THat the life of man in this world is full of troubles & miseries, is so common a complaint in the mouths of all men, of what ranke and quality soever they be; and so obvious a subject in Writers of all Ages, Nations and Professions, as that it may well be reckoned among those [...], or known Principles, which common sense teacheth, and Artists ground upon as indisputable truths. Yet he that will see this common and beaten subject, most exquisitely even in the judgement of humane reason, setting aside the credit and authority of divine inspiration, handled, needeth but goe to Ecclesiastes; the excellency of which discourse he shall best understand, who judiciously compares it with the choicest, and most approved peeces, either old, or late, concerning that argument. The truth is, there hath been little said by others upon that Theme, either for wit or wisdome much considerable, which may not both be found here, and probably be supposed originally to have proceeded hence. I will give one instance. What among the An­cients, upon this subject of mans misery, more famous, then that old saying, whereof they made one of their Sileni, (a degree above Philosophers, among ancient Heathens) to be the authour, That it was the chiefest happinesse, not to be born; next to that, quickly to die? Divers expressions of this saying by severall Greek Poets (if any shal desire to see them together, & compare them) have been collected by Erasmus. The matter is by Tully in his Tuscul, briefly thus recorded: Fertur de Sileno fabella quaedam, &c. There goes an old tale (or, story: for so the word fabula sometimes is taken) of a Silenus, [Page 2]who being taken by Midas the King, is said to have given him a ransome (or, reward) for his dismission: which was, that he taught him, how that it was a most happy thing not to be born; but in the next place, to die very soon. And this long before any memory of any either Midas or Si­lenus, Eccles. 4. ver. 1, 2, 3. was thus delivered by wise Solomon: So I returned and con­sidered all the oppressions, that are done under the Sunne, and behold, &c. Wherefore I praised the dead which are already dead, more then the living which are yet alive. Yea, better is he then both they, which hath not yet been, who hath not seen the evil work that is done under the Sun. These words, Better is he then both they, &c. misunderstood, might proba­bly occasion that opinion of the ancientest Philosophers, (of which we shall have occasion for to say more afterwards) that the soules of men had a subsistence long before their incorporation, and were thus driven into this lower world, and confined into bodies, as Ca­ges or Prisons, for some miscariages in their former and better con­dition. Pliny the eldest, who had studied the world as much as any man, and hath written of the world, (his Naturall History I mean) more then any; who for his parts of nature, (wit, and curiosity) and other great advantages of fortune might be supposed to know as much as any other man; his observation is, that nullum frequen­tius votum, no wish more frequent among men, then the wish of death; and thereupon his conclusion is, that Natura nihil brevitate vi­tae praestitit melius: and elsewhere he cals death, pracipuum naturae bonum, the greatest benefit of nature, or the greatest blessing that heavens have vouchsafed unto mankind. Yet all this notwithstan­ding, if any judging of this life by what hath hitherto happened unto themselves, and not much sensible of what they have known to happen unto others, be of another mind, and thinke better of the world then so; I might tell them of Croesus, and others, who once thought themselves the happiest of men, and afterwards became notorious examples of mans misery; I might also tell them, that among the miseries of this life, those that are publique, and extend unto many, (such as are the miseries of wars, slaughters, sla­veries, plagues, famines, and the like; of which that of the Poet,

hath generally beene true, and visible at all times) are the chie­fest, and those which most affect a man, that is a man indeed; that [Page 3]is, truly sociable, and communicable, [...], as the Greek Philosophers expresse it: this I say, and much more to this purpose I might tel them; but that, not the consideration of our miseries be they more or lesse, or what opinion men have of them, is the subject by me here undertaken; but the originall cause of our miseries, & what was the opinion of ancientest Heathens about it; and how consonant and agreeable it is with the truth of the holy Scriptures: such consonancy either of humane reason, (in times of Paganisme) or ancient traditions with the Scriptures, having been accounted by ancient learned Christians no small evidence of the truth of the Scriptures themselves, and by them therefore upon all occasions with all possible care, and curiosity, sifted, and inquired into. But before I come to what I have more directly proposed to my selfe, I must be way of introduction take notice of some o­ther opinions of theirs, that have much affinity with the former subject; and what relation they have to my main scope, will ap­pear in the progresse and conclusion of our discourse.

It is a common observation among the Ancients that there is no worldly good, which is not either tempered with some present evill; or at least, hath the seeds in it selfe of some evill consequence, and future inconvenience: [...]: or as some others, [...], that no worldly good, or pleasure, is pure, and sincere; unmixed, and untainted of the contrary. I know not any other subject that ancient both Historians and Philosophers (Greeks especially) more frequently insist upon, if it come in their way; or more willingly digresse into. Theophrastus in that excellent frag­ment of his Metaphysicks, handles it with admirable wit, and pro­fundity; shewing, that such is the nature of this sublunary world, as to consist of contraries; and how one contrary doth beget ano­ther: a curious speculation; curiously handled and speculated no [...] by Theophrastus onely, but by the authour of that polite Treatise De mundo, (too polite I doubt for Aristotles stile, though ascribed unto him by divers ancients, besides Apuleius, as Justin Martyr, and Philoponus) the which Apuleius of old, and Budaeus of late have turned into Latin. One of the first, if not the very first now extant, in whom this observation of the mixture of sweet and sowre in worldly things, is to be found, is old Plato, who recordeth how his Master Socrates, that very day that he dranke his last and fatall cup, which made him immortall to all ensuing generations, having ca­sually [Page 4]rubbed his thigh or knee to allay the itch, which the fetters had occasioned; and perceiving a kind of pleasure to ensue upon it; took that occasion to instruct his friends and auditors then present, concerning the nature of all worldly delights and pleasures in these wo ds: How incongruous in my judgement, O friends, is that thing, which men usually tearm sweet? how marvellously (or, naturally) inclina­nable it is to that, which because they cannot be together at one time, see­meth contrary, pain? Yet neverthelesse, such is their nature, that if a man pursue after the one and obtain it, it shall go very hard but he shall be con­strained, as if both hanged by one string, to have part in the other also. And certainly had Aesop thought of it, he would have made a Fable of it, how that God purposing to reconcile these two, sweet and sowre, toge­ther, and not being able; he did chain them together by the head (alte­rum ex altero verticibus inter se contrariis deligavit, as Aulus Gel­lius expresseth it;) so that whosoever is partaker of the one, cannot be long without the other also; as now it hath happened unto me, the same fetter having caused first pain, and now pleasure unto my thigh. So Socrates in Plato. What Aesop did not, learned and ingenious Camerarius hath since done; he hath contrived it into two fables, the one of thē with the text of Plato, the Reader shall find, if he please at the end of this Treatise. This was the practice of the Ancients, (I note it by the way, because we have many examples of it in the holy Scriptures) by fables and parables, to worke upon men: and they found it a most powerfull and effectuall way; whereof Plutarch in his Conso­lation to Apollonius, hath a notable instance; & it is in an argument of much affinity to this. But to return, it would be long even to name those severall ancient Authours, who have descanted upon it, and applied it to severall occasions. Pliny the latter among the Latins, in his incomparable Panegyrick, in few words, but as elegant and pithy, as they are short, thus: Habet has vices conditio mortalium, ut adversa ex secundis, ex adversis secunda nascantur, (nascuntur, not no­scantur; as it is in some editions:) Occultas utrorumque semina De­us, & plerunque bonorum malorúmque causae sub diversâ speci [...] latent.

But that which concerns us to take more especiall notice of, is an other observation of the same Ancients, concerning all extra­ordinary worldly successes, and more then usuall prosperity in any kind, which they held generally to be very ominous, yea very un­lucky; in so much as they were accounted wise and prudent, who could, if not altogether prevent, (which is not in the power of [Page 5]man) yet by certain art and cunning, temper and allay such ex­cesses of fortune. Whether this was intended by Menander, or no, (that famous Comick) I know not; for he might have another aim: but his words are pertinent:

The opinion may seeme strange, but the practice of many of them, upon it, much more; and the grounds both of the one and of the other, when well weighed and considered, most of all. Hero­dotus shall be the first from whom we will take our information a­bout it, as being the first of ancient Historians, now extant; and in that respect, for his antiquity, to us most considerable. He tou­cheth upon it often, upon divers occasions; but most fully and po­sitively (though not as from himselfe there, but in the person of A­masis, King of Aegypt, a Prince of great renown, among the Anci­ents) in his third book, and fortieth chapter, as it is usually divi­ded. Polycrates, King, or rather Tyrant of Samos; (an Island of the Egean sea, bordering upon Asia, once so flourishing, that even the hens of it were proverbially said to be milked; but now in a man­ner altogether forsaken of inhabitants) having had for a long time more then ordinary successe in all his enterprises, his felicity all that while not crossed in any other kinde either at home or abroad; Amasis King of Aegypt, his great friend and confederate, is re­ported to have writen a Letter to him about it; the copy where­of according to Herodotus was this:

Amasis to Polycrates, ( [...], haec mandat. as Camerarius renders it) saith thus: That thou dost well and prosper, is no small joy unto me, as thy friend and confederate; but I must tell thee plainly, that these great and overflowing successes doe not please me, who know ful wel, the nature of the Deity, how envious it is. It is my wish concerning my own self, and the same I wish to all that are deare unto me, sometimes to prosper, and sometimes to miscarry; and in this vicissitude of fortunes to passe my life; rather then without any alteration to prosper. For I ne­ver yet could heare of any, who having thus prospered long, did not, at the last, end in an universall destruction. Be thou therefore perswaded by me, and take this course with thy prosperity: Consider seriously with thy selfe [Page 6]what thing thou hast thou most esteemest, and for the losse of which then wouldest be most grieved: this, whatever it be, cast away, that it may never be seen again: And for the time to come likewise, if thy successes shall not interchangeably be varied, help thy selfe in the same manner that I have now shewed thee.

So Amasis to his friend Polycrates: And Polycrates being before, as is probable, possessed with the same principles of the nature of the Deity, as Amasis was, was easily perswaded. He threw a ring, which of all his [...], or precious jewels, he most valued, into the Sea, never likely, as a man would have thought, to see it more; but his good luck, or ill luck rather, as they apprehended it, was such, that he could not find occasion of griefe, though he sought it; not when he sought it, at least. For his ring was soon after brought to him againe. How this happened, and other particulars of the story, but especially the lamentable Catastrophe of his life, accor­ding to his friend Amasis his praediction, may be read in Her [...]dotus at large: and more briefly in others, (as Strabo for one by name) that had it from him. This narration to some that know nothing but their own times may seem ridiculous. I cannot peremptorily undertake for the truth of it: but for the probability, (that one particular of the miraculous return of his ring excepted) I can easi­ly, both from the opinion and practice of divers others in aftera­ges. Some write of Epaminondas, a famous Theban; some of Philip­pus, King of Macedon; that after high and unexpected victories, they became (in their outward cariage and deportment, at least) very sorrowfull, more like mourners, then triumphers, for no o­ther reason, then through feare of some great eminent disaster, which they by this provident sensiblenesse, and voluntary humili­ation hoped they should prevent: Of this latter, Niceph. Gregoras; of the former, Isid. Pelusiota, (not to mention others) bear record, and commend them for it: Christians both, the one an Historian of later Greece; the other (Isidorus) an ancient Father, one of S. Chrysostomes Disciples. Augustus, that great Monarch, (in whose daies the Saviour of the world was born, and took upon him the form of a servant) stipem quotannis, die certe, emendicabat à popu­lo, (saith Suetonius of him) cavam manum asses porrigentibus prabens: that is, in plain English, that once in the year he was wont to turn begger, and ( cavâ manu, that is, in the most ignominious way of taking) received almes of such of the common people, as would [Page 7]give him. Suetonius saith no more of it then so, neither in those days needed he, to be understood; but learned men, and well ver­sed in antiquity, that have writen upon him, shew the reason. He mistrusted his own long continued felicity, (though varied by many crosse chances and accidents, whereof Pliny the elder hath made a whole Chapter in his History of the world) and dreaded (upon the same supposition as Amasis in Herodotus) that so dreadfull, in those days, invidiam Numinis. So Camillus a Romane Captaine, having with marvellous successe delivered his Country from miserable thraldome, he made it, say ancient Historians, his request unto God, that if such hap and successe was too great to escape the stroaks of Heavens envy, himself, and not the Publique might be the object of those stroaks: which they say befel to him according to his desire; first, a suddain light fall; and afterwards, persecuti­on from those whom he had delivered.

To these I shall adde but one passage of Plutarch, in his Paulus Aemilius, that it may be compared with Herodotus, because the one will not a little give both light and credit unto the other. He­rodotus, according to the supputation of most accurate Chronolo­gers and Historians, publiquely (as the manner was in those days) recited his Histories about the year since the Creation, 3504. Plu­tarch, all know, lived under Trajan; so that the distance of time between Herodotus, and Plutarch, is of about 600. years. Plutarch then having related the particulars of this Paul. Aemil. his tri­umph, (according to the Roman fashion) for his wonderfull suc­cesse against Perseus, a Potent King, (the last of Macedonia, and the last of Alexander the great his successors,) having in a very little time got both King and Kingdome into his own hands; and now passing to the narration of those sad accidents, that befell him about the same time; to wit, the suddain death of two of his childrē which he kept at home, as dearest unto him, the one wherof died five days before; and the other four days after this publick triumphing:

In all this, Aemilius (saith he) was admired by all men, envied by none that were good and vertuous: but that there is a certain Deity, whose proper task it is to bring down lower ( [...], as it were by pumping) all great and overswelling prosperities, and so to mixe and temper every man's life, that no man may be happy in this world, without a rub, or a stain: So that according to Homer, those are to be accounted most happy indeed, & to fare best, whose fortunes are varied with a vicissitude of events in both kindes.

The place of Homer to which he refers, are those noted verses in the last of his Iliads, (elsewhere cited by Plutarch at large) [...], &c. where the Poet fains Jupiter to have two barrels or vessels by him, the one of good, the other of evill luck; out of which he distributes unto every man his severall fortune. Those men, saith he, to whom Jupiter deales out of both vessels, they are happy: but those unto whom he deals out of one onely, they are most unfortunate. It is not so expresly said by Homer, that they are unhappy unto whom Jupiter deals out of either vessell without mixture; but he is so interpreted by Plato, (whose words are not so clearly rendred by the Latin Interpreters, as they might have been) in his Books, De Republica, the 11. Book: which ex­position is here followed by Plutarch.

These few examples may serve to shew both their practice and their opinion, [...], that such is the nature of the Deity (of some Deity at least) to envy men. It was a thing so fre­quent in their mouths upon all occasions, that hardly shall you read any ancient Authour, either Greek or Latin, where you finde it not, or some traces of it. We shall meet with divers passages as we go on, which I forbear here, to avoid repetition. There be some ancient Authors who seem to derive it from Herodotus, as the first of that opinion; others, from Simonides, a Poet of very great an­tiquity: we shall produce their words, and shew the contrary, be­fore we have done. A strange thing it is to observe how apprehen­sive some were (none of the meanest neither, but men learned, and reputed wise and sober, in common estimation of men) in this kinde: so apprehensive, that they durst not acknowledge their own, though but ordinary welfare, without an excuse, left they might seem to boast, [...]lin. Epist. lib. v. Ep. 6. and so provoke envy. We may observe it in Pliny, the latter, plainly: In a place, commending the wholesome situa­tion of one of his Country houses, Mei quoque (saith he) nusquam salubriùs degunt, usque adhuc certè neminem ex its quos eduxeram me­cum, venia sit dicto, ibi amisi. So in the VIII. Book, and the ele­venth Epistle, having spoken of his wives miscarying of a child, and her great danger upon it, Fuit alioquin, (saith he) in summo discrimi­ne; impunè dixisse liceat, fuit. He durst not acknowledge her to be past danger (to which purpose the word fuit, is very emphaticall) without some such qualification, to deprecate envy, impunè dixisse liceat; as before, venia sit dicto: being both to one effect. Many [Page 9]such passages occurre in ancient Authours, where Interpreters and Commentators not aware of this so generally received opini­on, are much put to it; as it seems Dio Cassius was, though with­in lesse then two ages after, about that fact of Augustus his yearly begging, which out of Suetonius we have spoken of. But besides this, that which sometimes breeds no small obscurity, is the variety of tearms used by Authours in this argument: [...], and the like: we shall say somewhat of the chiefest of them at the end of this Treatise; that we be not too long upon words, before we come to the matter it selfe.

Now when they thus complained of the envy, or malignity of superiour powers, that some of them understood such powers, as they worshipped for gods, is not to be doubted, [...], or, [...], (which is all one) that is, God, or, the Deity, being the word often used in this argument; not by Herodotus onely, but divers other Greek Authors; as Deus is, by Latin Authors, not a few. But be­cause [...], daemon, or, [...] is the more usuall word upō this occasion; whether God, or the Devill, or somewhat equivalent to what we call the Devill, was by them that used the word in­tended, is a question not very easie to be resolved, if well sif­ted, and throughly canvassed. Ancient Grammarians and some others observe of it, that by Homer and other Ancients it is promiscuously used for [...], that is, God: which I thinke no man will make a question of, that hath ever but looked into any of them. The same Grammarians, or some of them, doe also observe, that the word is otherwise used by Hesiod, for an inferiour kind, once men, and afterwards immortalized, and deified to a certain degree of Deity, different from the first kinde; which will not concern us: but, whether of old, originally; or, if not originally, when then the word [...] and [...] began to be used in that worst sense we now spake of, either by some, sometimes; or commonly and generally by most; is a question both among ancient and later Writers; and it will concern us much to know the truth of it; if by any means it can be known. I shall therefore endeavour to say what may be said of it upon good and satisfactory grounds.

First, then it must be granted that soone after Christ the word daemon in question, began generally, not among Christians only, but even Heathens, in common use to be taken in the worst sense. This we learn from Tertullian, whose words in his Apologetick, [Page 10]are: Tertul. Apolo­get. ca. 22. Sciunt daemonas Philosophi, &c. Etiam vulgus indoctum in u­sum maledicti frequentat. Nam & Satanam principem hujus mali ge­neris proinde de propriâ conscientiâ anima eadem ex sacramenti voce pronuntiat. So I find the words set forth in the last Paris edition of the yeare 1635. which pretendeth to follow Rigaltius his Text, per omnia, but doth not here, I am sure. The common exposition of the words, grounded upon that false reading, is much contrary to Tertullian his aim and intention; which was to tell us, not what Christians thought, or were taught in their Sacraments con­cerning daemons: but what even Heathens themselves that wor­shipped them did in their ordinary language, unwittingly and a­gainst their wils, as it were, acknowledge of them: as is more fully declared by S. Augustine, long after Tertullian; whose words will give much light to those of Tertullians. S. Augustine then in his De Civit. August. in De Civi [...]. Det l. IX ca. 19. Dei, having first spoken of the acception, or use of the word in holy Scriptures, and among Christians, goes on in these words: Et hanc loquendi consuetudinem in tantum po­puli usquequaque secuti sunt, ut eorum etiam qui Pagani appellantur, & Deos multos ac daemones colendos esse contendunt, nullus ferè sit tam literatus & d [...]ctus, ( Tertullian goes no further then vulgus in­doctum: but now as Christianisme prevailed, the word grew more infamous every day) qui audeat in laude vel servo suo di­cere, Daemonium habes: sed quilibet hoc dicere voluerit, non se aliter accipi quam maledicere voluisse non dubitare non possit. So elsewhere, why Apuleius did entitle his booke De Deo Socratis, and not De Daemonio rather, whereas in that very book he disputes at large, and maintains it to have been a Daemon, (not a Devill, but one of those subordinate powers to the Deity, in Hesiod's acception) and not a God; the same Augustine gives this rea­son, Ita enim per sanam doctrinam &c. because through the Gospel of Christ the word daemon was become so generally odious, and abominable, that whoever had read the title, De daemone Socra­tis, before he had read the book it selfe, wherein the daemon is commended as one of the better kind, would have thought So­crates by that title, to have been possessed and out of his wits. Hierocles also, a Heathen Philosopher upon Pythagoras (so com­monly called) his Golden verses, acknowledges almost as much, in effect: but so obscurely, that without S. Austins help I should hardly have understood him. This Hierocles when he lived, I [Page 11]know not certainly; this we are sure enough of, that he lived since Christ a good while, and before S. Augustine. [...] in those verses, which in former times would have passed currant enough for [...], (often occurring in ancient Inscriptions, in Latin Dii Stygii called) he expounds of men emi­nent in knowledge and vertue, taking [...], for [...], contrary to the common use of that word. For [...] of it self sounding then but ill in the ears of most men; he knew well e­nough if [...] in its ordinary acception, (for subterraneos, or infernales) were put to it, it would be a hard thing to perswade men to take it in the better sense, for any other then meer Devils, Therefore not content with this bare interpretation, he adds with­all for further prevention, [...], &c. For God forbid, that is, any should conceive that the au­thour of these verses would bid us worship any evill kinde, ( [...] he means, or, evill spirits) [...], that is, as some perchance might surmise according to the more vulgar use of that word. Had learned Salmasius thought well of this, and better considered of the text of Hierocles, he would have been, I beleeve, of another opinion concerning the right meaning of these words, then that he is of in his Preface to the Arabick Translation of Cebes his Table.

Now to return to Tertullians words, (which I must desire the Reader once more to look upon) it hath been observed by some, that exsecramenti, in one word, and not exsacramenti, is the reading of some ancient Manuscripts; and exsecramentum, or rather, exe­cramentum, in Tertullian his African Latin, for execratio, or male­dictio, is by some others well expounded also; who, so far, saw the right meaning of the words, but did not, or could not sufficiently prove it; which now I think no man will make any question of. But whereas Tertullian both here and elsewhere, in his book De Testimonio Animae, doth seem to affirm (which hath most trou­bled Expositors, and made them to understand him of Christians) that not only the word Daemon but that of Satan also, was even by Heathens frequently used in detestation, or by way of cursing; whereof I know no vestigium in any other Author extant, but much against it extant in divers; I therefore conceive that the word pronuntiant (which is the word in both places) must be un­derstood, not of words expressed or uttered; but of a sense, or ra­ther [Page 12]sentence (and so the word pronuntio, is very proper) that may be inferred, as implicitly contained in the common use of that o­ther word daemon, which was spoken of: as if he said, That whilest they commonly used the word daemon in detestation, to ex­presse their aversnesse from a thing; they did at the same time im­plicitly subscribe to the truth of the Scriptures, which set out un­to us Satan, the Prince of daemons, as the authour of all evill. The very word proinde in the Text of Tertullian (by which his denique in that other passage must be expounded) doth imply some such thing, that it is but by way of collection or inference that Satan is thus pronounced against. Nam & Satanam principem hujus mali generis proinde de propria conscientia anima, eâdem exsecramenti voce pronuntiat; as it was well before in some former editions. And Rigaltius his edition varies but very little from this. In stead of anima, it hath animae, which comes all to one: but that he that reades Tertullian in De Testimon. Animae, cap. 2. will, as I con­ceive, judge that the righter. But now for the sense of the words, he that shall reade that learned man his Observations upon this and that other passage of Tertul. De Testimon. Animae. (cap. 3.) will I hope (if he mark well Tertul. his words) think the better of what hath here been said of them.

We take it then for granted, that the word daemon, or [...], soon after Christ, began to be taken in the worst sense; of the time before is all the question, not yet resolved. There be, who because the word [...], is taken sometimes in the worst, and sometimes in the better sense; for a happy, sometimes; and some­times for a wretched unfortunate man; infer upon it that therfore the word [...] likewise was originally vox media, as they call them, as properly signifying an evill, as a good spirit. But why not rather [...], so taken and used on both sides, upon a sup­position, that all mans happinesse, or unhappinesse, (as by divers Heathens is maintained) is [...], that is, (according to some) from God immediately; according to others, (taking the word [...], for fortune; as frequently) from fortune; and that the endevours of men in that kinde can but little, or nothing. Whence Eustathius upon a place of Homer, The words, saith he, may also be understood of Jupiter, who is [...]. So Orpheus, (though not that ancient Orpheus, of­ten mentioned by Plato, and by ancient Fathers; yet an ancient [Page 13]Poet, yea perantiquus, as some very learned and judicious speak of him) in his hymn or prayer intituled [...], he makes the same [...] the authour, as of happinesse, to some; so of misery, to others. There is as much ambiguity in the word [...], which by Chri­stians is usually taken in the worst sense for daemone corript, vel a­gitari, to be possessed: but by heathen Authors for the most part, in the better sense, for numine afflari, to be inspired: and so it should be translated indeed, in divers places, whe [...]e Christian Interpre­ters impose, unwittingly I beleeve, their own sense upon hea [...]hen Authors, wrongfully. Again, whereas ancient Heathens, Histo­rians and others speak often of hurts, and mischiefes done or occa­sioned by daemons, it is no good argument to inferre thereupon that therefore the word daemon of it selfe, is sometimes taken in the worst sense, it being as ordinary with them to ascribe such things to their best gods, as is at large proved by Clemens Alexandrinus and some others; and that in those very places sometimes, where they tel us of either their evil daemons, or evils done by their daemons, they forbear not the word [...], but use it promiscuously, calling the same sometimes [...], and sometimes [...], as I could shew by divers instances: so that we can inferre no more, upon this, of the word [...], then may be inferred of the word [...] also. The word Angel, is a good word of it sel [...]e, alwayes taken in the bet­ter sense when absolutely used; yet Psalme 78. ver. 49. we are told of evill angels. He cast upon them the fiercenesse of his anger, wrath, & indignation and trouble, by sending evil angels among them. Some Ex­positors by these evill angels understand devils, or evill spirits: but others with no lesse probability, good angels. Good angels may be the instruments and ministers of temporall evill, and in that respect called evill Angels. But as for this place, I for my part rather incline to them, Rabbins and others, who by evill angels un­derstand the evils, or plagues themselves, which were sent upon Aegypt; and this the rather, because I find that kind of expression to have been familiar to the Hebrewes of old. So for example, where Psalme 89.49. according to the Hebrew it is, What man is he that liveth, and shall not see death; the Chaldee Paraphrase renders it, [...]. What man is he that liveth, and shall not see the angel of death? And Hab. III. v. 5. according to the Hebrew: Before him went the Pestilence: the Chal­dee, [...], from before him was [Page 14]sent the angel of death; and so elsewhere. These kind of expressions, whether used the better to teach us, that all things life, death; good, evill, that happen to men in this world, are from God originally, whose ministers these Angels (called [...] spirits, in the New Test.) are; or by a kind of figure, called by the Grecians [...], whereby things insensible, incorporeall, are made to live; vertues and vices (which some Stoicks really beleeved) represented as animals, and the like; I shall not here inquire fu [...]ther. But it seasonably puts me in mind of an interpretation of the word [...] much to this purpose, which I remember to have read in Dio Chrysostomus, in a long Oration of Diogenes the Cynick, to Alexander the Great. It is a very considerable interpretation, but not to our purpose here: and therefore it shall serve to have mentioned it.

Hitherto we have found nothing, that could induce us to be­leeve that the word [...] was of old (as is affirmed by some) and before Christ vox media, & taken sometimes even by Heathens in the worst sense: much lesse, that it originally signified a Devill, or an evill spirit, as is by others affirmed. If Plutarch help us not, I doubt no man will: out of whom I finde two passages quoted to this purpose. The first is, out of his De I side & O siride, (to which they might have added another passage of the same author in his [...], where he hath the same words againe) where speaking of the opinion of many, (which it seems was Plu­tarchs opinion too, as appears, not by this only, but by other Trea­tises and paslages of his) concerning two contrary principia, or crea­tors; the one good, and the other evill: [...] ▪ (saith he) [...]. &c. that is, Of these two, the better they call, [...], god: the other, they call, [...], daemon: as Zoroaster the Magus, &c. Here first it must be observed, that [...] and [...], are Plutarch's own words, or interpretation: for the words used by them he speaks of, Zoroaster and others, were, (as himself soon often tels us) Oromazis, (Oromaides rather, as it is in that other passage we told you but now of) and Ari­manius. Secondly, that Aristotle long before Plutarch writing of the same thing, expresseth it otherwise, and it is not unlikely that Plutarch, though he kept not precisely to his Authors words, might take it, if not out of Aristotle, yet of some other (for divers are named by Dio. Laertius that write the same) that related it as [Page 15] Aristotle doth. Now, Aristotle in his first De Philosophiâ (they are Diog. L [...]ertius his words in his Proem to the Philosophers lives) writeth that the Magi were ancienter then the Aegyptians; and that ac­cording to them, there be two principles, (or authors) the one a good, and the other an evill daemon; (or, God) and that the first, is called [...] (or, Jupiter) and Oromasdes; and the second, [...], (or, Hell) and A­rimanius: which Hermippus, Eudoxus, and Theopompus, &c. From which words, it is evident, that [...] and [...] in Aristotles language is all one: and that all we can inserre from Plutarch's words, is but this, (which is no more in effect then hath already been granted and proved) that in his dayes, who was some 100. years after Christ, and some 40. or 50. before Tertullian, the word [...] began in ordinary language to be taken in the worst part, & sometimes in the writings of learned men also.

The second passage out of Plutarch, is out of his [...], or, Table-talk of the seven wise men at a solemn Feast, where to a que­stion proposed by Amasis King of Aegypt, [...]; What is most profitable, or beneficiall? answer is made, [...], God: againe, [...]; What most pernicious in the world? it is answered, [...]: a daemon, or the daemon. But what is the censure even there upon this answer? that [...] that it is a bold, insolent, unheard of answer and distincti­on; [...]; as the word is used oftentimes upon such occasions: or if you take the word [...], as ordinarily; that it is a bold Answer, & of dangerous consequence: of dangerous consequence in­deed, as making Devils of those whō they beleeved, & worshipped as Gods: an answer then, not grounded upon any publickly known and approved difference, or different sense of the words, but upon the conceit of one single man. That this is the sense of the words may further appear by another passage of the same Plutarch, in his tractat De defectu Oracul, where at the mention of evill daemons, one of the interlocutors is much scandalized, as at a thing un­known, and absurd. And yet the question there was not whether [...] of it selfe, or absolutely, was ever taken in the worst sense, (which is our question here) and must needs have offended much more; but whether there were any such indeed as evill spirits, or daemons. Besides what may be suspected not without some ground, that here also Plutarch might alter, not of purpose, but heedlesly, the ancient words, and fit them to the dialect of his times. And [Page 16]this I must also answer if another place of the same Plutarch should be objected, where speaking of Pythagoras his opinion con­cerning the first principles of all things, he writeth that he the said Pythagoras called [...] that is, the u­nity, God; and the [...], (duitie) daemon. And indeed it is obser­vable, that speaking of the same thing in divers other places, I doe not find that any where else, but in this, he tels us of this diffe­rence; no not in his Treatise De Iside & Osir. where neverthelesse we find divers other names and appellations collected, whereby the Pythagoreans extolled their said [...], and as much vilified and reviled the [...].

Having therefore taken some pains to satisfie my selfe, as not willing to passe by so notable an advantage to my cause, if I might have sound grounds to convince me; I must now desire to be excused, and that I may not be thought to prevaricate, if I dare not ground either upon S. Augustine his bare assertion, who some­where doth peremptorily determine that daemon was at the first ta­ken in the worst sense for a Devil: or, evill spirit; and doth acutely divise the reason both of the different, with some; and promiscu­ous use of the word, with others: not upon him I say; nor upon Clemens Alexandrinus in his Admon. ad G. (not to name others) his observation, who because Homer cals some of their chiefest Deities (among Heathens) [...]; and [...] (even among the Heathens of his time) were taken ordinarily for evill spirits, con­versing about Tombes and Sepulchres, &c. therefore he conceits that of purpose he did did so call them ( [...]) to dishonour and vi­lifie them. In the Edition of Clemens it is printed, [...], and translated, (then which nothing could be more contrary to his meaning) qui illos improbè honoravit: whereas it must of necessity be read, [...] ( [...] being here for [...], or [...]; that is, of purpose, and not casually, or unwittingly) [...]. Though the very context well weighed, and other considerations will en­force this correction; yet to prevent all cavill and opposition, I shall make Clemens to be his own Expositor, whose words in this very book, some 8. or 9. pages after are these: [...]: that is, And not Menander only, but Homer also and Euripides, and divers other Po­ets freely reprove your Gods, and make no scruple at all as freely to revile [Page 17]them. Other such conceits of Homer, and Plato's oblique reproofs of the superstition of their times, other Fathers, besides Clemens, have, which compared with this might adde further light unto it, if it needed it; which it doth not. To return therefore to our word, and to conclude somewhat; Upon all that hath been said hitherto about it, I conceive that from books now extant and remaining, ( Clemens and S. Augustine perchance might see many in their dayes that are not now to be seen) it cannot perem­ptorily be affirmed, or made good, that the word [...], or daemon used by the Latins, before Christ and Christianity, was taken in the worst sense, being put absolutely and simply, as Crammarians speak; that is, without any addition, or limitation; but either in­differently taken for the very same as [...], (which is the more or­dinary use:) or if for an inferiour and subordinate kind, even then, for good, and not evil spirits. Which use of the word after Christ al­so remained among the learned Heathens, as may appear by their writings, very common, even then, though not altogether so com­mon as before; but among the vulgar, it soon began to alter, and in time, quite lost its first use. However, nothing that hath hither­to been said doth hinder, but that the word many years, yea, and ages perchance before Homer might be taken otherwise then in his time and afterwards, and originally signifie a devill, or evill spirit, there being in all languages examples of divers words, which in processe of time have lost their primitive use and signification, and usurped another, farre different, yea sometimes contrary. This may be supposed, but supposed onely. And here the e [...]ymology of the word, if certainly known and agreed upon, might happily stand us in some stead: but neither are ancient Greek Grammarians and others that speak of it, altogether of one opinion about it; and among the learned of these later times, since the knowledge of tongues hath flourished more then ever, it is not agreed whether it be originally a Greek word or no, some fetching it from the He­brew, and some from the Arabick; so that in such variety of opini­ons, and dissonancy of judgements I shall not take upon me per­emptorily to determine, so as to build upon it: Neverthe­lesse what I thinke of the right Etymology of the word, and upon what grounds, (which will require more words then I can think seasonable in this place) shall have a place by it selfe at the end of this Treatise.

In the mean time, what need we so much to stand upon words, if the thing it selfe can be proved? to wit, that there was an old tradition among ancient Heathens of certain (however called) evill spirits, who envied mankind, and out of meer envy and malignity did what they could to mischiefe and annoy them. Somewhat to this purpose we shall have occasion to say when we shall treat of the Etymology of the word, what opinion the Ancients had concerning those they called heroes. But without it or any thing else, one single, but very pregnant and pertinent te­stimony of Plutarch may serve to doe the deed. I shall therefore first set down his words, for their sakes that are not so well versed in the Greek tongue, in English; and then in Greek: rather here, then at the end of this Treatise, with some others, because they are words of so much consequence to us: and not onely set them down in Greek, but also with some Notes and illustrations make them plainer, and clearer, and more unquestionable, then otherwise they would be to every Reader. Plutarch then in the beginning of his Dio, having spoken of some apparitions of spirits, & taken notice of some mens opinion, that deny all such apparitions to be really what they are pretended, but meerly to proceed from conceit and phan­cy, incidentall to children, and women, and such onely who through sicknesse, or any other distemper of the body, are not well in their wits; But on the other side, saith he, if such as Brutus and Dio, grave men and learned in Philosophy, not apt easily to be be moved, or to be wrought upon by any passions, were neverthelesse so affected with these apparitions, that they did acknowledge it unto others; we shall, I doubt, be enforced to allow of that very ancient opinion (though it may seem to some no lesse ridiculous then it is ancient) that there are certain wicked and envious daemons, (or, spirits), who envy good men, and oppose their actions, by sudden fears and troublesome phancies, endevouring to supplant them in their vertuous courses: and this of purpose, lest if they should continue unshaken and untainted unto the end in the pursuit of that which is right and just, they should after their lives attain to more happinesse then themselves have obtained.

Thus Plutarch in my English; his own words are these, [...].

[...]. Those that have passions, (saith Aristotle somewhere in his Politicks) cannot judg of the truth. where by [...], as here also in Plutarch, we must not onely understand those stronger affections, as anger, love, hatred, joy, sorrow, and the like; but all disordinate appetites, all vicious exorbitances from right reason, as vain-glory, covetousnes, pride, self-conceit, and the like; all which come under the notion of [...], or passions, and have been noted by best writers, not Philoso­phers onely, but Historians and others, some more violently, some more insensibly, but as dangerously, to corrupt reason, and parti­ally to sway the judgement, even of the most rationall otherwise, and quick-sighted.

[...]] [...], may be also translated, absurd, incredible, or strange: and this may be referred partly to their opinion, who laugh (as he told us before, and whereof you may reade more in Lucian's Dialogue inscribed Philopseudes, or [...]:) at all apparitions, as meer fables and fopperies: and partly to what here follows, of the envy, wickednesse and opposition of some daemons. As for apparitions, it is a large subject, and of great consequence. I purpose to treat of it hereafter by it selfe, God willing, and shall endaevour to satisfie all that are not yet satisfied, as about Apparitions, so about Witches. In the meane time I shall referre them to what learned M. Vossius (my worthy friend) hath written in his elaborate Commentations De Origine Idololatriae, lib I. c. VI. But it is more probable that this [...] here must be referred to that which follows of wicked spi­rits, or daemons. For evē since Christ, & Christianity far spread in the world, there were eminent Philosophers, that thought it much in­consistent with reason, to beleeve any such. Will you have some of their reasons? [...]. It is not easie to make these words runne as smoothly in the English as they doe in the Originall; but the sense is this: If any beleeve that there are any evill daemons, (or, that the daemons are evill) I aske, if they have their power from the Gods, how then evill? If not from them, then [Page 20]are not the Gods authors of all things. If not authors, then either because they would, but cannot; or because they can, but will not, neither of which is agreeable to the nature of God. They are the words of Sallustius the Philosopher in his De Diis & Mundo, the XII. Chapter. Much to this purpose are the objections of Celsus against the Serpent that beguiled our first parents. You may see, if you please, what answer is there made to him by Origen. Or, if he satisfie not, there be store of others Fathers, and Christian writers that will. Our author here (Plutarch) in his Discourse, Of the cessation of Oracles, takes it upon him to prove that it was the opinion of divers Ancients besides Empedocles, as Plato, Xenocrates, and others, that there were evill daemons. I wish he had set downe their owne words. I make no question of the thing, that divers ancients were of that opinion, that there were evill spirits; but what word they used, because we have found Plutarch before to relate the opinions of ancients not in their owne, but his words, or words of his age rather; I would gladly have knowne from themselves. However even there Plutarch doth acknowledge that the opinion would seeme strange to most men, and full (the very word here used) of absurditie.

[...]] There was an ancient tradition among heathens, that certaine [...], insolent, or rebellious Gods, or daemons; (Angels, indeed:) had been cast out of Heaven. The Originall of which tradition some that understood not, grounded it upon a pas­sage of Homer (from whom, and from Hesiod, they did ordinarily fetch all their Theologie) in his XVI. Iliad, where Jupiter severely rebukes his wife Juno, and bids her remember what she had for­merly suffered. Celsus in Origen, out of ancient Commentators up­on Homer, as is likely, doth produce a pregnant testimony out of Pherecydes (one of the first Philosophers, of whom there is any memory extant, Pythagoras his Master) concerning these [...], and their punishment. And it is his conceit, (or theirs ra­ther) that Pherccydes understood Homer as they did, and grounded his words upon him. But it is a ridiculous conceit; as their allegori­call exposition of Homers words is also, as ridiculous and imperti­nent, as any I have met with in that kind. Many men both later, & ancient, have been deceived (as is well observed by learned Hol­stenius, in his Notes upon Porphyrius) in the country of Pherecydes, making him Syrum, instead (a vast difference) of Syrium. Howe­ver, Pherecydes, though not an Assyrian, yet he is one of them that [Page 21]are recorded by the Ancients, ( Plutarch and Numenius) to have conversed with the Hebrews, and to have been instructed by them. It is very likely that Plutarch here had respect to some pas­sages as of others, doubtlesse, so of this Philosopher also. But more of him, or out of him rather, upon the last words. Of Empedocles there is no question at all to be made, but that he had writen of these kind of daemons, and of their fall and banishment from Hea­ven, very plainly and copiously, as may be collected out of di­vers places of Plutarch. In his Treatise [...], Of the inconveniencies and miseries of taking money upon use, he menti­ons [...], certain daemons, pursued by the di­vine vengeance, and cast out of Heaven; described by Empedocles; part of whose verses he there produceth.

[...].] Plutarch certainly doth here allude to Plato's words in his V. De Legibus, where Plato would have all men earnestly exhorted [...], &c. to make this their chief study, neither in time of adversity, when crosse daemons arise against them, nor in prosperity, when their own good daemon (such was their opinion in those days) stands for them and prevaileth, through immoderate either joy or sorrow to misbehave them­selves, but in all fortunes and conditions to cary themselves as be­commeth men, according to the rules of good order and decency. His words are many: but the chiefest to our purpose are these: [...], in Plato, & [...] in Plutarch here, opposit crosse daemons; that is in Hebrew, Satans; [...]. Of these evill crosse daemons, Porphyrius, that arch-enemy of Christianity, in his De Phi­losophiâ ex Oraculis, (quoted by Theodoret, Therapeut. III. where the Latin, electorum, for, ex oraculis, [...], must be corrected) and in [...], and elsewhere, hath pregnant passages: but because he lived long after Christ, when Heathens began in many things cunningly to temper their Philosophy with Christianity; I meddle not with him.

[...].] It is very likely that Plutarch had a respect to those words, (elsewhere by him excepted against, as we shall see afterwards) of Herodotus, that [...]. Now [...] what it properly doth import here, may best be learned, as I conceive, from Plutarch in his De Poëtis legendis, [Page 22]where he expounds that old proverbiall speech, [...] (that is, In the head of a Polypus, there is that which is good, and there is that which is naught) [...]: Because, saith he, this fish Polypus is pleasant to the taste, but it distur­beth sleep with troublesome and heterogenous (or, unnaturall) phancies, As also from Plautus, Plautus in M [...]t. & in Rud. Miris modis Di ludos faciunt hominibus Mirisque exemplis: nam somnia in somnis danunt. Ne dormientes qui­dem sinunt quiescere. And elsewhere, Miris modis, &c. as before: then followes, Velut ego hac nocte hac quae praeteriit proxima, In somnis egi satis, & fui homo exercitus. It is taken otherwise, passively, by Aristotle, where he defines [...], in men, to be [...], &c. Molestiam turbulentam: though there also it may bear an a­ctive construction. See also, if you please, Oracul. Chald. [...], &c. and there Psellus.

[...]] Herodotus again, lib. VII. ca. 10. [...]. By him, saith he, a great army may easily be overthrown by a small one, when God, envying them, shall send upon them a sudden fright or thun­der, (as upon the Marcomanni in Marcus Antoninus his time; a famous story among Christian writers) through which the most wor­thy have unworthily been defeated.

[...]] without falling, properly: which puts me in mind, (and I must have remembred it however) of Adam's fall. Now as we have here an ancient tradition concerning the envy and malignity of certain evill spirits to mankind; so was there among them another tradition of no lesse antiquity, concerning the fall of man, or men, from their primitive estate of Angelicall happinesse: both which traditions being put together, will make it evident, (which is a great part of our task) that the fal of Adam, as it is recorded in holy Writ, by the temptation of the Devill, was not altogether unknown unto ancient Heathens. Of this latter, (besides Plato, and all Platonicks after him, who speak of it often, but more ob­scurely, and allegorically) Tully writes in this wise: Ex quibus humanae vitae erroribus & aerumnis fit, ut interdum veteres illi sive va­tes, sive in sacris initiisque tradendis divinae mentis interpretes, qui nos ob aliqua scelera suscepta in vitâ superiore poenarum luendarum caussâ, natos esse dixerunt, aliquid vidisse videantur: verumque sit illud q [...]od [Page 23]est apud Aristot. simili nos affectos esse supplicio atque eos qui quondam, quum in praedonum Etruscorum manus incidissent, crudelitate excogi­tatâ necabantur; quorum corpora viva cum mortuis, adversa adver­sis accommodata, quà aptissimè colligabantur; eâ nostros animos cum corporibus copulatos, ut vivos cum mortuis esse conjunctos: that is,

From these many errors (or wandrings) and miseries of this mortall life, I am ever and anon much inclined to beleeve, that those ancient, whether Prophets, or Ministers and Interpreters of the divine will, by whom sa­cred rites & mysteries were instituted; who taught that we were born and brought forth into this world to suffer for some crimes by us commit­ted in our former life; did speak the truth indeed: as also for the same rea­son to subscribe unto that of Aristotles as most true, who writes that our punishment is not unlike that which was used by some Etruscan rob­bers (elsewhere by S. Augustine called Reges Etrusci; and Thusci Ty­ranni: Contra Cresconium Grammat. l. 4. c. 49. & contra Parmen. l. 3. cap. ult.) who to shew their cruelty towards some who were faln into their hands, devised this kind of death; to fit their live bodies with other dead bodies, and to bind them up very artificially, the one opposite to the o­ther, face to face, and so of other parts: that even so our souls are cou­pled and joyned with our bodies, as those live bodies were joyned with the dead. We owe this excellent passage of Tully unto S. August. by whom, out of his Hortensius, in his IV. book against Julianus the Pelagian, it is cited, and so preserved; the whole book from which it was taken, some few fragments excepted, being since perished. Orpheus is the man intended by Tully, who was both vates, and [...] too, a great contriver of sacred mysteries, who first, as we are told by Plato in his Cratylus, called the body, [...], quasi [...], a tombe, or sepulchre. This Orpheus is very ancient: accor­ding to Eusebius his computation, he lived about twelve hundred years before Christ was born; long before Homer. There is very little of his (some few verses, collected from severall Authors) now extant, that is truly his: but of old, even in Platoes time, as him­selfe witnesseth, there were divers counterfeit books that went under his name. Di [...]g. Laertius thinks him not worthy the name of a Philosopher. Neither doe I, if he did write indeed such things, as he layeth to his charge. Now whereas those ancients ( Orpheus, and since him, Plato and others) who speak of mans hap­pinesse before this life, seem to make man in that state of happi­nesse, meerly spirituall; a pure soul, I mean: this will easily be [Page 24]reconciled with the truth, if it be considered that the same Anci­ents, ( Plato I am sure) did attribute unto man, (that is, unto the soul of man) [...]; an immortall, bright, resplendent, and [...]: a materiall mortall body: of which t [...]ey th [...] desire to know more, may reade Synesius in his De Inso [...], and the Greek Scholiast there: as also Hierocles, upon Pythageras his ve [...]ses; who treat of it at large. So that according to them, the soule even before it was joined unto this body, was not without a body, but so different in qualities from this, that it seems it was mistaken for another quite different, as well in sub­stance, as qualities. And as for the place where this former life was, not mentioned here by Tully, but expressed by Plato and o­thers, to have been Heaven; we know that Paradise, the place of our first Parents abode during their innocency, is even in the Scriptures taken for Heaven, sometimes; or at least, for a place of blisse, different from the earth: and even S. Chrysostome, who sharply censureth those that turned the situation of Paradise, as it is described in the Scripture into allegories, yet himselfe spareth not to say, that our first Parents in Paradise, [...], inhabited the earth, as a kind of Heaven; styling man in the same place, [...], a Terrestiall Angel. S. Basil is yet more free in his expressions; and so are other Ancients, whom I shall not need to name.

[...].] Pherecydes his words in Origen against Cel­sus are these; [...]: that is, Of that portion is the Tartarean portion, (or company) kept by the daughters of Boreas, Harpyes, and Thuella, (or, Tempest) and thither doth Jupiter cast whoever of the Gods (or Angels; which word of Angels, was not unknown to ancient Heathens, as Pythagoras, and others: and Angels in the Scripture also, we know, are sometimes called Gods:) doth grow insolent; or, rebellious.

And so I have done with this place of Plutarch; which toge­ther with that of Tully, being unquestionable, deserve to be much made of by them who had rather a little genuine truth, though they labour for it, then plenty of specious impostures. The Si­byls, and Mercurius Trismegistus, we purposely decline to meddle with in this case; yea, and the Oracula Chaldaica too: which though [Page 25]I doe not altogether reject, yet I am very suspicious that there is in them more of Porphyrius, then his bare (as himselfe pretends) collection.

All this that hath been said well pondered, S. Austins assertion, that we spake of before, (with little variation) that the word [...], at the very first, (long before Homer) was taken in the worst sense, for an evill spirit; and afterwards, when evill spirits began to be worshipped, (which how it happened, Justin Martyr, and others that have written against the Gentiles, doe shew) for a good spirit; goodnesse and bountifulnesse (as Tully well argues against Epicurus) being if not the only, yet the chiefest object of divine worship; this assertion, I say, so qualified, though we can­not for want of proofs, and evidences of those times, affirm it certainly true, yet certainly it may be supposed and granted not improbable. But however, take the word in either sense, for a God, or for a Devill, the opinion we have spoken of, of the envy and malignity [...], will equally, but in different respects ap­pear to have proceeded originally from the Scriptures. And be­sides this, that the very word [...], God, by Greek writers, as the La­tin Deus, by the Latins, is often used upon this occasion, hath been observed before, and must here be remembred. The Text of the Scriptures that we must ground upon, is that unhappy confe­rence between our first mother, Eve, and the subtill Serpent, which we therefore think fit to set down here at large, as we find it re­corded in the third Chapter of Genesis, and the 1, 2, 3, 4, 5. verses of the Chapter. The words according to our last English Transla­tion are these:

Ver. 1. Now the Serpent was more subtill then any beast of the field, Gen. III. which the Lord God had made: and he said unto the woman, Yea, hath God said, Ye shall not eat of every tree of the Garden?

2. And the woman said unto the Serpent, We may eat of the fruit of the trees of the garden:

3. But of the fruit of the tree which is in the midst of the garden, God hath said, Ye shall not cat of it, neither shall ye touch it, lest ye die.

4. And the Serpent said unto the woman, Ye shall not surely die.

5. For God doth know that in the day ye eat thereof, then your eies shall be opened, and ye shall be as Gods, knowing good and evill.

Let the words, first in themselves; and then compared with the event, and other circumstances, be well considered, and these two inferences will of themselves, as I conceive, without the help of a comment, offer themselves to any ordinary judgement. First, that the Devill doth object unto God, their Maker, envy and ma­lignity towards men. Secondly, that it was meer envy and malignity towards mankind, that moved the Devill, thus to set upon the woman, and to counsell her as he did. As I will not therefore altogether decline them, so neither will I trouble my selfe and my Reader with multiplicity of Commentators upon the place. I think it will not need; and I must confesse, I have not, at this time, many by me to look upon. We shall treat of those two inferences in the order they were but now set down.

Of all Ancients that have written upon Genesis, i. I shall ever give the preeminence unto S. Chrysostome, for the most literall and ge­nuine Expositor. Upon the 4. verse, And the Serpent said, &c. he hath these words, (upon the fourth verse, as I said; but his words concerne the fifth rather) [...]: that is, Afterwards not content to have contradicted the words of God, that he might the better make way for his imposture, and by foiling the woman, fulfill his own designes, he doth traduce their ma­ker as envious.

Of later Commentators, Junius, (as most generally received a­mong Protestants) and learned Diodatus, (lately set out in Eng­lish: I wish more care had been taken both in the version and printing) will suffice. Junius upon the place, Videtur enim ex multis rationibus, &c. Among other arguments, which he (the Devill) used to perswade them, that men were not so loved of God, as they thought, but hated rather, and that happinesse was envied unto them, he brings this as the chiefest, because they were forbidden to eat of that fruit, from which depended man's chiefest happinesse, the knowledge of good & evil.

Diodatus, upon the fifth verse, God doth know, &c. He doth wrest (I make use of the translation set out) into a wrong sense the name of that tree, as if it had power to conferre divine knowledge, and the under­standing of every thing: accusing God of envy, and provoking the wo­man to pride and curiosity.

Before I proceed, I will by the way impart unto my Reader a [Page 27]certain passage of Aristotle, which I have often admired, and doe still, as often as I think of it. The opinion being currant in his days, that God was [...], or, envious; which by the vulgar, who have little sense of any other happinesse, but such as is to be found in the fruition of worldly goods, was applyed according­ly; Aristotle in his Metaphysicks takes notice of both; both of the opinion, and how applyed: and as for the opinion, he doth protest against it; [...], it is not possible it should be so: but secondly, were it so indeed, that such is the nature of God, as to be [...], then in all probability (saith he) his envy doth especially consist in this, that he doth not afford unto men the happinesse of perfect knowledge, and contemplation, He speaketh it of the Me­taphysicks particularly, as absolutely being the noblest of all sci­ences; by himself therefore, and by others often called, [...], Divinity. His words are not many, (as his manner is to be short) but contain fully the substance of all I have said; we shal have them afterwards upon another occasion. I think no man hath ever laboured to any purpose in the search of any truth, either divine, morall, or naturall; or ever observed with himselfe how prone men are generally, and always have been upon all occasi­ons both of themselves to mistake, and to be misled by others; who will not acknowledge Aristotle, (though hardly censured by divers) as well deserving that glorious title of [...] (divine) as his so much admired master by ancient, both Christians and Heathens, ever did, for so many lines. Especially if to this be added his complaint in another place, that men knew so little of those things that belonged unto God; De part. ani­mal. l. 1. c. 5. professing withall his readinesse to prefer a little true Divinity, well grounded, before all humane knowledge and philosophy.

But now to returne to the words of the Devill, as they are recorded in the Scripture: though there recorded to his shame, and for our instruction; yet the Heathens that had but parcels of it, and those too by tradition (whereof there be many examples in the ancient Fathers) much adulterated; no wonder if they made a contrary use of it, and by sad experience finding the effects of Adam's fall, and Gods curse; and not well informed of all particulars: the Devill also being as busie with them, up­on all occasions, as he had been with our mother Eve, to promote error and impiety: no wonder I say, if they made a contrary use [Page 28]of what is written and recorded, and beleeved of God, many of them, as our first Parents (upon the Devils perswasion) belee­ved. Even since Christ and Christianity, some Heathens, no vulgar men, that had read the Scripture very diligently, from these ve­ry particulars of Adam's fall, as they are there recorded, framed matter of blasphemy; and from Moses his words objected envy and mal [...]gnity unto that God, whose goodnesse and glory Moses in­tended to set out. So Porphyrius, a Philosopher, among Heathens, of prime note; by Christians justly surnamed [...], the impious; speaking of the forbidden tree, [...], saith he, [...]: that is. Questionlesse out of meer envy that tree was forbidden them, God envying men knowledge, and purposing that they should continue fooles, (or, idiots). He is answered by Greg. Naz. in his 38. Orat.

However, the opinion was not among Heathens so generally re­ceived, but that there were ever found some that opposed it. What Aristotle said of it, we heard but now; and before him, Plato in his Timaeus very peremptorily concludes it that God being [...], good, ( [...], good in the highest degree, is his word a little before) [...]. he is not at all capable, or ever was of any kinde of envy. And in the II. of his De Repub. he is very copious, and as earnest, as copious, upon that subject, that God is not the cause of any evill: which (with him) comes all to one as to say that he cannot envy. But then among them that were agreed concerning the goodnesse of God, there was no small controversie concerning his power. For, said they, were God as omnipotent, as he is good, why hath he not made all things as goodnesse would have prompted, for the best? Why not the world, (those that did not beleeve it so, as the Stoicks) eternall: men, immortall: good and vertuous, all, naturally? Hereupon the most (even of their wisest) tell into this grosse conceit, that God was not a [...]together omnipotent: that he had done what he could, and wanted power, not will, to doe all things as their own bold phancies and imaginations suggested unto them they should have been done: They did put all the fault of all that was done a [...]isse in the world upon the [...], or, materiam, that God was to work upon, and was not able (so they) to rectifie. Se­ [...]a Ep [...]st. [...]8. Mittamus animum ad ea quae aeterna su [...]t, miremur, &c. D [...]u [...]que inter illa versantem & providentem, qu [...]madmodum qua [Page 29]immortalia facere non potuit, quia materia prohibebat, &c. And in his Cur bonis mala, &c. cap. V. Quare tamen Deus tam iniquus in distributio­ne fati fuit, ut bo [...]is viris paupertatem, vulnera, & acerba funera adscri­beret? Non potest artifex mut [...]re materiam. Haec passa est. Quaedam &c. And again in the next Chapter; At multa incidunt tristia, horren­da, dura toleratu. quia non poteram vos istis subducere, animos vestros, &c. So elsewhere, more then once. And so indeed most of them, Philosophers, Historians, and others: even Epictetus himself (who comes neerest to us in most points) in Arrianus, he sticks not to say very peremptorily, [...], he could not certainly. I can­not excuse Plato, though some have taken great pains to doe it; how ridiculous soever the opinion may seem, his words are plain, that [...], or, materiaprima, as eternall as God himselfe, did concurre with him, to the making of all things: and that God [...] (so he speaks; and Alcinous out of him, [...]) that is, Did his best, that all things might be [...], for the best. Sometimes he speaks very doubtfully. I confesse, and cannot be excused from con­tradicting himself (as by Plutarch is well observed in divers pla­ces) in words, at least, whatever he intended: which also made the Ancients not to agree among themselves about his opinion. Dio. Laertius acknowledges but two principia, according to Plato; Plutarch, Apuleius, Alcinou [...], and others, reckon three. And of them that reckon three, some give them farre different appellations from those that others do: So that in very deed, let a man be never so well versed in Plato, he shall find it a matter of great obscurity & difficulty absolutely to determine what was his opinion. However, what we have now cited out of him, he hath in divers places.

Others againe there were, who took upon them to maintain, as the goodnesse, so the omnipotency of God, as Simplicius, (one of the later, but not inferiour unto many Philosophers) in his Com­mentaries upon Aristotle De Coelo, where he hath a long contesta­tion with Alexander Aphrodisiensis about it. Whether all his rea­sons and solutions (in point of humane reason, I mean, by which only he goes) be satisfactory or no; especially, where he handleth the point of morall evill, why permitted by God; because it is not my purpose here to engage my selfe, (elsewhere I may perchance) in that obscure and intricate Argument, I must leave to the lear­ned and judicious Reader, who will not repent him his labour if he read him attentively. All I shall say of it is this, that what he [Page 30]answereth concerning morall evill, is the very same that is answe­red by divers ancient Fathers upon this occasion: but extreamly disliked, slighted, and scoffed at by Plutarch in his Treatise, Of common notions against the Stoicks. Indeed as Plutarch relates that matter from Chrysippus, it cannot but seem very absurd and ridi­culous: But he that shall reade Simplicius not upon Aristotle only, but upon Epictetus his Enchiridion also, where he handles it (in two or three places) very largely, may perchance be of another opinion, and think that Plutarch might have spared some of his jests, and rather have taken more paines to understand the state of the que­stion better then it seems he did.

Of Chrysippus his opinion Aulus Gell. also hath a Chapter in his Noctes Atticae, which in the latter Editions of Aulus Gell. is set out as imperfect, or defective in the beginning: it was not so in the old Editions; and why it should be so in the new I know no reason, but that, as I conceive, those that first so set him out did not understand him, and chose rather (as many in that ease to the great prejudice of good Authors) to place the defect upon the Co­pies, then to acknowledge it in themselves. I shall be very wil­ling to bestow some paines to do that good Author some right, who hath taken so many paines to benefit posterity; and we shall finde it to our purpose too. Neverthelesse, because all men are not for that kinde of learning, it shall make no further interruption here, but shall be added at the end. The place of Gellius that we mean, is lib. VI. cap. 1. Homines fecisse dicitur, &c.

Lastly, besides these we have spoken of, there were yet others, who upon grounds of naturall reason stood for the goodnesse both and omnipotency of God as peremp [...]orily as any; yet durst not up­on the same grounds of naturall reason take upon themselves to an­swer all objections against their opinion, which (their naturall reason) they modestly acknowledged weak and desective, and in­capable of such high mysteries and speculations. Plotinus the Phi­losopher, as I remember, (I might say Aristotle too, but that what he saith of the defect of humane reason, which he compares to the eyes of Bats, is upon another occasion) hath an excellent passage or two to that purpose. Antoninus (a great and glorious Monarch in his dayes; by many, as deservedly as ever Heathen was, both for his learning and goodnesse, surnamed▪ The Philosopher) hath I am sure, which may be read in his Meditations concerning himselfe, [Page 31]lib. II. n. 8. but especially, lib. XII. n. 4. How so many came to pitch upon this [...], or materiam, and partly to joyn, partly to op­pose it unto God in the creation, might easily be conceived if we compare what divers of them write of it with the words of Moses, Gen. 1. v. 2. of the Chaos, which very Chaos some of them called [...], Necessity. Though they say not altogether what Moses saith, and added to it much; yet a man may in Moses's words see some ground for their errours. In so obscure a subject ( dark­nesse is in the Text, and caligo is the word used by some of them al­so for the Chaos) they might easily mistake him; they especially that had him but by tradition. But I will say no more of it here, because it is but upon the by.

And so much concerning the originall of the opinion, that [...], Daemon, or, The Daemon ( [...], and [...]; that is, God, and the Deity, in the language and more clear expression of divers others, as by divers examples hath appeared) is of an envious nature.

There be other places of Scripture, I know, (besides that of Ge­nesis) which upon this occasion, and not impertinently perchance, might have been considered of. As for example, those Ironicall words (though possibly not Ironically taken by all that might light upon them) of Almighty God, Gen. III. 22, 23. And the Lord God said, Behold, the man is become as one of us, to know good or evill. And now lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever. Therefore the Lord God sent him forth from the Gar­den of Eden, &c. And againe, those, Gen. XI. 6. And the Lord said, Behold, the people is one, and they have all one language, and this they be­gin to do: and now nothing will be restrained from them which they have imagined to do, &c. But especially, that ambiguous signification of the word [...] which as it signifies to be jealous (Exod. XX. 5. XXXIV. 14. and elsewhere frequently:) so Genesis XXXI. 1. and elsewhere, to envie. But since we have, as I conceive, sufficiently discovered and laid open the main spring of the errour, I shall be lesse solici­tous about the Riverets and smaller streams.

We will now suppose that Daemon was originally taken for a De­vill or Evill-Spirit. ii. This supposition is not without some probabi­lity, as hath been said. But if that will not be granted, we are sure however that since Christ it was so taken by many Heathens; and that even before, long before Christ, there was an opinion among Heathens of certaine envious Spirits or Devils that did set them­selves [Page 32]against men, to doe them what mischiefe they could. Now how consonant it is to the Scriptures to adscribe all temporall evils to the malice and envy of the Devill, as the first and originall cause, is so apparently obvious, as little shall need to bee said about it.

[...] Through envy of the devill came death into the world, saith the author of the booke of Wisdome, (Chap. 11. ver. ult.) attributed unto Solomon; In which words by death must be understood not bare death onely, but all the conse­quences of it: all the changes & chances to which this our mortality is lyable; which make our very life, (as divers ancient heathens have taught) rather a daily death, then life, properly, [...], saith S. Chry­sostome, [...], &c. that is, Behold the envy, and manifold, (or deep) subtiltie of the wicked daemon. For when he saw man created to highest honour, and little inferior to An­gels, &c. The word he useth here, and some lines after, is [...]; but afterwards both here, and upon the seventh verse, it is [...]. S. Basil in his Homilie, [...], That God is not the cause of evills, hath both the words together. [...]. Being (the Devill) the receptacle of all wickednesse, he laboured of envy also. Our honour became an eyesore unto him. So Basil there: but in his XXI. Homilie, Vpon di­vers (so inscribed) places of Scripture, having occasion to speake of envy in generall, he falls upon this particular of the devills envy, and mans ruine through it, and handles it very rhetorically, So Gregor, Nyssen, as pathetically, though not so largely, in his, De vita Mosis. Divers more might be added. Hardly shall we finde any Ancients that either speake of Adams fall, or his posterities miseries in this life, but have a touch of the Devils envie. As for moderne authors, in so obvious, and so unquestionable a subject among all Christians, I shall for beare their testimonies, and proceed to other matter.

We have presumed that time out of mind such an opinion was among the heathens concerning this invidia daemonis, the subject of our Discourse. We think we have said enough to make it probable. VVe will now see what can be said against it: to wit, whether his Name can be produced that first either said it, or was observed to say it among heathens: which though it might, yet it doth not follow but that originally it might be from the Scriptures, since that it may as probably be supposed, whoever that first was, by so [Page 33]many ages either neerer, or farther from the spring, that he had it from the Scriptures, which all antiquity beleeved that Pherecydes, Pythagoras, Plato, and divers others in their times by travelling into Egypt, and other farre countries, and there conversing with some of the Iewish nation, had some knowledge of. Neverthelesse, to give the reader all satisfaction I can in this point, I will (as we promised before) see what can be said about it. There be two, (more, it may be; but two that I remember) who seeme to make Herodotus the first: Plutarch, sufficiently knowne unto all men, and Eustathius, who hath commented, or rather abbreviated and con­tracted the ancient innumerous Commentators upon Homer. Plutarch, among other many tractats, in that part of his workes, which is called, his Morals, hath one intitled [...], Concerning the malignity of Herodotus; and in that tractat, a­mong other things, as well became him, he takes notice of his ma­lignity towards the Gods: His words are, [...], &c. In the person of Solon he reproacheth the Gods in these words: Dost thou, ó Croesus, consult me about humane affaires, who know full well that all Deitie is of an envious and unpeaceable (Gr. [...], that takes pleasure to disturbe, & to create troubles: we have spoken of the word before) disposition.] For what himselfe conceited of the Gods, in fathering it upon Solon, he addes malignity to blasphemy. This is all he saith of it; and it is very observable he saith no more. First, that whereas Herodo­tus foure severall times at least, upon severall occasions doth so blas­pheme, he should take notice but of one. And secondly, that he should say nothing (copious enough, if not exuberant upon most o­ther particulars) against the opinion it selfe by way of confutation, and in vindication of his gods; knowing well, that if Herodotus were the first, he was not the onely that had said it. The truth is, it is not likely that Plutarch did beleeve Herodotus to have been the first; neither indeed doth he directly say it, though his words might seeme to import as much. But besides this, Plutarch was conscious unto himselfe, that himselfe had said as much, or little lesse. There be divers places to be found in him, that might be pressed to this purpose: I shall instance in one. In his Consolation to Apollonius, Phi­lip King of Macedon, (saith he: we had somewhat of this Philip be­fore) upon the hearing of three severall happy tydings, all in one day, lift­ing up his hands unto heaven, he said, O daemon, unto these my good haps, oppose I pray thee, some tolerable misfortune: Knowing that such is the na­ture [Page 34]of fortune, to envy great successes. So Plutarch, who doth not in­deed use the word [...], as Herodotus doth; but how common and ordinary it is to all sorts of writers, (professed Epicureans and A­theists excepted) to use the word fortune in stead of God, is not un­knowne, and hath been, even by heathens, observed. We shall, not long after, quote a passage of Diod. Siculus, where [...] fortune; and [...], the Gods, are apparently in one and the same sentence, put for the same. Perhaps the generality of the assertion, that all Deity, &c. was it that Plutarch excepted against in Herodotus: & so he might be the onely perchance that so generally, and peremptorily (take them both together) doth affirme it. Certainely, whosoever was the first that durst publickly so blaspheme; so easily to entertaine, and so often to inculcate the blasphemy as Herodotus doth, even this was enough to evince his impiety; and it was not, I beleeve, without some providence, that his malignity, in generall, should be so sifted, and as it were, publickly in the eyes of all men, and that by the heathens themselves cited, arraigned, and condemned; (as it is there in that accurate Invective, or Indictment rather:) who had shewed so little ingenuity in the cause of God.

As Plutarch, so Eustathius, he also seemeth to make Herodotus the first author of this blasphemy; but seemeth onely. His words upon the last of the Iliads, are these: [...] &c. The Poet making, or setting out, or bringing in the gods, [...], generally, as often hath been observed, adscribes unto them such affections, as men in such cases would probably be affected with. A­mong which this is one, that those who in other things are far eminent, would not have those of a lower condition to be equall unto them in point of happi­nesse: whether, ( [...]) because they spight them; or, as Herodotus would say, ( [...]) because they envy; or for some other cause. I trans­late the words as they must be read, & not as they are printed (in the Basil. edition, at lest) [...]: of which no sense can be made▪ [...] and [...], imply but one thing, and it is likely some either Poet, or prose author upon this very subject, had the word [...]. However, [...] being the word (and the onely, as I take it) often u­sed by Herodotus upon this occasion it can be no wonder if Eustath, (or whoever; some ancienter Commentator in him perchance) ha­ving now occasion to use it himselfe, name him: thereby rather al­luding to his word, as I conceive, then to his opinion, as either pro­per to him, or derived from him.

But may not Eustathius be thought to derive it here rather from Homer him selfe? I think, not: for all that can be made of his words is not that Homer doth directly say so; but this, that the Poet doth adscribe such affections unto the Gods, as may be thought to proceed from such a cause. Homer's owne words in that place are these;

That is, How have the Gods appointed unto miserable men, to live in grief?

Which is no more then the Scripture saith in divers places, not of gods, but of God: and yet the cause, neverthelesse, according to the Scriptures, not envy, but justice, and just judgement, yea, and mercy, in some respect; as heathens themselves, upon this very sub­ject, acknowledge. Besides, it is well knowne, that Homer else­where, (we shall have occasion to produce his words upon the pas­sage of Aul. Gell.) brings in Jupiter complaining of the iniquity of men, who lay the cause of their miseries upon the Gods.

But were it so that Plutarch and Eustathius should directly say it either of Herodotus, or Homer; yet there would be other Ancients found of no lesse anthority then they, to contradict them. Simonides, an ancient Greek Poet, was since Homer indeed, but before Herodo­tus, one full century of yeares, at least. Now Aristotle, in his Meta­physicks, speaking obiter of this matter, and in the very termes as Herodotus doth, he quotes this Simonides, and might be thought to make him the first author. But he doth not▪ he takes notice of the saying from Simonides the Poet, indeed, and because from none but him, disapproving the saying, he is content to say, that Poets will lye. That no body said it before him he doth not write, neither will it follow. Lastly, how easily either Aristotle, or any other, in case they had spoken more peremptorily, might be mistaken in this point, since neither all bookes were extant in any age, that have formerly been written, be it the happiest age that ever was; nor all that are extant, likely to come to any one mans knowledge, be he never so carefull and curious, I leave it further to be considered. Aristotles words in English (those memorable words we mentioned before) are these: Therefore it may well be thought that the possession (or purchase) of this ingenuous noble science (the Metaphysicks) doth not be­long unto men: For the nature of man, in many respects, is slavish: so that according to Simonides this blessednesse doth peculiarly belong unto God; neither is it fit for man to seeke that science which is above him [or which [Page 36]is not granted unto him. Gr. [...]: that is, as I conceive, such trajections being very usuall, to Ari­stotle especially; [...].] And if that of the Poet be true, that God can envie, I think it appliable to this especially: [Gr. It is probable that it so fals out in this especially:] whence it will follow, that all men are unfortunate [Gr. [...]: he alludes to those verses of Euripides, as I take it, cited by him in his Ethicks, lib. VI. c. 8. [...]: which is divinely confuted by him in the said Ethicks, the 7. & 8. Chapters of the X. Book] who aspire to such excellency. But neither is it a thing possible that God should envie, but according to the Proverbe, Poets will faine many things (or often lye:) neither ought we (though but men, and not so capable of it as of other things, that is,) to make more reckoning of any other science then of this.

These words of Aristotle may give light to an obscure passage of Clemens Alexandrinus, who in his fifth Stromat. having discour­sed at large, and to that end, brought proofes out of the Scripture also, That God had not revealed the truth unto men, but in my­steries and allegories, in dreams, and symboles: [...], saith he, [...], &c. that is, not out of envie, since that to phansie God subject to passions, (so the word [...] must here be rendred, not as it is translated, patibilis: in which sense it is ta­ken, Acts XXVI. v. 23.) is impious, but, &c.

I have done with my main subject, the originall of that opinion of ancient Heathens, De invidia Daemonis. I must now remember an observation of the same Ancients, spoken of at the beginning, concerning unusuall, overswelling prosperity; for which there be­ing sufficient ground (in ordinary construction) upon daily expe­rience, the opinion de invidia Daemonis (especially by them of re­moter times from the beginning, who were lesse acquainted with ancient traditions) may be thought as well to be grounded upon the same experience. This tradition, de invidia Daemonis, being once up, and generally received among men, though originally grounded, as we have said, and derived from the particulars of Adams fall: yet afterwards, when the revolution of many Ages had partly adulterated, and partly altogether obliterated the truth of things, it was applyed by men diversly, according to the seve­rall opinions men had of the Deity, and as they stood differently af­fected (some placing happinesse in knowledge, some in greatnesse, [Page 37]in pleasure some, and some in some other thing) to the things of this world. But the most generall application of it being, as we have said, and partly shewed, to all eminent worldly prosperity; it will be requisite therefore, and consequent to our first intention to shew, what further probable grounds (besides experience) either from certain words of Scripture, seemingly importing some such thing; or from relations of Scripture Histories (from which, as an­cient Fathers prove, most of their fables were derived) ancient Heathens might have for this observation. Passages of Scrip­ture which by them might easily be drawne to that sense, are ma­ny: the effect of all which is by Christ comprised in these words, [...]: Whosoever shall exalt himselfe, shall be abased: and he that shall humble himselfe, shall be exalted, Matth. XXIII. v. 12. There was a saying among ancient Grecians, attributed by them unto Aesope, as Au­thor of it: but certainly, whether by Aesope first, or any other, taken out of the Scriptures originally, that it was the proper work of God, and his chiefest occupation, [...]: To abase the things that are high, and to exalt those that are low. It is thus expressed by Euripides: [...]; that is, Euripid. in Troad. I see the Gods, (or the wayes of the Gods) those things which are low, they exalt aloft, (Gr. they make to tower on high) and those that are eminent (or highly prised) they cast down. See if you please Iob V. 11. and XL. 10, 11, 12. Psal. CXIII. v. 6, 7. I Sam. II.3, 4, 5. &c. all pregnant places to this purpose as I take it, and many more may be found: but of all, I conceive that of Esay concerning Tyre, to be most emphati­call; Tyre, that once renowned City, whose Colonies, pene toto orbe diffusae, had spread themselves throughout the whole World almost, as ancient Historians testifie: Carthage, the once Imperiall City of Africa, (that so long contested with Rome about the Mo­narchy of the World) and divers other great Townes owing their originall unto it. Of this Tyre the Prophet Esay, Isay XXIII. 8, 9 among many others, hath these words, (I must crave leave that I may set them down in their originall language, because of the elegancy,) [...] 8, Who hath taken this counsell against Tyre, the crowning [City] [Page 38]whose Merchants are Princes, whose traffiquers are the honourable of the earth.

9. The Lord of Hosts hath purposed it, to staine the pride of all glory, and to bring into contempt all the honourable of the earth.

Though Tyre were the occasion and principall object (and well it might then be for the pride and statelinesse of it) of the words, yet the sentence I take to be generall, extending to all, as times, so places equally.

I have no thought that ever Lucretius, a notorious Epicurean, had any knowledge of the holy Scriptures; and his thoughts I dare say were farre enough from what the Prophet, or the Holy Ghost by him, aimed at in these words: yet it cannot be denied that he is an excellent Poet, and that his words come very near to the li­terall sense of those of the Prophet, where he saith,

Of Scripture Histories, that of holy Iobs more then ordinary pro­sperity, as it is recorded in the first Chapter; and the sudden alte­ration, which upon Satan (there said to have appeared among the sons of God) his wicked and malitious suggestion and crimination ensu­ed; so ancient and so remarkable, as it cannot be conceived that it should altogether be unknown unto them, so what they might ignorantly inferre upon it, they that are versed in their mytholo­gies may easily guesse. Through the instigation of the same Sa­tan (as is expressed I Chron. XXI. v. 1.) David King of Israel, would needs have the people numbred: whereupon Gods wrath and a great plague upon the people of God ensued. Of this there is no question, the Text is plaine, that God was angry, and the people plagued; but what was Davids crime, doth not so clearly appear by the Text; neither are Expositors of one minde about it. Josephus of old, and some Rabbins since him, make this to have been Davids trespasse, because he did not impose the redemption mony (half a sicle) commanded by God, Exod. XXX. v. 12, 13. upon such occasi­ons. Learned Diodatus his opinion (slipt over in the late English Edition of his Notes) upon II Sam. c. 24. is, that David (besides some other concurring provocations) offended in that he did not ob­serve the law concerning the right age, to wit, 20 years, from which and upwards, the people was to be numbred, Exo, XXX. 14. Num. I. 2.

So they: but the current opinion of Interpreters, saith P. Martyr, upon the place, is, that elatio animi and superbia, was his fault. God, saith he, had given him peace. He had got a Catalogue of his valiant men, and now he sets his minde upon it, to know the number of his thou­sands of Subjects. So Rev. Dr. Rivet also, Quando tuleris sum­mam filio [...]um Isr. &c. When thou takest the summe of the children of Israel: that is, When thou shalt number them, either by me commanded, or of thy selfe when thou shalt think it expedient for the publicke good. For the numbring of the people upon such occasions was not displeasing unto God, which neverthelesse in David for other causes was reprehen­ded. Not certainly, as some Hebrews are of opinion, because he took no care for the tribute money, which was to be payed unto God: this could not be the reason why Joab disswaded him from it: but because he saw that it was not done out of a good minde, but rather out of vanity and pride, as may appear from the whole context, II Sam. XXIV. So he. And this indeed, all circumstances, as he saith, of the story well weighed, will appear the most probable conjecture: multitude of subjects, (according to that of Solomon, In the multitude of people is the Kings honour, but in the want of people is the destruction of the Prince, Prov. XIV. 28.) being a very likely object of a Princes pride and carnall confidence. Now if pride was the cause both of this anger and plague, and the matter so publickly noysed and construed; it is very likely that the fame of so memorable a judgement (the sudden o­peration and cessation of it, if not the plague it selfe, being appa­rently miraculous) spread it self to many parts of the world, then inhabited by Heathens. Of Ambassadours sent by the Princes of Babylon to enquire of the wonder in the land vouchsafed unto King Hezekiah, in confirmation of his recovery and prolongation of dayes by the immediate hand of God, we are told expresly II Chr. XXXII. v. 31.

And since I have mentioned this of Hezekiah, I cannot passe by, being so pertinent to our purpose, Isidore Pelusiota, Isid. Pelus. Epist. l. 11. Ep. 74. that elegant and witty Writer, his observation concerning him, as it followeth: [ In the reign of King Hezekiah, the King of Persia came with all his power against Ierusalem, and was overthrowne by a divine miracle, one of the greatest that ever was. Whereupon Hezekiah being puffed up, and now through immoderate joy entertaining thoughts of himself above a man, God with a sicknesse, as with a bridle curbed him, to compose his swelling minde, and to make him sensible of his naturall frailty, and to cure [Page 40]him of that disease which his soule had contracted through excesse of joy.] So Isidore: and it is in that Epistle that he writes of Epaminondas, the Theban Commander, of whom we had somewhat in the be­ginning. What ground this Isidore might have either from the Scriptures themselves (by way of inference:) or from tradition for this observation, I know not: But in my judgement, Hezekiah's miraculous (in some circumstances of it) recovery of that sicknesse he speaks of, and upon it, his vaine ostentation of all his treasures and pretious things in all his Kingdome before those Ambassadours whom forein Princes had sent to congratulate him, so particularly noted in the Scripture, II Kings XX. 12, 13, &c. and upon this osten­tation that dreadfull denunciation of future heavie judgements up­on his posterity, do sufficiently evince, that Hezekiah in his prospe­rity (after his recovery at least) did forget himself; and that God in mercy to him did use means to recall him, before he should be too far gone. These words (besides the story) seem to me to import as much: II Chr. XXXII. 25, 26. But Hezekiah rendred not againe according to the benefit done unto him: for his heart was lifted up, therefore there was wrath upon him, and upon Judah and Jerusalem. Notwithstanding, Hezekiah humbled himself for the pride of his heart (both he and the inhabitants of Jerusa­lem) so that the wrath of the Lord came not upon them in the dayes of Hezekiah.

These, and the like passages of Scripture might, and did as I con­ceive, at the first (in part) occasion that observation of the Hea­thens, of the danger of more then ordinary worldly prosperity. But their ignorance of the Scriptures, or want rather of perfect knowledge of them, made them upon this observation to inferre (in the manner I have said before) this wicked and impious con­clusion, that God was of a maligne and envious disposition. I see here a large field open, but I will not enter into it, as not being within the compasse either of my undertaking (which was only to shew the originall of the opinion:) or my leisure and opportunity at this time. I shall only take notice of two reasons which are touch­ed upon by ancient Heathens, not Philosophers I do not meane, who have written of purpose, and more generally concerning Pro­vidence: but Historians, upon the by, and in this very subject of either great prosperity suddenly blasted, or sorrowes intermingled with joyes; their reasons, as I conceive, being very agreeable to the doctrine of the sacred Scriptures.

Herodotus, i. in one of those places where he chargeth God with envie, among other expressions to that purpose, hath these words: [...]: that is, That God will not end [...]re that any other should thinke well of himselfe, but himselfe. Indeed it cannot be denied that the holy Scriptures both of the Old and New Testament do set out God unto us, as very jealous of his honour in that particular, in whose eyes nothing is more odi­ous and abominable, then high looks, and high thoughts; who op­poseth himself against all pride and self-conceit (in point of wis­dome especially) as direct invasion, or usurpation upon his sove­raignty. I do not remember that God is said in the Scripture [...], to resist any other sinners but the proud. He disappointeth the devises of the crafty, saith holy Job; so that their hands cannot per­forme their enterprise. He taketh the wise in their own craftinesse, Job V. 12.13. and the coursell of the froward is carried headlong. This, I think, no man should wonder at; but rather wonder that any mortall men should so much forget themselves, their beginning, their end; their frail­ty, mentall and corporall, whilest they live; as to grudge God, their maker (who of meer dust and clay hath made them what they are:) this prerogative of being The only wise: either im­peaching his goodnesse, because men are but men, and not Gods; or contesting with his wisdome, as very Gods themselves, and not men. Such men (prodigies of ingratitude) have been, and are yet in the world. Est aliquid quo sapiens antecedat Deum. Sen. Ep. 53. Ille naturae beneficio, non suo sapiens est. Ecce res magna, habere imbecillitatem ho­minis, securitatem Dei. And againe, Jupiter, Id. Ep. 73. quò antecedit virum bo­num? diutius bonus est. Sapiens nihilo se minoris aestimat, quod virtutes ejus spatio breviore clauduntur. And few lines after, Deus non vincit sapientem foelicitate, etiamsi vincat aetate: Non est virtus major, quae largior. Such was the language, not of Seneca only, but of those wise men (not of all, some were ashamed of it, but of most) that were known from other Philosophers, by the name of Stoicks. I could instance in some of our dayes also, who though professing Christianity, come not short of these (if they have not exceeded them) in their way of boasting: but I will leave them to the cen­sure of posterity. Now if men, notwithstanding so many threats, and so many judgements against the proud and haughty, be never­thelesse so apt to take upon themselves: What then (it is S. Chryso­stomes observation somewhere,) would they do, if God did use no [Page 42]such means, no such examples to refrain them? So that upon due consideration, what in the judgement of blinde and corrupt na­ture seemed envie and malignity, will appear mercy: being used by God as a profitable medicine or antidote against the greatest and most dangerous infection of the soul: and to teach men (where­in, even in the judgement of divers Heathens, consists their chiefest as wisdome, so happinesse) wholly to depend of God, and in all things to acknowledge him all in all.

Jobs words that we but now mentioned (or others to the same purpose) are in Esay also, Esay XLIV. 25. and XXIX. 14. Out of one of them Homer it may be (or some other before Homer, of whom he might borrow them) had his: for they containe the very sense, the words are these (it is a woman, Penelope, that speaks.)

So much of the first reason. It is Herodotus his reason, that God of purpose doth often confound the (carnall) wisdome and glory of men lest they should think too well of themselves. So far Hero­dotus is in the right, and agrees well with the Scriptures themselvs: But his inference upon it (even in the judgement of more sober humane reason) most wicked and absurd, That therefore God doth envie to men their happinesse and prosperity.

Another reason is given by Diodorus Siculus in his III. ii. Biblioth. Hist. where having discoursed at large of the manifold blessednesse of Arabia Foelix; and particularly of the excellent odours and per­fumes that Woods and other parts of the Countrey do yeild, hee addes, [...]: that is, Neverthelesse God (so I translate here the word [...]) hath not afforded unto men any intire happines, without some blemish (or envie, [...]:) but to these his blessings he hath annexed somewhat that is hurtfull, which might serve to admonish them, who through continuance of worldly bles­sings are wont to grow into a contempt of the Gods. Here first I shall ob­serve, that whereas this seemeth to contradict what by some others is affirmed, that men are worse in times of extremity; it is easie to reconcile them by distinguishing, as of degrees of temporall cros­ses, so of differences of tempers and dispositions, some naturally [Page 43]being better able with patience to bear, though much more adver­sity; then they can prosperity, with moderation and sobriety: and some on the contrary, but this by the way onely. That plenty and long prosperity would be apt to beget pride, and impiety, or neg­lect of religion, the Israelites, and in them, all men generally were forewarned by God himselfe, Deut. VIII. from the tenth verse, to the end of that Chapter. Clem. Alexand. in the V. of his Stro­mata, not farre from the beginning, hath collected out of ancient au­thors some passages, which say almost the same. But let me give this caution to those that shall have recourse unto him about this matter first to read the passage of Thucydides in Thucydides (lib. III. in Cleo's speech) himselfe: which in Clemens is printed very imper­fect. And so may Philistus, who doth so imitate Thucydides, as that he doth almost transcribe him verbatim, be understood, his words, for want either of this caution, or of diligence, are much mistaken by the Latine Interpreter. But to proceed, That troubles and affli­ctions on the other side, are apt (of themselves, for divers circum­stances may alter the case) to stirre up zeale and devotion, and to bring a man to himselfe, is not onely observed by sacred writers, and by Philosophers, but even by them acknowledged that pro­fessed Atheisme, or (which comes all to one, as Tully of old hath proved) Epicurisme: as by Lucretius, in these words,

If therefore that be the nature of adversity and prosperity, or ra­ther, if that be mans nature, so to be wrought upon by adversity and so by prosperity; then upon their owne grounds it might easily be maintained against heathens that crosses and afflictions in this world, are not effects of envy in the supreme Dispenser of all things, but arguments of his goodnesse and providence. For what was e­ver more generally received and admired among them, then this divine (so they beleeved) praecept or admonition unto men, writ­ten upon the doores of that famous Church in Delphus, [...], Know thy selfe? Of which words though many different interpreta­tions have been devised by the ancients, (so many as would make [Page 44]a good large Tractat, if they were all collected into one:) yet that the maine drift and purpose of the words was to perswade men to [...], as Plato teacheth in his Charmides; that is to humility; or, ad minuendam arrogantiam, as Tully in his Epistles ad Q. Fratrem; is generally acknowledged. Humility, not towards men onely, in or­dinary conversation: but towards God also, as in matter of action and religious worship, so of thoughts and apprehensions concerning the Deity. Of humility towards God the Latine Lyrick Poet spea­keth well, Diis te minorem quod geris imperas: Hinc omne principium, huc refer exitum. and elsewhere againe, Quantò quisque sibiplura ne­gaverit, (contrary to the worlds wisdome, which teacheth men to think highly of themselves, that others may so think of them, and indeed not without ground, among worldly men) A Diis plura foret. I know that of old it hath passed very current among Chri­stians, that humility was altogether unknown unto ancient heathens either Philosophers, or others, under the notion of a vettue. And well indeed may it be tearmed and deemed the proper vertue of Christians, (or to speake more properly, of the Chirstian faith) if it be taken in it's full latitude for religious, (or spirituall:) for intel­lectuall and morall, (or civill) humility: and againe, if it be conside­red as the vertue of vertues, as by Christ our Lawgiver, and his Apostles it is proposed unto [...]s, and generally acknowledged by all Christians. However, it was not altogether unknowne to heathens as a vertue. The words indeed, humilis, and humilitas in Latine, [...], and [...], in Greek, are by them most commonly used by way of reproach: but even by them as by Christians, in the bet­ter sense sometimes. Witnes this admirable passage of Plato: [...]. that is, God, according to old tradition, having in himselfe the beginning and the end, and the midst of all things, in a streight and direct course, according to his nature, passes on from place to place. And after Him followes alwaies Justice, the punisher of all that forsake the Law of God. Of which whosoever aspires unto happinesse, holding fast, followes with humility and modesty. (Gr. [Page 45]humble and modest.) But he that is puffed up with pride, trusting ei­ther in riches or honours, or comelinesse of body, through youth and foo­lishnesse also boyling in himselfe with arrogancy, as one that needed nei­ther governour nor guide, but able to be a guide unto others; such an one is altogether voide of God. [...] must here be understood spiritually, (not metaphysically;) for what we say commonly, void of Gods grace. For otherwise, Aristotle (so is this very place ci­ted by Philoponus) De mundo, teacheth well, that [...]: there doth not, nor can any thing subsist in the world, altogether void of God. The same Author of that exquisite Treatise De mundo, who ever he be, (for Aristole's certainly for divers reasons, though otherwise not unworthy his name, it cannot be) hath the same passage of Plato that we have before, concerning humility, the first part of it at the end of his book, and concludes with it: and though he name Plato, yet he is mistaken by many, who referre Plato's name, not to these words that follow there, but to them that go before, which be not Plato's. And whereas in Plato, as we saw before, it is, [...]. there it is, [...]: which words I know not how to save from a direct tautologie, though Budeus in his translation hath made a shift to avoide it. How the old translator of that Treatise Ap [...]letus found them, because of the liberty he commonly takes, is doubtfull. But however his translation comes much nearer to Plato's sense, then that of Budeus, or then indeed, (that I may not be thought to lay the fault upon him) the Greek words themselves, as now printed in that Treatise, would bear. I can easily believe that the Author of it might alter somewhat in Plato's words: the word [...], it may be did not please him: but that he should alter them into meer tautologie, or indeed into non-sense, I do not believe. Bonau. Vulcanius, who hath written lear­ned Commentaries upon this Author De Mundo, passeth this place over in silence, which made me the more willingly to take notice of it.

But now to return to our word againe; there be others besides Plato, who have used the word [...] in a good sense. Aemilius Paulus in Plut. having had a great King, whom he had lately con­queted and taken, at his feet his humble suppliant; and observed, it seems, among some of the younger sort (brave and gallant spi­rits [Page 46]otherwise, whereof divers of his own kindred) much exultati­on, if not insultation; presently retired to his Tent, and having sent for them, after a long and sad silence, which was much won­dred at, he began very pithily and gravely to discourse of the changes of fortune, and instability of all humane prosperity, and concluded his discourse with these words; [...]; that is, Away therefore with your vaine boasting and bragging for this victory, ô young men, and rather with humility stand amazed, and fixing your thoughts altogether upon the future, con­sider with your selves with what kinde of unexpected accidents Fortune [Gr. Daemon] may requite every one of you hereafter for this pre­sent prosperity. Antistthenes, saith Theodoret, [...], maintained, that in humility (modestia & humi­litate, so the Latin there: which may also be further confirmed by what Dio. Laertius writes of him) mans chiefest happinesse consisted. In Plato but a little before, [...], I have translated, humility. I know the word of it selfe admits of other divers inter­pretations; but there I conceived that sense most proper. And so Plutarch I am sure, speaking of the same thing that Plato (that fa­mous Oracle [...]) useth the word, in [...]. Not to be proud, but humble, is the readiest way [Gr. best provision] to Philosophie. So ac­cording to Philo (of whom a man may almost as soon learn what Plato maintained, as by Plato himselfe) in his De vita contemplat. [...]. Which excellent saying is thus expressed in Latin by S. August. Ep. 56 ad. Diosc. Augustine, Ad capescendam & ob­tinendam veritatem via, prima est humilitas, secunda humilitas, tertia humilitas. All which tends to the illustration and confirmation of this second reason, that if humility be the end of Gods judgements, and in true humility be happinesse, then those judgements not the effects of envie, but of mercy rather.

There remaineth now nothing but Aulus Gellius his words of the opinion of many (opposed by Chrysippus) concerning the origi­nall of evils; and the Etymologie of the word [...] (as we pro­mised) to be considered.

We shall begin with Aulus Gellius, upon whose words if we be long, yet we shall not digresse from our subject. We shall say little [Page 47]upon him, but we might as well without him, and still keep to our Text. His words then, wherewith be begins his sixth booke, in ancient editions of Gellius, I find thus printed: Homines fecisse dici­tur tantam vim esse aerumnarum & malorum. Adversus ea Chrysippus cum in libro [...] quarto dissereret, &c.

So in the Colon edition, Opera & impensà Ioannis Soteris, Anno 1526. mense Junio. I know there were many editions of Aulus Gellius before this; but this is the ancientest that I could find at this time. He that took care of it, whether Soter or any other, pro­fesseth (at the end of the two Tables, or Indices; Ad Lectorem, &c.) to have compared it with divers former impressions, as particularly that which he calls Veneta impressio; and observeth some differences of lesse moment; but not any here: so that we may probably suppose this to have been the reading of ancienter editions also. And this the rather because Petrus Mosellanus in his Annotations upon Aul. Gellius, added to that impression, he also is altogether silent about it. In another edition by the same Ioannes Soter a. d. 1533. mense Sep. and another, Coloniae Agrippinae a. d. 1563, and another, Basileae a.d. 1565. all which I have lately seen, I find no difference, but that in some of them, the dicitur is parted, or divided from the rest of the words, with two comma's on each side, thus; Homines fecisse, dic [...]tur, tantam vim esse aerumn. &c. But now, if we come to later editions, in some we shall find it thus, Homines fecisse dicatur: tantam &c. dicatur, for dicitur, and a colon, or two points, after it. So in the Francford edition, Ex officanâ Zachario Palthenianâ, a. d. 1603. much improved by the learned lucubrations (which he calls his Noctes Parisinas) of that great improver of learning, Henricus Stephanus. In others, as particularly in that of Leyden, apud Hieronymum Ʋogel, a. d. 1644. it is set out as imperfect with three asterises (as they call them) at the beginning, thus, * * * homines fecisse dicatur: tantam vim esse aerumnarum & malorum, adversus ea Chrysipus, &c. I hope I shall make it appeare cleerely enough that the words before (as in former editions I meane) were very right and full: but what might make some men to deem them imperfect, and thereupon, as is most probable, rashly to stigmatize them for such, if any desire my opi­nion, it is this. First I conceive that they stuck at the Latine it self, as either not congruous, or too course, to be owned by so polite a writer as Aul. Gellius is generally acknowledged. Those words of the second period or sentence, adversus ea, might also move them [Page 48]as importing (in their construction) much more to have gone be­fore, then that short sentence. Besides, they might light upon a Manuscript (it is very likely they did) that wanted, if not the whole first word of the book (as I have seen some Latine Manu­scripts,) yet the first letter of the first word (then which nothing is more ordinary,) & a void space before it: which was done, where the first whether word or letter was intended artificially to be set out in colours, and beautified with figures, to be an ornament unto the Book. I have seen it in some old printed books also: as for example, in a Virgil and an Horace of Aldus his Edition, printed a. d. 1501. But if either word or letter were for any such reason omitted in the sixth Book, were they not at the beginning of other Books as well, where no such imperfection is noted? They were certainly; but they that stuck at this beginning, and did not at others, might unconsiderately phansie more here, then they did elsewhere. But I will not take upon me to give a reason, such an one as may be satisfactory, for that which I conceive to have been done without reason. However, they that know what inconve­niencies, yea, mischieves sometimes both to Church and State from such mistakes have issued, will not think such observations altogether inconsiderable.

But now to proceed; whether, as I say, it were done without reason or no; we shall first begin with the sense: as for the Latin of the words, we shall say more of it afterwards. The sense then of those words, Homines fecisse dicitur, &c. I take to be this: That men themselves were generally said, or supposed, to have been the cause that this world is so full of troubles and miseries. Many, if not most ancient Heathens that were of this opinion, did also main­taine, that God did not intermeddle with humane affairs. And that which lead them into this conceit, is, because they could not conceive how so much wickednesse and misery, as is apparently seen and acknowledged among men, could be the fruit of his ad­ministration, who, as he can do no evill himselfe, so he is of purer eyes then to behold (with patience & approbation) iniquity in others. The Stoick Philosophers (which Sect Chrysippus was a prime, if not sounder, yet propagator of) stood for providence, and a fatall necessity of all events; a fatall necessity, and yet a freewill too; none more eager and peremptory for it then they. It was indeed the main fundamentall of all their philosophy. But whilest they [Page 49]went about to reconcile these two, how they did involve and puzle themselves; hath sufficiently by Tully and other Ancients been observed. But to this particular of evils, that which they maintained, is, that they partly proceeded from God, and partly from men. From God, and yet he good neverthelesse: because, said they, such is the nature of worldly things, that good here be­low cannot be without evill. How this businesse is stated by Plu­tarch, and how by Simplicius, I must refer the Reader to what hath been said of it before: which gave us occasion to mention this place of Aul. Gellius. This, and the next Chapter of this sixth Book (of the said Aul. Gellius) are about it; I mean, concerning the originall of evils, both morall, and others, according to Chry­sippus (anciently famous for the multiplicity of his writings) his o­pinion. But I will not meddle with any particulars of the Stoick philosophy, that are not to our present occasion. So much as hath been said of it was necessary for the better understanding of these words we are now upon. For therefore saith Gellius that Chrysip­pus in his books opposed that common opinion.

That we have next to do, is, to shew that such an opinion was, though not approved by all, yet generally known and agitated among ancient Heathens, that men themselves had been the cause of those evils they commonly complained of: And that this was the opinion of some, (though not of them only) who either bru­tishly denied the providence; or blasphemously, the goodnesse of God: which opinion, as commonly known, being here by our Author but briefly set down, and not understood by some that read him, principally, as we conceive, occasioned this imaginary at the first, but now reall (as the words are printed) imperfection. Ho­mer shall leade, not for his antiquity only, but for his credit also among ancient Heathens. In his first Odyssie he makes Jupiter himself to expostulate the matter with mortall men, in these words:

The sense of which words is, That men do wrongfully accuse the Gods as the authors of their evils, whereas they may thank their own [...], wretchednesse, or wickednesse, through which they bring griefs upon themselves, which never were destinated unto them. So the Golden verses (as they commonly call them) [Page 50]containing the chiefe doctrine and instructions of Pythagoras, [...], &c. He shall know, (he that takes a right course to knowledge and wisdome, that is:) how men by acts of their own free-wils bring mischiefs upon their own heads, &c. Cran­tor, an ancient Academick, Xenocrates his Scholar, in his Consolati­on to Hippocles (cited by Plutarch in his Consolation to Apollonius) had these words; [ All these things doth that ancient philosophy well teach and admonish; all which if we shall not altogether allow of, yet this that concernes the troubles and travels of this life, is certainly true. For if it be not so by any order of nature ( [...], are his words) yet by our selves it is brought to this degree of wretchednesse and corruption.] Now these, (and so divers others whom we may spare,) though they derive the chiefest miseries of men from men themselves, yet doe acknowledge certain [...], unavoidable chances, or casualties, which proceeded from another cause; as by Crantor his words that follow in Plutarch, and by other passages not of Homer only, but even of those Aurea carmina, though not many, may appear. The Sto­ichs might be thought to say the same; but do not. That con­course of free-will and fatall necessity they speak of, is quite ano­ther thing: as will appear to them that shall examine the particu­lars of the opinions, which we shall not now stand upon.

But Seneca in his Naturall Questions, comes off more roundly, and charges men to the purpose. Never did man, I think, (upon one single subject, as that is, the benefit of windes) with more wit or Rhetorick plead for providence, then he doth in that Chapter. His words (some of them) that chiefly concerne us here, are these: Ingens naturae beneficium, si illud in injurtam suam non vertat hominum furor, &c. Adeò quicquid ex illis utile & necessarium est, non potest his repensari, quae in perniciem suam generis humani dementia excogitat. Sed non ideò non sunt naturâ suâ bona, si vitio malè utentium nocent. And againe, Non tamen, ut paulò ante dicebam, queri possumus de au­ctore nostri Deo, si beneficia ejus corrumpimus, & ut essent contraria ef­ficimus. And afterwards more generally yet; If we shall weigh (saith he) the benefits of nature by the perversenesse of them that use them, we may say, we have received nothing but to our hurt. Who useth his eyes that he may be the better for them? who his tongue? to whom is not his very life a torment? There is not any thing so apparently good and profitable, which abuse (or vitiousness) may not turne to a contrary use. [Page 51]Much more to the same purpose is there to be found.

Later Philosophers that have written of this subject; to mans wickednesse they joyn Gods justice, punishing or preventing: which how conformable it is to the Scriptures, no Christian need to be told. So Hierocles upon the Aurea Caerminae, in few words: [...]. Our wickednesse (saith he) and Gods righteousnesse, these two concur­ring are the cause of all our calamities. It is very well said: but it is not unknown to them that are versed in these Philosophers that li­ved since Christianity began to spread in the world, that they bor­rowed, even those that were their greatest enemies, (as Porphyrius, & this very Hierocles) divers things from Christians, and so might in divers points come nearer to our doctrine then former Phi­losophers did. There is not any thing that I more admire in this this kinde then what Virgil hath to this purpose, in his fourth Ecloge, Sicelides Musae, &c. which ( consideratis considerandis, what he was, when he lived, &c.) I conceive to be a very good com­ment upon GODS words, Gen. III. v. 17, 18, 19.

But to return to Aul. Gel. or rather (for we have not digressed) what hath been said, to apply to him; as it often fals out that men may speak the same thing, but upon different grounds, and, which much alters a case, to contrary ends; so we noted before, that ma­ny who derived the evils and miseries of this life from men, did it not to maintaine, but to overthrow providence so far as in them lay: which must now againe be remembred; because to such, especially, these words of Gellius seem to have reference. Those many I speak of were for the most part Epicureans; professed Epi­cureans I mean, who positively maintained, That God had no­thing at all to do with the affairs of men, no nor with the World in generall, which they did not acknowledge to have been created by God: and consequently what either good or evill happened unto men in this World, they must needs fetch from some other cause. Epicurus (as Dio. Laertius witnesseth in his life) made this very thing to be the chiefest occasion of evils among men, that men ad­scribed the cause of their goods & of their evils unto God. So Dioge­nes of Epicurus; so Tully, Plutarch, & divers others. But the Latin Interpreter of Diog. Laert. as if he had studied how to make him ridiculous, and to speak contradictions, he turnes it to a quite con­trary sense, and makes Epicurus, of the worst of Heathens, by Hea­thens [Page 52]thens themselves for his opinions extreamly abhorred, rather a Christian, then a heathen. The same Epicurus, as the same D. Laer recordeth, maintained, [...]. that is, That most e­vills men suffered (or, were subject unto in this life) proceeded from men themselves; either hatred, or envy, or comtempt being the cause. Upon which foundation, was that famous saying of his erected, that Fortuna sapienti rarò intervenit, as his words are translated by Seneca: that is, That Fortune (suddaine evill chances and alterations) had little or no power upon a wise man: because he held none wise, but such as did altogether sequester themselves from all such imployments, and courses of life, as were liable to either hatred or envy. What religion Pliny the elder was of, may easily be known from himselfe. It appeares clearely by him, that his religion, in point of doctrine and opinions, was Epicurus his religion: and therefore we may probably suppose that his aime was no other then that of Epicurus, where he makes this observation, (it is in the Proem of his seventh book) that Homini plurima ex homine sunt mala.

Now all this that hath been brought from severall authors, of men being the cause of evills, well considered, let us see what there is in Aul. Gellius his words justly to be excepted against, why they should not passe for perfect, as in former editions: Homines fecisse dicitur (saith he) tantam vim esse aerumnarum & malorum. Adversus ea Chrysippus cùm in libro [...] quarto dissereret, Nihil est inquit, &c. that is, It is commonly said that men themselves have bene the cause that this world doth so abound with evills and miseries. Against which opinion Chrysippus in his fourth book of Providence, disputing, There is nothing, saith he, &c. That this was the opinion of many, hath suf­ficiently been shewed, and that Chrysippus writing of, and for Pro­vidence, had reason to take notice of the opinion, may also as clear­ly appeare by what hath been said.

If the Latine of the words were it that they stuck at, (a poore businesse to be stood upon, when the meaning is knowne) then this happily, fecisse tantam esse vim, for, ut tanta vis esset: which indeed is more ordinary, as facere ut numerarent, and facere ut scirent, in Cor­nelius Nepos, and the like: and there is an old Grammarian (whe­ther Servius, or Priscian, I know not well) who somewhere passeth his judgement, that one Infinitive to governe another, is against the custome of the Latine tongue: but how much the good man did o­vershoot [Page 53]himselfe in so saying, let latter accurate Grammarians, ( Alvarez, Vossius, and others:) or rather let any ancient Latine au­thors be looked upon, and it will easily appear. If all that is not or­dinary, may be suspected, that I say not condemned, I durst under­take out of this one author to produce five hundred places, that may seeme more strange then this: such as these, Ibi scriptum est, tum multa alia, &c. Faceret me, ut earum rerum essem prudentior, &c. and Omnia quae pater jusserit, parendum, and the like. Or was it, because adversus ea, they thought was improper, after a single sentence? But if so, they should have considered that antea, postea, praeterea, and the like, before that through much use they did coalescere in one word, were so taken and used divided, as now joyned they are com­monly: antea, after one single thing spoken of, as well as after many, and so of the rest. I say commonly: so I take it: though I find that Hadrianus the Cardinall in his learned Observations, De sermone Latino, & modis Latinè loquendi, dedicated Carolo Principi Hispania­rum, makes it a particular observation of the word praeterea: Haec quoque clausula (praeterea) observatione praecipuè digna videtur: nam certo modo loquends non post multa solum connumerata à perfectis illis au­toribus ponitur, verum etiam post singularem aliquam vel personam vel rem. Cicero, &c. And so is postilla to this day, sometimes joyned, and sometimes divided, to be found in Plautus. And so much to that passage of Aulus Gellius. we are beholding to him that he gave us the hint of so much pertinent matter; and we hope we have in some measure requited him.

We are now come to the etymology of the word [...]: and it is more then reason that Grecians themselves, of whom we recei­ved it, should be first heard about it. Plato in his Cratylus where he doth purposely intreat of the derivation of ancient Greek words, among others, he takes this into his consideration; and his opinion is, (which hath since been followed by most,) that [...], is so contracted of [...], which is as much as [...], wise or pru­dent, as Plato himselfe there expounds it: or [...], (as Hesychius, and the Etymologist) that is, skilfull, well experienced. And so in­deed we find the words [...], and [...], the contrary of it, used by Homer and others, so that of that word or what it signifieth, no question at all can be made; though Plato mention it, or at least the sense of it, as out of use, and in a manner antiquated, in his dayes. And this etymology of the word [...], taking it in the [Page 54]worst sense for an evill spirit, would very well agree with what is written, Genesis III 1. and elsewhere, of the subtilty of the Serpent. Some question may be made whether [...], (which would much confirme this derivation) were ever used for [...]. Some passages perchance yet to be found in ancient Greek authors, might induce some to beleeve that it hath. As for example this distich of the Anthology,

Some, to whom the Greek tongue hath been much beholding, produce this very passage to prove that [...] (whereof much hath been said before) is sometimes taken for cacodaemon, that is, a devill, Whether they were led into this error by those that first wrote upon those Epigrams, or led them into it, I know not: but an error it is, as will easily appeare to any that shall wel examine the construction of the words, which cannot stand with that interpre­tation: neither is the jest or acumen of them any wayes improved by it, but rather obscured and impaired. I did wonder, saith the Poet, to see a black Maure Professor of Rhetorick; such eloquence from such lips, (in another Epigram to the very same purpose called [...], triple lips) to proceed, so white an attire, (such was the custome of those times) upon so black a skin. [...] therefore here must of necessity be translated either peritus, or Deus: but the lat­ter being not onely more warrantable, because common and ordi­nary; but also, (in that sense that Tully calls Plato, Deum philoso­phiae) farre more emphaticall here, is doubtlesse to be preferred: and so indeed I find the word by some others that have written upon the same Epigrams well rendred.

And so much I had to say concerning this Etymology, which makes the word originally a Greek word. Others there be of the same kinde, mentioned by Greek Grammarians, and others, but obvious enough, and in my judgement so little considerable, that I thinke it needlesse to insist upon them here. Neither indeed would I eagerly contend with any man about this matter, the origi­nall of the word in generall, whether Greek or Hebrew, but that it may be lawfull for any man to beleeve what himselfe shall thinke best about it. Neverthelesse, because it is generally agreed upon by the learned that are skilfull in the tongues, (whereof I shall have occasion to speake more at large in a Discourse that I in­tend [Page 55]shortly, God willing, to publish, concerning languages,) that most ancient Greek words, the sacred especially, came original­ly from the Hebrew, (the Mother of all ancient Tongues) and thence ought to be fetcht; I doubt I should not give the learned Reader that satisfaction that he may perchance expect from me, should I not take notice of what hath been said by others to this purpose concerning this word; and also impart unto him what I can say my self.

I have read somewhere (in Lilius Gyraldus, as I remember) that Steuchus Eugubinus, a man well versed in this kinde of learning, did fetch this word [...], by an Apheresis of the first syllable, from the Hebrew [...] Devils: which must be upon a supposi­tion that [...] at the first was taken in the worst sense. For other­wise if for [...], or God, he would rather upon the same grounds have said from [...]; that is, God, often used in the Scriptures. There be examples I know (in all languages, some) of such aphere­sis, or contractions of words: and what other considerations Eu­gubinus might have besides to perswade him, I know not, because I have him not at this time, nor indeed know certainly in which of his Books to seek it. Hugo Grotius, that incomparable man, in his Annotations upon the New Testament is of opinion that the word is ex Arabicâ Origine [...]: from [...] probably, which signifies to endure and continue: a fit word to expresse Gods eternity, then which nothing is more proper unto him, and in that respect a plausible derivation. But that any such word as [...] to expresse either God or a good Spirit (which his words seem to im­port) is used in that tongue, is more then I can yet learne, though I have done my best to satisfie my selfe. Neither in Herodotus or any other ancient Author that mentions the Deities anciently worshipped by the Arabs, doe I finde any thing that approacheth to it. Ludovicus Vartomannus indeed (cited by Mr. Vossius, in his first. De Origine Idolol. cap. 8.) in his Navigations relateth that the Calecutenses call the Devill Deumum, which comes somewhat near; but what affinity their tongue hath with the Arabick, or of what antiquity that appellation with them is, I know not. Petrus Texera in his Relationes, as he cals them, of the Kings of Persia, lib. l c. 5. witnesseth that the Persians, besides other names, call the Devill, Diu; which comes near (and probably came from it) to [Page 56]the Syriack, not [...] (as some write it, which signifies not Dae­mon, but Daemoniacus) but [...]: as in the Syriack Translation of the New Test, it often doth occurre. Somewhat here might be said of the Latin Deus, and the Greek [...], also: but I will keep me to my task, the etymologie of [...]; which for those rea­sons that have been intimated, I would rather derive from the He­brew, then Arabick. And because I cannot pitch upon any parti­cular with any warrantable certainty, I shall therefore propose to the Reader some variety, that he may have some choice and please himself.

If then neither that of Eugubinus, from [...]; nor what we have intimated of the Syriack [...] be allowed, I would have [...] sanguis, taken into consideration, because most of the Dei­ties worshipped by ancient Heathens, were observed, (a subject much insisted upon by ancient Fathers) or at least beleeved gene­rally to delight in the blood both of Men and Beasts: or rather [...] similem esse, from whence come [...], Chaldaik words, signifying, shapes, figures, images, and the like. And among these should I reckon [...] (sit honos auribus:) stercus, &c. the same reason might be given for it as is commonly (and is as currently received) for [...], Idols, from [...] of the same signification as [...].

I doubt my Reader by this hath enough, and perchance he thinks more then enough of this stuffe. Yet I will crave leave that I may touch upon one etymon more, because it will give us occa­sion to impart somewhat that is not vulgarly known, nor imperti­nent to our maine subject. [...] in Hebrew, a very common word, ordinarily signifies, to keep silence: from whence also proceed [...], taken for a Sepulchre sometimes in the Hebrew: and [...] (the very same word) the name of a certain Angell of death (as they call him) in the Chaldy Dialect. But [...] alone, as it signifies silere, would excellently well fit ( [...] and [...], ac­cording to Hesiod, being often taken for the same) an observation of Hesychius concerning the Heroes; which is this: [...]. That is, [...], The better, (or, excelling.) So do they call the Heroes, who seem to be a mis­chievous kinde. Whence it is that those that passe by the Heroa, (or, Tem­ples consecrated to the Heroes; or, any Heroes) use to keep silence, lest [Page 57]they be hurt by them. So ( [...], that is,) are also the Gods called, as by Aeschylus in his Aetna. The same observation is in the Sholiast. upon Aristophanes his [...], and a pregnant passage of Menander concerning the mischievousnesse of these Heroes (besides Aristophanes his own words about it) is there also. In Eustathius also upon the second Iliad, but more imperfectly, it is to be found. I will make no further application my selfe, but having now done my part, as I conceive, concerning the etymon of this word, leave all to the Reader, as his own judgement, or phancy shall incline him.

I remember somewhat concerning some other words ( [...],) was promised and referred to this place. Of the first, [...], all that I intended about it, was my opinion only con­cerning the right etymon of it, which because I hope to have ano­ther opportunity for it elsewhere, and would not be overlong here upon that argument of Etymologies, I shall now forbear. As for the second, [...], I have since found so much already observed of it by others, as namely by Henry Stephen, partly in his Thesau­rus, (a Book well known to all that aspire to any perfection in the Greek tongue) and partly in his learned Animadversions upon Erasmus in his Adagies, that I shall but need to refer my Reader to him: this only briefly added, That whereas he quoteth some ancient Grammatians and others, concerning the etymon of it, it seemeth farre more probable to me, that [...] ( vehemens Dea, as the Poet Catullus speaketh of it: [...], the punisher of overswelling, unbridled, whether speeches or acti­ons, as the Grecians) is a pure Hebrew word, [...], or [...]; from whence comes [...], and so [...]: the same difference of spiri­tus (the one aspirat, the other lenis) being in the Hebrew, as well as in the Greek words.

The last is [...]: this also, (and so acknowledged by all men) a pure Hebrew word: but that is not it that I would say of it. It is sometimes taken for [...], the envie of the Daemon: which I think few men have observed. As for example, in Cle­mens Alexandrinus, upon a very observable occasion, the divisi­ons of Christians among themselves, by both Jewes and Gentiles (as Clemens there witnesseth) objected to Primitive Christians, as a main argument against their faith. Among other things that are answered by him, he hath these words, [...]: [Page 58]which words are rendred by the Latin Inter­preter, Hujus aut [...]m cousa quod quicquid est pulchrum sequitur reprehensio. He had need to be very sagacious, if not a very Oedipus, that shall understand Clemens by these Latin words. His purpose was to answer them according to their own principles, who upon all occasions (as before we have shewed) of any extraor­dinary either felicity, or excellency in any kinde had this still [...], the envie of the Daemon, in their mouthes, and the dread of it in their hearts. And indeed the very word used by other ancient Christians, Historians, and others, upon this, or the like occasion (as the peace of the Church disturbed by persecutions) is [...]. So Gregory Nazianzen in his 21 Ora­tion, in the praise of Athanasius, [...]: This peace and prosperity of Gods Church, envy (saith he) could not end [...]re. Where it is apparent by the words immediately following, that by [...], envie, must be understood [...], or (he being a Christian) [...], the envie of the Devill: So Eusebius, but more fully, after he had spoken of the peace and tranquillity of the Church for many years: [...], &c. These things (saith he) no envie did restraine, no evill Daemon either by fascination, or any plots and machinations of men was able to hinder, &c. In which words, what at the first is briefly contained in [...], envie, is afterwards more fully declared and expressed in the words following; as will yet more clearly appeare to them that shall observe many such expressions of ancient Fathers upon other subjects also, where the word [...], envie, will not admit of any other in­terpretation.

Neither will it be wondred that Momus, in Clemens A­lexandrinus, or any where else should be taken for an envious and spightfull Daemon, if it be remembred that according to ancient mythologie, Momus was he that gave that pernicious counsell to Jupiter against mankinde, to cast the seeds of di­visions and dissentions among men, that they might destroy one another (Neque hic lupis mos, nec fuit leonibus Vnquam, ni­si in dispar, feris:) by warres and mutuall slaughters. It is said (so I finde it in Eustathius upon the first of Homers Iliads) [Page 59]that he did it to save the earth from a generall deluge or con­flagration, which Jupiter was about; hee suggesting to him, that this would be a more plausible and methodicall way, and offering himselfe to contrive the businesse for him. It is ve­ry likely that what we reade in Genesis of the confusion of Lan­guages, and scattering of men (before knitted and united in one Speech and one Language, as is expresly noted, Genesis XI. v. 1.) upon the face of the Earth, might be the first occasion of this Fable. But I have not further to do with that here. If I have done (in any reasonable proportion) what I have under­taken, I am glad, and heartily say,

Soli Deo gloria.