THE ICHNOGRAPHY OF THE TEMPLE of WISEDOME, Comprised in APHORISMES.

I. WE Stile the TEMPLE of WISEDOME a Book in which to man, as a Creature, made to view the workes of the Crea­tor, all things which are, shall be, or have been any where, are offered for his Contemplation, to that end, and in that or­der, by the means disposed to the end, as by the helpe of them all, he may be led, and brought on to him, of whom, through whom, and to whom, are all things, God, and to that eternall happinesse which is in him.

II. For this is to be wise at length, to under­stand and provide for our latter end (as God speaks, Deut. 32.29.) least a man swerve from his scope, happinesse, to the enjoyment of which with his Maker he was created: even as that desire which is [Page 2] naturall to him discovers, whereby every man wishes well to himselfe, and that perpetually. For he abhors death and ruine, and courts to lead a most pleasant life, and hence he declines all kind of evill and adversity.

III. But since men have so bruitishly degene­rated, by their heynous falling into sinne, continued for many ages, and alwaies increased that they nei­ther apprehend, nor care to understand Gods pur­pose in their Creation, nor those desires implanted in them naturally, much lesse the wayes poynting to an happy life; they are to bee roused up out of their drowsinesse by all meanes and devices possi­ble.

IV. In as much as wee all stand obliged to bee dispensers of divine goodnesse, and to be desirous to impart so much light to others as wee have re­ceived from God our selves. To the end that through the multiplication and different mutuall reflection, repercussion, and mixture of raies, light may come to an increase in their mindes, to see and finde out the Father of lights, and to walke in his light.

V. Now although God himselfe by his owne vertue, upholds the World which he hath created, beautifies it with his light, and governes it by his providence: yet because what hee doth ordinarily, he doth by ordinary meanes, it comes to passe that one creature by another is formed, reformed, che­rished, [Page 3] and directed to their ends through his dis­posall.

VI. Wee may bring for a witnesse the whole Quire of Creatures, and all the workes of Nature joind in so close an order amongst themselves, that none of them hath a being, or is made from it selfe, for it selfe, or by it selfe; but every thing depends of another, serves another, and is sustained by ano­ther. Whence indeed it is, that he hath distributed severall vertues to severall creatures, that each (on that part by which it is what it is, and doth what it doth) imitating the course of its Creator, is subser­vient to its neighbour creatures, and so tends to the preservation of the universe.

VII. Wherefore since God likewise in mankind for the graduall multiplying of the light of his knowledge, and of his works, hath hitherto impro­ved one by the help of another; and now the last age of the world seemes to be upon us, we must be­think our selves how we also may proceed (which verily may be hoped for in this life) to the utmost degree of knowledge; to wit, that we render our knowledge. 1. Universall, disgraced with no foul Casme. 2. Altogether true, spoyled with no mix­ture of falsehood and vanity. 3. Most easie, per­plexed with no troublesome obscurities and thorny doubts; but flowing fairely into the minde of its own accord.

VIII. Which three if we may come to obtain, [Page 4] our humane knowledge wil be in some sort perfect, viz the image of divine omniscience clearly shining in us: so disposing us, that striving in the same waies, by the same meanes, to the same ends, we may lay aside our usuall discords, and the vanities of all idle imployments, all of us being onely ready to relish, act, and speake the best things.

IX. We determine therefore, that a Booke should be compiled, for the containing all things which are necessary to be knowne and done, belie­ved and hoped for by man, in respect of this and the life to come, viz. an entire narration of those things which we know already, with an exact In­dex of such things as we are ignorant of, whether they be those whose knowledge is altogether un­attainable, or those that are left for further search. And all these things to that end, and in that order, that the mindes of men by medium's may be (as it were by a kind of an artificiall Ladder) advanced from the first to the last, the lowest to the highest, even to him from whom, by whom, and for whom are all things.

X. But that the same Booke may teach the same thing truely, and demonstrate it solidly, that it may throughly appeare, that they are not the trifles of fancies, but the firme foundations of things themselves: and that we may know that we are indued with knowledge, and not opinion. This Booke then shall containe nothing which may ei­ther [Page 5] be displeasing to our assent (as things apparent­ly false or vaine, or not prov'd or improbable are) or may not only tickle and invite our assent (as things which are likely and probable,) but compell it, which force remaines in the unvanquished and ever victorious truth, so that it be but skillfully ex­plaind, and laid forth to open view.

XI. Moreover, it is necessary this Booke should be contrived in a method, exactly fitted to disposi­tions, that whosoever shall read it, may likewise un­derstand it; carried on with a cleare and full light throughout, to the end that being translated into the common tongues of severall nations, it may be made of as common use, as God himselfe, the world, and our common sense is: so as it may be nothing else but the true and genuine Copy of those things which hither to the onely God hath revealed by his workes, his word, and notions imprinted in the minde of every man; and the true and common luminary and guide of us all to the life to come; and the Rule, and true directory of all things that are to be done in this life.

XII. The matter, Forme, Efficient, and end of it may move and perswade, that this same Booke should be termed PANSOPHY.

XIII. For the matter of it shall bee [...], which is to say, the Universe, and that whereof a wise man ought not to bee ignorant; namely, whatsoever good, gallant, and profitable thing, [Page 6] is any where to be found in Bookes; or what things likewise are not yet extant in any place, yet never­thelesse are in possibility to be had (things newly discovered, or what may be invented) we would have to be conveyed hither, that what thing soever shall come to be mentioned or thought upon, a suf­ficient information thereof may be here extant.

XIV. The forme of this Booke ought to bee [...], that is, an Universall harmony, or a consonance and agreement of each thing to other. For observations delivered here and there concer­ning things, although they be profitable, shall not be amassed and throwne upon an heape here; but the inmost nature of those very things is to be de­tected with that artifice, that as there is no disso­nance in God the Authour of things, nor in his workes and words, so there may be left no diffe­rence in our apprehensions: the medium's, viz the Centers of this being found out, in which also the extreames and opposites may agree, and cease their jarring, whereby there's hope it may be brought to passe, that whatsoever diverse men (so it be with reason) diversly think or act, either not knowing, or not understanding, or even opposing themselves, mutually may here come into a consent and harmo­ny: all the rivulets of thoughts and actions being reduced to their true and pure fountaines, where, will they nill they, they may acknowledge that they do agree, the rivulets, windings, and filthinesse [Page 7] which runs mixt therewith being now left out. For it will fall out that the most contradictions and controversies may be decided by neither or both. In that way that Christ determin'd the variance of the Jewes and Samaritans contending about the place of prayer saying, Neither in this mountaine, nor at Jerusalem, but every where in spirit and truth. And in another place, do this, and leave not the other undone, Mat. 23.13.

XV. The Efficient being of such fulnesse and harmony, can be no other than [...], that is, an universallity of the principles of knowing, viz. that what helps soever are divinely administred to man for to encrease and rectifie the light of know­ledge, all those should be here whole, and entire; namely, upon Gods part revealing himselfe to us, without himselfe those Theaters in which he hath unfolded what he had a will to, viz. the World, with all the workemanship of nature; and our minde, with all notions written thereupon; and the holy Scriptures, with all those mysteries which are here displayd. And on our part, all those in­struments granted us to apprehend those things which God hath revealed, viz. The outward and inward senses, and the sound faculty of reasoning, or discourse; and lastly, Faith, which is to be gi­ven to divine Oracles. For all these things, if they be fully employed, will cause us know all things which may be knowne: for because no­thing [Page 8] can be knowne, but what's revealed, or ap­prehended by Sense, or Reason, or Faith, or by all these joyntly: why may not he who knows these things, be said to know all things?

XVI. The end of the Booke shall be [...], viz. the universall use of all things unto all things, that whatsoever man must do or suffer, in time and eternity, may be learnt here at once: and that the minde of man may be here compos'd to a sufficient knowledge of all things: and the hands, and other members for the profitable contrivance of severall good workes, and the tongue for the apt utterance of each meaning of the minde; and the affections to the embracing of things of worth, and the avoy­ding of such as are us [...]lesse: and lastly, that the heart may be directed of God, and be taught so to fix it selfe upon him alone, that at length man be­ing remov'd out of the Circumference of things, may finde himselfe in God, their Center.

XVII. Concerning the making of such a Pan­sophicall Booke, that our thoughts may be seriously taken up; the very order of divine providence doth now lead us thither, the necessities of mankind compell us, and the present occasions invite us. The explaining of which three shall serve for the laying the foundation of our Pansophicall Temple.

XVIII. God as he is wise doth all things or­derly, every thing in its time, as the wise Solomon speaketh; and as he is good performes all well. [Page 9] Therefore this is the processe of good, rightly dis­pos'd, that it may increase by motion, proceeding from good to better, from the lesse to the greater, till the arrivall be at that, then which there's no­thing greater and better, that is to say, Perfection: which progresse of Gods wisedome, all the exam­ples of his workes testifie.

XIX. So although he could have fram'd the world in one moment, yet he was pleas'd to make use of a tract of time, and a graduall succession of formes, imprinting themselves upon their matter; beginning his workes from unshap'd, confus'd, and darke rudiments, yet ending in most distinct, ex­act, and excellent formes: which Law likewise he hath stampt upon nature her selfe, so that what things soever be produced, arise out of their seeds slender, and imperfect, and take their augmentation by little and little, even till they arrive in their se­verall kindes at their determinate accomplish­ment.

XX. He hath put mankinde in all things under the same condition. For when he could have pro­duced it in the full number (as the Angels and stars) as many as he pleas'd, he created the stock, onely, man and woman, and with the granting to these the multiplying their kinde, allotted for the generation of men some thousand yeares, till the whole earth might be filled with Inhabitants.

XXI. And when as he could have disclos'd to [Page 10] these men at one and the same time, the secrets of all mysteries in things naturall, artificiall, morrall, and divine; he chose rather to use an accustomed gradation, and leasureably to encrease the light of Sciences, Arts, and Faith, as all things to this very day hold on in their progresse.

XXII. For the age of all mankind, is as it were the age of one man, admitting its increase by de­grees, and promoting it selfe from Infancy by youth to a ripe and well settled strength of minde. which AUGUSTINE observing writes thus: Di­vine providence by a faire moderation of all things, so disposes the whole Series of generations from ADAM to the end of the world, as it were of one man, terminating the tract of his time in the de­grees of age, even from childhood to a decrepid e­state. And hence there are also degrees of vertue in manners, till he come to the cleare and perfect ver­tue of man, it concernes him to distinguish who piously devotes his minde to divine reading. (Of his 83. Quest. the 53.)

XXIII. And that it is so, that all things encrea­sed with mankinde, Sciences, Arts, Vertues, and Vices, Faith and Treachery, that is, impiety and errours; and by the occasion of Errours that new torches are lighted againe for the better illustration of truth: he perceives who sees any thing in Sacred or prophane History. For all things came forth as it were out of darkenesse into light, one thing after [Page 11] another: and every thing was in his first begin­nings rude and unpolisht, receiving by little and little distincter formes, and true perfection: And lastly, every invention passed from his inventor to other men, and people one after another, by succes­sive imitation.

XXIV. What therefore should keep us from hoping that it may fall out at length, that those things which had their encrease by parts, may grow up into the whole, and that those things which we polisht by degrees, may at length be extant in a perfect forme. And what things formerly apper­tain'd to this or that man, or Nation, tongue and Sect may become common unto mankinde. Cer­tainely that which hath a graduall ascent, must needs have a top: And if CICERO said truely; Time extinguishes the fopperies of opinions: (And why not? whereas truth the daughter of time, is onely solid, the fumes of opinions cannot but be subject to dispersions:) why do we not hope that the fictions and errours of so many Ages, may even through tract of time, at length be discovered, and expung'd?

XXV. Now if we may well hope for such a thing, why may we not likewise desire and endea­vour it? For what will that bee but a declaring of our selves Administrers of divine bounty, which uses to communicate it selfe by degrees, and diffuse it selfe more and more continually?

[Page 12]XXVI. Therefore, if we shall now at length assay to collect into one body, that various and ma­nifold light appearing at first as sparkes, afterward as torches, which the Father of lights in the succes­sion of fore-past ages kindled, and hath dayly more and more encreased. And then after we have redu­ced it into one universall Masse, endeavour to ren­der it most cleare and pure, and produce it for the worlds publick use and benefit, we may assure our selves we do nothing but what divine providence hath even led us by the hand to effect.

XXVII. Yea to do this same, the very neces­sities of mankind urge and compell us, which I shall explaine briefly, first of all in generall; after­wards by certain ranks or orders of men; at length by carrying a respect to these our owne times into which we are now come.

XXVIII. Touching the perpetuall confusions of humane affairs: the complaints of wise men in every age are sufficiently knowne and manifest, so as none can be ignorant thereof, unlesse he be ei­ther a stranger in the world, such as Infants newly entred into it are, or a meer trunck or block, as foo­lish ones are, who mind not what goes forward, nor regard or care how it's done. Now these con­fusions spring and arise hence, in as much as the greater sort of men (who even in their own and the worlds account seem to be wise) do all, or at least their principall and chiefe businesses without [Page 13] Counsell or reason, rashly, and ignorantly: In which sense, AUGUSTINE call'd the most men fooles, ( lib. 1. de lib. art. cap. 9.) And agreeable to this saith CICERO, there's nothing so common and ordinary as to understand nothing also: I think the Mule breeds oftner than a wise man is produ­ced. Since wisedome therefore the Governesse of things, deserts men; what wonder need it be to us to see all things done immoderately, and by way of tumult, and our imployments to misse of their ends, by running out of their bounds and limits, and our selves thrust headlong into sundry precipi­ces. It must necessarily redound then to the health and welfare of mankind, to place so clearly in the sight and view of all men, the true discover'd ends of things, and their certain medium's leading to those ends, and all the orderly and due manners, Courses and wayes of such medium's, that all men may in seeing see, and being taken with the sweet­nesse of that true happinesse, (which only true wis­dome shews, and gives a fore-taste of) be inflamed with the vehement and ardent love thereof. And this is that very thing which PANSOPHY seeks after and hopes for, through its waies of full Uni­versality, Truth, and Facility.

XXIX. For because those things are many, and after a sort infinite, which men in this life have for their Objects; as well without themselves, things naturall and artificiall, morrall and spirituall, good [Page 14] and bad; as within themselves, inclinations, de­sires, various affections, and lastly, near adjoyning to themselves, other mens opinions, studyes, endea­vours, and very different actions; it cannot be but they must be severally distracted and confounded by all these, so as they cannot do that which ought chiefly and especially to be performed; but even as any one by meer hap falls this way, or that way, so he permits himselfe to be inwrapp'd, and intan­gled. Whence it comes to passe, that whereas God made man right, they immix themselves both with infinite questions and occupations, (Eccles. 7.30.) and according to that complaint of SENECA'S, like a company of Cattell, they follow the flock a­fore not going where they should, but where they behold others. For which Ataxy or irregularity, no other remedy can be found, than that all things which a man either doth or may meet with, be re­duced, into a fixed and settled order, the Weights and valuations of all things, being evidently extant, that every one for his own benefit may clearly see, and wholely understand, what ought, and is be­hoofe-full, afore or after, more or lesse, to be atten­ded, affected, brought about and dispatched; which cannot be without an universall fore-knowledge and survey of things. For all things that are be so inter-woven by divine Artifice, (which PANSO­PHY will manifest and make cleare) that every thing is not so much for its own sake as for others: [Page 15] whence tis, that all things mutually cohere and become serviceable, and by turnes, not only things alike, but what are diverse and even contraries, il­lustrate and set out themselves: as we have it ap­parent in the body of any creature, how all the members, the greatest and least, highest and lowest, first and last, serve one another mutually: so that if you take away one, you shall spoyle and maime the use of the whole. Seeing therefore all things that are come to the composition and framing of the whole Universe, as of one Common-wealth by a concatination, or chaining together, which is no­where broke or interrupted, it must needs happen that by the ignorance of one remarkable thing, the truth of many be likewise darkned and obscured. Certainly, as SENECA said of the Writings of great and noted men: They are wholely to be look'd into, wholely to be handled and perused; For by the lineaments of their wit, they knit a worke, from whence nothing can be withdrawne, without a marring and ruinous defacement of the rest. That may be far oftner spoken of the whole structure of things and learning, that nothing can be withdrawne thence without spoile and ruine. Which also the same Authour saies in another place concerning the Counsel of life, and the aberrations of Counsels: we therefore offend, or swerve, be­cause we all deliberate to change the parts of life, but none of us consult about the whole. It agrees [Page 16] and squares most aptly with the search and enquiry of truth: therefore we erre diversly, because we deliberate about the parts and parcels of truth, but no man makes any matter, or troubles himselfe a­bout the whole entire Universall Catholick truth, uniting and kniting it selfe together on every side: which also FRANCISCUS SANCHEZ saw, and thus expressed: Libro quod nihil scitur, pag. 47. There's such a Concatination in all things, as no one may be idle but hinder or further another; yea, every one is designed for this hurting or helping of very many. Therfore for the perfect knowledge of every thing, tis requisite we know all things: And a little after you shall understand this by the familiar example of an ordinary Clocke. For if you would know how it strikes hourely, its meet you looke round all the wheeles from the first to the last, and what moves the first, and how this another, and that others, even to the last, &c. We must imagine the same in the great Orbe of things, in which you can find nothing but moves and is moved, changes and is changed, acts, and suffers. PANSOPHY therefore by whole­some Counsel takes all things in generall into its consideration, that it may evidently and most clear­ly appeare, how lesser things are, and come to be subordinate to the greater, the greater to the grea­test, the former to the latter, and the latter to the last; infinite things to finite, and the finite to one: [Page 17] that is, all visible things to man, temporall things to eternity, and things created to their Creator; and that nothing of all be omitted or left out, which may not be constrained and compelled to serve our last or ultimate end. To wit, by this meanes we shall know that the advice of ECCLESIASTI­CUS is sound and healthfull, Eccles. 5.18. Be not ignorant of any thing in a great matter or a small.

XXX. Now there ought to be no lesse, yea ra­ther greater care and solicitude about truth then universality: For to know truth is divine wis­dome, saith LACTANTIUS: Nor is there any use at all of figments but to mock and abuse wits, and lead men aside into waylesse places: Therefore in­deed the most thoughts of mortals are misty or smoky, slippery, crooked, vaine, and unprofitable for workes or actions, because for the most part instead of things which are true we acquiesse and rest in things which are like to, counterfeit or re­semble truth, embrace opinions for verity, and running out into opinions we have and returne lit­tle of certaine knowledge. Whence it is, that we had better be ignorant, then possessed with the knowledge of what is bad; because ignorance is lesse hurtfull then errour; even as a neutrality or indifferency in health is more tolerable, and rather to be endured then a sickly and distempered condi­tion, and as a rude behaviour or rustick carriage is to be preferred before manerlinesse and civility [Page 18] trimmed and polished for slinesse and malice. In as much then as there are to be sought out by us (un­lesse we will be deceived and become vaine) not things which are true and good to shew, but solid and substantiall, which may render us truely wise, good and happy: O how is it then to be wished that we had certaine and infallible rules of truth and goodnesse! For though our knowledge is like to be more contracted, and fall within a narrower compasse if we onely follow and pursue things which are certaine: Yet even that very little of dyed and approved truth, and that which affords sure and infallible use shall be of more account and esteeme then all weake opinions or guesses how diffused and large soever, or then any vaine and idle delights of fancy: Because its infinitely better to know any thing then to conjecture at infinite. And to the sick patient one little potion which eases him of his malady, is better then infinite most subtle discourses touching his sicknesse, or what remedies soever by the greatest provision and care procured and tendered to him, but not expelling or remove­ing his sicknesse from the place where it chiefely lies. For AUGUSTINE sayes well; truth what­soever it be is better then all that which may be devised and feigned according to our pleasure. ( Lib. de Ver. Relig. cap. 5.) Since therefore the wiser sort of men acknowledge, and confesse, and bewaile, and deplore the mixture of errours with [Page 19] truth in Phylosophy and Divinity, and up and downe else where: PANSOPHY which serves and seekes to collect onely things irrefragably true, and in a manner apodictically to demonstrate how to possesse them securely; endeavours without doubt a businesse which is likely to be very profita­ble and advantagious to mankinde: For what I pray is the reason why we should be willing to be cheated and mockt perpetually with uncertaine things, however plausibly made and contrived? Opinions ad placitum, or meerly to our owne like­ing, are as HELIOGABALUS his banquets, who delighted his guests with painted viands, and after­wards dismissed them hungry. That Feast is the best ordered where the guests are entertained with wholesome and well rellished dishes, although but few: Not where the pallat is provoked and ensna­red with various and contrary meates. For there good concoction, good sleepe, good digestion, a good colour in the face, and a good habitude of bo­dy and minde follows and attends a moderate plea­sure: Here surfeits, difficult repose, doting dreams, vomits, or wringings of the belly, diseases and deaths ensue. And as that is not a good and com­mendable pourtracture of a man which is fairely drawne; but that which extactly and exquisitely resembles his lively lookes featured whatsoever it be; so not that Geographicall table deserves praise which is garnished and set out with colours and [Page 20] (such as affect and take children) but that which exhibits the true and genuine distances of places: even so directly that book shall be held, and judg'd the best, that feigning or painting nothing ad placi­tum, repesents all things in that manner and forme, which the things in themselves are. Which per­petuall tabulature of truth that PANSOPHY may be, is that very thing which is sought after.

XXXI. But indeed, there will be need also of the light of method, by which only there is hope it may be obtain'd; that all things truly delivered may be both pleasantly read and easily understood, and hereby this book may become a wholsome lure of wits, and a Ladder happily erected, to climb and mount by to the tops of things: and lastly, an effi­catious remedy to take away in the greater part the differences of the world. Which three things we must shew may be expected from Pansophicall me­thod, that it may be apparent, we endeavour a mat­ter profitable and beneficiall to mankind.

XXXII. It's in vaine to hope that humane things, prolapsed and falne to decay by the com­mon errours of all can be restored and made entire, without the common help and joynt assistance of all: For seeing all are members of the worlds Common-wealth; no sooner can the state of hu­mane society be amended and chang'd for the bet­ter, then all begin to act by reason whatsoever they do, as well those that are subject and inferiours, as [Page 21] those who rule and governe. Now they cannot sooner begin and make this assay than they shall be taught and instructed to know the reasons how and why every thing may be necessary and requi­site to be done: all which things, after they shall be delineated according to the Rules and directions of truth it self; that also they may be desired to be knowne of all, there will be need of certaine baits or allurements, viz. A delightfull method, tem­p'ring every where pleasure with profit, and expo­sing all things to the cleare light, whereby this Amphitheater of the Universe may seeme to none a labyrinth or thorny bush, but a Paradice and delicious Garden to all. Now PANSOPHY propoundeth this to it selfe, so to expand and lay o­pen to the eyes of all the whole University of things as both every thing may be pleasurable to be view'd in it selfe, and also necessary for the extending and enlarging of the Appetite, from one thing to ano­ther.

XXXIII. These things an artificiall method promises to performe; so that whosoever shall have a mind to read these things, shall be able also to understand and conceive of them; a matter tru­ [...]y greatly to be wished. For common complaints [...]nd the examples of very few, scarce at length strug­gling out, and getting rid of difficulties, testifie, [...]hat the vulgar, and ordinary waies and passages of [...]he sciences are beset with thornes and rubs: for [Page 22] so they deliver & lay down the most things that not so much the sublimity or subtilty of the matter, as rather the very perplexed & obscure maner of deli­very serves for the involving & entangling of wits. Pansophy therefore seeking out Compendium's and Stratagems, & finding thē by Gods help; by which all things may be temper'd and suited by a certaine proportion, to the capacity of ordinary and indiffe­rent wits; why may i [...] not be er [...]dited to propose a businesse of publick benefit? for it displayes all in the very order of things, that each thing may stand in its own place, as it followes from the pre­mises, and begets consequents from it selfe, and hereby all precedents cannot but give light and lu­stre to their sequents, and the sequents and strength to their precedents, which if it be woven through­out from the beginning to the end, with like dili­gence and felicity: all things cannot but in like manner be penetrated by wits. For truly there is no Tower so h [...]gh, nor any Rock so inaccessible, to whose tops any one that is furnished with feet, may not attaine, if you set him sure Ladder, or hew him out due and convenient steps: whereas he who aslayes without these, is sooner likely to finde Precip [...]ces, than arrive at those tops which he fondly aspires to. So he who attempts the con­templation of things in none or in a bad order, is easily surpriz'd with giddinesse, and falls back, or slides forward into confused, preposterous, and [Page 23] monstrous opinions: But he who goes in right or­der and by degrees, may readily elevate, and raise himselfe even to the highest pitch.

XXXIV. It's evident, that differences, con­troversies, and brawles do still reigne every where, and trouble the affaires of men: Nor is it unknown to the wiser sort that these contradictions and quarrels come from divers and contrary studies, be­cause we learne not wisely to rellish, act, and speak the same things; but we whisper severall things into one another, or we are carried hither and thi­ther, every one by his proper eagernesse and passi­on: If therefore it may be obtained or brought a­bout, that all men as they are made by one God af­ter his image, destinated to one end of blessed eter­nity with him; sent into the same schoole of this present life; furnished with the same requisites of necessary helpes, or are certainely apt to be furni­shed; so may they but suffer themselves to be led by the hand in common from a common principle, through common meanes to common ends; why may we not hope more serious study about serious things, and lesse stir about trifles and by this more concord and lesse difference? Now since PANSO­PHY wishes, seekes, and assaies this it verily wish­es, seekes and assaies a businesse likely to bestead and profit man-kind in common.

XXXV. But let us come to particulars, and give a briefe touch by the way what hope PANSO­PHY [Page 24] may afford of bettering the state as well of the Vulgar as the Learned, and the Civill and Ec­clesiasticall, and to conclude all the Nations of the whole world.

XXXVI. Theres none but sees in what things the vulgar sort of men busie themselves; namely, in things frivolous and vaine, or truely in externalls which onely extend themselves to this fugitive and transient life, they regard not sollider good things internall and eternall, because they know them not; now they know them not, because they are not ac­quainted therewith; therefore they delight them­selves with gugawes, bawbles and trifles of their owne. For what can he doe who hath not lear­ned the inward culture and adorning of the soule? Who hath not tasted the sweeter fruits of vertues? Who hath not lookt into the more precious trea­sures of Wisdome? Who is in no measure admit­ted to the secrets of Heaven and Earth? How can such an one imploy himselfe save in sweating and toyling to plow the earth, gather fruits, scrape up mony, and to search and looke into such things as are done in neighbouring houses and places adjoy­ning? For it is not granted to humane nature to be altogether idle and drowsie, it will be busied, or busie it selfe. He that doth not this must needes doe something else; and he who transfers not the forcible bent and inclination of his nature to bet­ter matters, falls certainely into such as are worse: [Page 25] It will be therefore a wholesome intent and good purpose that even the very common people be in­vited at length into the common amphitheater of Gods wisdome, and that the vaile being with­drawne from these things in the presence of all, di­vine treasures be represented as they are in them­selves, and come to be esteemed of from the truth and reallity of the matter, to the end that the sa­vour of better and truer good things being per­ceived, they may accustome themselves to esteeme lesse of transitory worldly allurements, and make smaller reckoning of shaddowes then substances; and finally, also that those men of the lowest ranke, condemned to labours and grievous troubles, may by the hope of better things ease their calamitous and wretched condition.

XXXVII. Touching the state of learned men, PANSOPHY rightly constituted, may sundry wayes availe and advantage them.

XXXVIII. For first of all 'tis certaine, that very few of those who either please themselves with the name of learning, or are admired by o­thers, rely either on their owne, or on the founda­tion of things. For they follow the opinions of one another, which since they vanously depart from themselves and from things, it comes to passe that there is no end of doubts, contradictions, and disputes in Church and Schoole; by which the wits of the learned, and the consciences of the un­learned [Page 26] are troubled and tortured without end: For which disease if a meet remedy be sought out, it cannot be any other then that all be taught to follow, not the leaden rule of this and that Doctor, but the adamantine rule of God and things them­selves, and heereby not to come to bare supposalls but knowledge; which Will be done not by fol­lowing the externall likelihood of things, or acqui­escing therein, but by searching by certaine wayes the very intimate, solid, and unmoved truth of things, and by placing it in open view after it is drawne forth and solidly demonstrated, which thing PANSOPHY seekes after.

XXXIX. Furthermore, if we look upon those that study Arts & Sciences, some well observe that that variety of methods (by which every Science & Art, & Tongue, otherwise then as it differs; yea, the very same is delivered by one Authour on this maner by another on that) is not onely a Remora, but even a vexation and torment to wits: For hence it comes to passe, that all indeed make but difficult progresse; and the most taking a nauseous distast, and deterred with so many new lets and crosses continually hap­ning, start back from the course of their studies to other kindes of life, or wearied in so rugged a path, slake in their alacrity, leaving many things either untouched, or touching them but in an overly and superficiall manner. Truely HERCULEAN wits are rarely and seldome knowne into whose brests [Page 27] new valour returnes, and a new vigour arises at the meeting of a new monster, and the approach of a new encounter: And therefore solid Scholars grow so rare; who then may not thinke it profita­ble and necessary that this bar be removed? For those of BAZIL write wel in their Diatriba, con­cerning the compendious manner of learning, the Hebrew and Chalde tongue annexed to Mercurius Quadrilinguis, Printed in the Yeare, 1637. It cannot be well declared what a compendium or saving of labour and wearisomenesse it may be, eve­ry where to use the same Authour, the same Pre­cepts, and the same Method. Now PANSOPHY shall be no other then such a compendium of learn­ing all things in one perpetuall Method.

XL. And because such are not a wanting, who burning with the love of Sciences and Wisdome, yet by reason of the affaires and imployments of life, with which they are distracted, cannot be at leasure for the searching through of Libraries: Its altogether needfull that these have some briefe, but withall strong Viaticum of Learning, by vertue whereof, as ELIAS refresht by the service of an Angell with a morsell of bread, and draught of water, went on through Deserts to the Mount of God; so they also may be able to preserve spiritu­all life in any noyse and hurry of businesses. Now indeed of this nature is that which PANSOPHY endeavours; by which both men being at leasure [Page 28] may be profitably employed, and being employed may be speedily promoted to their principall ends and aimes. For it shall teach us to attend, and doe the first things firstly, and the chiefer chiefely; with the certaine use also of those things to good ends, which busie others without use or benefit at all.

XLI. Againe, those who saile through the vast seas of Authors, they have need as well as those that float in the Wildernesse of the Ocean of some such magnetick directory, whereby they may the better keepe and maintaine themselves from errours, quick-sands, and rocks. For those who sailed by sea, before the use of the Loadstone was invented, could not know whither they might be carried, and what way to steere the ship, unlesse it were in a cleare sky, or in view of shoare; in darke and cloudy weather, and when they were carried forth into the deepe they were at a losse, and at their wits end: So they who enter into the sea of Authours furnished with no rules besides the common and cloudable Sunne of common knowledges, and the shoares of preconceived doctrines, cannot but be in all places uncertaine and doubtfull of the event: Therefore since PANSOPHY endeavours to con­stitute such an universall directory (to wit an uni­versall and perpetuall harmony of truth) which who hath ready at hand, neede not care for any depths, nights, and darknesse, being certaine of the [Page 29] poles or hinges of the world, and secure of the Ha­ven and Port to which he tends; why may we not believe that it endeavours a businesse profitable and necessary for learned men in common?

XLII. If we have regard to Philosophers a­part (who being intent upon the speculation of all things, and their causes wherein they are contained, ought to be Masters of all things which are done rationably in any place) we shall finde that their state especially stands in neede of bettering and a­mendment. For what Philosophy soever the Schooles have and peremptorily hold, even all that is drawne from the Greekes and Arabians (Hea­thens and Mahumetans:) and therefore however it be freed from mixed superstitions, is neverthe­lesse very imperfect. Of which thing there are three certaine documents or sure proofes: First, because these being not furnisht with Divine Re­velation, (by which they might correct the aber­rations of their senses and reason) could not but be blinded and deceived in all chiefe and principall matters: For they were ignorant of the beginning of the World, as also of its end, and knew neither the constitution nor corruption of mans nature, nor its amendment, and manner of its amendment: Therefore what sound thing could they deliver ei­ther of nature or morality? Furthermore, that Greekish Philosophy was then when it was con­stituted and set up (namely, in the time of SOCRA­TES, [Page 30] PLATO, ARISTOTLE) a meere new thing in the world, destitute of sufficient experiences, catching at and laying hold upon any thing in its way, from this person thus, from another other­wise; and all things were transferred to matter of profession and disputes, in which some have en­wrapped others and doe hitherto enwrap their fol­lowers, with drawing wits from things to them­selves, and their owne conceptions; and as it were ensnaring them in jives and fetters, so as they cannot freely contemplate things. Lastly, even the matter it selfe instructs us, that the true and living Roots have been and still are a wanting to this Heathenish Phylosophy, by which it being vege­tated and quickned, might have growne continual­ly into a larger tree, and have produced alwayes more copious and abundant fruits. For that it ought to have been so, we see it in the example of Mechanick Arts, which as it were endued with a vitall spirit, encrease dayly, and come to perfecti­on: That if their first Inventers were alive againe, they should have need to turne Apprentices, and be set to learne, so rude were their first endeavours in comparison of this perfection, to which by the labour and diligence of their successors they are at this time advanced. Now we see the quite contra­ry in Philosophicall Sciences, that they throve most of all in their first Authours, and afterwards languisht; so that Moderne Persons may thinke [Page 31] 'tis enough for them even a far off to follow their foot-steps, which they openly confesse, who with such prayses extoll ARISTOTLE the Authour of this Philosophy, as they assigne to him the Dicta­torship, Empire, and Tribunall of Wisdome, not daring at any time to go out of his track or foot­ing. Hence it comes to passe that the Sciences for so many Ages stick fast in the footsteps of the An­cients, nor receive such increase as may beseeme mankinde, and grow adored after the maner of Sta­tues, but finde not any promotion or advancement: For if in the meane while any new thing be found out (as are the knowledge of the Load-stone, the Algebra, Logarithmes, Canons about Creeks and Gulfes, Clocks or Watches, the Art of Printing Bookes, &c.) this truely is not found out by the guidance and helpe of that Ancient Philosophy; but either by chance, or for that more excellent and choyce wits piercing further made bold to assay something peculiar, I wish to God then we might prevaile with those who devote themselves to the contemplation of things, that the principles being only rightly ordained, that they would give their mindes to trace the hidden truth of things, in things not in bookes or the conceits of others: O what faire and great hopes shew themselves of having continually more plentifull treasures of the wisdome of God digged forth? which as yet are, and will lye hid if men persevere in the resting on [Page 32] things found out, and adhere onely to the cogita­tions and devises of others. For what novelty I pray you can he finde out, who keepes himselfe on­ly in the wayes where an infinite go by perpetual­ly? What gold can he get out who ties and en­slaves himselfe to a veine already exhausted by o­thers even to the least parcell or crum, or that tries mettally earth over againe, which hath been a thou­sand times refined in hope of drawing something out of it still? It concernes therefore Philoso­phers that leaving these emptyed Mines, they open themselves new passages to finde out the treasures of nature and art; which seeing PANSOPHY both teaches, and in a good part by Gods helpe per­formes; no good and wise man who delights in the well-improving and promoting humane things can finde in his heart to envy, much lesse hinder it: The matter of it self speaks that.

43. These of the learned who are at leasure for the disquisitions of things, and institute or order disputations for the examining of opinions, have need of better helpes. For what is there perform­ed worthy so great designes as polemicall bookes are hitherto writ for? They dispute that they may dispute, not for determining, but fixing and encrea­sing Controversies. For those usuall disputations are meere circulations or wheelings about, and a worke without end; which the continuance of Opinions and Sects in this our Age clashing one [Page 33] against another doth plainely teach. All are oppo­sed, none overcome, one admires at the obstinacy of another, and yet no one yields; whats the rea­son? First of all Controversies are raised without necessity through the sole itching of wits, and out of a desire of renewing things, or contradicting o­thers, which on each side distracts, entangles and intricates the mindes of men. Then started Con­troversies are exaggerated beyond measure, every light dissent passes for Heresie; whence mens spi­rits are offended, estranged, and provoked. At length the very manner and way of untying knots, which we as yet use, proves ineffectuall. For to draw out our owne and overthrow opposite con­clusions, we make use of Principles (Canons and Rules, Distinctions and Limitations) which are catcht up any where, or even lately feigned and devised by our selves, that they may be suppositi­ons, and serve for our cause: Or which verily are not yet granted to by the other Party; such as the adversary seeing himselfe set upon with and pusht at, he either derides, or contemnes. Furthermore as well from these, as even from Principles which are true, and yielded to by the adversary are pickt many times conclusions not by Logicall, but Rhe­toricall Art; that is not by solid demonstration, by which assent is wrested from one, wil he, nil he, as it happens among Mathematitians, but by certaine perswasions soliciting indeed the assent, yet not [Page 34] necessarily drawing it forth. Lastly, the end of the disputation for the most part answers the be­ginning, so as it ends in prejudice and affection; whilst those that dissent are condemned, and their Odium instilled into [...]thers, which gives the adver­sa [...]y occasion of shrouding himselfe with a shield sutable to these weapons, and of defending him­selfe with aff [...]ction against aff [...]ction, and with per­tinacy against hatred. Now PANSOPHY pro­mises a remedy for these mischiefes; while it teacheth us that onely solid things be solidly hand­led; while it loads none with prejudice, yea ra­ther invites all equally, and laying downe Princi­ples really Unive [...]sall, really true, really cleare, which may be admitted of all of their owne accord and with pleasure, by these gradually without any hiatus or gap, and within perpetuall limits draw­ing mens mindes, it brings them leisurably to the v [...]y tops of truth not with relu [...]tancy, but spon­tanity and willingnesse. And so while it doth not exasperate mens mindes, but asswages and shewes the wayes of reducing into consent the senses or conc [...]its of those who even mutually contradict one another, if so be they have but any thing of truth and reason in them: It makes and causes all m [...]n being carryed on from the same Principles, by the same mediums to the same conclusions to give their assent to the last, as well as the fi [...]st; not through any perswasion of likelihood or probabi­lity, [Page 35] but by reason of the very clearenesse and per­spicuity of firme and unmoved truth.

XLIV. For Schooles also, if we would have them well provided for as we ought, PANSOPHY may afford and contribute notab [...]e help [...]. Name­ly because it concernes Youth even from the very beginning of life to be seasoned with right and sound perswasions which may thrive and grow up with them; this can scarce by any meanes be bet­ter and more certainely obtained, then if the Schooles have a booke at hand common to all, pro­pounding all wholesome things in one continued Method; by whose direction it may be plaine and evident that none of those things which ap­pertaine to the profitable culture and improve­ment of their mindes, are passed by, omitted or neglected in any place, but that all things are every where performed. For though all youth be not capable of all things; yet their Masters shall have such a rule from thence as they may neither be ig­norant, nor forget whereto all things are to be di­rected: But even certaine Compendiums of PAN­SOPHY accommodated or fitted to the capacity of first child-hood may be easily constituted and framed for the use of inferiour Schooles.

XLV. Consider with me now the Politicall or Civill State, and you shall see that PANSOPHY may be very serviceable also for its wellfare. Knowne is that speech of PLATO, and held for an [Page 36] Oracle long ago: That Common-Wealths are e­ven then like to be happy when either Philosophers rule them, or those who rule them play the Philo­sophers; then which saying nothing is more true; if true Philosophy, which is the true contemplati­on of all things be meant and understood thereby: For because Order is the foundation and bond of the safety of the Common-wealth, as also of all o­ther things, for the retaining which among all men and all things, Governours are to be vigilantly heedfull: Its a plaine case by how much any one better understands the way of order, by so much he may the better be president over others for the procuring and maintaining order. Now he best understands the order of things, who understands it universally, as it is the soule of all things, and knowes to distinguish fundamentalls from acces­sories, whereof these are every where necessarily the same, these other vary. Now hither PANSO­PHY doth altogether tend, that it may detect Or­der, the foundation and bond of all things, it may therefore make good Governours for Common­wealths: But its also of great concernment that they who are subject be not subject upon constraint but upon their owne accord, out of their love to justice. Now why may not this same PANSO­PHY effect and performe this, if the very Com­monalty also be admitted, that it may learne and understand that the publick safety of all in gene­rall, [Page 37] and the private of every one in particular doth consist in it, that every one may maintaine himselfe in his owne station, and readily and chearefully go about his owne businesses, whatsover they be that fall and happen to him?

XLVI. If you looke at the Church, PANSO­PHY by Gods helpe may yield likewise to small advantage to the safety, but even to the increases heereof. For its exceeding good, that even all Di­vines understand how exactly Gods words agree every where with his workes, that they may the better know to clear and explaine the mysteries of salvation, by the mysteries of common providence. And its profitable that the Christian common-peo­ple have not a commanded or extorted pharisaicall or an implicit, slubberly, but a certaine and expli­cite fayth, that they may reply to their teachers, as those Samaritanes to their first female Preacher. Now we beleeve not because of thy saying, but be­cause wee our selves have heard and know him. Now this will bee brought to passe, if they bee taught to understand, that which they beleeve, and to know that our fayth not onely contayns in it no absurdity, (as Infidels suspect, or even blasphe­mously affirme) but that it is a thing of all other most rationable, supported with the irresistible and irrefragable testimonies of the Scripture, of the world, of all the inward senses, and moreover of Infidels themselves, the confession of the very [Page 38] truth shining foorth heere and there from them al­so: Which in the progresse of time and light, may by the mercy of God bee a most strong engine, or battering Ramme, to convince and convert the ve­ry Infidels, the Jewes Turkes, and the remnant of the Gentiles: which could not be hitherto, by rea­son of our domestick discords and the unestablish­ed way of teaching the truth plainly. For so much as it is a common notion, the consent of opinions seemes a note or marke of truth: such a manifold dissent of Christians, could not but beget in Infi­dels, a suspition of falshood: nor had we any means in readinesse, whereby we might shake off that su­spition. For how can they obtayne the victory, who set upon the enemy disorderly, and besides that, oppose and fight against themselves?

XLVII. But wee ought to hope it may come to passe at length, that the Church having a better accord within it selfe, may bee furnished like wise with more powerfull weapons for the overcom­ming th [...] unbeleefe of Infidels. For even as the A­postle sayd, when hee considered the gradation of divine wisedome: in the dispensing of the revelati­on of himselfe that God spoke often sundry wayes by his Prophets, lest of all by his Sonne. So, why may we not imagine, that the Sonne himself, (who doth even whatsoever he sees his Father doe, John 5 19) after h [...] had propagated by divers wayes and degrees through Countries and Nations, the [Page 39] trueth of that doctrine which was brought from heaven, reserved some utmost excellent degree for the last times? since wee now see many waies which have gone before. For first of all he would have the mysteries of purchased salvation preached to the Genti [...]es by simple men and Idiots, but such as he made men believe were sent of God by the gift of tongues and miracles, that the hard hearts of m [...]n (alwaies arm [...]d by their owne obstinacy to resist God) might be absolutely forced to yield. Afterwards when the faith of miracles languish'd, and the world hardned it selfe against the truth, and [...]ag [...]d against his Saints: Christ layd down a­nother means, by which also the hardnesse of many was vanquished; to wit, the constancy of the Martyrs whose bloud was the seed of the Church. For by how much more Christians were put to sl [...]ughter, by so much more grew up, and came on dayly to display and lay open the victory of the Crosse; that as Christ, so Christians might over­come by dying. The world therefore yielded, and gave w [...]y upon Conquest. A third means of propa­gating th [...] Churc [...] forthwith approaching; name­ly when Christ gave it Kings as nursing Fathers, and Queens as nursing Mothers, by whose exam­ple and faithfull care whole Countreys were con­v rted. But when the sly and subtile deceiver had turn d this into the Churches bane, and had brought in security of life, dissolutenesse of manners, pro­phanenesse [Page 40] of doctrine, and a various mixture of errors; God against that darknesse set a new light of tongues, by the helpe whereof, and the benefit of Printing, the Sacred Bookes were brought to publick view, and the Writings of the Ancients by whose [...]ayd truth hath been fayrly purged from en­terd-in errors and superstition. But because heere also both seducers who see but a little in the open light, doe make a struggling, and those who follow the light, rather light for themselves particular tor­ches, (and thereby hinder their owne and one ano­thers light) then labour to enjoy a full light in common. And lastly, because the Gentiles remain to be converted, (for the Gospel of the Kingdome shall be preached in the whole World, before the End come, Matth. 24.14.) and the remnants of the children of Abraham are to be excited to seeke the Lord their God in the latter dayes, Ho. 3.5. why may not the Lord of all bee credited to have reser­ved a certaine universall medium, for so universall a businesse? By which both a clear light may shine upon those who sit in darknesse, and also the stiffe and refractory sinewes of those that rebell against the light, be slit, and Satan bee bound that hee can­not seduce the Gentiles &c. Now this kinde of Medium, which Pansophy shews us, is eyther that very same, or certainly some one very neere to it; viz. whereby it may be rendred most evident to e­very mans mind, that onely meere Christian Reli­gion [Page 41] consist in eternall harmony, so as it may bee discerned on every side, to bee all fayre and de­sirable.

XLVIII. It would be of special importance like­wise, that Nations & Countries dispersed through the divers Hemisphers and Climates of the World, & severed as it were by railes and partitions from one another through the propriety of Tongues, might have amongst themselves some common rule of things by which being regulated, evē such as do not understand, may understand themselves mutual­ly: For what should that be which the Lord promi­ses by the Prophet, if it be not this: That he will turne to the people a pure language, that they may all call upon the name of the Lord, to serve him with one lip or consent, Zeph. 3.9. And this may almost be the making of the lip one, whereby all are brought to understand themselves mutually; if not as to the sound of words, yet ac­cording to their sense and meaning. For if this booke when 'tis brought to its perfection should be translated into the Domestick Tongues of Nati­ons out of the Latine Tongue in which it was con­ceived at first, in as many Paragraphs, and as neare as may be to the very words: This would be a rare helpe, even for the most barbarous Nations for the easie learning of the Latine Tongue, run­ing parallell with their owne in that common Booke: By which meanes as it is of the European [Page 42] Nations; so it might also become the common Mercury of the Nations of the whole World: To which p [...]sse if the matter were once brought▪ we should have an universall antidote against the con­fu [...]ion of BABEL, a true Panagea, and the best me­dium for the communicating all good th [...]ngs.

XLIX. But we must now shew that which we promised, how our Pansophical purpose may be founded even in the very necessiti [...]s of this present Age of ours; to wit, that we may resist as much as in us lies those Monsters which prevail too much at this time, Presumption Cu iosity, Samaritanisme, Atheisme, and Fury, which armes it selfe dayly more and more to the destruction of man kinde.

L. For first of all the opinion of a learned Age is growne too much in use among very many, as though the studies of learning and wisdome had now attained to their [...], or full and perfect growth in this our Age. Drunke with which opi­nion even the retainers to a very little, or indeed but superficiall learning doe so please themselves, that they deeme themselves to be almost SOLO­MONS▪ and seeke after no truer learning, because they dreame that they possesse it already, and that there remaines not so much as any thing wherein they may make a further prog [...]esse: Whence it is, that in truth there's the greatest scarcity of learned men in this learned Age; the Vulgar studies run­ning out almost into a certaine babling and sophi­stication; [Page 43] it would be good and meet therefore that these supposers or over weeners might be car­ryed on into the Ocean of universall wisdome, and that the vast deserts of mans ignorance should be showne to them by the discoverd and designed shores of unknowne Lands, that understanding how little we know in comparison of what we are ignorant of, they may accustome themselves not to raise up, but pu [...]l down their cr [...]sts.

LI. But if men freed from this p [...]esumption shall be reduced to due modesty, and the ardent study of true wisdome, there will be need thereup­on that the businesse be ordered somewhat other­wise then hitherto it hath been; namely, that they whosoever they be, who are truely desirous of true wisdome, may come to it by more certaine and more compendious wayes: For those which we have had thus long, are ambagious or far ab [...]u [...], and uncertaine, yea dangerous. For that in this Age, which would be tearmed learned, Bookes, Schooles, Methods, and various opinions concern­ing various things are multiplyed even to admirati­on, Learners are utterly confounded, and we may feare, lest we be all overwhelmed, that at last we shall either read nothing, or believe nothing: If some bar or restraint be not layd upon this Age; as luxurious in conceiving opinions, as multiplying Bookes; and the Learners freed both from the wearisomenesse of reading many things, and from [Page 44] the tumult of encountring opinions, and from the two-path'd, or rather many trackt wayes of Er­rours, which they may meet with every where; which to be brought about by no other then a Pan­sophicall way, he shall acknowledge and confesse, whosoever shall truely perceive the true intent thereof; to wit, that all things may be derived from an infallible foundation, that is to say of things themselves, of divine testimonies of things, and of notions or knowledges written in our minde, in which three, as in her triple Palace eter­nall truth resides: And in such a Method, as by which all things may flow into our mindes easily and clearly.

LII. Which same thing also may be a remedy against humaine curiosity, whereby some are ex­cessively inflamed with an inordinate desire about lesse necessary, and forbidden points of know­ledge by the legitimate designed bounds of mans industry, and the found out markes or goales of that soveraignty and power over things, which is committed to the wit of man; and lastly, by the detected and clearly displayed limits, and all those meanes and wayes of possibility and impossibility. As far forth as they may be knowne, to the end that those who are busied in undecent unprofitable and impossible matters may be recalled from their vaine and irrationall inclination and eagernesse in­to the wayes of reason; and others may be taught to beware aforehand the occasions of falling into the like exorbitancy.

[Page 45]LIII. Moreover Dissentions and Disputes, yea Sects have too much prevailed in Philosophy and Divinity, in which both the learned and un­learned are wrapped and encumbred: So as either they cannot understand themselves mutually, or although they might understand one another, yet neglect it out of favour to sides and parties; which thing is the originall of severall confusions: For while we doe not one understand the words of a­nother, it falls out that we neither understand things, unlesse it be confusedly or amisse; and while we cast absurdities upon one another, we our selves seeme or are observed to cherrish farre greater in others; nor is there any one who can efficaciously decide Controversies, while we doe not edifie in common; but sliding into Parties or Factions, every man busily goes about to fortifie his owne Fabricks but to overthrow others with any kinde of undermining and possible craft; By which very thing, Sects are not lessened but fixt and setled; variances are not taken away but mul­tiplyed; odiums are not appeased, but exasperated and sharpened without end. O that God therefore would have pity on us, and recollect us from this dispersion, and restore to us (as he hath promised by his Prophets, and as I have touched before) one heart, and one way, and chosen lip, that we may understand the same things, speak the same things, doe all the same things, and serve the Lord with [Page 46] one arme. Now this, if as it is wished for, ought also to be hoped, it may scarce be obtained by any other, save a Pansophicall way: Namely, if the mindes of all men be brought into the open field of things themselves, and there prejudices being layd aside freely view not opinions of things but things themselves: by no other guide then sense, by no o­ther light then of sound reason, by no other umpeer and judge then God. And for as much as things are the same to all, and all have the same senses, and there is the same reason judging alike, of the like things; and lastly the same God attesting the same touching the same things, why should we be out of hope, of having it come to pass [...], that for the future, there may be also about the same things one sense, assent, & consēt amōg all? And so soon as we shal a­gree about things, words shall not be so able to di­stract us: For no longer words, nor our conceits, but things themselves (which are the same to all) shall be the basis or ground of our thoughts and speech­es. And it may be forecasted, by Gods helpe, that things and the understanding of things, and speech the interpreter of the understanding, may run para­lell through the whole Universe. And then diffe­rences will be happily taken away, and the occasi­ons of differences, no man being intent upon any other thing, then the very truth of things. Then shall contradictions cease, the appearances of con­trariety ceasing, nor will there be any need of these [Page 47] refuges or evasions. This is true Philosophically, not Theologically; I speake Ast [...]onomically, not Phisically, &c. Nor shall any one stile h [...]mselfe in Philosophy a Platonist or Aristotelian, in Divinity a Lutheran or Calvinist, or Papist, but all Philoso­phers and Christians: Because as there is a com­mon Christ or Sav [...]our of all; so both PAUL and CEPHAS, and APOLLO, and PLATO, and A­RISTOTLE, and whoever in any place hath any thing of truth or goodnesse, that shall be common to us, being taken out of the common treasu [...]e of truth: So who sees not but that Sciences and Arts may be reconciled amongst themselves, and Philo­sophy with Divinity, and the mindes and tongues of men d ffering from one another in opinions by the intervening of things themselves? Who there­fore may not also wish it? He's a fierce enemy who when he may atchieve a Victory fairely, had rather it should prove rough and bloody: We then are fierce and savage, if when the way of Peace and Concord offers it selfe, we had rather be embroyld in endlesse Wa [...]s.

LIV. There is now another Fowle and deadly monster which in this age, if ever hath strongly begun to infest mankind, and comes to bee quelld with the greatest Herculean labour, viz that most wicked prophanenesse, which they call Atheisme. This, whether it come from the multitude of Reli­gions, as some thinke, (because many a one seeing [Page 48] things various and contrary to be beleeved, is con­founded, and brought to that passe at length, that he beleeves Fayth is nothing else but a meere fable) or whether it proceede from the itch of sinning, through hope of impunity, if so bee a punisher of things done amisse may be denyed, as the Scripture intimates, Psal. 14.1. or whether it arise from a sawcy and malapert wantonnesse of wits, rushing irreverently upon all things yea, even upon God, whom at length the very brightnesse of his Majesty oppresseth, blindeth, and drives to a reprobate sense: it is certaine those fooles are not a wanting in our age; who say in their hearts there is no God, because there want no occasions of sliding thereto, viz. the base confusion of Religions, the horrid de­luge of hainous offences, the lavish licentiousnesse of wits. It's meet therefore that we think of reme­dies again and again; if we be touch'd with the glory of God, if we have a care of the security of our faith and hope; if the commiseration of our perishing neighbours affect us: and this by so much the more, by how much we perceive this plague to be the more creeping on, especially in the mindes of Polititians, who hold it commonly a­mongst their secrets of State, that they may use Re­ligion for a pretext, to take and awe the vulgar withall. Now what kind of remedy may we seek for Atheisme? the word of God, which is the power of God to salvation to every one that believes, can [Page 49] do nothing here, because they do not believe it. As for miracles, by which they might be wrought upon to believe, God uses not to put forth any for the convincing of Atheisme; because his ordinary workes may suffice in this case, as one of great note saith: Therefore these things are seriously to be urged, to the confusion and shaming of those fools. It's true, as saith the renowned VERULAM, that a smattering of naturall Philosophy inclines men to Atheisme: the deeper knowledge thereof brings them about to Religion, when by the chaine of things connexed or link'd within themselves, it leads them to God and providence. There will scarce then be found out any remedy of more effica­cy for the subduing and overthrow of this mon­ster, then a fuller, truer, and quite severer and exa­cter knowledge of things themselves, that they may grope by sense, and thereby lay close and fast hold on reason it selfe, which Pansophy both seeks after and hopes for. Thence there is hope it may be effected, that Atheists being compelled to heare the testimonies of all creatures, touching the Crea­tour, may bee constrayned at length to adde their owne; or being caught and held in close bee forced to deny themselves rather then God: viz. being re­duc'd to the absurdities of the Scepticks, that there is no sense of things, no things, no world, no men who may dispute of these things. Brought to which issue, they shall either yield themselves conquered, [Page 50] or it shall appeare they are fooles who saying there is no God, deny themselves, the world, and all things.

LV. Lastly, this Age hath need of some most present remedy against Phrensie, with which a great many men being surprized, run on furious­ly to their mutuall destruction. For we see the devouring and deadly flames of discord and wars passe through the whole world, destroying King­domes and Nations with that pertinacy as all may seeme to have conspired for their mutuall bane, not likely to give over, unlesse it be with their owne and the worlds ruine: There is nothing therefore, which at this time may be so necessary for the world to stay it selfe that it doe not utter­ly perish, as some universall instauration of mens mindes, and for this likewise an universall peace and concord powred forth as it were upon all man­kinde. Now I understand by Peace and Concord, not so much that externall agreement of Princes and Countries amongst themselves (which is a slippery businesse, and subject to be changed on small and slender occasions) as that inward accord of mens mindes in regard of tenets and opinions which possesse them: From which, if this may be obtained, man-kinde hath much which it may de­servedly promise it selfe. For opinions about fol­lowing or avoyding things, as they ceaze on mens mindes, so they stir up turbulent, or beget calme [Page 51] affections; and if they be the same they bring forth the same inclinations, desires and endeavours for good or evill, according as they are themse ves: We may therefore vainely hope that the mindes of men may any other way be brought to good and quiet affections, then by the encouraged studies of Piety, Humanity, and Wisdome, which wise Anti­quity hath gallantly expressed in that faigned nar­ration of the Theater of ORPEEUS, where all Beasts and Birds being gathered together, forget­ting their naturall appetites (of praying, sporting, fighting) stood friendly and sweetly by one ano­ther, whose sound as often as it ceased, the Crea­tures forthwith returned to their disposition. By which Apologue they taught us, that men who are by nature most greedy of gaine, pleasure, re­venge, so long as they give eare to the Precepts of Religion and Wisdome, so long they entertaine peace and society among themselves; if these be silent they fall into Seditions, Tumults, and salvage cruelty. Yea the Holy Scripture teacheth us the same, as it makes mention how the turbulent spirit of wicked SAUL could not be composed by any other way then by DAVIDS Harpe, and how the spirit of godly ELISEUS being moved with zeale, could not be recalled to tranquility without the like harmonious consent: What therefore hath the tumultuous world need of save some harmoni­ous Harpe, that it may come to it selfe? And be­cause [Page 52] Seditions have not layd hold on some few Countries somewhat nearer, or more adjoyn­ing to one another, but have even surprized the whole World; so as all the Kingdomes of Christi­ans, and what ever remaines of Infidell Nations rise up one against another, and the West is dasht against the East, and the North against the South; and indeed by the concurrence of sacred and pro­phane causes, for their Country and Religion. For so extraordinary a disease there is even need of an extraordinary universall remedy, viz. of the re­ducement of mens mindes into some universall concord: For the obtaining which, PANSOPHY by its owne desirable Panarmony, or generall a­greement will be fit and convenient, or else there will be scarce any other medium under Heaven.

LVI. The occasions which the most wise pro­vidence of our God, fencing in a way to some most faire and great worke, affords to make us bold in our desires to conceive such great matters as these, to presume of them through hope, to talke and write of them, and finally to attempt them by set­ting our hands thereto.

LVII. The first of these is the Commerce of Ages and Countries so rarely discovered of late. For hitherto the affairs of men were practised, po­lished, and tooke increase by parts in Mechanicks, and Liberals; and this indeed sparingly through Nations and Ages, even in a way also unknowne [Page 53] to one another. Now we are come to that passe, that by the benefit of Printing all the Monuments of Antiquity being drawne out of darkenesse, may be communicated to the wits of our Age, and by the found out meanes of Navigation, Commerce, or Traffick, may be haply entered on with all the Nations of the World. Whence by the emulation of Wits raised by this and that meanes, men have begun to sweat exceedingly in the searching out of new Inventions for some certaine latter lusters of yeares: But that very thing for the most part, rather by the private industry of certaine persons then in Common. What therefore may forbid us to assay it after a sort, the things of the whole World which have been, and are to be observed, which are and may be invented, may at length be made Common to all? To wit that all who are and shalbe admitted into the Theater of Gods wisdom, may be taught to attend what may be done, and to stir up themselves with mutuall alacrity to ob­serve more, and greater things constantly; for the wisdome of God will never faile to shew forth his Acts and Spectacles to the World. We must assay this with the good leave of God the president of our affaires; to whose glory it redounds to have very many, and very attentive Spectators of those shewes which his wisdome manifests in his Thea­ter; that such great workes be not without full witnesse and full admiration.

[Page 54]LVIII. The happy successes of wits hitherto, about the polishing certain perticular things, & the now fit piles of materialls particularly elaborated for the cōceiving so great a structure, give us also an occasion of attēpting Pansophy. For what have not Mechanicks hitherto assaid? to what perfectiō have they not brought their arts? what have not the Cō ­tēplators of things left unsearched? of what thing have they not laboured to trace out the most inti­mate reasons? Now with what accesse of humane science this is taught by the miraculous trimnesse of Arithmetick, Geometry, Opticks, Musick, Astro­nomy, Chymistry: Logick also by the wits of cer­tain late Authours is brought on to its chiefe ex­actnesse, although not yet made of publick use. Furthermore the fervent study about divine Lear­ning, and the pious and happy endeavours of brin­ging forth even abstruse mysteries and hidden sen­ses of Prophesies; whereby through Gods bounty, that we have been and dayly may be mo [...]e benefited than in fore past ages: they see and joy at it, who in the light of God see light. Therefore as SOLO­MON after he had caused Cedar, and other wood of good juice and odour, to be fel'd from the moun­tain Libanus, and to be transported to Judea, and to be hew'n out for sundry uses: and after he got marble to be cut out of Quarries, and neatly polisht, & after he had heap'd up gold in sufficient plēty, to­gether with other more precious mettals & gems, [Page 55] set his mind to the very structure of the holy Tem­ple, and happily finish'd it by Gods help in seven yeares space. So touching our selves, after we have collected hitherto great store of sensuall ob­servations: and after we have fairly built the shop of humane reasoning, and after we have discove­red the most rich veines of the golden mine of di­vine Scriptures; what may we thinke remaines, but that by the pleasure and guidance of God him­selfe our hands be set to the building the Temple of Universall Wisdome?

LIX. The third thing which we deservingly interpret, an occasion of our now entring on so great a work as this: xThat we see many in this our age, being desirous of proficiency for the better la­bour to this end, by a certain secret, and good in­stinct, that they may Epitomize Sciences, and Arts, how diffused and large soever, and that they may free them of rubs and thorns and commend them to a great sort by the addition of an artificiall Method; and by this Compendium to render men the more Learned. For we interpret those va­rious endeavours of diverse men of our age to tend hither, who have compiled and communicated to the world Pandects, and Syntagma's, and Bodies, and summes of Encyclopedies, and Panstraties, and of Divinity, Philosophy, Law, Physick, and Thea­ters also of humane wisedome, transformations of Sciences, great instaurations, Christian omniscien­ces, [Page 56] and such like works: whose endeavour of re­ducing things manifold into one, things dispersed into order, things obscure into light, if it do not displease good minds, why should ours displease, who perswade to the making out of all things some one, even more generall and common than all those, and more accommodated to Universall ends? Certainly, as in things individualls next of all make the species, the species the genus, the genuses the most generall genus; so in the conceipts of our un­derstanding, a very gradation requires that particu­lar things be contracted into summes, and summes into a summe of summes.

LX. Lastly, the hidden instincts of our owne heart, and motives arising otherwaies, and both the desires and exhortations of so many pious men (after the grounds of our purpose grew somewhat known) cannot but be a document that even by this means the most wise Counsell of the Deity is a making way for some thing, if we afford our selves obsequious instruments to him. For God and Na­ture since they do nothing in vain, how can it be in vain that he puts into us these desires of so great a matter, and that he gives us to see medium's of its possibility, and finally discovers the manner of those medium's more evidently day by day? that nothing may seem to remain, but that we earnestly pursue and haste forward the worke even to an hap­py effect. Inasmuch as God when he offers us any [Page 57] thing, would have us embrace it; when he goes before, he would have us follow; when he fore­shews us a patterne, he would have us expresse it by immitation, and perfect it by our very pains: Let them make me a Sanctuary (said he to Moses) that I may dwell amongst them: according to all that I shew thee after the paterne of the tabernacle, and the patterne of all the instruments thereof, even so shall ye make it, Exod. 25.8.9.

LXI. Yet we must answer to the objections of certaine persons not rightly attending the ends and meanes of our Pansophicall purpose, that they may not render it obscure, and cast a myst thereon.

LXII. Many a one will be ready to say, these enterprises rellish much of strangenesse, and rash­nesse. I answer: To thinke of the amendment of humane affairs, and to wish and endeavour it, is not so strange a businesse; so as even from the begin­ning of our confusions, God, and by the example of God, all good and wise men have been wont to do the very same thing, according as necessity requi­red, and occasions did invite, or the matter it selfe did permit: How therefore can it be tax'd or accu­sed of rashnesse, which is done by so great Au­thours? And if it be no rash thing to view and behold the works of God; to observe the footsteps of the wisedome of God, disposing all things sweet­ly to their proper ends. Lastly, to dispose all ones matters according to the will of God: Now God [Page 58] commands all these things, upbraiding those that do otherwise with stupidity and dulnesse. It will likewise not be a rash thing to invite others to eye the works of God, and to teach them how they may act all their affairs not rashly, but by reason, and to exhort and help on men, that all persons in all things (mending the intention of the supreame Deity) may yield themselves servants to it. By what means soever that be done, so it be done after the imitation of our heavenly Father (who what­soever he doth, doth it for Mens sake, and wills that all men should be saved, and come to the know­ledge of the truth; and both teaches and leads all men in the same wayes to the same place) its a pi­ous and holy businesse. Now PANSOPHY seeks for no other thing, than the manner and way, whereby all things may be so disposed to the bene­fit of mankind, and indeed to commune uses, by common medium's, that the common welfare of all exposed to the cleare light in each ones eye, may allure, and ravish all to it and to God the Authour of our welfare.

LXIII. They say: what! do you think the Church hath been destitute of such mediums? They are not by Gods grace a wanting: if so be men would not be a wanting to themselves. I answer: But this is the very thing which is here sought af­ter, that men may be in some sort efficaciously taught, not to be a wanting to themselves. And [Page 59] because those accustomed medium's are grown too much out of use, we perswade that they may be re­newed according to Gods command. Break up your fallow ground (Jer. 4.3.) nor yet by feign­ing any new thing, but by preparing the ancient wayes of the goodnesse and wisdome of God, that man shaking off drowsinesse and sleep, may be at­tentive to new helps. For we know, God be than­ked, the best innovation is, when the ancient wayes are reduced, as God commands, Jer. 6.16. Thus therefore perswading things to be innovated or re­newed, that men being called back to the ancient books of God and the Lawes of Nature, Scripture, Conscience, all may both be illuminated, and amen­ded to all things, and through all things after that most ancient manner, which was of God: What do we but that which God commands? we teach men to stand in the wayes and see, and aske for the old paths, where is the good way, that walking therein they may finde rest for their soules, Jer. 6.16.

LXIV. Now they go on to desire to know all things (which PANSOPHY goes about) is a foot­step of the curiosity of our first Parents, which we hitherto dearly pay for, and to instill into men the love of a certaine Omniscience, is a kinde of ser­pentine act. I answer. 1. Its customary and u­suall for God to change evill into good, and a pu­nishment into a benefit. The division of tongues [Page 60] was a penalty inflicted on mans pride: Now the Holy Ghost when he would that the grace of sal­vation should be dispersed amongst the Nations that were divided in tongues, he tooke not away tongues, but distributed himselfe into tongues; by a divine artifice improving and consecrating [...], or the variety of tongues, being the bond of humane confusion, to a remedy against confusion. 2. Furthermore, the desire of greater knowledge, was then rash, when it was unprofitable in the state of integrity; where man being furnished with a full degree of light, enjoyed the fellowship of his Creator, and might have enjoyed his happy­nesse without end, being ignorant of the contrary: Now after that he was averse from God, he lost God his light, and through the darknesse of his minde was involved in infinite evils, and knew no way of ridding himselfe of them: He hath alto­gether need of light, in which he may both see him­selfe, and surrounding dangers, and his God again restoring himselfe unto him, that is, that he may know the way of escaping misery, and recovering happynesse: For because a contrary is not expel­led but by a contrary, against darknesse there's no remedy besides light; nor any other against so ma­ny confusions of our minde, save a distinct know­ledge of things, that Sathan that old Impostor may no more so easily deceive us. 3. Therefore God in this our state doth forbid us no longer, he en­joynes [Page 61] us rather to try all things, that that which is good may be more certainely found out, and more easily retained. Hence are these speeches of God: See I have set before thee this day life, and good, and death, and evill: Chuse life that thou mayst live (Deut. 30.15.16.) also know and see that it is an evill thing, and bitter to forsake the Lord, (Jer. 2.19.) and the like: Therefore even as man then when he was forbidden the tree of know­ledge of good and evill, because he obeyed not, sin­ned: So now when by the same divine Mandates, we are commanded to try all things, if we doe not obey we double the sinne, adding now contumacy to a late rashnesse. The counterfeit modesty of A­CHAZ did not please God, that when he was commanded to aske a signe of God, refused, saying, he would not tempt the Lord; as though it were to tempt God humbly and thankfully to admit of those things which his bounty offers: Seeing then God shewes us both the necessity, and possibility, and occasions of a certaine, truer, and more univer­sall knowledge of all things, we shall be ingrate­full and blame-worthy, unlesse we admit this with thankes.

LXV. They say. Yet neverthelesse the title of PANSOPHY is presumptuous, not agreeing with humane knowledge, so far as it may extend it selfe; it is to be left to God alone. I answer, we will not wrangle about the name, when we shall agree [Page 62] about the thing. Yet we suppose there can be no cause, why any one may be deservedly offended at it: For we doe not therefore attribute any thing to man, that we may detract from God; but that the glory of God may thereby the more shine in man his image. And if the word wisdome or wise by the good leave of these persons be attribu­ted to man, when yet the Scripture expresly terms God alone wise, (1. Tim. 1.17. Eccles. 1.7.) Why may the adjection of the note of universality so offend? Surely we have no slighter grounds to oppose this then PITHAGORAS had, when he changed the word [...] into [...]. Now they report that he respected two things: God for whom alone he would have that glorious title left, that he should be called [...], or wise: Besides he had regard to Sophisters ad Triflers, who by the abuse of the word reckoned themselves among wise men. He therefore desiring to recall men from the opinion of wisdome to the studies of wisdome, added the marke of study [...], viz. a Philo­sopher: Now we have other like causes, why we thinke another note of universality ( viz. this [...]) should be proposed; the neglect of wisdome, and the word Phylosophy, Theosophy, and the abuse of others commonly received. First of all I say, be­cause most men are dull and sluggish, over securely leaving to God the title of wisdome, with the thing it selfe, that they themselves may grow bru­tish, [Page 63] and performe all their owne matters rashly, fondly, and foolishly; and those who would be wise, either seeke to be wise by piece-meale about certaine particular objects, being ignorant and carelesse of the whole comprisall of wisdome; or seeke to be wise without God, indeed neither ayming at God, nor conforming themselves and their affaires unto his rules. They are therefore to be called back to the Lawes and Rules of the all wise God, without whom as there is no Essence; so likewise no understanding, and no wisdome, and nothing true or coherent, that all men growne skilfull in the rellishing all things; but especially divine matters may be truly rendred like to God, and as much as possible. The manner therfore of Science being found out whereby ( [...].) all men about all things, altogether may be taught to be wise; why may it not deserve to be term'd, A certaine humane PANSOPHY? After the imitation of words already received, by which the fuller furniture or preparation of any thing is expressed by this adjection ( [...].) as wee may see on [...], &c. Heereunto is added the abuse of the name Philosophy against Theosophy, or Theology; and on the contrary, which they thus vulgarly distinguish, as if neither of them had any thing to do with the other, with a manifest wrong to truth, where therefore these are conjoyn'd, and [Page 64] men are taught (as AUGUSTINE speakes) both to act the Philosophers part in sacred things, and to be consecrated in Philosophy, by deserved right the name is changed, so as the thing wants not its fit index or discoverer. Yet at last if the appellation PANSOPHY shall displease the Church, it may be chang'd into another, even contrary, so as we may stile it instead of Omniscience, or all-knowledge, Nulliscience, or no-knowledge. For we must even needs come to that at length, if we shall consti­tute true PANSOPHY (which may reduce contra­ries likewise to an identity) that by how much the more a man sees by so much he may note more de­fects both of his owne and others, the wisest of men being witnesse. Eccl. 1.15.

LXVI. They object likewise, that we by calling PANSOPHY a certain Ladder to God, do transforme the worke of converting men into an Art which appertaines to God alone? We answer, as though it were indeed absurd either to joyne ex­ternall helps, to the inward operation of the Holy Ghost, or to use a certaine prudence and art in dis­pensing these: when as hee is the rather absurd who denies this: For God acts ordinarily by me­diums, in which mediums, there are borh men themselves (whom God hath as Labourers toge­ther with him, or co-workers, 1 Cor. 3.9) and also humane industry, which the art of method di­rects. Hence sith God promises a fair reformation [Page 65] of the Church, he promises Pastors which may feed his people with knowledge and understanding, Jer. 3.15. and teachers having the tongue of the Learned, knowing how to speake a word in season, Isay 50.4. And the practise of the Prophets, Apo­stles, and Christ himselfe, shews, that they were not wont to set upon men without certain strata­gems, whom they would excite, move, convert, or convince: that tis apparant, this work consists both of prudence, and a certain Art. Therefore if we make all these things collected into one, and by the benefit of method, accommodated to a ready use to be subservient to God, what do we but that which is pious and just in it selfe?

LVII. They say, there are Books enough already, and what are we the better? the world doth and will remain. I answer: we may be taught never to despaire, alwaies to hope better things, alwaies to afford occasions and helpes, by the patience and bounty of God, alwayes renewing it selfe, and in different manners discovering it selfe continually with more lustre: and moreover promising to these last times; a multiplication of knowledge, and light at the very evening of the world, Dan. 12.4. Zach. 14.7. Therefore let us endeavour that this be promoted, even as much as it shall please God by us, by reforming not onely books, but men to the diligent use of bookes; which PANSOPHY will do, teaching not onely all other things, but e­ven [Page 66] the universall use of it selfe.

LXVIII. Now how may the same book serve divers persons, seeing divers things delight divers men; and some things are agreeable to the learned, other to the unlearned; some to believers, other to unbelievers? I answer: The Chymicks out of this respect praise their Quintessence, because it is of so exquisite a temperature, that being applied to all things, it bestowes that on severalls which is needfull for every one: a cooling to things hot, an heat to things cold, moisture to dry things, and a drynesse to things moist; and therefore 'tis a pre­sent remedy for every disease. We may pronounce some such like commendation of this book when tis rightly trimmed and set out (as one which will be a certain Quintessence of bookes) that it will profit all, its fruit returning to every one. For by reason of the decent te perature of simplicity, with sublimity of truth, with exactnesse, it will come to passe, that by the simplicity of its method it may commend it selfe to those that are simple, and by the sublimity of things it may feed the lear­ned, and by demonstrating which clearly by a true faith, that nothing may be more rationall, it may raise delight in the faithfull, and dispose Infidels to faith or render them unexcusable.

LXIX. Now heer many a one objects, those who in matters of faith provoke or challenge men to reason, are Hereticks: Therefore PANSOPHY [Page 67] much alike assaying this, is worthyly to be suspect­ed. I answer: Therefore both JUSTIN MAR­TYR, ATHENAGORAS, LACTANTIUS, LUDO­VICUS VIVES, MORNEY, GROTIUS, and who ever else have by Reasons contended for the faith against Infidells? For divers men may doe the same, so as it may not be the same, if they doe it in a different end and manner as it is heere. An Heretick in divine Testimonies uses reason as a Judge: The Pansophist as a witnesse, he com­mands reason to go before, and presigne the paths by which he may catch divine Revelation: This would have God to go before, and would have reason follow: Therefore an Heretick by reason overthrows the Tenets of faith; a Pansophist doth establish them. He joynes the Creature with the Creator, this subordinates: He teaches reason to speake against faith, this makes reason speake for faith, that they who doe not admit the testimo­nies of God (Atheists and Infidells) or corrupt them by their naughty reasons (Hereticks, Sophi­sters, Smatterers) may be constrained by the force of their owne reason, and may be brought to that passe, that they may be compelled to stand for God and his truth against themselves; that is to say, to acquiesse in the word of God, and not resist it. In summe our God deserves that to his mouth the mouthes and hearts of all men attest, and be infor­ced to attest, which things PANSOPHY seekes af­ter.

[Page 68]LXX. What doe you hope then (say they) that there will be no contradictions? But there will alwayes be Heresies, I answer: I believe wicked men will alwayes be Rebels to light while the World continues (Job 24.13.) But shal we there­fore neglect to light Candles, because they are use­lesse to such as are blinde, or to purifie their flames by snuffing, because some lurking fellow delights more in darknesse? We know there must be He­resies, nor are they ever like to be wanting, which is the restlessenesse and craft of Sathan. Shall we not therefore have a care to remove and rid them out of the way, as often as God doth give occasi­ons? Its the part of the sonnes of light to oppose, what way they can, the Kingdome of darknesse, and to put lighted Candles in Candlesticks in the house of the Church, that they may give light to all who are in the house, the event being commit­ted to God. It's meet therefore to suppresse what darknesse soever we are able to vanquish by the power of light; although the Prince of darknesse, is like never to be a wanting to his occasions, to cast darkenesse even upon new light. For Christ the light of the world converts againe that very thing into an occasion of detecting new light: To whom indeed 'tis usuall to transfer all the endea­vours of his enemies, even their very ravings into an occasion of manifesting his glory (Psal. 16.10.) The more Sathan brings in darknesse, the more [Page 69] shall the splendor of divine light be disclosed, and a very lye shall shew the strength of truth, this we may safely hope.

LXXI. Lastly, there are some who object to us our tenuity and disabilities: How poore and meane a party are you that you should dare to move such great things as these? I answer: This is not to be lookt at, of what small abilities we are who advise these things, but how great he is in whose name we advise, and those things which we advise, and they for whose sakes we advise. He in whose name we are bold to exhort Mortals, that they seeke an universall remedy for their confusi­ons, is God, the Lord of all, ready to confirme his mercy upon all, and to establish his truth for ever; in whose power it is even to open the mouth of an Asse, or to excite stones to cry out, if others hold their peace; and for whom 'tis ordinary to use contemptible mediums, that the glory may be his owne, not theirs, who forget that they are the in­strument in the hand of God, if even they may seeme ought considered by themselves. The very thing which we would have to be promoted, is the glory of God, which is to be illustrated by all men and all things, as much as may be here under Hea­ven; that from the rising of the Sunne to the go­ing downe thereof, from this present even for e­ver the name of the Lord may be praised, and the whole earth be filled with his majesty. They for [Page 70] whose sake we doe these things are they whereof we our selves are the least part, yet a part, All men, to thirst after whose welfare as much as our owne, he hath commanded us, who hath produced all from one blood, redeemed all by one blood, he in­vites all to the same Communion of a future life, not willing that any should perish, but that all should come to repentance. He therefore who contemneth these things contemneth not us, but God, and the Majesty of God, but all man-kinde, to promote whose glory and welfare, as much as in him lies, he either dispises, or neglects, or even hinders others who doe endeavour it. As for our part, our slendernesse cannot at all incommodate or disadvantage things which are so much to be wished for by themselves; when even a very fool may suffice to give an occasion of a good matter: Of which ranke if we be reckoned; ye wise ones put forth your abilities, that whatsoever ye take notice of to be wanting in so great desires, may be supplyed.

LXXII. We praying with DAVID, Lord send out thy light and thy truth that they may lead us, and bring us unto thy holy Hill, and to thy Ta­bernacles. (Psal. 43.3.) From these very words we ingeminate againe and againe three essentiall requisites of PANSOPHY, to wit that there be ob­served.

• 1. The light of Method, whereby the mindes [Page 71] of all may be lead through all things without any obscurities and rubbes inoffensively.
• 2. The truth of Doctrine, that we take heed, lest any vaine thing admixe it selfe, either in the whole or in any part.
• 3. The subordination of all things to the last end, which is the dwelling with God in his Holy Hill.

THE DELINEATION OF THE PANSOPHICALL-TEMPLE.

I. WIth what words wise SOLOMON shuts up his Worke which hee writ of the Vanities of the World, with the same wee think good to begin the Deline­ation of that work, which we wish may prove an antidote against Worldly Va­nities. Of making many Bookes there is no end, and much study is a wearinesse of the flesh. This is the conclusion of the whole matter: Feare God, and keep his Commandements, for this is the whole duty of man. For God shall bring every work into judgement, with every secret thing, whe­ther it be good or evill, Eccles. 12.12, 13, 14.

II. Where because he ranks among the vanities of mortall men, both the itch of writing many Bookes (which he termes a matter of infinite la­bour,) as also that of reading (which he calls a wea­rinesse [Page 82] of the flesh,) and counsels us so to observe the chiefe scope of our whole life, that before all things, and after all things, those things may bee sought and done, by which we may be advanced in the feare of God, and rightly prepared for the things which we expect and look for after this life is ended: we following this advice, againe and a­gaine redouble our desires: that there might be a Book compil'd by the common helpe of all, which might remedy humane confusions, whose making should not be of infinite labour, but infinite use; and whose reading should not be a wearinesse to the flesh, but a recreation of the spirit, and which might not shew this or that by parcels, but the whole concernment of man, and might instruct him so to passe this transitory life, that he might bring with him to that dreadfull judgement, the testimo­nies of his well performed businesse.

III. We desire I say, that a booke be made, which one may be instead of all, a most true Inven­tory of all Divine and humane Wisdome; in which all things may be proposed facilely, that nothing may bee more easie; and briefely, that nothing be may shorter, and yet sufficiently, that nothing may be more sufficient; to wit, by conveighing the mindes of all men through all things which are and may be knowne, to him of whom, by whom, and for whom are all things, and who is both the beginning and end of our Wisdome, that there may [Page 83] remaine nothing else to be learne here under Hea­ven. For indeed PLATO himselfe writ, that the life of a wise man is a returne to God. How much more then doth it become us Christians to endea­vour that our wisdome may be nothing else then to be raised, drawne, and rapt through all things, and by the assistance of all things unto God?

IV. To which end if we enter upon our sacred Philosophy, it will also happen that none of these inferiour things, by which as by a reared Ladder, we elevate our selves to that high one inhabiting his eternity, can so much as hold us amongst them, and yet both delight and feed, and after their sort satisfie us more and better, then those whom they doe hold and entangle: Namely, if the largenesse of our Kingdome, the Universe by an artificiall brevity be presented to our mindes entire; and if by an artificiall facility discovering the reasons of all things, our mindes be let in into the possessi­on thereof; and lastly, if by an artificiall solidity of a thorough handling these things, we may ob­taine that the mindes of men being rid of infinite winding and wandring ambages of opinions and imployments, may be bound to the plaine and per­petuall grounds of Ʋnum, Verum, Bonum: And if by that means, the ways to jars, erronious tenets, & vain studies, & occupatiōs may be stopt (as much as possible) that they may not spread so licentiously.

V. The fundamentall reasons of which matter, [Page 84] because ye have already seene in the Ichnography of the Pansophicall Temple: Now the manner whereby wee may hope such a thing may bee brought to passe, is to be disclosed, which we shall dispatch in this present Orthographicall Delinea­tion of the same Temple.

VI. The outward face of an erected building, is wont to be drawne for this end, that men may more easily and exactly judge concerning the pro­portion of the whole, and of the parts. An Idea of which manner of proportion if we borrow from the draught of the Temple of God in EZE­KIEL these things should be observed; that the whole building be foure-square, and all the parts thereof, and the parts of parts (the Gates, the out­ward and inward Courts, the Tables, Altars, &c.) square, and all things consisting of lines meere parallell and perpendicular, and all things open, plaine, exposed to a free passage; lastly, that whatsoever rises up to any height, may by staires made before hand, be so connexed and knit with the lower, that nothing may remaine inaccessible, even to the very tops of the Temple.

VII. For the imitation then heereof, we lay downe before all things foure hinges of the Tem­ple of wisdome; to which all things of it shall have respect, Fulnesse, Truth, Easinesse, and Me­thod, all these exact.

VIII. Which foure things, verily certaine [Page 85] censours of Philosophies seeme to have observed to be as 'twere cardinall or principall matters in the fabrick of humane Science: For those who reckon up the Prerogatives of Peripateticall Philo­sophy vaunt of these foure things. 1. That none of the Philosophers hath more matters and things then ARISTOTLE in his bookes. 2. That he hath carefully searcht out the Reasons and Causes of things. 3. That he uses a brave, round, per­spicuous, and efficacious kinde of speech. 4. That lastly he hath been more observant of Method then his Predecessours. (Thus ALSTED hath it in the fourth Book of his Encycl. cap. 8.) which if they be liked off in ARISTOTLE, or any other good Authour (now they cannot but please cleare mindes) they are to be observed surely so much the more, yea most of all in this Booke of chiefest care and exactnesse. To wit, that heere (1) All the Reasons, (2) Of all things may be explained, (3) In most perspicuous language, and (4) In a most exquisite Method, then which there can be no better.

IX. The plenitude or fulnesse therefore of things and matters shall be the first hinge of PAN­SOPHY, on which all the businesses of it shall mainely rest in the whole, and in every part of it: In the whole, that the whole University of things may be seene heere; to wit, the world with all its fulnesse. Nor so onely as 'tis now, but even as [Page 86] it was before it was, and shall be after it shall not be; together with God its admired and adored President: For we must performe that for PAN­SOPHY, which in vaine, SENECA wisht for Philosophy; that as the face of the universall world comes into view, so that might be present­ed to us as a spectacle most like unto the world, (Epist. 90.) For that which he addes, is a testimo­ny for us, whose sight failes in what's next, that all severalls may more easily be shewen to us, not as yet capable of the Universe, that the sage man saw the Universe was to be subdued unto Wit, but could not be so as yet. He toucheth not the causes of impossibility, because perhaps he did not under­stand them: Now they are manifest to us, for there was a defect of Principles; especially of Di­vine Revelation, by the assistance whereof those things which are without our senses, and have beene before the memory of men, and which shall be after us, might have beene made knowne: And also the lack of sensuall observations from fore­past Ages. But whereas to us God hath both sup­plyed that defect of Principles by his word; and also observations continued for so many Ages, have encreased the treasures of experiments; why may there not be hope afforded us now of the capacity of the whole Universe? Let us then contemplate it no longer by parts onely, but all things in their whole compasse, as they flow from eternity, [Page 87] and flow backe into eternity, by the wayes and meanes accommodated to the Lawes of eternity it selfe: which let us discover to the world if we can, that men may begin to be wise, not by peece­meale, but wholely: filling all the Court of the mind with all solidity of learning.

X. This fulnesse of things in PANSOPHY will not consist with it selfe before it shall be manifest, that a certaine seat is assigned, or indeed meet or fit to be left to universalls and severalls, which are in the treasures of humane and divine wisdome, whether they be extant already, or as yet conceal'd. Also whatsoever may be spoken profitably and ne­cessarily of every thing, shall appear it may be spo­ken here, or surely that the fountaines are open, and the channels rightly disposed, so as it may be drawne out from thence; to wit, that whatsoever any man speaks, writes, thinks, endeavours, acts, he may act or do part of those things whereof here shall be the whole.

XI To be able to obtain which by any other meane we have had no hope, but that by fixing our last end, (for which even we and the world are, and all those things which surround us here, and come either to be viewed, done, used, or enjoyed by us, to wit, by our happinesse in God) as the Ba­sis and ground of the whole work: all the raies of our knowledge from all parts may be referred, as it were, to this Centre, and to this last eternall bound [Page 88] all these things which go before in the flux or pas­sage of time, may be subordinated as mediums to their end. Which how it may be dispatch'd by us, the Spectators shal see a little below in the draught of Pansophicall method. Here they are advertised only that the fulnesse of things is the first, and so the primary businesse which they are to minde and judge of in this draught of the Pansophical Temple.

XII. The second hinge herof we have made Truth, which in like manner all things shall regard. For to this Heavenly Nymph wee have dedicated a most religious altar in the Temple of PANSOPHY; to which there shall be no open accesse, for any feig­ned and bad opinion: lest therefore any vain, false, or counterfeit businesse might presse in hither, wee will have Guardians of unspotted fidelity, things themselves, and Testimonies concerning things from the mouth of God; with the proper sense of every man, and reason well forfeited against aber­rations: that heere no man may have need to feare the meeting with colourable deceit in any thing. Heere then touching all things are gathered all truths, (hitherto commonly scattered here and there) and with such evidence and clearnesse they are reduced to their Radixes, as the mindes of all men may be captivated to an eternall compliance with unmoved truth; and the confession of what is true, may at length also be wrung from such as strive against it, or if any continue opposite and re­fractory [Page 89] he may be convinc'd he denounceth warre to common sence, and his conscience, and things, that is, to man-kinde, himselfe, and God. And this shall be the second very great businesse, which the spectator shall give heed to, whether truth be delivered here with that evidence and certainty, as it cannot be contradicted (for he shall see a little beneath a Proofe or Say of its method.) If he shall take notice tis otherwise, he shall perceive we do not yet attain our ayme in that poynt, and leave the victory to others.

For that even all may easily judge concerning these things, who being endowed by God with a sound minde, shall come to contemplate the stru­cture of the Pansophicall Temple, we have purpo­sed to effect by perspicuity or clearnesse of speech; which we have layd downe as the third universall hinge of this whole structure. For after (the chiefe and never to be intermitted) respect of truth, the principall care shall be, that all may understand whatsoever shall be delivered. Which by what way I thinke it may be obtain'd, I must tell you plainly.

XIV. Wee altogether avoyd as Rockes and Shelves those obscure and perplexed termes of se­cond Notions, as they call them, with which even almost all books of vulgar Philosophy and Theology do not so much abound, as they appeare rough and ragged with their stiffe prickles. For [Page 90] what need is, there I should speak so as none may understand, o [...] scant a few, if I can speak that all may understand? I'le give an instance. One being minded to describe exactly the office or part of Lo­gick, writes thus: The subject of Logick is of in­formation, of tractation or handling, and of use. The subject of information is the wit; primarily indeed reason, but secundarily partly the memory, partly speech. The Subject of tractation is the manner of discoursing well. Tis term'd otherwise, The subject of Art, as also of learning, and the in­ternall. The subj [...]ct of use is Ens & non Ens, which is called otherwise the Subject of the Artifi­cer, and externall, &c. Who I pray you under­stands these things, unlesse he be wonted to these thorns by the use of some years? If I shall say, Logick informs and directs the mind in remem­bring, in speaking, I have said just the very same which he afore: but I have sayd it so as both the Learned and unlearned may understand me. I have said therfore more, because to more; he lesse, because to fewer, although with a greater circumstance of words, and under the shrouds of Riddles. Now why should not I rather speak so, as I may hope I do not speak to the winde. God is wont to speak to that people which he is angry with in another language, Esay 28.11. And when he intends to confound the Builders of Babel, he confounds their tongues, Gen. 11. but when to build up Sion he [Page 91] restores the ready use of the tongue that they may understand themselves mutually, who could not before, Acts 2. Therefore Paul checking the praise of certaine persons gotten from hence, because they could speak obscurely to the unlearned, saith; thou verily givest thanks well, but the other is not edi­fied. In the Church I had rather speak five words with my understanding, that by my voyce I might teach others also, than ten thousand words in an unknown tongue, 1 Cor. 17.19. which if it be to be imitated any where, then certainly here, where in the face of the whole Church, yea, of man-kind, for the common edification of all men, things come to be explained by words.

XV. We have no mind to depart yet from this hinge: because there is hope of much proficiency, if this pe [...]fe of obscure termes hitherto worne, and deservedly by an unprofitable use worne out, be ta­ken away. Indeed discreet and understanding men thanked TICHO BRAHE, because he removed out of Astronomic Orbs Reall, Eccentrick, Epicy­cles, Deferents, Aequants, and the rest of that use­lesse stuffe, teaching perfectly the Heavenly moti­ons in plainer hypothesis. Why therfore do we not attempt the same in all things which may bee known? to get rid of so many superfluous, obscure, rough, yea monstrous terms: through which they must passe as through thorns, who go to the green and pleasant walks of Sciences, and wherewith a [Page 92] good many being prickt, are either in great feare to venter, and withdraw; or march through not without being hurt, and raised with the most rag­ged conceits of the mind. But now if we can want such, and explain things plain of themselves, by plain words, which may be intelligible to all, what need have we of entanglements and trifling lets? SENECA sayth well: As it is a poynt of Lu­xury to desire delicate things: so tis a part of mad­nesse to refuse such as are ordinary, and may be had at any easie rate. Philosophy requires frugality, not pennance (Ep. 5.) Let us therfore either do this, that all knowable things may be delivered af­ter that manner, as they may be apprehended by every mans understanding readily, of their own accord, without an interpreter; or we do nothing. We because we have taken pitty of youth, which have every where so many torturing vexations, without necessity do assay to take away those, or if need require any terms to be retain'd to mollifie them by a meet scituation, and good definition. How well may the learned judge if they shall but set aside prejudice? Of whom yet if we do not ob­tain their approbation, we will appeale to Infants, little ones, and Idiots, who if they shall apprehend our things better, truth it selfe shall acquiesse in their judgements. For it is no new or strange thing for little ones to applaud the teacher of eter­nall truth, the Seniors persevering in their accusto­med [Page 93] drowsinesse. And this shall be the third prin­cipall thing which the Spectators shall observe, whether these our matters be so cleare as they may be understood easily by any one? For which busi­nesse (as I have already sayd) there is none but may be a competent Judge; yea perhaps, the ignoranter and simpler any one is, the more fit he may be.

XVI. The fourth hinge of our attempt, which will contribute wonderfull strength to the whole edifice of PANSOPHY, is concinnity or neatnesse of method: which we will have to be such as they who shall travell through these things, may per­ceive the conceptions of their mind to be knit as close to themselves, as they shall see the very things joyne themselves together in the Universe. Which that it may be had at length by the help of method, it was long agoe to be wished, that we might not alwayes teach on that manner, that Scholers might remain Scholers, and Teachers Teachers, (as SCA­LIGER speaks,) or that we might alwayes pro­long and never determine brawls and disagree­ments. What we may endeavour here, and with how great propernesse and aptnesse we may intend to couple things with things, and link them to mens minds, we must now bewray. And this shall be the fourth thing which the spectators shall princi­pally mark.

XVII. We have three chiefe and essentiall properties of Pansophicall method.

• [Page 94]1. A perpetuall Coherence with all things.
• 2. A perpetuall Gradation.
• 3. A perpetuall Uniformity.

By the benefit whereof we hope to obtain, that all things may be taught and learnt here easily, and with the greatest, and as it were Mathematicall e­vidence and certainty of truth.

XVIII. Perpetuall Coherence is in this, that all things, the greatest and the least, from the first even to the last, shall be chain'd together, and one thing shall so depend upon an other, that nothing of all those things which are any where, may either escape or chance to be seen in any other then its own place. Hitherto because things and words lay for the most part scatteringly, nor rightly dis­posed in their Classes or ranks, nor bound up a­mongst themselves with perpetuall ties: it could not be otherwise, then that even scatteringly and onely occasionally for the most part, there should both be found out, and carried together into a mixt masse, observations of things and words out of which Rules were made and dispersed through divers heapes of Disciplines (whereof there was neither certaine number nor order;) but the marriage of things and words being found out and established by intervening bonds of right conceipts (if conceits accurately and pun­ctually abstracted from things, may again accurate­ly and punctually imprint themselves in words,) [Page 95] it will be impossible for any thing to escape, which may not come into order.

XIX This to wit is look'd after, that as all things which are and may be thought and spoken, are one world knitting it selfe together on every side by its fulnesse: so what things are thought and spoken of that whole University of things, may be but one System of our knowledge unsepe­rable in it self, and so knitting it self together on e­very side by its parts, that neither there may be need for any thing to be omitted, nor twice repeated: and every thing may be beheld standing handsom­ly no other where then in its own place. So it will come to passe at length, that this work may be most like to the world, from which nothing can be withdrawn without ruine, or certainly a foule breach; nor any thing put to, or put otherwise without notable monstrousnesse. And that it may appeare what was believed formerly as impossible, that a verse could be taken from HOMER, that may be spoken by better right of the Pansophicall work.

XX. The like concatenation of things and con­ceits may be had if we go in a perpetuall Analysis through the university of things; to wit, from the first & highest conceit of Ens through all the diffe­rences of things, even to the last, and unpartable points of differences, as far as they may be noted: speaking of severalls by and by whatsoever we must speake in the same place.

[Page 96]XXI. Now in truth there is need of a quite new Analysis of things: because those which we yet have, are not sufficient for this use. Especially those famous ten Predicaments of ARISTOTLE, to which men vulgarly believe that all things may be recalled as to the chiefe genuses of things: yet how those genuses may be divided even into the most speciall specieses, neither ARISTOTLE, nor any other shews us. Whence it came to passe that the contemplators of things erred in the university of things and conceits, as it were in an infinite Chaos; and they who assayd to reduce theames which were offred them to the Predicaments, (which we were bid to do oftentimes in Schools) that businesse would either not succeed, or not without doubting and straining; which is an Ar­gument the veines of things were not rightly dis­covered: as also this, because reason is neither given there, nor appears by it selfe, why there are set down so many, no more, or fewer Classes of things? and why they follow one another in that order? whereas if wee had learned to observe aright the joints of natural cōpositiōs, the University of things would voluntarily resolve it selfe by its limbes, and it would be fairely evident, that things pro­ceed in this order and number, and not in ano­ther.

XXII. The matter therefore is to be attemp­ed anew, notwithstanding, that LUDOVICUS [Page 97] VIVES is out of hope, that any thing may be ren­dred perfect in naturalls while he writes: To de­scribe the orders of Formes, and to call them as it were into their ranks to a muster, and to dispose them in our speculation, as they are disposed in na­ture, this truly he only can do who made them. For the proprieties of things, their vertues and excel­lencies are unknown to us; unlesse perhaps in ge­nerall. (lib. 1. de prima Philos.) now grant we do not every where obtain the full and exact order of things: yet what forbids it to be somewhat better settled? For we trust though our industry faile in the displacing of substances by their forms, we shall yet shew a new artifice in accidents, and other Genuses of Enses: so as there may be had an Ana­lysis of things, which if it be not perfect, yet may prove the next to what's perfect.

XXIII. Now we lay down these conditions of a perfect Analysis of things: First, that it be al­together Universall, exhausting all things; that nothing may occu [...]re any where, which may not find its seat here amongst its neighbour matters. Secondly, that it be not forced and strained, but disposing things limbe by limbe as they resolve themselves of their own accord, sense and (the un­derstanding being never repugnant or crosse.) Thirdly, that causes may either be rendred every where or appeare by themselves, why there are so many Classes of things, and why neither more nor [Page 98] fewer, may be devised. This shall beget at last both pleasantnesse and security in Universall know­ledge.

XXIV. Furthermore, as the world, although in it selfe is one undivided, yet in is parts tis clearly distinguished for order sake: so it will be necessary that PANSOPHY, although one continued Sy­steme, be either divided or distinguished into cer­tain parts, books, and heads. Now this is not to be in any order contrived to our own liking, but in the Series which the very intention of the last end shall prescribe; to wit, our happ [...]nesse in God, through all things which any where are either to be promoted or illustrated; whose guidance if we follow, a threefold worke will issue forth unto us, yet it is to bee resolved into seven Sections, or Books.

XXV. For before all things, it is needfull that a certain preparation of minds be premised to that which is undertaken to be done, which is vulgarly called [...], or a fore-view: in Latine Prae­cognita. Then shall follow the very body of PAN­SOPHY, shewing the [...], or contemplation of all things which are any where. Lastly, [...], or after-view, shall conclude, demonstrating the true use of all things which are truly known.

XXVI. There is need of a fore-view, or of things which are to be known afore-hand; because in the producing every worke, it is requisite the [Page 99] matter be pre-disposed, that it may be made fit to receive the form: And why then is it not meet that men likewise be rendred docil, or teachable before they be taught? Truly unlesse we will lose our la­bour, and power the precious liquor of wisdome into leaking tuns, it's necessary we begin from pre­paratives, and not from the very work; to wit, that men may begin to awake out of that drowsi­nesse to which mortalls are so much accustomed and inured, and be touch'd with some care of tru­er and better good things, than those which they have common with Bruits. Which this Protheory of PANSOPHY shall seriously labour to effect.

XXVII. Now the Theory it selfe shall handle things themselves, in that order wherein they were produced they shall both proceed, and at last also end; which consideration shall yield five essentiall parts of PANSOPHY. To wit. First, because God before he made the world had repos'd in his divine mind the Idea's of things; that is, the man­ners and formes, according to which things were to be, and are formed. And then secondly, accor­ding to those Idea's, he contriv'd the frame of the World, and put into it that power which we call Nature, to continue even without end (if he would permit,) its motions and operations. And because (Thirdly) he concentred the power of Nature in man especially, and by it put forth himselfe vari­ously, so that wonderfull works proceeded from [Page 100] the wit of man, which Nature it selfe could never have produc'd of which the world is full▪ And yet because man (Fourthly) miscarried greatly in a bu­sinesse of the greatest moment, the government of himselfe, and thereby cast himselfe head-long into eternall destruction, and God by putting to his hand, restored man againe, and prescribed him be­ing restored new Laws, which if he keep, he avoyds ruine; if he keep them not, then he fully drowns himselfe in the gulfe of perdition: And it will come to passe at length, that (Fiftly) God, this visi­ble scene being taken away, wil discover his invisi­ble Majesty and glory to his Elect Creatures, and make them partakers of blessed eternity, and this shal be the last line of things, whereby God shalbe, and be beheld all in all. The contemplation of all these things shal afford in the same order five parts of PANSOPHY. In the first whereof we collect and contemplate those general and common waies, or manners of things, according to which all par­ticular things are, and be made. In the second we have to view the whole course of nature: In the third the works of mans wit, which are, and shal be found out. There is made a passage from thence to consider the mysteries of our perdition or fall, and restitution or recovery; which end in the state of eternity

XXVIII. The [...] shal put an end to the Theory of things accomplished in this sort, shew­ing [Page 101] the true use of true Wisdome.

XXIX So therefore whole Pansophy shall consist of seven Books, whereof the first shall con­tain Prepa [...]atories; the second Ideals; the third N [...]turals; the fourth Artificials; the fifth spiritu­als; the sixt eternals; the seventh the Praxis of all these, that we may know how to transfer what we know to noble uses.

XXX. In which regard PANSOPHY shall resemble some faire tree rising out of its own roots, leaning upon its owne, and that a firme stock and sufficient to sustain its bulk, displaying it selfe most distinctly into branches, and producing most whol­some fruits by an enliving power or vigour diffu­sed through all parts thereof. That root of whole or entire PANSOPHY shal be the book of its Prae­cognita; the Stock or Trunk of that Ideal Science, which they call PANSOPHY, vulgarly META­PHYSICKS, The Cardinall or chiefe Branches of those things which are, and be seen in this life, are three: The contemplation of Naturals, Artifi­cials, and Spirituals. The power diffused through all these things, enlivening and quickening all things, is God inhabiting eternity, yet at once pas­sing through, disposing, and governing all tempo­rall matters. Lastly, the fruits shall be the sundry uses of true knowledge for our present and follow­ing life.

XXXI. The view of EZECHIELS'S Temple, [Page 102] and our looking upon the Entry, the Gate, and the Court, the first, second, and third Sactuary, and lastly, upon the fountain of living waters, gave us the like disposall, as we have shewn in the explain­ing of our Pansophicall Endeavours. But we must observe, as there the whole Temple was consecra­ted to God, save that the most hidden things were kept in the utmost inner House: So in the Temple of PANSOPHY, all things ought to personate or sound out God; as without whom neither is there, nor commeth there to passe ought, nor any other way is there referred ought, then to himselfe. To wit, because it is hee alone, of whom, by whom, and in whom are all things: it were a wicked thing silently to conceale ought of his praise. Not is this to be done, that in the end at length all things may resolve themselves into his glory, (which will certainly be:) but that what way soever we shal go, even from the very en­trance of this sacred Temple; religious ears may heare and understand silent clamours of things; which will be, if to those that view all things, that wisdome also which reacheth from one end to another, and sweetly ordereth all things, Wisd. 8.1. with all things, and in all things be set abroad to their sight: that where ever we shall be, all things, even when we are doing another thing, may erect and direct the mind unto it.

XXXII. To catch at the occasions of which [Page 103] businesse there will be no need. They will in this reall distribution of things knowable, yield them­selves as much of their owne accord, as the very things are every where obvious and easie to the sences. For in the entrance the goodnesse and wisdome of God will openly offer it selfe to be considered, who hath destinated to map an end in himselfe, in the fellowship of his eternall happi­nesse; and thereto hath ordred all mediums free­ly communicated, and hath taught and doth teach the manner and use of those mediums. In the En­try-doore he shall come to our contemplation and view, as the first cause of all things that are; how all things may visibly represent him as their invisi­ble root, and yet may shew that he infinitely sur­passes, and is above them all. In the first Court together with nature, the Authour of Nature offers himselfe to be seen, as a hidden [...] or mo­ving string, and the most potent Governour, being able as oft as he pleases to work freely above and contrary to all the powers and Laws of Nature. In the second Court, where mans Kingdome is passed through in a survay; there likewise comes the King of Kings to our contemplation, who hath granted to man onely this dominion of things, and hath circumscribed it with limits, and sways, prohibits, or inhibits his Scepters according to his pleasure. In the third Court there shal be a de­scription made of mans most happy estate if he be [Page 104] under God; and of his dreadfull confusion if he forsake his observance and slide back into himselfe; and againe of his new blessednesse, if he insist and keep in the way of obedience, which the Son of God sent from his Father to restore our lost condi­tion hath taught. In the Sanctuary the glory of God is presented to our view, as the blessed shall fully behold it with open face for ever: as much of it as God shall think good to reveale for the present. And last of all, the way shal offer it selfe to our enquiry, whereby all these things being car­ried on and put to their best uses, may serve especi­ally to illustrate and set forth the glory of the great God.

XXXIII. These things touching the cohe­rence of the parts of PANSOPHY where I thinke good withall to mention one thing about their number, because of censurers. The first and last part, as they are reckoned up, may seeme to be no parts of PANSOPHY: seeing the first onely pre­pares the last seales up minds that are to be, and are seasoned with the knowledge of things. I grant I have sufficiently comprehended the very series of things in the middle body of the five parts: and say furthermore that two even among these five extreames, do after a sort the like Preparatory, and obsignatory office. For Metaphysick delivers nothing in speciall, it layes downe onely the gene­ral grounds of a [...]l. Now the contemplation of [Page 105] God without the creatures, is nothing but the top of that knowledge, which being gathered from the creatures went before; and whose perfection is yet differd for Heaven, So as it remaines that the three middle parts onely (those three Courts of the Pansophicall Temple) intirely enfold and embrace all those things which wee can comprehend in this life, all that provision of our Natural, R [...]tional, and Spiritual life: So tis indeed. But yet the University of things is one businesse, and PANSOPHY, or the knowledge of the University of things is another. That stands not at all in need of our Preparations, this wholely doth. For because the knowledge of things is a certain transplantation of the same into our minds, we ought not to be ignorant of that transplanta­tion, neither of the manner how it is to be done, nor of the use of it being done. Therefore SOLO­MON when he began to know the wayes of ac­quiring wisdome, he believed even that every thing to be a poynt of Wisdome, Wisd. 8 [...]1 Nor is he truly wise who knows ought, and knowes not the use of that which he knowes. Ther [...]fore those parts, the first and the last may by no meanes be severed or cut off from the body of PANSO­PHY; much lesse the second and the sixt: Be­cause as a building without a foundation, and a tree without its trunk or main body cannot stand: so neither can the order of things, wherein all parti­culars [Page 106] are contained, be known without the Basis of Order, which the first wisdome discovers. Lastly he cannot be said to know all things, who would verily contemplate God in the creatures, and the creatures in God, but would not likewise know what the creature is without God, and what God is without every creature: which because PANSOPHY in its last and deepest retirement, in­tends (by the guidance of God and his word) to meditate on piously, it is not to be deprived of this its last inner or withdrawing roome.

XXXIV. The second vertue of Pansophical method is Gradation: whereby things are so con­joyn'd with things, as alwayes and every where the latter may seeme of their owne accord to arise out of the former, and the more unknowne out of the already-understood Premises, without any skip or gap at all. Even as we see it to be in a tree, that the Stock riseth from the Root, from the Stock Boughs, from Boughs Twigs; from these Buds, Leaves, Blossoms, Fruits, in an unseperable order, whereby alwayes the latter are both produced, and strengthened, and enlivened by the former. By such a graduall concatenation of things we la­bour to obtain, that the minds of Learners may not onely suffice to raise them to all things by de­grees, but that they may likewise expresse their joy, fearing no danger of falling back or swer­ving: and their minds who are to be freed from [Page 107] bad opinions, suckt in elsewhere, and to be reduc'd to right judgements of things being detain'd by such a gradation, as it were with bars and bounds, though they would f [...]ll off, and slip by through the love of a preconceived opinion, yet through fear of a Precipice they may be constrained to go for­ward, and be carried on even to the top of plaine truth

XXXV. Which to be the onely Legitimate meanes of a harmlesse withdrawing minds accusto­med to the darknesse (of ignorance or errours) into the cleare light, that great Artist in teaching truth. AUGUSTINE both saw, and also taught in these words: Sore eyes are dazled with that very glister which they much desire to see, and that being scarcely seen, they retire into the dark with delight. To which it is dangerous (though being now such as may be termed rightly sound) to offer to shew what as yet they are not able to see. These therefore are to be exercised before, and the love of those things is profitably to be delayed and nouri­shed. For first, some things are to be shewed them which do not shine of themselves, but may be seen by the light, as a garment, or a wall, or some such thing. Then that which not by it selfe indeed, but yet by the same light yields a braver lustre: as Gold, Silvers and the like: yet not so glittering as to hurt the eyes. Then perhaps this earthly fire is to be tendered to their view modestly: then the [Page 108] Stars, then the Moone, then the glistering of the morning, and the shine of the brightning Heaven: in which (sooner or latter, either in the whole or­der, or in some things contained) every one accor­ding to his healthfull ability accustoming of him­selfe, shall see the Sunne, without trembling, and with great delight and pleasure. The best Masters take some such course with those that are most stu­dious and desirous of wisdome, but yet eye it not with a sharpe sight. For its the office or part of good Discipline to come to it by a certaine order; but without order it is a happynesse scarce credi­ble. Soliloq. lib. cap. 1.3. These things utters that happy and prudent Teacher of truth, concern­ing the way of teaching the truth prudently and efficaciously: which we immitating, doe purpose so to subordinate to themselves mutually all things drawne out of the treasures of wisdome, and layd forth to the eyes of men; as it may not be a busi­nesse of some extraordinary felicity, but of ordina­ry diligence (through Gods mercifull assistance) to touch the tops of wisdome.

XXXVI. For even the very series of the parts of PANSOPHY is in this manner graduall. For what else wil the Praecognita or fore-going no­tions of PANSOPHY be, then an eye-salve fitly prepared for mens dimme eyes? with which they being annoynted, they may begin to see their darknesse, and note the wayes of advancing them­selves [Page 109] out of darknesse into light, (now shining forth to them after a sort) and perceive desires to bend their study that way. And when they shall begin to be willing to be wise in this manner, they shal be exercised, and the love of those things shal be profitably defer'd and nourished with the con­templation of generall things. to wit, of common knowledges wherein the eternall light, God, hath impressed certaine rudiments of his artifice in the mindes of all men: which they shall begin to marke here (in the first part of PANSOPHY) by surveying likewise certaine beams of that Archite­ctress wisdom shew d through al things. Then they shal be brought forth to behold the more illustrious works of God in the Court of nature: where they shal see how the wisdome of God hath beautified with lively colours those her lineaments in creating things. After this being admitted into the Court of Art, they shal consider that eternall Lights thou­sand wayes reflex, refract, and amongst them­selves by turnes variously contemperated rayes in a more and wonderful harmony even to astonish­ment. Then shal be shewed them in their higher progresse at the first indeed that horrid Chaos and boundlesse bottomlesse pit of our darknesse, into which we, being left to our selves, fell; and then the brighter beames of eternall light sent down to swallow this up. Lastly mens minds shal be raised to contemplate the very sonne of eternity, as he is [Page 110] in himselfe, and shal be seen in his Majesty for ever.

XXXVII. By this artifice of gradation we have hope to obtaine that mindes may by little and little insensibly be led on to any pitch or height, no occasion being left either to the weake of being deceived, or to smatterers, and prejudicious persons of objecting or quarrelling against the truth: For 'tis knowne to those that are unused to high pla­ces, if they be carryed suddainely to the top of a Tower, their sight is troubled, so as they either tremble to looke downe, or else wax giddy; but if they wont themselves to looke from lesse high places, and raise themselves by degrees, they have use of a firme and steady sight as well on high as below; this is also knowne: Every matter con­trary to that thing to which any one hath accusto­med himselfe, if it come unawars, it doth vehe­mently amaze and trouble the senses; so as truth likewise offered over suddainely to them who have been accustomed to any errour, sets their mindes a trembling, as they seeme injured and oppose them­selves and contradict the very truth, and wrangle with it. Therefore lest this should fall out in this place, where Barriers are not provided for fencing or fighting exercise, but a Temple for contempla­tion, this kinde of ladder or scale of things shall beware before hand: In which even in the first and lowest step (in the very gate of PANSOPHY, [Page 111] Metaphysicks) such universall, by themselves clear, Principles of all things shall be put, as they being granted (now they cannot be granted, unlesse one will either put off modesty and shame, or be wil­ling to be mad or dote with reason.) Each one must needs grant likewise all the rest through whole PANSOPHY (so be they proceed also by degrees one from another) by reason of the already granted generall formes and rules of things, which onely he shall see applyed every where, and in no place new ones devised: Which furthermore shall serve to this end, that men differing in opinions a­bout particulars may be recall'd to a consent, and even they themselves straying may be able to cor­rect themselves: In as much as the generall rules of truth being already granted, they shall not dare (in sighting for their owne particular errour) to speake against them; which artifice shall be a cer­taine imitation of that divine stratagem which the Prophet NATHAN happily used in converting his King. For as DAVID being detained in the THE­SIS pronounced against himselfe, so as being brought to the HYPOTHESIS he was silent ac­knowledging his errour: So heere whosoever shall admit, and by his assent approve a generall truth, shall by that same make firme and consoli­date foundations: At which his wandring opini­ons afterward dashing may burst asunder, and fall to pieces of their owne accord.

[Page 112]XXXVIII. The third vertue of Pansophi­call method shall be Uniformity: Because this mat­ter shall not be handled so, another otherwise, but all shall be handled in the same manner. To wit, as the structu [...]e of SOLOMONS and EZEKIELS Temple did consist of meere Parellelograms, or e­very where like dist [...]nt lines; so as al [...] was either foure square, or foure cornerd throughout: So whatsoever shall occur in the Temple of wisdome, shall be explained by foure cardinall questions: What? By what? How? And how many fold? with causes, where ever the matter shall require, thereto annexed. For by these foure questions, whatsoever is essentiall, becommeth knowne. To wit (1) The thing, (2) The requisites of the thing. (3) The manners of the requisites. (4) The man­ners of the manners, or differences which they call Genuses and Species. The first question is dispatcht by a Definition, explaining what the thing is in its essence. The second by an intire structure of the Thing, or an Idea resolving the thing into its essen­tiall requisites. The third by Axiomes uttering all essentiall truths, as well concerning the thing as its requisites. The fourth by the distribution of the thing by new specificall differences, if it may have indeed any under it. And then every one of them is taken againe as a new theame to be deduced through the same foure questions▪

XXXIX. This shall be the perpetuall forme [Page 113] of our method, as it were a certaine Pansophicall truely artificiall Quadrature of a Circle, whereby the wandring volubility of methods may be redu­ced to some firmer stability: For that which Geo­metricians pronounce concerning the Quadrate, that it is the measure of all figures, that may be de­servedly said of this Quadrangular or four-cornerd method, that it is the measure of all methods: Now we are minded to illustrate this with 2 or 3 exam­ples taken as well from Naturalls, as from Artifi­cials and Moralls, least we seeme to speake Riddles.

XL. And we thinke good indeed to take a threefold naturall example; Substantiall, Acci­dentall, and Defective or Privative. The Sunne may be of substance; whose Pansophicall quadrate, briefe, and sinewy, and scientificall handling shall be such like.

The Definition) The Sun is the greatest Star in Heaven, an instrument destinated by nature for en­lightning the earth through its circuit, and thereby for enlivening all things therein, and for measu­ring the courses of times.

The Idea) it is constituted therefore of three things: 1. Of a very great masse of most shining light made up together round into one body. 2. Of a certain lively vertue flowing abroad with beams. 3. Of motion perpetually circular.

(N W. If any thing here might seeme doubtful it might be proved by the causes of all the asserti­ons [Page 114] rendred, that we may passe inoffensively to the things following. As that is which is here spoken of the motion of the Sunne, attributed by others to the earth. But this controversie in this partiall or severall handling of this theame, where premises are not to be premised, cannot be decided. Let this in the meane time be admitted as certaine, that the Sun gives light to the earth on every side, that there is need of circular motion, whether that be in the Sun, or the Earth.)

The Axioms:)

• 1. The Sun is the chiefe foun­taine of light [For for all the other Stars we might lead a perpetuall night.]
• 2. The essence of the Sun is light [For it cannot be taken from it, but it must ceas to be the Sun.]
• 3. The light of the Sun flows out by beames. [Its cleare to the eye, and is evinced by reasons.]
• 4. The light of the Sun issues out every way with beames [To wit, not onely towards the earth, but also to sides: which the illuminations of the Moon, where ever she shall be, do shew.]
• 5. Therefore the body of the Sunne is round. [For rayes cannot be spread through a circumfe­rence, unlesse from a circular figure.]
• 6. The Sun where ever he comes with beames, ministers light and heat.
• 7. And by either of these puts vigour into things.
• 8 The Sunne alwayes enlightens halfe of the earth, the other halfe remaines unenlightned.
• [Page 115]9. That presence of the Sun above the earth makes the day; the absence thereof night.
• 10. By how much the Sun is more verticall or just over the earth, by so much the more it shines and burnes; by how much the more collaterall, by so much the lesse.
• 11. The verticall or direct circlings of the Sun make the Summer, the collaterall the Winter.
• 12. The returne of the Sun to the same vertica­lity makes the yeare. And if any thing remaine to be sayd.

The Distribution) Is none at all, because the Sun is a single creature, one Individuum.

XLI. Light may be an example of a naturall Accident, whose Definition is thus.

The Definition) Light is the repercussion or beating back of beames of light from the superfici­es of a darke body, and the scattering thereof through neighbouring bodies.

The Idea) Three things therefore are required to the producing of light. 1. Some lucid or shine­ing body. 2. A beame darted from it. 3. A darke body upon which the beame falling may go asunder, and illustrate or make lightsome what are neare.

The Axiomes:)

• 1. Without light there is no beame of light.
• 2. Without a darke body there is no repercussi­on and dissiliency of a beame.
• [Page 116]3. A beame is invisible of it selfe: It is seene onely in the body that's set before it.

  (This appeares in a beame let in through a little hole, into a dark closet, where the beam is not seen, but upon the opposite wall; in which if there be a hole too, into which the beame falls, it will not be seene at all; unlesse perhaps little bodies termd Atomes flie in it, or you set your hand afore it.)

• 4. Darke bodies of a smooth or polisht superfi­cies, doe onely reject the beame, and send it ano­ther way; but such as are of a rough superficies, scatter and sever it.

  (For if you set a Looking glasse over against a beame, the whole beame is turned back another way, and carries the image of light wholly thither: If a board, and any thing lesse polisht, the beame bursts asunder, and spreads the image of light upon the light.

• 5. The brighter the beame, the more glistring the light.

  (Therefore there proceeds a greater light from the Sun beame, then from the beame of a Candle, though let in at the same hole.

• 6. The more beames, the more light.

  (For more Candles or Windowes give more light.)

The Distribution) Light is either naturall from the Sun and Stars: Or A tificiall from our fire and candles; or dead comming from glittering Gems, [Page 117] the scales of certaine Fishes, rotten wood, and the like.

XLII. The nature of a shaddow is Pansophi­cally explained thus.

The Definition) A shaddow is a lesse light in a b [...]dy which is enlightned, proceeding from the intervening of a dark body.

The Idea) It's made therefore of three bodies: of one bright, spreading, lightsome rayes or beams: of the second dark or duskish intercepting part of the rayes, of the third in like manner duskish or shaddowy, representing the light, as well spread, as intercepted on its superficies. Take away one of these, and you take away the shaddow.

The Axiomes.)

• 1. Every thing that's bright or clear casts forth beams.
• 2. Every thing that's dark being opposed to that which is light or bright shaddows;
• 3. Every thing which is dark being opposed or set-over against that which is dark is shaddowed.
• 4. A shaddow is the shaddow of an intermedi­a [...]e or middle body.
• 5. A shaddow is a certaine image of a body lying between two, representing all its greater parts.
• 6. The greater the light, and dark bodies the thicker, the thicker is the shaddow: And on the contrary.
• 7. The shaddow upon the opposite of what is light, alwayes increases.
• 8. If the body shaddowing be equall to the lucid, the e­quall shaddow is alwayes infinitely stretcht forth.
• [Page 118]9. If the shaddowing be greater than the lucid, the shaddow grows in infinitum.
• 10. If the shaddow­ing be lesse than the lucid, the produced shaddow decreaseth, til it end in a Cone and vanish.

(Note. All these for their more easie comprehensions sake, may bee shaddowed out in painted or coloured Schemes.

The Distribution.) Lastly, the differences of shaddows, if there be any, are to be explained.

XLIII. Of Artificials: a Horologe hour-teller or Clock may be an example.

The Definition.) An Horologe is an instrument of measuring time, that's made by Art (for the very Heaven is a natural Clock, which by the ceas­lesse wheeling of the stars measures the greater times of the world, but we have sought for instru­ments to distinguish accurately lesser even hourly spaces: and they are found out to be especially of three kinds. First, such as shew the houre by the Position or place of the Sunne, Moone and starres: which we call Dials. Others even in cloudy or da [...]k weather by a certain distillation of water or Sa [...]d, cal'd Hour-glasses. Lastly, such as proceed of [...]heir own motion, term'd Clocks or Watches. W [...] speak now of them all in generall, he that will m y treat with the same ease of their particular ki [...]ds.

The Idea.) The foundation of a Clock is moti­on (because even the very time, or duration of [Page 119] things, is a certain motion: now the measure and the thing measured agree in kind.) Wherefore eve­ry Clock requires three things. 1. Something moveable. [...] Something moving. 3. Spaces de­signed or markt out for hourly Intervals.

(We meet with these things as well in Sun-Di­als and Sand-glasses, as in Clocks or Watches.)

1. The Axiomes.)

• Every Clock hath motion. (Because without motion there can be no measu­ring of time, as we have already seen. Therfore such as are shut up in deep dungeons, where they have neither the liberty of the Clock, nor of the Sun, they can count no hours, dayes, years. Now in a Dial there is the motion of the shaddow; in an Hour-glasse of sand in a Clock of wheels.)
• 2. Every Clock hath something moveable.

  (Dials the Shaddow, Sand-glasses Sand, Clocks or Watches Wheeles.)

• 3. Every Horologe or Clock hath something moving.

  (Dials the Sun, which moves the shaddow by its own motion: Houre-glasses the weight of sand, which presseth it selfe downe-ward: Clockes weights hung at them, or a plate of steele forcibly wound up, and endevouring to restore it selfe to its liberty.)

• 4. Every Horologe hath intervalls or spaces for howres markt out.

  (Otherwise it were no Horologe or howr-teller, [Page 120] if it did not shew the howres; therefore the markt out lines and numbers doe shew them.)

• 5, The intervalls or spaces of these are accurat­ly distinguisht.

  (For otherwise they would not distinguish, but confound.)

The Distribution.) For brevity sake I have con­joynd the severall kindes of a Horologe. Dialls, Houre-glass [...]s, Cloc [...]s. But what remaines to bee spoken peculiarly of each of them, he may draw it out who takes delight therein.

XLIV. Lastly, let us adde an example out of Moralls, concerning Magistracy; whose Pansophi­call handling shall be on this wise.

The Definition.) Magistracy, is a lawfull pree­minence of certaine persons in humane society, in­stituted for the contayning of the very society in order.

The Idea.) The Requisites of this Eminency are:

• 1. That some one be fit for such a charge: that is, be able, know, bee willing to rule others, and keepe them in order.
• 2. To bee lawfully constituted: (whether by the right of election, or inheritance, or lawfull warre.
• 3. In very deed to rule and manage all things gravely, vigilantly, constantly. And that againe (1) By setting downe lawes of order, and taking [Page 121] care when they are set downe, that they be not un­known. (2) By observing order and [...]awes, how they may be kept. () By maintayning Law [...]s, by defending those that observe, and punishing those that break them.

1. The Axiomes.)

• Where ever there is a hu­mane society, there is need of th [...] bond of society, Order.
• 2. Where ever there is Order, there is there need of the bond of order, Lawes.

  (That none may bee ignorant of his place, and duties.

• 3. And where ever are Lawes, there also the Magistracy hath need of a Law-giver and keeper.
• 4. The Magistracy is not to be committed but to such as are fit.
• 5. He is fit to handle Magistracy, who can, knows, and is willing to rule others.

  (All these are required, because if so be but one be awanting, it takes away his fitnesse.)

• 6. Magistracy may not be usurped, unlesse law­fully committed.

  (For all men of their owne Nature being free, having the priviledge of Reason and Will, will not be ruled and obey otherwise then freely, where they both judge how much that is expedient for themselves, and also for humane society. If they thinke otherwise, (as when they see one in­trude himselfe into Magistracy, and judge that hee [Page 122] will abuse his power) they doe not obey, save by constraint. Now where coaction or constraint is, there all things are carried with violence, and prove enemies to order and long continuance.)

• 7. Magistracy is lawfully committed to whom it is committed by the consent of the people, or by Nature, or by God. (That is, either by lawfull Election, or lawfull Inheritance, or lawfull Warre; all which things have their Laws and Conditions, not to be touched here.)
• 8. Its the part of a Magistrate to give Lawes to the people.

  (But just ones, and such as to observe may be of publick use.)

• 9. It concernes a Magistrate to provide that none offend through the ignorance of Lawes.

  (Therefore they are bound to promulge and publish as well those by them made, as ancient, divine and humane ones. And therefore to set up Schooles, Churches, Courts, where such things may be taught; and being set up, to preserve them, and to provide and take care that there all may learne things to be done, and to be avoyded.

• 10. That all things be done according to the Prescript of Lawes is a businesse appertaining to the Magistrates watchfulnesse and circumspection.

  (For Lawes without execution are Bels without a clapper.)

• 11. The distribution of rewards and punish­ments [Page 123] belongs to the Magistrate.

  (Therefore much more to make War.)

The Distribution.) There are so many species or kindes of Magistrates or Rulers of humane soci­ety, as there are of societies: Domestick, Civill, Ecclesiasticall, Scholasticall, &c.

XLV. By these proofes or patterns it appeares, that all PANSOPHIES things will be brief, linkt together, graduall, cleare of themselves. For if these perhaps seeme not yet such to any one, I would have him thinke, that something is a want­ing here, which cannot be a wanting in the very body of PANSOPHY, to wit, that continuall draught of the minde, raising it selfe by degrees from one thing to another. Now we have fallen upon these things as it were abruptly, and they be­ing thus summarily and by parcells delivered doe savour of that frustillation or mincing of Sciences, against which we alwayes protest. I hope the more sagacious by this essay given, may smell out the commodiousnesse and benefit of this Method: To wit, if the Definition of a thing exactly circum­scribe its essence; the Idea resolve it into its Prin­ciples: And also Axiomes flow of their owne ac­cord from either: And lastly, the Distribution ad­vise us to proceed in the Analysis of things, that all things shall be easie to be perceived, and solid for use. For when the understanding doth see all things rise thus out of themselves, that nothing is [Page 124] inferred or brought in from any other place, it meets the truth of things with pleasure; that even as things determine themselves, so it may approve them by its testimony: Being sure, unlesse things be that which it sees them to be, they are not at all. By this meanes its obtained, that all things may shine by their owne light, that there may be no need that beliefe be sought, or procured in a beg­ing way,

XLVI. Now it will not be amisse to adde, what Lawes we set up to be observed in collecting and making these Definitions, Idea's, Axiomes, and Partitions of things: That if we (peradven­ture prevented by death, or letted by the labours of our ordinary calling) may not go on, those that will succeed, need not be ignorant of our minde. For I hope it may be that Christ may send out o­thers who may enter into our labours, and may bring on our seed-time to an Harvest, that both he who sowes, and he who reapes may rejoyce toge­ther, and gather fruit unto eternall life. (John 4.36.37.38.)

XLVII. Commonly in all these (Definitions, Idea's, Axiomes, and Partitions) these things are to be performed. 1. That all things be plaine and perspicuous in words and sense, needing as far as may be, no Commentaries, to be illustrated by ex­amples onely where there's need. 2. That they may be of greatest truth, altogether according to [Page 125] the Lawes [...]: that they may be neither oppugned, unlesse Sophistical­ly; nor have need to be defended by any excepti­ons, distinctions, limitations (whether faigned or true) which will be obtained, if paines be bestow­ed, that not any thing be attributed save to that, wherein it is first, and by it selfe. For AMANDUS POLANUS (in the Preface to his Logick) writes well. That the Vulgar Rules of Arts have ther­fore so many exceptions, because speciall things are delivered generally contrary to the Law, [...]. Therefore (saith he let it be ob­served what things disagree; and let things a­greeing be referred under one Genus, the disa­greeing under another; so there will be no ex­ception, but all things will be comprehended rightly in distributions. Now against the ne­cessity of distinctions, and limitations it will be a good remedy, that nothing be used that's ambigu­ous and homonymous, but that all distinct things be expressed in distinct words, in the very Analysis of things already, that not any thing at length be left to be determined by a Commentary: So it will be that even as things collected have no need to be collected, things ordered to be ordered; so neither may things distinct have need to be distin­guished, and things limited to be limited. 3. Let it be attended that the middle Centers of things may be found out, and expressed, whereby the oc­casions [Page 126] of contradicting may disappeare. For the most Controversies rise from this, because they are wont to exorbitate too much to the extremes on this side, and on that, who doe not rightly weigh the equall ballance of things about their Centers: For example sake, in the Booke of JOB its sharpe­ly disputed, whether the calamities of life oppresse the godly or the wicked? The first JOB, the latter his friends did defend. But experience teacheth (as SOLOMON taught by experience, witnesseth, (Eccles. 9.1.) that neither is simply true, because we see either of them happen. Therefore a cala­mitous condition shall be defined (in its place) thus; that the Definition may have the power not of solving that Controversie, but of taking it away. For example sake, if you define it thus: The Calamities of this life are the Instrument of Divine Providence, to try the good, but to punish the bad: For who can doubt now, how this Con­troversie may be decided? Especially when the true Idea shall come to it; and the Axiomes with the Partition: And it appeares too, whether that place (concerning the Calamities or miseries of life) may be referred? To wit, to the Doctrine of Providence.

XLVIII. But peculiarly we will have defini­tions to be such, as out of them as well Axiomes as Ideas and Partitions may be easily drawne, and may flow as it were of their owne accord. Also, that [Page 127] proofes of any of the Assertions may bee deduced through the very definitions of things uttered in the Assertion: to the end that that of the Philoso­pher may be manifest to be true indeed. That the Definition if it be perfect, or next to whats per­fect, puts an end to controversies: so as it may be called not without cause, the Judge of Con­troversies. The example of the former may be in the definition of Ens, which we have thus. Ens is, whatsoever is, is spoken, or thought.

N. W. For declaration sake the following things may be subjoyned. As from Praesum Prae­sens, Absum absens, Potis sum potens: so from Sum, Ens. Therefore Ens is, whatsoever it is. Yet there is added, & whatsoever is spoken or thought: because even those things which are not, are wont to be spoken and thought: as Cerberus, Pegasus, One-eyd Polyphemus, &c. which kinde of things although they bee nothing in themselves, yet be­cause while they are thought or spoken, and writ­ten, they busie or take up the mind, the tongue, the hand, paper, in that very thing they are now some­thing, and they are not altogether nothing. There­fore they are reckoned among Enses or beings.

The Idea) Therefore there are three things pro­per to an Ens or being. 1. To bee. 2. To bee able to be thought. 3. To be able to be spoken.

The Axiomes) 1. Whatsoever is, is (either tru­ly or feignedly, eyther in it selfe, or in imagination. [Page 128] How it is, so it is.) 2. W [...]atsoever is, something may be t [...]ought of it. 3. Whatsoever is, something may be spoken of it.

(For even when you say any thing is unsearcha­ble, and unsp [...]akeable then you say something, you thinke something of it.

The Partition) Therefore Ens is threefold: Re­all Notionall, Verball: or a thing, a conceit, a word: (things are some thing in themselves with­out the mind: notions are images of things in the mind: words are the carrying instruments of the notions of one mind to the mind of another &c.)

XLIX. An Example of the latter may be the speech of that blind man in the Evangelist: God heareth not sinners. Whether this may be true, we shall judge by the Definitions of God, of a sinner, of hearing, if they shall be most fitly true. For because (1) God is the Being of beings, that is, chiefly a Being, and consequently chi [...]fly one; true, good, that is, Holy. (2) But sin is an aversion or turning away from that which is good and holy. (3) Now to heare (is in this place) to heare perfectly or gen­tly, that is, to admit of any one freely, and to fulfill his will: how can the most holy, and most jealous God, love and promote those, who (so long as they are such) turne away themselves from him?

L. Its cleare therefore that there is great use of definitions, if they be such as this method requires. And we must seriously endevour that we may have [Page 129] such, though to frame and make them be a busines of great labour and wit. For VIVES (in his book touching the explaining of Essences, after he had taught that a good definition is, that which is briefe, cleare, reciprocall) writes truely. The taske or worke of defining belongs to some great and excellent man, who not onely hath searcht out the whole nature of the thing which he is a­bout to define, but even is not ignorant of all other things (if they ought to be limitated right­ly) about it: Otherwise it is easie to be con­founded, and to confound. Now an errour, though small in the defining, becomes great in a short time, &c. Yet how this great and difficult businesse (of defining things accurately) may be a little eased, we will adde an observation or two. First, let it be held firme and sure, that the Defini­tion consists of the next Genus, and the specificall difference. Secondly, that as I doe not deny that that is the best definition, which expresseth the Genus, and the difference in single words: As this is: Flame is burning smoake.) So I doe not su­perstitiously determine that the Plurality of words is to be avoyded, as often as the evidence and full­nesse of sence may be better provided for. And therefore those of ours, set downe a little before, are more full of words. Thirdly, that the diffe­rence as often as it cannot be had from the forme (for that these are sometimes unknowne, especial­ly [Page 130] in naturall things, we confesse as well as others) it is to be taken from the end: As BELLARI­NUS gathers out of ARISTOTLE himselfe, and shewes in the example of an Horse ( Praxi Art. lib. 3. Dist. 2. Num. 5.) Whose end seeing 'tis found out to be by the effects and use, that he may serve man in carrying him, or his things from place to place, speedily and handsomely: He casts away these two, that he may difference him from other living creatures, which afford the like use: For both the Oxe and the Asse carry, but not speedily; and also the Camel, but not so handsomely:) He makes from thence such a definition as this. A Horse is a living creature, ordained to carry a man from place to place speedily and handsomely. Fourthly, yet there seemes sometime to the formall difference there may be added the finall or efficient next to the thing, because that the Essence of the thing may be more fully expressed, and that (in the following Idea) it may resolve it selfe more easily into its Principles. For this end we in the Defini­tion of the Sunne and Magistracy, have added the finall; and in the definition of a shaddow the effi­cient: In the definition likewise of a Horologe, we have set downe the difference taken from the end, and from the efficient. Which if it doe not please, they shall be elaborated more accurately, that they may be altogether strict. But I tell you before, we shall become obscure, if we will be o­ver [Page 131] short; which Rock I mainely eschew, and would have it eschewed.

LI. Nor are the Idea's of things to be made with lesse care and thought; because there is no lesse use of them for a true, full, distinct, knowledge of things. For though the very definition compre­hend the whole essence of the thing; yet because it doth that but covertly, and the infoldings of things are so various, that the unskilfull knowing not how to distinguish essentialls from accessories, snatch oftentimes that, in which there lies nothing, but omit fundamentalls, by an errour most fruit­fully producing others; to hold essentialls in eve­ry thing certainely, will be the fairest light of the minde. Verily what HORACE pronounced con­cerning the necessity of the fore-knowledge of things for eloquence. Rem bene praevisam Verba haud in vita sequentur.

This same may be sayd concerning the fore­knowledge of Idea's for the production of things.

But to finde out the true Idea's of things, is no lesse Art, then to define things truely: Therefore we will advise you of something, by which way they may be sought out.

[Page 132]LII. It is necessary that all things which are made, and are, should be made, and be according to Idea's. For unlesse something were before in an Idea, (that is, might have some manner or forme, by which it might be made and be) it would not indeed be. Now the Idea's of things are threefold: Artificiall, Naturall, Divine. The Artificiall are a certaine Ectype, or imitations of things Naturall: the Naturall of Divine, the Divine are from them­selves, the true archetype of all things which are rightly done. Which yet in as much as they are hidden in eternity, nor appeare to us but as they are expressed in naturall things: Naturall things are to be search'd out by us as much as may be, as well for their owne sake, that we may understand the Artifice of Nature, as for the following Artifi­cialls sake, that we have the intelligence of their foundations: and lastly for precedent divine things sake, that we may penetrate also more safely into those hidden things, as far as the way of divine things permits.

LIII. Now all naturall things are made after the same Idea's, because by the same Maker. Who because he is one, hath kept one order in all things; and because he is the best, the best; and because true, truly, and not imaginarily. Truly therefore seeing that there is order in things, it may be truly found out, if it be sought in true wayes. Now the wayes are true, not which our understanding [Page 133] (which is too voluble and prone to errours) faignes to it selfe, and falsely attributes to things, but which things themselves do shew in their procee­ding. For from actions and passions come the qualities of things to be knowne, and from the qualities the essence, now from all these the essen­tiall requisites. These wayes of things if we shall follow, and observe the indelible characters im­pressed in things, we shall finde a wonderfull har­mony of things; after a certaine similitude of the first Being. For we shall discerne that all things are found in the lowest Being which are in the highest: but in the lowest degree, such as useth to be in the rudiments of things covertly: so as the more speciall, and alwaies perfecter diducti­on of creatures, may be nothing but a greater and perfecter explication ad extra, or outwardly of those things which are within: which our Meta­physick shall openly doe. Therefore all the crea­tures, even to the smallest dust or powders are here our Masters and teachers, if any things be made from them, and of them, let us regard and marke not with brutish eyes, but reasonable and attentive consideration.

LIV. For example sake that the Idea's of things may be perfectly found out, I thinke we must proceed thus: 1. What ever requisites true­ly essentiall are to be met with in all the species of any thing, there generall Idea is to be put under [Page 134] the very Genus of the same species. For example sake; because in every particular motion I see three termini, From whence, which way, whi­ther: Why may I not determine that these are the generall requisites of all motion? And why may I not seeke these same things in every Beeing? Cer­tainely every Beeing is from some thing; that is, hath some Originall. And proceeds from some way, that is, hath some forme, by which it is car­ryed some whither, that is, to its end.

2. What ever things are found requisite in the generall Idea of things▪ the same are to be sought in every species put under that Genus. For either all the same things will be found out (though under another, that is, a speciall forme and name: As the journy of Christ, Mark. 7.31. is described by these three, from Tyre, into Galilee, through De­capolis:) Or it will be an argument that the gene­rall Idea is not exactly made; which will give an occasion to mend it: Or lastly, it will be plaine and evident it is no true species of that Genus, which will serve to rectifie the Partition.

3. What things soever are in one species, some­what Analogous, or like and answerable in a con­venient proportion, to them may be sought out in the species which is opposite. For it is in it neces­sarily, although in some different manner, which that difference infers, which makes that new speci­es. So while I examine what things are required to [Page 135] the manner of foure-footed creatures, and search out somewhat analogous in the motion of things which creepe, which flie, which swim. I must needs finde out most profitable matters, and such as are truely in things.

LV. As for Axiomes, because none of the lear­ned are ignorant, that the maine strength of truth consists in them; none also will deny that exquisite paines should be bestowed on them in making them every way right, that is, in collecting, orde­ring, and making them firme and sure, even to an unmoved strength. For they are indeed, as they are tearmed, the rules of reasoning, and the Prin­ciples of all conclusions collected, and to be col­lected by true reasoning. Whereof there is a great­ter number, and more proper order, and power­fuller force, both to inquire and finde out the un­conquered truth of things, and also to free and de­fend it from errour, then yet men commonly un­derstand. Whereas therefore hitherto they are nei­ther collected, nor brought into order, they shine forth onely here and there from the thoughts, Doctrines, Discourses, and Actions of men: Nor doe men sufficiently know how to insist or settle on them; and therefore they suffer themselves to be carryed away with every winde of opinions and sophismes, or crafty and deceitfull cavills: And in the meane time there lies hid in them espe­cially both the secrets of the universall wisdome of [Page 136] God, and also the sparks and fuell of our univer­sall light; and lastly, the conditions and bonds of procuring universall concord and peace amongst all men, and all things: It will quit for cost to draw these out forcibly even with great and im­portunate labour, and set them in their right or­der, that they may be in readinesse for any use.

LVI. But we must have a mighty care, lest that be admitted for an Axiome, which is none: To wit, Propositions in part onely, not wholly, not every where, not alwayes, not by themselves, not reciprocally true. Of which kinde are not onely ma [...]y vulgar Proverbs, as also certaine sentences and Apothegmes of wise men, but even common Philosophies (and I would to God not Divinities) Canons and Rules, which they lay downe so, as forthwith by excepting, distinguishing, limiting, I know not whether I should defend or betray, certainely they must needs weaken their doctrine. And to what end is a Rule, which needs another rule? And of which we must alwayes be afraid lest it deceive us? PANSOPHY therefore contains Ax [...]omes truely Axiomes, that is, worthy credit (for that the word signifies) and rules already re­gulated, not to be regulated still.

LVII. But whence are such Axiomes to be taken? For we have sayd that vulgar bookes are not to be trusted, nor hath any one as yet taken meet and due paines in collecting them, and cleans­ing [Page 137] them from their mixed filth. Excepting the renowned, and brave spirited HEROE in subdu­ing and taming the Monsters of Opinions, B [...]RON HERBERT: Who had a Treatise of common Knowledges prepared for him, as we out of the same Authours booke of truth (pag. 63. & 154.) doe understand For all which writing, because it is hitherto denyed the light; what hinders, why even we may not as well assay, and set upon the businesse, and discover our thoughts, how we thinke they may be woven out to an end?

LVIII. Now Axiomes are best collected out of things themselves, by true, unerring, humane reasoning, but rather by divine, as we have them expressed in the word of God. For what ever any one thinkes, speakes, writes, argues, proves, or disproves, accuseth or excuseth, perswadeth or disswadeth, exhorts or heartily desires, promiseth or threatneth, &c. He alwayes and every where meets with certaine presupposed things, on which as on a Basis his very reasoning relies. For just as whatsoever is moved, is moved about something unmoveable; so whatsoever is inferred by reaso­ning, is inferred by the force of some unmoved truth; which may appeare by examples. If any one offer to beat his servant with a Cudgell for harme done, and he cries out, I did it not willing­ly: Loe here is reasoning on either side from things presupposed! For the Master presupposes [Page 138] the Axiome: He that doth harme is lyable to pu­nishment: Thou hast done harme: Therefore. The servant on the contrary: The innocent is not lyable to punishment. I am innocent. Therefore. And he silently laies downe another thing to his Major as knowne, to wit, this. An offence is vo­luntary. My fact is not voluntary. Therefore it is not an offence, &c. Behold such things occur, in the sayings and doings of all men, even the most foolish, as remaining footsteps of wisdome crea­ted together with man, and indelible (though di­versly stained with the dirt of folly) markes and characters thereof; that it appeares to be true, which JESUS the sonne of SIRACH sayd; That wisdome hath layd everlasting foundations in men (Eccles. 1.14.) Such common notions therefore may be gathered out of the speeches and actions of all men, even the most simple and foolish: So they be prudently seperated from the mingled filth and foyle of fopperies. Whereon to bestow ones paines and diligence, would be more better then to pick gold out of a dunghill.

LIX. But to gather Axiomes out of divine O­racles, that's in truth to gather Pearles from among Gold: For there lies hid the most precious trea­sure of true wisdome. For example sake, when I read, Exod. 22.1. That God commands that the thiefe restore that which he hath stolne, I gather this Axiome: That which is unjustly taken away [Page 139] is to be restored. Also that which is restored, is to be restored to him from whom it was taken away. Now because God for one Oxe, commands five Oxen to be restored, and for one Sheepe foure, I make an Axiome: He who dare doe more mis­chiefe, is the more to be punished. (For an Oxe is more then a sheep: therefore he who offers to do a greater harme to his neighbour, may smart the more for his iniquity.) Againe, because it is said in the same place, at the fourth verse. If the theft be certainly found in his hand alive, he shall restore double; from thence I collect an Axiome: An offence newly committed is to be punished more lightly, an old one more severely. The Rea­son is, (for nothing hinders us from adding also te­stimonies of reason to divine deeds and speeches, seeing God is the reason of reasons, and reason al­waies lyes under his speeches and actions, although he do not clearly and plainly expresse this every where) because first motions are not alwayes in our power, any thing may be admitted unawares, or through incogitancy, but he who offends long, offends the more, having spaces to deliberate and recollect himselfe, yet not repenting. I read in the same place at the third verse: If he have nothing, then he shall be sold for his theft: from thence I easily collect that that of the Law who hath not money in his purse, let him suffer in his person, hath the force of divine Law. Whereas I read in [Page 140] the same place, verse 2.3. that the thiefe might be killed in the night without danger of punishment, but not so in the day time: because he may be ap­prehended, and brought to judgement, or be cer­tainly knowne and accused; from thence issue Axiomes.

• 1. We must spare mans bloud, as much as may be.
• 2. Private revenge is unlawfull.
• 3. Deceitfull pretences are to be taken heed of, &c.

LX. Therefore let the holy Scripture be read orderly, accurately, and diligently, the reason of all Gods sayings and doings being considered as they are such (which truly is every where, by so much the more pure and solid, by how much the wisdome of God is greater than that of men) such kind of rules for things, and conceipts may be drawne out, or principles of reasoning with those very places of Scriptures (in the place of examples) set under a little after; that the book of PANSO­PHY may be truly a Key both for things and the holy Scripture. Furthermore other wisely-writ books shall afford the same use; that whatsoever may be observed to be spoken and done pithily and accutely, may be brought into an Axiome.

LXI. The second field of hunting Axiomes (though perhaps the former in order) are things themselves, and their proceeding rationably look'd [Page 141] on, if we attend in what admirable order, and by what force this or that is done. For whatsoever is done in any particulars, it is certaine that some ge­nerall power or force and forme, and end dothly under them all: for Example sake, That we see in living creatures a desire to preserve themselves, and that by an appetite to like things, and avoy­ding of contraries, the use of nourishments for their propogation sake, &c. doth appeare: wee must think all those things come from some supe­riour power, which is also in inferiour creatures, though in a lower degree, and though it put forth it selfe more obscurely. From thence then I ga­ther the supreame Metaphysicall Axiom: whatso­ever is, delighteth to be: or, whatsoever is, main­taines it selfe in its being, as long as it can. And by this way from all particular (Naturall, Artificiall, Morall, Politicall, Theologicall, so that they be so­lidly true) Axiomes, wee may draw out universall Metaphysicks: to which as to common rules all things may square and agree which are made or done, wheresoever they are made or done.

LXII. And contrariwise, some particular A­xiomes (about matters Naturall, Artificiall, Morall, and Spirituall) may bee found out of generall Me­taphysicks: if you reduce that particular Theme to its transcendent Genus, and view its generall Axiomes of substance, Accident, Quality, &c and apply them to a specialty, or particular. And thus [Page 142] we have indeed these and the other gallant things, which perchance without this guidance of gene­rals, had not come to our mind.

LXIII. If we goe on diligently in this three­fold way, we need not doubt of having a great Harvest of Axiomes, to wit, a very ample furniture and provision of solid wisdome: which if they bee comprised sententiously in choice words, even as Definitions and Ideas, and disposed in due order according to the Analysis of things, we shall have that we seeke after. For it will come to passe, by Gods helpe, that all things may be taught quickly, plainly fundamentally. Because Definitiōs through their shortnesse, will notably helpe the memory, and Ideas, the manner of their essence being explai­ned, the Understanding, and Axiomes by their so­lidity will serve specially for Certainty and Use. For truly by analysing and defining things, we may soone passe over the whole Universe, by bowelling the Ideas of things, we may behold the inwards of things; by understanding Axiomes well, wee may be assured of knowledge. Thus all things shall bee learned in one perpetuall Method, all tautologies shall be eschewed, causes of disagreeing shall bee cut off, the judgement of every one who passeth through these things shall bee sharpned, to observe one thing out of another most gallantly: and that which is the maine and greatest thing, the Art of convincing shall be had in readinesse.

[Page 143]LXIV. By the art of convincing, I meane a plaine proving or demonstrative method: Where­by every thing which is true may be presented with such evidence to every mans understanding, as none of a sound minde may deny assent; or if he deny, it may be wrested from him though un­willing and reluctant by the very force of invinci­ble or unmastred truth. As Mathematicians know how to demonstrate their owne things; so even we wish and labour that the like knowledge may be extended to all things. The manner of which thing if it shall be found infallible, that may deser­vedly come to be numbred amongst the chiefe gifts of God, and the principall benefits of PANSO­PHY. For now all may be taught the truth, un­taught errours, with that clearenesse and certaine­ty, as not any one may not understand, not any one draw ought so demonstrated into doubt, the truth of things powerfully printing it selfe upon the senses even by its owne light.

LXV. We know they are not a wanting who doubt greatly that this Mathematicall certainety and evidence of demonstrating may be transferred to other things. But neither are they a wanting, who make with us against them. ALSTED (Eu­cycl. lib. 1. c. 4. speakes thus. Mathematicians indeed arrogate to themselves this praise, that they have the noblest demonstrations. But it is not so, seeing Metaphysicks are the first or in­dependent [Page 144] Principles. And with the indepen­dency of their Principles is joyned the greatest noblenesse of things, and chiefe perspicuity from the nature of the thing. Likewise in his fourth booke and twelfth chapter, Metaphysicall Demonstrations are of all other the most certaine, firme, and evident. And in the thirteenth booke, chap. 1. He teacheth that the Naturalist is conver­sant about scientificall things. Verily BELLARI­NUS subjects morall things also to a scientificall Method. (Praxi scient. lib. 1. dist. 3 N. 8.) But surely we must overcome not by Authorities, but by unconquerable reasons, that an Apodicticall Method may and ought to be extended to all things. In which, as in a matter of very great mo­ment, we shall not thinke much to take a little paines.

LXVI. The Pyrrhonian Philosophers, called Scepticks, disputed in time past that all things are disputable on either part: Even this very question, Whether all things may be disputed on either part? So supposing that the truth of their assertion might be evidently demonstrated, if they could wrap up also this very assertion in doubt: Whether they play these things in jest or in earnest, it concernes us not; yet on us urging a serious thing seriously, and affirming that instead of slippery disputations, necessary Demonstrations ought and may be brought in, after their example a certaine necessity [Page 145] is imposed o [...] demonst [...]a [...]ing this very assertion so as none can resist or withstand. This then we now set upon to the honour of ever unconquered truth, and of the eternall Pres [...]dent thereof, God, being about to demonstrate these three by a Mathemati­call certainty.

• 1. That ev'ry truth is demōstr [...]ble by its own nature
• 2. That every Pansophicall thing is demonstra­ble by the power of method.
• 3. That this mystery of method consisteth in the accurate Gradation of truth.

LXVII. The first is demonstrated by this Apo­dicticall Syllogisme: Whatsoever ha [...]h true, nearest, and immediate Causes, Effects & Proprieties, that is truly demonstrable. But every truth hath true, nearest, and immediate Caus [...]s Eff [...]cts, and P [...]oprie­ties; therefore every truth is truly demonstrable.

The major Proposition is necessarily true; be­cause the firmest demonstrations [...]re taken from the nearest causes and eff [...]cts, and [...]ss [...]ntiall Proprieties. Nor hath any of the Logitians ever required, o [...] can require other. The minor is in like manner certain: because if any thing hath not causes, actions, passi­ons, true proprieties, that is not at all truly, that is, is not true. Therefore whatsoever is true, must needs have true causes, and proprieties and effects, whether they be knowne to us already, or not as yet. According to this reason onely that which is false is indemonstrable. For as much as it is not [Page 146] truly that which it is sayd or thought to be, neither hath it true causes, proprieties, effects, by which it may be demonstrated. Therefore it remaines al­wayes in suspence, like a myst having nothing those solid, whereby it may be caught and held, and with a certaine Fucus or colour onely of truth (which fearing it should be wip'd off, it will not be touch'd any whit hard) bewitching the eyes of those that are not aware. Therefore lest we be bewitched in any thing, let nothing of all those things which are taught be let go without this most rigid Apodicticall Examination: that if there be any Paint, it may vanish▪ and truth (which hath the nature of gold, that's not liable to corruption by water nor fire) may glister, and be rendred the more firme.

LXVIII. I demonstrate the second thus: where there are afforded all the requisites of true demonstration, there a possibility of demonstra­ting is afforded. But in a theame handled Panso­phically there are afforded, &c Therefore

The Assumption is proved; because every theame that's handled Pansophically, hath Propo­sitions making demonstration, being true [...]: to wit, Definitions, Hypotheses, Theorems, and Problems▪ For what­soever falls out to be handled Pansophically, that is presently defined before all things: Then is the Idea made; which is as it were an Hypothesis [Page 147] (yet not faigned but real by which being granted, satisfaction may be had to all demands or Queres about that subject or as a Problem which saith that something m [...]y be done, if this and that be af­forded; to wit, essentiall requisites. Then as for Axiomes, what are they but Theorems utte [...]ing some true and necessary aff ction touching the sub­ject? of so evident truth, that as meere principles they may be knowne by [...]h [...]mselves. Therefore from a good provision of Definitions, Hypotheses, Theorems, and Problems, why may we not knit good demonstrations?

LXIX. The third thing which I have pro­pounded to be demonstrated is, that the force of demonstrative method consists in an accurate gra­dation: And I desire I may have th ee M [...]chani­call things granted me, that I may demonstrate it by Mathematicall certainty and evid [...]nce.

• 1. Grant me the top, and grant me men, who may strive to get thither with their maine strength, and yet cannot ascend, seeing they certainely want a certaine medium, to wit, steps rightly made.
• 2. Grant me that st [...]ps being rightly made, one may ascend to any height.
• 3. Grant that steps may be made between any altitude and its basis, by a firme medium, one or more.

I require, I say, these things to be granted me as evidently true. But if any morose or crabbed [Page 148] person will not so much as grant me these things freely. I my selfe demonstrate these foundations of my demonstrations in nature.

LXX. Suppose a Tower of the height of fifty Cubits: And some who desire very much to get to the top thereof; and therefore they may walke round about it, looke about it round, assay all things, within and without, but in vaine: What's the reason? I will tell you: The defects of some Requisite. Now the Requisites of the efficient to produce the effect are (as PANSOPHY in its place doth teach and demonstrate) Power, Knowledge, Will: For even one of these being denied, the effect doth not proceed Therefore they either will not go up to the Tower, or know not how, or cannot But they are not unwilling, or they desire, and go about it. Nor are they ignorant, for they know how to use their feet, as their walking shews; therfore they cannot. And they cannot, either because they want power, or because they are prohibited, or because an instrument is wanting; For Pansophy appre­hends that there are these three hinderances of workes. But power is not a wanting, that is health and strength, which is plaine by their walk­ing and endeavouring: Nor are th [...]y prohibited by any counter-command or violence. Therefore an instrument, whereby they may climbe to high things, is a wanting; to wit, a Ladder or staires: For because no mans feet (an instrument to pro­mote [Page 149] them from p ace to place is given them by nature) exceed the length of two Cubits, nor in going can they stride beyond it: None also can advance himselfe beyond the distanc [...] of two Cu­bi [...]s without the helpe of some medium. Seeing then the height of this Tower is of fifty Cubits and the feet of those that walke abou [...] it but of two Cubits, or not so much: It's evident that they cannot go up to it without interm [...]diate steps. And because they doe not go up▪ that such an In­strument (sta [...]res or a ladd [...]r) is a wanting to them, which was to be demonstrated.

LXXI. But let staires be made and set very firme, and fenced round with sides, that there be no feare of a downe-fall; and let them be there, who wou [...]d, may and know how to go up (to wit by raising thems [...]lves from one staire or step to a­nother without skipping) the [...]ff [...]ct will proceed; although the height be a thousand times greater, otherwise it is impossi [...]le. Now I will demon­strate it by this Apodict [...]cal Sorites:

• 1 Whosoever hath feet right and well as they should be, he can go: (Fo [...] the prime efficient and instrument being afford [...]d, the [...]ffect may follow. Now feet are the instrument of going.)
• 2. Whosoever goes, he moves forward his feet one after another For unlesse he did move foreward, he would not go bu [...] stand: Nor can there be this moving forward without a setting of [Page 150] one foot before another by turnes)
• 3. He who moves forward his feet one after another, or by turnes, he goes.
• 4. He who goes, he tends forward o [...] back­ward, upwards or downewards For both to go forward and to go backward▪ and to ascend or de­sc [...]nd, is to go: And as a going upon even ground is called in Latine Gressus, so a going upwards or downewards Gradus.
• 5. He who goeth upwards he asc [...]nds by staires or steps
• 6. He who ascends or goes up by staires, may go up as far as the staires go.
• 7 Therefore whosoever hath feet, may go whithersoever the staires go. Which was to be demonstrated.

LXXII Now that staires may be made even to any height, if there may be had a firme medium joyning the basis to the top is without all doubt. For no other thing hinders st [...]ires to be made from the ea [...]th to the clouds, save that the intersected medium the Ayre or smoake ascending thither, are of too weake a cons [...]stence not receiving or ad­m [...]tting of holl [...]wnesse nor su [...]ab [...]e for bearing a burthen. But if a Mountaine, or Rock, or Tower may mount to that height, nothing hinders why stair [...]s may not be framed and made thereto by which a man also may come even thither. Because whether we please to make them wooden ones, [Page 151] or of stone, [...]on [...]st [...]uments are not a wanting by which they may be [...]hewen out: If so be we do not irke to take paines and use prudence. To wit, that the staire 1) begin from the bottome (2) and that they be continued to the top, (3) and that close together, and without any gap, that where one ends, an other may begin. (4) And let them be fit­ted to the statute of them for whom they are pre­pared. (Verily for a childish ascent theres need but of little distances of the staires, for a mans, the spaces may be larger.) (5) Lastly, if one continu­ed Ladder be not sufficient to arrive at the height, let more be made, till it may be attained to. As if Ladders be to set up within the Tower of fifty Cu­bits, and Wood of an equall length cannot be had, let there be severall Ladders from one story or loft to another. For example sake take beames of ten Cubits, and make of them Ladders of ten steps, and let every one be fitted to their sundry stories after this manner. (See in the following page.)

A firme medium then being granted betweene the basis and the top, staires may be made up to it. Which was to be shewne.

LXXIII. Now that the application of Geo­metricall demonstration may be well and fitly made to the D dactick matter, I say, to teach is no other thing then to lead the understanding into the [Page 153] thing which is to be knowne; (and to learne is to be lead by the understanding from things knowne to things unknowne. Ther [...]fore they are altoge­ther finished by the same requisites. For as in lea­ding, three things concurre; the Leader, the pa [...]ty lead, and the leading it selfe: and in this againe the termes, from whence, whither, by what way: so in Teaching, the Teacher, the Scholer, and the very act of Teaching and of Learning. In this a­gaine there are the termes: the first, from what: to wit, those principles in which the teacher and the Learner first agree. The second to what, to wit, conclusions as yet unknowne to the Scholer, but to which by teaching he takes paines to bring him: Lastly the way whereby he is to be brought on thither; which the Scholer is in like manner ig­no [...]ant of, but the Teacher ought to know. Now this unlesse it both tend thither, whither it ought, and be likewise explain'd, that he who is led, may go on without lets, or doubts he will not come thither. Wheresoever ther [...]fore they are, who would lead and be led, teach and be taught, and yet the effect doth not fol [...]ow according to their desire, there it's sure that sure mediums are awanting; that is, a way well explained, and staires rightly fitted for the raising the minde. Which also in a graduall method, with the continuing of some few Axioms I demonstrate thus.

LXXIV. The first Axiom. Every man by na­ture [Page 154] desires to know. The Maxime is Aristotles, which none ever made doubt of, for that it's a clear case: yea surely a certaine pleasure in asking, and experimenting sundry things, breaking forth even from our infancy followes us through our whole life. So as there's none (I speake of men, not of carkasses of men) who joyes not dayly to heare, see, tast, handle, and assuredly know some new thing. As it's manifest by the Examples of any of the larg [...]st sort, and such as are dull d and benumm'd with idlenesse: who although they do not trans­fer this force and eagernesse of nature to serious matters, yet they bestow their paines upon any kinde of trifles, rather than they will either deny, or can dissemble the spurs and instigations of na­ture.

Axiom 2. He who desires to know, desires to know truth.

For Knowledge unlesse it be true, is not know­ledge, but ignorance and errour: which none can wish or desire. For to what end would one erre, that is, be deceived? yea the mind rather abhors it naturally, and therefore if it perceive that it hath erred any where, or think it hath found out an er­rour, it changeth its opinion forthwith either o­penly or secretly. For causes may fall out why some one will not seem to think otherwise, but his errour being taken notice of by him, he cannot think otherwise.

Axiom 3 He who desires to know truth, doth delight in truth. This is proper to the heart of man, and even unseperable, that what it covets with desire, if the hope thereof be offered, it must needs rejoyce in it.

Axiom 4 Who delights in truth, comming to the truth doth embrace it. Nor can this be awan­ting from the nature of desire and love, bu [...] she must powre out her selfe upon the thing loved, and which she hath expected with joy, and joyne her selfe to it, and it to her.

Axiom 5. He that embraceth truth, holds truth. This also is proper to love, not to let go the thing loved Hence it is that men in their opinions (whe­ther they be true or false, sobeit they be but daubed or wash'd over with the paint of truth) persist so stiffly, that they had even rather dye, then throw away their opinions, which they have drunke-in in the name of truth.

Axiom 6. He that holds the truth, wishes o­thers to hold the same. This also is most naturall, and inseperable from the minde of man, whatsoe­ver he thinkes that he perceives truely, to wish that others may perceive the same, and may have as it were his owne minde, accounting it a wrong to him, if any will thinke othewise: and by hat act as it were silently upbraid him with errour. Hence ariseth amongst those that disagree in opinions (and especially about faith) that displeasure and [Page 156] inward hatred of their mindes: Because the minde reckoneth it selfe grieved, and is unqu [...]et, unlesse for the secure possession of truth it may have all men assenting, none contradicting.

Axiome 7. He that wisheth others to hold the truth, promotes and furthers others in the same. In every d [...]ff [...]rence of opinions we see it falls out thus, that some draw on others to their owne opi­nion by what meanes they can: Especially they who thinke they understand more then others, or are more inflamed with zeale. Hence all places re­sound and ring againe with the noyse of disputes, while one labours to gaine, and bring over to his opinion this person, and the other that, not onely one man another, but one Sect another, in Religi­on and Philosophy.

Axiome 8. He that promotes to truth, promotes by teaching.

For other meanes of propogating knowledges, besides teaching, are spurious, and unprofitable to that intention; as if any one perswade, command, enjoyne, compell to believe or thinke this or that, so or so. For to understand, or believe the truth, is to know: And to know is not a worke of the will, which that it may will any thing is wont to be bent with perswasions, commands, threatnings, constraint: But the worke of the understanding, which of its own nature is nothing but a Looking-glasse of things, receiving into it selfe whatsoever [Page 157] you shall off [...]r fitly and by cleare light, offer it therefore in teaching clearely, and fitly, and it will receive it.

Axiom 9. But many commonly teach and do not promote those they teach to what they desire. For the world is full of bookes and pens, where­with some strive earnestly to perswade others to be of their opinions; but with what profit? sure­ly little, and unbeseeming so great contentions. For amongst so many Troopes of Encounterers, if happily some one be converted, an hundred o­thers remaine settled in their place, nor suffer them­selves to be removed from their opinion. And those who are removed are carryed away as easily from the right path, into one that's erroneous, or from one errour into another, and from errour in­to truth. And that which is worse, Controversies are not onely not taken away, but multiplyed: And least they should be taken away, they are fixed in mens mindes, being hardned against one ano­ther.

Axiom 10. Therefore there is somewhat ne­cessarily a wanting to the common sorts of Teach­ers.

LXXV. For what's the cause, that from so good Premises such monstrous events follow? That all should be desirous of truth, and yet not finde it out? Or have we found it out truely (in some happy course) and are we bound indeed to [Page 158] shew it unto others, and yet cannot? It's most certain that we deale unskilfully with one another, and that the way and true manner of propagating truth is not yet commonly known. For surely those p [...]inciples which we have already seen im­planted [...]n every one by our good God, and to be in all men commonly, are good; to desire to see truth; to desire and follow if one can see: to de­sire also to have others partakers of the same truth, and to wish that, and for that cause not to be spa­ring of labour, and yet to availe nothing. Having the end, and having those who seriously desire the end, and yet the end not to be attained, is an infalli­ble token that we are either detective in mediums, or that the use of the mediums which we have are unknown: as here. To wit, that a t [...]ue Ladder for mans understanding by which the Leaders and the Led may certainly and safely ascend, and descend, is as yet wanting: which was to have beene shewne.

LXXVI. For if such a Ladder had been made, every mans minde would ascend to every top of things: which comes now to be shewn by a Lad­der of some certain Axioms.

• 1. Every man hath a mind or reason For with­out the mind he would not be a man, but a Bruit.
• 2. He who hath a minde, he thinks. For as it is the part of the eye to see, of the eare to heare, of the tongue to tast, of a nerve to touch; so it's [Page 159] proper and essentiall to the mind to think.
• 3. He who thinkes, he passes from thing to thing. For every thought is a certaine motion of the minde, by which we passe over from one thing to another, and from that againe to some other. Whence also it is called the discourse of the minde. For as the eye, when it hath many things to see, it cannot see those many things just at once, but one thing after another: So the minde whatsoever it thinkes, it thinkes something, of some thing, by something, one thing after another.
• 4. He who passeth from thing to thing, passeth step by step. For mens thoughts hold toge­ther, as a chaine, in which linke lets in linke. Yea, even when something comes into the minde upon a suddaine, being most remote from the former thought, yet it comes from some occasion; whether it come from within from something thought, or from without, from some sensible ob­ject. Uerily as there is no vacuum or gap in things, so neither in the understanding: And as one can­not go on with his feet but from the nearest (whe­ther pace, or staire or step) to the next; so by thought to come to any thing, unlesse it be from something, is impossible.
• 5. He who goes by steps, may go as far as the steps go. Therefore every man may ascend by the minde, as far as he sees the steps or staires of things before him. Which was to be demonstrated.

[Page 160]LXXVII. Now we must demonstrate that a Ladder for mans understanding may be made; and while I say made, I doe not understand any arbi­trary paines, as useth to be when Ladders are made ready for corporeall tops, so or so, as it plea­seth the Artificer; who takes the setting fracture, measure of the steps, from himselfe, or from those, for whose uses he prepa [...]es them. This mentall Ladder, because it shall onely be an image or re­semblance of the Ladder of things, made by divine artifice, it will not lie under our arbitrement or pleasure. The very things here shall give the mea­sure both to themselves and to the understanding. They erre dangerously, who thinke it may suffice that things be considered as they are to us, not of what kinde they are in themselves: Making our senses a rule to things, not things to the senses. We must do the quite contrary, and things are to be made (in which as in its Palace truth resides) the rule, both to themselves and to us, if we will at length struggle out of the tumult and clashings of opinions unto harmony, that as that knits things among themselves, so it may knit our minde about things. Our senses, the phantasie, the very minde or reason, have nothing which they can bring un­to or bring into things. But things by bringing themselves into the senses, the phantasie, the mind, forme true images of themselves, being perceived aright or orderly, but monstrous ones if amisse or [Page 161] disorderly. Nothing at all therefore is to be attri­buted to the sence or the minde by it selfe, but they are to be tyed most closely to things, unlesse we will be deceived and mockt without end and mea­sure.

LXXVIII. That then a Ladder for mans un­derstanding may be made from the Ladder of things, is evident: Because all things are disposed according to steps, as well the Universe it selfe, as every thing apart. For

• 1. Whatsoever is, is finite. (For concerning what is infinite, which is one thing, God, we doe not now treat.)
• 2. Whatsoever is finite hath bounds to its es­sence.
• 3. Whatsoever hath bounds to its essence, hath in its selfe something first, and somthing last, low­est and highest.
• 4. And where there is the first and the last, the lowest and the highest, there also there is the for­mer and the latter, the lower and the higher.
• 5. Where there is the former and the latter, the lower and the higher, there are degrees or steps.
• 6. And where are degrees, theres distinction; and where distinction, there is clearenesse: There­fore whatsoever is, hath distinct and cleare steps to its essence; which being well observed, lead on the minde into all the first and last, low and high places of everything.

[Page 162]LXXIX. We trust, that such a gradation, as may lead the mind to all things is in PANSOPHY, as well in the whole comprisall of things, as in e­very thing severally, or asunder. For as touching the whole, PANSOPHY hath a firme and unmove­able Basis, or a three fold ground-worke and sup­port Necessity, Possibility, Facility: which are solidly layd in the booke of Praecognita's. It hath also a splendid top as firme, Happinesse, or the rest of desires; which the last booke of PANSOPHY shall show in the delights of the mind enlightned in it selfe; and in the amendment and making bet­ter of all humane things, and in the illustrious pro­pagation of the glory of God. And it hath like­wise a firme medium to joyne the top to the Basis, and fit to receive solid steppings: to wit, on Gods part, most true Revelation made in works, words, and inward dictates, which are innate Notions en­graven in the mind of every man; and on our part, Sense, Reason, and Faith, that's to be given to the testimonies of God. Of which three-paird staffe or shank as it were, reared Parallelly, and every where connexed, that most solid Ladder of things is made: A five fold parted or broken Ladder, I say, arising through five divers Lofts or Stories. For the first and lowest Ladder or paire of staires is Me­taphysick, which raiseth the mind as far as it can through all generalls, known by themselves. The second in the second Region or Story of naturall [Page 163] things, discovers divine Artifices through all degrees of creatures. The third teacheth how to contem­plate the works of man, the supreame Creature, and sheweth how far the force of wit may ascend about created things. The fourth explains the com­merce of man with God himselfe his Creator, and thereby the mysteries of Salvation and Perdition. The fifth ascends from thence to contemplate the very increated God inhabiting his eternity. Where a man can go no higher, but he may go lower, to the right use of the Creator, of the Creatures, and of himselfe, that what life remains to any one, may be passed and spent in wise thoughts and actions, and that hereby at last there may be had a safe and sure and sweet passage by the gate of death to hap­py eternity.

LXXX. These things concerning the graduall frame of all PANSOPHY: that it may be mani­fest that there is no other foundation of humane wisdome layd, nor other end propounded, nor any possibility of comming to that end by other means, than that we go by here; to wit, whence, whither, and which way. All particular things may be dis­posed in the same graduall Series; yea they ought, because they cannot in another, if we will teach easily or plainly, and powerfully, that is scientifi­cally. Certainly, as he doats, who being set in the top of a Tower, would have some one fly from the earth to him, or fly over to him from the top of a [Page 164] neighbouring Towre, being not led on by steps. So doats he who thrusts his owne sense or meaning upon another, the truth thereof being not shewed to him leasurely and by little and little.

LXXXI. The use then of this gradual method shal be to teach the ignorant easily & plainly, and to un­teach those that erre powerfully. That these can­not but see the light of truth, and delight in it; and that the other cannot but take notice of their errour, and be won to the love of better and truer things. Now we must note, that to teach the ignorant, is but some one and a single businesse: but to teach those that erre requires double pains. For the igno­rant because they know neither truth nor falshood, are capable of both, and may be taught onely true things, they need not be untaught false things: the other because they are pre-occupated or taken up aforehand with false opinions, are first to be un­taught their errour, that they may be rendred both desirous and capable of truth, and then of being taught. Which as we have seen already cannot be done without gradation: because as the ignorant cannot be advanced to the top of cleare knowledge without steps, by a throw or leap: so neither can he that erres be cast down from the top of his error, through the stiffnesse of his opinions, which where­soever they once cleave to, they cleave to very close­ly, even to death, unlesse they be prudently taken out. For the mind of man (by the instinct of na­ture) [Page 165] beares that reverence to truth, that it con­stantly adores even the shaddow thereof; nor can it endure to be pluck'd from it, unlesse it be well taught things which are more true. Then that tru­er things may be taught, there's first need of a cer­taine stepping back, that is a bringing him off that which is absurd; that the very opinionist may plainly perceive that his opinion is contrary to the principles of knowledge, to Sense, Reason, Faith. And then he shall be judged brought off from the top of errour on to the plain, to wit, into the com­mon field of Principles. From whence by better and firmer consequences he shall readily suffer him­selfe to be led to the tops of better and firmer opi­nions, and shall be glad that he is brought thither, where he shall finde that he is better then before.

LXXXII. We must likewise observe this. That wher between the teacher and the learner (or rather the gain-sayer) the gap may be made up by some one medium, there is no need there of more, and that this demonstration may be dispatched by one Apo­dicticall Syllogisme; as we in the 67. and 68. A­phorisme have done. And where there is a greater distance, it needs more mediums, that there may be knit together by them like a chaine, an Apodicticall Sorites, as we have done in the 71. and 74. and 76. and 78. Aphorisme. Which manner of teaching, represents the Scale or Ladder to the eye, and the truth of chained consequence begins to appeare [Page 166] more evidently, then in the severed heapes of Pro­syllogismes. For example sake in Sect. 71.

• (1) Who hath good feet can go.
• (2) Who goes moves his feet forward one after another.
• (3) He who moves his feet forward one after another, goes.
• (4) He who goes, tends upwards, &c.
• (5) He who tends upwards, ascends by steps.
• (6) Who ascends by steps, may ascend, as far as the steps go.
• (7) Therefore whosoever hath feet, may ascend whithersoever the steps go.

LXXXIII. Here that the Sorites may be truely Apodicticall, and a firme chaine of truth, these things are to be well minded. (1) As in a chaine one linke layes hold on or goes within ano­ther; so doe Propositions cohere and keepe to­gether, here the predicate of the foregoing Propo­sition, being alwayes taken in into the subject of the following. (2) As in a chaine one linke is joyned fast to another essentially, that it may hold together inseperably: So here every Predicate may utter something essentiall of its subject, that it may be true without exception. (3) As in a chaine one linke is coupled with another, till the measure of the length be made up: So in a Sorites let one step be knit to another; till we shall come to that which may put an end to the Controversie. (4) [Page 167] Lastly, as in a chaine every linke is strengthned in it selfe severally, that it cannot be dissolved, other­wise there being but one broken the chain is broke too: So we must stay upon the sundry steps of a Sorites (when any one is led by this Ladder) so far as the truth thereof may be manifest, and not so much as any matter of doubt may remaine. And then we must proceed.

LXXXIV. But enough. We must make an end of our deliberations, and delineations, that we may come the better to the worke it selfe. For whatsoever we say, it may be still objected, where deedes are required, words are not sufficient. Now we promise not to give words but the worke: Though not in that perfection which we concei­ved in the Idea. That's it which we so often pro­test appertaines not to one man, nor to one Age, and this they understand of themselves, who dis­creetly weigh and consider things well. Nature her selfe would not have any great matter to be soone done, but hath set hard-ship in the way of every brave and goodly worke, and so ordered it in generation, that the greater sort of living creatures should be kept the longer in their dams bellies. Then why may not this so great a birth not of our wit, but of an age, stand in neede both of due time, and also a good many mid-wifely and faithfull helpers? SOLOMONS Temple was not perfected by one Worke-man: There Carpenters, [Page 168] Brasiers, Masons, Gold-Smiths, Jewellers, Engra­vers, Painters bestowed their paines. Here's likewise imployment and worke for Philosophers, Divines, Politicians, Physitians, and all ingenious men whatsoever. Therefore let them make haste hither, and not hold off, or refuse to furnish a com­mon treasury with common treasure, and to en­crease it by a common care; for its a common bu­sinesse which we have in hand.

LXXXV. Nor are present persons onely in­vited to go about the same thing with the same zeale, but even those who shall be after us. For though we hope the perfection of this worke will be still greater through a perpetuall progresse, yet we may never expect it at the height in this life. For as Number hath Unity for its beginning, but going on even in infinitum finds no end: So the wisdome of God communicated to us, arises from small principles, and diffusing it selfe by an infinite, can never be wholly exhausted. Which SYRA­CIDES observing sayd: The first man knew her not perfectly: No more shall the last finde her out (chap. 24.28.) Thus industrious spirits shall have something which they may continually sup­ply, amend, perfect and polish with the commen­dation of their names to Posterity, but no detri­ment at all to things themselves. For truth is a so­lid thing, the more it is poysed and brandished, the more purely it shines. Nor is there any roome [Page 169] for Impostures, when all places are full of num­bers, measures, ballances, and touch-stones, nor ought is admitted but what hath undergone a se­vere and full examination on all sides.

LXXXVI. And O thou our God! who hast found out each way of knowledge, and given it to JACOB thy Sonne, and ISRAEL thy Beloved (B 3. 37.) take pitty on us, and shew us thy wayes, teach us thy paths, lead us in thy truth, and teach us: For thou art the God of our salvation, on thee do we wait. (Psal. 25.4.5.)