. 10. What needeth us so to accumulate quotations and examples, when as it is evident, both from divine and prophane writ, that there have been almost, tot Tyranni, quot Reges?

Conclus. 6. Vnlesse it had been for some of these causes above­written, there was never at any time any King so absolute, but one way or other, according to Law, his power was restricted.

In establishing this Conclusion, we observe this order.

Firstly, we prove the point from example. And in doing so you [Page 48] will do well to observe, that examples to this purpose are of a two­fold kind. 1. There are some which point-out to us, That Kings in old were no lesse subject to Law, then any of the People. 2. Some of them shew to us, That though the King's power for the most part hath been absolute, yet notwithstanding in some case or other it hath been hemmed-in by Law. Of the first kind we have exam­ples both in the dayes of the Heroes, and in after-times. That in the dayes of the Heroes, some Kings were no lesse subjected to Law then the People, may be examplified both from the Commonwealth of the Jews, as also from the condition of some Kingdoms amongst the Gentiles. But we forbear till afterward, to speak any thing of the Jewish Commonwealth. And amongst the Heathen, you have to begin with the ancient and stately Kingdom of Egypt. It cannot be denied, but the Kings of Egypt in old were most precisely hedged-in by Law. Whatsoever they did, was according to Law. They wal­ked, they washed, they lay with their wives, they did eat and drink, according to Law: They wrote Letters, and dispatched Messages according to Law. It was not permitted to them to treasure-up sil­ver, to judge or punish any at random and according to their plea­sure: but as privat men they were subjected to the Laws, the yoke of which they did bear patiently, willingly submitting themselves thereto, and esteemed themselves happy to be subject to them. Di­od. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 2. cap. 3. This Diodore, as he confesseth him­self, hath from the writings of the Egyptian Priests, which he dili­gently searched, as he saith. Out of whose writings he giveth us three reasons, why the Kings of Egypt were for the most part good and kept themselves within bounds. 1. Because the sons of the chiefest Priests, who were the greatest and the most learned of al the rest, beyond the age of twenty years, were ordained to attend the King day and night: By whose on-looking and presence, the King was taught reservedness. 2. Because the Laws were most exactly and precisely exercised on the King's Person. 3. Because the Priests, as both before death, and after death, did celebrate the praises of the good Kings, honouring them with hyperbolick encomies, so they spake both before, and after death, to the discommendation and disparagement of the bad and wicked Kings, depriving them of stately Exequies at their interring. Now the desire of the one, and the fear of the other, kept them back from extravagency and debor­ding, [Page 49] and caused them cheerfully to take with the yoke. Ibid. And, which is more to be wondered at, Sesostris, one of the grand and primary Heroes, ordained Prators, as Judges, to govern in the Land of Egypt. Diod. rer. ant. lib. 2. cap. 1. The care of every thing was cast over upon them. Yea, Berosus telleth us, That Sesostris, whom he calleth Hercules, delivered Italy from tyranny and sla­very. Ant. lib. 5. This insinuateth, that this Noble Conquerour delighted much to live according to Law, when-as he could not en­dure tyranny to be exercised in a strange Kingdom, which he con­quered. Far leste I think, would he have suffered tyranny to be in his own Kingdom. The like also did his father O siris (whom Dio­dore calleth Simandius) in Italy. Ber. ant. lib. 5. Him Berosus calleth Jupiter the just. I conceive he could not have been so called, unless he had been a man that walked strictly according to Law. And if these two glorious Heroes, and noble Conquerours did sub­ject themselves to Law, how much more the rest of the Kings of Egypt in old, who were far inferiour to them? Let it be so, these two lived according to the Law, ex voluntate, but not ex loge, yet will it conclude (if we compare arightly the highness of them with the lowness of the rest) that the rest ex lege were subject to Law. So faith Diod. Ant. lib. 2. cap. 3. Where he also faith out of the Egyptian Writers, That the Egyptians choosed-out the best men of their chiefest Cities, of whom they made-up a Judicatory, not inferiour either to the Councel of Athens, or the Senat of Lace­demon, judging all impartially without respect of persons. Ari­stotle observeth, That it is a sign of a well governed Common­wealth, where neither tyranny, nor sedition is. Pol. 2. cap. 9. But we read not, but very seldom, that in old either of these was in E­gypt. See Beros. ant. lib. Maneth. de Reg. Egypt. lib. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 2. cap. 1, 2, & c. Moreover, Aristotle prescri­beth it as a rule, for preventing sedition, and keeping the Common­wealth in its integrity, to govern according to Law, and to abstain from tyranny. Pol. 5. cap. 8. & 10. The like do all Politicians, to­gether with the consent of Machjavel, and Salmasius. But it is known, that the Kingdom of Egypt, as in old there was seldom se­dition in it, so likewise it endured a long time inviolable. Which makes us conclude, that the Egyptian Kings kept themselves with­in bounds, refrained from tyranny, and walked according to the [Page 50] Law. But they could not ordinarily and for a long time have done so, unless they had been subordinate and subjected to their Coun­seilours and Parliament. The proverb is, Who get Liberty, do take Liberty. And for the most part, it alwayes holdeth good.

We must not imagine that the Kings of Egypt in the days of the Heroes were singular in this matter. The Athenians under These­us had a Kingly government, rather like a Commonwealth then Monarchy. Therefore faith Heraclid, [...] De Pol. Ath. i. e. Theseus having gathered the Athenians together, reconciled them, making them all of an equall and like authority. And Plutarch faith the like. But (faith he) he keeped back the popular government of Athens from confusion, differencing between persons and persons. De Thes. And so Theseus being subject to Law was at last banished by the People. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Diod. ant. lib. 5. cap. 5. Plut. in Thes. So insinuateth Heraclid in the place above-cited. Verily Theseus was both their King, and in valour and Heroicisme a second to Hercules the Grecian. Yea, Agamemnon whom Pa­terculus, and others do call Rex regum was subject to Law, albeit Salmasius def. reg. cap. 5. alledgeth the contrary. (1.) Because it is reported that he was thrust from his charge, because he would not suffer his eldest daughter to be sacrisiced, to satissie the fury of Diana, for the Roe which he killed feeding about her grove. Dict. Cret. lib. 1. (2) Because he was put from his Office by common consent of the Officers of the Army, and Palamedes put in his room. Dict. Cret. lib. 1. and Dar. Phr. de exci. Tro. (3) In a Convocation of the general Persons of the Army Agamemnon was greatly upbraided. Homer. Iliad. 9. (4) Because Aristotle likeneth the Laconick Government, to Agamemnon's power. And for this he citeth that of Homer, by us already alledged. And the Laconick, Government, he callech it [...], most according to Law. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 10. I confess with Salmasius, that Aga­memnon had the potestas belli. But what then? ergo he had a power in battel, whether to destroy the Army or not, either to deliver it up to the Enemy, or not. It no waies followeth. I confesse, he had an absolute Power in battel, to govern according to Law, but not both according to it, and against it. Questionless, the Army never gave him such a power as that over them, whereby in the time of [Page 51] command he might have disposed upon them as he pleased. They still kept a power in their own hands of deposing him, and acting a­gainst him according to his deserts. They deposed him, and acted against him, upon meer prejudices and groundless apprehensions: Ergo far more would they have acted against him, if in the time of battel he should have gone about to have sold them unto the Enemy. 'Tis ridiculous to say, that the General of an Army, hath power to sell the whole Army to the Enemy, and the Army may not resist him in so doing in the time of battel, though the Army may withstand him at any other time. Sure I am, they have more reason to withstand him at that time, then at any other: for as then they are most in hazard. so then they have most reason to stand by their own security and self-preservation. It is reported of Achilles, That he disdained to be commanded by Palameoes. And yet Palamedes was invested with that same power which A­gamemnon had. Moreover, Minos was not only King, but also the Law-giver of Crete. Heracl. de Pol. Cret. Nic. Damasc. de mor. gent. Cret. Val. max. lib. 1. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. rer. ant. lib. 3. cap. 5. lib. 5. cap. 5. & alib. Plut. de Thes. But, as afterward is also shewed, the Cretian Monarchy was not absolute, but regulated. And though you Tay, that it was so in after-times, but not in the dayes of Minos, yet do we gain the point: for it cannot be denied but the Cretians did use these same Lawes in after-times, which Minos first established amongst them. So faith Aristotle, Pol. 2. cap. 8. The like also faith Plato in the alledged Dialogue between Minos and Socrates. Socrates moving the question, Whether or not did the Cretians use the ancient Lawes of Minos and Rhada­manthus; Minos answered, they did. Lib. 7. Min. vel. de Leg. And Plato extolleth Minos above the very Heavens. And for this he citeth Homer and Hesiodus. He is holden by Homer to have been such a strict justiciar, that he faineth him to be the Judge of the de­parted souls. To which Lucian alludeth, Dial. Min. & Sost. Withall, he alledgeth him to have gotten his Laws from Jupiter. And Hesiod in even-down terms calleth him, the best of all mortal Kings. Yea Plato faith, That what he commanded the People to do, he did it himself also. And, which is more, he alledgeth, That the Lacedamonians had their Laws from the Cretians. Therefore we may conclude, that in Minos time the Cretian Monarchy was [Page 52] regulated: for what he commanded the People to do, that same he did himself likewise. And it was like to the Lacedamonian Mo­narchy, which was not absolute, but precisely regulated according to Law. What? Can I think that such a strict Justiciar and emi­nent Law-giver as Minos, would have assumed any arbitrary and loose power to himself, and denied it to others, executing on them the full rigour of the Law? That verily is against this practice of which Plato [...], who faith, That he commanded not to do one thin [...] and [...] another himself. The man is reckoned up amongst the chiefest Law-givers, and, as Hesiod, Homer, and Pluto would have it, he is the chiefest of them all. But afterward it shall be shewed, that all such were against a vast and arbitrary power. And to close up this whole matter in a word, Aristotle faith, That in old, Kingly Government was amongst the Cretians, but afterward the Cretian Cosmi (like to the Lucedaemonian Ephori) did take it away. Pol. 2. cap. 8. This insinuateth, that in old amongst the Cre­tians these Cosmi were, whose power was all one with the Lace­daemonian Ephori, who indeed had power over their Kings. And we read not of any beside Minos, who did institute these Cosmi a­mongst the Cretians. He was the first Law-giver amongst them, whose Laws they retained until after-ages, as is said already.

As amongst the Egyptians and Grecians, we find Monarchy in the dayes of the Heroes, in like manner we find it to have been re­gulated also in other Kingdoms. The Ethiopian Kings were so much restricted to Law, that it can hardly be determined, whether they, or the Egyptian Kings were most subjected thereto. As Dio­dore telleth us, of the subjection of the one to Law, so doth he story of the subjection of the other thereto. In expresse termes he faith, That the Ethiopian King, according to statute and ordination, lea­deth his life according to the Laws, doing every thing according to the Country-fashion, neither rewarding, nor punishing any, but according to the Law of his Ancestors. And, which is more to be wondered at, the Priests have such power over the King, that at their command and pleasure he suffereth death. And for this they alledge it to have been an old custom amongst all their Kings from the beginning, to undergo death at the desire of the Priests. Rer. ant. lib. 4. cap. 1. I shall not stand here to dispute, whether or not, Monarchy amongst the Indians, in the dayes of the Heroes [Page 53] was regulated and subjected to Law. Albeit there be some proba­bility for the non-absoluteness thereof, yet we think it good to leap it over, because the matter is not clear enough. And we shall be­gin with the Indian Kingdom, to shew, that in after-times in it Kings were of a non-arbitrary and regulated power. It is reported, that the Indians established those Laws which they received from their ancient Philosophers, the Gymnosophists: Who taught, that all were free, and none were servants. This they established by Law. And so the Indians, like the Lacodemonians, had their Ephori and overseers, chosen-out from amongst the common people; and be­side them there were some few chosen, who in nobility and pru­dence exceeded all the rest, who were interested in governing and ordering all the great affairs, both of King and Kingdom. Diod. rer. ant. lib. 3. cap. 10. In like manner the Egyptians, as in the he­roick times, so in after-times, they most precisely subjected their Kings to Law. Diod. ant. lib. 2. cap. 3. For as in old both the King and the Kingdom were governed and regulated by Pretors, so after­ward out of their chiefest Cities, Heliopolis, Memphis, and Thebes, the best men were chosen to sit in Judgment, and to over-rule all, not inferiour to the Athenian Areopagites, nor to the Lacedemo­nian Senatours.

Amongst the Grecians there were severall Kingdoms wherein the Regall power was hemmed-in by the hedges of Law, in after­times after the dayes of the Heroes. Which maketh Aristotle say, that in after-times the power of Kings was weakned, and subjected to the People, partly by the peopl's detracting from their power, and partly by the King's own voluntary dimission. Polit. 3. cap. 10. We have examples of these not only amongst the Grecians, but also among other nations. The Athenians diminished the power of their Kings after the Codrids had become lecherous, soft and effeminate. At that time they changed their Kings into Princes, whom they cal­led [...]. Heracl. de Pol. Ath. But it seemeth very probable that then they rather changed the name then the power of their Kings: for long before the race of Codrus was extirpated, Theseus had re­stored liberty to the Athenians, and (as is said already) had e­rected a Commonwealth amongst them. Which appeareth to have lasted during both the time of the Kings, and likewise of the Princes. And consequently seeing there was a Common­wealth [Page 54] in both their times, there could be no difference in their power. But that we may give an exact and punctuall answer to this pre-occupation, you shall take notice of the dif­ferent condition of the Athenian Commonwealth, and of the chan­ges thereof. First, before Theseus reign, we do not imagine o­therwise, but that the Athenians were governed, not onely by a Kingly government, Ber. art. lib. 5. Maneth. de reg. Egypt lib. Heracl. de Pol. Ath. but also their Kings then were of a vaste and absolute power, according as the power of the Kings used to be in the dayes of the Heroes, Arist. Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. Secondly, under Theseus reign the power of the Kingly government was much impaired. Then the people were restored to liberty, and got power in their hand, as is said already. Therefore Euripides faith, that the Athenians under Theseus did not come under the yoke of one man, but the people as free men governed like a King by course. In Thes. Yet we must not imagine that then there was a perfect and entire Commonwealth erected. No, verily: for Theseus re­mained notwithstanding as their Prince, and as one having grea­ter authority then any Patriot and Commonwealth's-man. I will not say that Theseus retained a power in his hand, equall to the power of the People, and their Representative. That is expresly a­gainst what Euripides and others above-cited do report. But this much I may say, that he retained as much power in his own hand, as made him superior and of greater authority then any one at-least, whether of the Councel, or of the People. And that he was the first man in dignity and authority in the Commonwealth is clear. 1. Because as both Aristotle and Plutarch report, he remained notwithstanding the Prince of the Commonwealth. Therefore even unto this day he is reckoned-up in the Catalogue of the Athenian Kings. 2. Because he differenced between the Patricians (whom we call gentle-men) tillers of the ground, and Crafts-men, giving to them power according to their ranks and stations, investing some of them with greater, and some of them with lester power: and con­sequently seing he differenced one kinde of persons from another in the Commonwealth, making some of them in authority Superiour to others, much more hath he retained a power in his own hand, whereby he was differenced from any amongst all the rest. 3. Be­cause the Codrids and those who succeeded him, were properly cal­led [Page 55] Kings, and therein they are contra-distinguished from [...], the Princes, and diametrally opposed to them. But I conceive that there was greater reason why Theseus was a King then they were. He was heroick, and not so were they. Yea, Heraclid in plain terms faith, that Kings were not abrogated from amongst the Athenians till the posterity of Codrus became effeminate and lecherous. At which time (faith he) they were taken-away, and Princes put in their room. Observe therefore, that from Theseus untill the last of the Codrids, the Athenian Monarchy was regulated. We establish the point thus. 1. Because Theseus himself (as is proved already) was regulated: Ergo far more Codrus and his posterity were re­gulated. Theseus was of an heroick temper, such as were not the Codrids. And so by nature he was more disposed for an absolute way of governing then they. He lived in an heroick time, wherein Monarchy was most in request. But their time was of another stamp wherein Monarchy was wearing-out of request. 2. Because, while­as the Grecians carried-on an Engagement against Troy, at that time the Athenian Monarchy remained regulated also. Justin faith, that Demophoon son to Theseus was Captain of the Athenian na­vy, which went out with Agamemnon against the Trojans. lib. 2. But we believe other more antient Writers rather then him, who say, that the Captain of the Athenian navy then was Mnestheus, Theseus son. Dict. cret. de bel. Tro. lib. 1. Dar. Phr. de exs. Tro. lib. and Homer. Iliad. 2. Howsoever Plutarch gathereth from the way of Homer's speaking of the Navy, which came from Athens, under the conduct of Mnestheus, that Theseus government was re­gulated and much impaired: for (faith he) Homer doth call these ships, as belonging to the People. in Thes. Just so say Dictys Cre­tensis, & Dares Phrygius. And so Plutarch's way of reasoning holding good the Athenian Monarchy, whether under Mnesthe­us, as some say, or under Demophoon, as Justin faith, was not ab­solute but limited: for the ships which were rigged out of Athens, against Troy were not called Mnestheus or Demophook's ships, but ships belonging to the people of Athens. Well, I reverence this con­sequence, not for it-self (for Homer speaketh that same way of the out rigging of ships in other Grecian Kingdoms, where I do not think but there was absolute Monarchy, though in some things peradventure circumscribed) but for Plutarch's authority. And [Page 56] so in this matter resting upon it, I conclude, that seing the Atheni. an Monarchy was kept within the bounds of Law, in the dayes of Mnestheus and Demophoon two brave Heroes, much more was it of a circumscribed power in the dayes of Codrus and his posterity, who were but of an ordinary and non-heroick temper. And as for Co­drus himself, I do not think that such a man would have endea­voured the away-taking of those liberties wherewith Theseus pri­viledged the Athenians, whereas in maintainance of their liberties he exposed himself to the undergoing of death it-self. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 6. Just. lib. 2. Plut. in Codr. Aye, and which is more, whileas the Codrids became lecherous, loft, and effeminate, the Athenians did abrogate Kings from amongst them, and changed their Kings into Princes. Which beareth us this much in hand, that the Athenians did retain a power in themselves, whereby they might either keep-in or shut-out their Kings. And it is remarkable that it is not said they did abrogate their Kings, because of the ty­ranny of the Codrids. Heracl. de Pol. Ath. Which insinuateth that notwithanding their personall escapes and out-breakings, they acted nothing for diminishing the peoples Power.

Thirdly, after the Codrids had become effeminate, and had a­bused their power, the people took-away Kings from amongst them, and in their room set up Princes. Now, the question may be moved whether or not had these Princes as great power as had Theseus and Codrus? For removing of this difficulty observe, that there were some who did govern onely as Princes, and some did rule as Kings. Those who governed as Princes are of a threefold kind. 1. Some of them were appointed to govern for their whole lifetime. Who were thirteen in number, each of them reigning af­ter another. 2. Some of them were decennal Princes, seven in num­ber who governed every one of them for the space of ten years. The last of the decennall Princes was Erixias, whose government left-off, an. mun. 3282 before the reign of Pisistratus about 128. years. 3. Some of them were annuall and yearly Magistrates. Some would think it strange to say that these three kinds of Princes had that same power and authority which Theseus and Codrus, or any other of the Athenian Kings had. But if you take along with you this distinction, you shall find the matter clear. There is a twofold non-absolute and circumscribed power. 1. Intensive and [Page 57] substantiall. 2. Extensive and circumstantiall. It cannot be denied but these Princes in all the three kindes had one and the same power, intensively and essentially, which Theseus and the Codrids had. The reason of this is because the power of the Athenian Kings in it­self, and at the utmost was but a regulated power subjected to the Law of the people, as is proved already. Therefore saith Euripiàes, bringing-in Theseus speaking of the power of the Athenians,

In English.

Whence it is more then evident, that Theseus was no lesse subjected to Law then any of the people. Thence it is that Diodore reporteth, that the Athenians taking it in an evill part that Helen by lot had fallen to be wife to Theseus, he feared them, and therfore transport­ed her into Amphidria. Rer. ant. lib. 5. cap. 5. And how they keeped both him and the Codrids in subjection to Law, is already proved at length. Which maketh us say, that formally and accor­ding to the essentiall frame of non-absolute and limited power, they had no more power then any of these Princes above-said, who did govern onely as Princes: for both of them were subjected to Law, and neither of them had a prerogative over it, and an exemption from it. We have shewed already that the Athenian Kings had no such priviledge: Ergo far lesse had the Athenian Princes any such priviledge. 1. Because Princes as Princes are ever one way or other inferiour to Kings. 2. Because the Athenians changed their Kings into Princes, because their Kings became lecherous, soft, and effe­minate. And consequently unlesse they had changed their power as well as their name, they had wrought to no purpose for reforming the abuses and enormities of their Kings. 3. The annuall and yearly Princes, (whereof nine did govern together, six of them being [Page 58] Thesmothites) were solemnly sworn to the people that they should govern according to Law. And he who was [...], King, amongst these [...], Princes, had no more power but to provide for the sacrifices, and to order and govern the battell. Her act. de Pol. Ath. This commeth just to that which Aristotle saith concerning the detracting of the power of Kings in after-ages. Then (saith he) the people detracted so much from their Kings, that they entrusted them with no more power but to govern the battell, and to over­see [...] the sacrifices. Polit. 3. cap. 10. This is reckoned-up by him as the lowest degree of Monarchy, which he calleth [...], most according to law, and of the Laconick kind. Pol. 3. cap. 10. and 11. But if you shall alledge that the yearly Princes amongst the Athenians had not such power as the decennal Princes, and those Princes who keeped the government for their life-time, I shall not stand much to yeeld that: for I suppose that as in some accidental and circumstantial way, in the matter of power the Athenian Kings were differenced from the Athenian Princes, so it is most probable that after such a manner, these three foresaid kindes of Athenian Princes were differenced each-one from ano­ther, and therefore it is alledged that a Commonwealth was not e­rected amongst the Athenians till annuall Princes were set over them. Which maketh the Princes of the first and second kinde, though not of the third, to be reckoned up as Kings. Yet they must give me leave to say, that though the Athenian Common­wealth was not fully and compleatly established till the up-setting of annuall and yearly Princes; notwithstanding in some degree or other, there was ever a Commonwealth amongst them, from the dayes of Theseus untill some of their annuall Princes began to usurp and brought them under bondage: for not onely, as is said already, their Princes of the third kinde, but also their Kings and Princes of the first and second fort were subjected to Law, and the people had a ruling power over them. And so all of them had the like power according to the effentiall frame of a regulated and non-absolute power, though the Kings had a more vaste authority, and might extend their power further according to Law then the Princes, and those of the first kinde, then the Princes of the second, or at least of the third kinde, Even-as Majors, v. g. have greater power then Alder-men, and Alder-men then Counsellours. Howsoever we find [Page 59] that the Princes of the third kinde are also called [...], as well as the rest. They are said to have had the power of the battell, and [...], of the sacrifices. He who had this power is called [...], King. Thus we finde that he had that same power which the Lacedemonian Kings had. But it is afterward shewed that such were proper, though not absolute Kings. Well, I regard not though you esteem not such as Kings properly so called. I lose nothing by this. If we argue from examples of former and ancient Commonwealths, then have we the Athenian and Lacedemonian Republicks as presidents of a popular government and Common­wealth. Friend, this is the mark we drive most at in the matter in hand.

Those Princes who governed as Kings did usurp a greater power then what according to the fundamentall government of the King­dome, and the institution of Theseus did belong to them. So Cylon endeavoured, but his attempt was choked in the bud. Herod. lib. 5. Thucid. lib. 1. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Cic. de leg. Phutar. de Sol. But what he intended Pisistratus acted, as is storied by the same au­thors, together with Diogenes Laertius, Valerius maximus, and Diodore. And that usurpation continued untill Thrasybilus and Rhinon's dayes. These did vindicate the liberty of the Athenians, a­gainst those tyrants who did keep them under bondage. Herac. de Pol. Ath. Val. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 5. cap. 6. Aemil. Prob. de Thras. And so their government turned meerly popular, and became an even-down Commonwealth. Alex. ab Alex. lib. 4. cap. 23. And as for these Princes we deny not, nor can we say otherwise, but they had, not onely as great, but also greater power then any of the Athenian Kings, whether Theseus or any King that succeeded him. And that they were of equall power at-least, is evident: for they did reign not as Princes, but as Kings. Her. de Polit. Ath. And Pisistratus (one of these usurping Kings) in his Epistle to Solon saith plainly that he walked according to Solon's Lawes, differing in nothing from the people but in honour and dignity. But he addeth, that he took upon him that power which the Athenians conferred upon Codrus and his posterity. And in this he acknowledgeth that he sailed, and had such a power, not by the Law of the Kingdom, but by a Law of his own making. Whence it is evident that Pisi­stratus by usurpation took upon him as great power as did Codrus, [Page 60] or any of his race. Yea, and that they had greater power, is also clear: for Justine storieth, That after Codrus, while-as the Ad­ministration of the Republick vvas given over into the hands of yearly Magistrates, the King's lust became the People's law. Thus he telleth us, that in the times of defection, and vvhile-as corrup­tion entered the State of Athens, Kings became absolute and vvere of an arbitrary povver. Post Codrum,—administratio Reipublicae annuis Magistratibus permissacst. Sed Civitatinnullae Leges tune erant, quia libido Regum pro legibus habebatur. And aftervvard he speaketh, how they vvere reformed by Solon, and hovv Pisi­stratus and others vvho succeeded him, did tyrannize over them. Lib. 2. Solon looked upon the Athenians, under Pisistratus reign (albeit he governed according to Solon's Lavvs) as under the yoke of bondage. ‘ [...].’ Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. And it is reported, that Cleon, and those who followed him, destroyed the Commonwealth. Great tyranny there indeed, and arbitrariness of power. Her. de Pol. Ath. Thus we see clearly, how that not onely Kings in af­ter-times were regulated and in all things subjected to Law, but also, as some of the Athenian Princes were inferiour, so some of them were superiour to the Athenian Kings.

In Corinth, the Kingly Government was also regulated. [...], Herac. de Pol. Corinth. i.e. Periander first changed the Commonwealth, taking to himself a guard,—and at last appointing to himself a Senate. Now you must not think, that this Senate had not power over Periander. 1. Because that Se­nate cannot properly be called a Senat, wherein the King hath a ne­gative voice: It is but at the most a cypher, far from the nature of Senates that were in old amongst the Athenians, Carthaginians, &c. 2. Because Periander, in his Epistle to Solon, advised at him, what he should do in securing himself from those who went about to kill him. And Solon in his Epistle to him, advised him to lay­down his lording power. It is very easie to know what hath been the cause, why his own subjects endeavoured to cut him off: for it is reported of him, that he was the first King who went conveyed with a guard of Souldiers. Whereupon he suffered none to live in [Page 61] the City. This could not but irritate his subjects against him, and make them conspire against his life. See Herod. lib. 5. Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. & Periand. Herac. de Pol. Corin. Thra. sibulus counsel was just contrary to Solon's. He desired him, to spare none, whether friend or foe, but cut all off. Which he did indeed, as Herodot reporteth. But we must think, that he advised with Solon, after he had put in execution Thrasibulus counsel: for Solon, in his Epistle to him, telleth him, That the way to secure himself in his Kingdom, was, not to cut-off any, but to lay-down his lording power over them. This infinuateth, that he had fol­lowed Thrasibulus counsel, and had cut-off his subjects, before ei­ther Solon wrote to him, or he had advised with Solon. And He­raclid saith in even-down terms, That he was neither unjust, nor violent, hating all gross and scandalous vices, and commanding all those to be drowned in the sea, who were prostitute to such man­ner of wickedness. This could not be in the time of his tyranny, when he made havock of his people, and of which Heraclid spea­keth, before he entereth a-talking any thing of his justice and reser­vedness. Which is more then apparent to us, that he became a just and moderat man, leaving-off his tyranny and oppression, upon So­lon's counsel and advice. And so we fear not to say, that he did put power in the peoples hand, adding a Councel to him, for keep­ing him within the bounds of Law. This we may learn from Hera­clid, who having spoken of his moderation and justice, telleth us, That he did constitute [...], a Councel or Senate. Verily, we can­not think but it was Periander's wisdome and choice, to follow Solon's counsel, in giving liberty to the people, and in priviledging them with a power over him, to hedge-in his wayes by the rules of Law. Aristotle saith, that his lord lig over the people made them lay their heads together against him. Pol. 5. cap. 10. And Solon counselled him, to leave-off his lording power, as the chief and only vvay of securing himself, and conciliating the favour of the people. Who can think that such a vvise man as he (who is reckoned-up a­mongst the seven Sages) vvould have despised the counsel of such a vvise man, another of the Sages also? Yea Chilo, in his Epistle to Periander, though in a satyrick way, is little or nothing different from that vvhich Solon counselled him to. And that Periander practised according to Solon's advice and counsel, is clear, by com­paring [Page 62] it vvith vvhat Heraclid speaketh concerning Periander. He had the vvise men, his fellows in vvisdom, in greater respect then to postpone any of their advices, as is evident from his Epistle vvhich he vvrote to them. Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Per. 3. Because it vvas Periander's express judgment, that Popular Government was better then Monarchy, Dio. La. ibid. Now, this could not be, while-as Periander delighted to lord and tyrannize over his peo­ple. And so, 'tis more then probable, that as he changed his judg­ment, he likewise changed his practice. These two go alwayes hand in hand together. Wherefore to me it is more then evident, that Periander gave his people power over him, and willingly subjected himself to Law.

Regal Government amongst the Carthaginians, in after-times was regulated, and in all things subjected to Law. But you will do well to consider with me these things. 1. As Carthage was in its beginnings. 2. As it was in after-ages. In the first respect, it cannot be denied, but Regal Government in it was absolute. First­ly, Because Dido, the first founder of Carthage was worshipped by the Carthaginians as a Goddess. Secondly, Because Dide, by her own proper industry builded Carthage, and made the Carthagi­nians a People. Just. lib. 18. Thirdly, Because in the begin­ning Kingly Government was most in request. And therefore King­doms in the beginning were governed by Kings. So say Aristotle, Justin and Salust. Then men were little acquainted with the rules of Policy. Which makes Aristotle say, that Kingly Government in the beginning was established, because it was then difficult and hard to find-out many men of wit and judgment, to govern the Commonwealth. Pol. lib. 3. cap. 11. & lib. 4. cap. 13. We shall therefore not judge it strange, that Kings in the beginning of any Kingdom were absolute and of an arbitrary power. People then had not policy, and knew not how to exercise Law aright, and to keep their Kings within the bounds thereof. But according to the se­cond respect, we must think that there was a change in Court. Then the Carthaginian Kings became subjected to Law. It is there­fore reported, that Machaeus (or, as Orosius saith, Mezeus) vvas banished by the Carthaginians. And finding, that [...] after he vvas by strength of hand released from his banishment) he endeavoured to lord over them, they accused him, and executed judgment on [Page 63] him, as on a malefactor and paracide, both as a Rebel against his Country, and as a murderer of his son. Just. lib. 18. Tell me not that Machaus was not their King, but the general Captain of their Army. (1) Because his son Cartalo, was by the Carthaginians trimmed-up in a Kingly attire, instead of Machaus his father; they clothed him in Purple, and put a Crown of Gold upon his head. This signifieth that Machaus was of a Kingly Power, though not boundless and arbitrary. Just. ibid. (2) Because the Laced [...]mo­nian Kings had no power, but of the battel. And yet they were properly Kings. But Machaus had such a power as that. (3) Be­cause it cannot be denied, but Machaus had as great power as Han­nibal. Mago succeeded to Machaus, Asdrubal to Mago, and Han­nibal to Asdrubal. Just. ibid. But it is known, that Hannibal was of a Kingly Power: for he was one of the two Carthaginian Kings. Aemyl. prob. in Han. 'Tis remarkable that Hannibal, for fear of the Carthaginian Senate, sled into Syria. Wherefore the Senate forfeited his estate, did cast down his house, and declared him a banished man. Prob. ib. Plut. in Han. Howsoever Ari­stotle in even-down terms telleth us, That the Carthaginian Kings were subjected to Law. For comparing the Carthaginian, and La­cedemonian Commonwealths together, he saith, that the Cartha­ginian Kings, and Senat vvere just so as the Lacedemonian Kings and Senatonrs: [...]. Pol. 2. cap. 9. And so he subjoyneth, that the People both amongst the Carthaginians, and Lacedemonians, did command both King and Senate, having a povver of judging them, and of contradicting their Ordinance. That same also he saith of the Cretian Commonwealth. And cap. 7. he faith. That Cosmi amongst the Cretians, had the same povver vvhich Ephori had amongst the Lacedemonians. I consesse, in that chap. he faith, That in the begin­ning the Cretians were governed by Kings, who were at last taken away, and the power of the battel devolved upon the Cosmi. This maketh nothing against us: for so he insinuateth, that the Cretian Kings had but the power of the battel, seing in putting out their Kings he speaketh of no more power that was added to the Cosmi, but that they were entrusted with the managing of the war. And cap. 9. in plain terms he saith, (comparing the Cretian and Lace­demonian Commonwealths together) That the Cretian Kings and [Page 64] Senate were of the same stamp and condition, of which were the Lacedemonian Kings and Scnatours. And (faith he) in the Car­thaginian, Lacedemonian, and Cretian Commonwealths, the peo­ple had power both over King and Senate, to judge and withstand them.

As for the Lacedemonian Kings, it is beyond all controversie, that in after-ages they were subjected to Law, no lesse then the peo­ple. Therefore saith Xenophon, [...] De Repub. Laced. lib. i.e. Lycurgus did not suffer a lor­ding and tyrannick power to be given to the King, nor did he put such power in the people's hand, as to beget jealousie and envie a­gainst the kingly power. And Aristotle saith, [...] Polit. 3. cap. 10. i.e. The Kingly Power in the Laconick Commonwealth is most restricted to Law: for it hath not a vaste and arbitrary power. This maketh him say, Pol. 2. cap. 7, & 9. That the Kingly Power was subjected to the People, and the E­phori had the greatest power in the Commonwealth. Which com­meth just to that which Heraclid saith, [...] De Pol. Laced. i.e. The Lacedemonian Ephori had the grea­test power in the Commonwealth. Xenophon likewise faith, That the King did swear monethly to the People, to govern according to Law. De Rep. Lac. lib. And Nicolaus Damascenus, That he did swear to govern according to Law, before he got the Crown. [...] De Mor. Gent. Laced. And how great the power of the Ephori, the Representative of the People, was over all the rest of the Magi­strates in the Commonwealth, you may learn it from Plat. de Leg. lib. 4. Isoc. Pan. & Plut. de Civil. Instit. Whereupon faith Xe­nophon, they had power of deposing, imprisoning and judging (even to the sentence of death) the rest of the Magistrates. [...] De rep. Laced. lib. And because of the vastness of their power over the rest of the Magistrates, they did at their own hand imprison and condemn Agis their King, Plut. in Ag. In this they went a­gainst the Law of the Nation, because according to it, they had only power to judge and sentence their King, while-as the King of the [Page 65] other family did sit upon the Bench with them. Pausan. Lacon. But they without the concurrence of any, at their own hand did imprison and sentence Agis. The power of the Lacedemonian King is taken-up in these notions. 1. At home he had charge of the sa­crifices, Arist. Pol. 3. cap. 10. Herod. lib. 6. Xenoph. de rep. Lac. lib. of ordaining Magistrates and Priests, and of dismissing Messa­ges, whether friendly or hostile. See Herod. & Xenoph. ibid. But Xenophon faith, That at home he had but the honour of a private man. 2. From home, and in the battel, he was first, and had the chief hand in managing the matters of the war: So say the fore­cited Authours.

Inst. 1. The Lacedemonian Monarchy (saith Salmasius) was peculiar. All other Monarchies beside were absolute and of an un­circumscribed power, though some were more intense, and some more remisse. And (saith he) the Lacedemonian Kings were ra­ther General Captains, then Kings. Therefore Aristotle defineth their power, to be a power of commanding the battel, from a per­petual title of birth-right. Pol. 3. cap. 10.14. Yea, and though the Lacedemonian Ephori did cut-off Agis, yet not withstanding the people did abominate and detest that fact. Def. Reg. cap. 8. Where­fore the man doth esteem the annual Carthaginian Kings properly not to have been Kings. Otherwise (saith he) the Judges of Israel may also properly be called Kings: for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had. The one were called Sophetim, and the other Sufetes. Both which come to one purpose. And yet (saith he) the Scripture calleth the Judges of Israel, Kings, Judg. 18. But this must be taken in an improper sense. And so he con­cludeth, that Probus doth call the Carthaginian Sufetes, Kings improperly. Def. Reg. cap. 7.

Ans. We do much wonder at the man, who is not ashamed to say, that all Monarchies besides the Lacedemonian were absolute and unsubjected to Law. We have evinced the contrary of that al­ready, having shewed from the examples of many Commonwealths, that Kings were no lesse subjected to Law then any of the people. And in this the manner of Royall Power amongst the Romans is not wanting. The power of the King was subjected to the Senate. Rex ad Senatum referebat. Pomp. Let. de mag. Rom. i.e. The King had his referres to the Senate. Penes hoc quidens senateres adeo [Page 66] semper totius Reipublicae summa innixaest, ut ne Reges quidem, Consules, aut Dictatores, aut alius quispiam magistratus incon­sulto Senatu quippiam moliretur. Fenest. de mag. Rom. i.e. The sum and head of the whole Commonwealth did ever so depend from these senatours, that even Kings, Consuls, or Dictators, or any other Magistrate did not enterprise any thing without consulting the Senat. Senatores,velutipresides, & Reipublica custo­des, tanta authoritatisfuere, ut si populus Regem, aut magistra­tum quempiam jussisset, id sic ratum foret, si Senatus author fieret. Alex. ab Al. lib. 4. cap. 11. i.e. The Senatours,as Praesidents and keepers of the Republick, were of so great authori­ty that if the people had commanded the King, or any Magistrate, that accordingly should be ratified, if the Senat authorized it. See also Liv. lib. 1. Dionys. lib. 2. Digest. lib. 1. tit. 9. Luci. Ann. lib. 1. cap. 1. & Plut. in Romul. Aye, which is more, Dictatours (where­of Julius Caesar was one) who amongst the Romans were of grea­ter power then Kings, were subjected to the Tribunes: for it is re­ported that M. Fabius appealing from L. Papyrius Dictatour to the Tribunes, by their authority exempted his son 2. Fabius from pun shment. Alex. de Alex. lib. 1. Well, we shall not alledge that the Tribunes, the Representative of the people, had greater au­thority positively in exercising acts of Law then the Dictatours: for not onely Alexander ab Alex. lib. 1. Geni. di. cap. 3. lib. 4. cap. 23. lib. 5. cap. 2. but also Pomponius Let. de magist. Rom. and Fenestella de mag. Rem. lib. alt. do plainly say, that in respect of positive authority the Dictatours were above the Tribunes, and there was no appellation from them. Yet all of them say, that in re­spect of negative authority, the Tribunes were above Dictatours, Consuls, and all the rest of the Roman Magistrates, because they had power of interdicting and discharging all the rest of the Magi­strates, Dictatours, or any other from undertaking any thing as they judged sit and expedient, should neither be acted-for nor against. And so having this power de jure, as is condescended upon by Alex­ander himself, and all others, I admire why Alexander maketh any question concerning M. Fabius appellation from the Dictatour to the Tribunes: for so he did not appeal to them, as to judges of grea­ter authority then the Dictatour, but as to propugnatours and de­fenders, having a power of inhibiting what was done, as they judged [Page 67] amisse by the rest of the Magistrates. Albeit they had not a main voice in judging (wherein the power of the Dictatour was above their's) and in descerning, yet had they a main voice in defending, approving and disapproving.

And whereas this man alledgeth that Aristotle is of his judge­ment, he is close mistaken: For Aristotle doth not define the La­conick Monarchy, [...], the power of the battell, according to a perpetuall title from blood-right, because he opinionateth that the Lacedemonian Kings were not properly Kings, but because the greatest authority the Lacedemonian Kings had, was in leading-forth the Army. There indeed they were primi above the Senat and Ephorie. Whereupon he also calleth the La­conick Monarchy [...], a power of leading forth the Army by it's own power. He is so far from being of Salmasius opinion, that contrariwise he reckoneth up the Laconick Monarchy amongst the proper species and and kindes of royall power. Polit. 3. cap. 10. and 11. And whileas he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings, he doth so call them, Pol. 2. cap. 7. and 9.

Inst. 2. Aristotle doth so (faith Salmasius) 1. Because the power of the battell was hereditary to the Lacedemonian Kings. 2. Because the Lacedemonian Kings in battell had a full free and Kingly power. Aye, (faith he) they had also a power in those things, which related to the ceremonies, wherewith Kings in old were solemnly entrusted. Def. Reg. cap. 8. Ans. The first reason is forthwith nought. 'Tis a bad consequence: The Laceàemonian Kings were hereditary Commanders of the Ar­my in chief: Ergo Aristotle because of that calleth them Kings. Zuasi vero he had had no such reason for him to call them Kings, if they had onely been entrusted with the power of the battell by e­lection. Friend, you are a-little mistaken in this. 1. Because Ari­stotle divideth the power of the battell into hereditary and elective power. Pol. 3. cap. 10. Thus he contra-distinguisheth the one from the other, as two different species properly and specifically differen­cing the power of the battell in generall. 2. Because a Kingly power is not therefore Kingly, because it is hereditary. Yea, which is more, a Kingly power, cater is requisitis, is properly and formally elective. And therefore Aristotle should have had more reason to have cal­led them Kings, if their power had been by election, and not by suc­cession. [Page 68] So the man himself judgeth whileas he faith, that the Car­thaginian and Cretian kings were better ordained then the Laco­nick; Because (faith he) the Laconick kings are ordained by suc­cession, and they by election. And he addeth a reason to this, be­cause faith he, by election the best are choosed, whereas by blood­right the like cannot be had. Whereupon (faith he) the heridita­ry title of Kings amongst the Lacedemonians hath brought great hurt and detriment unto the Commonwealth. Polit. 2. cap. 9. And as for his second reason, it plainly contradicteth himself: for so he confesseth, that in the battell they had a Kingly power. And he hath little reason to say, that Aristotle called them Kings because they had a power of over-seeing the sacrifices. So had the Athe­nian annuall Princes, whom properly he will not admit to be cal­led Kings, Howsoever it cannot be denied, but properly they were Kings, albeit they were subjected to Law. 1. Because it doth not follow that a King properly is not a King, because he is a regulated King. We have shewed already, that GOD no otherwise moul­deth the King, but as he subjecteth him to Law. Assert. 2. And afterward we shall shew how that the Kings of the Jews were re­gulated Kings. And yet who will deny but they were proper Kings? 2. The King is not properly King, unlesse he be a regulated King and subjected to Law, as both already and afterward is shewed. And therefore the Lacedemonian Kings were Kings properly, the ra­ther because they were regulated. 3. Because Salmasius himself confesseth, that in the battell the Lacedemonian Kings had a full and Kingly power. And yet then their power was not absolute and arbitrary. They had not then a full power to act against Law, but according to Law, as you may learn from Conclus. 6. in com­paring their power with Agamemnon's power. Therefore either Salmasius will contradict himself, or else he must needs say, that Kings are properly Kings, though they be regulated. 4. Because all that write of the Lacedemonian Commonwealth, of whom we have cited many already, do call the Captain-Generals of their Ar­mies, Kings. And 'tis remarkable that Lylander in an oration, which was found after his death, perswaded the Lacedemonians to shake­off the Kingly government, and elect a Captain-Generall for go­verning the battell. Plut. & Aemyl. prob. in Ly [...]. This he speaketh of the Lacedemonian Kings, as contradistinguished from Captain-Generalls [Page 69] of Armies. O, but (faith Salmasius) Lysander onely deherted the people from setting over their Armies Captain-Gene­ralls by succession, and perswaded them to take from them the name of Kings. Def. reg. cap. 8. See how the man bewrayeth himself: for Lysander was Captain-Generall of the Lacedemonian Army. And yet he was not their King. Therefore amongst the Lacedemonians it was one thing to be King, and another thing to be Captain Generall of the Army. I confesse their King had also the power of the Army. But he had not onely other power beside, but also he had power of the battell in a more intense way then any deputed and substituted Captain amongst the people. Otherwise there had been no difference between Lysander and the King, who was but onely Captain of the Army. Yea, which is more, Lysan­der doth not speak of shaking-off regium nomen, but regiam pote­statem as is clear out of Probus. But sure I am, regia potestas is not nomen regis, but res regis.

Salmasius shall have no need to deny that the Carthaginian an­nuall Kings were Kings properly so called. But in the interim he shall give us leave to consider and take a light view of the nature of the word susetes. Which is taken in a twofold sense. 1. Largely. And so the word may be derived from the root [...] sapha. Whence sufes is all one with [...] sophe, speculator inspector, episcopus, or ephorus. Thus sufetes may be referred to judges of any sort. And in this sense Alexander ab Alexandro referreth it to the Graecian [...]symnet [...], the Egyptian dioecetes, the Persian megistanes, the Os­cian medix, &c. Geni. di. lib. 4. cap. 23. Him Julius Scaliger fol­loweth, whileas he faith, Porro qui Hebraïce sciunt, & non ig­norant Poenos, Tyrorum colonos esse, concedent mihi, Sufes idem esse, quod [...]. And so the man supply­ing Festus words, saith, Sufes dictus est Pocnerum lingua summus magistratus, ut Oscorum medix, &c. 2. Strictly and by limita­tion. And so it is derived from the root [...] saphat. Whence su­fes is all one with [...] sophet. Which in the Greek is [...], a judge. In this sense it is applyed to the Carthaginian yearly Kings, and Roman Consuls. Alex. ab. Al. gen. di. lib. 3. cap. 3. The word sufes by Festus, and T. Livius is rendered consul. So it is by Sa­bellicus, Aen. 5. lib. 5. It cannot be den [...]ed but as sufetes is a Pu­ [...]ick Word, so in it's most strict and rigorous acceptation, it is only [Page 70] relative to the Carthaginian annuall Kings. Yet I must needs say, that as it is taken strictly and by way of limitation, with very good reason it may be referred to the Roman consuls: for they had that same power which the Carthaginian Kings had, and both of them were yearly Magistrates. Having thus discussed the grammary of the word, you may observe, that in it's first acceptation it is not onely relative to those who in old were above Kings, but also to those who were inseriour to them. And in the second acceptation it is relative to such, who amongst the Carthaginians were both re, and nomine Kings, and amongst the Romans, to such who were Kings, not nomine, but re. But if we take sufetes precisely for so­phetim, (unlesse you take sophetim in a larger sense then it is taken in the book of the Judges) you must needs say, that it is onely re­lative to such who were Kings neither re nor nomine: for after­ward I shall make it appear, that the Judges of Israel were so far from being of a Kingly power, that contrariwise they were but of equall authority with any of the Sanhedrin. At least it is easy to prove that they were not of a Kingly power, or of such power as had the Roman consuls, and the Carthaginian sufetes, albeit we should say that they were the first of the Sanhedrin, having greater power then any of the rest: for the Athenian annuall Princes had more power then any member of the Athenian councel, and yet they were not properly Kings. We may say the like also concerning the decennal Princes, and those Princes who amongst the Athenians did govern for their life-time. I deny not but these may be, yea and were, called Kings, who were not so indeed, as the Judges of Israel, Judg. 18, And, we deny not, (as Salmasius will have it, Def. reg. cap. 8.) but many both of old and new also were and are not called Kings, who were and are of greater honour & authority then they. What then? This will never conclude, that the Carthaginian su­fetes were not of a Kingly power. Though the word sufetes may be taken for sophetim, yet shall we never conclude therefrom, that the Carthaginian sufetes had no more Power then the Judges of Israel. At the most it concludeth, that they had not a kingly power in a full and intense measure. And therefore the word in its most native signification is all one with Consules, who had a kingly power, though not in the highest degree. And for my-self, I can [Page 71] find no essential difference between the Carthaginian Sufetes, and the Lacedemonian Kings. Whereupon I am made to conclude, That as the one, so the other also, were of a kingly power.

This man looketh upon the off-cutting of Kings, as a thing of an­other world, even as if such a thing had never been practised be­fore since the world began. He telleth us of Agis, how that amongst all the Lacedemonian Kings, none was cut-off but he. But in the interim he shall observe, that though in the examples which we shall alledge to this purpose, there be some of them which speak nothing of the off-cutting of Kings. Yet all of them do speak of the punishment of Kings, either one way or other. And know like­wise, that in old, Kingdoms in punishing of capital faults, used di­verse wayes of punishment. Amongst the Indians the delinquent, though guilty of the greatest crime, got no more for his punish­ment, but to be shaved at the King's command. This was thought amongst them a capital punishment. Nicol. Damasc. de Mor. gent. Ind. Some Nations, who dwelt about Cancasus, on capital transgressours did execute banishment, as a capital punishment. They executed it instead of death. It is reported, That the Tral­lians thought it punishment enough to inflict upon a murderer, if he did give a bushel, or measure, of Pulse to the friends of the defunct. The Druids and Cercets, for the greatest faults, did no more, but interdicted the delinquent from being accessory to the sacrifice. The like punishment was also executed upon sacrilegious persons in E­lephantine Ethiopia. Alex. ab. Al. gen. di. lib. 3. cap. 5. Where if the Reader shall be pleased a little to trouble his eyes, he shall see how that some Nations in old, according to the Laws of the king­dom, in their punishments were most severe, though against the smallest faults, and some were not so, but were most remisse in their punishment, though against the greatest crimes. Therefore Salmasius shall not think, that those, who did not punish their Kings with death, were any more favourable to them, then those, who did bring them to the scaffold and cut-off their heads: for he may see, that amongst some Nations, even a small punishment was thought capital. We shall therfore think, that the Egyptians of old in with-holding stately and glorious burials from their delinquent Kings, did esteem that as great, if not a greater punishment, then if they should have brought them forth, and caused cut-off their [Page 72] head. Diod. rcr. ant. lib. 2. cap. 3. In Meros they withdrew them­selves from the society of their delinquent Kings, till through want of company they consumed away in languish. This they esteemed a greater punishment, (and indeed so it was) then if they should have brought him to the scaffold. Alex. ab. Alex. lib. 3. cap. 5. And how the Egyptians plagued Amasis their King, is storied already, Prop. 1. Ans. The Senate amongst the Cum [...]ans, which they called Phylactus, holding their Kings by the hand, still detained them till they either rewarded them, or punished them according to their deserts. Alex. ab. Alex. ib. The heroick Theseus was ba­nished by the Athenians. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Diod. Sic. rev. ant. lib. 5. cap. 5. Plut. in Thes. Sardanapalus, because of his beastliness and sensuality, was dethroned by his subjects. Arist. Po. lit. lib. 5. cap. 10. Metasth. an. Pers. lib. Just. lib. 1. Diod. Sic. ant. lib. 3. cap. 7. And (as Herodotus, lib. 1. storieth) after Sar­dinapalus was put out of the way, both the Assyrians and Medes for a long time were governed without Kings, by Popular govern­ment. The Athenians did cut-off Cylon, together with his com­plices, who intruded himself upon the Kingdom, or at least endea­voured to do so. So did they cut-off Hipparchus, son to Pisistra­tus, and also endeavoured the off-cutting of Thessalus, another of his sons, who succeeded to him in the Kingdom. They did also cut­off Cleon, together with 1500 with him, who had destroyed the Commonwealth. Herac. de Pol. Ath. They caused Miltiades to die in ptison, although he was King of Chersonesus. Hered. lib. 6. Val. max. lib. 5. cap. 3. Aemil. Prob. in vit. Miltiad. Plut. in vit. Cim. And you will find Aristotle tell you in the general concerning Pisi­stratus and his posterity, who were Kings in Athens, how they were punished and shut from their Kingdom. Pol. 5. cap. 10. Leo­nidas, King of Lacedemonia was banished. So was Cleombrotus. And Agis was imprisoned, and cut-off in prison, though I must needs say, unjustly. Plut. in Ag. & Cle. But Aristotle shutteth­up all this in a word, [...], i. e. Therefore the L [...]cedemonians have destroyed many kingly powers. Pol. 5. cap. 10. The Syracusians, under the conduct of Dion, expelled Dionysius, and banished him. Arist. Pol. 5. cap. 10. Aemil. Prob. & Plut. in Dion. The Carthaginians once banished, and at last did cut-off Mach [...]us. Just. lib. 18. They also banished [Page 73] Ha [...]ibal, and forfeited his [...]state: And if he had not stolen away privily, they had cut him off. Plut. & Prob. in Han. Tarquini­us [...], C. C [...]sar, and D. Nero were cut-off by the Romans. Luc. A [...] lib. 1. cap. 7. lib. 4. cap. 2. P [...]ut. in C C [...]s. & Carol. M. Su [...]. in C Cas. & Ner. [...]. victor. in Ner. Epit. vit. C [...]s. in C C [...]s. Ignat. Ro [...]. prin. in lib. 1.

Inst. [...]. O but (faith Salmasius) Nero was cut-off, not de jure, but de [...], And ( [...]a [...]th he) there was as great a difference be­tween Cha [...]ls and Nero, as was between the Roman Senators, and the English Butchers. Def. R [...]g. cap. 4. Ans. This poor man koweth not what he would be at. His over-word is, Did ever any, as the Rebels in England, cut-off their King? Was ever any Nation (faith he) so monstruous, so cruel, and so barbarous as the English [...] Cut-purses, and bloody Butchers, who dared to put hand in their dread Sovereign? Read this man's Book all over, and you wil find this to be his over-word: What? Did not the Senat of Rome cut-off [...]? And yet (faith he) never any before did cut-off their King, but the English Enthusiasts, and giddy-headed Tray­ [...]ours. The man needeth not to look upon the off-cutting of Charls, as a thing singular: If he will not be wilfully deluded, he may learn from what foregoeth, many examples of punishing, and cutting off del [...]quent Kings. The Question between us is not on­ly, whether, or not Kings, de jure, may be cut-off; but also, whe­ther or not de suct [...], Kings were punished and cut-off by the Peo­ple? Concerning the fact, Salmasius cannot get it denied, albeit he strives to justle us out of it, by changing the state of the question, and starting aside from that, which for the present is most in hand. And I wonder much, that the man calleth in question the lawful­ness of the fact of the Roman Senat, in causing Nero to be cut-off. And as for the jus and lawfulness of the Roman Senat's fact, in cut­ting-off Nero, I know not, if any beside Salmasius can deny it, but an incarnat Devil: he was a murderer, a paricide, a persecuter of the Saints, and a destroyer of the Commonwealth. And Roy­allists themselves have not a face to deny, that it is lawful to cut-off Tyrants. And whereas he faith That there was a difference be­tween Nero and Charls, and between the Senatours of Rome, and the Representative of England. So say I too. Nero was an Eth­nick, but Charls a Christian. But friend, nomine Christian, and re [Page 74] Antichristian. In this he was worse then Nero, more dangerous at least, though not so grosse. Nero was a paricide, but not Charls. Yet let me tell you, as they differed in some things, they agreed in other things. As Nero was an enemy to Christ's reign, so was he. As Nero was a murderer, so was he. As Nero was a persecuter of the Saints, so was he. And as Nero was a destroyer of the Common­wealth, so was he. And as for the Representacive of England, they differ from the Roman Senatours in this, that they professed friend­ship to Christ, & the Roman Senatours in Nero's time were not so. And who, but enemies to Christ, will say, That Ethnicks had more power to execute judgment on a Tyrant, a persecuter of the Saints, and a destroyer of the Commonwealth, then such had in executing judgment on a man of that same stamp, rather worse then better?

And to draw home to our own doors, we will give you some ex­amples out of the English and Scotish Chronicles, how Kings were punished and brought upon the stage. Amongst the English Kings, we find these, Gorboniannus, Emeriannus, Vortiger, Ed­wine: All these were dethroned and put from their Kingdom. Ed­ward 2. was imprisoned by the Barons, with the help of the young Queen and Prince. Edward 5. was dethroned, and obscurely bu­ried in the Tower of London. Amongst the Scotish Kings we find not a few, who were either banished, imprisoned, or cut-off. The­reus by his Nobles was constrained to flee for fear of them. Dur­stius was killed in battel by his People. Gillus, his People and No­bles arising against him, diffiding his own, fled into Ireland, and at last was discomfited, taken, and killed. Evennus 3. was taken in battel by his Nobles, & condemned into perpetual bonds. Dardsanus was taken in battel, and being beheaded, his head was hanged-up for a spectacle, and his body cast into a Sinck. Lugthacus, once was censured by a Parliament, for slighting the counsel of the States, in appointing base men to Publick Offices; and at last he was killed by the Noblemen and People. The like hapned to Mogaldus, Conarus degraded and imprisoned (where he died) till he resign­ing the Kingdom, they substituted another. Athirco being pursued by his Nobles, killed himself. Donaldus 3. usurper, was killed by Crathilinthus, idonea manu collecta. Romachus was censured by the Parliament, and being beheaded by his Nobles, his head was put upon a pole. Constantinus 1. was punished by his States. [Page 75] Ferchardus 1. (Renuentem, arce expugnata,—in jus pertrahunt) in prison killed himself. Ferchardus 2. was also censured by the Parliament. Egenus 8. was put to death by the Parliament, all consenting thereto. Donaldus 5. being censured by the Parliament, was put in prison, where he killed himself. So Ethus being dethro­ned, in prison died of grief. Constantine 4. was killed in battel. Grimus, being taken in battel, his eyes were put out, and he died of wounds and grief. Macb [...]thus being vanquished, fled into the Castle of Dunse, where he was killed. Donald 7. was made to flee by Duncanus (for whom the Nobles sent) in Aebudas. Dun­canus was made to flee, and afterward put in prison, where he died. This was done by Edgar, sent for by the Noblemen to that pur­pose. Edward Baliol was expelled and shut-out of his kingdom. James 3. was killed in the pursuit by his Nobles. Q. Mary was arraigned in Parliament, and by a great part condemned to death, by many to perpetual imprisonment. What will Salmasius say to these practises? Or rather, what will the Scots speak of them? O marvelous and unspeakable Providence! Never enough admired, never enough praised: Behold, and see in this matter the stately steps of Providence. It is known this day to the world, that no Na­tion is so malignant as Scotland, so much idolizeth a King, and do­teth upon him as it doth: It is not ashamed, to postpone Christ's Interest to Caesar's. No Nation pleadeth so much for absolute power to the King, as it doth; It pleadeth for an absolute immu­nity to the King, from all punishment and restraint. And yet (albe­it I have read most of the ancient and chief Chronicles of all the an­cientest and chiefest Kingdoms of the world) I never read of any Kingdom that proceeded so much against, and so often did punish delinquent Kings, as the Scots in old have done. No question, our LORD in his wisdom hath done this, that the ancient Scots may stand up in judgment to-day, to condemn the practice of the latter Scots, who are not ashamed to idolize a King, a creature like them­selves.

Having most abundantly evidenced, how that Regal power in many sorrain Kingdoms, in old, hath been subjected to Law, no lesse then any inferiour power; we do now in the next room, draw­ing home toward our own doors, demonstrate, the King of Britain to be a regulated and non-absolute King, according to the Laws and [Page 76] Customes of England and Scotland. As for England, we must needs take it under these notions: 1. As it was before Julius Cae­sar conquered it: for that time, it is thought very doubtsome and uncertain, and therefore I minde to passe it at this time, till aft [...]r­wards in a more convenient place; in a word, not soaring to say, that Brutus, the first King of England, was an absolute King: for as he lived in the dayes of the Heroes, wherein Regall power was most in request, so by his own proper conduct and industry, he first­ly founded and planted a Kingdom there. This cometh nigh that which Aristotle saith, alledging that [...]n the dayes of the Heroes Kings had [...]. Observe by the way, that tho [...]gh [...] draweth nigh to [...], yet is there some difference be­tween them. but how they diff [...]r, as also how Aristotle in this place is to be understood, you have at length expressed afterward. Now Aristotle fo [...] his saying assigneth many causes, amongst which these be, [...] either by gathering people tog [...]ther, or by pu [...]c [...]asing a kingdom. Pelit. 3. cap. 10. Now Brutus, a [...] is reported, did both these. And consequently, we need not scruple to say, that he had a full and absolute power. We dare not say so much in behalf of his posterity, and those who immedi­atly s [...]cceeded h [...]m. Heroîcisme then was upon the declining hand, and withall, the people were not so much engaged to them as to Brutus himself. And, after the Line of Brute was ended, it is reported, that Corbomannus K. 28. was depo­sed by the people, which could not have been, if he had had an absolute and arbitrary power. Emerianus K. 34. when he had ty­rannously reigned seven years, was deposed. Chirennus, K. 41. through his drunkennes reigned but one year. Whereupon we may very probably conclude, that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus, who was subdued by Julius Caesar, the English Kings were not abso­lute. 2. As it was from Julius Caesar, unto William the Con­querour. As for this time, there may be something said for the ab­solutenesle of the English Kings. If we speak of those Kings whom the Roman Emperours deputed, it is likely, they had an absolute power, by derivation from the Roman Emperours, as had Herod from Antonius, and the Roman Senat. Jos. ant. lib. 15. cap. 4. And whileas the Englishes were subdued by the Danes and Saxons, I think it no wonder, though then the Kings of England had an [Page 77] absolute power, and that which is called [...]. We have shewed already, that conquering Kings are all-commanding Kings. See. Concl. 1.4. And those who are acquainted with the English History, do know, that from Cassivelanus, unto William the Conquerour, the Kingdom of England was never free, either of intestine or of forraigne wars. It was no time then for exerci­sing Laws to the full against any, much lesse Kings. There were some of their Kings at that t [...]e, to whose conduct and valour the En­gl [...]shes were much engaged, [...] maintaining their Liberties and with­standing the force and fury of the common Enemy. No wonder, though such, by way of gratification, were invested with a full and large power. Others again were meer Conquerours, or else depu­ted by the Conquerour And so we think, there was reason for it, why such were clothed with an absolute and plenary power: for then the Kingdom of England was not under Kings but under Ma­sters. And what can Masters do, but ford over their servants? All that while the Kingdom of England was an unsettled King­dom, and could scarcely be called it's own. Which maketh me in reason conclude, that the [...] there was little time left for exercising Policy and putting Lawes in execution. This Polydo us Virg [...] ­lius telleth in a word whileas he saith, that before Henry 1. there were few Conventions made by the Kings amongst the people, for ordering according to Law the businesse of the Kingdom. Angl. hist. lib. 11. Although in an absolute notion [...], we may say, that from Brutus unto Cassivelanus, and from Cassivelanus unto William the Conquerour, Kingly Government in England was non absolute, and without full power, yet we cannot say so in a relative notion [...], as afterward shall appear.

3. As the Kingdom of England was about the dayes of the Conquerour, whether a little before, or afterward, unto this time. We deny not but under the reigne of the Conquerour himself, Re­gall Government in England, was of a most absolute and arbitrary power. In this we take Salmasius by the hand. He needed not Des. Reg. c [...]p. 8. to have troubled himself to have cited any Au­thors for proof thereof: Very reason it-self teacheth the p [...]t: for he subdued England by strength of hand. But sure I am, a Conque­rour may dispose upon a conquered Kingdom, according to his plea­sure. It is an act of favour in him if he do not destroy all, much more [Page 78] as an absolute Lord to rule over all. In the interim I desire Sal­masius to take a view of Polyd. Virg. Angl. hist. lib. 9. where he shall find the point evidenced to his heart's desire, beyond any Historian he citeth. Although in this we go-along with him (as we must needs do) yet notwithstanding we can­not say so much, whether concerning Edward who pre­ceded, or those who succeeded him. Let it be so, that those who succeeded the Conquerour, had the same priviledges which the Conquerour did arrogat to himself. Yet can it not be denied, but according to Edward the Confessour his Lawes, or as they are called, the ancient Lawes of the Kingdom, Kingly Government in England is regulated, and not absolute. We make the point good from these reasons. Firstly, because according to these Laws the King of England is not hereditary. And therefore we read not, that ever Edward did tie the Crown of England to Royall succession. I confesse, it is alledged, that he promised the Crown after him to William the Conquerour, (who was of neer kinred and great credit with him) if he had not children of his own. But this is not only improbable in it-self, but also it is so judged. And why shall we think other wayes of it, seing the Conquerour came not to the Crown of England, by blood-right, but by meer Con­quest, having the whole Kingdom of England against him? And Polydore saith, Hinc colligere licet, vel Edovardum non servasse sidem Gulielmo, quam à principio de hereditate regni, non satis considerate dedisset,—vel nullum (qnod verisimilius est) fe­cisse promissum. Angl. hist. lib. 8. This he gathereth from that which Edward spake to Haraldus, whileas he prayed GOD, that either he would avert the comming of England into the Conque­rours hand, or else that he would keep him back from it so long as he lived. Therefore to me it is more then apparent, that the Con­fessour did not in his Testament assigne the Conquerour to the Crown, albeit Salmasius alledgeth the contrary, Def. Reg. cap. 8. What? Doth not Polydore tell us, that because Edgarus was of young and tender years, he was not admitted by the people to reigne? And fearing lest the Conquerour should succeed to the Crown, they rejoyced greatly, that Harald took upon him to reigne in Edward's room: Whereat (as may be learned from Po­lydore) Edward was not displeased himself, but very well satis­fied [Page 79] that Harald should succeed to him. Whereupon we fear not to say, that not onely the power of enkinging was in the people's hands, but also, that the Confessour did not promise the Kingdom to the Conquerour after him, although the contrary be alledged. And is it likely, that the people would have so much de­clined and withstood the Conquerour, if Edward had assigned him to the Crown as his heir? No verily; for they adored him as their Law-giver. It is known, that Rufus was but third son to the Con­querour, and yet he was created King. Him the people preferred be­fore Robert his eldest brother. What? Would they have done so, if blood-right, by the Law of the Kingdom, had been the title to the Crown? No verily: It is remarkable, that Rufus was ordained King, and it was not so much as objected, that Robert was elder then he, he being but the third son to the Conquerour, and Robert being the eldest. Yea, Rufus dying without children, they appoin­ted Henry, the Conquerours fourth son, King; as yet passing-by Robert the eldest. And (which is more) though Henry 1. had left in his Testament, his daughter Mathildis, together with her sons, as heirs of the Kingdom, yet not withstanding the people crea­ted Steven, Nephew to Henry 1. By the authority of Parliament it was ordained, that Steven so long as he lived, should enjoy the Kingdom of England, and that Henry 2. son to Marthilais, daugh­ter to Henry 1. should succeed to Steven in the Kingdom of Eng­land, passing by any that was begotten by Steven. Likewayes the people created John King; although K. Richard (dying without heirs) had lest Arthure, son to Gaufredus, who was elder then John, heir to the Crown. I might speak more for clearing this put­pose, but I forbear, judging this sufficient. Whence it is more then evident, that the Crown of England, since the dayes of Edward the Confessour, by no Law of the Kingdom, is hereditary. I con­fesse, since that time, now and then, the Kings eldest son did succeed, and was holden as Heir of the Kingdom. But this was onely by custome, through favour of the Race, in which, according to the manner of Nations, (which I must needs call an abuse) very ordi­narily the first-born, is preferred as the onely lawfull Heir of the Crown. Therefore seing the Crown of England since that time hath not been (at least, precisely) hereditary; to me it seemeth very probable, that for that time it hath not been absolute [Page 80] and arbitrary: for so the original and fountain-power of enkinging is in the People's hands. And consequently in this respect, the Peo­ple are simply above the King, as the cause is simply above its ef­fect. Philosophers say. That can a est n [...]bi [...] [...] effect [...]. And so, seing the King of England dependeth from the People; no que­stion, they have simply a power over him, and not he an absolute power over them.

Secondly, Because, according to these Laws, the liberty of the subject is vindicated, and the Prince is subjected to Law. Because in Henry 1. his time, a Parliament was holden. At which time Parliamentary Power by the Law of the Kingdom was declared the Supream and highest Authority: for any thing of weight was re­ferred to it. So that whatsoever was done, either by the command of the King, or of the People, it was holden null, unlesse it had been ratified by the Parliament. In it every one, whether King, or other Members thereof, have alike and equal power of speaking. And withall, nothing spoken in it is of validity and force, unlesse it be concluded on by the major part, together with the approbation of the King. Polyd. Ang. hist. lib. 11. It is observable. That by the authority of the Parliament it was ordained, That Steven so long as he lived, should remain King of England, and that Henry 2. af­terward should succeed him. By whose mediation and authority, the debate between Henry and Steven touching the Crown, was decided. And, I pray you, how could these things have been, unlesse the Parliament had been above the King?

Inst. 4. But ( saith Salmasius) the power of convocating, and dissolving the Parliament, belongeth to the King of England. The power of the Parliament is extraordinary, and pro-tune. But the power of the King is ordinary and perpetual. And likewise, the King of England in Parliament, hath a negative voice. And there­fore in many Acts of Parliament, he is called the King and Lord of the Parliament, and what is ordained, is enacted in his Name. And so ( saith he) though the King of England doth act according to the Laws of the Kingdom, and concurrence of his Parliament, yet notwithstanding, he is an absolute King. Otherwise the Kings of the Jews had not been absolute, who had power to do nothing with­out the consent of the Sanhedrin. And Artaxerxes had not been absolute, who could not be reconciled to Vasthi, because the Law [Page 81] discharged it. Yea, if Kings were not absolute, because they act according to the Law, and the advice of their Parliament; then Cambyses had not been absolute; who conveened a Councel, while­as he intended to marry his german sister, and demanded of them, if there was any such law for allowing such a marriage. Def. Reg. cap. 8. & 9.

Answ. Salmasius shall do well, to consider these few things. 1. What the power of the English Parliament is. Which is defi­ned by Camdenus, to be made-up of three Estates, having the highest and most sovereign power in making Laws, confirming Laws, annul­ling Laws, interpreting Laws, and in doing every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is concerned. Brit. chorog. de Tribun. Ang. This is far from Salmasius mind, who ( Def. Reg. cap. 9.) opinionateth, that the Parliament hath not power over every thing in the Kingdom. But Polydore summeth-up the power of the Par­liament under these notions. First, Every thing wherein the good of the Commonwealth is interested, is referred to it. Secondly, Whatsoever is done at the command, whether of King or People, is of none effect, unless it be authorized by the Parliament. Third­ly, It establisheth and taketh away Laws, as it judgeth fit. Fourth­ly, Every Member of it hath a-like power and freedom in voicing. And what is decreed and enacted by Parliament, he calleth it, the proper and municipal Law of the Kingdom. Seing then the Par­liament is the most sovereign and supream power in the Kingdom of England, according as it was in old; how can it be said, That the King of England hath power over it? If it be so, then you ad­mit two Supream powers, and a power above a Supream power; which is contradicent. The Lacedemonian Ephori were no other­wise above their Kings, but because they were invested with the highest and supream power. All things were referred to the Par­liament, even as the Roman Consuls, as Festus (out of Coelidus) saith, did refer every thing to the Senate. Now, because of this, the Senate had the highest power, and was above the Consuls. Er­go, seing all matters of the Commonwealth in old, in the Kingdom of England, were referred to the Parliament, no question it had power above the King. The Roman Senate is therefore said, to have been of the supreamest power, Fenest. de Magistrat. Rom. cap. 1. because neither Kings, nor Consuls, nor Dictators, [Page 82] nor any other Magistrate, could do any thing without their advice and counsel. Ergo, seing whatsoever the King of Eng­land, or any other of that Kingdom, did in old, was to no purpose, without the authority and approbation of Parliament, without all controversie the King of England was subjected to the Parliament. Salmasius concludeth the King to be above the Parliament, be­cause he alledgeth, the Parliament can do nothing without the King. Why may not I then conclude, the Parliament to be above the King, because re ipsa, and according to the Law of the Kingdom, the King can do nothing without the authority and consent of the Parliament? Where then, I pray you, is the King's negative voice? There is not a Member in Parliament, cui oequa loquendi potesias non competit. So saith Polyd. Angl. hist. lib. 11. What? Do you imagine, that ever the Parliament could by their authority have drawen-up the foresaid agreement, between Steven and Henry 2. unlesse they had had power above the King? What they did there­in, was a direct acting both over Steven their present King, and Henry 2. their future King. But, will you tell me, whileas the States of England did seek of K. John, to be governed by the anci­ent Lawes made by Edward the Confessour, whether or not were these Lawes Acts of meet pleasure, giving the King a liberty to do as he would, either to tyrannize over the people, or not? You can not hold the affirmative, because what they demanded of the King, was to be restored to liberty & to be freed of tyranny. Polyd. Vir. Angl. hist. lib. 15. And if you hold the negative part, then do the ancient Laws of England pull absolutenesse out of the king's hands, and subject him to Law. Magna charta saith, The King can do nothing but by Lawes, and no obedience is due to him but by Law. And the States of England were so far from permitting John to rule at randome, and not according to the ancient Lawes of the kingdom, that contrarywise they combined against him, entering in oath together, to pursue him still on, till he should govern according to Law, and establish the ancient Lawes of the kingdom. Yea, al­beit that Pope Innocent commanded them to lay-down arms, and though upon their deniall thereof, they were declared enemies by the Pope, they notwithstanding followed-on their purpose, and cryed-out, that they would be avenged by fire and sword, on such a wicked tyrant, who did so much slight the people. Aye, which [Page 83] is more, they sent into France, and from thence brought Ludovick the French king's son, and created him king, notwithstanding any thing either John or the Pope could do in the contrary. Thus they never rested, till in sorrow they brought John's head into the grave. Where I pray you is the absolutenesse of the king of Eng­land, whenas the States would not suffer him to govern but ac­cording to Law, and in denying to do so, pursued him in arms, un­kinging him, enkinging another in his room, and bringing himself in sorrow to the grave? This is far from the arbitrary and infinite power of kings, Salmasius speaketh of. And whereas he saith, the parliament is but extraordinary and pro tunc, this is, either because Kings were long before Parliaments; or because the Parliament hath not power to intermeddle in every businesse of the Common­wealth, but is conveened pro re nata, for ordering the weightiest Affairs of the kingdom. If you say the former, we do not deny it. We heartily confesse, that of all Governments, Monarchy was first established. And Aristotle giveth the reason of it, because (saith he) in the beginning it was hard to find-out many men, fit and able to govern. And therefore necessity moved them to lay the govern­ment on one: for though in the beginning it was hard to finde-out many, yet was it easie to finde-out one endowed with qualities and gifts for governing. Polit. 3. cap. 11. lib. 4. cap. 13. But though this be granted, yet doth it not follow, but Senats, or Parliaments being established, they have (even according to the custome of the Nations) more power then kings, as is shewed already. And therefore Aristotle saith in the places fore-cited, that by processe of time, the number of Common-wealth's-men increasing, kings at last went close out of request, and were denuded of all power. And Pol. 3. cap. 10. he saith, that in after-times the power of kings was extremely lessened, partly because of their own voluntary demit­ting, and partly because of the people's detracting from their great­nesse. Nay, any king Aristotle alloweth, he alloweth no more power and greatnesse to him, but to be greater and more powerful then every one separatim, and many conjunctim, but to be of lesse power and greatnesse then the peoople. Pol. 3. cap. 11. But I pray you, what is the Parliament, but the Representative of the people? If you say the other, we deny it, as is shewed already. And it seem­eth very strange to me, that the Parliament hath not power in small [Page 84] matters, and yet hath power to manage and go about matters of highest concernment. If Salmasius will ask Philosophs, they can tell him, Qui potest majus, potest minus. He imagineth that he gaineth the point, because the King of England had power to con­veen and dissolve the Parliament, as he judged fit. This is but a singing of the triumph before the victory: for the Roman Consuls had the same power over the Senat. Alex. ab Alex. gen. di. lib. 3. cap. 3. But who will say, that they had an absolute power over the Senat, though they had power of convocating and dissolving it? It is not unknown, that their power notwithstanding, was a non-ab­solute and limited power. Alex. ab Al. ibid. Pompon. Let. de mag. Rom. cap. 15. Fenest. de mag. Rom. cap. 7. So say Festus and Coelidus.

2. What honour is given to the King. And if Salmasius will consider this aright, he will find that there is a vast disproportion between his honour and his power, and that there is more given to him in word then in deed. The King of Scotland cannot be cal­led by Salmasius, or any other, an absolute Prince. This afterward shall most evidently appear. And yet in many Acts of Parliament he is called the Parliament's Sovereign Lord and King, and what is enacted in Parliament, ordinarily it is expressed under the King's name. Salmasius imagineth, that this maketh much for his pur­pose, whileas it is said, Dominus noster Rex, ad petitionem suorum proelatorum, comitum, & baronum congregatorum in Parlamen­to, constituit certos articulos. In praf. stat. voc. Art. sup. chart. temp. Ed. 1. i.e. Our Lord the King at the desire of his Prelats, Earles and Barons, assembled in Parliament, constituted certain Ar­ticles. In Parlamento supremi domini Regis, illius concilium con­venit, & it a proeceptum est ab ipsomet. In stat. Escheat. fact. 29. an. Edv. 1. i. e. In the Parliament of our Sovereign Lord the King, his Councell conveened, and so it was commanded by himself. The like we have in the Acts of the Scotish Parliaments. Eodcm die Rex per modum statuti ordinavit. Jam. 1. Parl. 6. act. 83. i.e. The same day the King by way of Statute, ordained.— Rex, ex consensu totïus Parlamenti, statuit & ordinavit. act. 84. i.e. The King with consent of the whole Parliament, did statute and ordain. But Parl. 5. act. 81. the King withall getteth a very lordly stile. Item the said day, our sovereigne Lord the King, with consent of the [Page 85] whole Parliament, ordained. The Scotish parliamentary acts are full to this purpose. But can any therefore conclude, that the King of Scotland is an absolute Prince? No verily. Kings get such honour, and every thing for the most part is enacted and emitted in their name, not because they have power and dignity above the Parlia­ment, but because they are the highest and chiefest Members of Par­liament. And let me tell you, people are so much deluded with the greatnesse of the King, that they cannot give him onely that which is his due, but they ascribe that which is due both to him and Par­liament, to him alone. People know better how to idolize Kings, then how to honour them. Yea, people are more ready to obey the King, then the Parliament: And therefore I think, Parlia­ments that will have Kings for effectuating their purposes, do wife­ly to emit Acts in the King's name, and set him a-work to execute them. Therefore Salmasius shall not need to boast with this, that the King of England is called, the Parliament's Sovereigne Lord; and the Parliament, the Councell of the King. The like he will find more then once amongst the Prefaces and Acts of the Sco­tish Parliaments. Yet he, or any for him, can never prove, that the King of Scotland is an absolute King. He shall therefore do well, (left he confound things which should be divided) to distinguish carefully between that which the king hath re tenus, and what is given to him but nomine tenus. And so he will find, that though the king of England hath as much nomine tenus, as if he were an absolute Prince, yet re tenus he is subjected to Law.

And whereas he alledgeth, kings may governe by advice and counsell of Parliament, and yet may be absolute, and have a nega­tive voice, the like say I too. But he shall give me leave to say, that such have not such a vast power as he talketh-of, as afterward is shewed. I confesse, the examples of Ahasuerus and Cambyses are to the purpose, though the man fail a-little concerning the jus of the kings of the Jewes, as afterward is shewed. Howsoever, though I grant this, yet shall he never prove, that the king of Eng­land, according to the Law of the kingdom, is an absolute Prince, and hath a negative voice in Parliament. He can never shew me, that the king of England had the same power which the king of Persia had.

Inst. After the Conquerour (saith Salmasius) in Rufus', Henry 1 [...] [Page 86] Steven, Henry 2. and Richard 1. did remain purum putum Mo­narchicum, the power of even-down and unmixed Monarchy. And though (faith he) in the reigne of King John, that power was les­sened, yet was there nothing derog ated from the King's suprema­cy and absolutenesse, remaining unviolated, untill the perjured En­glish rebels at this day have altered and diminished the just great­nesse of the King of England. Def. reg. cap. 8.

Ans. I admire that this man knoweth nothing, but to rail on them whom he knoweth not. Well, I cast him over into GOD'S hands, and fall to examine what he alledgeth. Sure I am, not with­standing all his railing, it cannot abide the touch-stone. It is known to be a manifest lie which he alledgeth, concerning the immediat successours of the Conquerour. It is reported in even-down terms, that these kings (of whom Salmasius expresly speaketh) estee­med Norman Laws established by the Conquerour, too rigo­rous and unjust. And therefore, before they got the Crown, they promised to the people to abrogate them, and in place of them, to establish the Laws of the Confessour. Yea, every-one of them promised more then another, and to keep themselves within the bounds of Law, to the very heart's desire of the people. This was not only promised by themselves, but also by others in their name. And unlesse they had so promised, they could never have gotten the Crown. They got it upon the expectation of the accomplish­ment of their promise, as the English Histories do abundantly sto­rie. And it cannot be denied but Henry 1. did give the Englishes a free Parliament, and made it the government of the kingdom. So that he is called the first king in England, in whose time the power of Parliament was established. And as for John, it is very well known, that because he did not stand to his oath and promise at his Coronation, for establishing the ancient Laws of the kingdom, but endeavoured to governe after the manner of the Conquerour, in an arbitrary and loose way, therefore the people rose-up in arms a­gainst him, and dethroning him, did set-up another in his room. And whereas this man saith, that the ancient Lawes of the kingdom did not derogate from the supremacy and absolutenesse of the king, the contrary of that is already proved. It seemeth strange to me, that he is not ashamed to affirm, that what Laws were established by Edward the Confessour, and granted by King John, were pre­served [Page 87] inviolable to this day, derogating nothing from the absolute­nesse of John's successours. Who knoweth not, that the liberties of Magna Charta, and de Foresta subject the King to Law? And because that Henry 3. did not stand to the maintenance thereof, af­ter he had given his Oath at a Parliament at Oxford, to maintain them inviolable, therefore the People took up Arms against him, till after many debates between them, they caused him often to pro­mise, that they should be inviolably observed, as well by him, as by all other. Thus they tied, not only him, but also his heirs, to govern according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom. And because Edward 2. did act against these Laws, following the counsel of Pe­ter Gaveston, and the two Spensers, therefore he was imprisoned and dethroned, after several conslicts between him and the People? 'Tis remarkable, that the People refused to crown him, till firstly he did put P. Gaveston from him. And likewise Edward 5. was deposed, after he had reigned two moneths and eleven dayes, and was obscurely buried in the Tower of London. Where then, I pray you, is the absoluteness of the King of England?

Inst. 6. Under Edward 4. (saith Salmasius) it was enacted, That the King might erect a publick Judgment-seat, by his Let­ters patent, in any part of the kingdom he would. Under Henry 7. it was enacted and declared, That the King had a full power in all Causes, in administring Justice to every one. In the first year of Edward 6. a Statute was made, declaring, all authority, both Spi­ritual and Temporal, to be derived from the King. Def. Reg. cap. 9.

Answ. I must needs say, This hath more colour of probation, then any thing the man as yet hath objected. But not withstanding this he will do well to observe this distinction. 1. What is given to the King by way of complement and Court-expression. 2. What is giving to him in reality and by way of action. The truth is, in the first notion there is as much ascribed to the King of England, as if he had been indeed an absolute Prince. On him you have these Court-Epithets, The King of the Parliament, The sovereign Lord of the Parliament. Yea, and the Parliament is called, The Parlia­ment of the King. He is called, The Original both of Spirituall and Temporal power; having full power over all causes and persons, and to crect Judicatories in any part of the kingdom, where he [Page 88] pleaseth. This is spoken. But what then? Examine the matter a­right, and you will find it but spoken. What? cannot Court-Para­sites, and flattering Councellors passe a fair compellation upon their Prince? 'Tis the least thing they can do, to bring themselves in cre­dit with him. Read the Parliamentary Acts of Scotland, and you will find just as much spoken, if not more, of the King of Scotland. In Parl. 18. Jam. 6. Act. 1. & 2. James 6. is called, Sovereign Monarch, absolute Prince, Judge and Governour over all Estates, Persons, and Ca [...]ses. And yet who dare say, but the King of Scot­land, according to the Law of the kingdom, is a regulated and non­absolute Prince? But according to the second notion, let us exa­mine the strength of these Epithets. And so in the first place we fall a-discussing particularly these three Sanctions, of which Salmasius speaketh. The first faith, That the King by his Letters patent may erect Court-Judicatories in any part of the Kingdom, where he pleaseth. This will never conclude, that the King of England hath an absolute power. This Act only speaketh of his power of calling inferiour Judicatories. What is that to the purpose? The King of England had power to call, and dissolve the Parliament, the highest Judicatory of the Land. Yea, Henry 1. did ordain and constitute the Parliament. Yet notwithstanding that, (as is shewed already) the King of England cannot be called absolute. The King of Scot­land hath power of giving-out Letters of Caption. Parl. Jam. 2. chap. 12. Courts of Regalities are justified by the King's Justice, chap. 26. And the Parliament petitioned the King to cause execute the Act anent the Establishment of Sessions, for executing Justice, chap. 65. The power of the Colledge of Justice is ratified and ap­proved by the King. Jam. 5. Parl. Edinb. Mar. 17.1532. But who will therefore call the King of Scotland an absolute King? The second Sanction giveth the King full power over all persons, and all causes. But I pray you, doth this give the King power over the Parliament and Laws? No verily. It only giveth the King power over all persons and estates, separatim, but not conjunctim, as conveened in parliament. Which cometh just to that which A­ristotle faith, alledging, that the King hath power over all, seorsim, but not conjunctim. Polit. 3. cap. 11. And he is said, to have a full power, not because his power is absolute and boundlesse. Verily, it must not be taken in a simple and absolute notion, but in a rela­tive [Page 89] and comparative sense. It doth not imply the exemption and immu­nity of the King, from Civill and Politick subjection to Law: But at the most it pleadeth for exemption to him from forraine power, and subje­ction to forrain laws. This is evident by comparing this sanction un­der Henry 7. with stat. 18. Rich. 2. ch. 5. Where it is declared that the Crown of England is free without subjection to any other Crown, but is onely subject immediatly to GOD, in every thing which relateth to the managing of it's Affairs. The like is spoken Henry 8. Par. 24. So we find the like fulnesse of power pleaded-for to the King of Scotland. ITEM It is thought expedient, that since our Soveraign Lord hath full jurisdiction, and free empire within his Realm, that his Highnesse may make Notares,and in time to-come, that no Notare made nor to be made by the Emperour's authority have faith in Contracts Civill, unlesse he beapproved by the King's highnesse. Jam. 3. parl. ch. 38. This exemption is pleaded for to the King of Scots, from subjection to the Imperiall Lawes. But who, I pray you, for this will conclude the King of Scots to be an ab­solute Prince, having immunity and freedome from all Lawes, whether muncipall and Country-Lawes, or sorensick and forrain? And as for the third sanction, the words whereof be these, Omnem authoritatem spi­ritualem & temporalem derivari a Rege, you shall be pleased concerning it to observe this distinction. There be two termes in the act it-self, one concerning temporall and another concerning spirituall power. We begin at temporall power. The King may be called the originall of it two wayes. 1. Formally, i.e. as if all temporall power were therefore authoritative and juridicall, because of the Kingly power, it being only in it-self effentially authoritative and commanding. This we deny to be the sense of the sanction, in respect of temporall power. It is not onely repugnant to Magnacharta, the ancient Lawes of the Kingdom, the nature of Parliaments appointed and ordained in Henry 1. his time, to the oaths and promises of Rufus, Henry 1. & their successoursto act and govern ac­cording to Law, but also to the ordinary practices of the Estates, who in maintenance of their Liberties and the ancient Laws of the Kingdom, did rise in armes against their Kings, and caused them nilled they, willed they, to subject their necks to the yokes of Law. Amongst other of their practices this is very remarkable, that albeit they had saluted Ludovick as their King, and put him in the room of John, yet notwithstanding in the end they declined him, and in his stead crowned Henry 3. John's son. This speaketh much of the States power above the King. 2. Virtu­ally. It cannot be denied but in this notion all temporall power depen­deth from the King. And that two wayes, effectively, and vindicatively. Effectively, because the King of England had not onely power of convee­ning & dissolving the Parliament & of ordaining inferior Judicatories, but also by him the Parliament of England was firstly instituted and or­dained. [Page 90] Vindicatively, because it was his part to patronize and execute the acts of Parliament, at least as the main and prime man of main­taining and defending them. The like power the Kings of Scotlana had also as is clear from their Acts of Parliament. But as for the spirituall power of the King of England, I stand not much to confesse that he had a formall and Ecclefiastick power in Church-matters, and that what power the Church (so called) had was derived from him. It cannot be denied, but before the conquest there were Ecclesiasticall Laws made by many Kings of England, as Inas, Alfred, Edward the elder, Gythrum, Ethelstane, Edmund, Edgar, Aetheldred, Canutus and others. In the in­terim this Gentleman shall do well to observe, that the King of England had not alwayes this power. It cannot be denied but Lanfrancus, An­selmus, and Berket going to complain on their Kings and Governours, firstly brought the Pope's judiciall authority from Rome into England, both over King and people. Which supremacy of the Pope over the Church of England untill in and about Henry 8. his dayes, who did shake-off the Pope's yoke, did continue. And so Edward 6. succeed­ing to him; to me it is more then probable that by the scresaid sanction made in his time, the ancient power of the Kings of England in Church­matters was taken out of the Pope's hands, and put upon the King. And it cannot be denied, but according to Edward the Confessour's Lawes, the King of England had a primary formall and Ecclesiastick power in Church-matters. I stand not to grant that. But what though I should say, that according to this statute made in Edward 6. his time, the King of England had a primary and originall power, and that formally, both in respect of spirituall and temporall jurisdiction; yet will it onely con­clude an absolutenesse of the King according to Law, but not against it. It no wayes denudeth the people of a fountain-power, to desend them­selves against the unjust decrees and actings of the King. The Roman dictatour had an absolute power in judging, and yet it was lawfull for the people to repeal his acts in their own just defence. Many times have the People of England defended themselves from their King and stood by their own liberties; notwithstanding the King's acting against them. What, I pray you, is it for me to say that the King of England by this act is called the originall both of spirituall and temporall power, under a formall notion? Is he not called also the King and Sovereign Ford of the Parliament? Is not the Parliament called his Parliament? Is not every thing ordinarily acted and emitted under his name? Is it not ordinarily said, It is ordained by the King With the eonsent, or at the desire of the three Estates? It is very seldome said, It is ordained by the King and Parliament. But, I pray you, what be these but Court-com­plements? They are words, and nothing but words. Go, conser them with the practice of the Parliament, and you shall finde the one just [Page 91] contrary to the other. No wonder forsooth, because the King getteth more honour then he hath power. Trie this, and you will find it an or­dinary practice. Aye, which is more, cannot a corrupt Parliament through the defection of the times give the King more then what is due to him, either by the Law of GOD, or by the law of the Nation? Know we not that Parl. 18. K. Jam. 6. through the backsliding of the times did advance him to greater priviledges then the King of Scotland by the Law of the Kingdome had, or can be warranted by the Law of GOD? Indeed, I will not say so of Henry 8. for it is known that in his young years he did put the managing of the Kingdom into the hands of the Princes, as did others of his predecessors before him. And as for Edward 6. I must needs say, his times were better then any times of his predecessors. But it appeareth to me, that as both Henry and he have encroached very far upon the liberties of the Church (so called) so did they encroach too far upon the liberties of the State. But leaving Henry, of whose power I find not so much spoken as of Edward, I must tell you one thing concerning Edward, and it is this. Those who write of him, and namely Foxe, do crie him up beyond all the Kings of Eng­land, for piety, wisdom and learning. And Foxe runneth so far out in his commendation, that he esteemeth him inferiour to no King, though worthy to be preferred to many. Whereupon he feareth not to match him with Josiah, and put the qualifications of both in one ballance. Which maketh me imagine that the foresaid act emitted in Parliament under Edward's reign, did passe in his behalfe, because of his personall endowments. The like act upon that same ground, (though in re­spect of him it was meerly pretended, without any reality in his person) did passe Parl. 18. upon K. Iam. 6. Thus the case is extraordinary We den [...]e not but because of personall endowments Kings may be, and have been advanced to greatest power. What? will this conclude an ordi­nary president thereof, and a standing law therefore? No verily, There is no consequence from extraordinaties to ordinaties. The standing an­cient lawes both of England and Scotland are against absolute Princes. Of scotland and of England we have spoken already at length. Verily the example of Edward 1. though there were no more, may serve to clear o [...]r purpose. He, to repair what was done amisse by his father Henry 3. (who was at variance with the people touching the liberties of Magna charta, and de foresta) did much gratifie the people; restoring them to great liberty, and abrogating all lawes which did make for the bon­dage and slavery of the people. Howsoever the matter be five sic, five non, these sanctions above-cited by Salmasius, do conclude the Parlia­ment to have power above the King. The reason is, because if we look precisely on these acts, what power the King hath is from them. They not onely declare, but also they enact and ratifie his power to be such [Page 92] such. And so the king's power is the creature of the Parliament, depen­ding from it, as the effect from the cause. But sure I am, cause est nobilior suo effectu, And consequently, if the king hath an absolute power, by vertue of the Parliament, then must the Parliament's power be more absolute; for prepter quod unumquodque est tale, illud ipsum est magis tale. And nemo dat qnod non habet.

Inst. 7. Bractonus (saith Salmasius) doth averre, that the King hath power over all that is in his kingdome. And that those things which concern peace and power, do only belong to the Royal dignity. Every one (saith he) is under the King, and he is inferiour to none but to GOD, as reason requireth. In power be ought to be above all his subjects: for he ought to have none like him, nor above him in the Kingdom. De Angl. Monar lib 4. cap. 24 fect. 1. lib. 1. cap. 8 sect. 8 & lib. 2. de Reg. In Rich. 2. stat. 18. cap. 5. it is said, Corona Anglie libera fuit omnt tempore. & non habet terrenam subjectionem, sed immediate subdita est DEO in omnibus rebus, & nulli alteri. Act. 24 Parl. Henr. 8. Regnum Angliae est Imperium, & ita ab orbe fuit acceptum. Act. Parl. 24, Hen. 8. Quod hoc tuae gratiae regnum nullum superiorem sub DEO, sed so­lum tuam gratlam agnoscat. Euit, & est liberum a subjectione quarumcunque legum bumanarum— Cap. 9.

Ans. We stand not to glosse Bracton's words. He lived in Henry 3. his dayes. And finding the King and States at variance about superio­rity, as a Court-parafit, he wrote in behalf of the King, as Royallists do now-a-dayes. He did just so as they do now Bracton had that same oc­casion of writing in behalf of the King, which Salmasius hath to-day. As the late King was at variance with the people of England, for claiming absolute power over them; so the controversie stood just so in Bracton's time between Henry 3. and the people. But I pray you was it not as free to Bracton to flatter Henry, as for salmasius to flatter Charles? Leaving this man to himself, I hasten to examinet he strength of these Acts which Salmasius citeth. And in a word, they do not plead so much for the ab­solutenesse of the king, as of the kingdom. They do not speak de Rege Angliae, of the king of England, but de corona, or Regno Angliae, of the Crown or kingdom of England. Howsoever, none of them doth speak for immunity and exemption to the king of England, from municipall, but from forraign Laws: And therefore they declare the Crown of England to be a free Crown, and subject to no other Crown; and the kingdom of England to be a free kingdom, subject to the Laws of no o­ther kingdom. I confesse, they declare the king to be above the king­dom, and inferiour to none but to GOD. Which is true indeed, taking the kingdom in esse divisivo but not in esse conjunctivo. Indeed, the King is above all in the kingdom sigillatim, one by one And in this respect he is inferiour to none but to GOD, though taking the kingdom in a col­lective body, he be inferiour thereto.

[Page 93] Inst. 8. In the first year of James his reign in England, the Parliament ac­knowledgeth him to have an undoubted title to the Crown by blood-right. And therefore they did swear alleageance both to him and his posterity. Where­upon Camdenus saith, that the King of England hath supreme power and meer empire. De Brit. lib. And Edvardus Cokius saith, That according to the ancient Laws of the Kingdom, the Kingdom of England is an absolute Kingdom: Wherein both the Clergy-men and Laicks are subjected immediat­ly under GOD, to their own King and head. Cap. 9.

Ans. As for that concerning James, we make no reckoning of it: He was declared the righteous and undoubted heir of the kingdom through the defection and back-sliding of the times. What other Kings of Eng­land hinted at before, that he did execute. Because he became King of Great Britain, and entered the kingdom of England upon blood relati­on; therefore slattering, Malignant and Antichristian Counsellours did declare his title to the kingdom of England to be of undoubted heredita­ry right. I pray you, friend, were there not Malignants then, as well as now? I may say, there were moe then, then now, at least they had grea­ter authority then what Malignants have now a-dayes. And tell me, do not Malignants at this day make use of the King's pretended great­nes and hereditary right to the Crown of Britain, for cloaking their kna­very, and effectuating their malignant purposes? Do not you imagine, but Papists and Malignants in England had that same reason for them, to make use of K. Jame's power? What I pray you, is the over-word of Papists and Malignants in Britain to-day? The King (say they) is the undoubted heir of the kingdom, and absolute in power: Who then should rise against him? This is even the most they have to cloak their knavery, and to cast a lustre upon their Antichristian and malig­nant endeavours. Do you imagine that the devill was sleeping in K. James time? No verily. And there hath nothing been done these twelve or thirteen years by-gone, whether against State or Church, but what was moulded then. The very plat-form of all was cast in his dayes, By the Scotish Parliament his power was declared absolute: And by the English Parliament, his right to the Crown of Englana was declared undoubted and hereditary. They stood not to swear obedi­ence to him and his posterity into all ages. And how far on he drew the power of Episcopacy, and how much he acted for intruding the Masse Book upon the Kingdom of Scotland, is more then known. Ma­ny wits, and many Pens, in his dayes were imployed for carrying-on and effectuating malignant & antichristian designments. Sal. is a child to object from the practice of the English Parliament in K. James time. He may as well object for evincing his purpose, from the practice of the Parliament holden at Oxford, by Charles. And if he doth either of them he doth nothing but beggeth the question. He telleth us that the Par­liament [Page 94] of England K. James an. 1. declared and enacted his right to the Kingdom of England to be undoubted & hereditary. Well, I can tell him that William the Conquerour, the Normane-Lawgiver, doth denie to the King of England any such title or claim to the Crown Diaaema regale (saith he) quod nullus autecessorum meorum gessit, adeptus sum, quod divi­na solummodo gratia, non jus contulit haeriditarium,Nemincm Anglici regni constituo haeredem, sed aeterno conditori, cujus sum, & in cujus manu sunt omnia, illud commendo; non enim tantum decus baeriditario jure possedi, sed diro insiictu, & multa effusione sanguinis humani, perjuro Regi Haraldo abstuli, & interfectis, belfugatis fautoribus ejus dominatui meo subegi Camd. Brit. chorogr. deser. which he citeth out of hist. de monast. Steph. Cadom. in Norm. i. e. I have acquired the Royall Crown, which none of my ancestours did bear, which the grace of GOD alone, and not heredi­tary right bestowed upon me,I constitute no heir of the English Kingdom, but I recommend it to the eternall Creator, whose I am and in whose hands are all things: for I did not enjoy such a honour by he­reditary right, but by dire conflicts, and great effusion of mans blood I took it from the perjured King Harald, and subjected it to my dominion, having killed or put to flight his favourers. Thus Salmasius may see that he buildeth hereditary right to the Kingdom of England upon a sandy foundation, in pleading for the undoubtednes thereof from what right the Conquerour had over it. Let it be so, the Conquerour himself had right to it by the sword, yet in his fore-going latter-wil he shaketh all his succestors loose of any right to it by succession, and casteth the disposition thereof wholly over upon GOD and the people. Whence was it, that (as is said already) the people did create Rufus king in his room and passed-by Robert his eldest son. 'Tis remarkable, that no where it can be read that the Conquerour did tie the Crown of England to his poste­rity. Salmasius cap. 8. maketh a fashion of proving it out of Malmsbu­riensis, Hundingtonionsis, and other English histortans: who say nothing but that the Conquerour subdued England, and caused the people swear allegeance and sidelity to himself. No other thing can be read in them. And no-where can salmasius find it, that ever he did tie the people of England by bath, both to himself and his posterity. Neither dar Salma­sies conclude any thing from these Historians, directly. He concludeth that but by the way, because of the Conquerour's full and absolute subjecting of England to himself, as indeed these Historians do report. Yet friend, this is but a stollen dint. You lose more then you gain by it.

As for Camden he cannot be of Salmasius judgement, unlesse he con­tradict himself. From him we have said already, that the power of the Parliament is above the King. Therefore whileas he faith that the King of England hath supremam potestatem, & merum imperium, it cannot be [Page 95] understood of the kingdom taken in a collective body. And it is true in­deed, taking the people sigillatim, one by one, the King of England is a­bove them all, and interiour to none, but to GOD. And in this sense he speaketh well, nec praeter Deum superiorem agnoscit. In this sense the latter part of Cokius words is to purpose. Because of this superiority the 24. Parl. Henr. 8. passeth a fair complement upon him, saying, that the kingdom of England doth acknowledge none superiour to it under GOD but his majesty, and that it is governed by no Laws, but what were made within it-self by the tolerance of him, and his progenitors. Per tolerantiam tuce gratiae & tuorum progenitorum,Misalmasi it had been more for thy purpose, if they had said, Per authoritatom tuae gratiae, & tuorum progenitorum. This soundeth no ordinative and effective, but permissive and approbative power in the King. Well, let this passe, the former part of Coktus words doth not speak of the absoluteneste of the King, but of the kingdom of England. Juxa tgitur lages bajus regni anti­quas, (saith he) hoc Angliae regnum absolutum est imperium,De jur. Reg. eccles He saith not Angliae Rex absolutus est imperiator. There is a dif­ference indeed between the King's power, and the kingdom's power, So much of England.

We come now in the next room to demonstrate the King of Scotland, according to the Law of the Nation, to be a regulated and non-abso­lute Prince. This is so clear, that we need not to speak any thing of it. And it is so abundantly proved by our godly 81 dear Country-man, Lex Rex, quaest. 43. that no man in it can go beyond him. Therefore we shall only glance at it by comparing in some few particulars the Lacedemonian kingdome with the Scotish, in subjecting their Kings to Law. 1. As the Lacedemonian King did every thing according to Law; ( [...] Polit. 3. cap. 10) so the King of Scotland hath power to do no other wayes. In the Parliament an. 1560. the Nobility saith frequently to Q. Regent, Regum Scotorum limitatum esse imperium. nee unquam ad untus libi [...]inem, sed ad legum praescriptum, & nobilitatis consensum, regi solitum. So it is decla­red Parl. at Sterl. 1567. and 1578. concerning Q. Mary. This was practised by Mogaldus, who did all by the Parliament, as the ancient custome was. Whence the kings of Scotland had no power to do any thing without the advice and counsel of the Estates. They had no pow­er to establish or abrogate laws, according to their pleasure. This my dear Country-man proveth at length in the place above-cited. In the interim take-alongst with you that decree made in Finnan [...]s, Rex 10. his time, viz That the king should enjoyn nothing of concernments but by the authority of Parliament, and that they should not administer the Republick by private and domestick councell; nor the businesses of the king and publick, should be managed without advice of the fathers, and that kings by themselves, without the ordors of the fathers, shires [Page 96] and governours, should not make or break war, peace or leagues. 2. As the Lacedemonian king did bind himself by oath to govern according to the I awes of the kingdom, Xenoph. de Repub. Laced. &. N. Damasc. de mor. gent. Laced. so the king of Scots by Oath and Covenant is tied to do the like. The plat-form of the king's coronation-oath is set-down, K. James 6. Parl. 1. Whereby he is obliged, to maintain the true Kirk of GOD, and Religion now presently professed in purity, and to rule the people according to the laws, and constitutions received in the Realm, causing justice and equity to be ministred without partiality. This did both James 6. and Charles swear. And that this is no new custome amongst the kings of Scotland, you will find it more then abundantly proved by our learned Country-man in the place above-quoted. 3. The Lacedemonian kings were subjected to the stroke of justice. Which maketh Pausanias so to write of them, [...] i. e. Concer­ning the Lacedemonian King judgment was so ordered: Twenty eight in number who were called Senatours, were appointed to judge. And with them did sit the Ephorick magistracy, together with the King of the other family. So the king of Scots was censured by the Parliament, made up of three Estates. His neck was brought under their yoke, as my learned Country-man maketh good in the place fore-quoted. And so, as the Lacedemonians did cut-off, and turn-out many kings, ( [...] Pol. 5. cap. 10.) so the Scots in old did the like, as is made good already. See Lex Rex, loc. cit. I have read much of the non-absolutenesse of the Athenian, Cretian, Lace­demonian kings, &c. But I may justly say, that no kingdom in the world (as I can learn from history) hath exercised Law more, or so much on their kings, as the Scots have done. There is indeed a strange change in Court amongst the Scots, if we compare the latter times with the for­mer. For my self, I observe GOD's speciall providence in it, who wil have the practices of the ancient Scots much to condemn and plead a­gainst the endeavours and practices of the latter Scots to day. Yea, the ancient Scots even in this do go beyond the Lacedemonians, viz. the La­cedemonian king was hereditary. But till Kenneth 3. the Scotish king was elective, though for favour of the Fergusian race, those who came of Fergus were created kings. See Lex Rex, ibid.

It remaineth now that we make good the conclusion it-self, from the examples of kings in the second notion, i. e. of those kings whose power was one way or other limited, though for the most part absolute. In this we will observe Aristotle's method. He brancheth-forth Monar­chy into four species. The first he calleth Laconick, and [...] Polit. 3. cap. 10, which cap. 11. he reckoneth-up, as the fourth [Page 97] branch of Royall Government. Of this we have spoken already at very great length. The second kind he calleth herill and despotick. Such kind of Monarchy (saith he) was in Asia. And albeit he saith, that under such kind of Royall power, the people lived as slaves and ser­vants, yet withall he telleth us, that the government was carried-on and administred according to the Laws of the kingdom. We stand here a-litle, to illustrate this by example. v. g. The Median King had an absolute power over the Medes. Any thing the Kings of the Medes decreed and enacted, was unalterable. Because of the vastness of their power, the wicked Presidents obtained a Decree from Darius, That none should make prayer to any save to the King, for fourty dayes. Dan. 6. And yet notwith­standing, Darius had not power to recall his Decree after it was made, albeit he laboured till the going-down of the Sun to revoke it. Ibid. The King of Persia was an absolute Prince, Esth. 1. Dan. 6. Herod. lib. 3. And yet notwithstanding Abasuerus, not only in divorcing Vasthi, did call a Councel of wise-men, experienced in the Laws, but also he submitted himself to their determination, Esth. 1. And albeit he desired through the abundance of love he did bear to Vasthi, to be recnociled to her, yet could he not recall the Divorcement, because the Law made against it, Joseph, Antiq. Jud. lib. 11. cap. 6. I deny not but the Persian Kings had an arbi­trary power in making Laws. Yet being made, they had not power at their own pleasure to recall them. Their Laws were irrevocable, Esth. 1. Dan. 6. And consequently, though their power was absolute in making Laws, yet was it limited in abrogating them. They had power to make them, though not to break them. 'Tis observable, that Cambyses, a most wicked and tyrannous King, desiring in marriage his german­sister, called a Councel to consult thereabout. Albeit he had an arbi­trary power, to do what he listed, yet went he not about that mat­ter, brevi manu, but sought and followed the advice of his Counsel­lours therein. And at this day there be many Kingdoms, wherein Monarchy and Regal Government is of this same stamp and tenour, as namely amongst the Turks. The third is elective and aesymnetick. This kind of Monarchy also Aristotle calleth [...]. This he il­lustrateth by the example of the Mityleneans, who elected Pittacus to reign over them Truly, for my-self I do imagine, that they did give Pittacus an uncircumscribed power, because of his personall endow­ments, to govern as he pleased. Therefore they did not restrict him to govern according to the Law of the Kingdom, but voluntarily sub­mitted themselves to Laws of his making. They did not tie him by Law to them, and in this his power was illimited and without bounds. Yet in so far as they conferred absolute power upon him, but as be­cause of his personall endowments, he would undoubtedly govern ac­cording to Law; in so far his power was limited and circumscribed. See Gyraldus, de vit. Pittac, And Diog. Laer. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Pittac. [Page 98] The like power did the Athenians also offer to Solon, as is above-said. The fourth he referreth to Monarchy, as it was in the dayes of the He­roes. This kind of Monarchy he calleth also [...], Pol. 3. cap. 10. and cap. 11. he calleth it a Regall power restricted in some things, [...]. and what these things be, he hinteth at, cap. 10. saying, that they had not power over the sacrifices, which concerned the Priest­hood, and that some of them were either tied by oath to the people, or by lifting-up the scepter, to govern according to Law. Thus it is manifest, that all the four kindes of Monarchy Aristotle speaketh-of, which were set up in old, one way or other are limited and subjected to Law. But concerning the fourth kind, which was in the dayes of the Heroes, we must stand a-litle here. Hence the question ariseth, whether or not doth A­ristotle refer this fourth species of Monarchy to the Heroes without ex­ception? We shall not stand much upon what may be Aristotle's mind in this matter. It appeareth to us, that he is in this indefinit. I confesse, his words with a distinction may bear a good sense. Yet I must needs say, that neither in this, nor in the third species, the man is clear: for, I take him to be summing-up all the ordinary species of Royall power. But ei­ther he erreth, or else he confoundeth in the third and fourth species, both ordinary and extraordinary kindes of Royall power, together, taking them both under the same power and notion, And in this he erreth also. But that we may clear our purpose, the Reader shall mark this way of dif­ferencing the species of Monarchy one from another. Generally it is divi­ded into ordinary and extraordinary Monarchy. In an ordinary acceptati­on it is parnbasilick, and non-pambasilick. In this sense Aristotle is to be understood, as we covceive. And so the pambasilick Monarchy. ( i.e. which hath a power over all things) relateth to the fifth species of Royall power, which Aristotle, Polit. 3. cap. 11. superaddeth to the four foresaid species there­of. And the non-pambasilick ( i.e. which hath not a power over all things) is relative to these foure species above-written. Each of them (according as both Aristotle, and example teach) is either one way or other, limited and kept within bounds. And afterward we shall also shew it from reason it­self. But observe by the way, that the third species of Monarchy in this sense, cannot be illustrated by the example of Pittacus. What power was laid upon Pittacus as is shewed already, was done in an extraordinary way. Now Aristotle in this species, cannot confound that which is ordi­nary and extraordinary together, and illustrate them both by one and the same example. As for the fourth species taken in this sense, I do verily imagine, that his words deserve a distinction. Whereupon the question may be moved, whether or not doth Aristotle by [...] (which he maketh the fifth species of royall government) understand an all-com­manding power, according to law or both according to, and against law? it cannot be imagined, as afterward shall appear, that Aristotle understand­eth an all-commanding power above Law. Therefore is it, that Polit. 3. cap. [Page 99] 10. he interlaceth the fifth species of Monarchy with the fourth. Without any clear and formall distinction, as he doth cap. 11. he passeth from the one to the other, in a continuat way, linking the one with the other. And so taking up the fourth and the fifth species, under a continuat notion, we ea­sily resolve Aristotle's meaning by this distinction. In the former part of the fourth species, he a verreth, That Monarchy in the dayes of the Heroes, was in some things restricted, wanting this [...], an all-comman­ding power. And in the latter part of it, he saith, that in ancient times kings had that which is called [...]. Verily, the man in this is ve­ry cryptick and unclear: He speaketh of the dayes of the Heroes indesi­nitly. So doth he of ancient times, But opposing ancient times to the days of the Heroes, they can be relative to no times, but to the golden age; which was immediately after the Deluge about 131 years. All this time, as is shewed already, there was not so much as any politick government at all. And to this Age immediately succeeded the time of Heroicisme. Nim­rod, and many other heroick Blades immediately after that Age, did break­forth who erected kingdoms and did many valiant acts. And if we speak of the ancient times before the Flood, we find also (as is shewed already) that contradistinguishing ancient times from the time of Heroicisme, there was no kingly power set-up, till men of renown and heroick spirits did erect it about the 1556 year of the world. And all the while be­fore, which was the Golden Age before the Flood, there was no kind of Politick government at all, as is shewed already. So then, whether before or after the Flood; the times of the Heroes did immediatly succeed to the ancient times. And as in the ancient times there was no Monarchy or Regall power, so it was firstly erected and set-up by the Heroes. Therefore you may see that is very hard to purge Aristotle's meaning in this from er­rour. Yet for respect I bear to the man, I will put upon his words the best sense they can bear. And so I suppose, that he referreth both the parts of the fourth species to the dayes of the Heroes. Now, it cannot be denied, but even amongst Heroes of the secondary kind, there was difference of power, some being of a more intense, and some of a more remisse power. No que­stion, those of them who in respect of time were prior to others, were also in dignity and power, prior to them. I cannot think, but how much more Regall power was in request, so much more the power of it was extended. Therefore was it, as is shewed already, that some kings were altogether illi­mited and uncircumscribed in power. But in the fore-times of Heroicism Monarchy was more in request then in the after-times thereof. And conse­quently those ordinary Heroes, who had the first start of time, before others of that same kind, were of a more vast and intense power then they. As they were superiour to them in time, so likewayes in power. In this sense Ari­stotle's words hold good, if he refer the former part of the fourth species to the after-most times and ultimat center of Heroicisme, and the latter part to the prior, though not to the first times thereof. You cannot say, that [Page 100] the former part is relative to ordinary, and the latter part to extraordinary Heroes. It is already proved by us, Conel. 1. That extraordinary Heroes had more then [...], an all-commanding power. They had [...], an arbitrary power, to do what they listed. These two Ca­ligula, speaking of himself to Antonia, pertinently distinguisheth.— Remem­ber (saith he) that I may do all things, and that I have power to do to all men, what I please, Sucton, in Calig. cap. 29. Thus he putteth a difference between [...], an all-commanding power, and [...], an all-willing power. And beside this, even ordinary Heroes, namely the founders of pri­mary Colonies, had an absolute power without al restriction, Con. 2. Where also is shewed, that Heroes in after times, as founders of after-Colonies, had an absolute power though not so intense and uncircumscribed as foun­ders of primary Colonies. Such indeed had power to do all things, though not to undo all things. And so, according to the rules of proportion, as the after-Heroes were of lesse power then the former, so the last of them had lesser power then any of them. Aristotle saith, That at last the power of Kings became exceedingly lessened. This was after the flower of heroicism was quite faded. This could not be at the first, but hath come on by degrees. After [...], which the erectors of primary Colonies had, in-stepped [...]: Which Aristotle saith, was in ancient times i. e. in the times of the after-Heroes, in and about the dayes of the founders of the seconda­ry Colonies. And then toward the close, or in and about the middle time of Heroicism, the Kingly power in some things became restricted, as Ari­stotle saith: And so he subjoyneth, that at last it became exceedingly les­sened. Now you see, that in reason no better construction can be put up­on this fourth species of Monarchy, assigned by Aristotle. And for reverence of the man's memory, I suppose, that the third species of Royal power, is taken by him, both in an ordinary, and extraordinary acceptation. And he only illustrateth it, as it is taken in an extraordinary sense, because that way it is more material then the other way. He passeth the illustration thereof, as it is taken in an ordinary notion, because so it is not only lesse material, but also that way it is more clear then the other way. Or I may say, that Aristotle confoundeth these two notions together, because compa­ritively aesymnetick Monarchy taken in an extraordinary notion, may be called ordinary. The reason of this is, because men at least may be, because of personal endowments more frequently called to govern in an absolute and ordinary way, then for extraordinary Heroicism, and such like. How­soever, this I know, that Aristotle reckoned-up no other kinds of Monar­chy, but such as have power to, and do govern according to Law. But these, who are advanced to an illimited power because of personal endow­ments, are not precisely called thereto to govern, whether according to, or against Law. That doth militate against the ground and motive of their call. They are no otherwise called to govern according to their pleasure, but as people expect, their will shal bring forth the choicest Laws. Whence [Page 101] precisely and formally, their power both according to the subject and ob­ject thereof, is restricted and kept within the bounds of Law. But we can­not say so of absolute Monarchy, acquired and conferred by extraordina­ry heroicism and such like. And consequently we may very justly say, that Aristotle referreth absolute Monarchy, obtained because of personal endow­ments, to the third species of Regal government, and doth not refer abso­lute Monarchy because of extraordinary heroicism and such like, to any species or kind of Monarchy he speaketh of The reason we say, is this, because any kind of Monarchy he speaketh of, doth not exceed the bounds of Law. But illimited Royal power conferred, because of extraordinary qualifications, precisely and formally doth not exceed the bounds of Law. Whereas being conferred upon grounds of extraordinary heroicism, pur­chase, and such like, precisely and formally the power thereof out-reacheth all Laws. Thus we judge Aristotle's mind to be cleared concerning all the species and sorts of Monarchy summed-up by him.

I confesse, Salmasius imagineth that Aristotle, by Pambasilick, or all-go­verning Monarchy, doth mean arbitrary Monarchy, having power to go­vern at random, either according to, or against Law. But the Gentleman in this is a little mistaken: for otherwise in the moulding of the King he had not required such conditions and limitations as he doth. Which be these. 1. That he should descend of such a race, which in vertue and good­nesse should exceed all others, Pol. 3. cap. 1 2. Whence is it, that both there, and Polit. 1. cap, 3. he saith, that the best, according to nature, over-ruleth that which is worse, and lesse good. 2. That the King himself should ex­ceed the rest in vertue and goodnesse. Yea, but for a King to govern accor­ding to his own hearts lust, even against Law and Reason, there is no ne­cessity of vertue and goodnesse, seing illegality and injustice flow from a vicious and corrupt principle. Therefore Aristotle in opposing Monarchy, or Government laid upon one, to Government carried-on and managed according to Law, doth not insinuate an arbitrary power in the King, ha­ving immunity and freedom from Law; but in so doing he only opposeth the power of Government laid upon one, to its power being laid upon many, implying, that as in this respect the Governour is subject to the rest, and cannot act any thing of Law without their consent and assistance; so in the other respect the Governour in carrying on things according to Law, hath immunity from subjection to any other beside, and in doing things legally may perform them without the interposition of any other man's authority. Whence we see that Aristotle alloweth an absolute power in the king to act according to Law, but not to act either according to Law or against it. And therefore in so far he taketh these by the hand, who deny Monarchy to be according to nature, in as far as they contend, that to be against Nature, which is against Law. Which maketh him conclude, Ty­ranny to be against Nature, it being against Law and Reason. And conse­quently he doth not allow arbitrary power in the king, to do either good [Page 102] or bad according to his pleasure. He only pleadeth for power to the King, which is according to Nature, Justice and Utility. He will have him a man excelling others in vertue, and governing according to Law. [...] Polit. 3. cap. 12. Moreover, it is contrary to the nature of the word [...], which Aristotle expresseth, cap. 11. to render it an arbitrary power. There is a very great difference between [...], and [...]. Howso­over he expoundeth it himself, cap. 10. and defineth it to be a power [...], to govern the city, and all the publick matters, whether at home or abroad. thus the man speaketh of a govern­ing power. but arbitrary power is a misgoverning power. he speaketh of a power ordering and doing all things. but arbitrary power is a power of misordering and undoing all things. it doth not follow, that because kings of old had power over all things: Ergo they had power to dispose on them according to their pleasure Quasibero there were not an all-comman­ding power, according to Law. This consequence doth not immediately follow from the Antecedent. It is a fallacy ab homonymia: for there is a two­fold all-commanding power, one according to, and another above Law. 'Tis therefore a poor shift, to conclude an arbitrary power from an all­commanding power. The original [...] doth bear an arbitrary power, only by way of analogy. and it is known, that the Roman Dicta­tor had [...], an all-commanding power, though not [...], an all-willing power. Well, let it be so that Aristotle saith, That kings in ancient times had an arbitrary power, a power above Law. But I pray you, what kings then doth he understand? Either they are the Founders of the primary Colonies, or the after-Heroes and Founders of the seconda­ry Colonies. If of the first kind, ergo you gain just nothing. We have grant­ed that already, Concl. 2. Their power was extraordinary. If of the second kind, we might also therein take you by the hand. Howsoever with some distinction or other you have our mind cleared in this, ibid. Therfore how­soever you understand the latter part of the fourth Species, I lose nothing. If you say that Aristotle only meaneth in it an all-commanding power ac­cording to Law, then do I gain my purpose. And if you suppose his mean­ing to be otherwise, you learn from what foregoeth, that I lose nothing. Thus the case is extraordinary. And I deny not but Royal power that way hath been arbitrary. Yet you cannot deny, but the first, second, third and fourth (or the former part thereof) Species of Monarchy, do not speak a word of Royal power above Law.

Although Aristotle's words may bear this construction, yet do we judge it were corresponding to his sense and meaning, to put this sense upon them. In the former part of the fourth Species he contradistinguisheth the times of the Heroes from the ancient times, which he expresseth in the lat­ter part thereof. But the one being opposed to the other, if we speak rigo­rously [Page 103] and properly, by the ancient times can be nothing understood but the golden age: which after the flood (Ethnick Writers know no time be­fore the flood) lasted, as some say, 250 years, and as others say with better warrant, 131 years. All which time, if we speak properly and rigorously, there was no kingly government at all: for, as is shewed already Concl. 3. there was no government then but natural and oeconomick.— In qua nullo ferente legem, natura ipsa vivebatur,—Mnes. Phoen. Damasc. lib. 97. bist. drchil. de temp. Not withstanding this, I do imagine, that Aristotle opinionateth, there were Kings in the golden age. Fuerat enim antiqua Civitatum (saith he) guhernatio, rationabiliter, pancorum & regia. Polit. 4. cap. 13 So say Sa­lust, conjur. Catel. and Trogus, or Justin, hist. lib. 1. Indeed these two do dia­metrally oppose the ancient times to the dayes of the Heroes: for they contradistinguish them from the times wherein the Assyrian monarchy took its beginnings. Which was the very first birth of herocisme. And yet they say, before this time Imperium penes Reges erat. What is meant by these Reges, Fabius Pictor explaineth. Principes (saith he) quia justi erant & reli­gionibus dediti, jure habiti Dii & dicti. De aur. sec. &c. lib. 1. And yet in the preceding words he saith, Ea aetate nulla erat monarchia, quia mortalium pecto­ribus nondum boeserat ulla regnandi cupiditas. Therefore by these Reges, and Principes can be nothing else understood, but the fathers and heads of the chief families, as Shem, Japhet, &c. over all whom Noah did rule as a common father. And it cannot be denied, but such had [...], an all-commanding power; yea, and [...], an all-willing and arbi­trary power, Concl. 3. which maketh Trogus say, Principio rerum,—arbi­tria Frincipum pro legibus erant. Lib 1. This was because those Fathers and Princes did not only stand in order to the People, as natural fathers to na­tural children, each of them being by the intimate bonds of Nature tied to other, (which maketh Aristotle compare the fifth Species to oeconomick and paternal government) but also because they did far go beyond their people in the matter of qualification. Yet we must not imagine that this arbitrary power which they had was so, precisely and formally. If we speak rigo­rously, arbitrary power conferred because of intimate and natural relati­ons, and personal endowments, is rather limited then illimited: for as the grounds thereof tie the people to all due obedience and subjection, so they tie the Prince to every due and lawful way of governing, and that in a most intense and extraordinary way. Therfore speaking precisely Aristo­tles [...], all-commanding power, doth not include [...], an all-willing and arbitrary power. But let it be so, that Aristotle speaketh of an arbitrary power given to Princes and heads of chief families, yet can it be no other wayes understood, but as it is already explained by us, Concl. 3. Which speaketh nothing, but of an arbitrary power, in an extraordinary case. But ab extraordinariis ad ordinaria, non est sequela.

As Aristotle is very unclear in the latter part, so is he likewise intricate in the former part of the fourth species. In it he saith that the Kings in the [Page 104] in the dayes of the Heroes were in some things limited and did govern [...], according to the Law. This indeed deserveth a distinction. No question extraordinary Hero [...]s and the founders of primary Colonies had a vast and arbitrary power, concl. 1. and 2. What power other Heroes had, I stand not much on it, to determine. Yet I may very conveniently use those distinctions which are expressed, concl. 2. But for further clearing this point, we shall stand here a-little to illustrate by Example all these wayes Aristotle setteth down in the former part of the fourth species, where­by heroick Kings came to their Crowns. In summing them up we shall observe a more exact and resolutory method then Aristotle doth. (1.) By gathering people together and planting Colonies. Which is considered four wayes. Firstly, by way of lot and division. Thus the primary Co­lonies were planted. And no question the founders of such had power to govern at randome, concl. 2. Secondly by way of donation. Thirdly, by way of subordination. Fourthly, by way of purchase and acquisition. Though we cannot be of Aristotle's minde in respect of the founders of the first sort of Colonies, yet in respect of the second and third, we may take him by the hand. And notwithstanding this, we may very probably con­clude either of the parts, whether by granting or by denying, the arbitra­rinesse of the founders of these Colonies. Howsoever concerning all the four sorts you have our judgement expressed, concl. 2. (2.) By way of battell. Firstly, by way of regaining. So did Dionysius, Hercules, Ber. lib. 5. and Orestes, Dict, de bel. Tro. lib, 6. Secondly by way of conquest. So did the extraordinary Heroes, as is shewed already, concl. 1. Ordinary Heroes who subdued Kingdoms be these. Amongst the Assyrians, Arius, Baleus, &c. Beros. ant. lib. 5. Amongst the Grecians the Heraclids who sub­dued Mycenae, and Alemeon who subdued the Kingdom of Thcb. s. Diod. lib. 5. cap. 4. and 6. (3.) Because of the benevolence and bountifulnesse of ancestours. So Crana and Cranus were dignified with the swaying of the Seepter, amongst the Razenues, because of the singular benevolence and courtesie of Janus their father toward the Italians. For the same reason al­so Thuscus, son to Hercules the Egyptian, was graciously admitted by the Arnites, Libarnites, Musarnites, to reign over them. Beros. ant. lib. 5. (4) By cunning and art. This may be taken two wayes. Firstly, as it implieth a conferring of the Kingly power, because of engine and invention. Thus the Thebans advanced Oedipus to reign over them, Sophocl. in Oed. tyr. Diod. lib. 5. cap. 6. Secondly, as it implieth a cunning and subtil way of obtaining the Kingdom. So Camesenuus obtained the Kingdom of Baciria, Ber. lib. 5. and Neoptolemus acquired the Kingdom of Thessaly, which belonged to his father Achilles, Dict. Cret. de bel. Tro. lib 6. 5) By acquisition. This is ta­ken three wayes. Firstly, by way of emption. Thus Agamemnon obtained the military power over all the Grecian Princes in the Trojan expedition, by letting-out amongst the Souldiers a huge masse of money, Dict. Cret. lib. 1. Secondly, by way of compensation. So Antenor was created King of Dar­dany, [Page 105] in compensation of his pains in betraying Troy to the Grecians. Dict. Cret de bel. Tro. lib. 5. Dar. Phr. de exc. Tro. lib. Thirdly, by way of meer purchase and simple acquisition. Thus did Aeneas acquire Melena, with its Continent. Dict. Cret. loc. cit. Salust. conjur. Catel. So did Iolaus purchase a Kingdom to himself in Sardmia, Diod. lib. 5. cap. 2. These things being thus illustrated by example, I do nextly desire the Reader carefully to distinguish between extraordinary and ordinary Heroes, and between those of them who were in the precedent times and those who were in the subsequent times of Heroicism. For my-self I cannot say, but extraordi­nary Heroes at least, and the founders of primary Colonies, were invested with a vast and arbitrary power. But as for the ordinary Heroes, and the after-founders of Colonies, I am contented with Aristotle, to say, That their power was hemmed-in by the hedges of Law. We find several ex­amples amongst the after-heroes to this purpose. Priamus was not only withstood by his own subjects, who did steal Helena, but also what he did therein either firstly or lastly, was according to the advice and coun­sel of the Senatours. Dict, Cret. de bel. Tro. lib. 1. & 5. Dar. Phr. ae excid. Tro. lib. And though Dares Phrygius reporteth, that Priamus determined and voiced otherwise then they who followed Antenor and Aeneas (who appear to us to have been the major part of the Senat: for we gather from both these Historians, that not only the greatest part of the Senate, but also the whole body of the People were for the concluding and drawing up peace with the Grecians. I confesse Dares Phrygius in plain terms faith that Priamus voiced against peace, and truce taking-up with the Grecians, and what he voiced was established and holden as a thing concluded-on by all. Indeed, he carried it contrary to all who opposed him, as Dares will have it. Yet Dictys storieth the just contrary, and saith, that Priamus, followed the advice and determination of the Senat. And indeed Q. Ca­laber, lib. 12. and Tryphiodor, de Il. exc. insinuate no lesse for they observe Dictys way, which he hath in storying the Grecian stratagem which en­sued upon terms of peace concluded on between the Trojans and Grecians. Howsoever, albeit I think my-self rather oblidged to encline to Dares re­lation, yet lose I nothing thereby, if I do so. I am not of that opinion to think, that Priamus was so hemmed-in by Law, as the Lacedemonian Kings. Let it be so, he had a negative voice in Senate, as Dares in sinua­teth; yet sure I am none will say, that the Senate was a cypher, having no authority at all. You will learn from these fore-cited historians the contrary of that. And in so far as Priamus did act according to the advice & counsel of the Senat, in as far he did act according to Law. Thus he did not simply act according to pleasure, and in an arbitrary way. No verily. In this his power was somewhat limited. And this is all that both Ari­stotle and we do crave. And so we must not think but Alcinous was some way or other regulated by his Princes and Rulers, as you may read, Hom, odys. 8. And how much Agamemnon was subjected to Law, is shewed [Page 106] already. Of him is made good, that which Aristotle speaketh, of the tying of the King to the People, by the elevation of the Scepter as by Oath and Covenant. Hom. Il. 2. Alex. ab Alex. lib. 5. cap. 10. We need not think it strange to say, that in the dayes of the Heroes Kings were some what subjected to Law: for not only Agamemnon, but also Theseus, were no leste subjected to Law, as is shewed already, then the Lacedemonian kings? 'Tis observable, that Orestes, son to Agamemnon, and King of Mycenae, was judged and absolved by the Councel of Areopagus. Him Mnestheus, son to Theseus, and King of Athens, could not get set free, till firstly he was examined by the Areopagites whom Dictys calleth most strict Justiciaries, de bel. Tro. lib. 6. Mark, that the Mycenan King was judged by the A­thenian Judicatory. Then tell me, seing a King of another Kingdom in the dayes of the Heroes was subjected to the Law and Judicatory of A­thens, shall we not think that Kings in those dayes, in some things at least, were restricted and subjected to Law? Verily this is an argument from the greater to the lesser. But hear what Alexander ab Alexandro faith, Tantique Areopagus fuit, ut Heroas & semideos illuc in judicium advocatos di­cerent, & Pisistratus in eo judicium subire non dubita it. lib. 3. cap. 5. i. e. And Areopagus was of such power, that they cited into judgment the He­roes and Semidei, and Pisi [...]atus doubted not to undergo judgment there. And I would have Royallists to observe, that in this matter I give them more of their will then Aristotle doth: for according to this last sense and exposition, his words insinuate, That all Kings in the dayes of the Heroes in some things were restricted. Yet we say that many of them had a vast and arbitrary power Ye [...], in the latter part of the fourth species he saith, That Kings in ancient time had but [...], an all-governing power. But we go further-on with the Malignant, and say, That they had [...], an all-willing power. Yet preci [...]ely and properly, their power was but Pambasilick, an all-governing, and not arbitrary and il­limited.

We shall stand here a while, to speak of the Kingdom of England: for it is not only the chief subject of our discourse, in order to which we drive all that we speak, but also it falleth-in here by a string-line. Already we have spoken of it at length, from the dayes of the Conquerour, or a little before, until now. It therefore remaineth, we speak of it, as it was from its beginning unto the reign of the Normans. And so we consider it under these notions. 1. As it was in its first beginning and original And though I will not say, that Britain was inhabited so soon as other Kingdoms, which lie in, and about the middle and chief part of the Earth. No que­stion, such parts were firstly inhabited, as both history and reason doth teach. Yet I may very conveniently say, that the chiefest Kingdoms, and those which he next Armenia, being planted, after people were extream­ly multiplied on the earth, they did seek out to inhabit the uttermost Isles of the world. There was a physical necessity for this. People daily mul­tiplying [Page 107] could not dwell all in one part, but of necessity they behoved to depart one from another, for residence sake Yea, there was a moral rea­son for it also. No question, desire of great lands and possessions, so soon as people were greatly multiplied on the earth after the flood, could not but set them a work to seek-out the remotest parts. This is confirmed by what the holy Ghost faith: The sons of Japhet, Gomer,—by these were the Isles of the Gentiles divided in their lands, every one after his tongue, after their families, in their nations. Gen. 10. I pray you tell me, whileas the holy Ghost speaketh there indefinitely of the Isles of the Nations, if he doth exclude the Isle of Britain? What more reason is there to exclude it then any other? And for my self I think, there is more reason to in­clude it then any of the rest. Firstly, because it is the chiefest Isle in the world. And therefore in it self the more delectable, and the more to be sought after. Secondly, because Gomer, whom Berosus calleth Comerus Gallus, did come into Italy, and erected Colonies there, Ant. lib. 5. Now tell me, is it not most probable that Gomer did translate Colonies from I­taly into France, and from thence into Britain, every-one of them ly­ing contiguously one with another? We find as much in his name as pointeth-out this. [...] Gomer signifieth to end. And is not Bri­tain (as it were) the last center and extreame part of EUROPE? Berosus giveth him a surname, calling him GALLUS. Now the Frenches are called Galli. And Gallus commeth from [...], milk. But the Frenches are called white or fair in respect of other nations which lie nearer the Sun. But Britain was called Albion, which signifieth white­nesse. And thus very appositely it partaketh of the signification of Go­mer's surname. And why shall we not think, whether France or Britain one way or other, have their denomination from the names of their first founders, as well as other nations and kingdomes have their names from the founders, who firstly erected them? V.G. Israelites from Israel, As­syria from Ashur, Media from Medus, &c. Camden largely disputeth for the plantation of Britain by Gomer. But the man is somewhat intricate, and confused in it, alleadging that the originall of the Britains is as it were derived from the Frenches. I will not deny, but Gomer hath sent Colonies, firstly to France, it lying next to Italy, where Gomer himself took up his residence. Yet I may say, that he did send Colonies nextly into Britain, which is adjacent to France. Verily, he might have simul, and se­mel, translated Colonies into both: for as France is next adjacent to Italy, so Britain is next adjacent to France. I cannot imagine, that Britain lying so near Italy, that ever Gomer would have lest it unplanted, till by the multiplication of Colonies in France, people out of France had been tran­slated into Britain to plant it. Howsoever I stand not on this, but sure I am, both Frenches and Britains have their original from Comerus Gallus, as Camden very notably and at length proveth, Brit. Chorog. deser. Albeit Caesar, de bel, Gal, & Diodore, rer. ant. lib. 6. imagine, that the Britains [Page 108] be [...], Aboriginists. Thirdly, because Theophilus Antiochenus saith, Cum in priscis temporibus,—homines,—post linguarum divisionem aucti & multiplicati paulatim sunt,—nec prius desierant terram ubique occu­pare, quam etiam ad Britannias, in arctois climatibus accesserint, i.e. When in ancient times—men,—after the division of tongues, encreased and multiplied by little and little,—neither did they leave-off to possess and take-up the earth every-where, until they did also come into Britain, si­tuated under the Pole Artick In this notion I take, Britain to have been under Gomer as its King and Saturn. And so I conceive, he had an arbi­trary power over them Concl. 2. But what Government they had amongst them after Gomer's death, cannot be determined. Yet in all proba­bility they had no Kingly Government amongst them till Brutus dayes. And in respect of this time, Dio Nic. ex Xiphtl epit. de Brit. saith very per­tinently, Apud hos populus magna ex parte principatum tenet. And Camden noteth, That as the Frenches, so the Britains in old were not governed by one, but by many. So say Caesar, bel. Gal. lib. 1 & 5. and Pomponius Me­la, de sit. Orb. lib. 3. cap. 2 & 6. But I take all these to speak of the Govern­ment amongst the Frenches and Britains as it was immediatly before the conquest of Julius Caesar, or at least as it was from the first beginning of these Kingdoms until his dayes. Howsoever you will do well to observe with me, that in old, France was divided into three parts, according as Caesar and Mela do story. But Berosus divideth it into two parts; the one he calleth Gallia, and the other Celtae. But for reconciling these divisions, you shall know, that Berosus speaketh of a more large division then they do. He contradistinguisheth these three Kingdoms one from another, viz. Italy, Celtae, and Gallia. The inhabitants of Italy he calleth Comari, from their King Comerus. The inhabitants of Celtae he calleth Disceltes, or Cel­tes, whose first King (saith he) was Samotes. The inhabitants of Gallia he calleth Galli: for (faith he) Comer's nephews did so call them from his surname, Gallus. This insinuateth, that Comer's nephews sent-out with Colonies from him, did firstly plant and inhabit Gallia. Which maketh us conclude, that Gallia includeth both France and Britain. No question, the inhabitants of both in old have been called Galli, from Gallus, the sur­name of Comerus, seing both of them were alike planted by him and his posterity. We need not think it strange, to say, that both of them do pass under the same epithet and notion: for the Frenches are called Cimbri, as Valerius maximus, Cicero, and Appianus say; and Gomeri, as Josephus, and Zonaras teach. So the Britains are called Kimbri, changing C, into K. and Cumeri, changing Go, into Cu. They are so both called from Gomer, or Comer, the name of Gallus. And consequently, seing they both have one common epithet from his forename, why may they not also passe under one notion, and be called Galli from Gallus his surname? I wil not much contend, whether the Frenches or Britains had Kings after the dayes of Co­merus and his nephews, or not. And if they had any, sure I am they were [Page 109] governed by moe then one. No question, the Land in both was divided into divers Satrapees. So we find the Kingdom of Italy in old, to have been so divided. Yet we do not think, but amongst those Satrapees there hath been one greater then any of the rest. As no question, in Italy, the Comars were more powerful then any of the rest of the Colonies and in­habitants of the Kingdom, as you may learn from Beros. ant. lib. 5. So amongst the Frenches, the chiefest Kingdom was the Satrapee of the Cel­tes. Thence it is that Berosus, ant. lib. 5. doth reckon-up in a catalogue the Kings of the Celtes, as he doth the Assyrian Kings; and Manetho be­ginning where Berosus lest, summeth-up one by one the Kings of the Cel­tes, as he doth reckon-up the Egyptian Kings. Thus there is no repugnan­cie between the divisions of Berosus, and of Caesar and Mela: for he spea­keth of a general and large division, and they keep themselves within more restricted and narrow bounds. They only speak of the division of France, separating it into three parts, Belgia Aquitani [...], and Celtae. And if we beleeve them, in old, ever unto the dayes of C. Caesary these were three distinct Satrapees, governed by different Magistrates and distinct Laws. The chief people in Aquitania were called Ausci, in Belgia, Treveri, and in Celtae, Hedui. Mel. de sit. Orb. cap. 2. And the chief Magistracy amongst the Hedui, was called Vergobretus. With which in Caesar's dayes Divitia­cus and Ltscus were invested. Which was a yearly Magistracy, having power both of life and death, as Caesar faith, de bel. Gal. lib. 1. What the Vergobret did amongst the Hedui, was done, convocatis corum principibus. Those who were clothed with it as they were annual and but for a time, so they did nothing absolutely and by themselves, but according to the counsel and advice of the Princes. This is far from the arbitrary power that Salmasius speaketh-of. Yet we will not say, that the power of the Celtick Kings was alwayes so hemmed-in by Law. I do not think but their primary founders, not only amongst the Celtes, but also amongst the Aquitans and Belgists, had a vast and arbitrary power. Yea and their after Kings so long as the flower of Heroicism lasted, had such power as Aristotle speaketh-of (and which by us is already expressed) in the fourth species, or in the former part of the fourth species of Monarchy, Polit. 3. cap. 10, & 11. And so, the flower of Heroicism fading, and Kingly Go­vernment wearing out of request, no question, there hath been no more power left to their Kings, then what Caesar speaketh-of in the place a­bove-cited. Which cometh just to that which Aristotle faith, concerning the detracting from, and dimitting of the power of Kings in after-times, Polit. 3. cap. 10. Although we may very justly say, That the Kingdom of France was divided into distinct Satrapees, ever until the dayes of C. Caesar, yet we dare not adventure, positively to say so much of Britain, if we take it by restriction for the Kingdom of England. And, that this may be cleared, We,

2. Must diligently observe the cause and reason, why England and [Page 110] Scotland are called Britain. Thus we come to consider England in a se­cond notion, as it was in the dayes of Brutus, untill in and about the days of C. Caesar. By the way I must needs confesse, that this is a hard busi­nesse on which I now enter, more difficult to be found-out, then any thing we have spoken to this purpose. The originall of France and Bri­tain, is very easily learned from Beros. ant. lib. 5. M. Porc. Cat. Orig. lib. So­linus, and others. But how Britain was secondly inhabited, is much con­troverted amongst the Writers. Some imagine, that it was secondly planted by Brutus, son to Ascanius. Of this opinion is Galfredus. But this cannot be; for we read of no such man, whether in Maneth. de Reg. Aegypt. Sempr. de div Ital. Solin. cap. 1. Marl. lib 1. cap. 2. or in any other Writer beside, who speak of Aeneas and his posterity. Others again ima­gin, this Brutus to have been a Roman Consul. Of this opinion is Gildas. But for this he can produce no Author. But others think, that he was either Brito Centaurus, of whom Hyginus speaketh or els Bretan, whose daughter (as Parthenius Nicoeus saith) was Celtice, on whom Hercules begot Cel­tus, the father of the Celtes. From him Hesychius draweth the denomina­tion of Britain. For my self I subscribe to this, albeit I suppose this Brito Centaurus to be all one with Bretan. Howsoever, if we may give credit to these Writers, Britain was secondly inhabited by one named Brutus, or Bretan, or Brito, according to the Greek. And why may we not, I pray you, as it were a posteriori conclude Britain to have been secondly planted and governed by one called Brutus, or Brito? Kingdoms ordinarily use to derive their denominations from such. To this very pertinently agreeth that of Sibylla a most ancient Writer, ‘ [...],’ Βρυτεσσι signifieth Britoins. And I think, the derivation of it very perti­nent to deduce it from Brutus, as Media from Medus, and Gallia from Gallus; And it is observable that she addeth, ‘— [...]’ The point being thus established, I make no reckoning whether this Bru­tus be called a Trojan, or a Grecian. And if he was a Trojan then I may justly say, if it be true which Ammian, lib, 15.saith. That whileas the Tro­jans came into France, they did also come into Britain. And that such came into France, is confirmed by Manetho, who saith, that Francus about the 9 year of the Egyptian dynastie, was created and ordained the Celtick King. Him he calleth one of Hector's sons. De Reg. Egypt. Now, this could not have been, unlesse (as Ammianus reporteth) many fugitive Trojans had come along into France. And so in all probability, as the dispersed Trojans took-up their residence, and erected a Kingdom in France, they have done the like also in Britain, the one lying contiguous with the other. But for further clearing the point, we must not lightly over-leap that whieh Parthenius saith. The man imagineth, that Celtus son to Her­cules, begotten on Celtice, daughter to Bretan, was the begetter and founder [Page 111] of the Celtes. Here is need of a distinction. Surely, Samotes, as is said already, firstly erected the Kingdom of the Celtes. And Hercules the Egyptian (as Berossus saith) coming thorow the Celtes into Italy, begot on Galtea (whom Nicoeus callcth Celtice) with the consent and permission of her parents Galatis, or, as Nicoeus saith, Celtus, who was created King over the Celtes. And from him they were called Galli. Which, as is imagined, the Latines use for Galatoe. Howso­ever herefrom it appeareth, that the Celtes had not their beeing, but their name from Hercules son. And so reconcling Parthenius with Berosus, we may call Hercules son. Galatis-Celtes. Whence from his name they were called Galatoe, or as the Romans say, Galli, and from his surname Celtoe. Indeed B [...]rasus doth not expresse the name of Galtea, or Celtice her father, unlesse we take Celte, who did reign over the Celtes, at that time when Hersules came along them. Which maketh us opinionat that Galtea, or Celtice, was daughter to Celte: for, as Berosus saith, with the consent and permission of her parents, Galatis was born of her, King to the Celtes. And who I pray you, had power to put such a disposition and right up­on Galatis, but the King and Queen of the Celtes. I warrant you, such a thing standing upon consent and renunciation, without being obtained by strength of Arms, the consent and permission given to Hercules son to reigne over the Celtes, was not sought from any inseriour, but from him whose interest it was to reign as King. I trow, it stood not upon the consent and permission of any subject, that Hercules son should be born King to the Celtes. And consequently, Celte at this time being King over the Celtes, was Galtea's father, by whom it was given, that Galatus ( Hercu­les son) should be born his successor and King after him. Therfore, follow­ing Berosus I conclude, that the Celtes were so called from Celte giand-fa­ther to Galatis, and Galli, or Galatoe from Galatis, nephew to Celte, and son to Hercules. Yet Nicoeus positively and expressely calleth Celtice, or Gal­tea her father, Bretan, From whom Hesichtus, as is said already, deduceth the originall of the Britains. And this being true it followeth, that Bri­tain's Brutus is more ancient then they ordinarily talk-of. Althought I do fully imagine, that Britain hath it's denomination from this Bretan; yet I will never think, but Britain was inhabited ere ever this Bretan was. The Celtes are so called from Celte, and Galli or Galatoe, from Galatis. And yet they were a people long before their dayes. Verily, I think it most likely, that Britain hath it's denomination from Bretan, and was se­condly en peopled by him: for resigning the Kingdom of the Celtes to Hercules son his nephew, it is more then apparent, that being a King all his life-time before, for his own honour and advantage, he hath gathered a number of people together out of his own Kingdom, and translated them into Britain, and there erected a Kingdom. This was more hono­rable and advantageable to him, then to live a privat life in subjection to his nephew. What? can it be imagined but desire of wealth and [Page 112] honour both to himself and his posterity, would have drawen him on to such an under-taking? No question, he being a powerfull King, and father-in-law to the great Monarch Hercules, on whose son he had con­ferred a singular courtesie, in renouncing the kingdom to him, did want nothing that conduced, not only for undertaking but also for effectuating such a purpose. Wanting his own kingdom, Britam, a glorious kingdom lying next to France, either at that time scarcely enpeopled, or at least fil­led with men of rude breeding, it cannot come in my mind to think o­therwise, but this Bretan became Brutus to Britain. And this I take to be him, about whom they controvert so much. Which agreeth with that which is storied, saying, That the Britans were a people of lesser Britany, which is in the Celtick region, who in old did inhabit the Isle of Britain. Whether you shall imagine, this Bretan, and Brito, to be all one, or that the Trojans came into Britain, whileas they came along into France, I remit it to the Reader to judge, as a thing arbitrary and indisterent. And herein I do not contemn the authority of Waldhave, who calleth Britain Brute's Lands. Thus concerning the original of Britain, firstly, and lastly, I have offered my judgment freely, which being arightly considered, doth much serve to reconcile all different opinions in this matter. Well, whe­ther you say that Bretan came into this Isle with Bretanes, or Brutus, with Trojans, (I shall not stand to controvert, if he be Brito of whom Hyginus speaketh) whileas Francus son to Hector came along into France, and did reign there, what power they had is already shewed, but namely concl. 2.

It being sufficiently proved, that Britain was secondly enpeopled by Bretan, and very probably concluded to have been enpeopled the third time by fugitive and dispersed Trojans, under the conduct of Brito, of whom, (as we may probably say, though the contrary may be also hol­den) Hyginus speaketh: It now remaineth to consider what power those Kings had who succeeded Bretan and Brito. The tract of time which in­terveened between these two Kings, may be easily learned: for it is ga­therable from Berosus, that Bretan erected his kingdom under the reign of Baleus, R. Assyr. XI in, or about the fourteenth, or sixteenth year of his reign, ann mund. 2225, or 2227, and Brito did set-up his kingdom in Bri­tain (as may be gathered from Manetho) in, or about the first, or second year of Teutheus reign, King of Assyria XXIX, in, and about the year of the world 2791, or 2792. Concerning the power of these tow Kings we have spoken. And we come nextly to speak of the power of those Kings who succeeded them, untill the dayes of C. Ciesar. Out of no ancient Writer we can learn in particular what those Kings were. But in the ge­neral we learn these two things. 1. That in old, Britain was governed by Kings. 2. That afterward (though before Casars time) it was divided into Satrapees, and governed by many Princes. We take it upon us, to illustrate and prove both these. The first is evident from Tacitus, who [Page 113] saith. Olim Regilus parebant. To which he inunediatly subjoineth, Nane per principes Jactionibus & studiis trahuntio. Thus he distinguisheth between the condition of Britain, as it was in old, and as it was in and about his time, In old (saith he) it was governed by Kings, but now being divided into factions it is governed by Princes. And therefore in another place he saith, a regibus, use an principes. But Salmas. by principes understandeth the Roman Caesars, Def. Reg. cap. 8. He saith so that he may elude the Govern­ment of England by many. He would have it to passe (if he could get it) that it was never governed but by Kings. It is no wonder that he be blinded in other things, seing he shuttcth his eyes at so clear a light as this. It cannot be denied but Tatitus speaks of the government of England as it was in old, and as it was in and about his time. 1. Because it is very unlike that ever he would have called the Roman Caesars, Princes. 'Tis an epither of lesse honour and power then Kings. And so I imagine, that he would rather have called the Kings of England Princes then them. Sure I am, the Rontan Caesars were more powerful & did reign in a more kingly way then the English Kings. 2. Beause he contradisting [...] in positive termes the Government of England, as it was in old, from what it was of late, saying, That in old, Britain obeyed Kings, but now (saith he) it is go­verned by many, and divided into factions. And Salmasius himself cannot get this denied. Of which Princes Caesar speaks-himself Principe [...] and [...] convenire, & se, civitatesg suas Caesari commendare coepe [...]unt, De bel. Gal. lib. 4. Thus the kingdom was delivered-up into Caesar's hands, not by one man, the King, but by many, the Princes. And lib. 5. he saith, Summd imperli bellique administrandi, communi consilto permissa est Cassivelauno. On which words, Camden noteth, That Britain then was not governed by one, but by many, taking that same course by common consent, in choo­sing Cassivelaunus General and chief leader to them, as the Frenches did in choosing Divitiacus to repel Caesar, Brit. cborogr. de print. incol. But what needeth us to stand here? We shall make it more appear in proving the second particular. The first is also confirmed by the testimony of Mcla. Eert [Britannia] (saith he) populos regesque populorum,—De sit. Orb. lib. 3 cap 6. And what power those Kings had, I mind not to say precisely that it was so restricted as the power of the Lacedomoril in Kings. Neither will I say, that it was so narrow as the power of the English Kings, after the Conquerour. Yet I may justly say, That it was not boundless and arbi­trary, as Salmasius dreameth-of. So saith Die Niceus, ex Xiph. epit. Apud hos populus magna ex parte prineipatum tenet. i.e. Amongst them ( viz. the Britams) the People in a great part do govern. This telleth, that in old, even in the time of Kings, in Britain, there was Popular Government. Kings then in Britain were not sole Lords, but the People did govern al­so. Hence it is that Cordilla jussu papuli, was set to reign over the Britains. So Gintolinus Populi jassu, Rex dicitur, Polyd. Ang. hist. lib. 1. Because of the People's swaying power of old in Britain, Kingly Government some­what [Page 114] before the dayes of C. Caesar, was altogether abrogated, as in part is shewed already. But Salmasius shall not think that of old England was singular in this. There were in old other parts in Britain, where the kingly power was limited and hemmed-in by Law. Concerning the AEbudan Isles, Solinus thus speaketh, Rex unus est universis.Rex nihil suum habet, omnia universorum, ad aequitatem certis legibus stringitur. Ac ne avaritia diver­tat a vero, discit paupertate justitiam, utpote cui nihil sit rei familiaris, cap. 25. i. e. all of them have one King.—The King hath nothing proper, all things belong to the people, he is compelled to equity, by certain Laws. And lest avarice should withdraw him from the truth he is taught justice by poverty, (to wit) as one that hath nothing belonging to himself.

The second particular is manisest from Strabo, who saith, Complures apud eos sunt dominationes, lib. 4. In the original dominationes is [...], which signisieth Princes or Rulers. Thus they were governed toward his time, by many and not by one. And Salmasius from this is made so to say, albeit he endeavoureth to elude what Tacitus saith, hist. lib. 1. The words are already cited and vindicated. But Diodore is most clear to this pur­pose, speaking of Britain. Reges, principesque, ibi sunt plures, pacem invicem servantes, Rev. ant. lib 6. cap. 8. But sure I am, Salinasius will not say, that such had an absolute power over the people. Their Kings had not such power: Ergo far lesse they. Yea, the Heduan Vergobret, who did reign over moe then any of them, had not an absolute and arbitrary power. Which maketh me think, far lesse had they any such power. And tis ob­servable what they did, was communi concilio, Caesar de bel. Gal. lib 5. So much touching the State of England in the second notion, i. e. as it was from the dayes of B [...]etan, Brito, or Brutus.

3. We come now to speak of England, as it was under the Romans, Sax­ons, and Danes. As it was under the Roman yoke (speaking precisely) Eng­land had no Kings but the Roman Emperours. And what power they had, is spoken already, concerning the Roman Dictators. And as for the power of the Danish and Saxonick Kings in England, no question, they had greater power then any of the Kings of England in old, or since the dayes of the Conquerour, if we except K. James. But to say, that their power was boundless and arbitrary, is more then I dare affirm. I will not deny, but the first, whether of the Danish, or the Saxonick Kings, had that same po­wer, which the Conquerour had over England. As he subdued England, so did they. And it is the Conquerours priviledge, to rule at random; Such do ordinarily conquer against Law. And I pray you, why do they not also rule without Law? But that all who succeeded these, had the like power also, I cannot be moved to affirm. It cannot be denied, but even under their reign there were Parliaments and Councels. And I trow, they were not cyphers. I might enlarge this, but I judge it needless: for I care not which of the parts be affirmed. Under these Kings, England was not its own, but a subdued, and unsetled Nation. Which maketh me say, [Page 115] that it was no wonder, albeit then there was no time for it to exercise the Laws against its Kings. Thus at length I have offered my judgment freely concerning the power of the Kings of England, both of old and of late. And that we may shut up this whole purpose in a word, for eut­ting-off all that Salmasius can object, you shall be pleased carefully to distinguish between extraordinary and ordinary Monarchy. As for an extraordinary Regal power, which was conserred on Kings, whether for extraordinary heroicism; personal endowments, or such like we shall not stand to say, that such had not only [...], an all-command­ing power, but also [...], an all-willing and arbitrary power. See Cocl. 1, 2, 3 & 4. Yet we cannot say so much of ordinary Monarchy, if we look to the precise and ordinary way of the power of Kings. This by example is at length she wed already. And so we come,

Secondly, to prove it by reason. Can any in reason imagine, that peo­ple, unlesse it be for some extraordinary cause or other, will subject their necks to the pleasure and arbitrement of any? Nay, it is a combing a­gainst the hair, for people to resignitheir liberty into the hands of any man, giving him a full power to dispose upon them at random. It is very observable, That once Kings in Asia had not only an all-commanding, but also an all-willing power. So Nomrod, Belus, Ninus, and Semiramis, as is shewed already, Concl. 1. And yet at last this pambasilick and arbi­trary power, turned over into a despotick power governing [...], according to Law. Polit. 3. cap. 10. Under these four Kings the condition of Regal power was very extraordinary. And so it was no wonder, though they did reign in an extraordinary way, having more will then other Kings. But the kingdom becoming setl [...]d, the power of their suc­cessours was hemmed-in. Their wings were a little clipped. And may we not judge so of all other Nations? Verily, I think it holdeth a ma­jori: for the Assyrian Kings were universal Monarchs, and no kingdom could ever match with the Assyrian empire. Which makes me imagin, that as the Kings of the Assyrian empire in an ordinary and sotled case were re­duced to Law, far more in that respect hath the case of other kings been such. And withall observe, there was a time, when Regal Government was much in request. It was much cried-up in the dayes of Heraicism. And that rather in the flower and beginnings, then in the sadings and after-times thereof. And so it was no wonder though at that time kings were invested with a vast power. But by process of time, Monarchy be­came lesse esteemed. The power of it became much lessened, partly [...], the kings themselves dimitting, and partly [...], the people detracting from their greatnesse. so saith Aristatle, Polit. 3. cap. 10. So then we must not imagine that though kings sometimes had a vast and arbitrary power, they alwaies had such a po­wer, and their wings were never clipped. Nay, the disposition of every age is not for Royal power it-self, much lesse for the arbitrariness thereof. [Page 116] Let me never dream, that the ordinary way of people is to bring their necks under such a yoke. What is more consonant to nature then liber­tie? and what is more dissonant to it then tyranny? Can any deny, but arbitrary power in actu primo, is tyranny? It is still in a capacity either of tyrann [...]zing, or non-tyrannizing. It hath still a disposition for acting, either according to, or against Law. Can people then have an ordinary temper for taking with such a yoke? No verily, that is against the haire wi [...]h them. 'Tis repugnant to their innate liberty, and the natural desire thereof. Yea, 'tis repugnant to the natural antipathy which all bear in hand against tyranny.

This being done, we hasten now to give a direct and particular an­swer to that which Salmasius alleadgeth son proof of the second Proposi­tion. We consesse, that some Kings of Assyria had an absolute and ar­bitrary power. But we deny that such power was competent to all the Assyrian Kings, as is proved already. It will never follow, that because the first Kings of Assyria, who were extraordinary Heroes, in whose time the condition of the Kingdom was unseded, had an arbitrary power; therefore all the Assyrian Kings had the same power also, whileas the Kingdom became established. The one way the caso is extraordinary, and the other way it is ordinary. But there is no consequence from ex­traordinaries to ordinaries. And Salmasius concludeth very unjustly, the Assyrian Kings to have been absolute, because the Persian Kings were so. I consesse, the Persinn Kings had a power to do any thing they plea­s [...]d [...] but this was by the means of the great Persian Monarchs, Cyrus and Darius. W [...]read in Dantel, 6. ch. that in their dayes, the Persian Laws were unalterable. And so we conceive, that Law which gave the King of Persia a power to do every thing according to his pleasure, was made under their reign: Otherwise, they could not have decreed unalterably; Nelther could Darias have decreed, that none for fourty dayes should pray to any [...] to him, unless he had had an absolute & god like power conserred upon him by the Law of the Kingdom. Of this Law Her [...]dot speaketh, lib. 3. in the history of Cambyses marriage with his german sister. And it is known, that Cambyses did shortly after succeed to Cyrus. And it is already said by us more then once, that conquering Kings may, and did reigniatorandom. And so it was no wonder, though the Per­sian Kings had an absolute power. 1. Because it was established amongst the first and fundamentall Laws of the Kingdom. It was enacted by the power and means of the first Founders of the Persian Monarchy, who subdued the Assyrians, and brought them under. But you can never shew me a Law amongst the Assyrians, establishing the arbitrary power of their Kings. 2. I do not deny, but arbitrary power may be retained in succession (being once acquired by some of the predec [...]ssours) for some short time. So arbitrary power acquired by Ni [...]rad, continued till in, and about the reign of Zames. And if you say that it lasted longer, sure I [Page 117] am, it did not exceed the dayes of Heroicism. After which time Monar­chy in Asia became despotick and heril. Neither can you shew me (as is proved already) that in the dayes of the Heroes, regal power was arbi­trary, unlesse it had been in some extraordinary case. Well, I stand not to grant, that arbitrary power once acquired, may endure some few hun­dred years. But I cannot be brought to say, that such a power can be re­tained into many ages. This you may learn from what foregoeth. Now the Assyrian Monarchy continued about 1547, whereas the Persian Mo­narchy [...]asted but 230 years. And though Ottanes desineth Monarchy to be, that to which every thing is lawful unpunishably; yet he doth so by way of taxing the greatnesse thereof. And positively he taxeth the great­nesse of the Persien Kings, objecting to the people the licentious arbitra­rinesse of Cambyses and Magus. Thus he endeavoureth to disswade the People from establishing Monarchy, telling them, that it was neither good nor pleasant. And he giveth this reason for it: because (saith he) it hath a priviledge to do every thing unpunishably, Herod. lib. 3. So then he desineth Monarchy after that manner, not because he esteemeth it to be its due priviledge but because he holdeth it as that which is com­petent to it against the pleasure and profit of the people. Therefore is it, that he useth it as a disswading motive, for provoking the people no lon­ger to set-up Monarchy amongst them. We stand not here to glosse Ar­tabanus mind, who commendeth that Law amongst the Persians, whereby was enacted, That the King should be honoured as the Image of GOD. He was a great Courtier with the King of Persia. And it is the least thing Conrtiers can do, to slatter. Although we do verily think, that Artaba­nus did allow vast and arbitrary power in the Persian King, yet that can be hardly drawn from his words. In Scripture, Kings are called Gods, and we are commanded to honour them as GOD's Vicegerents; yet doth it not follow, that according to Scripture-stile they are absolute, and have an arbitrary power. And we admit that of Claudian, who saith, that the Persians gave alike obedience to cruel and tyranous Kings. Therefore was it, that by the very Law of the kingdom, arbitrary power was con­ferred upon their Kings, and continued so long as the Persian Monarchy endured. And though the Fersian King had an absolute power in making, yet not in breaking Laws as is said already. It is already shewed by us, That in some things the power of the Persian King was restricted.

Salmasius needeth not to tell us, that the Egyptians did not bring their Kings to the Stage. This is blocked-up already from his singers. And though they did bear much with Cambyses, it was no wonder: for he subdued them. And what can a subdued people do, but suffer? And 'tis known that Cambyset himself was a vile tyrant. Therefore the story of Judeth calleth him Nabuchodonosor. So saith Josephus also. And Ottanes addeth to that, Herod, lib. 3. And what can Tyrants do but tyrannize? Such are very ready to usurp an arbitrary power, concl. 5. As for Busiru, [Page 116] [...] [Page 117] [...] [Page 118] I cannot think that ever the Egyptians had any such King, though Isocra­tes saith so, I consesse, I read of such a man in Diodore, Rer. ant. lib. 2. cap. 1. But I can read little or nothing of him either in Berosus or in Manetho. 'Tis true, B rosus, Ant. lib. 5. saith, That Busiris was King of Phoenicia. So saith Dtodore, Ant. lib. 1. cap. 2. And Herodot repoiteth, That Sen [...]a­cherib invading Egypt, the Egyptians went about to help him against their own King Sethon, because he abused them, and did not his duty to them, Lib. 2. Thus we see that the Aegyptians did hardly bear with tyrannous kings. This at length is shewed already. And what power Agamemnon had over the Grccian Army, as also what power the Gre [...]ian Kings had, how they were absolute, and how not, is shewed abundantly already. It is no matter that Philip saith, That the king hath equal power with God. So did Caligula arrogat an arbitrary and God-like power to himself. Su­et. in Cal. cap. 29. 'Tis the least thing that tyrannous kings can do, to plead for more interest, then either GOD or Nature hath conserred on them. And Ecphantas calleth the King [...], not because he should be governed by none, but because he is above every one seorsim. In which notion he is above all, and subject to none. Yet this doth not conclude, but he is subject to the people, or their Representative. But knowing, that there are many Court-parasites, I regard not though you reckon-up Ec­phantas amongst them. Yea, it is already shewed by us, That the Roman Kings were regulated. And albeit we should grant, that Romulus was an absolute Prince, yet would Salmasius gain just nothing: for by his conduct and industry he made the Romans a People. And we have said already, that such kings, from whose conduct the people's welfare doth intimatly depend, have been absolute. But the case of such is extraordi­nary. And as for that which Pomponius saith, it needeth a distinction. It cannot be denied, but Romulus had a pambasilick power before the Senat was erected by him. But after it was established, we deny that he had any such power, as is shewed already. This distinction you almost find in terminis, Digest. lib. 1. tit. 2. l 2. where Pomponius words are cited. This way also Tacitus is to be understood. We consesse, the Roman Emperours have immunity from Law, and that according to the very Law of the kingdom. Princeps legibus solutus est, Dig. lib. 1. tit. 3. l. 31. And upon this ground say Severus and Antoninus, Licet legibus soluti simus, attamen legibus vivimus, Instit. lib. 2. tit. 17. And it cannot be denied, but Dio approveth that same Law. So do all king-flatterers. Yet Dion, lib 51. saith, That this Law was enacted firstly in favour of Octavius. And no wonder: for he subdued and overcame all that stood by the liberties and priviledges of the people. But the Conquerour may rule at random, as is often said al­ready. So Darius, and Cyrus, having subdued the Assyrians, obtained the like priviledge, not only to themselves, but also to their successours. In such a case we deny not, but kings have had an absolute and arbitrary power. But though Augustus obtained this priviledge, yet sure I am, the Dictatours had it not, as is shewed already.

[Page 119]I confesse, Diotogenes doth compare the King with GOD in some re­spects, i.e. As GOD is first by Nature and in Himself, and hath power over all the creatures; so the King by way of imitation and resemblance is first, and hath power on earch. But I read not a word in him of his comparing the King with GOD in the matter of absoluteness. And sure I am he could not make a comparison in order to GOD, under the notion of arbitrary power: for GOD's essence knoweth not what it is to act against Law, and to tyrannize. Yet I do verily think that the man is of Salmasius judgment: for he saith, [...] i.e. The King hath an unsubjected power. And we do not deny, but Justinian, Novel. constit. 105 saith, That the King is above Law. He calleth himself also [...], Nov. constit. 1. tit. 1. Yet sure I am, Plutarch doth not say so, though Salmasius doth father it falsly upon his name. And truly for my self, I think it a great wonder, that Plutarch being a great Courtier with Trajan the Emperour, did not swear what Justinian spoke, 'Tis the least things Kings can do to say, They are abso­lute, and Courtiers to seal it with an Oath. A flattering Tacitus can say, Principi summum rerum arbitrium D [...]i dederunt. And Virgil before him delu­ding Augustus with flattery, blusheth not to say, ‘ Divisum imperium cum Jove Caesar habet.’ But this may be admired, That Plutarch, a most eminent Courtier, in plain terms saith, Lex omnium regina, Com. in Princ. But more of this af­terward. And though Emperour Justinian claimed an arbitrary power, yet neither Theopompus, nor Lycurgus do so. But you shall hear more of this afterward. Well, I think it just nothing for Salmasius to tell me, that Kings and Courtiers do plead for an arbitrary power to the King. They both hold that as their interest and what the one saith the other sweareth. But he must think it very material, and take it to his second thoughts, that both Kings and Courtiers do decline and abominate arbitrary and illi­mited power. Friend there is not self-interest here. But the other way you cannot say so much. And what is it that interest will not make a man do, who regardeth nothing but self-ends? As the one way partiality, so the other way impartiality taketh room. And as for Salust, truly Salma­sius wrongeth him very much. It is not his opinion. Impune quae libet fa­cere, id est Regem esse. But Memmius thereby end eavoureth to disswade the Romans to keep themselves by all means possible from the yoke of King Jugurtha, here by insinuating the dangerousnesse and inconveniency of Monarchy, just so as Ottanes did to the Persians. But neither of them did allow this, but taxed it as an unjust and hu [...]tful power in Kings. I must needs say Salmasius quoteth Memmius and Ottanes their words, as the De­vil quoted in tempting Christ, Matt [...]. 4 David's words, Psa. 91. v. 11. That which directly made against the Devil's temptation, he held-out, and only expressed that which he thought made for his purpose. So doth Salmasius straight-forth in quoting the words of Ottanes and Memmius. The [Page 120] thing that maketh against him, he suppresseth, and that which in shew maketh for him, he expresseth.

SUBSECT. 2. The rest of the Arguments, for enforcing the second Assertion, propounded and followed-forth.

HAving at length discussed all that Salmasius doth, or can reply a­gainst our second Argument, we make ready now to propound the rest of our Arguments, whereby the King's arbitrary power is dismissed. And what further may be objected against our second Ar­gument (as indeed Royallists do) we shall take it off by the way, in pro­secuting the rest of our Arguments. And so by the way we shall meet with these Royallists, who with Salmasius, do directly militat against our second Argument. Now,

Thirdly, we make good our purpose from the power that the Kings of Israel and Judah had. And for clearing this, you shall be pleased to take notice of these Conclusions.

Conclus. 1. The wicked Kings of the Jews bad an arbitrary power, both over Religion and the People of GOD.

For proof of this, see 1 Sam. 13.14.15.22.23, &c. 2 Sam. 21.1 King. 12.14.15.16.20.22.2 King. 3.8.10.13.14.15.16.17.21.24.2 Chr. 10.11.12.18.21.22.24.25.26.27.28.33.36.

Conclus. 2. The tyrannous and usurping Kings of the Jews, in all proba­bility had an arbitrary power over the Republick.

There is reason for this: for such did reign against Law. And why did they not also rule against Law? And what can tyrannous Kings do, but reduce the people to slavery? Now it is known that the Kings of Israel for the most part, were of this temper. Many of them were cruel tyrants and vile usurpers. Therefore is it said. Rex neque judicat, neque ju­dicatur, non aicit te [...]imonium, xec in ipswn dicitur, In cod. Sanb. 11. This Maimonides expoundeth concerning the kings of Israel, in Gemar. tract. de synedr. cap. 11 And this I take to be very true concerning the usurping and tyrannous kings of Israel, They did not judge, because tyrannous and usurping kings delight in cruelty. They seek nothing but their own ease, and if they act any thing according to Law it is only for the fashion, as the tyrant Cambyses did, in seeking his german sister in marriage. What? Such hold will for Law. They know nothing but,

Such Kings do not judge according to the Law of the Kingdom. Nei­ther is there power according to the Law of the Kindom laid upon such. What they do is done by themselves unanswerable to any. They act [Page 121] will-way, and not Law-way. They were not judged, because they did take power to themselves above all Law. It cannot be denied but Sal­masius concludeth well from 1 Son. 8. and 2 Sam. 8. that the King of Is­rael judged. Def. Reg. cap. 2. But he will do well to advert, that though this be true Rex judicat, concerning the King of Israel, according to God's institution, the Law of the Nation, and the practice of some of their Kings, yet this is as true Rex non judicat, concerning the ordinary pra­ctice of their Kings. And it is very observable, that Jannoeus, whom they called Alexander, all the while he did reign over the people of the Jews, acted nothing according to Law, but tyrannized over them, fos. ant. Jud. lib. 13. cap. 21.22. But in Gem. tract. de Syned.) cap. 11. it is said, that because of Jannoeus, it was enacted, that the king should neither judge, nor be judged. And if it be true that it was enacted then, then do I not think that it was upon that fabalous ground, (which doth not so much as relish to Salmasius) of which the Rabbinick writers speak, but because of the tyranny and cruelty of the man, who did not govern law­way, but will-way. And as Alexander, so the tyrant Herod had an ar­bitrary power, though we suppose it did depend much from the conces­sion of Antonius, Jos. Ant. lib. 15. cap. 4.

Conclus 3. The good Kings of the Jews because of personall endowments, had exemption and immunity from Law.

This is manifest in the examples of David and Solomon. There were two things chiefly in David which were against the Law. 1. Multrpli­cation of wives. Whereof David had very many, 1 Chr. 3. and 14.2. Murder upon the back of adultery, 2 Sam. 11. And Solomon did many things contrary to the Law 1. He multiplied gold and silver. 2. Horses and Charets. 1 Kin. 10.2 Chron. 9.3. Wives. And 4 he fell into adul­tery, 1 Kin. 11. And yet we read no that either David or Solomon were judged therefore by the [...]. And what (I pray you) could be the reason of this? Not because the king de jure hathimmunity from Law. Nor because they over-awed the Sanhedrin by force of armes. We read nothing of that. And you shall not make me believe, that the Sanhedrin durst not attempt the executing of justice upon them. 1. You thereby put a great note of reproach upon David and Solomon. You do no lesse then insinuate a disposition in them for rebellion, if you alleadge that the San­hedrin, which de jure (as both already and afterward doth appear) had power over them, durst not for fear of their resistance, execute judg­ment on them. That had been a disposition to resist the higer powers. Which the Holy Ghost condemneth, Rom. 13. And I will not think that such men had the Spirit of rebellion to repine against the execution of ju­stice. 2. We find that the Sanhedrin did execute justice on Amaziah. And the people did so against. Athaliah, 2 Kin. 11.2 Chr. 23. Which ma­keth me think that it was not for want of power, that David and Solomon [Page 122] were spared. Other Kings of Judah were punished for their faults. The Sanhedrin and people had power to execute justice on them. And why not also on David and Solomon? They were all Kings alike. And it is very remarkable that after Solomon's death, ten tribes declined the house of David, because of Solomon's heavy exactions and tributes he laid upon the people, 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10. I believe they were as powerfull to revolt from Solomon as from Rehoboam. And seing the people took so heavily with Solomon's yoke, that therefore they did revolt from his son, it maketh me think that the Sanhedrin did not spare him for fear of his power. Verily both they and the people have born patiently with his slips and heavy impositions, because of his rare and singular qualifica­tions. Otherwise I can see nothing for it, why the people did not make a mutiny against, and revolt from Solomon as against, and from Reho­boam. 3. Because, as both already and afterward doth appear, the San­hedrin, both according to GOD's institution, and the Law of the na­tion had authority and jurisdiction above the king. But sure I am it had been a very uselesse power if they durst not have exercised it. It had been all one to have wanted that authority, with wanting power to have put it in execution as occasion served. And this had been a having, and a non-having power. Which is ridiculous and repugnant. Neither can you alleadge that they were spared, because then judicatories were al­together turned corrupt, and knew not what it was to exerctse justice: for that doth directly militate against the eminent Reformation both of Church and State, that was under the reign of both these Kings. There­fore seing David and Solomon were spared, not because they were abso­lute, nor because the people durst not execute judgement on them, nor because the people and judicatories under their reign were altogether dissolute, not knowing the way of exercising justice; to me it is more then manifest that their delinquency was past-by, because of their per­sonall endowments. The shining vertues and eminent graces that did appear in them, no question have kept back the Sanhedrin from putting hand on them O! what a temptation would it be to me, to voice for a David's off-cutting? O! how much would my soul be grieved to sen­tence against a Solomon? And shall not I think but those of the Sanhedrin were much taken up with the qualifications of these men, as well as I could be with the vertues of such-like? I cannot think that I am singular in this.

In the interim observe, that my meaning is not that they had such a vast power as Salmasius dreameth of. I do not think that ever the Sanhe­drin would have spared them, unlesse they could not have done other­wayes, if they had turned positive and even-down tyrants and destroyers of the Commonwealth. But onely my meaning is, that because of their eminent qualifications, they had immunity from Law in some notes of [Page 123] delinquency. Neither do I speak, that they had this priviledge, de jure, but de facto. Thus you see that this is no argument for Royallists, who object, the Sanhedrin's sparing of David and Solomon, as a ground of the King's arbitrary power: And in this none is more ready then Salmasius, Def. Reg. cap. 5. But they shall do well shortly to observe these things. 1. They were spared, because of their personal endowments. They were extraordinary men: Therefore they were extraordinarily priviledged: They got an inch to the yard, and piece beyond common. Now ab ex­traordinariis, ad ordinaria, non est sequela. 2. It cannot be denied, but they got a dispensation for some points of delinquency. But Royallists have to prove, that they positively tyrannized over the Commonwealth, and de­stroyed it, and not withstanding had exemption and immunity from law. This I am sure they can never make good. 3 This speaketh something of the exemption of Kings from Law, de facto. But Royallists, when they have said this, have as yet to prove, that this factunt is de jure.

Inst. O, but, (say they) de jure, David ( and if he, then also Solomon, and all other kings beside) had immunity from Law for he saith, Against thee, thee only have I sinned, Psal. 51. And they take this to be the meaning of the place; as if David had been subject to none but to God. And for this namely they cite Ambrose, in Apolog. Dav. cap. 10. l. 2. Epist. 7. See Deus & Rex, and Salmasius, def. reg. cap. 3. But this is the main prop that all Roy­allists have for setting-up the arbitrary and lawless power of the King.

Ans. I shall not stand here to repeat the judgment of Interpreters. Our learned and dear Countryman, Lex Rex, quoest. 26. of this speaketh abun­dantly. But in few words I expound the words thus. They are to be ta­ken [...], insinuating, that David had mainly sinned against the LORD, and that David was more grieved for his sins, in so far as they offended GOD, then in so far as they offended man. No question, they are to be considered in an hyperbolick sense. They must not be taken in an exclusive, but in an inclusive notion. Just so as are these words, I [am] the LORD, and [there is] none else, Is [...]. 45. & Deat. 4. Now, this can­not be taken literally and simply as it is propounded. Otherwise it should follow, that there were no creature beside the Creator, and no other thing beside the LORD. And yet it is known, that there are Angels, men, and many other creatures. Therefore their sense is meerly figurative and hy­perbolick, pointing-out the eminency of GOD's essence. Even so David thereby aggravateth his grief for his offence done against the LORD. He only repeateth his sin done against GOD. But he speaketh nothing ex­presly [...], as it was done against Bathshebah and Uriah. No reason can be given for this, but because it more grieved him, that he had offended God then man. And so, as a man only taken-up with thoughts of guil­tiness and miscarriage in order to God, he only harpeth upon that string: As a man over-charged with sorrow for sin done against God, can take no time to think upon his offence to man. So David carrieth himself just [Page 124] so here. And yet it cannot be denied but he sinned both against Bathshe­bah and Uriah. Otherwise, in so far as he committed adultery with the one, and murder against the other, in so far he did not sin. And conse­quently, he was excusable both before God and man. Where there is no sin, there is no Law. Our godly and dear Country-man would fain put a fair construction upon Ambrose, saying, that his meaning is, There was none above David, de facte, ibid. But the simple truth is. Ambrose is altogether of Salmasius opinion. Rex unique er at, (saith he) nullis ipse le­gibus tenebatur, &c. Any man that speaketh so plain language to this purpose as he doth, 'tis but lost travel, to glosse it: But if we compare Ambrose's practice with his judgment, we will find the one contrary to the other. It is reported of him. That he did excommunicate Emperour Theodosius, and would not suffer him to enter the Church (so called) till firstly he did satisfie for his slaughter committed amongst the Thessaloni­ans, Theodor. lib. 5. cap. 7. Soz [...]m. lib. 7. cap. 24. Hondorf. & Lonic. theatr. bist. exempl. 5. proec. We admire how Ambrose could do so much against the Emperour in action, seing to his practice he is contrary in profes­sion.

I cannot over-leap an interpretation which Salmasius citeth out of one whom he calleth Anonym [...]s He alleadgeth that David saith so, because God only could pardon him. But, saith Salmasius, this cannot be: for the remission of sins, obtained by the blood of Christ, under the new Testament, unto life eternal, bad no place undor the [...] Testament. O! (saith he) what igno­rance and wickednesse go hand in hand in these knaves? Def. Reg. cap. 3. This gloss [...], which Salmasius so much hisseth-at is the very words of Lyra. And it is cited by our dear Country-man Lex Rex, quoest 26. Well then, let that Anonym [...]s be what he will (whom I take not to be the authour of Lex Rex) Salmasius hath no reason for that interpretation to call him ig­norant, unlesse he call Lyna ignorant also. And I must needs say, Hell, and the D [...]vil never invented worse, then what now Salmasius speaketh. I wonder if he dare deny, but Christ was also mediatour under the old Te­stament, aswell as under the new. Dare he say, That under the old Te­stament remission of sins unto life eternal was not centred upon Christ, and acquired by him? Hath this man a face to Aeny Christ to be the Redeemer of Beleevers under the Law? By whose mediation I pray you did they pass from death to life, if not by the righteousness of Christ, who is the only Advocat before the Father for the sins of all the Elect? I con­fesse, those who were under the Law beleeved in Christ, who was to be incarnated, and who was about to shed his blood on the Crosse for the Redemption of Beleevers. But doth this take-away Christ's blood shed under the now Testament, as the ground and center of Salvation and re­mission of sins to Beleevers under the old Testament? Howsoever, sure I am, this Gentleman cannot deny, but under the old Testament God only could pardon sin. Now this Authour, whom he calleth an ignorant and [Page 125] pestilent knave, saith no more but this. And I shall let any indifferent Reader judge between Salmasius and him, whether or not Salmasius hath reason to rail so much against him, because he saith. That under the old Testament GOD only could pardon David's sin. Oh! that this poor wretch is not ashamed to speak so blasphemously. This truth is old e­nough, and can speak for it self. And sure I am, there is no honest heart who will allow Salmasius in this.

Royallists need not to brag much, because David was unpunishable by man, for his murder and adultery. Arguing from this, the state of the Question between us and them is changed. And thus the Question is moved, Whether or not a man according to God's own heart, one worth ten thousand, and as in qualification, so in station, above every one of the People, should be cut-off and punished by the State, for committing adultery with a pri­vat woman, and committing murder against a privat man? And what if I should hold the negative of the Question, (as indeed I make it a great case, and do spare to determine upon either of the parts at this time; yet would Royallists gain just nothing? The Question between them and us is this: Whether or not the King is unpunishable by man, though turned a positive tyrant, and forthwith a destroyer of the Commonwealth? Friends, shew me the like practice in David, and the Sanhedrin's sparing him notwith­standing, and I shall yeeld to you. Ye are so far from being able to do so, that weighing David's murder in a square ballance, you will find it lighter then is supposed: for neither he, nor his, had formally, but virtu­ally a hand in the murder of Uriah. This is far from a destroving of the People. 'Tis not like Nero's wish, that all Rome had but one Neck, that he might cut it off. Now, Royallists must object from the Sanhedrin's sparing a Nero. Otherwise they beat the air, and change the state of the Question.

Conclus. 4. The Kings of the Jews, de jure, had no arbitrary and uncir­cumscribed power.

This we make good, firstly from divine institution and God's moul­ding of the King, Deut. 17. from which is already proved, Subsect. 1. As­sert. 2. That the power of the Jewi [...]h king is hedged-in by Law. And Josephus on the place saith, That he should do nothing without the con­sent and advice of the Priest, and Sanhedrin, Antiq. Jud. lib. 14. cap. 8. 'Tis but vanity in Salmasius to clude Josephus speech, saying, That his meaning is only concerning the Kings of the Jews after the captivity, Def. Reg. cap. 2. Is he not blind, that seeth not this man's deceit? Sure I am, that which is spoken of the King, Deut. 17. was spoken long before the Kings of the Jews after the captivity, yea, long before there was any King in Israel. 'Tis the very positive rule and pattern of all Kings. And Jose­phus in the place above cited, as it were commenting on Moses words, giveth the meaning of them. Nay, but you shall further observe the fal­lacy of this Gentleman. He studieth to put his own construction as most [Page 126] beseemeth his honour, upon Josephus words. And yet notwithstanding, he refelleth Josephus, and cannot rest satisfied with his own construction. Yea, which is more, he sleeth, cap. 9. to what Josephus saith, as to a main ruth, in respect of all the Kings of Israel, both before, and after the Cap­tivity. Then tell me what manner of man can he be, who cap. 2. declineth from, and cap. 9. enclineth to Josephus. In the one place he plainly de­nieth, That the Kings of the Jews, whether before, or after the Captivity, were tied to do nothing, without the consent of the high-Priest, and San­hedrin. And yet in the other place he affirmeth the contrary. But he loseth all his labour, whether to deny what Josephus saith, or to glosse it according to his own humour: for, as afterward is shewed, Josephus was no friend to Monarchy. And, which is more, what Josephus faith, is the common judgment of Jewish Writers Rex,—obediat curioe senatus majoris. i. e. The King,—let him be obedient to the authority of the higher Sanhe­drin, Deut. 17. Senatus major intersiciendi gladio jus habeat. i.e. Let the higher Sanhedrin have the right and power of killing by the sword, Exod. 21. Ne­mo sese opponat decretts sanctioris Senatus. i.e. Let none withstand and resist the Statutes of the greater Sandedrin, Deut. 17. R. Mos. Egypt proec. aff. 176. and 225. proec. neg. 316. It cannot be denied, but the Jewish King was regulated, seing not only he was oblidged to give obedience to the higher Sanhedrin, but also every one without exception was tied not to contraveen the Acts and Sentence thereof. He had not so much as [...], much lesse [...]. The power of the sword was not in his hand, but in the Sanhedrin's. Thus his power was restricted, as was the authority of the Lacedemonian king, and the power of other Kings, as is spoken-of already at length. Yea, Maimonides faith, Qui ex familia Davidis, sunc judicant, & judicantur. And so in expounding that, Rexne (que), judicat, ne (que), judicatur, cod. San. cap. 11. he saith, That it is true in respect of the Kings of Israel, but not in respect of the Kings of Judah. And in what sense it is true concerning the Kings of Israel, is already explicated by us. The Gematick Writers from these words, Ob, house of David,— execute judgment in the morning, and deliver him that is spoiled out of the band of the oppressour, Jerem. 21. move this Question, Nisi in jus vocari póssent, quomodo judicarent? i. e. How could the house of David judge, unlesse they were judged? This they prove, because in Scripture we are commanded to search and try our wayes, i.e. as they say, Corrige te ipsum, deinde alios corrige. Salmasius rageth at this, and he denieth what they infer. I shall not take it upon me to make good their consequences. Let Salmasius im­pugn them as much as he will. My purpose is only to shew. That they are not of his opinion. They are contented not only to say, That the king of the Jews, at-least of Judah, (as Salmasius himself out of Sichardus & R. Lakises hath) was subjected to Law, but also they dispute for that, and endeavour to enforce it by Arguments.

Secondly, from their acting with the concurrence of their Princes: And [Page 127] David consulted with the Captains of thousands, and hundreds, [and] with every leader. And David said uuto all the Congregation of Israel, If it [seem] good unto you,let us send abroad unto our brethren,that they may gather themselves unto us, 1 Chron. 13. There is much in this, If it seem good unto you. This insinuateth that as David would not act without the advice and counsel of his people, so his acting depended from their determina­tion. For the King had taken counsel, and his Priests, and all the Congregation in Jerusalem, to keep the Pass-over in the second moneth. He doth it not of his own head without advice. And the thing pleased the King, and all the Congregation. It is a thing done by common consent. So they established a decree,—Mark, it is not said, So the King established a decree. But the Authority both of King and Princes is interposed. The decree floweth from the joynt-authority of both. Therefore it is added, So the posts went with Letters from the King, and the Princes, 2 Chron. 30. They go not forth as commissioned only from the King, but also from the Princes. And it is most remarkable, that which Zedekiah said unto the Princes.— The King [is] not he [that] can do any thing against you. Jerem. 38. Ergo, if the King could do nothing against the will of the Princes, he had not an ar­bitrary power to dispose upon matters as he pleased.

Inst. The King delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes (saith Salmasius) not because he was inferiour to them, but by way of courtesie and gratification, and perhaps for fear of sedition. Def. reg. cap. 4. Ans. I confesse [...]osephus. ant. lib. 10. cap. 10. doth insinuate as much. But by your leave I must needs say, that Zedekiah might have delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes, whether through gratification or through jealousie, and yet he needed not to say that he could do nothing against them. And sure I am, if he had had an arbitrary power over them, he would never have said so. 1. Because it had been a known and mani­fest lie. Which he would have been ashamed to have spoken in the pre­sence of the Princes. 2. He should have done altogether against gallan­try and wildom. Against gallantry, because if he should have denied his power by way of gratification, then should he have been simple. And if through jealousie, then he had been base and cowardly. Against wise­dome, because the high way of somenting sedition, is to dash upon sus­pition thereof. The seditious party is encouraged, upon the fainting and relenting of the other. Well, I do not dispute upon what grounds Zede­kiah delivered Jeremiah into the hands of the Princes. Whether it be the one way or the other, it is not materiall. Yet you must give me leave to add, that you can assign no reason whether from gratification, or from jealousie, why he should have said that he could do nothing against the will of the Princes, if he had had an arbitrary and boundlesse power. Nay but the words are so clear, that they need no commentary.

Thirdly, from the councell of the old men given to Rehoboam, who said to him, If thou wilt be a servant unto this people this day, and wilt serve [Page 128] them, and speak good words to them, then they will be thy servants for ever, 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10. They perswade the king to keep himself within bounds, and not to rule at randome. They would have the King to car­ry himself as a servant toward the people. This is far from an arbitrary and lording power. It came to this, that either Rehoboam behoved to go­vern according to Law, and dimit of the power which his father had, although it was not boundlesse and arbitrary, in the full vastnesle of ar­bitrary power, or else the people would leave him and revolt from him. Thus it was not in Rehobeam's option to lessen or not to lessen the yoke of his father which he held upon the peoples neck. No verily; Neither did the old men counsell him to dimit any thing of his father's power, as meer­ly depending from his own arbitriment, but in relation to the people's desire. And that not onely because of necessity, but also because of con­veniency. Verily, the old men had been far in the wrong to Rehoboam to have counselled him to dimit any thing of his power, if he might have retained it justly. No necessity lawfully could have moved the old men to perswade Rehoboam to dimit his power, if he had had such a power of GOD, and if the defire of the people had been unhonest and unjust. No evill should be done, that good may come of it, Rom. 3. Verily the young mens counsell had been more just and reasonable, then the coun­sell of the old men, if Rehoboam lawfully might have kept the people un­der his fathers yoke, and if the peoples defire had been unlawfull. But it is known (as salmasius himself confesseth) that Solomon unjustly keep­ed the people under heavy pressures, 1 Kin. 11. and the counsell of the old men was just and reasonable, yea and the defire of the people was ho­nest and equitable, 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10 Lof. ant. Jud. lib. 8. cap. 3. Now tell me, whether or not the Kings of the Jewes de jure had an arbitrary and lording power over the people? If they had such a power de jure, then did the people contra jus, in desiring Rehoboam to dimit his father's power, which at the most can be called nothing but absolute and uncircumsori­bed, and the old men did also contra jus, in defiring Rehoboam to satisfie the people's desire. Salmasius himself will not say so. But he acknow­ledgeth that the peopl's desire was just, and the old mens counsell season­able. Yet I remit it to any indifferent reader to judge, whether or not the people could have desired Rehoboam to lessen the yoke of his father, and the old men could have counselled him to serve the people, and satisfie their desire without the note of highest treason, if he had been their ab­solute lord? And if you deny that de jure they had any such power, then do I gain the point.

Inst. Salmasius hath no more to say against this, But (1) they did not accuse, condemn, and bring Rehoboam to death, as the English rebels deale with K. Charles. (2.) There is none who will not condemn Jeroboam, As an apostate and rebell, and impute rebellion to all his successours, Def. reg. cap. 4. Ans. This is a meer shifting of the question. What is it to the [Page 129] purpose that the people of Israel did not accuse, condemn, and cut-off Rehoboam? Will it therefore follow, that he had an arbitrary and lording power, or that they went not about to eclipse his power, and to keep it within bounds? The contrary of that is shewed already. And I think, Salmasius will say, that they had not reason to cut-off Rehoboam. He did no more but threatned them with heavy pressures and grievous imposi­tions, and that through the suggestion of wicked and evill counsell. We read not that he had tyrannized over them, and had put any thing in acti­on, which he threatened them with. And yet they say, What portion [have] we in David? neither have we inheritance in the son of Jeffe. Every man to your tents O Israel, and now, David, see to thine own house, 1 Kin. 12.2 Chr. 10. My friend, were they any thing behinde with Rehoboam in this? And I am sure, they did as much against Rehoboam in revolting from him, and in setting another King over them, upon his threatning them with tyran­ny, as if they should have cut him off, if at any time he had actually exercised tyranny upon them, Consideratis considerandis, the case is just one. They declined him upon his profession of tyranny. And I pray, imagine you but they would have dealt far more roughly with him, if he had put it in action? Did they not stone Adoram to death, who was sent out by the King to them? And was not the King constrained to flee to Jerusalem, for fear of his life, after they had revolted from him? Yea, were they not al­waies in a posture to have withstood the King, if he had come against them in arms? 1 King. 12. & 13.2 Chron. 10. & 11. I cannot stand here to dispute, whether or not they did lawfully revolt from him. But sure I am, I may very justly determine upon either of these two. 1. That Je­roboam was a vile idolater, and was not worthy to be a King. 2. That the people justly defired Rehoboam to dimit of the power which his father had, and that the old men did arightly counsel Rehoboam to do so. Neither of these doth Salmasius deny. And so I gain the point, as is already proved.

Fourthly, from the People of the Jews processing their Kings. So did they against Athaliah, 2 King. 11.2 Chron. 23. and Amaziah, 2 King. 14.2 Chron. 25. See subsect. 2. prop. 1. And as they processed their Kings, so did they resist them, as afterward is shewed. But I pray you, could they have done such things lawfully if their Kings had had an arbitrary power over them? And that they did such things according to Law and Reason is proved by us.

Fifthly: If Ahab had had an absolute power, I see no reason how he could have been refused of Naboth's Vineyard, 1 King. 21. Sure I am, if he had had a prerogative above Law, and a power to dispose according to his pleasure, either upon the goods or the person of the subject, he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard at his own hand, without so much as de­manding it with Naboth's leave. And yet the text saith, That Naboth ha­ving refused to give it him, he went home much dismaid, and refused to eat bread, because Naboth had denied it to him. And, which is more, he [Page 130] could not get it till a false processe was led against Naboth, by the crast of Jezebel. But is it imaginable that ever such things would have been done, if Ahab's power had been arbitrary and uncircumscribed? No verily. No question, if his power had been boundlesse, by vertue of a Royal Act he might have taken Naboth's Vineyard, either without grieving himself, or without leading a false processe against Naboth. And therefore Mr. Withers; [...]. Tom Plain-man saith notably:

Now hereby is made to appear. That the Kings of the Jews were not ab­solute, whether according to the Law of God, or the Law of the King­dom. And why then do Royallists plead so much for the King's arbitrary power, seing the Jewish Kings, de jure, had it not? Which maketh me think other Kings far lesse should have it: for the ordination of the Jewish Kings did depend from God in a most special way and God there in was most intimatly concerned. We must not think, that the Kings of Judah, after the captivity, de jure, had any priviledge above Law, more then those who preceded them. According to the Law of God they had no such pri­viledge, as is shewed already. And that according to the Law of the Na­tion they had it not, is also evident. (1.) Because after the captivity the store of the Government was changed. And they had not so much as [Page 131] Kingly Government, much lesse absolute Monarchy, till Aristobulus firstly usurped the Crown, Jos. ant. Jud. lib. 13. cap. 19. (2.) Because the people did withstand the tyrant Alexander. And whileas he was dying, he was necessitate to exhort his wife, who succeeded to him to dimit of his power, and to promise to govern according to the advice and counsel of the Se­natouis, and Pharisees, Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 22. & 23. Which she did accordingly, cap. 21. And at her death she desired the Sanhedrin to dis­pose upon the Kingdom as they pleased even while her son Aristobulus was in arms, for bringing the Kingdom to himself. Yea the Sanhedrin not onely accused Antipater, but also arraigned Herod before them, who for fear of them was constrained to slee, Ant. Jud. lib. 12. cap. 17. And what arbitrary power Herod had, was by [...] concession, whom Herod blinded and deluded with gifts, Ant. Jud. lib. 15. cap. 4. I confesse, whileas Herod was cited before the Sanhedrin, he was not King but Go­vernour of Galilee. But what then? I hope Salmasius will not deny (which indeed he confesses) that his father Antipater did reign as King. And yet the Elders of the People did accuse him before Hyrcanus. But neither Hyr­canus, who indeed was King of the Jews, nor Antipater, who was Procu­rator, and managed the matters of the Kingdom because of his weakness, were able to absolve Herod, notwithstanding Caesar the President of Syria, wrote some Letters to Hyrcanus, threatning him, if he did not absolve him. The Sanhedrin went-on so precisely against Herod, that they went about to condemn him to death. So that Hyrcanus was necessitate, in satisfying Caesar's desire, to cause Herod flee quietly away. Now, I would fain know of Salmasius, if either Hyrcanus or Antipater had had an absolute and arbi­trary power, might they not have absolved Herod at their pleasure, the Sannedrin nilling, or willing, and not basely for fear of the Sanhedrin have dismissed Herod secretly? Therefore Salmasius must give me leave to say, (though he imagineth the contrary) that Sichardus very pertinently urgeth this example, to prove, that the power of the Sanhedrin was above the King. And Salmasius himself denieth not, Def. Reg. cap 2. & 5. but the strain and current of Rabbinick Writers doth run this way.

Inst. Nay but (saith he) in the Jewish Talmud it is spoken otherwise. And therefore it is said, Rex neque judicat, neque judicatur, non drest testimo­nium, nec in ipsum dicitur, in Cod. San. cap. 11. Def. Reg. cap. 2. Answ. Verily this Gentleman needeth not brag much of this: for the Jewish Writers pull this out of his hands by a distinction. Some of them under­stand it concerning the Kings of Israel, and some of them refer it to the Sa­maritan Kings. But they deny it to have place in the Kings of Judah, and those who came of David. I admire much, that he should cite the autho­rity of Jewish writ for him. He doth not deny, but the Jewish Writers are no friends to Kingly Government. And they positively say. (which he denieth not himself) that the King of the Jews was subjected to Law. And, which is more they particularity condescend upon three cases, wher­in [Page 132] the King was judged and punished by the Sanhedrin, viz. Idolatry, Murder, and Adultery. Let Salmasius impugn their sayings and consequen­ces as much as he will, (no question, they speak many things from the purpose) I regard not. All that I seek of them, is, to shew, that they are far from his opinion, though he leaneth much to humane authority. Yea that which in their sayings seemeth most for him, he himself is not fully satisfied therewith. He is constrained to put a fair face upon that, Rex ne (que) judicat, saying, That it only hath place in the Kings of the Jews after the Captivity. But if his construction stand, then we shall expound the words thus, Rex ne (que) judicat, i.e. The King of the Jews after the Capti­vity, did not judge, ne (que) judicatur, i.e. The King of the Jews, whether be­fore, or after the Captivity, was not judged. And so you must after the same manner expound the words which are added to these. And for my self I take this exposition of his to be meer non-sense. And sure I am, there is no Humanist, who according to the rules of true Rhetorick, can admit such an exposition. I see he will have Rex, taken in an ambiguous sense. But I know not if ever he read, that one and the same word in a con­tinuate Oration, is taken under divers senses. Such cryptick expressions become not Humanists, but Sophists, & Amphibologick Prophets. Well, we have given the sense of these words already, in this same Section, Concl. 2. And we mind no more to stand here, but only put Salmasius in mind of this, That the Kings of the Jews, whether according to the Law of God, or the Law of man, had no prerogative royal above Law: Ergo far lesse any other Kings are so priviledged.

Fourthly: Absolute power, in actu primo, is a tvrannick power: Ergo it is not a lawful power and a power from God. The Antecedent cannot be denied, because absolute and arbitrary power putteth the King, or any invested therewith, in a disposition for, and capacity of acting either ac­cording, or contrary to Law, of tyrannizing, and non-tyrannizing over the People. Now this aptitude of arbitrary power is the very adus primus thereof. The consequence is also undeniable: for God cannot be the au­thor of any evil and tyrannous power. Power, in so far as it is tyrannous in as far it is sinful and unlawful, either in lesse or more. The Scripture of God crieth-down tyranny, and so doth the very Law of Nature. But who will say, That God hath hand in any thing that is evil and unjust; unl [...]sse he will not be ashamed to say, That God is the author of sin? And if it be so, that absolute and arbitrary power is not of God, I admire how Malignants are not ashamed to plead so much for it.

The point being thus established from Scripture, and reason ground­ed thereupon, the next thing we have to do in this businesse, is to shew, that it is not onely my judgement, but even that also which the very light of Nature taught Ethnicks to embrace. Herodot approveth Pindarus, be­cause he called Law the King and Lord of every thing, lib. 3. And lib. 7. he saith, that amongst the Lacedamonians Law was King. In like manner [Page 133] Plutarch approveth Pindarus for that same, comment, in Princ. Plato doth much cry-up Lycurgus, because he prevented tyranny, in choosing some to govern with him in the Kingdom, and made Law King. So that (saith he) Law became the King of men, and not men the Kings of Law, In epist. ad famil. Dion. And in the politicks he saith, We should not call the ci­vill and kingly power absolute. Aristotle reproveth arbitrary power in the Lacedemonian Ephorie, and in plain terms saith, that it had done bet­ter to judge according to Law, then according to it's own will, Polit. 2. cap. 7. And Polit. 4. cap 4. he saith in even-down termes, that Law ought to rule all. Which maketh him say, that where Law doth not lord, there is not a Republick. Yea cap. 5. he calleth absolute optimacy, tyranny, calling it all one with the tyranny of kingly government. Pol. 5 cap. 10 he differenceth the tyrant from the King in this, viz. that the object of the King is honestum, and of the tyrant, quod placet. Thus he maketh Salmasius his cui quod libet licet, the propriety of a Tyrant, not of a King. And therefore shutting-up the whole matter in a word, he calleth all powers above Law meer tyrannies. But you shall not need to imagine that Aristotle in this contradicteth himself, whileas Pol. 3. cap. 11. & 12, he alloweth pambasilick monarchy. 1. Because, as is above said, there is great difference between [...], and [...]. And already we have shewed that Aristotle doth not absolutely, but comparatively op­pose government laid upon one governing ex voluntate, to government mannaged and carried-on secundum legem. 2. It is far from Aristotle's mind to dispute simply and absolutely for such a power. But his main purpose is to dispute against these who deny pambasilick and all-gover­ning monarchy to be according to Nature. And it cannot be denied, but both mixed and unmixed monarchy are naturall, albeit arbitrary and unlimited regall power be against the very Law of Nature it self. It is no wonder though Aristotle speak something for Royall power. Had he not Alexander to deal-with, who could endure none to govern but him­self? Church-Prophets or rather prating parasites, such as are the lying spirits, and King-flatterers now a-dayes, were they as great Courtiers as Aristotle was, I trow they should not be ashamed, in plain language and positive terms to prefer the King to CHRIST. The Ethnicks called Jupiter primus. But they could find in their heart to change that, and say, Caesar primus. Tell not me that Aristotle is for absolute and uncir­cumscribed monarchy. Compare place with place, and you will finde the contrary. Yea, Polit. 2. cap. 12. he layeth down this as a ground. That Monarchy transgressing the right model, is against Nature it self: But sure I am, a power to tyrannize and act against Law, is against the right model: for both in actu primo, and actu secun [...]o it is a tyrannick po­wer. Howsoever Aristotle in that same place explaineth what the right model is, as is shewed by us already. And it is far from taking-in arbi­trary power. And, which is more, Aristotle is so far from allowing arbi­trary [Page 134] Monarchy, that, as afterward is shewed, no Government taked so much room in his heart as Deinocracy. And what need we stand here, do not all Law-givers disclaim arbitrary and uncircumscribed power? viz. Zaleucus, Charondas, Onomacritus, Thales, Lycurgus, Philolaus, Plato, Dra­con, Pittacus, and Androdamas, of whom Aristotle speaketh, Pol. 2. cap. 10. These could not have precisely prescribed Laws for hedging-in the wayes of people, unlesse they had been positive and even-down enemies to abso­lute and arbitrary power. Howsoever it is without controversy, That the chiefest Law-givers we read of amongst the Ethnicks, could not away with arbitrary and uncircumscribed Government. Solon was altogether against it, Arist. ibid. Diog. Laer. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Sol. Val. Max. lib. 5 cap. 3. lib. 7. cap. 2. & lib. 8. cap. 7. Trog. lib. 2. See also Isocr. Areop. Panath. De permut. Pittacus. was somuch against it, that having reigned a-while over the Mityleneans, at last he resigned the Kingdom, Diog. La. de vit. Phil. lib. 1. in Pittac. See also Simonid. carm. Val. Max. lib. 4. cap. 1. lib. 6. cap. 5. Who will deny Lycurgus to have despised arbitrary power? So Xenoph. de Repub. Laced. and many others do report, as Herodot, Plato, Auistotle, &c. Neither can it be denied, that Plato was an enemy thereto as is shewed already. He could not endure the tyrant Dionysius, as Laertius. Plutarch, and others do report. And that Minos did abhor arbitrary power, is shew­ed already, Concl. 6. Because he was a most noble Law-giver, therefore he is feigned by Homer, Odyss. 11. to be Justiciar over the souls departed: In a word, that of Pindarus, Lex omnium est Reginal mortalium, at (que) immor­talium, passeth current amongst the chief Law-givers, and Philosophers: To which Plato. the great Philosopher and Law-giver, in terminis doth subscribe, lib. 24. de Rhetor. What? shall we over-leap the most noble Lacedemonian King, Theopompus, indeed not unlike the signification of his name? No verily. Whileas it was said by his friends to him, having su­peradded the Ephorick power, That he should leave, lesse power to his successors then he had of his predecessors; he forthwith answered, saying, Nay, but I leave them a far greater power, Arist. Pol. 5. cap. 11. See also Valer. max. lib. 4. cap. 1. & Plut. de doctr. princ. lib. Of the heroick Theseus we have spoken enough already to this purpose. And, which is to be ad­mired, the very King-flattering Isocrates doth story much of his disclaim­ing arbitrary power. And this he reporteth not to his discredit, but to his praise, Helen. laud. & Panath. What needeeth us thus to multiply the actings and judgments of men against arbitrary Monarchy? Have we not already at large shewed it to be repugnant to the ordinary course and strain of all Commonwealths? We will stand no longer here, but hasten toward another Question.