SECT. I.

TO begin with the first Questi­on; Those that would ex­clude Final Causes from the consi­deration of the Naturalist, are wont to do it (for ought I have observ'd) upon one of these two Accounts: Either, that with Epicurus they think the world was the Production of Atoms and Chance, without any intervention of a Deity; and that consequently 'tis improper and in vain to seek for Final Causes in the effects of Chance: Or, that they judge with Des Cartes, that God being an Omniscient Agent, 'tis rash and presumptuous for men to [Page 4]think, that they know, or can in­vestigate, what Ends he propos'd to himself in his Actings about his Creatures. The Ground on which the Epicureans have rejected Final Causes, has been disallow'd by the Philosophers of almost all other Sects; and some have written suffi­cient Confutations of it, which therefore I shall here forbear to in­sist on; though somethings I shall upon occasion observe, that may help, if not suffice, to discredit so unreasonable an Opinion. But the Cartesian Argument has been so pre­valent among many Learned and Ingenious men, that it will be worth while (if it be but to excite better Pens) to spend some time in the Consideration of it.

Perhaps one thing that alienated that excellent Philosopher, from allowing the Consideration of Final Causes in Physicks, was, that the School-Philosophers, and many other Learned men, are wont to [Page 5]propose it too unwarily, as if there were no Creature in the world that was not solely, or at least chiefly, de­sign'd for the Service or Benefit of Man: Insomuch that I remember I have seen a Body of Divinity, pub­lish'd by a famous Writer, wherein, to prove the opinion he favours, of those that would have the world annihilated after the day of Judge­ment, he urgeth this Argument; That since the World was made for the sake of Man in his travelling Condition (homini viatoris causa,) when once Man is possess'd of his Everlasting State of Happiness or Misery, there will be no further use of the World. The opinion, that gives rise to such presumptu­ous and unwarrantable Expressions, did, as I guess by his objection, more choque Des Cartes, than I won­der that it should displease him. But the indicretion of men ought not to prejudice Truth; which must not be cast away, with the un­warrantable [Page 6]Conceits that some men have pinn'd upon it.

Wherefore, since I cannot entire­ly close, either with the opinion of the Epicureans, or of the Cartesians, I shall leave each party to maintain its own opinion, and proceed to pro­pose mine: For the clearing of which, and indeed of the Disqui­sition of Final Causes, I shall beg leave to premise a Distinction, which, though novel, I shall ven­ture to employ, because it comprises and distinguishes some things, which I think, ought neither to be overlook'd nor confounded.

I conceive then, that when we speak of the Ends which Nature, or rather the Author of Nature, is said to have in things Corporeal, One of these four things may be signi­fy'd, or, if you like that expression better, the End design'd by Nature may be fourfold:

First, there may be some grand and General Ends of the whole World, such as the Exercising and Displaying the Creators immense Power and admirable Wisdom, the Communication of his Goodness, and the Admiration and Thanks due to him from his Intelligent Creatures, for these his divine Ex­cellencies, whose Productions ma­nifest his Glory. And these Ends, because they regard the Creation of the whole Universe, I call the Ʋni­versal Ends of God or Nature.

Secondly, in a somewhat more restrain'd sense, there may be Ends design'd in the number, fabrick, placing, and wayes of moving the great Masses of Matter, that, for their Bulks or Qualities, are con­siderable parts of the World; since 'tis very probable, that these bodies, such as the Sun, Moon, and fixed Stars, and the Terraqueous Globe, and perhaps each of its two chief [Page 8]parts, the Earth and the Sea, were so fram'd and plac'd, as not only to be capable of persevering in their own present state, but also as was most conducive to the Universal Ends of the Creation, and the good of the whole World, whereof they are notable parts. Upon which account these Ends, may, for distinctions sake, be call'd Cos­mical or Systematical, as regarding the Symmetry of the great System of the world.

There is a Third sort of Ends, that do more peculiarly concern the Parts of Animals (and probably Plants too) which are those, that the particular parts of Animals are destinated to, and for the welfare of the whole Animal himself, as he is an entire and distinct System of or­ganiz'd parts, destinated to pre­serve himself and propagate his Species, upon such a Theatre (as the Land, Water or Air) as his Structure and Circumstances de­termine [Page 9]him to act his part on. And these Ends, to discriminate them from others, may be call'd Animal Ends.

Fourthly, and lastly, there is an­other sort of Ends, which, because they relate particularly to Man, may, for brevity's sake, be call'd Human Ends, which are those that are aim'd at by Nature, where she is said to frame Animals and Vege­tables, and other of her producti­ons, for the use of Man. And these Ends themselves may be distin­guish'd into Mental, that relate to His Mind, and Corporeal, that re­late to His Body, not only as He is an Animal fram'd like other Ani­mals, for his own Preservation, and the propagation of his Species (Mankind;) but also as He is fram'd for Dominion over other Animals and works of Nature, and fitted to make them subservi­ent to the Destinations, that one may suppose to have been made [Page 10]of them to His service and benefit.

This Distinction of Final Causes, which I hope will not prove alto­gether useless, being premis'd; I shall begin my intended Discourse, by owning a dissent from both the opposite Opinions; Theirs, that, with the vulgar of Learned Men, will take no notice of Final Causes but those we have stiled Human ones; and theirs, that (as they think, with Descartes) reject Fi­nal Causes altogether; since, tho' I judge it erroneous to say in the strictest sense, that every thing in the Visible World, was made for the Use of Man; yet I think 'tis more erroneous to deny, that any thing was made for ends Investi­gable by Man.

'Tis a known Principle of the Cartesian Philosophy, That there is always just the same quantity of Motion in the World at one time, that there is at another: Of which [Page 11]Assertion this Reason is given; That there is no Cause, why God, who is Immutable, should at the beginning of things, when he first put Matter into Motion, have gi­ven it such a quantity of Motion, as would need to be afterwards augumented or lessen'd. But I see not, how by this Negative way of Arguing, those that imploy it, do not (implicitly at least) take upon them to judge of the Ends, that God may have propos'd to himself in Natural things. For, without a Supposition, that they know what God design'd in set­ting Matter a-moving, 'tis hard for them to shew, that His Design could not be such, as might be best accomplish'd by sometimes adding to, and sometimes taking from, the Quantity of Motion he communi­cated to Matter at first. And I think it may be worth consider­ing, Whether by this Doctrine of theirs, the Cartesians do not more take upon them than other Philo­sophers, [Page 12]to judge of God's De­signs. For, if a Man be known to be very Wise, and have vari­ous ways of compassing his seve­ral Ends, He that, seeing some of those ways have a direct tenden­cy to some Rational End, shall conclude That End to be one of those that is intended, does there­by less presume, and express more respect to that Wise Man, than he that should conclude, that those cannot be his Ends, and that He can have no other Design knowa­ble by us, except a certain Gene­ral one nam'd by the Assertor. And indeed, it seems more easie to know, that this or that particular thing, for which an Engine is pro­per, may be among others, intend­ed by the Artificer, tho' never so Skilful, than to know Negatively, that he can have no other than such or such an End.

And how will a Cartesian assure me, that among the many Ends, [Page 13]that he grants that God may have propos'd to himself in the Produ­ction of his Mundane Creatures; one may not be, That We, whom he has vouchsaf'd to make Intelli­gent Beings, and capable of Admi­ring and Praising him, should find just cause to do so, for the Wisdom and Goodness he has display'd in the World? which Attributes we could not well discern or celebrate, unless we knew as well, that the Creatures were made for such Uses, as that they are exceedingly well fitted for them. I know God's Im­mutability is alledged, to prove that the Quantity of Motion is ne­ver vary'd: But to me 'tis not evi­dent, why God's having particular Ends, tho' some of them seem to require a Change in his way of Acting in Natural Things, must be more inconsistent with his Im­mutability, than his Causing many things to be brought to pass, which tho' abaeterno he decreed to do, are yet not actually done, unless in [Page 14]process of Time. And particular­ly it seems not clear, why God may not as well be Immutable, tho' he should sometimes vary the Quantity of Motion that he has put into the World, as He is, tho', according to the Opinion of most of the Cartesians themselves, he does daily create multitudes of Ra­tional Souls, to unite them to Hu­man Bodies: Especially consider­ing, that these newly created sub­stances, are, according to Des-Cartes, endow'd with a power, to determine and regulate the moti­ons of the Spirits and the Conari­on; which are things clearly Cor­poreal, I say not this, as if I ab­solutely rejected the Cartesian Do­ctrine, about the continuance of the same Quantity of Motion in the whole Mass of Matter. For, whe­ther or no it be a Truth; I think 'tis no unuseful nor improbable Hypothesis: And I have not so much argued against it, as upon the Grounds, on which they argue for it.

Wherefore, to come now to the thing it self, whereas Monsieur Des-Cartes objects, that 'tis a Pre­sumption for Man, to pretend to be able to investigate the Ends, that the Omniscient God propos'd to himself in the making of his Creatures; I consider by way of Answer, That there are two very differing ways, wherein a Man may pretend to know the Ends of God in his visible Works: For, he may either pretend to know only some of God's Ends, in some of his Works; or, he may pretend to know all his Ends. He that arro­gates to himself, to discover God's Ends in this latter sense, will scarce be excus'd from a high Presump­tion, and no less a Folly, from the reason lately intimated in the Car­tesian Objection. But to pretend to know God's Ends in the former sense, is not a Presumption, but rather, to take notice of them is a Duty. For, there are some things in Nature so curiously contrived, [Page 16]and so exquisitly fitted for certain Operations and Uses, that it seems little less than Blindness in Him, that acknowledges with the Carte­sians a most wise Author of things, not to conclude, that, tho' they may have been design'd for other, and perhaps higher Uses; yet they were design'd for this Use. As he that sees the Admirable Fabric of the Coats, Humors, and Muscles of the Eyes, and how excellently all the parts are adapted to the making up of an Organ of Vision, can scarce forbear to believe, that the Author of Nature intended It should serve the Animal, to which it belongs, to See with. The Epi­cureans indeed, that believe the World to have been produc'd but by the casual concourse of Atoms, without the intervention of any In­telligent Being, may have a kind of excuse, whereof other Philoso­phers are destitute, that acknow­ledge a Deity, if not also a Provi­dence. For the very Supposition, [Page 17]for instance, that a mans Eyes were made by Chance, argues, that they need have no relation to a design­ing Agent; and the use that a man makes of them, may be either casual too, or at least may be an effect of His knowledge, not of Na­ture's. But when, upon the Ana­tomical Dissection, and the Optical Consideration, of a Human Eye, we see 'tis as exquisitly fitted to be an organ of Sight, as the best Artificer in the world could have fram'd a little Engine, purposely and mainly design'd for the use of seeing; 'tis very harsh and incongruous to say, that an Artificer, who is too intel­ligent either to do things by chance, or to make a curious piece of work­manship without knowing what uses 'tis fit for, should not design it for an use to which 'tis most fit.

'Tis not to be deny'd that he may have more uses for it than one, and perhaps such uses as we cannot di­vine; but this hinders not, but that, [Page 18]among its several uses, this, to which we see it so admirably a­dapted, should be thought one. And I see not, how it does magni­fie Gods wisdom, or express our Veneration of it, to exclude out of the number of his Ends in framing Human Eyes, that most obvious and ready use which we are sure is made of them, and which they could not be better fitted for. This may perhaps be not unfitly illustra­ted by the following Comparison, whereof the application were su­perfluous: Suppose that a Coun­try Man, being in a clear day brought into the Garden of some famous Mathematician, should see there, one of those curious Gno­monick Instruments, that show at once, the place of the Sun in the Zodiack, his Declination from the Aequator, the Day of the Month, the Length of the Day, &c. It would indeed be presumption in him, be­ing unacquainted both with the Mathematical Disciplines, and the [Page 19]several Intentions of the Artist, to pretend or think himself able, to discover all the Ends, for which so Curious and Elaborate a Piece was framed. But when he sees it furnished with a Stile, with Ho­rary Lines and Numbers, and in short, with all the Requisites of a Sun Dial, and manifestly perceives the Shadow to mark from time time, the Hour of the Day; 'twould be no more a Presumpti­on than an Error in him to con­clude, that (whatever other Uses the Instrument is fit, or was de­sign'd for) it is a Sun- Dial, that was meant to shew the Hour of the Day.

And here I shall demand of those, that will not allow us to think, that any Natural Things are directed to Ends knowable by Men; whether, if the Divine Au­thor of them had really design'd them for such Ends, the things themselves are not so Fram'd and [Page 20]directed, as in that case they should be? And whether the Fabrick and Management of Natural Things, do really countenance or contradict our Supposition?

For my part, after what has been already discours'd, I scruple not to confess, that I see not why it should be reputed a Disparage­ment to the Wisdom of any Agent whatsoever, to think, that his Pro­ductions were design'd for such Ends, among others, as they are excellently fram'd and fitted for; unless it did appear, that those Ends were unworthy to be De­sign'd by the Wise Agent. But that cannot be justly said in our present Case; since 'tis not injuri­ous to the Divine Author of things, to believe that some of the Ends, to which he destinated divers of his Corporeal Works, were; To exert and communicate His Exu­berant Goodness, and to receive from his intelligent Creatures, such [Page 21]as Men, an ardent Love, a high Admiration, and an obsequious Gratitude, for having display'd so much Wisdom and Beneficence, in exquisitly qualifying his Works to be wonderfully serviceable to one another, and a great number of them to be particularly subser­vient to the Necessities and Utili­ties of Man.

And indeed I can by no means assent to that Assertion of Mr. Des-Cartes, That it can­not be said, Nec fingi potest, aliquos Dei Fines, magis quàm alios, in propatulo esse; omnes enim in im­perscrutabili éjus sapientiae Abysso sunt eodem modo reconditi. Resp. Quart. ad Object. Gassendi. that some of Gods Ends (in his Corporeal Works) are more manifest than o­thers; but that all of them lie equally hid in the Abyss of the Divine Wis­dom: since there are many of his Creatures, some of whose Uses are so manifest and obvious, that the generality of Mankind, both [Page 22]Philosophers and Plebeians, have in all Ages, and almost in all Coun­tries, taken Notice of, and Ac­knowledg'd them. And as to what he adds, (by which he seems to intimate the motive that led him to make the foremention'd Asser­tion,) That in Physicks, all things ought to be made out by certain and solid Reasons; to this I an­swer, First, That I see not why the admitting, that the Author of Things design'd some of his Works for these or those Uses, amongst others, may not consist with the Physical Accounts of making of those things; as a Man may give a Mechanical Reason of the Stru­cture of every Wheel and other part of a Watch, and of their way of acting upon one another when they are rightly put toge­ther, and in short, of the Contri­vance and Phoenomena of the little Machine; tho' he suppose, that the Artificer design'd it to show the hours of the day, and tho' he [Page 23]have that intended use in his Eye, whilst he Explicates the Fabrick and Operations of the Watch. I answer, Secondly, That I rea­dily admit, that in Physicks we should indeed ground all things upon as solid Reasons as may be had; But I see no necessity, that those Reasons should be always precisely Physical: Especially if we be treating, not of any parti­cular Phaenomenon, that is produc'd according to the course of Nature establish'd in the World, already constituted as this of ours is: but of the first and general Causes of the World it self; from which Causes, I see not why the Final Causes, or Uses, that appear ma­nifestly enough to have been de­sign'd, should be excluded. And to me 'tis not very material, whe­ther or no, in Physicks or any o­ther Discipline, a thing be prov'd by the peculiar Principles of that Science or Discipline; provided it be firmly proved by the common [Page 24]grounds of Reason. And on this occasion let me observe, that the Fundamental Tenents of Mr. Des-Cartes's own Philosophy, are not by himself prov'd by Arguments strictly Physical; but either by Metaphysical ones, or the more Catholick Dictates of Reason, or the particular testimonies of Ex­perience. For when, for instance, he truly ascribes to God, all the Mo­tion that is found in Matter; and consequently, all the variety of Phoenomenae that occur in the World; he proves not by an Ar­gument precisely Physical, that God, who is an Immaterial Agent, is the efficient cause of Motion in Matter; but only by this, That since Motion does not belong to the Essence and nature of Matter, Matter must owe the Motion it has to some other Being: And then 'tis most agreeable to common Rea­son, to infer, that, since Matter cannot move it self, but it must be mov'd by some other Being, that [Page 25]Being must be Immaterial, since otherwise some Matter must be able to move it self contrary to the Hypothesis. And when Des-Cartes goes to demonstrate, that there is always in the Universe, the self-same quantity of Motion, (that is, just as much at any one time, as at any other) and con­sequently, that as much motion as one Body communicates to ano­ther, it looses it self; he proves it, by the Immutability of God, which is not a Physical Argument strictly so call'd, but rather a Metaphysical One; as he formerly prov'd, God's being the Cause of all Motion in Matter, not by Principles peculiar to Physicks, but by the common grounds of Reason.

Tho' Monsieur Des-Cartes does, C'est une chose qui de soy est ma­nifeste, que nous ne pouvons con­noistre les fins de Dieu, si luy mes­me ne nous les re­vele. Et e [...]core qu'il soit vray en Morale, en egard à nous autres hommes, quetoutes choses ont este fai­tes pour la gloire de Dieu, à cause que les hommes sont obligez de louer Dieu pour tous ses ouvrages; & qu'on puisse aussi dire, que le soleil à este fait pour nous eclairer, pour ce que nous experimentons que le soleil en effet nous eclaire: ce seroit toutes fois une chose puerile & absurde, d'assu­rer en Metaphy­sique, que Dieu, à la facon d'un hom­me superbe, n'au­roit point eu d'au­tre fin en bastis­sant le Monde, que celle destre louè par les hommes; & qu'il n'auroit creè le soleil, qui est plusieurs fois plus grand que la Terre, à autre dessein que d'eclai­rer l'homme, qui n'en occupe qu'une tres-pe­tite partie. as I have formerly shown, speak very Dogmatically and Universally, against [Page 26]Mens endeavouring or pretending to know any Final Causes in Natural things; for which Reason I have, as well as the genera­lity of his other Readers, and even his Disciples, look'd upon the Sense of those positive Ex­pressions as con­taining his Opini­on; yet, since I writ the foregoing part of this Treatise, I lighted on a Passage of his, wherein he seems to speak more cautiously or reser­vedly, opposing His Reasoning to Their [Page 27]Opinion who teach, that God hath no other End in making the World, but that of being prais'd by Men. But in that short Discourse where­of this Passage is a part, there are two or three other things wherein I cannot Acquiesce. As first, that 'tis Self-evident, that we cannot know the Ends of God, unless he Himself reveal them to us; (he must mean in a Supernatural way, if he will not speak impertinent­ly:) For what he says to be evi­dent of it self, is not at all so, to the generality of Mankind, and even of Philosophers; and there­fore I think, it ought not to be barely pronounc'd, but (if it can be) should be prov'd. And next, he does not show how we are ob­lig'd to praise God for his Works, if He had no intention to have us do so, or that we should discover any of the Ends for which He made them. If a judicious Man should see a great Book, written in some Indian Language, which he [Page 28]is utterly a Stranger to, and should know nothing of it, but that 'twas made by a very Intelligent Physi­cian: He might indeed conclude, that the Work was not made by chance, but would have no means to be convinc'd by the In­spection of the Book it self, that it was compos'd with great Skill and Kindness, and deserv'd his Praise and Thanks: Since he could not know any of the particular Ends, to which the several Chap­ters of it were destinated, nor con­sequently discover how skilfully they were fitted to reach such Ends. What Des-Cartes says, that 'tis childish and absurd to think, that God had created the Sun, which is many times bigger than the Earth, only to afford Light to Man, who is but a very small part of It, is somewhat invidiously pro­pos'd; there being few able Wri­ters, that confine the Utility of the Sun directly to the affording Light to Man; and the littleness of his [Page 29]Bulk, ought not to make it thought absurd, that God may have had an especial Eye to his Welfare, in fra­ming that bright Globe; since not only, for ought appears to us, that most excellent Engine of Mans Body, is a more admirable thing than the Sun, but the rational and immortal Soul that resides in it, is incomparably more noble than a thousand Masses of brute Matter, and that not so much as Organiz'd, can be justly reputed, (as will be hereafter more fully declared.) And since in this very Discourse, the accute Author of it confesses, that we may know the ends of God's Corporeal Works, if He reveal them to us; a Christian Philoso­pher may be allow'd, to think the Sun was made, among other pur­poses, to inlighten the Earth, and for the use of Man, since the Scripture teaches us, that not only the Sun and Moon, but the Stars of the Firmament, which Des-Cartes not improbably thinks to be [Page 30]so many Suns, were made to give Light to the Earth, and were divi­ded to all the Nati­ons that inhabit it. Deut. 4.19. Perhaps it were not rash to add, that I see not why the Belief, that a Man may know some of God's Ends in things Corporeal, should more derogate from our Veneration of his Wisdom, than to think we know some of his Ends in other Matters, of which the Scrip­ture furnishes us with a mul­titude of Instances, as (particu­larly) that of Job sacrificing for his Friends; and the declar'd Uses of the Ʋrim and Thumim: Since God may, if He pleases, declare Truths to Men, and instruct them, by his Creatures and his Actions, as well as by his Words: As when He taught Noah by the Rain-bow, and Jonah by a Gourd and a Worm, and regulated the Incamp­ment of the Israelites, by the gui­dance of a Cloud, and a fiery [Page 31]Pillar. Lastly, whereas Monsieur Des-Cartes objects, that those he dissents from, talk as if they look'd upon God as a proud Man, who design'd his Works only to be prais'd for them; I know not, whether in this place he speaks so cautiously and reverently of God, as he ought, and elsewhere is wont to do. For as Humility, tho' it be a Vertue in Men, is extreamly remote from being any of Gods Perfections, so That may be pride in a Man, who is but a Creature, imperfect, dependent, and hath nothing that he has not receiv'd; which would be none at all in God, who is uncapable of Vice, and who may, if he please, justly propose to himself His own Glory for one of his Ends, and both require and delight to be prais'd by Men for his Works; since he is most wor­thy of all praise, and 'tis their du­ty and reasonable service, which he is graciously pleas'd to approve of, to pay it Him.

'Tis not without trouble, that I find my self oblig'd by the exigen­cy of my design, so much to op­pose, in several places of this pre­sent Discourse, some Sentiments of Mr. Des-Cartes, for whom other­wise I have a great esteem, and from whom I am not forward to dissent. And this I the rather de­clare to you, because I am not at all of Their mind, that think Mr. Des-Cartes a favourer of Atheism, which, to my apprehension, would subvert the very foundation of those Tenents of Mechanical Phi­losophy, that are particularly his. But judging that his Doctrine (at least as it is understood by several of his Followers, as well as his Ad­versaries;) about the rejection of Final Causes from the consideration of Naturalists, tends much to wea­ken, (as is elsewhere noted) if not quite to deprive us of, one of the best and most successful Argu­ments, to convince Men, that there [Page 33]is a God, and that they ought to Admire, Praise, and Thank him: I think it my duty to prefer an im­portant truth, before my respect to any Man, how eminent soever, that opposes it; and to consider more the Glory of the great Au­thor of Nature, than the Reputa­tion of any one of Her Interpre­ters.

And to strengthen what I have been saying, give me leave to mind you more expresly here, of what I have elsewhere Intimated, viz. That the excellent Contrivance of the great System of the World, and especially the curious Fabrick of the Bodies of Animals, and the Uses of their Sensories, and other parts, have been the great Mo­tives, that in all Ages and Nati­ons induc'd Philosophers to ac­knowledge a Deity, as the Author of these admirable Structures; and that the Noblest and most Intelli­gent Praises, that have been paid [Page 34]Him by the Priests of Nature, have been occasion'd and indited by the Transcending Admiration, which the attentive Contemplation of the Fabrick of the Universe and of the curious Structures of Living Crea­tures, justly produc'd in them. And therefore it seems injurious to God, as well as unwarrantable in it self, to banish from Natural Philosophy, the Consideration of Final Causes; from which chiefly, if not only, I cannot but think (tho' some Learned Men do other­wise) that God must reap the Ho­nour that is due to those glorious Attributes, his Wisdom, and his Goodness. And I confess, I some­what wonder, that the Cartesians, who have generally, and some of them skilfully, maintain'd the Ex­istence of a Deity, should endea­vour to make Men throw away an Argument, which the Experience of all Ages shews to have been the most Successful, (and in some Cases the only prevalent one) to [Page 35]establish among Philosophers the Belief and Veneration of God. I know the Cartesians say, That their Master has demonstrated the Ex­istence of a God, by the Innate Idea that Men have of a Being in­finitely perfect; who left it upon the mind of Man, as the mark of an Artist imprest upon his Work: And also that they ascribe to God, the having made Matter out of nothing, and alone put it into Mo­tion; which sufficiently argue the Immensity of his Power. But, tho' I would by no means weaken the Argument, drawn from the Inbred Notion of God, since I know, that divers Learned Men have Acquiesc'd in it; yet, on the other side, I see not, why we may not reasonably think, that God, who, as themselves confess, has been pleas'd to take care, Men should acknowledge Him, may also have provided for the securing of a Truth of so great Consequence, by stamping Characters, or lea­ving [Page 36]Impresses, that Men may know his Wisdom and Goodness by, as well without, upon the World, as within, upon the Mind. The bare Speculation of the Fa­brick of the World, without con­sidering any part of it as destinated to certain (or determinate) Uses, may still leave Men unconvinc'd, that there is any Intelligent, Wise, and Provident Author and Disposer of Things: Since we see generally the Aristotelians (before some of them were better Instructed by the Christian Religion) did, notwith­standing the Extent, Symmetry, and Beauty of the World, believe it to have been Eternal. And tho' They, whatever their Master thought, did not believe it to have been Created by God; yet, be­cause they asserted that Animals, Plants, &c. act for Ends, they were oblig'd to acknowledge a Provident and Powerful Being, that maintain'd and govern'd the Uni­verse, which they call'd Nature: [Page 37]Tho' they too often dangerously mistook, by sometimes confound­ing this Being with God himself; and at other times, speaking of it as Co-ordinate with him, as in that famous Axiom of Aristotle, Deus & Natura nihil faciunt frusta. I acknowledge therefore, that, as I set a just value upon the Cartesian Proof of God's Existence, so I see no reason, why we should disfur­nish our selves of any other strong Argument to prove so noble and important a Truth; especially, since the Cartesian way of consider­ing the World, is very proper in­deed to shew the Greatness of God's Power, but not, like the way I plead for, to manifest that of his Wisdom and Beneficence. For, whereas a Cartesian does but shew, that God is admirably Wise, upon the supposition of his Exi­stence; in our way, the same thing is manifested by the Effect of a Wisdom, as well as Power, that cannot reasonably be ascribed to [Page 38]any other, than a most intelligent and potent Being: So that by This way, Men may be brought, upon the same account, both to acknow­ledge God, to admire Him, and to thank Him.

SECT. II.

TO give you now my thoughts of the second Question, viz. Whether we may consider Final Causes in all sorts of Bodies, or only in some peculiarly Qualify'd Ones. I must divide Natural Bodies into Animate and Inanimate. The former of which Terms, I here take in the larger sense of those, who under it comprehend, not only Animals, but Vegetables; tho' I shall not disdainfully reject the Opinion of those Learned Men, that are un­willing to allow Plants a soul or life, at least as properly so call'd, as that which is confessedly gran­ted to Animals.

Of the Inanimate Bodies of the Universe, the Noblest, and those [Page 40]which on this occasion deserve chiefly to be considered, are the Sun, Planets, and other Coelestial Bodies. For, when Men saw those vast and luminous Globes, and especially the Sun, move so con­stantly, and so regularly, about the Earth, and diffuse on it Light and Heat; and by their various Revo­lutions produce day and night, Summer and Winter, and the Vi­cissitudes of Seasons, that are so opportune for the Inhabitants of the Earth: The observers, I say, of all this concluded, both that these Motions were guided by some Divine Being, and that they were design'd for the benefit of Man Whether this be a demonstrative Collection, I shall not now debate; but I see not, why it may not have thus much of Probability in it; that in case a Man shall think, that the Fabrick of the Coelestial parts of the World, was the curious Pro­duction of an Intelligent and Di­vine Agent, the regular Phaenomena [Page 41]of the Heavens will not contradict him; since there is nothing in that Fabrick that misbecomes a Divine Author; and the Motions and Ope­rations of the Sun and Stars are not such, but that they will allow us to think, that, among other purposes, they were made to Illu­minate the Terrestrial Globe, and bring Heat and other Benefits to the Inhabitants of it: So that the Con­templation of the Heavens, which so manifestly declare the Glory of God, Psal. 19.1. may justly excite Men, both to admire his Power and Wisdom in them, and to return him Thanks and Praises, for the great Benefits that accrue to us by them.

But now, on the other side, it may be said, that in bodies Inani­mate, whether the portions of Mat­ter they consist of be greater or les­ser, the Contrivance is very rarely so Exquisite, but that the various Motions and Occursions of the parts [Page 42]of Matter may be, without much Improbability, suspected to be ca­pable, after many Essays, to cast one another into divers of those Circumvolutions of Matter, that, I remember, Epicurus calls [...] and Des-Cartes Vortices; which being once made, may continue very long, by the means express'd by Cartesius, or by some other as probable Ones. But, without al­lowing this Hypothesis to be more than not very improbable, when I consider, what Causes there may be to fear, that we are not yet sufficiently acquainted with the true System of the World, and are not usually sensible enough, how small a part We, and the Ter­restrial Globe we inhabit, make of the Universe; I am apt to fear too, that Men are wont, with grea­ter Confidence than Evidence, to assign, the Systematical Ends and Uses of the Coelestial Bodies, and to conclude them to be made and moved, only for the service of the [Page 43]Earth and its Inhabitants. And tho', even as a meer Naturalist, I will not deny, that, as Man actu­ally receives Benefits by the esta­blish'd order and motion of the Stars, so one of the several Uses intended by the Author of Nature in them, may particularly respect Men; yet I am apt to think, that by what we hitherto know, 'twill not be easie to be prov'd, that some, at least, of the Coelestial Bodies and Motions, may not be in­tended more for other purposes, than to cast their Beams, or shed their Influences (supposing they have some) upon the Earth. And at least, I cannot but think, that the Situations of the Coelestial Bo­dies, do not afford by far so clear and cogent Arguments, of the Wis­dom and Design of the Author of the World, as do the bodies of Animals and Plants. And for my part I am apt to think, there is more of admirable Contrivance in a Mans Muscles, than in (what [Page 44]we yet know of) the Celestial Orbs; and that the Eye of a Fly is, (at least as far as appears to us,) a more curious piece of Workman­ship, than the Body of the Sun.

As for other Inanimate Bodies, as Stones, Metals &c, whose matter seems not organiz'd; tho' there be no absurdity to think, that they al­so were made for distinct particu­lar purposes, if not also for Human Uses; yet most of them are of such easy and unelaborate contextures, that it seems not absurd to think, that various occursions and justlings of the parts of the Universal matter, may at one time or other have pro­duc'd them; since we see in some Chy­mical Sublimations, and Christalli­zations of Mineral and Mettalline Solutions, and some other Phaeno­mena, where the motions appear not to be Particularly guided and di­rected by an Intelligent Cause, that Bodies of as various Contextures, as those are wont to be, may be pro­duc'd; [Page 45]of which I have elsewhere given some Instances.

If it be objected, that if we allow Chance, or any thing else, without the particular Guidance of a wise and All-disposing Cause, to make a finely shap'd Stone, or a metalline substance, growing, as I have some times seen silver to do, in the form of a Plant; it ought not to be de­nyed, that Chance may also make Vegetables and Animals: I can by no means allow the consequence. There are some effects, that are so easy, and so ready, to be produc'd, that they do not infer any know­ledge or intention in their Causes; but there are others, that require such a number and concourse of conspiring Causes, and such a con­tinued series of motions or operati­ons, that 'tis utterly improbable, they should be produced without the superintendency of a Rational Agent, Wise and Powerfull enough to range and dispose the several in­tervening [Page 46]Agent's and Instruments, after the manner requisite to the production of such a remote effect. And therefore it will not follow, that if Chance could produce a slight contexture in a few parts of matter; we may safely conclude it able to produce so exquisit and ad­mirable a Contrivance, as that of the Body of an Animal. What then, if sometimes in sawing pieces of va­riegated Marble, men happen, tho' rarely, to meet with the Delineati­ons or Pictures (some of which I have beheld with pleasure) of Towns, Woods, and Men? For, besides that the pleasingness and ra­rity of such spectacles inclines the Imagination to favour them, and supply their defects; would any wise man therefore conclude, that a real Town or wood, much less numbers of men, should be made by such a forluitons concourse of matter? What comparison is there, betwixt the workmanship that seems to be expressed in a few ir­regular [Page 47]Lines, drawn upon a plane superficies, and perhaps two or three Colours luckily plac'd; and the great multitude of Nerves, Veins, Arteries, Ligaments, Ten­dons, Membranes, Bones Glan­dules, &c. that are required to the compleating of a human Body; of which numerous parts (for the Bones alone are reckon'd to amount to three hundred) every one must have it's determinate size, figure, consistence, situation, connexi­on, &c. and many or all of them to­gether, must conspire to such and such determinate Functions or uses? And indeed, tho' I keep by me some curious ones, yet I never saw any Inanimate production of Nature, or, as they speak, of Chance, whose contrivance was compara­ble to that of the meanest Limb of the dispicablest Animal: and there is incomparably more Art express'd in the structure of a Doggs foot, then in that of the famous Clock at Strasburg.

And, tho' the Paw of a Dog will be confess'd, to be of a structure far Inferior to that of the Hand of a man: yet even This; however A­ristotle prettily styles it the Instru­ment of Instruments, is a less consi­derable Instance to my present pur­pose, than another Instance, which therefore, since my intended brevi­ty permits me not to consider many, I shall pitch upon, as that which I shall almost only insist on, in the fol­lowing part of this Tract. And this Instance is afforded me by the Eye. For Tho' the parts that con­curr to make up that admirable Or­gan of vision, are very numerous, yet how little any of them could have been spar'd or alter'd, unless for the worse, may appear by that great Number of Diseases, that have been observ'd in that little part of the Body. Since each of those Diseases consist in this, that some of the Coats, Humors, or other parts of the Eye, is brought into a State differing from that whereto [Page 49]Nature had design'd it, and where­into she had put it. 'Twould be tedious so much as to enumerate the several distempers of the Eye, whereunto Physitians have given particular Names; wherefore I shall only mention two or three things, wherein one would scarce imagine, that a small recess from the natural state could bring any considerable, or perhaps sensible, in­convenience. That which we call the Pupil, is not (you know) a substantial part of the Eye, but on­ly a hole of the Ʋvea: which aper­ture is almost perpetually changing it's bigness, according to the differ­ing degrees of Light, that the Eye chances from time to time to be ex­pos'd to. And therefore one would not think, but that, whilst this hole remains open, it performs well e­nough it's part; which is, to give admission to the Incident beams of Light, whether direct or reflected. And yet I lately saw and discours'd with a woman, who after a Feaver, [Page 50]was not able to debate the Pupils of her eyes as formerly; and tho' they were so very little narrower then ordinary, that I should scarce have taken more notice that 'twas at all so, if she had not told me of it, yet she complain'd she had thereby almost lost her sight, seeing Objects in certain Lights but very dimly and imperfectly. And tho' the Prae­ternatural constriction of the Pupil be not a frequent distemper, yet tis not so rare, but that Physitians have given it a place among the Stated diseases of the eye. And on the o­ther side tho' it appear by what hath been newly related, that a competent wideness of the Pupil is requisite to clear and distinct Vi­sion, yet if it's wideness exceed due Limits, there is produced that di­stemper that is call'd Dilatatio pu­pillae; which is worse then the for­mer, because it oftentimes deprives the Patient almost totally of his sight. And, tho' it may seem but a slight circumstance, that the trans­parent [Page 51]coats of the eye should be devoid of colour, and of as little mo­ment, that the cornea should be ve­ry smooth, provided it be transpa­rent: yet when either of these cir­cumstances is wanting, the sight may be much vitiated; as we see that in the Yellow-Jaundies, when 'tis come to a high degree, the ad­ventitious Tincture wherewith the Eye is Imbued, makes men think they see a yellowness in many ob­jects, to which that colour does not belong. And I know an In­genious Gentleman, who, having had a small pustula excited and bro­ken upon the Cornea, tho' the eye have been long whole; yet a very little Inequality or depression that still remains upon the Surface of the Transparent Cornea, does so affect him, that tho' he can read well in a Room, yet when he comes into the open fields or the streets, he for a pretty while (as himself has par­ticularly complain'd to me) thinks many of the Objects he looks on ve­ry [Page 52]Glareing, and sees many others, as men do stones at the bottom of a Brook or running water; which I impute to the want of Uniformi­ty in the refraction of those reflect­ed beams of Light, that fall upon the Cornea, whose surface is not so smooth and equal as it should be.

To give some further Proof, that the Eye was made with design, I shall here take notice of an observa­tion or two, that do not occurr in the dissection of a human Eye, and therefore are not wont to be menti­oned by Anatomists.

I have observed in Frogs, (as I presume some others also may have done) that, besides those parts of the Eye which they have in com­mon with Men, Dogs, Cats, and the most part of other Animals, They have a peculiar, whether mem­brane, or Cartilage, or both, which ordinarily is not perceived; where­with they can at pleasure cover the Eye, without too much hindering the sight, because this membrane [Page 53]is as well Transparent as strong; so that it may pass for a kind of moveable Cornea, and (if I may so call it) a kind of false-scabord to to the Eye. In furnishing frogs with this strong Membrane, the providence of Nature seems to be conspicuous: For they being Am­phibious Animals, design'd to pass their lives in watery places, which for the most part abound with Sedges, and other plants endowed with sharp Edges or points; and the progressive motion of this A­nimal being to be made, not by walking, but by leaping; if his Eyes were not provided of such a sheath as I have been mentioning, he must either shut his Eyes, and so leap blindly, and by consequence dange­rously, or, by leaving them open, must run a venture to have the Corneae cut, prickt, or otherwise of­fended, by the edges or points of the Plants, or what may fall from them upon the Animals Eye: whereas this Membrane, as was [Page 54]said, is like a kind of Spectacle that covers the Eye without taking a­way the sight; and as soon as the need of imploying it is past, the A­nimal at pleasure withdraws it in­to a little Cell, where it Rests out of the way, till there be occasion to use it again. This you may see, if you apply the point of a pin, or a Pen, or any such sharp thing, to the Eye of a frog, whilst you hold his head steady: for to screen his Eye, he will presently cover it (at least for the greatest part) with this Membrane, which when the danger is over he will again with­draw. And, because many if not most sorts of Birds, are wont or destinated to fly, (as more would do if not kept tame) among the Branches of Trees and Bushes; least the Prickles, Twigs, Leaves, or other parts should wound or of­fend their Eye. Nature hath gi­ven them likewise such another kind of horny Membrane, as we have been mentioning in frogs.

'Tis known that Men, and the generality of Four-footed Beasts, and of Birds, have several Muscles belenging to their Eyes; by the help of which Muscles, they can turn them this way, or that way, at pleasure; and so can obvert the Organ of Sense to the Object, whether it be placed on the right hand or the left, or above or be­neath the Eye. But, Nature ha­ving not given that Mobility to the Eyes of Flys, (the reason whereof I shall not now stay to consider) she hath in recompence furnish'd them with a multitude of little protuberant parts, finely rang'd upon the con­vex of their large and Protuberant Eyes: So that by means of the number of these little Studs (if I may so call them) many beams of Light that rebound from Objects placed on either hand, or above, or beneath, the level of the Eye, fall conveniently enough upon that Organ, to make the Objects they come from, visible to the Animal. [Page 56]Which you will the more easily be­lieve, if you contemplate (as I have often done with great plea­sure) even the Eye of an ordina­ry Flesh-Fly, (for Bees and other greater Insects have immoveable Eyes too, but I find them not so pretty) in a good Microscope and a clear Day. For you may reckon some hundreds of these little round Protuberances, curiously rang'd on the Convexity of a single Eye.

But perhaps some, whose parti­ality for Chance makes them wil­ling to ascribe the structures of Animals rather to That, then to a designing Cause; will make them draw an Objection, fit to be here obviated, against our Doctrine, from what we have observ'd of the difference between Human and other Eyes: Since they will pre­tend that all Organs of Sight ought to be conform'd to those of Men, as those that are the best and most perfect. 'Tis true, that Man be­ing [Page 57]justly reputed the most perfect of Animals, it is not strange that he should (as Men generally do) presume, that His Eyes and other parts of his Body, are the best contriv'd of any that are to be found in Nature. But yet I think we cannot from hence safely con­clude, that all Eyes, which in other Animals are of Structures differ­ing from those of Man, are for that reason defective. For I consider, First, That the admirable Wisdom display'd by the Author of Things, in fitting the Eyes and other Or­ganical parts of Animals, for the Uses that seem manifestly to have been design'd in their Fabrick, and for the respective Functions we actually see them exercise, may justly persuade us, that the things whose Reasons or Uses we do not alike discern, are yet most wisely constituted: Such an Author as God, having too much knowledge to do any thing unskilfully; and We having too much presumption, [Page 58]if we think He can have in the framing of his Creatures, no Ends that are beyond our Discovery. And, Secondly, We may represent, that the Eye is not to be consider'd abstractedly as an Instrument of Vision, but as an Instrument be­longing to an Animal of this or that kind; and who is ordinarily to make use of it in such and such Circumstances. And therefore I think it ought not at all to Dispa­rage, but rather highly Recom­mend, the Wisdom and Providence of the great Author of Things; that he has furnish'd various Spe­cies of Animals, with Organs of Sight that are very differingly fram'd and plac'd: Since this di­versity nobly manifests his great Providence, and (if I may so call it) Forecast; that has admirably suited the Eyes of the differing kinds of Animals, both to the rest of their Bodies, and (which I here mainly consider) to those parts of the great Theatre of the World, [Page 59]on which He designs that they shall live and act. Thus though diver. Beasts, as Horses, Oxen, and so [...] others, have their Eyes furnish'd with a seventh Muscle, besides the six they have in common with Men; we must not conclude, ei­ther that the Organs of Vision are Imperfect in Men, or that those of these Beasts have something super­fluous. For Horses, &c. being to feed for the most part on grass and herbs of the Field, and, that they may the better chuse their Food, being oblig'd to make their Eyes look ve­ry long downwards; the seventh Muscle does excellently serve them to do so, without that weariness, which if they were not furnish'd with it, that durably constrain'd Pasture would be sure to give them; whereas Man who has no such ne­cessity of looking assiduously down­wards, would be but incumber'd by a seventh Muscle.

On the other side, the defective­ness observable in the Eyes of some Animals, in comparison of those of Man, may be ascrib'd to the thriftiness (if I may so speak) of Nature, that, on most occasions, declines doing that which is not necessary to the particular Ends, She aims at in the Fabrick of a Part. Thus Moles being design'd to live for the most part under Ground, the Eyes which Nature hath given them, are so little, in proportion to their Bodies, that 'tis commonly believ'd, and even by some Learned Men maintain'd, they have none at all. But tho' by Anatomy, I, as well as some others that have try'd, have found the Contrary; yet their Eyes are very differing from those of other Four­footed Beasts. Which is not to be wonder'd at; considering, that the design of Nature was, that Moles should live under Ground, where a Sight was needless and useless; and where greater Eyes would be [Page 61]more expos'd to danger: And their Sight, as dim as 'tis, is suf­ficient to make them perceive that they are no longer under Ground, (at least so as they are wont to be) which seems to be the most neces­sary use they have of Light and Eyes.

Zoographers observe, That the Camelion has avery uncommon stru­cture of his visive Organs; since, to omit lesser, tho' not inconsiderable, peculiarities, his Eyes often move independantly from one another; so that, for Instance, he may look directly forward with the right Eye, and with the other at the same time, directly backwards to­wards his Tail; or may turn the Pupil of the former straight up­wards, whilst he looks downwards with the other. Which peculiar power seems to have been granted him by Providence, that, being a very low Animal, and destinated to live for the most part in Trees [Page 62]and Bushes, and there chiefly feed on Flys; He may perceive them, which way soever they chance to come within the reach of his long Tongue, by suddenly darting out of which, he catches his nimble Prey.

Whereas it may be observ'd, that many or most, if not all, meer Fishes have the Chrystalline Hu­mours of their Eyes, almost sphe­rical as to Sense, and consequently far more round than that Humour is wont to be found in Man, and other Terrestrial Animals. This difference of Figure, tho' it would be inconvenient in Us, does very well accommodate Fishes; since they living in the Water, which as a thicker Medium, does much more refract the Beams of Light, than the Air through which they pass to our Eyes; 'twas fit, that the Chry­stalline Humour of Fishes should be very Globous, that by the help of their Figure, the Beams already [Page 63]refracted by the Water, should be yet so much refracted and made Convergent, as to Paint the Images so near, as upon the bottom of the Eye.

One that being Curious, had more Opportunity than I have, to survey and reflect on the various Structures of the Organs of Vision in differing Animals, may, if I mistake not, be able to find by com­paring them with the other parts of the same Animal, and the Scene he is design'd to act on, and the uses he is to make of his Eyes in his most ordinary Circumstances; such a Person, I say, may be able to offer a probable Reason of seve­ral differences in those Organs, that, if commonly taken notice of, would seem to the Censorious to be aberrations of Nature, or de­fects: To which purpose I remem­ber, that an ingenious Cultivator of Opticks, gives this Reason, of what both he and I, have taken [Page 64]notice of (tho' it be usually over­look'd) about the Figure of the Pu­pil; namely, that, tho' it be ob­long in Horses, Oxen, and divers other Quadrupeds, as well as in Cats, yet in the former kinds of Animals, the Pupil lies transvers­ly from the right side of the Eye to the left, but in Cats its situati­on is perpendicular; whereof he ingeniously guesses the Reason may be, that Horses and Oxen, being usually to find their Food grow­ing on the Ground, they can more conveniently receive the Images of the laterally neighbouring Grass, &c. by having their Pupils trans­versly plac'd; whereas Cats, being to live chiefly upon Rats and Mice, which are Animals that usually climb up or run down Walls, and other steep Places; the commodiousest situation of their Pupil for readily discovering and following these Ob­jects, was to be Perpendicular. But 'tis time we proceed in our Discourse.

Other Instances to the same pur­pose with this are elsewhere deli­ver'd: and therefore I shall now, to strengthen the Apology for Di­vine providence, take notice, that the differing structures and Situ­ations of the Eyes in several Ani­mals, are very fit to shew the foe­cundity of the Divine Authors Skill, (if I may so speak,) in being able to frame so great a Variety of ex­quisite Instruments of Vision. And indeed, if I may presume to guess at any of Gods Ends that are not manifest, (for some others of his Ends seem Conspicuous;) I should think, that this delightful and won­derful Variety that we may observe, not only in Animals themselves con­sider'd as entire Systemes, but in those parts of them that appear de­stinated for the same Function, as particularly that of Seeing, was de­sign'd, at least among other Ends, to display the multiplicity of the great Creators Wisdom, and Shew his intelligent Creatures, that his Skill [Page 66]is not confin'd to one sort of Living Engines; nor in the parts of the same kind, (as Eyes, Ears, Teeth, &c.) to the same Contrivances: but is able to make for the same use, a mul­titude of surprising Organs or In­struments, tho' not perhaps all equal­ly Perfect, (since to do so, we may think he must make no Animals but Men,) yet all of them curious and exquisite in their kinds, and in or­der to their differing Ends. To be able to frame both Clocks, and Watches, and Ships, and Rockets, and Granadoes, and Pumps, and Mills, &c. argues and manifests a far greater Skill in an Artificer, than he could display in making but one of those sorts of Engines, how artificially soever he contriv'd it. And the same superiority of know­ledge would be display'd, by con­triving Engines of the same kind, or for the same purposes after very dif­fering manners. As Weights indeed are of great use and necessity in the famous Clock of Strasburg; and [Page 67]therefore it recommends the Inven­tors of Watches, not only that they can make Clocks of a very little and easily portable Bulk, which the Strasburg Machine is not, but can make a Clock without weights, and by means of a Spring perform their Office. And thus, tho' to fly, it seems absolutely necessary that an Animal should be furnisht with Feathers; the Wise Creator hath shewn that he is not confin'd to make use of them for that purpose: since a Flying Fish is able to move a great way in the Air; and the Indies have lately furnisht us with a sort of flying Squirrils (whereof I saw one alive at White-Hall.) And tho' the flight of these is not long, yet there is another kind of Animals without Feathers that can fly long enough, namely the Batt; tho' some of these, as I have seen, be little less then Hens: and I have been assurd by a credible Eye-wit­ness, that in the kingdom of Gol­conda, He had seen much bigger.

But tho' this consideration may suffice to justify the Wisdom of the Creator, who being an Agent most Free, as well as most Wise; Men ought not to find fault, if he think fit to Recommend his Wisdom by displaying it in very different man­ners: yet this is not all that may be said on this occasion. For there are many Cases, and perhaps far more than we imagine, wherein the peculiar, and in some regards less perfect, fabrick or situation of an Eye or other Organical part, may be more convenient than the corres­pondent Organ of Man, to attain the Ends for which was given to an Animal that was to act upon such a Theatre, and live by such Provi­sion. Besides that an Organical part may, in some Animals, be intended for more uses than in others, and therefore may require a differing structure; as in Moles, the Feet are otherwise fram'd or situated than in other Quadrupeds; because the chief use they were to make of [Page 69]them was to walk upon the Ground, but to Dig themselves ways Under Ground. The provident [...] wisely suiting the Fabrick of the Parts, to the Uses that were to be made of them: as a mechanist im­ploys another Contrivance of his Wheels, Pinions, &c. when he is to grind corn with a Mill that is to be driven by Water, than when he is to do the same thing by a Mill that is to be mov'd by the Wind. And the Camelion has a Tongue, both pecurliarly shap'd, and of a length disproportionate to that of his Body, because he was to take his Prey, by shooting out (if I may so speak) his Tongue at the Flies he was to live upon, and could not often approach them very near without frighting them away. And in many Cases in which this Reflection does not so properly take place, we may ob­serve, that there is a wonderful Compensation made, for that which seems a desect in the parts of an Animal of this or that particular spe­cies, [Page 70]compar'd with the correspon­dent ones of a Man, or an Animal of some other species.

Thus Birds, that (except the Bat and one or two more) want Teeth to chew their food, are not only fur­nish'd with hard Bills to break it; and Birds of prey, as Hawks, &c. with crooked ones to tear it; but, which is more considerable, have Crops to prepare and soften it, and very strong Muscular Stomachs to digest and grind it: In which work they are usually help'd by gravel and little stones that they are led by Instinct to swallow, and which are often found (and sometimes in a­mazing numbers,) in their Stomachs where they may prove a vicarious kind of Teeth.

I shall hereafter have occasion to say somewhat more against Their Opinion, that find fault with those Animated Structures that we think to be Productions of the Divine Wisdom, under pretence that the [Page 71]Parts of some living Creatures are not so curious and Symmetrical, as not to have been casually produci­ble. But in the mean time, I shall here note, for those that ascribe so much to Chance; that Chance is really no natural Cause or Agent, but a Creature of Man's Intellect. For the things that are done in the Corporeal World, are really done by the parts of the Universal Mat­ter, acting and suffering according to the Laws of Motion, establish'd by the Author of Nature. But we Men, looking upon some of these parts as directed in their Mo­tions by God, or at least by Na­ture, and dispos'd to the attain­ment of certain Ends; if by the intervention of other Causes, that we are not aware of, an Effect be produc'd very differing from that which we suppos'd was intended; we say, that such an Effect was produc'd by Chance. So that Chance is indeed but a Notion of Ours, and such a thing as a School­man [Page 72]man might call an Extrinsecal De­nomination, and signifies but this; that in our apprehensions, the Phy­sical Causes of an Effect, did not Intend the Production of what they nevertheless produc'd. And there­fore I wonder not, that the Philo­sophers that preceded Aristotle, should not treat of Chance, among Natural Causes; As we may learn from Aristotle himself; who is more just to Them in Suspecting they own'd not such a Cause, than in Taxing them of an Omission for not having Treated of it.

And on this occasion, I shall on­ly add, before I proceed, that whereas some of the most curious­ly shap'd kind of Stones, as the Astroites, have embolden'd many of the Favourers of Epicurus, to bring them into Competition with these Animals, or Parts of Ani­mals, from their likeness to which, they have receiv'd their Names; it is fit to be consider'd, First, that [Page 73]some Learned Men have of late made it very probable, that some of the curiousest sorts of these Stones were once really the Ani­mals whose shapes they bear, or those Parts of Animals which they resemble; which Animal substances were afterwards turned into Stones, by the supervening of some Petre­scent Matter, or Petrifying Cause; of which Metamorphosis I have met with, and do elsewhere mention, more Instances than are fit to be so much as named in this place. Se­condly, Though some of those sorts of Stones were the Production of the Mineral Kingdom; (for I will not be Dogmatical in this Point) yet, besides that it would not clearly follow, that they owe their shapes to Chance, since there is no absur­dity to admit Seminal Principles in some more elaborate sorts of Fos­siles; I think it would be very injurious to make these Producti­ons vye with the Animals, to which they are Compared.

For the Resemblance of shapes, wherein alone they and the Ani­mals Agree, being but the Outward Figure, is but a Superficial thing, and not worthy to be mention'd, in comparison of that wherein they differ: The rude and slight Contex­ture of the best shap'd Stones, being incomparably inferior to the Internal contrivance of an Animal; which must consist of a multitude of Parts, of such a Figure, Bulk, Texture, Situation, &c. as cannot but be obvious to any that have seen Dissections skilfully made. And 'tis not only in the Stable and Quiescent parts, that this great In­ternal Difference between Stones, and the Animals they resemble, is to be found; but there is in a Living Animal a greater difference, than a­ny of the Knives of Anatomists can shew us in a Dead one betwixt a Stone, tho'never so curiously Figur'd, and an Animal. For there are, I know not how many, Liquors, Spirits, Digestions, Secretions, Coagulati­ons, [Page 75]and Motions of the whole Body, and of the Limbs and other parts, which are lodged and per­form'd in a Living Body, and not in a Cadaver; and are perchance far more admirable, even than the structure of the stable and quiescent Parts themselves. So that, tho' a Stone, outwardly very like a Shell­fish, were made by Chance; yet from thence to Conclude, that Chance may make a real Living Shell-fish, would be to argue worse than he that should contend, that, because even an unskilful Smith may make a hollow piece of Metal, like a Watch Case, tho' he can fill it but with filings of Iron, or some other rude Stuff, he must be able to make a Watch; there being less difference betwixt the skill ex­press'd in making the Case of a Watch, and the Movement, than in making a Body like a Shell, and the Internal parts of a real Fish: Or to say, that, because Putrefa­ction and Winds, have sometimes [Page 76]made Trees hollow, and blown them down into the Water, where they swim like Boats, therefore the like Causes may make a Galley built and contriv'd, as well within as without, according to the Laws of Naval Architecture, and furnish'd with Mariners to Row it, Steer it, and, in a word, to excite and guide all its Motions to the best Advan­tage, for the Preservation and va­rious Uses of the Vessel. In short, if Chance sometimes does some strange things, 'tis in reference to what She her self, but not to what Nature, uses to perform.

And now, to give you the Sum­mary of my Thoughts, about the Second Question; 1. I think, that from the Ends and Uses of the Parts of Living Bodies, the Natu­ralist may draw Arguments, pro­vided he do it with due Cautions, of which I shall speak under the fourth Question. 2. That the In­animate Bodies here below, that [Page 77]proceed not from Seminal Princi­ples, have but a more parable Tex­ture, (if I may so speak) as Earths, Liquors, Flints, Pebbles, and will not easily warrant Ratiocinations, drawn from their supposed Ends. 3. I think, the Coelestial Bodies do abundantly declare God's Power and Greatness, by the Immensity of their Bulk, and (if the Earth stand still) the Celerity of their Motions, and also argue his Wis­dom and general Providence as to them; because He has for so many Ages, kept so many vast Vortices, or other Masses of Matter, in scarce conceivably rapid Motions, with­out destroying one another, or loosing their Regularity. And I see no Absurdity in supposing, that, among other Uses of the Sun, and of the Stars, the Service of Man might be intended; but yet I doubt, whether, from the bare Contemplation of the Heavens and their Motions, it may be cogently inferr'd, at least so strongly as Fi­nal [Page 78]Causes, may be from the stru­cture of Animals, that either the sole, or the chief, End of them all, is to enlighten the Earth, and bring Benefits to the Creatures that live upon it.

In what has been hitherto said on our Second Question, 'tis plain, that I suppose the Naturalist to dis­course meerly upon Physical Grounds. But if the Revelations, contain'd in the Holy Scriptures, be admitted, we may rationally be­lieve More, and speak less Haesi­tantly, of the Ends of God, than bare Philosophy will warrant us to do. For, if God is pleased to de­clare to us any thing concerning His Intentions, in the making of his Creatures, we ought to believe it; tho' the Consideration of the things themselves, did not give us the least suspicion of it; which yet in our case they do. And therefore a late Ingenious Author did caus­lessly reflect upon me, for having [Page 79]mention'd the Enlightning of the Earth, and the Service of Men, among the Ends of God, which he thought undiscoverable by us. For whether or no we can discover them by meer Reason, as divers of the Heathen Philosophers thought they did; yet sure we may know Those that God is pleas'd to Reveal to us: And the Persons, I argu'd with, were apparently such as ad­mitted the Authority of the Scrip­tures; which expresly teach us, Gen. 1.16. that God made the two great Luminaries, (for so I should render the Hebrew words [...]) the greater for the rule of the Day, and the les­ser for the rule of the Night. And that He made the Stars also, and set them in the Firmament, or rather Expansum of the Heaven, to give Light upon the Earth. And a little above, among the Uses of the Lu­minaries these are rec­kon'd, ver. 14. to divide the Day [Page 80]from the Night, and to be for Signs, and for Seasons, and for Days and Years. And in another place, the Prophet Moses dehorting the Isra­elites from Worshiping the Sun, the Moon, and the Stars, tells them, that the Lord, had im­parted them unto all na­tions under the whole Hea­ven. Deut. 4.19. And therefore those Carte­sians, that being Divines, Admit the Authority of Holy Scripture; should not reject the Consideration of such Final Causes, as Revelation discovers to us; since 'tis certainly no presumption to think we know Gods Ends, when he himself ac­quaints us with them; nor to be­leive that the Sun, tho' it be gene­rally esteem'd to be a nobler Body than the Terrestrial Globe, was made, among other Purposes, to give Light to its Inhabitants. 'Tis recorded in the Book of Genesis, Gen. 1.26, 27, 28. the Design of God in making man, was, that men should Subdue the [Page 81]Earth (as vast a Globe as 'tis) and have dominion over the Fish of the Sea, and over the Fowle of the Air, and over the Cattle, and over all the Earth, and (to speak Summarily) over every living thing that moveth upon the Earth. Gen 9.23. And the same Book informs us, that after the Deluge, God deliver'd all Terrestrial Beasts, and Fowle, and Fishes, and every moving thing that lives, into the hands of Men; and intended that they should eat Animals, Gen. 1.29. as before the Flood, He had appointed them all the sorts of wholsome Ve­getables for their Food. And since God was pleased to appoint that men should live on these Creatures, it cannot be absurd to say, that, a­mong other Purposes to which he destinated the Sun, His Shining upon the Earth was one; since with­out His Light and Heat, men could not provide for, or enjoy them­selves; and neither those Plants that Men and Cattel must live upon, [Page 82]could grow and ripen; nor (con­sequently) those Animals that were to be their principal Food, and serve them for many other uses, could be sustain'd and provided for. Many other Texts that show, how much God was pleas'd to intend mans wel­fare, and Dominion over many of his Fellow-creatures, might be here al­ledg'd. But I shall content my self to mention, what the Kingly Prophet sayes in the 8th Psalm, Psal. 8.56. where speaking of Man to his Maker, he sayes; Thou hast made him, a little lower than the Angels, and hast crown'd him with Glory and Honour. Thou mad'st him to have dominion over the works of thine hands, and hast put all things un­der his Feet. Indeed if in Man we consider only that Visible Part, his Body; the smallness of it may make it thought improbable, that Portions of the Universe incomparably great­er than He, should be at all intended to be serviceable to Him. But Chri­stians ought not to think this incre­dible, [Page 83]if they consider Man, as he chiefly consists of a Rational Mind; which proceeds immediately from God, and is capable of knowing him, loving him, and being Eternal­ly happy with him. They that des­pise Man consider'd in this capacity, do very little know the worth of a Rational Soul; and estimate things like Masons, and not like Jewellers, who justly value a Diamond no big­ger than a Bean, more than a whole Quarry of ordinary Stones. And particularly to those Undervaluers of their own Species that are Divines; it may be represented, that God, who will not be deny'd to be the best Judge in this case, as in all others; was pleas'd to consider Men so much, as to give David cause to admire it in the words lately cited; and not only to endow them with his Image at their first Creation, but when they had criminally lost and forfei­ted it, he vouchsaf'd to Redeem them by no less than the Sufferings and Death of his own Son; who is in­comparably [Page 84]more excellent than the whole World. And 'tis not incredi­ble that God should have intended, that many of his other works should be serviceable to Man; since by Miraculous Operations he hath some times Suspended the Laws of Na­ture, and sometimes Over rul'd them, upon the account of Man: as may appear by Noahs Flood; by the pas­sage of the Israelites on dry Land through the Red Sea, and the River of Jordan; by the standing still of the Sun and Moon (or the Terestrial Globe) at Joshua's command; by the in efficacy of the burning Fiery Fur­nace, on Daniels three Companions; and (to be short) by the stupendious Ecclipse of the Sun at the full Moon, at the Crucifixion of the Messias. To which I might add, that the chief part of Mankind, namely the Chil­dren of God, will by their most bountiful Remunerator, be thought fit to inhabit the New World (for that by an Hebraism is meant by the new Heavens and the new Earth [Page 85]St. Peter speaks of) which shall succeed the Renova­tion and Refinement of the Present World by the last Fire, 2 Pet. 3.10, 11, 12, 13. that will not only Dissolve, but, if I may so so speak, Transfigure it.

And we shall the less scruple to admit that such vast and bright Bodies as the Sun and Moon, may be design'd (among other things) to be serviceable to Men; if we con­sider, that 'tis so far from being a constant Rule, That a Thing more excellent cannot (by a wise Agent) be imploy'd for the good of one that is less so; that not only the first Angel whose Apparition we read of in the Scrip­ture, Gen. 16.9. &c. was sent to relieve Hagar, a Slave wandring in a Wil­derness; another had regard to the life of a Sooth-sayers Asse; Numb. 22.23. Gen. 32.1, 2. 2 Kings 6.17. and many others (and sometimes Com­panies of them) were imployd on Earth to do good Offi­ces [Page 86]to particular persons: but of all the Angels in general; the Excel­lent Epistle to to the He­brews informs us, Heb. 1.14. That they are Ministring Spi­rits, sent forth to Minister unto them who shall be Heirs of Salvation.

SECT. III.

TO handle the Third Que­stion, viz. Whether, and in what sense, the Acting for Ends may be ascri­bed to an Ʋnintel­ligent, and even Inanimate Body? It will be necessa­ry for us to clear the grand Difficulty that has, ever since Aristotles time, and even before that, Perplex'd those that allow in Natural ral Philosophy, the Consi [...]eration of Final Causes. The Difficulty is obvious enough: For, much the greater part of Bodies being [...]o [...]d of Knowledge, and most of them (as all Inanimate Bodies) of Life it self, it seems not conceivable, how they should act constantly for Ends, they are not capable of pre [...] ­signing; and appositely imp [...]oy M [...] [Page 88]that they have no Knowledge wherewith to make choice of.

Aristotle, who expresly teaches, that Nature does nothing in vain, and rightly judg'd, that the Acti­ons of Natural A­gents tended to cer­tain Ends, vid. Aristot. De Coelo, lib. II. c. 5. & eund. De Gen. & Interitu lib. II. cap. 10. takes no­tice of this Difficul­ty; but seems rather to Shift it off than Resolve it; The Solution he frames regarding so peculiarly the Words wherein he has express'd the Ob­jection, that I much doubt, whe­ther it would signifie much to clear the same Difficulty propos'd in other Terms. And to me he seems to speak so darkly, not only in his Translators Latine, but in his own Greek, that, if he have given a good Solution of the Difficulty, I must ingenuously confess my Dull­ness, in not being able to under­stand it.

But, to consider the Difficulty it self, there are two Accounts, on which the Actions of natural A­gents may be said to tend to a cer­tain End: One, when the Agent has a Knowledge of that End, and acts with an Intention to obtain it; as, when a man shoots an Arrow to hit a mark: The Other is, when the Action of the Proximate A­gent, is indeed so directed as it ought to be to obtain an End, and yet that End is neither Known nor Intended by the Proximate Agent, but by a Remoter Agent that is In­telligent. In the former of these Senses, I cannot admit that (not now to Examine whether any Liv­ing, but not Rational, Works of Na­ture May) any Inanimate Bodies Can, act for an End; for, to do so, presupposes, that the Agent both Knows the End he is to attain, and Purposes to attain it; which are things whereof Inanimate Bodies are uncapable. And to fancy with [Page 90]some, that they may have a Know­ledge sui generis (as they speak,) which, tho' confin'd to the actions proper to this or that particular kind of Body, is yet sufficient to de­termine to those Actions; is to of­fend against that rational and re­ceiv'd Rule of Philosophizing, En­tia non sunt multiplicanda sine neces­sitate, and to introduce a sort of Knowledge, which I fear the Pro­posers do not well conceive; or at least, I am sure I do not.

It remains then, that I embrace the second Sense, in which we for­merly said, that Natural things may be said to to work for an End; tho' indeed in this Case, we must speak somewhat improperly: For, by him that Considers, the Action will be oftentimes more justly attributed to the Intelligent, but Remoter, than to the Immediate, Agent, which is but, as it were, the Instrument of the other. But how this is possible to done, appears difficult to be ex­plain'd. [Page 91]To me it seems, it may be thus conceiv'd: The most Wise and Powerful Author of Nature, whose peircing sight is able to pene­trate the whole Universe, & survey all the parts of it at once, did at the Beginning of Things, Frame things Corporeal into such a System, and Settled among them such Laws of Motion, as he judg'd sutable to the Ends he propos'd to Himself, in ma­king the World. And as by vertue of his vast and boundless Intellect that he at first imploy'd, he was able not only to See the Present State of things he had made, but to Fore­see all the Effects, that particular Bodies so and so qualify'd, and acting according to the Laws of Motion by him establish'd, could in such and such circumstances, have on one another: So by the same Omniscient Power, he was able to contrive the whole Fabrick, and all the parts of it, in such manner, that, whilst his general Concourse main­tain'd the Order of Nature, each [Page 92]Part of this great Engine, the World, should without either Intention or Knowledge, as regularly and con­stantly Act towards the attainment of the respective Ends which he de­sign'd them for, as if themselves really understood, and industriously prosecuted, those Ends. Just as in a well made Clock, the Spring, the Wheels, the Ballance, and the other parts, tho' each of them Act accor­ding to the Impulses it receives, and the Determination that is given it, by the other pieces of the En­gine, without knowing what the Neighbouring Parts, or what them­selves do; yet their Tendencies are so Determin'd, and sometimes Over­rul'd, and their Motions so Quickn'd, by the structure of the Clock, that they would not move more conve­niently, nor better perform the Functions of a Clock, if they knew that they were to make the Index truly mark the Hours, and intended to make it do so. 'Tis true, that 'tis not easie to conceive how One [Page 93]Agent should, by so sim plean In­strument as Local motion, be able to Direct a Multitude of Agents, as nu­merous as the Bodies that make up a World, to Act as regularly, as if each of them Acted upon its own particular Design, and yet all of them Conspir'd to obey the Laws of Nature. But if we consider, that 'tis to God, that is an Omniseient and Almighty Agent, that this Great Work is ascrib'd, we shall not think it incredible; especially if we con­sider, that, whereas 'tis manifest enough, that a Multitude of Bo­dies Act, as we have suppos'd; if we will not ascribe the Direction and Superintendence of the Motions, that are manifestly fitted for the attainment of Ends, unto God, we must do it to Nature; which will not Lessen but Increase the Difficulty: And when I have seen, as sometimes I have with pleasure, a great En­gine, wherein the Works of I know not how many Trades, and a great many other Motions, were perform­ed [Page 94]by little Puppets, that manag'd the Tools of the Artifficers; and all these were set a work by one Spring, which communicated Motions that were regulated and determined by the particular structure of the little Statues and other Bodies: when, I say, I consider such things as these, I cannot think it impossi­ble that the Divine and Great [...], Heb. 11.10. as both Phi­losophers and sacred Writers have styl'd the Worlds Creator; should be able by the Motions and Struc­tures of Matter, to set a work very many Partial and Subordinate En­gines. For 'twill not, I hope, be de­ny'd, that the Multitude of These does not any thing near so much sur­pass the number of Those, which I saw in the hand of an illiterate Tradesman, as the Narrow Know­ledge of that Artifficer is surpass'd by the Boundless Understanding of an Omniscient Artist. And 'tis more, in the making so many and so vari­ous Bodys act according to their [Page 95]particular Designations, & yet all of them Conspire to the General Ends of the Universe, that Gods Wisdom, and (if I may so speak) his Skill is display'd, than barely in the mak­ing Bodies Act Appositely for Ends to themselves Unknown. For, if Moving Bodies be duly display'd, and have a sufficient connection, 'tis not difficult to Direct a few of them to the attainment of an End propos'd by an Understanding A­gent, tho' Unknown to the Immedi­ate Agents: As anciently among the Jewish Husband-men, (and at this day in some parts of the East) the Ox, that intended no such mat­ter, did by Treading the Corn as well Separate the Grain from the Straw, as our Plowmen do, when they thresh it purposely to make that Separation: And a Horse or an Ass in a Mill, may as well by his going round Grind the Corn, as the Miller himself could do.

Nor is this Doctrine inconsistent with the beleif of any True Miracle; for, it supposes the Ordinary and Settled Course of Nature to be maintain'd, without at all deny­ing, that the most Free and Power­ful Author of Nature is able, when­ever he thinks fit, to Suspend, Alter, or Contradict those Laws of Motion, which He alone at first Establish'd, and which need His perpetual Con­course to be Upheld.

The Laws of Method would ob­lige me to conclude here this Secti­on, and pass on to another: But in regard that all I thought my self oblig'd to say about it, leaves it so very short, as to be very Dispro­portionate in Bulk to the other Se­ctions of this Discourse; I will crave leave to lengthen it in this place, with Something, which, tho' it may be judg'd to belong more properly to Another, will not perhaps be thought to be impertinent Here; [Page 81]and much less to be useless to the design of this Discourse.

Here then you may please to take notice, that in all that I have dis­cours'd in the second Section, or may elsewhere have occasion to say, against the receiv'd Opinion, that the whole material World was made for Man; I would not be under­stood to speak either too dogmati­cally, or too exclusively: my de­sign being to deliver, what I thought might probably be represented, to take off the Prejudice, that Men are generally prepossess'd with in their own favour. For, tho' the Argu­ments I alledge Against the vulgar Opinion, seem as yet to me more probable than those I have hitherto met with For it, especially as it re­lates to the vast Caelestial Region of the World; yet I am not only wil­ling to grant, that, among the Ends design'd by the Authour of Nature in several of his Works, especially Plants, Animals and Metals, the [Page 82]Utility of men may be one, and per­haps one of the principal: but I am not averse from thinking, that Hu­mane Ends, (or Uses that relate to Men,) may have been design'd by God in several Creatures, whose Humane Ʋses Men are not yet a ware of: And that he may have intend­ed, that of several of his Creatures, whereof Men do already know, and make some Uses, they shall hereaf­ter discover other Utilities, and perhaps nobler Ones.

Those that reflect on the Provi­dence of God, whilst they repre­sent what they call Nature as a Step-mother to Man, whom She brings Naked, Toothless, and Help­less into the World; whilst She furnishes the new Born Foetus's of Brutes with Wooll or other Cloth­ing, and both with a Power to Walk and Seek their Food, and (as to many of them) with Teeth to Eat it: Those men, I say, have been long ago answer'd by the Eloquent [Page 83] Lactantius, and other Champions of Providence. And therefore I shall only add this, that God by giving Man Necessity and Reason, has ef­fectually Excited him, and richly Furnisht Him with Ability, to procure for himself far greater Ac­commodations and Advantages, than those Beasts come into the world with; and by vouchsafing him that Noble Faculty of Understand­ing, He has put it in his Power to convert to his own use those very Things, for which Profane Wits would have the Condition of Beasts preferable to His. For Man, by his Reason imploying skilfully such Admirable Instruments as his Hands, is able to Master and Apply to his own Uses, the fierceness of several Wild Beasts, as Leopards (which the Persians Hunt with,) the vast strength of Elephants, the huge bulk of Whales, the Sagacity of Spaniels, Hounds, and Setters, the Swiftness of Grey-Hounds, the Suttlety of Tumblers, and the Furs of Beavers, [Page 84]Martins, &c. To omit a Multitude of others, which God, by the single Gift of Reason to Man, has inabled him to master and make use of to his own advantage. And tho' at first he be helpless enough, and un­able to exercise his Dominion over inferiour Creatures; yet God has sufficiently provided for Him, by giving his Parents whilst he needs them, that [...] Natural affection for Him, which engages them to take care of him, till he be in a condition to take care of himself; and become qualify'd to obtain such knowledge and Industry, as may make him Pos­sessor of the advantages, whereof his Indulgent and Bountiful Crea­tour made him capable.

Those Moderns that think it re­diculous to Imagine, that, in fram­ing such Vast Bodies as the Earth, and some of the Caelestial Globes, their Creatour should have any Re­gard to so small a Part of the Earth as Man, and design'd that They [Page 85]should be some way or other ser­viceable to him, look upon Things rather as Surveyers, who consider mainly their Extent, than as Philo­sophers, that Estimate them by their Intrinsick Value. For tho' it be true, that Man consider'd barely as an Ani­mal, is a Creature little enough to be Contemptible; yet as He is endow'd with a Soul Immaterial, Rational, and Immortal, he is a Creature much more Noble and Excellent than the whole Terraqueous Globe, or a much vaster Masse of Corporeal Substance that is Stupid and Inani­mate. For the Rational Soul is capa­of Understanding and Willing, (which are higher Faculties than meer Matter can reach to) and which is more, of Knowing, Serving and Enjoying God. And Man being the only Visible Creature, that is capable to Understand the Wisdom, Power, and Beneficence of God in the Creation, and in many ways to Subdue a great Variety of the other Creatures, and Apply them to his [Page 86]Uses: it ought not to seem strange, that the Wise Author of the Uni­verse, that made all things so as to bring Glory to himself, should have a more especial regard to so Noble a Piece of his Workmanship, than to any, that being meerly Corporeal, can neither Understand his Wisdom and his Power, nor Render him thanks nor Praises for the Manifold and admirable Effects of them. And that Littleness that is alledged to make Man a Contemptible Crea­ture, is so far from being a Dispa­ragement to that Noble part of him, the Soul, which makes him a Man, that is, a Rational Creature; that its Excellency consists in being less than the Minutest Body; Since not having Extension, it is not Divisible; which is the Prerogative of Substan­ces, which, for that reason, are Im­material and Immortal.

This mention of the Human Mind leads me to a further Reflexion, which is, That many parts of the [Page 87]Material World, whereof Man has not been known to make any ad­vantage, in the Capacity of a meer Animal, may yet be highly useful to him, as he is a Rational Creature, that is, Capable, by Contemplating the great and Admirable Works of God, to Raise his Mind to the ac­knowledgment of the Divine Ar­chitects Power, Wisdom, and Bene­ficence, and thereby Find produc'd in him due Sentiments of Venerati­on, Gratitude and Love. And These may be safely reckon'd among those Ends or Uses, which in the first Sec­tion we have Styl'd Human Ones; Since some of the Heathen Philoso­phers themselves call'd the World a Temple, and one of the more Phi­losophical Fathers of the Church loftily Styles it, [...].

And indeed we find, that the Psal­mist alone may furnish us with di­vers Instances to our present purpose. Psal. xix. 1, 2, 3. For not only He teaches us [Page 88]that the Heavens declare the Glory of God, and that in a Language, that, notwithstanding what happen'd at Babel, reaches to all the Nations of the World; but He imploys the Contemplation of Gods Visible Works, to excite in himself and o­thers true Sentiments, both of De­votion and of particular Vertues. Thus the Consideration of his having been won­derfully form'd in his Mothers Womb, Ps. CXXXIX. 14. moves Him to Re­vere and Celebrate the admirable Skill of the Opificer. Psal. civ. thorow­out especially v. 24. Elsewhere the Consideration of the Regular Vicissitudes observable in the course of Nature, invite him to Admire and Extoll the Providence of God. And when in another place, He beholds those Vast Bodies and Shining Ones, Psa. viij. 3.4. that com­pose and adorn the Coe­lestial part of the World, he justly falls into Sentiments of great [Page 89]Humility and deserved Grati­tude.

And as to This Use, the Distance; and Vastness of the fixt Starrs, the Im­mensity of the Heavens, and the Re­gular Motion of the Superiour Pla­nets, (supposing they can bring Man no other advantage) may do him good Service; since they afford him Rational and Solid Grounds to believe, admire, adore, and obey the Deity. For by thus Spirituali­zing (if I may so speak) the Corpo­real works of God, there may accrew to the Pious Soul, Uses far more va­luable than they can afford the Bo­dy; since they will Perfectionate the Mind here, and Continue to be ad­vantagious to it, when the Body will not need the World, and the World it self, as to its present Con­stitution, shall be destroy'd.

But to proceed from this Use of the World, which is Theological, to a Humane Use, that is more Phy­sical, [Page 90]as relating to the present wel­fare of Man, as he is an Animal, as well as a Rational Creature: I shall represent That, as a Nation is often­times, in the account of Providence, consider'd as one Man, notwith­standing Its various dispersions, and perhaps long continuance; as the Israelitish People, during many A­ges, notwithstanding its Divisions and Captivities, was address'd to and treated, by the Prophets and Apostles commission'd by God, as one Person, nam'd Israel, whom God som­times in the Scripture is pleas'd to call his Son: Exod. 4.22. Hos. 11.1. so perhaps it will not be absurd to conceive, that Mankind it self may in some regards, or as to some purposes, be lookt upon by its Author as one Man, who, by Suc­cessive Improvements of his know­ledge, may from time to time be enabled to make New and conside­rable Uses of the things, that the Wise and bountiful Providence of his Maker had fram'd, with a Fore­sight [Page 91]that he would, and with In­tention that he might, make them advantagious to him. And therefore it cannot safely be concluded That every thing whose Usefulness to Man is not yet obvious, nay, That every thing that seems hurtful to him, can never be made beneficial to him. For we see that Opium was for many ages look'd on only as a Poyson, but now is imploy'd as a Noble Remedy, (as indeed it is, if skilfully prepar'd & Judiciously ex­hibited) in many Violent, and often­times Dangerous, Distempers. Vipers are Venemous Animals; but yet their Flesh is a main Ingredient of that famous Antidote Treacle; and be­ing in great part Dissolv'd in Tract of Time in good Spanish Wine, I have try'd it with Surprizing Suc­cess, in an uncommon and very dif­ficult Case. Scorpions also afford, by bare Infusion, an Oyl that not only Cures their own Stings, but is very available in several Distem­pers. And I remember, that a learn­ed [Page 92]Professor of Padua, having Cured the Widow of a Soveraigne Prince of a Fit of the Stone, answer'd me some few Days after, that the chief Remedy he Imploy'd and Rely'd on, was a Preparation (which he in­timated to Consist mainly in a light kind of Calcination) of Scorpions, which, somewhat to my Wonder, he made his Patient take inwardly. And, tho' the Roots of Maudioca be reckon'd among Poysons, when the Juice is in them, of which I else­where relate a Notable Instance; yet, when the Juice is Press'd out, and the Firm part reduc'd to Meal, it affords the Cassava, which is the Common Bread of a great Part of the Americans: and I did not scru­ple to Eat of it here in England. Nay the Poysonous Juice it self, in Divers places of the West Indies, is even by the unskilful Inhabitants turn'd into an Ordinary, and by them beloved Drink. But enough of this sort of Instances; I shall be more Brief in those of another Kind, [Page 93]whereof the first is afforded by the Loadstone, which, tho' for many A­ges admir'd by Greeks and Romans, for what is Commonly call'd its At­tractive Vertue, had not its Direc­tive Vertue known, at least any thing Vulgarly, in these parts of the World, till within less than four Ages; Since when, of what Vast Use this Stone has prov'd to Man­kind, the discovery of the West-Indies, and of the Way of Sailing by the Cape of good Hope to the East-Indies, sufficiently declares. I will say nothing of the Uses of the Silk Worm, and the Sugar-Cane, which were little taken Notice of for many Ages, even by the Civiliz'd and Lux urious Greeks and Romans; but now, together with the lately disco­ver'd Cocheneal, which is but an In­sect, and far less than the Silk Worm, make a good part of the Trade of Europe, and furnishes the Tables of the Delicate with Sweet meats, and the Courts of Princes with many of their Finest Ornaments. [Page 94]But not to insist on such things as these, but to proceed.

It deserves also to be consider'd on this occasion, That many Things that are not thought Useful to Men, because we see not that they direct­ly bring in many Immediate Advan­tages, may yet be of great Use to them, as they Minister to, or are Ne­cessary for, other things that are very serviceable to them. As the ex­cessive Rains that cause the over­flowings of Rivers in divers parts of Africk, and some other Countries, tho' they seem rather Destructive than profitable, do yet, by their sea­sonable Inundations, make Egypt and some other Countries exceed­ing Fertile, that without them would be very Barren: and among Us, those Clouds that do us no Immedi­ate Service, do oftentimes, by Wa­tering our Fields and Gardens in Summer, and by Manuring them, as 'twere, in Winter, do Nourish those Trees, Grass, Corn, Herbs, and [Page 95]other Plants, whereof some Serve immediately for Aliments to Man, and others are necessary for the nou­rishment of Sheep, Oxen, Deer, and other Beasts that Men usually feed upon.

Not only Plants, and Animals, and Stones, and Metals, and such other smaller Bodies as are within Mans reach, are capable of being made use of by Him; but to advance a Step farther, to far greater Masses of Mat­ter, and even some of those remote Caelestial Globes, which he is thought able only to Contemplate; One of those Ends, to which the Indul­gent Creatour destinated them, may be To be serviceable to Man.

To say nothing of the advantage that skilsul Seamen make of the Eb­bing and Flowing of that vast Col­lection of Waters, the Ocean; The Declination of the Mariners Nee­dle, and the Variation of it, which probably depends upon the Moti­tions [Page 96]or changes of some Vast Inter­nal Portion of the Terraqueous Globe, is found to be of great Use by Experienc'd Pilots and Naviga­tors, in their Voyages through those Vast Seas they use to pass, between Europe and the East-Indies; as I learnt by particular Enquiry, from Eminent Persons, that have more than once Sail'd upon those Seas. The Moon, to omit her Light, serves Men, not only to make Moon-Dials by, and to foretell regularly the Times and Quantities of the Vari­ous Ebbings and Flowings of the Sea, the knowledge of which is ve­ry Beneficial, if not necessary, to Mariners, but serves Mathemati­cians for Divers other Purposes. The Sun, not to mention his ordi­nary Light and Heat, and the neces­sity of them to the Plants and Ani­mals that afford Man Food and Me­dicines, and to the Production of many other Effects; whereon his Welfare depends, do inable him, by Concave and convext Glasses, to [Page 97]burn with Coelestial Beams, with­out the help of Culinary Fire; and enable the Gnomonist to make Ac­curate Dials, to know exactly how the Time passes; the Cosmogra­pher, to make very useful Disco­veries of the Elevation of the Pole, and Latitudes of Places; and the heedful Observer of his Rising and Setting, to discover what Artists call his Amplitude, which is of good use to Astronomers, and more to Navigators, by helping them to estimate, among other things, the Variation of the Compass, (from true North and South Points.) And the Conjunction or Opposition of the Sun and Moon in Ecclipses, tho' it be a frightful thing to the Superstitious Vulgar, yet to Know­ing Men, that can Skilfully apply them, these Ecclipses are of great Use, and such as common Heads would never have Imagin'd; Since not only They may, on divers oc­casions, help to settle Chronology, and rectify the Mistakes of Histo­rians, [Page 98]that writ many Ages ago; but, which is, tho' a less Wonder, yet of greater Utility, They are, as things yet stand, necessary to define with competent Certainty, the Longitude of Places or Points as­sign'd on the Terraqueous Globe; which is a thing of very great mo­ment, not only to Geography, but to the most useful and important Art of Navigation. And lastly, at how stupendious a distance so­ever the Fixt Stars are plac'd, yet their remoteness cannot hinder the Industry of Man, from making even These Serviceable to his Uses; Since, if we should admit those de­terminate Coelestial Influences that are little less than the Idols of Astro­logers, they would enable us to pre­dict the Changes of Weather, the Fertility and Dearth, the Sickliness, or Healthiness, of any propos'd Sea­son; and, not to lay any stress up­on so Controverted a Science, 'tis plain that Skilful Navigators can make use of any of the fixt Stars, [Page 99]to know by any of them, what Hour 'tis of the Night: And 'tis more known, that Fishermen and Pilots did generally for many Ages, till within these four last Centuries, make very great use of the Pole-Star, and other of the Northern fixt Ones, to guide them, when nothing else could, in the perilous Courses of their Navigations.

I have seen, and been Master of a Telescope, made in the form of a Walking-Staff, so that it was fit­ted to serve for several purposes; whereof tho' one was very different from the other, yet all of them were in the Idaea of the Artificer, and intended by him. The like may be said of a Concave Metalline Burning-Glass; which, tho' it is imploy'd to magnify the Pictures of Objects, to cast their Images in­to the Air, and to Concenter the Sun-beams to a Focus, in which they will burn several Bodies; yet These and many other things, which, tho' they seem to have little Affinity [Page 100]with these, are perform'd by a Metalline Concave, were before­hand destinated by the Artist, who foresaw and intended, that in such various Junctures of Circumstances, it should produce all those deter­minate Effects.

And indeed, if we consider Gods Omniscience and Providence, and how Indulgent a Creator he has been to Man; it may well seem reason­able to think, that as God foresaw that Men might make very various and profitable Uses of divers of his other Creatures, by the help of that Prerogative of Reason, which he had vouchsaf'd them; So he de­sign'd that Men should reap the Ad­vantages he had made many of his other Works capable of affording them. And I confess, I think this Reflection may justly serve to Re­commend the Doctrine about Final Causes that we embrace, to Philo­sophers that are truly pious: Since it furnishes them with just Argu­ments [Page 101]for Gratitude to the Author of so many good things, as the Corporeal World, by being con­templated or possest, affords them. For to look upon the World, as vast and curious a Work as it is, on­ly as a vast and curious piece of Workmanship; may indeed give a Man a great Idaea of the Power and Skill of the Divine Architect: But will rather exact his Wonder, than his Gratitude. And there­fore the Ancient Aristotelians, who look'd upon the World as Eternal and Self-existent in a Condition like its present System; did not use to Thank God for the Benefits they receiv'd from things Corpo­real: Tho' some of them thought themselves Oblig'd to thank Na­ture; which they look'd upon as acting with Design, and propo­sing to her Self for Ends, the Wel­fare of the Universe, and of Men. To illustrate this with something, whose Application is Obvious. If a Traveller being in some Ill-inha­bited [Page 102]Eastern Country, should come to a large and fair Building, such as One of the most Stately of those they call Caravanzeras; tho' He would esteem, and be delighted with the Magnificence of the Stru­cture, and the Commodiousness of the Apartments; yet supposing it to have been Erected but for the Ho­nour or the Pleasure of the Founder, He would Commend so staely a Fa­brick, without thanking him for it. But if he were Satisfied that this Commodious Building was design'd by the Founder, as a Receptacle for Passengers, who were freely to have the Use of the many Conve­niencies the Apartments afforded; he would then think himself ob­lig'd, not only to Praise the Mag­nificence, but with Gratitude to acknowledge the Bounty, and the Philanthropy of so Munificent a Benefactor.

SECT. IV.

IT remains now, that we dis­course a while of the Fourth and last Question, propos'd at the beginning of this Tract; which was, With what Cautions Final Causes are to be Consider'd by the Naturalist?

But the Cases whereto this Que­stion may relate, are so many and so differing, that, what I shall en­deavour upon so diffus'd and diffi­cult a Subject, will be rather to point you out some Sea-Marks, that may direct you to shun those latent Rocks, against which divers Learn­ed Men have dash'd; than to pre­sent you with a Mariners Compass, and a Sea-Card, that may constant­ly guide you in the Courses of your [Page 104]Navigation, through so unfrequen­ted a Sea.

And, to make way for what I am to offer by a Distinction, the want of which seems to have con­tributed to the Obscurity of my Subject; I shall observe to you, that there are two ways of Rea­soning from the Final Causes of Natural Things, that ought not to be Confounded. For, Sometimes from the Uses of things Men draw Arguments that relate to the Au­thor of Nature, and the General Ends he is suppos'd to have intend­ed in things Corporeal: As, when from the manifest Usefulness of the Eyes, and all its parts, to the Fun­ction of Seeing, Men infer, that at the Beginning of Things the Eye was fram'd by a very Intelligent Being, that had a particular care, that Animals, especially Men, should be furnish'd with the fittest Organ of so necessary a Sense as that of Sight. And Sometimes also, upon [Page 105]the supposed Ends of things Men Ground Arguments, both Affir­mative and Negative, about the peculiar Nature of the Things themselves; and Conclude, that This Affection of a Natural Body or Part ought to be granted, or That to be denyed, because by This, and not by That, or by This more than by That, the End de­sign'd by Nature may be best and most conveniently attain'd. This latter sort of Arguments I am wont to call purely or simply, Physical Ones; and those of the former sorts may, for distinctions sake, be styl'd Physico-Theological Ones; or (if we will with Verulamius refer Final Causes to the Metaphysicks,) by a somewhat shorter name, Metaphy­sical Ones.

What has been premised about these Two Ways of Arguing, al­lows me to proceed to what I shall venture, tho' not without much [Page 106]diffidence, to offer you, concer­ning our Grand Questtion about; which I shall refer my present Thoughts to the Five ensueing Pro­positions.