ALCON of Creet, as a Dragon was embracing his son, shot an arrow into the heart, and hurt not the child, but the Dragon died imme­diately. Our State-Archers will now shew their skill and art, if (by Gods blessing on their labor) tyranny and oppression may be ta­ken away, without prejudice or hurt to the Nation: and for the better carrying on of so necessary and good a work, I have undertaken to prove, that when Princes become Dragons (as the Scripture usually stileth great Tyrants) Isa 27.1. Ezek, 29.3. 'tis lawful for the supream and Soveraign power of the People to shoot at them, and kill them likewise; and whatsoever to the contrary is objected, either from Scripture, Law, Reason, or inconveniences, I have fully answered and refuted.

1. Objec. First, The Rebellion of Korah, Dathan, and Abiram, is men­tioned, from which example some conclude, that all opposition and [Page 2] resistance is unlawfull of the people against their King: Ergo, this kind of proceeding much more.

Answ. This objection being impertinent, I shall speak the lesse to it. 1. Because a faithfull officer in the due exe­cution of his office, may not be opposed, resisted, punished: will it follow, that the unfaithfull and wicked must be left alone? Moses was a lawful Magistrate, and Aaron a true Minister of God, faithfull and good men both, and there­fore to be obeyed; but Kings becoming perjur'd tyrants, are not so; neither is there any Allegeance or obedience from the people due to them, as we shall hereafter shew.

But 2. If this example be well considered, it will suffici­ently serve to justify so much as by me is here asserted, and thus I prove it: For any man or men causlesly to mutiny against the Supream Power of a Kingdom, and most unna­turally and impiously invade mens Lives, Liberties, and E­states, oppose Justice, and seek to bring a whole Nation to utter desolation, such lawfully may be resisted, suppressed; yea, by the example of Korah, &c. put to death: Now cer­tain it is, howsoever Kings ruling according to Law are publick Ministers of State, neverthelesse degenerating into Tyrants, and acting against Law, they are in such a case, no more then private men: because whatsoever at first was confirmed upon them in respect of Office, it did not in any sort make a change upon their persons; neither set them at any distance touching subjection to the Law, either a­ctive or passive, more then they were before; their personal estate was the same still as before, neither are they exempt­ed from corporall punishment if they break the Law, more then any other men.

2. objec. It is further objected, Exod. 22.28. Thou shalt not revile the gods, nor curse the Ruler of thy people. Again, Ecc. 10.20. Curse not the King, no not in thy thoughts, and curse not the rich in thy bed-chamber. If Kings may not be curs'd, much less put to death by their Subjects.

Answ. 1. The first text is not properly meant of Kings, but pertains rather to Judges and other sort of Rulers; and [Page 3] so the Jew Doctors understand the place. 2. Solomon well explains the place, Prov. 17.26. It is not good to strike Princes for equity; that is, evil speaking of Magistrates for well do­ing, is a wicked and vile thing. Hier. in hunc. ver. [...] 3.The other text by some is applyed unto Christ the King of his Church. But take it literally, because Kings may not be curs'd, which is prohi­bited under pain of condemnation, will it therefore follow that Kings may be theeves, murderers, traytors, tyrants, and commit any wickednesse, and not be cal'd to an ac­count by such who are above them, and have a lawfull Po­wer in their hands to punish them? 4. The place com­prehends Rich-men as well as Kings, and therefore it may be as well concluded from it, that no man if rich, may be punished for any crime or fault whatsoever. 5. Both these if rightly applyed are altogether for us: for whosoever (whether King or Prince) shall curse and revile the Su­pream and Soveraign State of the Land, and that for well doing, as call them Rebels and Traytors, and violently seek to destroy them, he absolutely violateth this Law, Thou shalt not revile the gods. It is true, there is here no punishment set down for him, that should thus rail: But seeing (as one writes on the place) Willet Qu. 57. he that railed on his father and mother was to die for it, Exod. 21.17. much more worthy of death was he, which should curse the fathers of the Countrey.

3. objec. I counsell thee to keep the Kings commandment, and that in re­gard of the oath of God. Be not hasty to go out of his sight, stand not in an evill thing, for he doth whatsoever pleaseth him. Where the word of a King is, there is power, and who may say to him, What dost thou? Ecc. 8.2,3,4. Hence the Royallists argue, If the word of a King must stand, and his power not to be resisted, how can his Subjects lawfully touch his Person?

Answ. 1. To keep the Kings commandment must be under­stood of things just and lawfull: otherwise (as the Apostle saith) We must obey God rather than man. It is well laid down by Philo, Philo de vita Mo­sis. Regis officium est jubere quae oportet fieri, & vetare a quibus abstinere debet: caeterum jussie faciendorum, & interdi­ctio cavendoru m proprie ad Legem pertinet. Atque ita consequi­tur, [Page 4] ut Rex animata sit, Lex vero sit Rex justissimus. The office of a King is to command, those things which ought to be don, and to forbid those things which ought to be avoyd­ed. But the command of things to be don, and the forbid­ding of things not to be don, properly belongeth to the Law. And so it followeth that a King is a living Law, and the Law is a most just King.

2. The oath of God here, is the oath which is taken in the name of God, and whereof God is made a witnesse: The meaning is, the King is so to be obeyed, as that God is not to be disobeyed, and that the oath made to the King is so to be kept, as that the oath made to God be not broken. Hence Tremellius reads it, sed pro ratione juramenti Dei, but with regard to the oath of God: shewing that Subjects are by their Allegeance and Covenant no further obliged to observe the Laws of earthly Princes, then are agreeable to Gods commandments.

3. Whereas it is said, He doth whatsoever pleaseth him: this must be understood only of a good King, and just cōmands, as if it were supplyed with, whatsoever pleaseth God, not licet si libet, as if all were lawfull whatsoever a King should do; but the genuine sence of the place is, stand not in an evill mat­ter, for the King hath power to do whatsoever he pleaseth in way of justice to punish thee, if thou continue obstinate in evil courses, to forgive thee, if thou confesse, submit and crave pardon of him for the same.

4. Who may say to him what dost thou? that is reprove, or censure him for doing justly as Job expounds it, Chap. 34 18. and so must the place be understood: to wit, that no man may presume to question the Kings just actions, war­ranted by the Law of God and men, but otherwise Kings may, and are to be reprehended, as we have sundry exam­ples for it, in Elias reproving Ahab; Elisha, Jehoram; Na­than, David; John Baptist, Herod. 1 Sam. 13.13. 2 King. 3.14. Jer. 1 [...] 28. chap. 22.3. Ho. 5.1.2 Yea, not only so, but to be resisted, withstood, and opposed in their unrighteous courses. Hence Augustine and Ambrose do affirm, Augu. in Psal. 82. Amb. in Offic. when He­rod and Pilate condemned Christ, and caused him to be put [Page 5] to death, howsoever the people lamented it, were sorry for him, and sorely bewail'd his death; yet were they all pu­nished: and why so? because when they were able and might have taken him out of the hands of unjust and wick­ed Magistrates, and so preserv'd his life, they did it not, in this regard they wrapt themselvs in the same guilt of blood and became murderers of him.

But lastly, This text intends, only private men? not a Parliament, the supreamest Judicatory and Soveraign po­wer in the Kingdom: for in this High Court, the Kings Per­son is no other than another subject; I say it again to this Court, He personally stands as a single man to be questi­oned, censured, punished as the Crime and Cause shall be. And in truth, here lies the stone at which many have stum­bled, much like to that long controversie between us and the Church of Rome, about Petros, and Petra; Peter, and the Rock. We distinguish them, taking the person of Peter to be one thing, his faith, or Christ another. Whereas the Papists will allow of no such distinction. So the Title and Office of a King is one thing, the Person another: and how­soever the former comes not into question, yet the latter may. But many by mixing and confounding things together which should be severed and distinguished, appre­hend not how the Person of the King, and not the Title and Office of a King can be questioned, censured, and punished. Hugo Grotius, putting down seven cases in which the people may have most real action against the King, to accuse, and punish him: Groti. de jure bell. & pac. l. 1▪ cap. 4. The second is, He may (saith he) be punished as a private man.

4. Objec. That place in Psal. 105.14.15. is usually objected, Touch not mine anointed. This by Royallists is applied to Kings, as a prohibition, that no man touch them, so as to hurt their Persons.

Answ. 1. The words in the Prophet, do not at all concern Kings, but were spoken directly and immediatly of the Pa­triarks, their wives, & families, walking as strangers from Nation to Nation; the which is evident by vers. 6. by the [Page 6] whole serious of the Psalm, which is historical; some places of Genesis to which the words relate, Gen. 12. 10. to 20. ch. 20. & 26. 1. to 29. and the general con­fession of all Expositors on the place. The Cavalliers had in one of their Colours (which was taken by the Scots at the battle of Marston, July 2. Anno 1644.) the Crown and the Prelates mitre painted, with these words, Nolite tangere Chri­stos meos: so that it seems the antichristian mitre claims here a share with the crown.

But 2. Admit this Scripture should be so meant, (which is not so) yet nothing can be hence rightly gathered, that Kings should be exempted from Arrests, Imprisonments, or Sentence of death it self. For 1. If we take it spiritually for the internal oyl of the Spirit, as this annointing is com­mon to subjects as wel as Kings, so it must follow necessa­rily that in their persons they are no more exempted from arraignment and capital censures than other men.

2. Admit it be meant of an actual external Anointing, yet that in it self affords Kings no greater priviledge, than the inward unction of which it is a type, neither can it pri­viledge them from the just corporal sentence of all kinds: and this is manifest in Sihon, Og, Adonibezek, Eglon, Agag, Jo­ram, Ahaziah, Jehoaz and others, who by Princes and sub­jects of another nation, were apprehended, and slain, and justly, as all grant without exception. Besides, Kings who are subordinate homagers, and subjects to other Kings and Emperours, though annointed, may for treasons and rebel­lions against them, be lawfully judged to death, and exe­cuted; as appears by sundry presidents in our own and forraign Histories. Yea, the Roman, Greek, and Germane Emperors, have been Imprisoned, Deposed, and some of them judicially judged to death by their own Senates, Par­liaments, and States for their oppression and tyranny: So the ancient Kings of France, Spain, Arragon, Brittain, Hun­garie, Poland, Denmark, Bohemia, India &c. & that justly not­withstanding any pretence of being anointed Soveraigns: And it is by Grotius confessed, Grot. de Jur. bel. & pac. l. 1 cap. 4 That the People may punish the King to death for matters capital, if so it be agreed on betwixt king and the people, as in Lacedemonia.

3. If the Scope and Sence of this Text be duly weighed, it is so far from affording Kings any corporal immunities, or exemption from punishment, as it cleerly speaks the con­trary: For the words are not spoken of Kings, but by God Himself spoken unto Kings, that they should not touch his Spiritual anointed Saints, men consecrated unto him by the oyl of the Spirit. But you wil say, What if they touch Gods anointed, even spoil and murder them for his sake? I answer, The Law ( Gen. 9.6.) excepteth none: the dea­rest that nature knoweth are not excepted. Who so sheddeth mans blood, by man shall his blood be shed. The Supream Court of Justice is here highly concerned. Thus saith the Lord, Be­cause thou hast let go out of thy hand a man whom I appointed to utter destruction; therefore thy life shall go for his life, and thy people for his people. 1 King. 20.42.

5. obiect. Davids often sparing of Saul, though in his hand is of­ten object. And Dr. Gauden in his late Letter to his Excel­lency, saies, You cannot be ignorant of Davids both conscienci­ous and generous respect to Sauls safety, and life, whom he leaves to Gods justice, by no usurpation of power, successes, or opportuni­ties of revenge. page 7.

Ans. 1. There is nothing from Davids carriage towards Saul in this particular, but to bring it into a short account is thus: Subjects ought not wilfully or purposely to mur­der or offer violence to the person of the King, specially in their cold blood when he doth not actually assault them, nor have a lawful power judiciously to proceed against him.

2. But more particularly I answer. The difference was but private and personal between Saul & David, David be­ing Sauls private subject, servant and son-in-law; not pub­lick between Saul and his Parliament or Kingdom. Now many things are unlawful in private quarrels, which are just and honourable in publick differences. Saul intended no Arbitrary government, nor to make Israel a conquered people, nor yet to cut off all the godly, under the pretence of hereticks and sectaries; neither to destroy laws, liber­ties [Page 8] and Parliaments: nor came Saul against these Princes, Elders, and People who made him King; only David's head would have made Saul lay down his arms.

3. Howsoever some reasons may be given wherefore Da­vid spared Saul, as, 1. Being his father-in-law, and lord too, and so it would have been thought somewhat an un­naturall act in him, and savoured too much of private re­venge and ambition, aspiring to the Crown before due time. 2. By his lenity to convince Saul, and reclaim him from his bloody pursuit, and cleer his innocency to the world.

And lastly, Manifest his dependance upon God, and his special promise, that he should enjoy the crown after Saul, by divine appointment: neverthelesse, if these and other Scriptures be well perused, Saul and David soldiers (if not David himself) conceived that David might with safe con­science have punished him, as well as pittied him. 1 Sam. 24.10.11 12.17.18 & 26.23.24. Expedi­ent I confesse it was (for the considerations mentioned) to spare him, but whether the thing in soro Dei and in it self al­together unlawful had he slain him (specially after he had killed the Priests, and destroyed both men and women, chil­dren and sucklings in Nob) 1 Sam. 22.18.19 I leave to the judicious Reader to think of.

6. Objec. That place 1 Sam 8.9. and ver. 11. is much alleadged to prove both the absolute power of a King, and the unlaw­fulnesse of resistance. Grot. de Jur. bel. & pac. lib. 1. c. 4. n. 3. Hugo Grotius, Barcl. cont. mon l. 2. p. 64. Barclay, Arnis. de fur. 6. Mai. c. 1. n. 3. p. 157, 158. Arnisaeus, Dr. Fern 3. p. Sect. 2. p. 10. D ^r. Fern, and others argue thus; that by this place, The People oppressed with the injuries of a tyrannous King, have no­thing left them but prayers and tears to God, and will have us di­stinguish inter officium Regis & potestatem, between the Kings office and the Kings power; and it cannot be ver. 9.11. the cu­stome and manner of the King, but must be the law of absolute Majesty, &c.

It is said of Paracelsus that the diet he prescribed his pati­ents, was to eat what, and how often they thought fitting themselves. Royallists and Court-flatterers do allow such an absolute prerogative to Kings, that if they would make use of their plenitude and unlimitted power, there is no wick­ednesse [Page 9] but they may do. viz. violently ravish matrons, de­flour virgins; unnaturally abuse youth, cut all their Sub­jects throats, fire their houses, sack their Cities, subvert their Liberties, and (as Bellarmin puts the case of the Popes absolute irresistible authority) send millions of souls to hel; yet no man under pain of damnation, may or ought de­mand of him, Domine, cur ita facis? Sir, what do you? such a slavery those vermins have sought to bring all Subjects into.

But to answer, 1. The scope and drift of the place is thus: Samuel being displeased with the people because they would reject Gods government, who was then their King, having in his own hand the regal rights, and did substitute under him Judges, whom he extraordinarily called, qualified, and inspired them with his spirit; shews them the manner of the King, ver. 9.11. not what they should be, and ought to do in right, but what they use to be, and do in fact, and how commonly they demean themselves in Government, contrary to Gods Law, Deut. 17.15. and the Lawes of the Kingdom; and that he speaks not here of the Law or pow­er of a lawfull King, but of Saul's tyrannicall usurpation: is evident thus.

1. The Hebrew word is not [...] but [...], the which as our English rendreth, is the manner, and so the word usually signifies 2 K ng. 17.26. Gen. 40 13. Exod, 21,19. 1 Sam, 27,11. a custome or manner; and as a custom, so a wicked 1 Sam, 2,13, 1 Kings 18,28, custome. Peter Martyr on the place saith, He mea­neth here of an usurped Law. The custome and manner of doing, say Junius and Tremellius. Clemens Alexandrinus on the place saith, non humanum pollicetur Dominum, sed insolentem daturum minatur tyrannum, he promiseth not a humane Prince, but threatneth to give them an insolent tyrant. So saith Beda. Lyra expoundeth it Tyranny: so Cajetanus. And Serrarius, he speaketh not here, quid Reges jure possint, sed quid audeant; what they may do by right and Law, but what they wil be bold to do; and so speaketh Thomas Aquinas, Osiander, Peli­can, Borhaius, Willet and our last large Annotations, take it, that Samuel setteth not down the office of a King; and what [Page 10] he ought to be, but what manner of Kings they should have, such as would decline to tyranny, be tyrants, not Kings, rule by will, not by Law.

2. He speaketh of such a power as is answerable to the acts here spoken of: but the acts here spoken of, are acts of meer tyranny. As 1. to make slaves of their sons, ver. 11. was an act of Tyranny. 2. To take their fields, and vineyards, and oliveyards from them, ver. 14. was no better then Ahabs cruelty towards Naboth. 3. To put the people of God to bondage. ver. 15, 16. was to deal with them as the Tyrant Pharaoh did. 4. He speaketh of such a Law, the execution whereof should make them cry out to the Lord because of their King. ver. 18. but the execution of the just Law of the King, Deut. 17. is a blessing, not a crosse or curse.

3. It is clear, that God by his Prophet disswades them from their purpose of seeking a King, by fortelling the e­vil of punishment, that they should suffer under a tyrant. for 1. Samuel is to protest against their unlawfull course, v. 9. 2. He is to lay before them the tyranny and oppression of their King, which cruelty Saul exercised in his time; as the history of his life sheweth. But he speaketh not one word of these necessary and comfortable acts of favour, that a just King by his good Government was to do for his peo­ple, Deut. 17. 3. It is set down, ver. 19. how in effectual Sa­muels exhortation was: now how could it be said, they re­fused to hear the voyce of Samuel, if he had not dehorted them from a King.

2. Touching these words, and ye shall cry out in that day be­cause of your King. 1. Here is not one word of any lawfull remedy, for this is not alwayes understood of praying to God by reason of oppression, as by many Is. 15.4. Ha. 2.11. Deut. 22.24. Scriptures doth appear. 2. Though it were the Prophets meaning, they cry­ed unto the Lord, yet it is not the crying of a people truly humbled, and in faith speaking to God in their Zec. 7.12. Psal. 18.41. troubles, and therefore such prayer as God heareth not. 3. It is a rule in Logick and Divinity, Ex particulari non valet argu­mentum negative; from one particular place a negative ar­gument [Page 11] is not good. To apprehend, imprison, and put a ty­rant to death is not written in this particular place: there­fore it is not written at al in other places of Scripture. But 4. The text sayes not They shall only cry out, as if no other course were to be used against a tyrant, but crying out, which shews a meer fallacy and absurdity in what they speak. Be­cause a man must pray for Kings and Rulers; Ergo, there is no tribute or obedience due to them. Again, Men must pray for their daily bread, and sick persons seek to God for health. Ergo, they must only pray, and not labor for it, they must take no phisick but only pray.

3. If the Prophets words be rightly understood, he is so far from affirming that the power of a King is absolute, and uncontroulable, as on the contrary he closely admonisheth the people, that they should look to him, as to restrain and bridle his licentious liberty, and keep him within the due limits of law and reason, and seeing he is apt to degenerate into a tyrant, and cruelly to oppresse the subjects, to be therefore prudent and carefull seasonably to prevent so great a mischief and danger.

Lastly, In the whole description here of a tyrant there is not one word against our Conclusion. For 1. The peoples power (whose Representatives the Ordines Regni, the States of the Kingdom are) is above the King. Polib. his. l. 6, Such were the Ephori amongst the Lacedemonians, the Senate amongst the Romans: The Forum Superbiense amongst the Arragonians: The Electors of the Emperors: the Parliaments in England, Scot­land, France, and Spain: The Fathers of Families, and Princes of Tribes amongst the Jews. And for this Soveraign and Supream power of Estates, as above Kings, I appeal to Jurists, and to approved Authors. Argu. L. aliud. 160. sect. 1. de Jur. Reg. l. 22. Mortuo de fidei. l. 11.14. ad Mum. l. 3.14. Cornelius Bertramo, c. 12. Junius Brutus, Vindic. cont. Tyran. sect. 2. Sigonius de Rep. Judaeor. l. 6. c. 7. Author Li­belli de Jur. Magist. in Subd. q. 6. Althus. Pol. c. 18. Calvin Instit. l. 4. c. 20. Pareus in Rom. 13. Peter Mart. in lib. Judic. c. 3. Joan Marianus, de Rege, lib. 1. c. 7. Marius Salamonius [Page 12] Lib. 1. de Principatu Hottaman de jure. Antiq. Reg. Gallica. l. 1. c. 22. Danaeus Polit. Christ. l. 3. c. 6. Buchanan de Jure Regni a­pud Scotos.

2. The King is under Law, and punishable by Law, as we shal manifest more fully hereafter. It is the Law▪ Imp, l. 4, dignavox C, de leg. & tit. Quod quisque Juris in alium statuit, eodem et ipse utatur. What a man of right enacteth for another, the same he himself should do. If otherwise, proving a Tyrant, he may (saith Bartol) In tractat, de Tyran, & in tract, de re, Ci. Jun. Bru, vind, con, tyr. l, 3. be just­ly deposed by his superiour, or according to the Julian law, by force of the whol Common-wealth most deservedly punished. I will end this point with the words of Junius Brutus. A Tyrant (saith he) is more outragiously wicked, than any thief, high-way-robber, murderer, or sacrilegious person, and therefore deserves a far grea­ter, heavier, and severer punishment.

7 obiect, I find some to frame their objection thus. None of the Pro­phets in the old Testament reprehending the Kings of Israel and Judah for their grosse Idolatry, cruelty, and oppression, did call upon the great Councel of State, to convent, cen­sure, & put their Kings to death upon any of these grounds, therefore to put them to death is unlawful.

Answ. 1. It is a great Non-consequence, Aristoteles aut Plato hoc non dixerunt, hoc Ergo ita se non habet. Fra, Bur [...] Instit, L [...], l. 1. c. 18. This duty is not practised by any example out of the Prophets in Gods word. Ergo, It is no duty. Practice in Scripture, is a narrow rule of faith: shew a practice when a husband stoned his wife because she enticed him to follow strange gods. Yet it is comman­ded, Deut. 13.6. when a man lying with a beast was put to death. Yet it is a law, Exod. 22.19. so many other laws, the practice of which we find not in Scripture.

But 2. Seeing none of the Prophets did forbid the thing, or dehorted the people from proceeding this way, there­fore it was lawful, and the people freely might have done it, if they had been zealous of the law, and had a heart to it. And to make this cleer, take notice what the Law saith, Levit. 19.35,36, Deut. 25,13. Ye shall do no unrighteousness in judgement, in meteyard, in weight, or in measure: just ballances, just weights, &c. Thou shalt not have in thy bag divers weights, a great and a small. These ordinan­ces [Page 13] taught men justice. Ye shall not respect persons in judgment, ye shall not be afraid of the face of man: deu. 1.17. so that whosoever was a murderer, an adulterer, a witch, a Sodomite &c. he was to be put to death. And questionless, had the Lord inten­ded, that some, (namely Kings, howbeit murderers, adul­terers, witches,) should be exempted from the punishment of such laws, as being no power or Court on earth to reach them, it would have been some where set down. And therefore whereas it is objected, that the Prophets speak no where of putting their Idolaters & wicked Kings to death, the truth is, it needed not, neither was there any reason for it, for it was never questioned in the Prophets times, whe­ther Kings might be put to death if they did such things as by the law was death.

3. Not only is it evident by the History of the Kings and Chronicles in sundry places, 2 Kin. 21.11.12. & 23.26. & 24.3. Jer. 15.1,2,3.4. that God did punish the people for the wickedness of their Kings: but likewise the Pro­phets have threatned so much: the which thing surely God in justice would not have done, neither the Prophets so have spoken, had not the people power to have removed them, and put them to death for their capital crimes, according to the Law.

4. When the Prophets exhorted the People to repent, and to execute justice and judgment, and to deliver him that was spoiled out of the hands of the oppressor. Jer, 7.5. & 21.12. & 22,3. Here they did call upon the great Councel of State to punish their tyrannous, murderous, and idolatrous Kings with death, according to the law: for otherwise, how could the people truly repent, or have answered what the Prophets exhorted them unto in point of justice.

5. That tyrannous Princes, not only by command of Gods Prophets, but of God himself, and by his special ap­probation have been put to death by their subjects, 'tis ap­parent in Scripture: thus Nadab by Baasha, Elah by Zim­ry, Jehu by Gods own appointment puts to death Joram and Ahaziah Kings of Israel and Judah: And say, that it was extraordinary to Jehu that he should kill Joram, yet there [Page 14] was an expresse law for it, that he that stirreth up others to idolatry, should die the death. Deut. 13.6. And mark what Mr. Rutherfurd writes in this very point, Preem Elect, qu 34. p. 364 THERE IS NO EXCEPTION OF KING or Father in the Law: For to except Father or mother in Gods matters is expresly against the zeal of God. Deut. 33.9.

8 obiect. That passage in Psal. 51.4. is much taken hold of, where King David confessing his sin of adultery and murder to God, useth this expression, against thee, thee only have I sin­ned, and don this evill in thy sight: Sac. Mai. p. 148. de author prin. c. 4. num. 5. p. 73 Hence Maxwell, Arnisaeus, and others conclude, That the King is above all Law, and all earthly Tribunals; accountable to none for his actions, but to God, and that there was not any on earth, who might punish David.

I have somewhere read how Calisthenes Lucullus servant, gave his Master poyson, not of any evill intent, but suppo­sing the poyson had power to make his Master love him the more; but it put him out of his wits, and kill'd him. Fawning Sycophants, and Court-flatterers, have usually thus served Kings and Princes, in hope of more love, and greater preferment from them, have powerd into them the venemous doctrine of absolute Monarchs, Arbitrary power, to be responsable to none but God only, for what they do; by which means they have grown mad Tyrants, and afterwards cut off by some visible and sensible stroke of justice.

But to the objection, I answer, 1. It is most certain that David by his adultery and murder (being sins against the second table) did sin not only against God, but against Ʋ ­riah, his wife, children, and kindred, and against his own soul. And this must needs be so, for otherwise, 1. The King because a King is free, not only from all punishing Laws of men: but from the duties of the second Table simply, and so a King cannot be under the best and largest half of the law, Thou shalt love thy neighbour as thy self.

2. He shall not need to say, forgive us our sins as we forgive them that sin against us. For there is no reason from the na­ture of sin, and the nature of Gods Law, why we can say [Page 15] more the subjects and sons sin against the King and Father, then to say, the Father and King sin against the sonnes and subjects. 3. The King killing his Father Jesse should sin on­ly against God, but not break the fift commandment, nor sin against his Father.

2. As all Emperors, Kings, and Princes, are subject to the Lawes of God, of nature, and Nations; so are they bound in conscience to give satisfaction and recompence to their sub­jects against whom they sin in this nature; and David him­self determines so much in his own cause. And Davids an­ger was greatly kindled against the man (the man was himself, 1 Sam. 12.7. thou art the man) and he said to Nathan, as the Lord liveth the man that hath don this shall surely die.

3. For the reason of Davids speech, in saying, against thee, thee only have I sinned. Expositors are diversly minded, some say, he meaneth none durst judge or punish him, but God onely. Lorinus the Jesuit observeth eleven interpretations of Anci­ent writers all to this sence. It is true, Beda, Euthymius, Am­brose, Chrysostome, Basil, Theodoret, do acknowledge from the place de facto, there was none above David to judge him: so Augustine, Basil, Gregory, Arnobius, Dydimus, Hieronim. But the simple meaning is, Against thee only. 1. As my eye wit­nesse and immediate beholder: for he conceal'd his sin from men, but could not from God. 2 Sam. 12.12. 2. Because as the cause stood, God only could remit the punishment of his sin. 3. By only he means comparatively, as if he should say, principally and especially against thee: Isa. 43 5 Psal. 41.3 and the word ( 1 King 15.7. Josh 1.7.18, 1 Sam. 18.17. only) is often so taken.

4. The Sanedrim did not punish David: Ergo, it was not lawful for them; nor is it lawfull for a State to punish a King for any act of injustice, is logick which we may resist.

5. Had the adultery, and murder been publickly known, and complained of to the Great Councel of the Kingdom, I do affirm, and will stand to it, that they might judicially have proceeded against him for it. And because some wil be ready to brand this under the scornful terme of a new light, or think I am singular herein, I shall here set down the judg­ment [Page 16] of a judicious and learned professor of Divinity, Mr. Sam. Rutherfurd a Scotchman. Preem of Elect of King. qu 26, p, 241 The Prelate (saith he) draweth me to speak of the case of the Kings unjust murder confessed, Psal. 51. To which I answer, He taketh it for confessed, that it had been trea­son in the Sanedrin and States of Israel, to have taken on them to judge and punish David for his adultery and murder, but he gi­veth no reason for this nor any word of God: and truly, though I will not presume to go before others in this, Gods law (Gen. 9.6. compared with Numb. 35.30,31.) seemeth to say against them.

Nor can I think that Gods law, Deut, 1,17 2 Chr. 19 6,7, or his deputy the Judges are to accept the persons of the great, because they are great: and we say, we cannot distinguish where the Law distinguisheth not. The Lord speaks to under-Judges, Levit. 19.15. Thou shalt not respect the person of the poor, nor the honor of the person of the mighty, or of the PRINCE, for we know what these names [...] and [...] meaneth. I grant it is not Gods meaning that the King should draw the sword against himself; but yet it follows not, that if we speak of the demerit of blood, that the Law of God accepteth any Judge great or small, and if the STATE BE A­BOVE THE KING, as I conceive they are, though it be a humane politick constitution, that the King is free from all coaction of law, because it conduceth for the peace of the Common-wealth, yet if we make a matter of conscience▪ FOR MY PART, I SEE NO EXCEPTION THAT GOD MAKES OF IT; if men make, I crave leave to say, A facto ad jus non sequitur. Thus that Reverend Author.

Lastly, This sin against Ʋrijah was personal, and a private injury into which David fell by occasion, and out of hu­mane frailty: it was the first and only sin that he commit­ted in this kind that ever we reade of, he made no trade of it, he repented for it, and never relapsed after into it. Where­as Charles Steuart in a hostile and publick way hath murde­red many thousands of his best subjects, by giving War­rants and Commissions under his own hand to Atheists, and Papists, personally appeared in many battles to destroy the people, caused sundry villages, towns, and cities to be [Page 17] ruinated by fire, plunder, rapine, authorised villanous Pi­rates of other nations, (not to mention his own Son, nor Rupert that monster of mankind) to rob and kill his own subjects at sea: gave Ormond commission, and the bloody I­rish, to kill and massacre, not so few as two hundred thou­sand, men women, and children, of the Protestant religion in Ireland; not to speak of fifteen hundred widowes which he made in one morning, as M ^r. Henderson told him; nor the losse of Rochel in France, by his lending ships to the French King; and this was his trade and constant practice ma­ny yeers together, and doubtlesse would have continued so to this day, had not the Lord of Hosts by a powerfull hand (using our Army as instrumental means) supprest him: and for all this his heart never smote him as it could be percei­ved, but remain'd impenitent and incorrigeble in his sins.

9. obiect. It is likewise objected, Jer. 29,7. That the children of Israel were com­manded by God himself to pour out supplications & prayers for the peace and prosperous estate of Nebuchadnezer a most cruel tyrant, and that it was not lawfull for the Jewes to withdraw themselves from the subjection which they did owe unto his Empire: Neither would the Lord authorize the people to deliver themselves from un­der Pharaoh, but made Moses a Prince to bring them out of E­gypt with a stretched out arm: Nor did the Lord deliver his Peo­ple by the wisdom of Moses, or strength of the People, or any act that way of theirs, but by his own immediate hand and Power. Hence conclude, that subjects may not punish their Kings for any misdemeanour.

Answ. 1. The Jews were not only subjects and of a pri­vate condition, but likewise most of them servants and bond-men under the power and Empire of the Caldeans, and therefore for private men to rise up against the Magistrates, or to resist them with force of arms had been unlawfull.

2. And let it be observed, that the Jews came by the im­mediate appointment of the Lord, under the power of the Caldeans, of which thing they were often preadmonished and fore-told by the Prophets: so that it was not only un­lawfull for Zedekiah and the rest of the Jews in the time of [Page 18] their captivity to resist the tyranny of the Caldeans, but likewise before the captivity, they could not with a good conscience have resisted, or maintain'd the city against them when they had besieged it; forasmuch as the Lord comman­ded them by Jeremy that they should deliver up the city in­to the hands of the Caldeans, and without resistance yeeld themselves to be their servants. Chap. 21.2,3,4, & 27,1,12,13,14, ch 36, ch, 37

3. Touching Pharaoh, 1. He had not his crown from Is­rael. 2. Pharaoh had not sworn to defend Israel, nor be­came their King upon condition and oath to maintain their Laws, Liberties, and Rights. 3. Israel had their land in Egypt by the meer gift of the King. 4. The Israelites were not his native subjects, but strangers and sojourners; who by the Laws of the King and Princes, by the means of Joseph had gotten the land of Goshen for their dwelling, and liber­ty to serve the God of Abraham, to whom they prayed in their bondage. Exod. 2,23,24. The Kings of England (as Kings) have stood to England in a four-fold contrary relation: they have had their crown by the voluntary and free choise of the People, and no otherwise but conditionally; that is, covenanting and taking their oath to do so and so, for the publick good: The English are natives, not beholding to their Kings for their possessions, nor ever held the same as gratis from them: The Supream and Soveraign Power of the Kingdom is in their hand; the which Israel in Egypt never had, nor could lawfully challenge.

10. obje. D ^r. Gouden speaking of putting the King to death, saith, Never did Christ or his Apostles by practice or precept give the lest intimation of the will of his Father as agreeing to what you declare to be your purpose. Christ (saith Maxwel) Sac. San. Mai. c, 5. n. 6. in the cradle taught by practice to flee from Herod, and all Christs actions are full of mysteries and our instructions: He might have had Legions of An­gels to defend him, but would rather work a miracle in curing of Malchu's ear, as use the sword against Caesar. He suffered under Pontius Pilate, & to commend patient suffering of ill, & condemn al resistance of superiors, would have servants suffer buffets not only for ill doing of good masters, but also undeservedly of these masters [Page 19] that are evill, and that from his own example, 1 Pet. 2.18.21.23. much more are we patiently to suffer of Kings without resistance.

The monuments of Babels ruin, shew farre off to be high and great things, but being neer they are very low and lit­tle too: whatsoever is here, if we come up close to it, 'tis impertinences, non-consequences and nothing else. And first in general we answer, 1. Christ saying, His Kingdom is not of the world, and refusing to take the Magistracy upon him signifyed thereby, that for civil politie he left it to the peo­ple, to practice according to the humane Law and reason, and as it might best serve for every nations safety, peace, and welfare. 2. When the D ^r. writes next, I would have him set down where Christ and his Apostles, by precept or practice taught, that any man for murder, treason, rebelli­on, &c. might lawfully be put to death by the higher po­wers: if he find this thing no where directly or by conse­quence in the New Testament, then under favor of his Do­ctorship, it is simply spoken: But if he can find such a pre­cept or practice, thus far I do ingage, and challenge any man to oppose, that I will as clearly prove from the same place, that the Commons of England may lawfully put their King to death for the like crimes. 3. If Christ came not to de­stroy the Law, as the Law of nature, Nations, then it is not contrary to any precept or practice of his, for the Parlia­ment of England, to judge to death the King for treason and high misdemeanors against the law of nature and Nations. But the first is true, therefore the latter.

2. For a more particular answer: 1. Christ flying into Egypt, what mystery soever it had, sure I am, it contained no prohibition against the lawfull execution of justice and judgment upon any man.

2. That Christ might have defended himself with more then twelve legions of Angels, but would not, it was not because, to cut off tyrants is unlawfull, [...] no shadow for that in the Text, but because it was Gods will, that he should drink the cup his Father gave him.

3. That Christ blamed Peter for speaking of drawing [Page 20] his sword: Rivetus sheweth the reasons, Rivet, in dec. in mand. 6. pag, 234. 1. Because it had a kind of revenge in it: for so few could not repel such an Army as came to take Christ. 2. He waited not on Christs answer. 3. He could have defended himself another way. 4. It was contrary to Gods will revealed to Peter. Mat. 16,21,22,24

4. To the place in Peter I answer: 1. Patient bearing of wrong, and punishing wrong doers are compatible in one and the same person. One act of grace is not contrary to another: Not to respect persons in judgment, is as commen­dable a vertue as patient suffering for a good cause. 2. The scope of the place, is not to forbid all violent resisting, but only forbiddeth revenging resisting, as not to repair one wrong with another, from the example of Christ, who when he was reviled, reviled not again: and therfore the Argument is a fallacie, Ab eo quod dicitur [...] ad illud quod dicitur [...] If a master attempt to kill an innocent servant, and invade him with a weapon of death, in that case the servant is free from guiltiness, if (there being no other way to save his life) he slay the master than be kild himself: because I am neerer by the law of nature, and dearer to my self and mine own life, then to my brother. 3. No Prince hath a maste­ry or dominion over his subjects, but only a free, pater­nal, and tutorly over-sight for the good of the people. The masters in the Apostles time, had a dominion over ser­vants as over their proper goods. Ro. 13.4.

11. obje. But the special Objection of Royallists is, Rom. 13.1,2. Let every soul be subject to the higher powers, for there is no power but of God: and whosoever therefore resisteth the power, resisteth the ordinance of God. Hence therefore they conclude, Grot. de Jur. bel. & pac. l. 1 cap. 4 Barc, con mon. l. 3. c, 9 Maxwel S [...]c. San. Mai. c. 2 p. 29. 1. That the King is the supreamest or highest power here intended. There is no Judge above a King on earth. 2. Howsoever, in those dayes there was a standing and continual Senate, which not long before had the Supream power in the Roman State, yet now the Empe­rour was Supream, and therefore no power of resistance left to the people. 3. The prohibition, doth not only concern Christians, but all the people under these Emperours, and howbeit Religion was persecuted, the peoples Liberty lost, and the Senate then enslaved [Page 21] by Edict and Laws inforced on them by Nero and other Emperors, yet notwithstanding, the Apostle forbids to resist.

That I may give a satisfactorie answer to this Objection, I desire the Reader to consider the occasion of the Apo­stles words, which I take to be thus. The Roman Magi­strates being Infidels, people newly converted to Christian Religion, might think themselves exempted from any sub­jection or obedience unto them, by reason of Gospel-liber­ty and further, that it was not lawful for them to make use of such Magistrates in any civil cause what wrong soe­ver they suffered: To refute which error, the Apostle in­forms them, that howbeit the Magistrates were unbeleeving Gentiles, yet their authority and power was from God Himself, and in that regard, their profession of Christiani­ty did rather obleige them, then exempt them from subje­ction; and they were Gods Ministers appointed by him, to punish offenders, and to take vengeance on them. Now bring this into an argument, because Religion exempts not subjects from due obedience to lawful pagan Magistrates, and people oppressed may seek redresse of their grievances, therefore Tyrants may not be legally arraigned, censured, and put to death by the highest and supremest Court of the Kingdom.

2. If the Apostles words be observed (even word for word) there is not any thing in them against the arraign­ment of a tyrant. For 1. The Higher Powers must be sub­mitted to: and why? Because they are ordained of God, and are Gods ordinances. vers. 1, 2. That is so far as they govern according to reason and just laws, preserve their Peoples liberties, persons, and estates. But where is it said, When they prove traitors to the Kingdom, and are the Devil's A­gents, they may not be severely punished for it. 2. Because those who resist lawful authority, and just commands, re­ceive to themselves condemnation, is not this, a non sequi­tur, that the Parliament whose jurisdiction and power is above the King, may not call him to an account for tyran­ny and mis-government.

3. Rulers must be obeyed, Because they are not a terror to good works, but to evil. verse 3. is not this a good consequence, when they are profest enemies to all good works, and do e­vil and continually evil with both hands, that same power which hath set them up, cannot take them down again.

4. Obey him saith the Apostle, why? because he is the mini­ster of God to thee for good. v. 4. But can this be applied to a ty­rant, who hath destroy'd the people in body & goods; doth it not rather plainly imply, that those who are the devils ministers to us for evil, rather then Gods for good; by a law­ful power above them, should be thrust out of their place.

5. It is said, ver. 5. But if thou dost that which is evil, be a­frayd, for he beareth not the sword in vain, for he is the minister of God, a revenger, to execute wrath on him that doth evil: Can a­ny Roialist find any thing here, which is not spoken in re­ference only to faithfull Magistrates, in the execution of justice upon malefactors, wherein they must not be resisted, much lesse punished for well doing. And by the rules of contraries, a Tyrant that makes war upon his people, to ruin, spoyl, and enslave them, protecteth all wicked men, gives liberty to all manner of unrighteousnesse, bears the sword, not only in vain, in reference to the publick good, but draws it forth only upon those that are good; for such cruelty, oppression and impiety, may lawfully be cut off.

3. The text doth include all higher powers, not to be re­strain'd only to Kings and Emperors, but comprehends all kind of civil Rulers: Augustin, Irenaeus, Chrysostom, Hierom, expound it of Masters, Magistrates. So doe Calvin, Beza, Pareus, Piscator, Rollor, Marlorat, So do Popish writers, Aquinas, Lyra, Hugo Cardinal, Carthus. Pierius, Toletus, Cornel. a Lapide, Salmeron, Estitius, expound the place. Hence it must follow, that no resistance of the higher powers is here prohibited, but only in the due and legall execution of their offices. For no man will deny but inferior lawfull of­ficers illegally endeavoring to subvert Liberties, Laws, and unrighteously governing the people, may be imprisoned, arraigned and condemned for their misdemeanor. And [Page 23] this granted (which cannot be denyed) our conclusion is fully proved: and thus I make it appear.

Whosoever is a murderer or a traytor to the State, may lawfully be put to death by the civil power that is above him, and that by vertue of this text, Rom. 13.1,2,3. But the King of England is under a civil power and jurisdiction; to wit, the Soveraign power of the Parliament. Ergo, If a murderer or traitor to the State may lawfully be put to death. Though there be no Tribunall (saith Mr. Rutherfurd) formally, regall, and Kingly above the King, yet there is a Tribunal vertual, eminently above him, in the case of tyranny; for the States and Princes are above him.

4. That the Romane Emperor (when Paul wrote) was the Supream and highest power in the Romane State, is most untrue: Iustinian indeed, speaks somewhat that way, Dig. l, 2. Tit, 2. p, 146. that the Emperor was absolute, but he is partial in this case. Bodin proveth, Bodin de Rep, l, 2 c. 5. pag. 221. That the Romane Emperors were but princes of the Common-wealth, and that the Soveraignty remained still in the Senate and people. Livius, Florus, Tacitus, say the like; and to put it out of all doubt, the case of Nero that wicked Emperor is proof sufficient, whom the Senate judicially condemned, and as a publick enemy to the State adjudged him to have his head fastned to a fork, and so to be publickly whipt to death, and then to be precipitated from a rock; upon which sentence he being sought for (and forsaken of al) to avoyd the execution ther­of, murdered himself with a poinyard.

5. As for tyrants and wicked oppressing Magistrates, they are not within the intendment of this text, neither is there any thing here spoken to prohibit the people from censu­ring and punishing of them. for 1. That which is not the Ordinance of God, but rather of the devil, and the meer sin and enormity of the Governor himself, not of the Govern­ment, is not within the compasse of this text.

2. That which is no point of the Magistrates lawfull power ordained of God, but diametrally repugnant to it, as tyranny, oppression, violence, &c. is not within the verge or compasse of this text.

3. All Powers intended in the text are not only ordain­ed [Page 24] of God but also circumscribed and bounded with certain rules of Law, justice, and honesty, within which they must contain themselves, and if they passe beyond those limits, they are none of Gods Ordinance. Now the tyranny and op­pression of Kings and Rulers are meer exorbitances, arbi­trary, illegall actions exceeding the bound of justice and honesty, prescribed by the Law of God and men: therefore not within the limits of this text, and therefore to be resist­ed, and the Person punishable.

4. Howsoever the lawfull power of Princes be of God, yet the tyranny it self, and abuse of this power is of Satan, and therefore though the power it self which is good and profitable, be to be honored and continued, yet the tyrant justly may be condemned to death, as not within the com­passe of this text.

13. Obje▪ And thus much for the first sort of Objections: we come now to the rest. Kings (some say) are in dignity and power a­bove tho people, their persons sacred, not criminal or obnoxious to any tribunal but that of God. King Theodor. in Cassidore speaking of himself, Cassi. var. l. 6, var. 4. hac sola ratione discreti, quod alteri subdi non possi­mus, qui Judices non habemus. In this respect we are distin­guished from others, that we cannot be subject to another, who have no Judges over us. Impune quidvis facere, id est, Re­gem esse.

I have read in Plutarch, that Alexander Magnus published he was the son of Jupiter Hammon; yet when he saw the hu­mor running down from his wounds, was constrained to say, this is [...] not [...] the blood of man not of God: and smelling the stench of his own flesh, asked his flatterers, if the gods yeelded such a stench. Princes (specially of late) have deem'd themselves to be None-such, and altogether un­like other men, but when they shall see themselves as priso­ners stand at the bar, and justice don upon them, they will think otherwise of their condition. I know what the com­mon saying is:

A practice against Scripture, reason, and conscience: It is no Law grounded upon any divine principle, That the King doth no wrong, only his wicked Councellers and bad instruments must be punished, but he not: the Lord saith, the soul that sinneth, it shall dy; and in all ages hath punished the author of sin, and persons commanding such and such wickednesse, more severely and extreamly, then the agent, who acted by the others warrant, commission, and autho­rity. We see dayly the mother punished for her whordom, yet the bastard spared; but that the bastard should suffer, and the mother escape, it is such a thing as I think was ne­ver heard of.

Now touching the objection I answer, 1. Simply, abso­lutely the people are above and more excellent then the King, and the King in dignity inferior to the people and the whole Kingdom: and this I prove. 2 Sam. 19.9. Psa, 78.70.71. 1 Sa. 10,1 Ro. 13.4. 1. Because he is the mean, ordained for the people, as for the end, that he may save them: a publick shepheard to feed them, the captain and leader of the Lords inheritance to defend them; the Mini­ster of God for their good. 2. The pilot is lesse then the whole passengers, the General lesse then the whole Army, the physitian lesse then all the living men, whose health he ca­reth for; the Master or Teacher, lesse then all the Schollers; because the part is lesse then the whole. The King is but a part or member of the Kingdom.

3. Those who are given of God as gifts for the preserva­tion of the people, to be nursing-Fathers to them; those must be of lesse worth before God, then those to whom they are given, for the gift, as a gift, is lesse then the party on whom the gift is bestowed: But the King is a gift for the good and welfare of the people, as is manifest, Esa. 1.26.

4. People though mortal in the individuals, yet in the species cannot dye, Ecc. 1.4. but the King as King may and doth die, and therefore more excellent then that which is accidental temporary, and mortal.

5. The people are before the King, and may be without the [Page 26] King, and therefore must be of more worth then that which is posterior, and cannot be a King without them.

2. The people in power are superior to the King, and that upon these reasons: 1. Because every efficient and con­stituent cause is more excellent then the effect: every mean is inferior in power to the end. But the people are the effici­ent cause, the King is the effect; Isa. 3.7. the people are the end both intended of God to save the people, to be a healer and phy­sitian to them.

2. Common reason, Law, and experience, manifests that the whole, or greatest part in all politick or natural bodies is of greater power and jurisdiction, then any one particu­lar member. Thus in all corporations the Court of Alder­men and Common-Councel is of greater power then the Major alone, though the chief officer: so the whole Bench, then the Lord chief Justice, and the whole Councel then the President. And it is Aristotle's expresse determination, Pol, lib. 1 C. 2. & l. 3. c. 8. Ma­jorum rerum potest as jure populo tribuitur. The King (as we sayd just now) is but a part or member (though I grant a very noble and eminent member) of the Common-wealth.

3. The Soveraign Power to make Laws, and so a power eminent in their states representative, to govern themselves, is in the people. Ergo,

4. Those who can limit power, and bind royal power in elected Kings, they in power are superior to Kings. Peter speaking of Kings and their Supremacy, cals them a creature or humane ordinance, because it took its originall and rise from men, and can be bound, limitted, or restrained, as they see occasion. 1 Pe, 2.13

Coverrunias a great Lawyer saith, Cover. Tom. 2. pra. quest, c. 1. n. 2. 3. That all civil power is, penes remp. in the hands of the Common-wealth; and it is a re­ceived principle, That Soveraign Power, eminently, fontaliter, originally, and radically, is in the people.

But it is objected, The people have made over their right, and whole power to the King, all is freely given up into his hands, and so may not retract or take back what they have once given.

Answ. 1. It is a thing neither probable nor credible that [Page 27] any free people when they voluntarily incorporated them­selves into Kingdoms, and of their own accord set up an e­lective King over them, that there was such a stupidity and madnesse in them, as absolutely to make away their whole power to the King and his heirs for ever, and to give him an entire, full, and incontroulable Supremacy over them, and so to make the Creature superior to the Creator, the de­rivative greater then the primative, the servant more po­tent than themselves, and so of free-men to make themselves slaves, and for their more safety to be more enslav'd.

2. People cannot by the Law of nature resign up their so­veraign and popular power, authority and right, into the hand of a King: for neither God, nor natures Law, hath given them any such power.

3. He who constituteth himself a slave is supposed to be compelled to that unnatural fact of alienation of that li­berty which he received of God, from the womb, by vio­lence, constraint, or extream necessity, and so is inferiour to all free-men: but the people do not make themselves slaves, when they constitute a King over them.

4. If the people give all power away: 1. What power is then left them to make a new King when this man dies? 2. If the King turn distracted, or like Nebuchadnezer his rea­son be taken from him: what then? or if he turn Ty­rant, and destroy his subjects with the sword? In a word, If the King be absent and taken captive, the people having given all their power away, there can be nothing done in such and many the like cases, for their own safety.

5. He who sweareth to the people to be regulated by law and taketh the Crown Covenant-wise, and so as the people would refuse to make him their King, if either he should re­fuse to swear, or if they knew certainly that he would break his oath, he had never the whole power of the people resigned up unto him.

6. Though the people should give away their power, and swear, though the King should kill them all, they would not resist, nor defend their own lives though he should com­mit [Page 28] the vilest wickednesse that was ever heard of, yet they would not question him for it; this should not obliege the conscience, for it should be intrinsecally sinfull, and an oath directly against the law of God.

7. These are known rules in law, nature, and reason, Ne­mo plus iurus ad alium transferre potest quam ipse haberet. No man can give to another of right more than that which he hath. Again, Non debet actori licere, quod reo non permittitur: so Alterius circumventio alii non praebet actionem. So likewise, Non debet alteri per alterum iniqua conditio inferri. If the fa­ther have resigned his whole right of liberty in the hand of the King, yet could he not take in his posterity with him, neither obliege them in point of equity and conscience to confirm and observe what against the law of nature he had done, but his children afterwards might lawfully, yea and ought to stand fast in the liberty which the law of God, na­ture, and nations had made them free, and not be entang­led in the slavish yoke and bondage of their father. Nullus videtur dolo facere, qui suo jure utitur

I shall here conclude this point with a few observations. 1. Seeing the servant is no better than his Lord: Kings may as lawfully be punished for their crimes as other men: because in dignity and power they are inferior to the people: they are the Ministers and Servants of the Common-wealth, not Masters of the State, which title good Kings did never scorn, nay evil Princes have affected that name, and for some a­ges none of the Roman Emperours (unless those who were most manifest wicked, and notorious professed tyrants, as Caligula, Nero, Domitian) would be called Lords.

2. If the King as King, be the peoples Creature, they his Creator, then by the same power they may un-king him: For eodem modo quid constituitur dissolvitur, in what manner a thing is constituted it may be dissolved. Again, Omnia quae jure contrahuntur contrario jure pereunt.

3. Whosoever grants that the King in power is inferior to the people, he must necessarily grant that by this power duly and rightly administred, a King for treason and mur­der may lawfully be put to death, for it is absurd and ir­rational [Page 29] to say, there may be a power, and the due execu­ting of it unlawful.

4. If our forefathers in times past have given away all their power and right to Kings, and have sworn not to pu­nish them for tyranny and misgovernment, it concerns us not, neither are we tied to such engagements, oaths, promi­ses which they have made, but in point of conscience, law and reason, are free to use our own due power, as occasion shall be offered

13 obiect As the King is above the people in dignity and power, so say Royallists, he is absolute, and hath a prerogative above all law. Such a plenitude and fulnesse of power (saith Sanches) Th. San. Ma. Tom 1. l. 2. dis. 15. n. 3. as subject to no necessity, Nulliusq. publici juris regulis limitatus and bounded with rules of no publick law. And so Baldus before him. Bald. l 2. n 40. c. de s. & aqua. Ʋlpian saith, Vlpian. l. de regib. The Prince is loosed from laws. Bodin Bodin de Rep. l. 7. cap. 20. Nemo imperat sibi, no man commandeth himself. Tholosanus saith, Ipsius dare non accepere: the Prince giveth lawes, but receiveth none. Donellus distinguisheth betwixt a law, and a Royal law proper to the King. Don. l. 1. com. c. 17 Trentlerus saith, Tren, vol 1. [...]9. 8. The Prince is freed from laws, and that he obeyeth laws, de honestate non de ne­cessitate, upon honestie, not of necessity: And with him Soto, Gregorius de valentia and other School-men, subject the king to the directive power of the law, and liberate him of the coa­ctive power of the law.

It is reported of one Licas and Thrasilius, being cured by Physitians of the Phrensie and phantastical conceits, grew afterwards very angry with their friends because they left them not alone in their former foolish condition. I know there is little thanks to be expected from the Kings of the earth, by seeking to remove that State destroying principle which their Court-flatterers have put into them, as, Absoluteness, a prerogative above law, not under power of any jurisdiction &c. neverthelesse, the work being useful and ne­cessary for the publick good, it is fit it should be taken in hand.

That God hath given no absolute and unlimitted power to a King above law, is cleerly proved thus:

1. He is appointed of God, even when he sitteth on the throne, to take heed to read on a written copy of Gods Law, that he may learn to fear the Lord his God, and keep all the words of this Law. Deut. 17,18,19. Notwithstanding the great­nesse of the affairs of his Kingly office, he must read the Law, the more carefully to observe and obey it in every particular, for the ordering of his own life, and for the government of the people.

2. Whatsoever power a King hath, he hath it from the people, and all the power they gave him, is a legal and lawful power, to guide themselves in peace and godlinesse, and save themselves from uniust violence, by the benefit of Rulers; and therefore to claim a power a­bove Law, or to use a tyrannical power against the people for their hurt and destruction, or to be exempted from punishment; is not only against the peoples intention in their election, but such a power as they never gave him, never had, never could give; for they cannot give what they never had, and power to destroy themselves, they never had, nor to save any man, who should commit such crimes, as by the Law of God and nature deserveth death. I say such a power the peo­ple never had, never gave him, and so consequently a King hath it not.

3. The Law saith, Illud possimus quod jure poscimus. Again, it is no po­wer which is not a lawfull power, and therefore if a King murder the inno­cent, and do acts of sinfull iniustice, this tyrannicall power is not from God, otherwise then by way of permission, as a power to sin, in devils and men is; and therefore such a power is restrainable and punishable by the subiect, as being a power, I say, not from God at all.

4. Note the conditions tacite or expresse, upon which the Prince receiveth the crown: For soedus conditionatum, aut promissio conditionalis mutua, facit vis alteri in alterum; a mutual conditional covenant giveth Law and power over one to another: I ask then, why a subject break­ing his covenant with the King by treason or rebellions should be pu­nished for it justly; and the King breaking his covenant and oath with the people in degenerating into a tyrant, and murdering the innocent, should not be punished likewise? Specially seeing it is acknowledg­ed, That the States of the Kingdom who gave him the crown are above him, and they may take away what they gave him, as the Law of Nature and God saith, Qui habet potestatem constituendi, etiam & jus adimendi. Rutl plea for the people. quest. 26. pag. 234. l. nemo 37. l. 21. de reg, jur l. ille a quo 13. S.

5. If the King turn a paricide, a lyon, a waster, and a destroyer of the People, as a man he is Subject to the coactive Laws of the land; if any thing should hinder that a Tyrant should not be punished by law, it must be, either because he hath not a superior, but God, or nemo po­test a se ipso cogi: but this ground is false and absurd, for a politick soci­ety, as by natures instinct, they may appoint a head or heads to them­selves, so also if their head or heads become ravenous wolves, the God of nature hath not left a perfect society, and free people remedi­lesse, but they may arraign and punish the head or heads to whom they gave all the power that they have for their good, not for their de­struction.

6. Where ever there is a covenant and oath betwixt two equals; yea, or superiors and inferiors, the one hath some coactive power o­ver the other. If the father give his bond to pay the son a thousand pounds, as his patrimony; though before this ingagement the father was not oblieged, but only by the law of nature to give a patrimony to his son: yet now by a politique obligation of promise, covenant, and writ, he is so oblieged to his son, to pay a thousand pound, that by the Law of Nations, and the civil law, the sonne hath now a coactive power by law to compel his father, though his superior, to pay him so much of his patrimony. Even so (though it should be granted (which I shall never grant) that the King stands superior to his King­dom and States, yet if the King come under covenant with his King­dom (as ours have don) he must by that come under some coactive power to fulfill his covenant: for omne promissum (saith the Law) cadit in debitum, what any man doth promise falleth under debt. If the Co­venant be politique and civil, then the King must come under a civil obligation, to perform the covenant, and though there be none on earth superior to King and people to compel them both, to perform what they have promised; yet de jure by the law of nations each may compel the other to mutual performance. And this is cleer, 1. By the law of Nations, if one nation break covenant with another, though both be Independant, yet hath the wronged Nation power, de jure, to presse performance, and to force the other to keep covenant, or punish them for violation.

2. This is proved from the nature of a promise or covenant, de­scribed by Solomon, Pro. 6.1,3 My son, if thou be surety for thy friend, if thou hast stricken thy hand with a stranger: Thou art snared with the words of thy mouth, and art taken with the words of thy mouth. The meaning is, by a word of promise and covenant, the creditor hath coactive power, though he be an equal or an inferior to the man who is surety, even by law to force him to pay, and the Judge is obliged to give his coactive power to the debtor, that he may force the creditor to pay. If then the King (giving, not granting he were superior to his whole Kingdom) come under a covenant to them, to preserve their rights, lives, liberties: but contrarywise destroys their persons, goods, cities, by sword, plun­der, and fire, by his commissions granted to inhumane malignants and bloody Irish, they have power to compel him to give satisfaction.

3. The law shall warrant to loose the vassal from his lord, when his lord hath broken his covenant. Hippolitus in L. Si quis viduam, col. 5. & dixit de quoest. l. Si quis major, 41. & 161. Boltol. n. 41. The Magde­burgens. in libel. de Offic. Magist. Imperatores & Reges esse Primarios vas­sallos imperii, & Regni, & proinde fi feloniam contra Imperium, aut Regnum committant, feudo privari, proinde ut alias vasallos.

14 obie. I find this to be a main objection, That there is no law for subjects to put their Kings to death, for any crime. It is (saith Bodin) a great dif­ference [Page 32] to say that a King may be lawfully slain, by a strange Prince, or by his Subjects

It is no commendation or grace given to the law, that it should be like the spiders web, that catcheth the little flies, and lets the greater escape.

But to answer. 1. It is an error and a great mistake, to say, that the Commons in the house of Parliament, or the representative Kingdom are subjects to the King. This I utterly deny, to wit, as they are Judges, there, to be subjects to the King, neither doe they Judicially convent his Person before them, censure and iudge him to death, (quatenus) as subiects: but thus, He being a minister, a steward, or servant of the people, and they representing the whole body of the people, doe call him to an account, not as Subiects to him, but indeed as his lord and master, and so have a Soveraign power to iudge him to death, if his crimes deserve the same.

2 In point of law Bodin gives us the whole cause, Ibid. for he confesseth Where the Prince that bears rule is not an absolute Soveraign, but the Sove­raignty is either in the people or Nobility: in such a case (saith he) there is no doubt, but it is lawfull to proceed against a Tyrant in way of justice, and to put him to death: and gives for it the example of Nero and Maximinius. That the Kings of England have not been absolute Monarchs, but the Supreame Soveraignty resided in the people, is a thing certainly known, and so abundantly proved by other hands, as there cannot be any shew of reason brought against it.

3. Seeing the King is under law, and the representative of the peo­ple above the King to proceed in iustice against him, hence it will ne­cessarily follow, that the King by law, may lawfully be put to death: for the law saith, the highest or supreamest Judge upon earth, cannot pardon and free the guilty of the punishment due to him. A. de le. l. non ideo minns. Rom. 3,4 Deu. 1.17

And the reason is, he is, but the minister of God, a revenger to execute wrath upon him that doth evil. And if the judgment be the Lords, not mans, not the Parliaments, as indeed it is not, he cannot then draw the sword against the innocent, nor absolve the guilty, except the would take upon him, to be wiser then God, respect persons in judgment, and dispose of that which is proper to his master. Now sure it is, God only univocally and essentially as God, is judge; and God only and essen­tially, and all men in relation to him, are ministers, legates, deputies, ser­vants, I say, in relation to him, equivocally and improperly Judges, and meer created, and breathing shadows of the power of the King of Kings. And look as the Scribe following his own devise and writing, what sentence he pleaseth, is not an officer of the court in that point, nor the pen and servant of the Judge: so the Supream Councel of State, and Representative of the Kingdom arraigning the King for murder, Trea­son, and other high misdemeanors, would be but forged intruders and bastard Judges, and go contrary to Law, so far as they gieve not the ve­ry [Page 33] sentence of God, and are not the very mouth of the Iudge of Heaven and Earth, to pronounce such a sentence as the Almighty himself would do, if he were sitting on the throne or bench.

4. Howsoever there be some solemnities of the Law, from which the King may be free, which indeed are not Laws (as Prickman pro­veth) D. c. n. 78 but some circumstances belonging to the Laws: Nevertheles, if a king commit murder, adultery, theft, and be a traitor, a waster, and destroyer of his people, their goods, lives, Laws, Liberties, con­trary to his oath and Coronation-Covenant, in this case I confidently affirm, there is no law (that hath reason, equity, or justice for its bot­tom and ground) against the putting of such a King to death by the great Councel of State (as we have formerly shewed) above him. And the reason is cleer, for the people have no power to make a law, that the King shall not dy by the hand of Justice what wickednesse so­ever he should commit.

5. I would gladly be informed by any Iurist, or Statist, If a Tyrant without a title may be killed, yea by a private man; why a Tyrant that hath lost his right and title to the Crown, by the highest Judica­ture in the Kingdom, may not lawfully be put to death. Ut L. & vim F de Justit. & jure ubi plene per omnes. For the first, the law gives it, and it is so generally held by Vasquez, Barclay and o­thers. Vasq. l. 1 c. 8. n. 33. Bar. cont. Monar. l. 4: cap. 10 pag. 286. And for the latter, observe what Royalists themselues acknow­ledge, Winzetus against Buchan, saith of Nero, Wintzet. adv. Buc. p. 275. that he seeking to de­stroy the Senate and People of Rome, and seeking to make new lawes for himself, excidit jure Regni, lost all right to the kingdom. And Bar­clay saith, a Tyrant such as Caligula, spoliare se jure Regni, spoileth him­self of the right to the Crown. So Grotius, Groti. de jure bell. & pac. l. 1 cap. 4. Si Rex hostili animo in to­tius populi exitium feratur emittit regnum, If he turn enemy to the king­dom for their destruction he loseth his kingdom: because (saith he) Voluntas imperandi, & voluntas perdendi, simul consistere non possunt. A wil or mind to govern and to destroy, cannot consist together in one.

6 The cutting off of a contagious member, that by a Gangreen would corrupt the whole body is wel warranted by nature and reason: for the safety of the whole is to be preferred before a part. But here perhaps, it will be objected, cut off a mans head, and the life of the body is taken away; so the King being the head, destroy him, and the whole body of the Common-wealth is dissolved. I answer. God cut­teth off the spirits of Tyrannous Kings, and yet the Common-wealth is not dissolved: For 1. This or that tyrannous King being a transient mortal thing, cannot be referred to the immortal Common-wealth, as it is adequate correlate. 2. If all the Kings of the earth were remo­ved, yet the Common-wealth would not leave off to be a body, it would be only a casting off of one form of Government for another, the worser for the better; but the natural body without the head can­not live.

Lastly, Mr. Pryn citing some Law-Books, where the King is said to [Page 34] be the only Supream Governor of this Realm, hath no Peer in his Kingdom, ought not to be under man. Soveraign power of Parl, l. 1. p 104, 105. Thus answereth, 1. That the meaning of al these books is, the king is above every one of his Subjects particularly & distributively as single men: but if we take them collectively in Par­liament, as they are one body, and represent the whole kingdom, then they are above the King, and may, yea, ought to restrain and question his acti­ons, his male-Administrations, if there be just cause. 2. Bracton explains himself how he is highest and without a Peer, to wit, in distributing ju­stice, that is, he is the highest Iusticiar in the Kingdom, but as the Law as any in receiving justice. And for the Oath of Supremacy, it relates to the Popes forraign Princes authority, formerly usurped in this Realm, and not at all to be referred to Parliaments, or their jurisdiction, power, superiority, preheminence, or authority, not so much as once thought of by the subscribers of this Oath, which had its creation and autho­rity from the Parliament.

15. Obje Some say, For people to adjudge their King to death, is without example, either in Scripture or humane history.

Answ. 1. We argue this negatively, this is neither commanded, nor practised, nor warranted by promise: Ergo. It is not lawfull, But this is not practised in Scripture: Ergo. It is not lawfull, It followeth not. I read not in all the word of God, of a man put to death, for ly­ing with a beast, for witchcraft, for tempting the people to go a who­ring and serving a false God; yet these things are written, and are all divine precepts.

2. Physitians say, that that Physick which only stirs the humors, and doth not carry them away, leaves the body worse then it found it: so, it hath been seen by often and wofull experience, when the States of a kingdom have only stirr'd their Princes by opposing and resisting their tyranny and misgovernment, and not cut them off, they have brought upon themselves and the whol Realm the more mischief and misery afterward.

3. Former examples are no binding rules to us, otherwise then we see men have acted according to reason, religion, Law; for wherein soever they differed from these things, therein ought we to differ from them. 4. If kings formerly have not judicially been put to death for murder, treason, and other capital crimes, it is the more needfull and usefull that such a thing should now be don, that all other Nations far and neer may hence know and learn, what their duty is, and what they may lawfully do, in point of Law and conscience, and not stand stil as if they were beasts in a base and sencelesse slavery any longer.

But Fiftly. To speak more directly to the objection, There is no new thing under the sun. We have many examples of Emperours & Kings which have judicially been condemned & put to death by the Soveraign power of the people. Matth. Par. pag. 273, 274, 275. Not to speak of Nero mentioned before: nor of our King John who was condemned to death by a Parliament in France, for slaying his Nephew Arthur treacherously with his own [Page 35] hands, and likewise to lose the Crown of England. It is said of Ama­ziah king of Iudah 2 King. 14.19. That they made a conspiracie against him in Jerusalem, and he fled to Lachish, but they sent after him to Lachish and slew him there. Not privately, but openly, as acted by publick authority for his great impiety, and having broken his Oath and Co­venant: whereupon we reade not of any complaint, inquisition, pro­ceeding, or punishment inflicted on those that slew him after his death either by the people, or his children, as there was upon those that slew king Amon: but being slain, They (to wit, the persons who had put him to death) brought him on horses, and he was buried in Jerusalem: and all the people of Judah made Ahaziah King. Which plainly shews that what was formerly done by the greater part of the State at Jerusa­lem, was afterward confirmed by Common-consent, and executed by command of those which might lawfully do it.

In like manner Andronieus, was apprehended, deposed, & put to death by the people for his tyranny and oppression. Nic. Chr An nales fol. 52. Grimst. Emp. hlst pag. 160. Reg. Sco Buchan. lib. 4. pa. 111. So Iulianus, not on­ly deprived of the Empire, but authoritatively commanded to be slain in his pallace. Heliogabulus (that monster of mankind) was by the Praetorian Soldiers, put to death with the Senate and peoples approba­tion. Dardan King of Scotland by the unanimous consent of the No­bles and people had his head cut off (which they carried about for a laughing-stock) and threw his corps into a jakes, after he had reigned 4. years, Lucktock the 22 King of Scotland, for his vitious and base life was convented before an assembly of the chief men and slain with the instruments of his wickedness. ib. p. 113. Eugenius the 8. another of their Kings, was for his filthy lusts, covetousness, and cruelty, slain in the assembly of his Lords, by their general consent, and his companions in villany and wickednesse hanged: Et ipsi gratum populo speculatum praebuere: pag. 165. which was a greateful spectacle to the people.

So Agis and Pausanias two Lacedemonian Princes put to death by the people. Mun. cos. l. 5. c. 37. p. 1248. So the Thracian Kings for their offences by publick consent were punished with death. The usual practice of the Saboeans was to stone their Kings, if they highly transgressed and went beyond their bounds. If need were, it might be shewed out of Histories and ap­proved Authors, that the Athenians, Ionians, Melesians, Marchomanni, Quadi. Persians, Sicilians, Corinthians, Parthians, Meroes, Gardii, Medes, Paphii, Cathians, Ethiopians, Sidonians, Germanes, Swedes, Danes; and antiently even all other Nations, not only prescribed laws, and lim [...] to their Kings, but cald them usually to an account for their misgo­vernment, and oft times put them to death when they saw cause. Alex. ab [...] 4. [...] fol. [...]. [...]uel. & Gibel. pli l. 4. Alex. l. 6. c. 4. Plut. in Arat. Val.

6 The putting to death of Tyrants in former times hath been held so lawful and honorable, as large rewards have been propounded to the undertakers and authors thereof, and to the living they have given the goods of the Tyrant as to the deliverer of their Coun­try, and honored the dead with Epitaphs, and Statutes of brasse, [Page 36] as in Athens, Harmodius, and Aristogiton, together with Brutus, and Cas­sius: Max. l. 2. c. ult. L. 3. & L. om [...] ne delictū, Sect. ut F. de re mil. in Greece Aratus the Sycienian, and thus by publick Decree of their States, because they had freed their several countries from the tyranny of Pasistratus, Coesar, Nicoebis, yea, those monuments of Ty­rant-killers by antiquity were so honored and highly esteemed of, as they placed them in their Temples on sacred banqueting beds: And when Xerxes (having vanquished the Athenians) had carried away with him the Statutes of Harmodius and Aristogiton into his own country: Se­leucus one of the successors of Alexander the great King of Syria, caused them with all diligence to be carried back again, and to be set up in their own places.

In Norway antiently they had this custom, That whosoever slew a Tyrant King, was thereby made a King. Gul. Neu brig. l. 3. cap. 6. And what the Poet wrote was the opinion then, and common saying of the people.

For conclusion: This only I shall add, to say, There is not an exam­ple any where of the like practice. If it be meant not so judicially and ac­cording to the strict rule and form of law, I confesse there may be much truth in it: For commonly heretofore, amongst all Nations, Iewes. Turks, Papists, Heathens, &c. People observed not the manner as matter, they thought Tyrants so worthy of death, as they did not much mind how and in what way to cut them off, so they were de­stroyed; hence it came to passe, that few tyrannous princes in old time ever died a natural death, but either by their subjects, or their means were slain in warre, or by some private hand made out of the way: which gave Iuvenal occasion to say,

And therefore this late proceeding against the King, seeing it was so legal, it shall live and remain upon record to the perpetual honor of our English State, who took no dark or doubtful way, no indirect [...]by-course, but went in the open and plain path of Justice, Reason, [...]w, and Religion: and in this regard they need not fear the re­proaches and falshood of malitious tongues and pens; for as God doth approve their work, and owns it, so he will defend them, his, and their Cause in spight of all treacherous and wicked Designs, either of Men or Devils.