THe Free-borne people of England live or ought to live by or under a Law of common consent, the Su­preame Ruler or highest Magistrate whereof is the KING, whose Oath is to conserve and maintaine justas leges & consuetudines quas vulgus elegerit, &c. the just Lawes and Customes which the Common People shall choose, (as many doe expound it.) Others will have the Verbe elegerit to signifie hath chosen, according to the French Aur [...]n choisy: and Mr. Jenkins alledgeth this reason for it, Jenk. Resp. ad Prin. Customes can­not referre to future time, and both are coupled together, Lawes and customes; so that Elegerit must be taken in the Preterperfect Tense: But by the favour of Mr. Jenkins albeit Customes are not properly alterable as are Lawes, and though Lawes and Customes are coupled together, yea alterable Lawes are nominated and placed before Customes; yet may the verbe Elegerit be taken in the future Tense; for the Reason why Lawes are inserted in the Kings Oath, or propounded to the King in his Oath before Cu­stomes, is, first, because Lawes are more worthy and noble then Cu­stomes, for that Lawes are Rules or Regulations of the whole or entire People, but Customes are Rules onely of some or of a part of the People, and that in some things onely.

Secondly, Lawes are more ancient, to speake generally, then Customes, for it's very probable that the Saxons comming out of Germany into Britaine brought the Common Law with them, as a Rule agreeable to the Law of Nature and Reason, which they had learned or had delivered unto them from their fathers; yet Cu­stomes they could not bring with them, for Customes have Relation to Place as well as to Persons, but neither the Saxons, nor any other [Page 2]People could have Relation to a Land or Country before they possessed it: so that the coupling of Lawes and Customes together, or Nominating or Placing Lawes before Customes in the Kings Oath, is no amiable Reason, From whence a direct consequence may be deduced, that the Verbe Elegerit must or ought to be taken in the Preterperfect Tense, or that it may not be taken in the Future-Tense, and consequently that the King may not be strictly tyed and obliged in foro conscientiae, to conserve and maintaine such just Lawes as the Common-People shall at any time make choise of: but admitting the Verbe Elegerit to be taken and expounded in the Preterperfect Tense, albeit there be difference in Grammar, yet is there no great difference in Logick or Reason; for the King taking his Oath to maintaine the just Lawes and Custome [...] which the People or Common-People have chosen, taketh his Oath by an Implicite or Tacite condition to conserve and maintaine the just Lawes which the People shall chuse; for at the first making of that Oath, and at our Kings their taking of it ever since, the Common-people had then chosen, and have ever since conserved such choise, that not only there should be no Lawes de futuro, for the time to come, with­out their Consent, but also that upon their Request or Petition our Kings should Redresse such Agrievances as they should complaine of, and likewise propagate such just Lawes as they should propound conducing to their generall good or welfare: and that was the Reason why heretofore it was inserted in many Statutes, Be it there­fore enacted by the Kings Majesty, with Assent of the Lords, &c. and at the Request of the Commons, &c. wherein two things are to be noted, first, that the Commons did Request, not command or en­force our Kings to passe such Acts; secondly, that our Kings did upon such Requests usually passe them. And albeit the King have a Negative voice, or rather a voice for advise, or to advise, as the words Le Roy s'avisera import, yet I conceive that he is strictly tyed in Foro conscientiae according to his Oath, and the end of his Government (which is the good of the People) to passe such Acts for Civill Government as the Commons shall Request him to passe. Jenk. Resp. ad Prin. But Mr. Jenkins and others make a Quaere and aske, who shall be Judges? whether such Lawes as the Commons shall Request be just or no, the King is tyed or obliged by Oath only to propagate and maintaine the just Lawes which the Common-People chuse or Request. In Mr. Jenkins his opinion, the judges and the Masters of Chancery, with the Lords or Peers assisting the King ought to [Page 3]be judges of the Common-People, or of their Representatives, or Trustees their Requests, rather then two, or three, or a few Com­moners, who sometimes are not learned in the Lawes of the Land. To this Quaere, and the Allegations, I answer, that the Com­mons Primario, or in the first Place are, and ought to be the judges, even as Customary Tenants are, and ought to be their owne Evi­dences; although one man ought not to be judge in his owne Case, yet all in a Kingdome, or Common-wealth, can have no judges of their Common Interest but themselves, or some amongst themselves, at leastwise no Competent judges: and where the Common Interest is controverted, there they, who have the greatest Interests, or whom it most concernes, ought to be judges Primario or in the first place; and surely the Common People in generall have the greatest In­terest in their Common Interest, and the Lawes of the Land most concerne them, wherefore they, or their Representatives, or Trustees, ought to be judges Primario, or in the first place. And as touching that, many in the House of Commons are not somtimes learned in the Lawes, nor have any great knowledge in State affaires; it may be so; and it may be wished, that none but such as have sound judgments, might sit in that Honourable House, and I beleeve that the words habiles homines, in the writ of Burgesses intend such men, and not men of great Estates, who are sometimes men of meane understandings, and yet by feasting (I will not say Bribing) or by flattering, or by an over-awing Power, attaine to be Parliament men; howsoever, for as much as such men being chosen, are capable to consult and advise with others wiser then themselves, and are in matters of great Concernment, guided by the Discretion of others, their votes going along with the votes of others, they may be accompted competent judges, of what may be beneficiall, or prejudiciall, to the Common-wealth. Howsoever I doe not exclude the Lords, or the House of Peeres from being judges secundario of such matters, as generally concerne the King­dome: for although Mr. Jenkins conceive them not to be Vulgus, Jenk Resp. ad Prin. truly I conceive the Lords in England to be but vulgus superlatum, even as Bishops are but clerici Prelati, and Aldermen but cives elati; in England the Nobles have no distinct or different Lawes, as in Germany, Poland, and some other countries; these here inherit by the Common Law, or Lawes Common to others; they also contract Bargaine and sale by the same Lawes, and are subject to the same Lawes; some Priveledges they have which make ra­ther [Page 4]a Titulary, or circumstantiall, then an Essentiall or specificall difference, between them and the inferiour Common-People. But it may be some will say, why should not the Lords being dignified, or Noble, be Judges Primariò, or in the first place, rather then the Commons? I answer, that the Lords are not intrusted by the Peo­ple, as are the Commons, and therefore in matters of Gene­rall concernment, the Commons ought to precede them; not­withstanding de se & suis in things that meerely concerne the Lords, as also concerning matters of Fact, And for this causo, as also to advise the King, are the Iudges, & Masters of Chance­ry called to the House of Peeres. Jenkins in his [ Cor­diall. &c.] or controversie which shall happen by writs of Error, or otherwise to come into that most Ho­nourable House, therein the Lords De Jure precede the Com­mons. But Mr. Jenkins will have the House of Peeres to be Judges of the Lawes, rather then the House of Commons, because the King by his writ saith, that he will consult and treat with the Peeres, and Prelates of the Kingdome, for, and touching the great Concern­ments of the Common-wealth (for the King never sits in the House of Commons) the Peeres doe consulere and consequently (as saith Mr. Jenkins) judge of the concernments of the Common-wealth, the Commons doe but Facere et consentire, according to such Consulta­tion or judgment; which Power ad faciendum & consentiendum Mr. Jenkins saith the King gives them by his writ; & to strengthen his Opinion he quoteth a great Lawyer: But by the favour of Mr. Jenkins, and such as adhere to his opinion, albeit the King say in his writ, that he will consult and treate with the Prelates and Peeres, touching the great concernments of the Common-wealth, for that they are properly his Assistants, he sitting with them, doth he therefore say that he will not treate with the Commons? nay, doth not the King treate with the Commons, by Messengers, when he desireth Aides and Subsidies, and have not the Commons a Negative voice therein? can the King and the Peeres make an Act of Law without the Commons? are the Commons tyed or obliged necessarily to doe and consent to what the King and the Lords shall determine, as Mr. Jenkins seemes to intimate? surely no, our Lawes and customes speake them absolutely free in these things. And whereas Mr. Jenkins saith that the King by his writ gives Power to the Commons, ad faciendum & consentiendum, therein he is greatly mistaken; the King by his writ onely appoints the place and time, and instances the words, ad faciendum & consentiendum, to shew the cause or End of their Convention or assembling together, ☞ but the Peo­ple give them their Power, who elect or nominate them, and [Page 5]also transact their Power unto them, by their Parole at their E­lections, and by their Indentures wherein they insert the words, ad faciendum & consentiendum, as from themselves to the Part [...]es, whom in the said Indentures they Nominate and intrust: and indeed, were the Power of the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses, derived to them by the Kings writ, such Indentures were needlesse and frivolous, the Sheriffs might only make their Return, se fecisse Electionem secundum Breve receptum, and such like. Moreover, it is against Reason that a People shall have Power to nominate and in­trust some about their Affaires, and shall, for that end, allow them wages, (as doe the Counties, Cities, and Townes Corporate, to the Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses) and yet that such Trustees or Stewards should derive no Power from the People their Trustors, neither as their Judges Delegate, nor Allegate; that is to say, nei­ther as Judges for them according to Law, nor as Judges for them according to Reason and Conscience. But M. Jenkins conceiveth, the House of Commons to be no fit Judges of Lawes, or Acts for the Peoples good, because they are not called ad consiliandum, but the House of Peeres. And furthermore, Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.] and his [Cordiall.] that the House of Com­mons are no Court, at leastwise no Court of Record, nor can give an Oath, or examine upon Oath; And that House which cannot doe the lesse, cannot doe the greater. By M. Jenkins, and other his adhe­rents favour, is it not of greater moment and concernment to be called ad faciendum & consentiendum, then ad consiliandum, or con­silium dandum? He, or they, who are called to Councell, are called only to advise with; but he, or they, who are called ad faciendum & consentiendum, are called to Act with, or to be Co-enactors.

Therefore the King, by his Writ, invites the People to doe and consent, (by their Representatives) touching such difficult and urgent affaires as concerne Himself, the State, and defence of the Kingdome of England, and Church of England, of which He intends to Consult with His Peeres: And great Reason it is that the Common-wealth should, at the least, have free Power in her self to acknowledge her own, Finalem Concordantiam, her own, Facere & consentire, ☞ albeit she were in nature of Femine Covert Baron (as M. Jenkins would have her) the King being sponsus Regni, Jenkins in his [ Lex Ter. p, 41.] qui per annulum is espoused to his Realme at His Coronation: And certainly the King conceives such Power inherent in the Common-wealth, when He declares in His Writ, Ita quod pro defectu Potestatis hujusmodi, seu propter impro­vidam Electionem Militum Civium, & Burgensium, &c. Moreover, I [Page 6]could tell M. Jenkins that Common-wealth hath greater Power [...] The KING receives the Ring at His Coronation, as doth Femme Covert Baron, and consequently the Common-wealth rather espouses the King, then the King the Common-wealth: So that the Common-wealth is Regina sui ipsius, ☞ the King, Rex Rege [...]s, as was Philip the second of Spain in England, albeit modo difference, for he was King meerly of Courtesie, but our Kings are Kings by Descent: And whereas M. Jenkins doth in severall places except against the Power of the House of Commons, affirming that they are not fit to be Judges of the Lawes of the Land, for that they can­not punish Felony, or Treason, nor give an Oath, nor are a Court of Record, &c. It maketh no matter whether they can doe these things, or whether they are a Court of Record or no, in relation of their being Judges of the Lawes of the Land, so farre forth as they are to judge of them; for the Commons are not called and chosen chiefly to judge of matters de facto, according to the Lawes in Being, (for that the Courts of Justice may determine of) but to judge of the Lawes themselves, ☞ De Facto & de Fieri, whether they be con­venient or inconvenient, fit to be continued, or repealed; or whe­ther new Lawes ought to be made for the good of the Common­wealth or no; and these things they may doe as Judges Allegate, or Ʋmpeeres for the People, although the House of Commons were no Court of Record. Moreover, I conceive that he, or they, who covenant with others to doe any Act, or Acts, which shall be rea­sonably advised, or devised by the Covenantees, or their Councell, or the like, doth make such Covenantees their Councell, or Arbi­trators, Judges Primario, or in the first place of such Act or Acts, and such Covenantors make themselves, or become Passive to the end, and Active to the meanes of such Covenant, that is to say, they are to doe, or Act what the Covenantees will (with Reason) have them doe or Act, albeit the Acts which they do are their own Acts; even so that Potentate, who Covenanteth by Oath (for his Oath is Vice contractus vel compacti) to conserve and maintain the Just Lawes and Customes which the People shall chuse; ☞ or otherwise the Just Lawes and Customes which the People have chosen, (it being one of their Chosen Lawes, that their Potentates shall de futuro up­on their Request, redresse their Agrievances, be it by repealing Acts inconvenient, or enacting some de Novo) such Potentate doth surely make the People their Representatives or Trustees, Judges Pirmario, or in the first place of such Act, and makes himself, or [Page 7]becomes Passive to the end, and Active to the meanes of such his con­tract by Oath; that is to say, He is to doe what the People will (with Justice and Reason) have him to doe or Act, albeit the Acts which he doth are his own Acts. But M. Jenkins saith, that both Houses have many times tendred unto our Kings, unjust and unreasonable Bills, which it had been better for our Kings to have denied, or not have passed, then to have consented to, and have passed; and Ma­ster Jenkins instanceth touching Religion, Bills tendred to Henry the 8. and to Queen Mary; Bills tendred unto Richard the 3. and also to the aforesaid Henry the 8. Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.] concerning Civill Govern­ment, &c. I conceive M. Jenkins might have instanced enough, and to many such Bills, but what of all this? Is there not Bonum Reale, and Bonum apparens, secundum tendentiam vellietatis, Reall Good, and seeming Good, which may be in it self evill? and is there not verum Reale, and verum Formalt, secundum quod ad se fert Intel­lectus; a Reall Truth, or a true Reall Being, and an apprehended Truth, or a true apprehended Being, which may be no true Reall Being; even so there is justum Reale, and justum appaerens, or for­male, an Act, or Being Really just, and seemingly or formally Just, as it is apprehended by understanding, and embraced by the will, which may be in it self unjust: wherefore, if the People (to whom the King is tyed by Oath) or their Representatives or Trustees, so long and so farre as they intrust them, shall on behalfe of the Peo­ple tender to the King, a Bill of Civill Government to them, seem­ing Just and Reasonable; but to the King seeming unjust and unreasonable, and it may be so in it self, the King notwithstanding, is by an Implicite Condition of his Oath, tyed or obliged to passe such a Bill if it deprive not himselfe, of his owne Just Rights, for Id juris est quod Nationis est, if a Nation or People, will induce themselves into an inconvenience, conceiving it convenience, the King cannot help it; he may use the best meanes he can, by advise, Arguments, and the like, to prevent it; but if the People, and their Representatives, wil persevere in their Desire or Request, the KING (as aforesaid) is obliged to passe it, The KING is the supreme Ru­ler, or highest Magistrate for the People, or over the People ad agen­dum, to put the Lawes in Execution; but the KING is not chiefe Judge of the Rules, or Lawes, by which the People will be Gover­ned; the People themselves, and those whom they intrust so farre as they intrust them, are, or ought to be Judges thereof Jure Primi­tive: moreover, if a Covenantee will desire, or require of a Cove­nantor [Page 8]an Act, (of which the Covenantee is Judge Primariò, or in the first Place) no way beneficiall, but rather detrimentall to him the Covenantee, the Covenantor is obliged to grant, or performe such an Act tending to the end of his Covenant, not otherwise to endamage himselfe; even so it is between the KING who is Cove­nantor by Oath, and the People who are Covenantees concerning Lawes and Statutes touching Civil Government to be enacted, or repealed, and abolished.

But some it may be will say, suppose the Commons or both Hou­ses of Parliament should tender unto the KING a Bill, or Bills, de­structive to His owne Just Rights, is he bound to passe such? truly no! He may justly refuse them, for the End of His Oath is to con­serve and maintain the Just Lawes which the People have chosen, or shall chuse, for their Good; not the unjust Lawes which they shall chuse to destroy or deprive Him of His Royall Right: Jus Regnandi is the Kings by discent, even as Jus Regni (to speake properly) is the Peoples by birth-right, (no way excluding the King from any bene­fit thereof) The People promise or Covenant by Oath to obey the King as their supreame Governour or highest Magistrate, and to maintaine Him, His Heires, and lawfull Successours, in His, and their just Rights and Dignities; and as the Kings Oath tieth and obligeth Him to the People, certainly the Peoples Oath tieth and obligeth them to the King: although our King in England be not a Personall Monarch to make Lawes, and Governe at His pleasure, as some af­firme that the Great Turke, the King of Persia, and such like Tyran­nicall Princes do; (albeit, I conceive, that even those Potentates are in some things limited) yet out King is a Legall Monarch to Reigne and Governe by Lawes made and consented unto by the People; so that although the King have not an absolute Power to make Lawes, ☞ He hath an absolute Power to administer the Lawes; and I hope there are none that will thinke or attempt otherwise.

Having said, that the King is tied by an implicite Condition of His Oath (admitting the Verb Elegerit to be understood in the Pre­terperfect tense) to passe such Bills concerning Civill Government as the Commons or both Houses shall tender unto Him, (not de­structive to Himselfe) and having said, notwithstanding, that the King hath a Negative Voice, or a Voice to advise, and consequent­ly not to passe such Bills untill he have advised; some it may be will say, that there is a contradiction or opposition in these Assertions; but there is none, for even every Covenantor may be the courtesie [Page 9]of the Law advise with Himselfe and His owne Councell, as well as with the Councell of His Covenantee, before He make or doe Acts tending to the End of His Covenant, and great Reason it is, that the King should have as great, or rather greater Freedome in that He is the supreme Ruler, or highest Magistrate of the Common­wealth; a freedome to advise, or to deny untill advise be taken doth not Nul nec in foro conscientiae, nec in foro Juris, ☞ the tie or obli­gation of Oath or Covenant so farre forth as such Oath or Cove­nant tieth or obligeth.

Furthermore, concerning the Kings Oath aforesaid, although He be tied and obliged by vertue thereof to passe Bills touching Civill Government, (as aforesaid) yet I conceive that He is not tied and obliged by vertue of His said Oath, to passe Bills touching Religion, tendred unto Him by the Commons, or both Houses of Parliament; for, at the making of that Oath, neither the Commons, nor their Representatives, or Trustees; nor the King, or His Lords, or Peers, had any thing to doe, or did meddle with matters touching Reli­gion, to define, frame, or alter any thing therein; such things were then altogether performed by Ecclesiasticall Councels and Assem­blies; nor would the People, nor did they tie or oblige the King by Oath to doe that which (as then) they conceived He had no Power to doe: and the Kings, who have successively taken that Oath since the first making thereof, have taken their Oathes according to the intent and meaning of that Oath when first compiled, and no other­wise; so that I doe not conceive the King to be obliged by vertue of His said Oath to passe Bills touching Religion tendred unto Him by the Commons, or both Houses of Parliament.

But some (it may be) will say, that the King is tied otherwise Ex Officio, to passe such Bills touching Religion, as the Commons, or both Houses shall tender unto Him; it may be so, but if so, yet both the King, and both the Houses, ought to be very cautelous and conscientious how they make Acts touching Religion, in which they may erre themselves, and by which they may ensnare and molest o­ther mens Consciences: however, the Kirk-men having borrowed (I suppose) some infallible Night-caps from the Roman Bishops, dreame exceedingly, that they interpret the holy Scriptures without errour of the least Iota.

Master Jenkins saith, that the King is Principium Caput, Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.] & finis Parlamenti; the King is Principium, I grant Him, for that the King by His Writ appoints the time, and place, of Parliamentary [Page 10]Conventions, and that the King is Caput, I also grant it Him in that the King is the supreme Ruler, or highest Magistrate of the Common-wealth; but that the King is Finis, at leastwise, Finis in­teger aut tetalis Parlamenti, I deny it; for Finis, or causa finaelis, is causa propter quod, the cause for which a thing is ordained; and cer­tainly, salus Populi, which is suprema Lex, the safety of the People, their generall good and welfare is the end; at leastwise, the princi­pall end of Parliamentary Conventions: and Master Jenkins seemeth in his [Cordiall to the good People of London] to acknowledge as much, for whereas Master H. P. Barrister of Lincolns Inne affirmeth, that the safety of the People is the supreame Law, (as indeed it is:) Master Jenkins replying to him, Jenkins in his [Cor­diall.] faith, Neither doe we sweare, but His Majesty and we will sweare to the contrary, and have sworne and have made good, and will by Gods grace make good our Oath to the World, that the KING is not above the Law, nor above the safety of His People, the Law and the safety of His People, are His safety, His Ho­nour, and His strength: these are Master Jenkins his words, whereby he acknowledgeth, That the safety of the People are the Kings safe­ty, honour, and strength; so that if the King be the end, or a par­tiall end of the Parliament, according to his Assertion, the Peoples safety must needs be the principall or ultimate end.

Master Jenkins saith, That it cannot be said the King doth wrong, and that it was declared by all the Judges, and Serjeants at Law, [Tempore.] The Reason is, (saith Master Jenkins) Nothing can be done in this Common-wealth by the Kings Grant, or any other Act of His, as to the Persons, Goods, Lands, Liberties of the Subjects, but must be according to the established Lawes, which the Judges are sworne to ebserve and deliver between the King and His People, impartially to rich and poore, high and low; and therefore the Justices and the Mi­nisters of Juctice are to be questioned and punished if the Lawes be vio­lated, and no Reflection to be made on the King.

By Master Jenkins favour, if it be granted, that the King doth not wrong in ministring the Lawes, but that the Ministers of the Lawes whom the King intrusteth doe the wrong, will it therefore follow, that it cannot be said that the King doth the wrong, otherwise both in His naturall and politique capacity? surely no! The King may usurp (and yet be a King de Facto) as did Henry the first, his Bro­ther Robert being alive; and William the second also, notwithstan­ding his Fathers Will; Stephen; Richard the first, and John his Bro­ther, (for Arthur Sonne of Geoffry Duke of Britaine, third Sonne [Page 11]of Henry the second was right Heire to the Crowne, Richard being the fourth Sonne, and John the fift Sonne of the said King Henry) Edward the third, while his Father lived (for though his Father were a dissolute Prince, yet the Son ought not to have usurped his Right; and albeit a People may (as did the petty Kings and People of So­dom and Gomorrah, the Jewes, Athenians, Romans, and divers other Nations) free themselves from tyranny and slavery, yet they ought not Depose their King for vice) Henry the fourth that subtile Usur­per, Richard the third that politique Tyrant.

The King may break his faith and promise with his own People, and others, as did the Norman, and some of his Successours very con­stantly, as if it had descended to them with the Crowne.

The King may break his Oath, as did Henry the third, and some others.

The King may, through his owne covetous and ambitious desire, impose illegall Taxes upon the People, he may also engage himself and his People in unnecessary Wars and Broiles, as Kings have done either; and if it be said, that Kings are in such things many times misled by their Councels, and therefore they themselves ought to be excused; I answer, no [...] for, Kings ought not to be misled by their Councels, Privatio Rectitudinis in debito esse Actus Peccatum est; Kings have the meanes not to be misled in such matters if they will make use of it; but many times Kings will be led by Cabinet Coun­sellours, Creatures of their owne making, who depend upon them, and endeavour to humour and please their Princes for their owne Ends, and not to counsell them according to prudence and justice: and sometimes Kings have done what liketh themselves without counsell.

The King may by an over-awing Power, or by a kind of mena­cing, or high carriage, enforce, or cause the Representatives of the Kingdome to doe, or agree to that, to which (if such unjust and in­direct meanes were not used) they would not agree unto; as did Henry the eight, in obtaining the Lands of Abbies and Monasteries; for admit the Abbies and Monasteries deserved to be dissolved, yet for as much as their Lands were Terrae Regni non Regis, they ought to have been applied, and employed to the good of the Kingdome, not of the King, there being then neither Law, Reason, not Presi­dent for it: but K. Henry partly by frownes, mutterings, and threat­nings, and partly by promising that he would with those Lands maintaine an Army for the defence of the Kingdome, and ease the [Page 12]People from other Taxes, and Payments, (which how well he per­formed, all men know) obtained and got into his hands those Lands by consent of both the Houses of Parliament: wherein how justly, or unjustly, both Houses dealt, I will not dispute it at this time.

But to goe on, Jenkins in his [Lex Terrae.] M. Jenkins himself instanceth, that in King Johns time the Nobles and Commons of the Realme conceiving that the Anci­ent Customes and Rights were violated, &c. Et paulo post, after the subjects had obtained their Rights and Liberties, which were no other then their Ancient Customes, &c. by which two instances of his, He in some sort acknowledgeth that the People were wronged in their Customes and Rights, from the time of the Norman Conquest, to the Reigne of Hen. 3. and who did the wrong? Surely the Norman and his Successours, who severally violated them, not such Judges and Justices of the Lawes who then were, for they did but as they were commanded: To conclude, the King may in these and the like things, both according to his naturall and politique capacity, Peccare contra Deum, contra Proximum, & seipsum, and if it be said, notwithstanding, He can doe no wrong, certainly that tenet if it be Ens Legis, it is scarce Ens rationis Ratiocinatae.

That the King can doe no wrong [in Curiâ,] nor the Pope erre [in Cathedrâ,] I take them to be Axioms much alike: for my part I pretend not to the knowledge of the Lawes, but honour the knowledge thereof: thus much I know, non jurari in verba magistri, I have heard say, that the greatest Clerks are not sometimes the wisest men; and I must tell M. Jenkins, and others, that sometimes also the greatest Lawyers are not the soundest School-men, for if they were, some of them would not have said, and written, what they have: M. Jenkins saith, Jenkins in his [Cor­diall.] The Law and Custome of this Land, is, that a Parlia­ment hath Power over my life, liberty, lands, and goods, and over every other subject, &c. Pax cum pedibus, good Master Jenkins, not so fast; what doth Master Jenkins meane by the word, Power? if he meane by the word, Power, that the Parliament hath power to protect the lives, liberties, &c. of the People, I grant it him; or if he meane by the word, Power, that the Parliament hath power applicare in neces­sitatum Regni, the Proprieties of the People, I also grant it him; but if Master Jenkins meane by the word, Power, that the Parliament (including the King) hath an absolute Power to dispose of the Peoples Estates merè ad Placitum, I absolutely deny it; and tou­ching this, I have formerly inserted Reasons in two Printed Books: [Page 13]Moreover, the Parliament cannot Tradere Populum Angliae aliene Juri, deliver over the Free People of England to a foraine Govern­ment, or to Lawes imposed by Forainers, or composed and con­tinued in relation to Forainers; nor can the Parliament by any Ordinance, or Act whatsoever, deprive the Free people of England of their innate Right of electing Knights, Citizens, and Burgesses for Parliament; in these things, and things of the nature of these ten­ding to the fundamentall Rights and Lawes of the People, the Par­liament cannot, nor ought not any way to violate the People, or Nation; if they doe it, they doe not onely fall and faile from the Protection of the People, but they become Preditores & Hostes Patriae: The King is to consider that although he have his Jus Reg­nandi, his Crowne by discent, and holds à Deo ordinariâ per successio­nem, God himself being the Efficient Cause primarily, yet he holds it in ordine ad Populum, in relation to the People, who tie him by Oath, &c. in England, salus Populi, not Majestas Imperii, is the chief object and end of Government: The Representatives or Trustees of the People are also to consider that they are creati in Ordine ad Populum, not Nati in Ordine ad se, as are the Venetian Senators; that they are intrusted by the People according to the Kings Writ, Pro quibusdam arduis & urgentibus Negotiis, not made unlimited or absolute in all things; so that the King and both the Houses of Parliament ought to endeavour for the generall good of the Com­mon-wealth.

I am of Master Jenkins his Opinion in this, That the safety of the People is the safety of the King, and that the honour of the King is supported by the honour of the People, or Nation.