Whilst I was musing the fire kindled, and at the last I spake with my pen; wri­ting but what I believe, and believing what I write to be the very truth, my conscience bearing me witnesse in the Holy Ghost.

ALthough the King and Parliament assembled together, are the most honourable and supream Court of the Kingdome, from whom there is no humane Appeal; yet they are still to be loo­ked on but as a company of men subject to infirmities, passi­ons, and errours as others are: and therefore may determine (even where they concur) things evill in themselves: or else we must grant that no Parliamentary Acts were ever evill in themselves (and so needed no abrogation) but only inconvenient for time and occasions, and so needed but suspensions, till fit seasons of re-inforcing them might return. And if the whole may erre in their determinations, much more may the parts seve­rally and alone.

2. In so great a number it is probable there still will be, (as it is certain now there are) some of green yeers, slender parts, small experience, little, or no learning either in Arts, or Law: and I may adde (from the censures of some part of that Court upon the other) of (at least) suspected integrity: who as they are chosen by popular voices (wherein sinister References of times beare no small sway) so are they (probably) lead in Voting by Popular Arguments tending most to liberty: being incompetent Judges of the Method's and My­steries of State-government. Whence it will follow, that since number of Voyces, and not depth of Argument carries it; the fittest and justest Proposi­tions, may be oft overborn by number, which cannot be confuted by reason.

3 As it is true, that no evill ought to be imagined of the Parliament, so is it as true that No evill ought to be imagined of the King; and yet it is not untrue, that where there is none, the Greatest evill may be suspected, and the Greatest evill may be where None is imagined.

4 Though no Evill ought to be imagined of the Parliament, conjunctim and in the lumpe: viz. That what the King and Both Houses shall faitly and freely conclude upon and enact, will prejudice no man; yet in regard of particular Members, when I know evill by them, I may suspect evill from them. Else why doth one part of the Parliament not only suspect, but say so much, and so great evill of the other? Whilst they mutually repute each other enemies to the State, which of all Civill evils is the greatest.

[Page 5]5 When there is a noise of extream danger (which all men fear) and then earnest undertaking for prevention, (which all men desire) it is easie to conceive, how readily men will assent, without a due examination either of the immi­nence of the danger, or lawfulnesse of the prevention: especially men of the weaker sort, not well able to judge of either.

6 When it is possible that no one in either house of Parliament may bee learned in the Laws, since Noblemen, Knights, Gentlemen, Citizens and Towns-men (of which they consist) are not necessarily so to be, nor one more then Another: I see not how the judgment of the Law can fully and properly reside in them; especially when the King consents not. And so much seems implyed by the sitting of the Judges in the house; who (for ought I heare) have no other office there, but to advise or advertise in point of Law.

7 When it is said, that the judgment of the major part of both houses is the judgment of the Parliament, and consequently of the Kingdom; I conceive it is not rightly affirmed. For (besides that the judgment of the Clergy is not (so much as in a shadow) there represented, who are a considerable part of the Kingdome, and should be presumed to have as good judgment, and be as good men as others:) I resigne not my judgment but obedience to the Parliament: and not barely to the Burgesses of my own Town (whom perhaps I think ve­ry unfit, and who were chosen against my will,) but to the result determinati­ons of both houses; and not to them only neither, but as all are allowed, con­firmed, and perfected by the Kings assent. For I am represented in the Com­mons but as subordinate to the King, and to joyn with the King and the Lords (not without, or against both, or either of them) to make Lawes for the good of the Kingdom. So that when the Act is made by the concurrence of all three States; then, and (I suppose) not till then, it becomes obligatory, and as a peaceable Subject I must obey, if it be lawfull before God; though my judg­ment be still free, and at home, and I do think it inexpedient, as the Negative part of Votes do. For it is impossible, and against Reason and Nature, that an understanding Mans judgement, backt with strength of Argument should bee led captive meerly by the ods of two or three voices.

8 The major part of the houses being that part, which exceeds the other though but by three or foure voices: shall not that Law which is concluded only by the advantage of those voices, without the Kings consent, be a Lesbian Rule, or a Nose of wax; which upon a second Vote may passe the contrary way, upon a casuall absence or presence of so small a number? The Law is a strait Rule, and always like it selfe. If such or such a thing be Law after it was so voted by the major part of the houses, it was Law before it was so voted; unlesse an absolute power of New-law-making be in such a Vote) and so might [Page 6]be put in execution without a new voting: only the Law ought to be produced. If the major part of the Votes of both Houses be only Declarative of the Law, then in reason the first Voting should stand, or else this will bee a very uncer­taine rule: And so the case of ordering the Militia should not be according to Law, because it was first, and twice countervoted by the House of Lords. Such broad and obvious exceptions ought in matters of so high concernment, to be fully cleered and removed.

9. When the question is, Who shall be Iudge of Law? I conceive it must bee meant, either of the sence of particular Laws, or of the latitude and scope of the Law in generall. If of the first, I suppose the sence will appeare, either first, By the cleere light it hath in it selfe, (as the Sun shewes its own light) or secondly, By references to other Laws or clauses touching the same argument which are more perspicuous. Or thirdly, By the usance and practice, which is the life of Laws. If none of these can make it plain, in my judgement it becomes no Law, but is obsolete, until a ful sence be agreed on again by that ful Authority which first made the Law. Otherwise I see not how any rule for declaring of Law can be alwayes absolutely determinative. For (besides that the same thing is at divers votings, diversly voted) If the Votes of either House should chance (as possibly they may) to be equally divided, and the major part of both Hou­ses severally, be necessarily required to determine; where shall the determina­tion be, when the Votes of one (at least) are equally ballanced? Unlesse we fly to a third way, viz. the major part of both Houses in grosse, where the excep­tion lyes as full, because even then also they may chance to be equall. If it be understood of the Second, then that Latitude or Scope ought to be evinced frome some Termes in the Law expressed, (which termes are to be produced) and not from the pleasure of any who shall say that is lawfull which seems so to them: especially when they make themselves the sole Judges of Law and Equity. For whither will not such a liberty reach? A Transition is so made, à genere ad genus, from positive law to the law of reason; and that, being vari­ous according to diversity of apprehensions, cannot bee imposed upon all, where the full Legislative power is not concurrent. And I conceive it is no [...] pro­perly said, That in extreame danger, I may by Law doe that which otherwise I may not do: but that in such a case, I may doe that and be excused, which by Law I cannot doe. As in an assault (I thinke) the Law doth not say, you may kill a man, or take away his weapon, but if you doe it, The Law will not punish you, because it is against all reason, that where the Law affords me no help, it should not hold me excused for helping my selfe, when Necessity (which hath no law) is so pressing, that otherwise I must perish.

10 When necessitie and extream danger are made the grounds, for (other­wise) [Page 7]doubtfull and dangerous undertakings, it were meet those Termes were rightly defined, that so we might cleerly see the foundnesse of our warrant. I conceive it to be, when a man is so presently distressed, that hee can make no possible use of any positive law to helpe him, and so becomes in a sort disob­liged from it, and left free to the law of Nature, which prompts every thing to seeke the preservation of it selfe. This necessity dispenceth with ordinary duties both to God and man. But we must be sure of the necessity before we assume the liberty. If a man steale, and plead necessity, he shall not be excused because the Law hath not left him remedilesse in his want. I may not take a­nothers sword from him, because I have cause to feare he will hurt me; nor the sword that I have lent one, though he hath threatned to kill me, so long as he drawes it not upon me, nor offereth force unto me: Because I have yet a re­medy by law, and may bind him to the Peace, &c. And then much lesse may I wrest his away that hath sworne to defend me. When necessity is but suppo­sed, no Simple and absolute necessity is confessed, and so no law under pre­tence of necessitie is yet to be violated. The Kingdome may be in danger and yet the danger not extreame; nor any necessity such, but that it may bee pre­served by ordinary defence: or if the danger be urgent, we may not seeke to prevent that without Law, which by law is well provided for already. In great dangers (such as now are supposed) the Kingdome is to be put into a po­sture of defence against Forraigne Invasion, or Domestick Tumult and Rebel­lion. By Law and Custome the King is to order it. [And so much is acknow­ledged by the present Parliament in their Reply to the Kings Answer of the 29. of January: where (speaking of the Forts and Castles of the Kingdome) they have these words. viz. We confesse the nomination of any person to those places, be­ing so principall and inseparable a Flower of your Crowne vested in you, and derived to you from your Ancestours, by the fundamentall Laws of the Kingdome, you may reserve to your selfe. And anon after speaking of the Militia, They say, Which Militia [...]e likewise acknowledge by the Law is subject to no command but of your Majestie, and of Authority lawfully derived from you▪] Now the King carefully applying himselfe to it; I see not what necessity, or disobliging extremity can justly be alleadged to dispossesse him of it, when he is not convinced to have failed in his duty. To doubt that he will faile, is not to prove that he hath, but rather that yet hee hath not done it. If the Enemie were landed, or the Subjects assaulted (which are degrees beyond our dangers, (at least) when this fell first into debate) the ordering of defence would be still in the King; (unlesse where particular out­rages, enforced particular places to the defence of themselves by the law of Necessitie, which awaiteth no Lawes.) But if the King bee regardlesse of his Trust and his peoples safety, and let the Enemy graze along his Kingdome; or [Page 8]any of his Ministers prove false to the State, and either take with a Forraigne, or become themselves a home Enemy, and the King strive not to suppresse them, or (all which far be it to imagine) do animate and incite them to despoyle his good Subjects; Then (and I suppose not till then) is the danger in extre­mity, and then is the plea just for the Lawes of necessity▪ which doe not on­ly enable the State in common, but every man in particular to seeke the preser­vation of himselfe and of his Countrey, by all such wayes as stand not in op­position to the Law of God.

11 When I protest to defend the power and priviledges of Parliament; It is but so far as lawfully I may, and so far as I know them, or ought to know them being easy to be knowne, viz. such as by Custome and unanimous Consent have obtained as unquestionable, not such as are quarrelled among themselves, some claiming, and others gainsaying: nor such as are challenged, without, or against the King; who being part of the Parliament, ought to have Consent in the concluding of Priviledges; at least ought not to be unpriviledged with­out his consent whose priviledges are protested for, as well as (and with) the rest, and the defence of them sworne to in the oath of Supremacy: Where wee sweare (to our power) to assist and defend all Iurisdiction, priviledge, preheminence and Authority graunted or belonging to the Kings Highnes, his Heires &c. If the disposing of the Navy, Forts, Magazines, and Militia bee (as tis confessed they are) by the Law of the Land the Priviledge of the King, there can be no distinction (to my apprehension) imagined, upon any feares, or iealousies whatsoever, (where no evill is by him actually practised, and all intentions of evill are absolutely ab­jured) to warrant any men, (few or moe, in Parliament, or out of Parliament, who have taken that Oath) to dispossesse him of them, or detaine them from him, in what manner soever hee shall come to demand them. For the Oath is peremptory and unlimited, & non est distinguendum ubi lex non distinguit. To say they are de­tained for him, (not from him) might have some colour if the King were either a child, distracted, or Weake minded: But to an adult and understanding Prince, such a pretence is a higher derogation, by disparaging his wisdome or fidelity.

12 Where power is invested in any; and by custome, and free consent of all is made hereditary: I conc [...]ave it cannot afterwards be limited with other con­ditions then at first were agreed on, without the consent of him that hath it.

13 That which is certainly lawfull, and but doubtfully dangerous, is to be chosen rather then that which is not certainly lawfull, and but doubtfully safe, When A man offers no violence, (though upon good reason I feare he will hurt me) to let his sword alone is certainly lawfull, and but doubtfully dangerous: To wrest it from him when he makes no assault, is not certainly lawfull, (but rather certainly unlawfull) and but doubtfully safe: (or rather undoubtedly dange­rous) [Page 9]for by that occasion a quarrell may be made, and bloud shed, which might otherwise possibly (at least) have bin saved. I would the application were not easie.

14 If a man being illegally dispossessed of his right, doe (in heat of contenti­on) use some illegall meanes for the recovery of it, that is not to be drawne into argument to justifie the illegallity of the first usurpation. If a man unassaulted wrest my sword from me, and I afterwards beat him, he may not draw my after­beating into argument, to justifie his taking my sword from mee.

15 When the envy of not yeilding to the advise of his great Councell, is cast upon his Majestie; It is fit to set the case upon its owne leggs. It seemes by ma­ny passages in the observations, and other bookes and by more then Booke-pas­sages, that the King is esteemed a Tyrant over his people. For what else is im­plyed in the distrusting and Vilepending of his Oathes, Obtestations, Impreca­tions, Execrations? In reputing the Attendance and Company about him (whom he ownes and protects) Enemyes to the State in raising at least defen­sive Armes? in seizing his Navy, Shutting the Towne Gates against him, and possessing his Forts and Magazines against his Command? For will a man wrest anothers sworde from him, if he do not presume he will draw it upon him? Nay, is it lawfull to take any mans sword (if any mans then) till it be drawne upon him, or some violence offered him, or threats given him? [If it be said then it is too late, it may as well be said, till Then it is too soone] Now then, When they are so opinioned, and jealous of the Kings love and fidelity; how can it be imagined that he should looke on them as Ingenuous and Equall Counsellours, and not be as distrustfull of the sincerity of their advise? For how shall I per­swade another to be directed by me as his friend, when I give him to understand that I take him for mine Enemy, that intends mischeife against me? especially when the matter is not of ordinary concernment, wherein each ones Rights are left free and untouched; but such as trencheth deep into his Majesties Preroga­tive, and tendeth not only to the spanning of his power, but mainly also to the quenching of his honour; whilst by yeilding to such advise, he must tacitely confesse that he is not worthy to be trusted, and by consequence openly proclaime that he is unworthy to be King.

16 If the (so called Malignant party should chance to be the prevailing part in the houses, The King puts the case in his Answer to the Declaration of the 26 of May, pag. 8. and should alleadge that through the precipitancy of some mens pretended zeale, the Kingdom were like to run into confusion, (for such a case may be, and [Conspiracy for pretended Reformation] was the Title and Argument of a Book many yeers since) and therefore must be safely secured: and presuming the King favours that side, and not liking the course that he will take to secure the Kingdom, they should vote it lawfull for them to doe it themselves without [Page 10]him: must this presently be concluded to be the judgement of the whole King­dome, and to be according to Law, when no law can be produced? and the King to bee ill-affected to his best Subjects, or to be misled by evill Counsellours to un­doe himselfe and all his Kingdome, by not yielding to the advise of his great Counsell? or will the Adverse part take it well to be reputed Enemyes to the State, a malignant Party, evill Counsellors &c? If not, It were but meet that the substantiall differences of the case were so well opened, that they that desire to know what is iust and right might tell where to find it; and that all men of mo­derate Capacity and Ingenuity, might cleerly see the Infallibility of the one par­ty, and the Hypocrify of the other.

17 When the Forts, Magazines, Navy, Offices, &c. are said to be intrusted to the King, or the King intrusted with them for the good of the Kingdome; The fence of the word Intrusted, in this place would be cleered. Not to question whether the King have these things by way of Trust from the people; it will be of all granted, (as it is by the King himselfe) that God & the Law have trusted him with them, and that for the good of the Kingdom: and so to imploy them he is further tyed by his Oath. But there is a twofold trust, one that is Absolute and unlimited, otherwise then that the end is specified, supposed, or presumed: end not so much limiting the Trust, as the Trust denoting & implying the end. And there is a Trust conditionate and circumscribed in such sort, that to faile in the performance is to forfeit the Trust. The first gives a man a right to the thing intrusted; The second gives him only a right to the trust of the thing. I conceive the Kings Trust is of the first kind, who being presumed to mean All good to his people, (according to the Maxime in Politicks, No evill ought to be imagined of the King) hath these things frankly and absolutely committed to his Governance and disposing: And however he shall order them, I suppose he is accountable to no man, nor questionable by any, unlesse he cleerely, publickly, and undoubtedly dispose of them to the ruine of his Kingdom; and so puts the people to an evident extremity or lawlesse necessity. If there be any limits the Law should expresse them, For he being Supream, there is no other power to impose them. Neither are the actions of his Ministers to be censured, unlesse by them the known Lawes have bin violated. If this Trust must be managed or re­gulated by both Houses of Parliament; First that Power should be made appear to the King and the People, and then there must either be a standing Court of Parliament, or else one must be called so oft as the King shall have occasion to send out Ships, take out, or put in powder or Amunition into his Magazines, chuse any Officers, &c. which is uncouth to cōceive. If a man having confidence of his Friend, shall say to him, Sir, I will freely give up my whole estate into your hands, only you shall sweare you will be a Father to my Children, here is [Page 11]implication of a Trust, and yet a clean right in the thing▪ so that he may set or sell, build or pull down, give or lend, and yet be accountable to none, nor falsifie his Trust, so long as the Children want nothing (yea, and if he fail [...] of the trust, perhaps some Court of Conscience may relieve them but I believe no positive Law can controule him. The case is otherwise with Feoffees, or Executors in Trust, who have a right only to the Trust, and none to the thing intrusted, which is wholly the Heires, the poor's or Legatiries to whom it was bequeathed.

18 The Kings and Subjects interests are mutuall He refers to every subject, and every subject unto him, as the Lines from the Centre to the Circle: And what interest he hath in one, he hath in another, and in all as well as in any: And his interest in them is of an higher Alloy, and more noble. As command i [...], then subjection. The interest of protection is motuall. The [...] is, that all the people are more worth then the King, but King & people and more worth then either.

19 Personall differences of wisdome of folly, weaknesse or strength, cou­rage or cowardise, meanesse or excellency of parts or arts, make no difference in the Right of the King; though they show a great difference in Gods dealing with the Kingdome.

20 When a King playes the Tyrant, or usurps upon his peoples just Liberties, I conceive it must be either first by a violent suppression of old Laws and Cu­stomes yet in force, or se [...]ondly by a wilfull obtrusion of new Laws by force, or thirdly by a wicked oppression by force without Law. When therefore Ty­ranny is imputed to, or implyed in a prince, (of or against: whom, we ought not lightly to thinke any evill, or receive any accusation) it will become Christians thoroughly to examine upon what points he is convinced, and not to take up such reports by whole sale and in gros [...].

21 If the King have not a Negative, he seems not to have so much power in Parliamentary Acts as one common Burgesse: For if the Voyce be even be­fore, that Burgesses may be the casting voyce of the House, and I see not so much as a vote allowed his Majesty.

22 When the King shall think it not fit to give his consent to what the major part of Parliament shall agree upon, He is not barely to be considered, as one single man: against so many: For besides his Privy Counsell at hand, men ac­customed to, and experienced in matters of State: and besides that possibly a very great number of both Houses are also of the Kings mind; we are to con­sider the King as one best acquainted with the Rules and Mysteries of Govern­ment, being (as it were) the Trade to, and is which he hath bin born, bred, and brought up: And therefore is presumed alone to see further into it, then many others together. For (besides that God hath a speciall way of communicating wisdom to Kings, in which regard A mise sentence is said to be in the lips of the King. Prov. 16.10. And the heart of Kings is unsearchable, Prov. 25.3.) Hystories make it [Page 12]plain, that there are Ar [...]dya Imperij and Militi [...], which the King and Captains apprehend when a thousand doe not and which perhaps may not be fit for all men, (nay not for any man else) to know.

23 When an Adult and Prudent Prince shall owne, approve of, and protect such and such Persons as his tryed and known Friends or Counsellours: If Any (under what pretence soever of their suggesting evill Counsell, when no evill practices are apparent, yea when such Councels and Practices are utterly dis­avowed and abjured by the King) shall presume, not only without the Kings consent, but against his expresse Command, to take up Armes to destroy and take off such Persons: though no Evill (quod absit) be intended against his Per­son; And yet who can tell what is in his heart that comes towards a man with a drawn sword in his hand [...]) I see not what Distinction can help, but that such Arms are taken (not for, but,) against the King. Otherwise how can any thing be said to be done against God; who being inviolable in his Person, cannot o­therwise be resisted, then by the blaspheming of his Name, breaking his Com­mands, rejecting his. Motions prosecuting, and perfecuting his Servants, &c.

24 When it is said, The King was made for the people, and not the people for the King; (besides, that the Comparison is as idle as that of the Members against the Belly in the Apologue, & the Apostle hath met with it, 1 Cor. 12.) it is (also) not absolutly true. For the King was no more made a man for others thē they were for him, nor made a King more for the good and safety of the People then the people were put into such a posture of order & obedienche, that e might be safe as well as They: yea rather He, then Any (if not then many) of them, as be­ing supposed the chiefest among them. The sense wherein it seems best to hold is; That The King was made for the need or necessity of the people, and not They for his: Viz. He can more securely be no King, then the People can be without a King. And He takes the surrender of their Power with the Dependances, and Con­sequences, not as a kindnesse from Them, but as doing a kindnesse to Them; (as is implyed in the refusall of the Vine, Fig-tree, and Olive-tree to rule over the rest, in Jotham's Parable, Judg. 9.7. &c. and in the History of Jepthah, Judges 11.4. &c.) For on him▪ They unload their Cares and Feares, who forgoes his Own private Ease and Quiet, that He may procure it to his People: Himselfe taking care that all men else may live without Care. Now on whom the Ne­cessity lyeth most, on Them lyes the greatest Obligation to respect. Therefore Saint Paul requires giving of thanks: for Kings, 1 Tim. 2.2. So may we say a Cap­tain, a Pilot, a Physician, a Schoolmaster were made for the need of their Correlates, which should render Them more honourable, and rather draw re­spects to Them, then challenge greater observance from Them.