HAving, out of a tender reſpect of my dear Country, wherein I have enjoyed many comforts in this life, and care of the honour of that Religion whereby I hope to attaine a crowne in the life to come, repreſented, with a Letter, an abſtract of the Armies formerly publiſht overtures for accommodation, to their Officers aſſembled in Councell. And being uncertaine, whether the ſaid Paper were delivered according to my directions, or if it were, being certaine that it was not regarded, but inſtead of purſuing their former offers for Peace, we meet with an over-ly acknowledgment of their errour therein, and an high attempt to fruſtrate this Treaty; firſt preſented to the Parliament, and after to the people in Print: I thought it my duty, to compare their former pretences for Peace, with their preſent propoſitions for diſturbance, to ſee which in the ballance of reaſon, and Scripture, may ſeeme more ponderous, to weigh downe the judgement of an indifferent obſerver.

And firſt of all it is to be obſerved, how apparently contrary their preſent is, to former Remonſtrances. The former clearly declaring no Peace probable to be firme, and laſting, without proviſion for the quiet, ſafety, and Honour of the King, and His Royall Family, and indulgence likewiſe to His Party. This is iterated to be the way to conquer hearts, to remove ſeeds of fewds, and future War. But the latter, like the Lawes of Draco, is writ in blood, breathing out Tryall or Execution againſt the King, Prince, and Duke of Yorke, and and all rigour to their partakers. The former was well made out to us by a double experience: for firſt, while theſe things were held out by the Army, all hearts were quiet, and expectations fixt to ſee whether ſuch faire propoſals would not put a happy period to our miſerable diſtractions.

But when all theſe overtures proved but empty flaſhes▪ or golden dreames: and inſteed of happy Peace, with ſome ſatisfaction to all intereſts, to make it laſting; Behold the King firſt immured in a remote Caſtle, afterwards laid aſide with Votes of no more Addreſſes, and thoſe that erewhile (when they needed Him) interpoſed ſo gloriouſly for Him, voluntarily ingaging to beare out thoſe Votes againſt Him, and all others: what followed, but heart Land, and Sea commotions, whence ſuch a dangerous flame, that if God had not wonderfully interpoſed, to try us with one more lucidum intervallum, to ſee whether we would be wiſer, and honeſter actum eſſet: there had been an end of our hopes, whether of Reformation or contended for Liberty, if the King be ſo minded as they afterwards repreſent Him. And though the Land be now quieted, yet Sea, and hearts remaine ſtill troubled. The Parliament awaken'd by this, plainly ſaw that the ſtate of the Nation would not be ſetled without the King, nor the hearts of the Nation quiet, without the Kingdome be ſetled: for till ſetling, the Husband-man, Graſier, and Tradeſman, the ſupport of a Nation for ſubſiſtence, and wealth, live in fear, and labour in vaine. And though the diſeaſe be quaſht, the cauſe not being removed, a little time muſt of neceſſity bring a relapſe, and the danger of relapſes naturall, or civill, Phyſitions and Stateſ-men very well know. The Parliament finding by ſad experience the errour of the Vote for no more Addreſſes, reſolved upon a Perſonall Treaty with the King. And though backward to it, while all was in combuſtion: yet after God had cleared the coaſts, they proceed with more celerity, and alacrity, and things are very far, and faire for a good iſſue: And yet in Treaty all things are propoſed, that both Nations thought requiſite for the freedome, and happineſſe of both Kingdomes; for which they had ingaged ſo deepely. And it is very obſervable that during the late ſecond War, rumours were ſpread abroad (whether true, or ad faciendum populum to pleaſe the people, let God judge) that the. Officers of the Army had ſeene their errours too, and if things were quieted, it ſhould appear, that they would hereafter know their ſphere and acquieſce in the Parliaments determinations: Yet now when upon ſo good tearmes peace is at our doores, Behold a thundering Declaration againſt His Majeſty, and His Royall Family, to breake Treaty, and alter the forme of preſent government, with other things, which boade nothing but perpetuall diſtractions, to neceſſitate a perpetuall Army, knowing they muſt be the men, and ſo ſtill be in a circumſtance to over-awe all that ſhall dare to croſſe their deſignes, wils and humours. And now a query put upon all Treaty, eſpecially this preſent Treaty, reſolved to be neither juſt nor ſafe: but upon what grounds comes now to be examined.

And firſt after many tedious circumlocutions, apt not to inſtruct, but to diſtract the Reader, They grate upon the Houſe, the ingrate remembrance of the Vote of no more Addreſſes. But the Houſes have learned that ſecundae cogitationes meliores, ſecond thoughts are wiſer: but our wiſe Anceſtors left us no proverbe for third thoughts. That were indeed to manifeſt that inſtability, that is inconſiſtent with ſolid ſagacity. After this as tedious paines is taken to make it ſeeme probable, that the Parliament went not into this Treaty voluntarily, but inforced: But all that can in truth be aſſerted in this particular will I beleeve but amount to this.

That the diſcontent and danger that did ariſe from the Vote of [no Addreſſes] did convince them, that that was not the way to ſettle the Nation in aſſured peace, and quiet: And ſo that a Perſonall Treaty was more for the Publique good, then the Vote of no Addreſſes: for, had the Parliament entertained the motion of a Perſonall Treaty through feare onely, then would they have Treated, where thoſe they feared, deſired it; that is, in, or about London. But they would not condeſcend to it any where but in the Iſle of Wight: Whence we gather but that the Parliament were free from force in the thing, becauſe they over-ruled the place: And that the People were free from deſigne, otherwaies then for ſetledneſſe by Treaty, becauſe they did acquieſce in a Treaty any where.

After our Remonſtrants, proceed pag. 14, 15. to diſpute the Juſtice and Safety of this Treaty: But uſher it in with the ſtate of the Queſtion. And firſt, becauſe the Safety in queſtion relates to Publique intereſt, they ſet downe the ſumme of the publique intereſt of a Nation, in relation to common Right, and Freedome; and therein firſt, lay downe, that for all matters of Supream truſt, they have a Common and ſupreame Councell, to conſiſt of Deputies, or Repreſentees freely choſen by themſelves, &c. But here's a great ſtumble at the threſhold, and eſſentiall errour in the very entrance: for they are not to ſet downe (if they will ſpeak to purpoſe) the intereſt of an Eutopia, an imaginary People; but what is the Publique intereſt of this Nation, as it now ſtands, having a ſupreame Councell, partly of Commons Elect, partly of Lords Hereditary: and by the continued conſtitution of our Parliaments, the Power, and Priviledges of the Houſe of Peers, is ſuperiour to that of the Commons: and thoſe Rights and Priviledges of both Houſes they have proteſted, ſworne, and covenanted to maintaine in generall. And particularly, (and that if I miſtake not, to draw on their conſent to the Votes of no Addreſſes) the Army, by ſome of their Officers, did declare to the Lords at their Barre, (and after to all the world) that they would maintaine and defend the Priviledges of the Peers of England. It's apparent then, that the ſtate of the Queſtion which theſe have drawn, will not conſiſt with the fundamentall conſtitution of the Government of England, which the Parliament have often declared, and all have proteſted not to alter; and therefore, how impertinent their Arguments muſt needs be on ſuch a falſe foundation, the intelligent Reader will eaſily judge: For the ſame errour runs along, in all the particulars of the ſtate of the Queſtion, that are given of an Imaginary people, not of this People of England, under that frame of Government which is already eſtabliſh'd amongſt them.

In the application of this to the ſtate of our National affairs, they aſcribe to the King an indeavour by ſeverall Warres to maintain an Abſolute intereſt in Himſelfe, againſt that Publique intereſt laid downe by them, which they ſay was aſſerted by the Parliament: which two particulars, both King, and Parliament have publiquely diſavowed. The King in His Anſwers to the 19 Propoſitions delivered at Beverly, clearly acknowledging this Monarchy not to be pa • e, but mixt with Ariſtocracy, and Democracy; the wiſdome of Our Aunceſtors, having in Our conſtitution, gathered what was good, avoided what was evill, in all the three. And further, that the Monarchy was not abſolute, but Regular in its administration. And the Parliament all along declaring, that they would not violate the juſt Right or Greatneſſe of the King, nor alter the frame of Government eſtabliſhed. And how can it be imagined, that the Lords ſhould ingage for ſuch an Intereſt, as deſpoiles them of all part in the Supreame truſt, wherein they have the largeſt ingagement, and an Hereditary right?

After, pag. 20. they tell us of ſome particular Intereſts incident with the generall, both to King and Parliament: wherein in my judgment, they are as much miſtaken in what is ſaid in reference to the King, as they were in the generall, for they ſay, it was His intereſt to ſuppreſſe the power of Godlineſſe, or any thing of Conſcience obliging, above, or againſt humane conſtitutions, &c. for, what is the intereſt of a King, but to get the peoples hearts? and how is that better gotten then by countenancing Godlineſſe? And a King that hath a Nation ingaged to him by Oath upon Oath, the greateſt tie to Conſcience. And a King that pretends but to be a Regular Monarch, what can more advance His intereſt, then to countenance conſcientiouſneſſe? So many plaine precepts lying obvious in Gods word, for Chriſtians to be obedient and ſubject to ſuch for conſcience ſake. But to let that alone, and come to the diſpute, where two things are ſuppoſed, 1. That where a Perſon is truſted with a Limited tower, and obliged by Oath, to rule according to Lawes, and breaks that Oath and trust, &c. He doth thereby forfeit all that power and truſt he had, and ſets the People free to take their beſt advantage, and to proceed in judgment againſt him. But firſt of all, this ſuppoſition, that abuſe of Power is in this caſe a forfeiture, muſt not be aſſented unto. There is a Limited power, that is delegatory, ſub poena, under paine of forfeiture: and there is a Limited power Hereditary, which deſcends abſolutely, but is not to be exerciſed without limits, and thoſe confirmed by Oath. Our Kings truſt is of the latter ſort, He is King, and ſo proclaimed, that is Heire, aſſoone as His Predeceſſour is dead, and exerciſes all Regall power, and other Officers their inferiour powers under Him, ſome yeares ſometimes before Coronation, and ſo before His Oath. Beſides, in the Oath of Allegiance, we abſolutely ſweare to maintaine the King in His Regality, and His Heires after Him. Though therefore becauſe He is to be regulated, we may tie His hands to prevent future Tyranny, yet we cannot ſtrip Him of His juſt Regall power, becauſe he holds not on condition of forfeiture.

The ſecond ſuppoſition is, of a King breaking His truſt, and fayling in His attempt, brought to quit His claim to abſoluteneſſe, but afterwards ſhall indeavour by force to overthrow all againe, and ſo raiſe Warre, &c. Then he muſt be guilty of the higheſt Treaſon, at leaſt of all the bloudſhed in the unjuſt Warre, pag. 22.23. And then it is inferr'd that all this the King hath done, &c. But here I deſire candour to be uſed, and conſideration to be had, to what His Majeſty held forth, and what probability there might be of His ſincerity therein.

Firſt, in all the late buſineſſe He never pretended to abſoluteneſſe, but onely to maintaine the Lawes, and Legall Rights of Himſelf and Subjects.

2. The Oath that He had taken at Coronation for the protection of His people, and in ſpeciall the Clergy, did carry a very probable ſhow to make him hold faſt the Militia, without which He could not protect them; and to ingage Him to uſe His power for protection of Biſhops, whoſe ſtanding He thought lawfull, and whoſe immunities He had ſworne to maintaine.

3. As the Parliament had Jealouſies of Him, ſo was He not without faire colours of Jealouſies from them, of their intendment to overthrow Monarchy, which ſuch courſes as are in this Remonſtrance, may more confirme Him in.

Theſe things conſidered, He wants a great deale of charity, yea juſtice, that ſhal not acquit the King of any wilful murther: Gods knowes His heart, but His pretences were faire, and He had very probable grounds to lead him to theſe pretences, to ſtand on His Guard, to maintaine His legall Rights, and the Rights of thoſe His Subjects, that were afraid of too much alteration in Religion; which I beleeve were the greater part for number.

As therefore if He had conquered, though the letter of the Law had made His Oppoſites, Traytours; yet becauſe the Law had proved them to have been Traytours onely in action, not in intention, they might have expected favour, and it had been unjuſt to have dealt with them, as in a caſe uncontroverted, where there had been wilfull tranſgreſſion.

So ſhould it now be conſidered in the caſe of the KING, and His Party: and therefore in laying the caſe, the KING is not onely unjuſtly, but uncharitably uſed.

Neither ſo farre as my reaſon extends is it truly ſaid, that a few of thoſe many evils that our King hath acted were judged capitall in ſeverall of His Predeceſſours.

We read indeed of ſome of His Predeceſſours baſely, and wickedly murthered, but never any ſuffering death as the reſult of any judgment paſs'd upon Him. From this miſtaken ſuppoſition ariſeth that want of change or remorſe, which they complaine of in the King.

The fault they here lay to His charge, He will confeſſe, were He guilty of it, He hath cauſe to abhorre Himſelf in duſt, and aſhes. But He will deny their ſuppoſition, and that He intended no ſlavery in people, nor abſoluteneſſe in Himſelf, but defence of Himſelf and thoſe of His People, that craved His protection in their Legall Rights. And His errour was to be jealous of thoſe that He ſhould have confided in: And from this errour hath growne theſe ſad conſequences. But ſo long as the Army go on with ſuch Declarations, they will free Him from errours, juſtifie His jealouſies, countenance His defence.

But yet nearer, for the juſtice of accommodation with the King without triall, or puniſhment: I think it reſts in this, when the Law acquits, civil Judges may acquit; but the Law acquits the Perſons of our Kings: Therefore civil Judges may. You confeſſe ſuch maximes as give abſolute impunity to Kings, and that the Kings of England can do no wrong, are found in Law-books, (though you ſay) as Heireloomes of the Conqueſt. But if they be in our Law-books, books, they are legall Priviledges, and preheminences by our Lawes, and then thoſe that have taken the Oath of Supremacy, and ſworne to maintaine all the preheminencies, and Priviledges of the Crowne, (as all Parliament men have at their admiſſion) cannot puniſh the Perſon of the King, becauſe its an infringing of a legall priviledge.

I might adde ſuch Judiciary proceeding againſt, or without Law, will not ſtand with their Oaths, that have ſworne to maintaine Law and legall Rights of all.

But pag. 50. they ſay, they cannot ſee how it may ſtand with juſtice, to puniſh the Miniſters, and let the Head go free: nay, they further ſay, what ever grounds may be brought to exempts Kings from humane juſtice, or excuſe them when they wilfully give commiſſion &c. The ſame reaſon will ſerve to abſolve, and indempuifie their Miniſters, &c. At leaſt, they ſay, they would faine heare one principle for the one, which would not by rationall deduction, extend to the other.

I Anſwer, firſt, it cannot be denied but that in evill things, he that gives the Commiſſion, and command, is deepeſt in trangreſſion; ſo on their ſuppoſition, a King muſt deſerve more blame and puniſhment then His Inſtruments: But then ſecondly, it is to be conſidered, that humane Lawes and penalties look at ſafety, as well as demerit; now to puniſh a King is like to ſet all on a flame, and ſo to endanger the Weal publike, therfore though their guilt be great, yet they are left to God to avoid inconvenience. But now Miniſters deſerve puniſhment though not ſo much, and the puniſhment of them, may free the Common wealth from danger for future, for if the King can have no Inſtruments, He can doe no miſchief.

To conclude this point, about the justice of accommodation: let me aske them this Queſtion, have they not read what David did, in his Civil Wars both with Iſhboſheth and Abſalom? cloſing them up without any trial, or execution, (though much blond was ſhed in both.) And if Kings may accommodate with Subjects without any trying, and puniſhing them, to avoid future In ••••• ctions; why may not Subjects for the ſame reaſon, & on the ſame tearmes, accommodate with their Kings, and be blameleſſe? an Argument from a Scripture example is cogent, where the reaſon is the ſame, elſe our Saviour would not have uſed it, Mat. 12.3, 4.

Why did this Army themſelves gives pardons to that neſt of thoſe in Oxford, whom they accounted the originall Delinquents? But to prevent blood, and danger by loſſe of time: why may not the Parliament then paſſe by the errours of the King, to prevent the blood-ſhed, that will inevitably follow, upon rigour, and execution?

But now to the ſecond queſtion touching the ſafety of this accommodation; againſt which they argue: Firſt, from experience, that ſeldome or never have ſuch accommodations proved eaſe to the people: for anſwer, I would demand againe, where the rejection of a King, and His poſterity, hath not proved the fatall cauſe of endleſs civill War? and whether that be not as deſtructive to publique intereſt as any thing to be feared from accommodation? After the Depoſing of Richard the Second, how long did this Nation continue in blood, and how endleſſe was the contention? till an accommodation in the union of the divided Houſes by the marryage of their heires: nor would that ſerve when there was but a ſuſpition of an In Perkin Worbeeke. Heir male of the Houſe of Yorke ſurviving. And ſo is it like ſtill to be. They have not now all the ſeed Royall in their hands, if they would with Athaliah deſtroy them. Nor are they like to have, ſith they propoſe ſuch a way of ſummons to the Prince, and Duke of Yorke, as if it be not intended to diſcourage Them from returning, yet muſt it needs have that effect. And they ſo baniſht for ſuch a cauſe, viz. ingagement to free their Father from ſo cloſe Impriſonment: on what heart will not move pitty, that hath either the ſence of humanity, or the affection of a father, or a ſon in him? And ſo draw on Forreigne force, to joyne with a diſcontented, and oppreſſed party here, which they confeſſe to be numerous: which is a danger that can neither be avoided, nor parallel'd on the other hand.

Next for their arguing the likely-hoods of the Kings willingneſs to breake all thoſe conceſſions, which He ſhall grant: We may argue with more probability to the contrary. Kings that intend to breake, care not what they grant, ſo it be not of things that diſable them from breaking. But our King in the late Treaty, hath been moſt free, and ſpeedy in paſſing away His owne power, and tenacious onely in thoſe things wherein not onely conſcience was pretended, but without great uncharitableneſſe we cannot queſtion but that he was really ſcrupled about them. And he that will adventure life and all, rather then grant one thing againſt conſcience, why ſhall not we hope, that He will be as tender in keeping, when conſcience is once ingaged in other things?

For what is held forth that the King may pretend His non ingagement to His conceſſions, becauſe under force. I Anſwer as before, if the King had any ſuch thought, He would not care what He granted, becauſe all were nullities. Beſides, though there be a diſpute in Law, whither promiſes or obligations, made under reſtraint, be binding, yet all Divines know, that to a conſciencious man its ſinfull to take the oath he intends not, or is not lawfull for him to keepe, and if the thing covenanted be lawfull, and intended to be kept: he that makes conſcience of any thing, will make conſcience of ſuch a covenant: by taking whereof though he ſuffer ſome damage, yet he purchaſeth life, and liberty to himſelfe.

After there is a long diſcourſe of the advantages the King ſhall have, to undoe all if He have a mind to it. And if the King after all theſe conceſſions, (which are more in many things then the far greater part of His people do deſire) ſhall be rejected and fall, will there not be that pitty to the ſuffering, that indignation againſt the executioner, that will cauſe more dangerous riſing then ever, when any Forraigne helpe is brought by the Princes either to relieve, or revenge their Fathers ſufferings? Therefore for ought I ſee, the dangers of accommodation are but probable, and ſcarce that. The dangers of rejection, and execution inevitable. I would therefore propoſe it ſeriouſly to the conſciences of theſe men, whether it be truely the fear of danger to the publique intereſt of the Nation, that makes them ſo averſe to accommodation, or rather to the private intereſts of them, and a party in the Nation; and in that, feare not ſo much of ſuffering evill, as loſing either thoſe great hopes or holds, that by the preſent diſtractions they enjoy.

Afterwards they proceed to their owne excuſe for formerly being ſo forward for Accommodation, and Moderation to the King and His Party, which they now ſo much oppoſe. And indeed they did then hold forth ſuch good grounds for publique intereſt, as to root out ſeeds of future war, to conquer hearts, &c. That it will never be beleeved, but either then they were not reall: but did onely pretend, to ſtrengthen themſelves with his party, which done, they ſhewed themſelves in their colours, or elſe that now private intereſt doth carry them againſt that of the publike, which they really followed, when their owne private was involved with it. But they tell us, they were cleared in their judgements by the Parliaments Votes of No Addreſſes, and the Reaſons of it. As though there were any thing therein now, which had not been known, and murmured long before, even during the time of Addreſſes.

But they then come to anſwer an Objection from the Covenant ingaging to a perpetuall care to endeavour the preſervation of the Kings Perſon and Authority, &c. and ſo concluding under a neceſſity of perpetuall Addreſſes. And to this,

Firſt, they ſay, the Covenant, as other promiſſory Oathes, heaping together ſeverall diſtinct intereſts, which may be inconſiſtent, and yet ingageth poſitively to them all, may become a ſnare.

I would they would conſider this in the Kings Coronation Oath, wherein mixt intereſts intangled him, that it might move ſome pity in them, as looking on him under a ſnare by his Oath, and not take all in the worſt ſenſe, as though all the oppoſition he made had flowed from wicked principles in him.

Secondly, they ſay, the undertaking for the King in the Covenant, was not abſolute, but conditionall to preſerve His Perſon and Power in maintenance of Religion and Liberties, &c.

I Anſwer, Though there be ſuch a clauſe in the Scotch Covenant, yet in the Proteſtation, in the Oath of Allegeance and Supremacie, there was no ſuch condition, for evaſion: and I hope our Engliſh Oathes are as binding as the Scotch Covenant: I would therefore know how they can anſwer either for execution or depoſition to the obligation of thoſe oathes.

Secondly, they ſay, the Covenant, as for the civill part of it, is betweene man and man; and the King not concurring, we ſtand not ingaged to him.

This is a grand miſtake, for the whole Covenant is to and with God, though in ſome things in it, we engage to performe duties to man. And though in Covenants betweene man and man, that are mutuall and conditionall, one ſtands not bound, unleſſe the other accept: yet the caſe was not ſo in this Covenant, but both Nations to cleere themſelves from any evill intentions towards the King, and to approve their loyaltie, doe profeſſe to men, and covenant to God, theſe things, not with the King, but for the King, and his intereſt. And therefore an ingagement lyes before God, though the King never take the Covenant.

But I would put a queſtion to them upon another branch of this Covenant, and the Proteſtation, which is againſt all Popery. And I would know of them, what point of Popery hath been more fully, or cleerly oppoſed by Proteſtants, Engliſh and others, then that Jeſuiticall one of murthering, and depoſing Princes? And I would know of them, how they will excuſe their way of depoſition, and execution, from ſymbolizing with that point of Popery ſo condemned? I doubt not then but I may lawfully conclude, that the Army have more cauſe to repent of their preſent, then former Remonſtrances; and may doe well to interpoſe onely for the intereſt of themſelves, and party, to be conſidered in the cloſure: but deſiſt from their indeavour of an abſolute breach.

I will ſhut up all with a ſtory in our Engliſh Chronicle, which hath often been in mine eye, wiſhes, and hopes too, mutatis mutandis, ſince the beginning of our Warre: Our Henry the third, having firſt loſt the love of his people, and after faine into their power: And being by meanes of his ſonne delivered, he reflected (warn'd by ſmart and danger) on his former errors, reformed them: And being exalted, ſtudied not revenge, but the exalting of his throne by righteouſneſſe, and thereby made his people happy, and himſelfe glorious. And lived to faſhion his Edw. the 1. ſtyled Englands Juſtinian: for though as many awes were made in his, as any other kings time; yet none of his were ever aboliſht by following Parliaments. ſon and ſucceſſour to make him partner of his owne experience and authority, ſo framed him to affect vertue and glory, that he ever ſhewed himſelfe in all his actions, capable to command not the Realme onely, but the whole world. Vid. Sir Rob: Cottons Hiſt. of Hen. 3. pag. 39. to the end. If we have ſo much faith and piety to pray, why may we not have ſo much charity as to hope that our King reſtored by Accommodation, will apply thoſe incomparable abilities, that in his ſuffering he hath made demonſtration of, ſo to promote the happineſſe of His people, as may be a full reparation of Himſelf in Honour, and them in damages. So prayeth a lover of his Country, a Zelot (onely in the way of conſcience,) for his King, and a friend to the Army in regard of that piety that many of them profeſſe, and he humbly begs them all to ſtudy to practiſe and honour: and that by avoiding all ſuch courſes that may give ſuſpition, that men that pretend higheſt to piety, and the publique, do yet deviate from the rules of both to uphold themſelves and their private intereſt.

And thus have I adventured to give my ſenſe of ſome part of this Declaration ſo farre as it contradicts their former overtures for accommodation, to the maintenance of which I was ſomewhat ingaged by what I had formerly done.

And this I hope will not be altogether uſeleſſe, till ſome man of more leiſure, depth, and inſight of ſtate affaires, ſhall fully ſhew how weak and impolitick they are in their whole Declarat.

Yet one thing further I cannot but touch, to wit, that Propoſall, pag. 66. The ſumme whereof is this, That it be declared, That ſuch Repreſentatives (that is, of the Houſe of Commons) have, and ſhall have the Supreame power and truſt, as to the making of Lawes, Conſtitutions, and Offices, &c. and as to the altering, and repealing the ſame, the making of Peace, and Warre, and to be the higheſt finall judgment, in all civill things without any appeale, &c. And after this, and other Propoſals, is this clauſe added, pag. 67. That n •• e may be capable of any benefit, by the agreement, who ſhall not conſent or ſubſcribe thereunto.

Here note firſt, that both King and Lords are excluded from any ſhare in the Supremacy: now I would faine know with what modeſty ſuch a thing can be propounded to the Houſe of Commons, and that by diverſe, themſelves Members of that Houſe, when they know, that all the Members of the Houſe of Commons take an Oath of Supremacy to the King, at their admiſſion, and all that have taken either Covenant, or Proteſtation, are bound by thoſe Oathes to maintaine the Priviledges of both Houſes of Parliament? And who knoweth not that by the preſent conſtitution of our Parl. The Houſe of Peers is in many things ſuperiour to that of the Commons: will they propoſe things for civill advantage, which will involve both themſelves, and thoſe to whom they propoſe them in plaine perjury the firſt day? Is this conſiſtent with piety? Nay with common honeſty? And yet here is a further miſchief ſtill, for if the Major part of them ſhould through fear, or deluſion become ſo vile as to receive, and promote theſe propoſals, then the agreement contained in them muſt be ſubſcribed by all, and non-ſubſcribers, be excluded from any benefit by the agreement. And then I would know of them in what condition theſe free people ſhall be in, that for want of ſubſcribing, ſhall be excluded the benefit of the agreement? ſhall they not looſe the benefit of Free borne ſubjects? and what if they cannot in conſcience ſubſcribe it? As if they have taken, and make conſcience either of Proteſtation, or Covenant, or Oath of Supremany, (as far as I can ſee) they cannot, would they impoſe ſuch a penalty to inforce conſcience?

Sure this makes me remember that which was fore-told me many years agoe: That if theſe great pretenders for liberty of conſcience, could once be poſſeſt of power, they would be the greateſt oppreſſours of conſcience, that ever were in England ſince the Reformation. And ſure the Biſhops impoſed ſubſcription onely on Miniſters, and on penalty of loſing Eccleſiaſticall livings onely: but theſe would have a ſubſcription impoſed on all, upon penalty of loſing the Priviledge of Free Deniſens. Doth not this call upon City and Country to awake, and to Petition the Parliament for, and to ſtand by them in the rejection of ſuch Propoſals, as will either ingage to the defiling of their conſciences by a grievous ſin, or expoſe them to greateſt miſery, and ſlavery? or elſe I may conclude with ſorrow. Fuimus Angli.