CHAP. I. There is a God that is mans Creator.

HE that denyeth this, denyeth himself to be a man, and therefore is not to be disputed with: yet proveth it to others, while he denyeth it.

We see it of all the Individuals, that they by Generation receive their Existence; There is no man alive now here in flesh, that was alive a thousand years ago. Generation succeedeth Gene­ration. And as all men that are now on earth had a Beginning, so must there be one first man that also had a Beginning. Or else he must have been a pure Act, without Composition, or imperfection, self-sufficient, and without cause, and so not have been Man but God, and therefore not the supposite that we speak of: And as he had been infinite in Durati­on a part ante, so must he be a parte post: for that which have no cause, can have dissolution or end. But this is not the case of man: therefore man had a Beginning.

For before he was, he was not: and that which is not, cannot work. Nothing can do nothing: who­soever made him, knew what he did, and how, and why. But neither he that was not, nor his parents knew either what was doing while he was formed in the womb, and how he was fashioned, nor to what end each part and motion was appointed. Therefore neither did we make our selves. nor are our Parents the principal cause of our Being. Nor could the first man be made by himself when he was not, or his Pa­rents that had none.

If he be an effect, he must have a cause. Nothing below can be his principal Cause: Nothing doth lay claim to such an honor; Nothing is sufficient for such a work: All things below are effects themselves, and therefore have their causes.

Sense it selfe is a sufficient Discerner that we are sensible: and Sense and Reason that we are vegeta­tive: And Reason sufficiently discerneth that we are rational: not by an immediate intuition of the Pow­er but by an immediate Intellection of its own Acts. While I reason to prove that man is rationall, and you reason against it, we both prove it.

Mans soul is capable of these; and some in a less, and some in a more excellent degree are possessed of them: so few men will confess themselves to be whol­ly void of Wisdom and Goodness, that we need not prove the existence of these Endowments.

For no one can give that which he hath not to give, either formaly or eminently: Nothing of it self can make that which is better then it selfe: for then all the superabundant perfection of the effect should be without a cause. He therefore that made man, must needs have more Power, Wisdom and Goodness then all the men that are, or ever were in the world: be­cause they had none but what he gave them.

Either man was made by a Creature, that had him­selfe a Maker, or immediately by the uncaused Pri­mitive, Simple, independent being, which is the cause of all things else. If he were made by a Creature, that Creature being but a dependent Being, could be but dependent in its causation, and so could be but the instrument of, or subservient to the principal cause. And as the first cause is not diminished, or loseth not any of his perfection by making the Crea­tures, and communicating to them, no more is he the less in any effect, because he useth them: But as they have no Being but from him, so they can do nothing but by him; and as his perfections are as glorious, as if there were no Creature in Being; so the effects, which as his instruments, the Creatures perform, are as much [Page 5] his own, as if there had been no Instruments. For if they are Creatures, they can neither have nor do any good but wholly from the Creator; so that if it could be proved, (as it cannot) that the first cause did immediately make man, yet would it not alter our case, or conclude him to be ever the less our Maker.

And that he is an eternal Being without Beginning or cause, is clear: For else there should be a time, (as we may call it) when there was Nothing. And if ever there had been a time when there was No­thing, there never would have been any thing: For nothing can do nothing, and make nothing: He there­fore that thinketh God had a Beginning, thinketh that he was caused by nothing, without a cause: and so that all things were made by nothing.

And as the Eternity of God is thus most clear, and is his Immensity. For he made not that which is greater then himselfe, or that can comprehend him, else he should communicate more then he hath, and the effect to be beyond its total cause, which is im­possible: And if he comprehend all things, and be greater then all things, he must be immense. And that he is infinite in Power, Wisdom, and Goodnesse, and so most perfect, is clear, because all the Power, Wisdom and Goodnesse of the Creature is from him; and therefore he hath more himselfe then all the Creatures have: and therefore is infinite in all. If all the Power, Wisdom and Goodness in all the world were contracted into one person, it must be less then his that giveth all. None can make that which is better then itselfe. I pass by all other Arguments, as intending at this time no other demonstrations; but [Page 4] [...] [Page 5] [...] [Page 6] these, from the same effects which we are to treat of. And from these the conclusion is now made plain, that THERE Is A GOD: and that HE CREATED MAN.

CHAP. II. God is the Soveraign Ruler of Man­kind.

THE experience of all that have the least time, Godliness doth assure us of the truth of this. Thus it is with them: They are convinced of the va­nity of all things else, and their desires are set on the life to come. And what they profess, the rest of men are capable of. The soul liveth quite below it selfe, and without any true satisfaction or content, or any true improvement of its faculties, that lives for no more then temporal things, and looks for no life after this.

We see de facto that most of the world is ruled by [Page 7] some hopes and fears of a life to come. Mahome­tans, and most Infidels profess to believe it; Especi­ally their Law-givers, who therefore make the bet­ter Laws. And the same nature of man, and common experience declareth, that were it not for such hopes and fears, the world would turn Cannibals, and be like so many ravenous beasts. Men in Power would have nothing sufficient to restrain them from the greatest wickedness; and secret Murders, Burnings, Stealings, Slanders, Whoredoms, and other Villanies would fill the world. So that the Hopes and Fears, and con­sequently the Promises and Threats of a Happiness or Misery hereafter, are Gods means agreeable to hu­mane nature, for the due Government of mankind.

For God maketh his Creatures suitable to their use and ends. Every work-man will fit his tools, or other work to the end he makes them for. God hath not bestowed these noble faculties on man in vain. If he would have had him uncapable of enjoying God hereafter, he would have left him as he hath done the bruits, uncapable of knowing him, desiring and seek­ing him. If he would not have given us another life, nor punish the wicked with a future misery, he would not have promised or threatned such things, nor ruled the world by the Hopes and Fears of them. For God is not impotent or defective in Wisdom and Goodness, that he should choose, or be necessitated, to govern the world by deceits and lies. He hath his [Page 8] choice of better means: and tells us in the nature of his works for what he made them.

It is apparent, that the knowledge of a God and Happiness, which we may not enjoy, would tantalize us; and the fore-knowledge of an everlasting mise­ry, as possible and probable to the ungodly, would be a continual cause of fear and care to us: And there is not a Heathen that ever I yet met with, or scarce ever heard of, thar dare say, He is sure that there is no life to come: They all confess, That it may be so, for ought they know, though some of them take it to be unlikely and do not believe it. Now the very Possibility which is discerned by almost all, and the Probability which is discerned by most, must needs excite abundance of cares, and fears, and sorrows, which would be all in vain, and deluso [...]y, and vexations, if there were no such thing, as a life to come, which is the Object of these affections: yea, the wiser any man is, the more he knoweth the insufficiency and vanity of all below, and the great Probability of a life to come; supposing him to be without a certainty) And therefore if there were no such future state the wisest men should be the most deluded, and so prove in the end the most foolish, which is a thing not to be supposed, that the most wise and perfect Author of nature should be guilty of. God would not have [Page 9] given man wisdome as his Excellency, and the image of his Maker, thereby setting him above the rest of the inferior world, and all this to make him indeed a more miserable, deluded, befooled Creature, and the scorn, as it were of nature! The Lord of nature doth better suite his works unto their ends, and is not the common deceiver of the world.

It is impossible that any man should be a loser by God, and by the faithful performance of his du­ty; Satan himself, when he would make man mise­rable, endeavoreth to that end to make him sinful, as the onely way; and never dreameth of making him miserable by his duty; nor hath the impuden­cy to move that he may be destroyed for well-doing: It is abhorrent from the wisdome and goodness of the blessed God, to set man in the world upon a course of duty, which the more he performeth, the more he loseth by it. The work is good, or else it could not be our duty: and the doing of good must tend to our good, and not to our hurt. It is mans perfection or excellency to be obedient to his Ma­ker, and to exercise wisdom, piety, honesty, and a due care of his own felicity, to which his nature doth so potently incline him: therefore to think that this is his folly or loss, is a contradiction to the nature of the thing.

And that such a course of duty is naturally incum­bent on us is evident: For nature teacheth us that the God that made us should be feared, and loved, and served above all: and that we should live soberly, righteously and piously; Yea, more then so, when the worser sort of Infidels and Heathens cannot say, that they are sure their is no life to come: and when the most of the world believe there is; and when the common reason of man-kind (even of the Heathens) acknowledgeth it to be probable, in this case, the plainest voice of Reason doth com­mand us, to make it the very care and busi­ness of this life to make preparation for another. When we all know how short, uncerain and certain­ly vain, and unworthy to be much regarded, the pleasures, and profits and honours of the world are, or any thing that it can yeild us, Reason tells us that he is worse then mad, that will not prefer a probable everlasting happiness, and the avoiding of a probable future misery, before such things as these. And there­fore Reason telleth men, that if there be such a proba­bility of future joyes and sorrows, it should be the principal care and business of our lives to attaine that joy, and avoid that sorrowe (though there were no certainty) so that mans natural Reason concludeth that the principal work of his life on earth, should be to prepare for another life, so exceeding great a mat­ter as that, being not for a lesser to be neglected, or rashly ventured.

But now if after this, there were no such life of fu­ture joyes and sorrows for us, then all this care and diligence were lost; and that course of life that wis­dome it self directs man to, would be in vain, which [Page 11] is not to be imputed to him that giveth wisdom un­to man: And as he that performeth his duty most carefully to God, would suffer most in the world (as experience telleth us) and most be deprived of the pleasures, and honours, and profits which the flesh desireth, and so be deprived of that which sensuality accounteth felicity; so on the contrary side, the most impious and unconscionable men would be freed from all the foresaid cares and fears, and la­bours of wise men for another life, and would have liberty to please their flesh, and live in all the sensu­all delights that they can attain, and so they would be gainers by their folly and badness; and consequent­ly folly would be wisdom, and wisdom would be fol­ly; good would be evill, and evil would be good. It being certain then that a possibility and probability of another life is obvious to the light of nature, and that this possibility and probability obligeth every man in reason, to live here in preparation to another life, and to think no paines or cost too great for so great an end, and consequently that the God of nature, hath in nature prescribed man this work; it must needs follow, that either there is such a life indeed hereafter, or else that God hath made our nature, and appoint­ed our lives to be all but vain, and false, and delusory, and commanded us, or directed us to that as good, which shall be our loss; and shewed us that as evil, which would be our gain; And if God cannot or will not govern the world without this course of delusion, falshood, and frustration, then he is below some of his creatures, or at least not perfect in power, wisdom and goodness: and then there is no God, and then there is nothing.

1. Otherwise all men should be happy, because all ate men, which is not true. 2. Otherwise there should no means be appointed for man to use, in or­der to his end; for he hath his natural powers with­out any industry of his own. 3. Else there should be an equality or felicity to the obedient and disobe­dient, the vertuous and vitious, and consequently vertue were no perfection and no vertue, and vice no vice; duty no duty, and sin no sin, if all tended to the same end, and were equally consistent with our wel­fare. 4. The light of nature teacheth all men, that vice deserveth punishment, and vertue praise, and that Murderers, Traitors, and other wicked persons deserve not that happinesse in this world, which others have, but forfeit their accommodations or lives; and that there is a certain laudableness or capableness in humane actions, according to which men should be esteemed and used, and that it should go well with the good, and ill with the bad. 5. And mans hap­pinesse being Gods gift, can be given to none but up­on his termes, and to such as are acceptable to him. 6. And the corruption of the best things makes them worst; and therefore a bad man is worse then a beast, and must be more unhappy; as a bad Angel is worse then a man: who otherwise considered in his essenti­als was much above us.

For the means must be fitted to his intel­lectual nature and the motives to his faculties. God moveth not living creatures, as he doth the inani­mate: We cast a stone, but we drive a beast. God can carry a man up and down, as if he had no life of his own: but if he had intended to do thus ordinarily by him, he would not have given him life: for he doth not his excellent works in vaine; so God can move man as beasts are moved suspending his reason, and drawing him by meere sensitive baites, and moving him by objects that shall necessitate his faculties to act; but if he had intended to use him as a beast, he would have made him but sensitive as a beast, and not have given him the nobler faculties of a discursive in­tellect, and free-wil in vaine. To these therefore must the means be suited.

He that is capable of duty, and is what he is, and hath what he hath intirely from God, must needes owe himself, and all that he can perform, to God, and therefore must have instructions of his Makers will, and be directed by him concerning his duty, which else he cannot perform.

We are sociable through naturall inclination, and also through necessity, being every man insufficient for himself, and needing the help of others to our present subsistence, and safe, and pleasant, and com­fortable being, and to further us in Gods service, and to our ultimate end: And we are made sociable for the common good, and the propagation and pre­servation of mankind: and principally because that holy societies honour our Maker more then holy separate persons.

For an unknown end inviteth not the Rationall Creature, nor is intended or sought. As bruits must be drawn by sensitive objects, so man must be drawn by intellectual objects suited to the nature of man. And these objects must be propounded, that they may be apprehended: And as sensitive objects are offered to beasts to work upon their sensitive appetite and fantasie, by way of necessity (because that is agreeable to their nature) so are the objects of the Rational soul [Page 15] propounded to our Intellect and free will, that they may be rationally and freely received, which is a­greeable to humane nature. And as we have natu­rally a power of Volition [...]nd Nolition, chusing and refusing, and the Affections of Love, and De­sire, and Joy, and Hope, and Fear, &c. so none of these are made in vaine; and therefore all must have their objects: and these must be the great things of the life to come which we are made for, with the matters of this life that help or hinder them; or else they cannot be the objects that are most suitable to our faculties, and for which it is that we are men. So that it is plaine from the nature of man, that he is a Creature to be governed by Laws.

For Laws are vain and delusory without execution, and will dishonour the Government, as if he could not rule without vaine Promises and Threats. Laws are the Subjects Rule of Duty, and the Judges Rule of Judgement: [...]herefore most certainly if God have Laws, he will have judgement according to his Laws.

For there can be no effect without its cause: no Laws without a Law-giver, no Judgment without [Page 16] a Judge Legislation, and judgement with the exe­cution of the sentence, are the parts of Government: and therefore are the Acts of a Governor.

1. Mankind hath One Original, and one Common nature, and one End, and their Creator and Governor is that end, which all should intend, and are capable remotely in their naturals to attain and enjoy: there­fore they can have but one Soveraign.

2. He that is the Soveraign Ruler of the world must (as to Aptitude) 1. Have wisdom enough to know all the Subjects, and all the secrets of their hearts, and to diserne each vertue and vice, each duty and sin that's done within by their thoughts, wills, or affections: and also he must be wise enough to know all the concernments of all his Subjects through the world, and all at once; and to know what Laws to make for them, and all the means that are fittest for their Government.

2. And he must have so much goodnesse as to be immutably true to the common end of the Govern­ment, and to be indefectible in Truth and Justice. 3. And he must have so much power, as to be able to Protect all his Subjects in the world, and to repress all Enemies whatever, and to reward all according to their works, and to punish all that shall offend, and see to the execution of his Laws.

3. And besides this Aptitude, he must have the chiefest Title to be their Soveraign.

1. God and he only hath the fulnesse of Wisdom, goodness, and power, necessary to so great a work. Or if these perfections in any creature were proportion­able to the Government of all the world. 1. Yet were all this but in dependency upon God, and therefore that creature were not apt for soveraign Rule, as having and doing nothing of it self, but by a higher Cause. 2. Creation is a Foundation from whence the most absolute Right of Government doth result that is imaginable; but in the order following.

Man being first considered more generally as a Creature, whatever he is, must needs be his Makers: Creation gives so perfect a Dominion as leaveth no pretence for a competition, to the Creature himself, or any other Creature, so that making us of nothing, [Page 18] it is impossible but we should be his Own: and there­fore Dominion or propriety is the first result of our Creation.

Man being considered as before described, a ratio­onal free Agent to be Ruled Morally, or by Laws; it next followeth by necessary resultancy, that his Maker and Owner, is his Soveraign King; having the Jus Imperii, as well as the Jus Dominii, which none else can have but derivately and subordinately to him, we have then evinced from the nature of man (waving other arguments further from our subject) that GOD IS THE SOVERAIGNE RULER OF MAN-KIND.

CHAP. III. Of the Constitution of Gods King­dome.

BEcause this is the foundation of all my following discourse, as I have evinced it from nature, so I shall for the use of them that are pretenders to Chri­stianity, more fully manifest it from Scripture, and then answer what some say against it. Though he is not a Christian indeed that believeth it not, [Page 19] (nay he is a certain Atheist, it being a denying God to be God, do deny him to be the Governour of the world) yet because some among us that renounce not Christianity openly, and some that pretend to it and to a belief of Scriptures, do yet directly or in­directly deny this, I shall at least help all to stop their mouthes, while they own the Scriptures.

Psal. 29. 10. The Lord sitteth King for ever.] Psa. 47. 6, 7. Sing praises to our King, sing praises, for God is the King of all the Earth.] Psal. 10. 16. The Lord is King for ever and ever.] Psal. 24. 10. The Lord of Hosts, he is the King of glory.] Isa. 43. 15. I am the Lord your holy One, the Creatour of Israel, your King.] Zach. 14. 9. [And the Lord shall bee King over all the Earth, in that day shall there be One Lord, and his Name One.] 1 Tim. 1. 17. [Now unto the King Eternal, Immortal, Invisible, the only wise God, be honour, and glory, for ever, and ever, Amen.] 1 Tim. 6. 15. [Who is the blessed and only Potentate, the King of Kings, and Lord of Lords.] Mal. 1. 14. [For I am a great King, saith the Lord of Hosts, &c.] Psal. 47. 8. God reigneth over the Heathen] Psal. 47. 2. [For the Lord most high is terrible; he is a great King over all the Earth.] Psal. 95. 3. For the Lord is a great God, and a great King above all Gods.] In the Lords Prayer, having first acknowledged his Celestial dignity and Paternal relation, and prayed for the Hallowing of his name (which is our ultimate end) We next pray for the coming of his Kingdom, and next for the doing of his will, or actuall obedi­ence to him, and that in all the Earth as it is in Hea­ven, acknowledging him King of Heaven and Earth; and we pray for Provision, Remission, and Protection [Page 20] from him as our King, making it the conclusion of our prayers, and summe of our praises, that the Kingdom, Power, and Glory are his for ever.] The Propheticall King doth thus begin his solemn praise to God, 1. Chro. 9. 10, 11. 12. Blessed be thou, Lord God of Israel our Father for ever & ever. Thine O Lord is the greatnesse, and the power, and the glory, and the Vi­ctory, & the Majesty: for all that is in the Heaven and in the Earth is thine: thine is the Kingdom O Lord, and thou art exalted as head above all, both Riches and Ho­nour come of thee, and thou Reignest over all, and in thy hands is power and might; and in thy hand it is to make great, and to give strength unto all.] Psal. 22. 27, 28. All the ends of the Earth shall remember and turn unto the Lord: and all the kindreds of the Nations, shall worship before thee: For the Kingdom is the Lords, and he is the Governor among the Nations.] And Psalm. 145. 1, 5, 11, 12, 13. [They shall speak of the Glory of thy Kingdom, and talk of thy Power; to make known to the sons of men his mighty Acts, and the glo­rious Majesty of his Kingdom: thy Kingdom is an everlasting Kingdom, and thy Dominion endureth throughout all Generations. Psalm 103. 19. [The Lord hath prepared his Throne in the Heavens, and his Kingdom ruleth over all.] Verse 20. The An­gels do his Commandments, hearkning to the voice of his word.] Verse 22. His Dominion also extendeth to all his works in all places. Isa. 37. 16. saith Heze­kiah, [Thou art the God, even thou alone, of all the Kingdoms of the earth; thou hast made heaven and earth.] Psalm 146. 10. The Lord shall reign for ever.] Psalm 97. 1. The Lord reigneth, let the earth rejoyce.] Psalm 99. 1. The Lord reigneth, let the people tremble.] [Page 21] Psalm 98. 9. With righteousness shall he judge the world, and the people with equity.] 2 Chron. 20. 6. Jehosa­phat saith, (O Lord God of our fathers, art not thou God in Heaven, and rulest thou not over all the Kingdoms of the heathen? &c.▪ Psalm 67. 4. [Thou shalt judge the people righteously, and govern the Nations upon earth.]

It will be useless to add more; for he that will not believe these, will not believe more. From his Le­gislation, and other Acts of government, I shall ful­lier prove the point anon. That God is our cheif Go­vernor.

But one Thomas Anglus ex Albiis East-saxonum, in English, Thomas White, a Papist, in his book about Purgatory, and his other Writings, would perswade us, that such notions as these are but Metaphorical, and the conceits of vulgar heads, when properly ap­plyed to God, and that indeed they that are wiser, know that God governeth as an Engeneer, that is, by a Physicall Premotion only, as men govern Clocks and Watches, or the Pilate governeth a ship.]

But 1. Scripture cannot be so eluded by any that truly believed it to be Gods Word, its evidence is so plain and full. All that it saith might else be denyed with such an answer as this; But affirmation is no proof.

2. It is before proved, that a meer Physical mo­tion and Government is not suited to the nature of the rational Creature: but that he must be governed by the proposal of convenient Objects, it is by Laws or moral Government. 3. If man can be governed without Laws, why do Parents command, and Princes make Laws, and judge men by them. 4. Man must [Page 22] be ruled by his Creators Will, not meerly as operat­ing physically by a secret influx, but as known; And we cannot know Gods Will immediately; for no man hath seen God at any time; who hath gone up into Heaven? but we must go to the word that is nigh us, Rom. 10. Only by Signs can we know Gods Will concerning our Duty; and those signs are Laws.

But I suppose that Mr. White doth mean, that God hath Laws, but yet these Laws do infallibly deter­mine, and objects necessitate the Will, and so all Causality is properly physical, and that which we call Moral, affecteth as necessarily as that which we call Physicall, though man cannor see the force of causes in their connexion and secret influence.

But 1. If this were true, that moral operations thus cause, yet still it is one thing to govern a rational Creature by the force of duly proposed Objects, and another to move him as a lifeless stone: And if the first way of Government be granted as to God, he will still be the universal Monarch. (And let them consider how the Pope can reign as Vice-God, or Vice-Christ, if God, if Christ himself do not reign.]

But 2. We shall not beleeve such bold Assertions without better proofe then he hath given. 1. Because we know that there is true contingency in the world, which his Assertion would overthrow. 2. we know that there is a Will in man that is a self determining Principle, and naturally free, and that this part of the naturall excellency of man, that's called Gods Image, and maketh him capable of moral proper Government, with B [...]uits are not. 3. Because his Doctrine of Necessitation by a train of Objects, [Page 23] overthroweth all Religion, and not only denyeth the scope of Scripture, but blasphemeth God, and denyeth the before manifested Truths, which the light of nature doth reveal. For which way ever men will wriggle, there is no shift left, for them that hold this unresistable causation of Objects, as to the Will, but plainly they must affirm, that God is the principal cause of all sin, (so far as it is capable of a cause) and consequently of all the calamities and damnation of the sinners. For whether it be by ne­cessitating physical predetermination, or by necessi­tating objects, is all one. God is the chief cause of the faculties of the soul that are supposed thus to be necessitated, And God is the chief cause of the Ob­jects, and their disposition; (and all the temptati­ons, according to the opposed Doctrine) so that God is hereby made the chief unresistable determin­ing cause of them to sin; even as much as by make­ing fire and straw, and setting them together, he is the cause of the combustion. And then that he should hate sin which is principally his own work, and send his Son to die for it, and damn the impeni­tent for it, will not be believed, but taken for sceni­cal Delusions, by those that practically hold this Opi­nion. And so Scripture and Christianity is made a scorn, and all Religion and Conscience overthrown. All this we will believe, when Mr. White hath proved that a Man is a Beast, and that the Will hath no more freedom then the Appetite of a Bruit. But he debaseth the noble nature of man, and knoweth not the natural liberty of the Will, which makes man capable of a Government, different not only from the motion of a Jack, or Clock, or Ship, but al [...]o [Page 24] from the driving of Coach-horses, or the over-sight and ordering of a stock of sheep, who are not gover­ned by Laws and Judgement. What Blasphemy more o [...]icus, then to make God the chief necessita­ting cause of all the sin that is committed in the world, and then to make such a stir against it, and preach them from it, & inflict the penality of it on Christ, and damn men for it in everlasting misery! But as a man takes it for his honour that he can make a Watch that by natural inclination can go of it self without his own continuall motion, so God hath honoured him­self by making a free Agent that can determine it self, and be the Principal (though not of its Actjon as Action,) yet of its determination or Action as com­parative: and though moral Habits may yet be strong In [...]liners of the Will, and moral freedom may be lost, (and is in the unsanctified) yet natural liberty remaineth as essential to the Will; and even in Heaven it will be infallibly determined to good, not by the destruction of the natural Power or liberty in it self, but by the perfection of the moral Habit, and the presence of the most glorious Object, and the security and manutenency of the promised grace of him whom we shall there behold for ever. And though in this life Objects may determine the Intel­le [...] per modum naturae by necessitation, (further then it is commanded by the Will, and its acts are partici­p [...]i [...] è li [...]eri and s [...]me habits may be so potent as (with convenient Objects), infallibly and constantly to de­termine the Will; yet it is not so withall, nor do Habits as such, or Objects as such, Necessitate the Will, and determine it by the way of nature, as they do the Sense and Intellect.

But my Objections are of small moment to Mr. White, for he will grant me the conclusion as a cer­tain thing; He oft affirment, (in his treat of Purg. and elsewhere) That God hath no vindictive Judge­ment or Justice; And he demonstrateth, that all the world, or as good as all, shall be happy; (if you take all for demonstration that is but ushered in with an Ergo) In his Enclid. Metaphys. Stoech. K. this is his Propos. 16. Mentes incorporatae plere{que} ad beatitudinem perveniunt. And will you see it demonstrated? [Cum enim instrumentum propter actionem seu effec­tum propter qu [...]m fit, instrumentum illud est substantia­liter malum quod substantiam sui effectus non estnatum p [...]rficere: Quare cum mundus sit instrumentum ad per­ducendas mentes incorporatas ad Beatitudinem, nisi hoc efficiat, erit substantialiter malus: substantia autem Beatificandi genus humanum clare est, ut tot particu­lares animae beatificentur ut quae deficiant non sint suffi­cientes ad partem considerabilem totius multitudinis constituendam, &c. So again De Med. Anim. statu. Rat. 5.

Answ. 1. But who can tell how many are a consi­derable part? If one of a thousand may perish, and yet God escape your Judgement, why not one of nine hundred? and why not one of eight hundred? and why not halfe, or most. 2. But will not your censure fall heavy on God upon your grounds, if any at all perish? If so, why were you so modest, as to be ashamed to speak out, and say, that you demon­strate that none shall perish? 3. Experience telleth us, that it is too considerable a part of the world that are ungodly, sensual, Gluttons, Drunkards, Whore­mongers, Murderers, yea, most of the world by far [Page 26] that are Infidels and Idolaters, and millions that be­lieve not a life to come, and seek not after it, yea, that hate and persecute them that do. And shall all, or almost all these be saved? What danger is there then in sin, and what is the use of Christianity, or Pi­ety, or Conscience, if the Heathens, and Infidels, and impious are so generally happy? Is this Popery? and this the Champion of the Roman cause? 4. Do such Papists as these believe the Scripture, that so frequently and plainly speak the contrary, telling us, That [the Gate is strait, and the way is narrow that leads to life, and few there be that finde it, Mat. 7. and that many shall seek to enter in, and shall not be able, Luk. 13. 24.] and that it is a little flock that shall have the Kingdom, Luk. 12 32.] And that without Holiness none shall see God, Heb. 12. 14. Nor enter in­to his Kingdom without Regeneration, and Conversion, and mortifing the flesh, and living after the spirit, and doing the will of God, John. 3. 3, 5. Mat. 18. 3. Rom. 8. 1, 13. Mat. 7. 22, 23. And that God hateth all the VVorkers of iniquity, Psalm 5. 5. And that he will se­parate them as the Goats from the sheep, and judge them to everlasting fire, Mat. 25. and that Christ will come in flaming fire, rendring Vengeance to them that know not God, and obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, 2. Thes. 1. 9, 10. and punish them with everlasting destruction from his presence. And that all they shall be damned that obey not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness, 2. Thes. 2. 12. And that their worm never dyeth, and their fire is not quenched, Mark 9. 43, 44, 45. 46. Are not these, and many such passages plain enough? Or is he a Christian that be­lieves them not? And is he not of no Religion, or a [Page 27] false Religion, or false to his Religion, that is ashamed to own it, but will pretend to be a Papist, a Christian, when he is no such thing? 5. Nay, would not Juli­an, and most sober Heathens have been ashamed of these men? and Jews, and Mahometans think them unworthy of their Communion? When all these profess to believe the necessity of honesty at least, to the attainment of felicity! But these men pluck up all Religion by the roots, and tell almost all the swi­nish impious dishonest persons in the world of a certainty of salvation. (but wo to them that trust to their demonstrations) Forsooth, The world is naught if it bring them not to happiness! And what need then of Honesty to Felicity, when the rout of the dishonest are sure of it without it? Are these principles fit for Magistrates to allow their people to read, unless they desire their perdition? 6. But to his Demonstrati­on: Before he had come to his Ergo, he had many things first to have proved; as, that the World is a to­tal and sufficient Instrument, without supernaturall or speciall Revelations; That this instrument is not only a propounded and commanded means, but that God hath absolutely decreed and resolved de eventu, to accom­plish the felicity of all (or almost all) men by it: and that with almost all the Heathens, and Idolaters, and Whore-mongers, and Murderers in the world, this Instrument doth not only bring Felicity to their choice, (and the way to felicity) but also unresistably or effectually cause them to choose it, or save them with­out such a choice; and that there is nothing for man to do for his felicity, but to be wheeled to it by the instru­mentality of the world; and that the haters of holiness shall be happy without Holiness, that is, Happy without [Page 28] happiness, or sound and healthfull without health, or else shall be made holy by the world at the departing of their soules, and that against their wills, when he hath proved such impieties and contradictions as these, we shall review his demonstration.

But his great foundation is [Propos. 4. Deus Creat caetera propter ipsamet:] demonstrated thus, [Cum enim nihil extra Deum sit illi amabile (which was be­fore demonstrated in spight of Scripture and nature too) & natum perficere ipsum, clarum est, si solus Deus consideretur, indifferens esse, Creata sint nec ne: Quare cum Agens ex cognitione agat ex intentione boni, clarum est, Deum in creatione intendere bonum ipsa­rum creaturarum, seu creare illas, ut ipsis, non sibi, bene si.

Answ. 1. It seems then God loveth not the Creature, and yet made the world for them only, and not himselfe. He will make them happy without love: But it hath of old been thought a description of love, velle bonum alicu [...] ut ipsi bene sit: to will the felicity of another. 2. The will of God is the beginning of all things: and therefore the will of God must be the end. The good pleasure of his will produced all things, and the fulfilling or plea­sure of the same will is the end of all things. Its not possible that God should have any ultimate end but himself, nor that any of his operations should be ultimately for any thing below him that is their Ori­ginal; Can the infinite God make a temporary fi­nite imperfect Creature the ultimate end of his in­tentions, This were to make it God; it being his prerogative to be the Omega as well as the Alpha, Thomas Aquinas is more to be regarded here then [Page 29] Thomas ex Albiis, 1. q. 103. 2. 2. c. Utrum finis gu­bernationis mundi [...]it aliquid extra mundum? R. Cum principium rerum sit aliquid extrinsecum a toto univer­so, scilicet Deus, necesse est quod etiam sinis rerum sit quoddam bonum extrinsecum, & hoc ratione apparet, &c. And before [Cum finis respondeat principio, non potest fieri ut principio cognito, quis sit rerum finis ignoretur] And doth not Mr. White think that God was the beginning of all? That which is chiefly loved by the principall Agent, is chiefly intended in his principal works at least: but Mr. White thinks that no Creature is amiable to God, therefore none can be loved by him: therefore none can be his ultimate end

2. But you say, It was indifferent to God whether they were created or no? Answ. To his commodity it was indifferent, that is, he needed them not: and to his will it was free, if you mean that by indifferency: But yet that free will chose to make a world, and to communicate his goodness to his Creatures, for their felicity and not for his own, (that could receive no addition from them) but yet for himself, even they and their felicity being ultimately for the good pleasure of his will. God can fulfill or please his own free will, without receiving any addition of felicity, and yet all the felicity of the Creatures shall be but a means to that his pleasure.

That which was Gods ultimate End must be before his intention (the finis cui) for it is not possible that he should intend so much for nothing; for that which was not amiable or existent, nor could be so much as in esse cognito, if the will of God had not first caused it: and God doth not wholly and directly go out of [Page 30] himself in his Volitions: But no Creature had a be­ing before Gods Intentions, nor could their being be intended by him with out the pre-existence of him to whom their being should be ultimately refer­red.

3. How far Intentio finis is properly agreeable to God, and what it is that is called by us, Intention in God, is no more known to you, then how many stars are in the firmament, and when proud men will reduce the greatest matters, and clearest certainties, to their uncertaine fancies they magnifie themselves to their own perdition, and prove the most pestilent enemies to the Church and truth.

I conclude then that ultimately God doth not make his Creatures ut ipsis bene sit, but he makes them and disposeth of them, some to felicity, and some to servitude or misery for their sin, but all to the plea­sure of his will. His will is the fountaine beyond which no cause is to be assigned, and his will is the end, beyond which there is no end. And one would think this should be no controversie.

And 4. I would know of this man, whether he would take it for a happinesse or not, to be a Toade or a Snake. If not, whether God is bound any more by the Law and reason of his Creation to make all men happy that deserve misery, rather then to make all Toads and Serpents to be men, that never sinned. If it cross not the reason of his works, that you should labour, and weary and famish, and beat and kill your Horse or Oxe, that sinned not: why should it crosse the reason of his Creation to condemn the obstinate despisers of his grace? If you say [because he made men for everlasting happinesse, and not beasts,] I An­swer, [Page 31] 1. It is the temporall happiness of beasts that is denyed them. 2. He made wicked men no more for happiness, then Snakes and Toades, (unless antece­dently to offer them that happinesse which they re­fuse.)

But let us hear the proof of this strange conclusion of yours; That [Nihil extra Deum est amabile ab ipso. Prop. 3.] This is all [Cum nihil sit amabile quod non sit bonum (true) neque bonum nisi habitum de­lectet habentem, (partly false) & delectare habentem sit eum perficere (false as universally asserted) Cum delectatio sit precipuus actus cognoscentis, palam est, omne bonum esse intrinsecè perfectivum cognoscentis, cui est bonum, sed nihil est intrinsecè perfectivum Dei, cum in eo sit essentialiter omnis plenitudo entis seu perfecti­onis: nihil itaque extra Deum est Bonum & ama­bile.

Answer. 1. There is a Bonum in se & simpliciter, as well as a Bonum alicui respectivum. As all love is not of Concupiscentiae proceeding from defect, (nor strictly amicitiae) so all good is not desired or used as a means, nor is bonum habitum, or desired, but some loved simply for it self.

2. All delectation or complacency is not to per­fect him that hath it. Scripture most frequently a­scribeth love, delight, and complacency to God, which are not to perfect him. I conclude then, that 1. God loves the creature as Love signifieth his will to doe it good. 2. He loves the good which he hath communicated to the Creature, as good according to its proportion, with a love of simple Approbation and Complacencie. Not that he loves any thing in it but what is from him, nor so without himself, as if [Page 32] all did not live, move and be existent i [...]m; but yet the good communicated to the Creature is distinct from God himself. All that is from God is good (he saw that which he had made to be good, and very good, Gen. 2.) But good may be accounted amiable to God, therefore all that is from God may be accounted amiable to him.

3. What a God would this man feign to the world that loveth nothing that he hath made, (for he can love nothing that is not amiable) when in­deed he hateth nothing that he hath made, but for sin which he made not, and he is love it self. The mag­nifying of Gods love to man in the work of Christ is his Incarnation, Life, Doctrine, &c. and the work of the Spirit, and all Gods Ordinances, and the End of all his Mercies, and the very work and use of Heaven it self. And this learned man that's blinded with pride, would teach us now that God loveth no man and nothing but himself, God knows better then you what love is in himself who hath expressed it of himself. Ask any honest man on earth whether he believes this doctrine, or would have it true, that God loves no man.

4. And what a world of Creatures doth this man feign that are none of them good and amiable.

5. And see whether he teach us not all to deny our love to God. For 1. To tell men that God loves no man, is the way to have no man love him. 2. If God must love nothing for himself, because nothing is good to him, it will follow that man must love no­thing for God ultimately, upon the same account. As nothing can add to God, so we must love nothing as that which can add to God: And therefore if that [Page 33] reason en [...]h against Gods loving any thing for himselfe, it will be reason enough against our loving any thing for him. And if God doe all for man, be­cause he can have no other end, then man must on the same reason doe all for himself. And therefore when he makes God mans End, he can mean but the final object that makes us happy, which is onely to love God for our selves, as our own felicity. But that God should be more loved simply for himselfe, then as our felicity is apparent: 1. In that nature taught the Heathens to love the common good, a­bove their own felicity: therefore our own felicity is not our highest end. A valiant Heathen would have sacrificed his life for his Countries good: not onely for a reward to himself in another world, nor onely for the fame (if their Professions may be cre­dited) but for the common good. 2. And the light of natural Reason, telleth all them that have not cap­tivated Reason to selfishnesse, that every man should do thus: If the Common-wealth should perish unless my life redeemed it, or if my death would save the lives of ten thousand that are of greater use then I, my Reason tells me I should readily sacrifice my life for them, though I had no reward for it to my self: which was the ground of Pauls words, Rom. 9. 3. [I could wish that my self were accursed from Christ, for my brethren, &c.] Not that he actually made such a choice, for it was not offered to his choice: but that it was more eligible, if it had been offered, and if the perdition of one could be the salvation of thou­sands, it were in it self an evill to be undergone for so great a good; if it had been so appointed us of God. The greatest good is greatliest to be desired, [Page 34] though it be not our own. He that would not him­self be annihilated, rather then the Sun should be ta­ken out of its natural place and office, or the World annihilated, though it were supposed that he could survive) should go against the clearest light of na­ture. That which resisteth this within us is Naturall instinct, or loathnesse to dye or be miserable, which is in every sensible Animal, and therefore is to be subjected to Reason as the Appetite is. Reason can­not take away the appetite, and make a man love bit­ter, and loath sweet, &c. but it may rule it: so it cannot take away our loathness to be miserable, but it may tell us that we should submit to it for the com­mon good. And this sheweth that mans own per­sonal felicity is not his highest end, even in the eye of natural reason. And if so, it is most certaine, that if we must goe above our selves, we must goe to the highest, which is to God: whose pleasure and complacency in his works, is above all the good of the works themselves, when we say [His glory is his end and ours] we meane that [the communication of his Excellency to his Creatures, and his glorious ap­pearance in them in his Complacencie:] so that this Glory and Appearance is but Materially his end, but the complacencie of his Will) which was the beginning, is formally his End.

And if still you dream like a man of Earth, that God can have no delight and complacencie, in any thing but himself, because he needeth nothing; and it cannot perfect him. I Answ. 1. Delight in God (whether in himselfe or another) is not such a thing as mans delight, nor is it to be comprehended by us, and therefore from things beyond our reach, we must [Page 35] not deny the evident truths that are within our reach. As God doth first take pleasure in himselfe without any note of imperfection, and deserves not to be accounted imperfect, because he is not most happy without that pleasure, so he next taketh plea­sure in his Image, or the appearance of his perfecti­ons shining forth in the Creatures; which will be most eminently in his Son, as the Glorified Head of the Church, and then in the glorified Church his bo­dy. And when he hath told us that he loveth and takes pleasure, and delighteth in his Sonne, and his Church, it is but a folly of a high nature for us to con­tradict him, and say, he speaketh all this after our conceits: We grant that the expressions are A­nological or Metaphorical: But therefore we con­clude they are not meere falsities, but signifies som­what transcendent in God, that hath so much ana­logie or likeness to the Love, Complacency, Delight of man, that we cannot fitlier conceive of it then under these notions. And therefore we must con­clude both that God delighteth, or takes pleasure in his works, and loveth Christ, and his Church, and yet that he doth not this to perfect himselfe, or adde any thing to his own felicity: but the very Compla­cency of his Will is his highest End; and therefore as it is folly to aske the Original of Gods will which is the Original of all things, so it is no less to aske what is the end of his will, which is the End of all things. To heap up here the plain abundant Testi­mony of Scripture, that there is Complacency and Love in God, to a Christian is needlesse, (and to most Heathens) but to Infidels that believe not the Scripture, is vaine. See Aquin. 1. q. 20. art. 2. pro­ving [Page 36] that God loveth all things, contrary to this Eng­lish Thomas, that saith, he loveth nothing, because no­thing is good. We shall only give him leave to con­clude what he please as of himself. If he will needs maintain that he is not good himself nor amiable to God, and consequently to no good men, let him have his liberty.

In his precedent proposition. 2. He would per­swade a fool that yet he is Orthodox, while he main­taines that [Ens primum est Gubernator Universi sive Deus: but his description of Gubernation telleth us his sense) Gubernator [...]m dicimus eum qui ex cognitione & potestate per alios agenda dirigit & efficit] so that it is a Physical Government only that hath effection ever conjunct with direction that he meaneth. And so his Moral Government by Laws fitted to free Agents, where his Sapiential Excellencie is purposely set forth to our observation and admiration, and when he e­ffecteth not all things that he commandeth as a Go­vernour, this is cast out of doors, further then as it is fancied to be a Physical engine. But 1. God doth not cause all the sin of the world, and make that a part of his Government of the world; nor doth he the less Govern when he Commandeth, because he doth not effect mens obedience, but permit them to disobey. We magnifie his Omnipotential operations, and that in the very sanctification of his servants; but we will not therefore deny his Sapiential frame of Government, nor say that God Governeth not when his Laws are broken, unlesse by causing men unavoidably to breake them. These blasphemous do­rages are no part of our Belief.

And that you may see how he profiteth, he con­cludeth [Page 37] his Book in these words [Palam est, Deo ni­hil reliquum esse praeter Creationem & conservationem, hoc est nihil omnino de Gubernatione, sed eam integre commissam esse creaturis, non erraturis a legibus divinis in Creatione ipsis inditis] that his, Nothing is left to God but Creation and Conversation, that is, Nothing at all of Government, &c. this is wholly from the beginning committed to Angels. So that it is not enough to over­throw the whole frame of Moral Government of free Agents, but the very Physical Government which is left, is wholy in the hand of Angels, and no­thing of it left to God.

But 1. Its nevertheless the work of God, if it be the work of Angels; Though he use means, yet im­mediatione virtutis & suppositi, he is yet as neere himselfe to the effect, as if there were no means, and as he is not the lesse by the Existence of Angels, so he Doth not the lesse because of the Agency of An­gels.

2. The proof of this universall Government of Angels is none, but the Ergo of a dreaming man, that snorteth Syllogismes. And therefore if we should not deny it, we must yet remember what Paul ad­viseth us concerning Mr. White, and the Bhemenists and such like, whom in their Ancestors he was ac­quainted with, Col. 2. 18. [Let no man beguile you of your reward, in a voluntary humility, and worshipping of Angels, intruding into those things which he hath not seen, vainly puft up by his fleshly mind.] (And who would not worship Angels if they are our only Go­vernours! But yet he makes praying to them as need­less, as it is to pray to the Sun to shine, or to the poise to move the Clock.)

[Page 38]3. Is it Angels that send or give the holy Ghost to renew and sanctifie the Elect of God? or to inspire the Prophets. Prove this if you can. Or is the Holy Ghost some Angel? Neither can you prove that. You finde not in Nature or Scripture that the Image of God is wrought by Angels on the souls of men.

4. Did not the second Person in the Trinity im­mediately assume the nature of man? was he conceiv­ed by Angels? Incarnate by Angels? yea not immedi­ately incarnate at all? nor immediately lived in flesh on earth, dyed, rose againe, Intercedeth for us, &c. Doth God doe all this remotely only, and Angels Proximately? Then Christ was an Angel? And is it Angels Proximately, and Christ remotely that shall judge the world.

5. Though I deny not but Angels might be service­able in giving Moses Law, yet how prove you that Angels are our Law-givers? Laws we have, and Laws Divine? and they are none of them, given us in the name of any Angel as his Laws. Very much we ascribe to them, in their ministration for the heirs of life, and in the Government of the world: but we shall not defie them, and deny God to be God. Note that, Propos. 2. This man himself makes it all one to be [God] and to be [Governour of the Universe] He therefore rhat saith he hath wholly committed to Angels the Government of the Universe, saith according to Mr. Whites exposition, that he hath divested himself of his Godhead, and wholly committed it to Angels to be Gods.

But the Reader will think I have been too long with this Man. But I am concerned in it much to confirm and defend my only Foundation, that [Page 39] GOD'S OUR SOVERAIGNE KING and I would have you know what points they be that Papists are introducing, and the rest of them tolle­rate as not de fide. This is the man that hath prefaced to Turbervils Manuall, and written for Traditi­ons, &c. And I would have men awakened to take [...]orice what persons in the present controversies we [...]ve to doe with, and what a design is laid among [...] that seem of divers parties to destroy Christia­nity, and set up Heathenisme or Infidelity: If they [...]ve thei [...] [...]y and expected success, the Worship­ [...]s o [...] [...]he Sun, are like ere long to be none of the [...]st among us in Religion: But God will shame [...]

[...]. 25. [...] denial of the Soveraignty of God, and his Moral Government is the denial of Deity, Hu­ [...], Religion, Morality and pollicy, most of which I shall manifest brieffly in these following In­stances.

1. I have shewed already that it is a denying God to be God, because to be God, is to be the Gover­nor of the world, at least in Title.

2. If God be not Governour, he is not just: For [...]ommunicative Justice he cannot exercise on Creatu­res that are wholly his own. And distributive Justice he can have none, if he have not the Relation which Justice doth belong to. He that is not a Ruler, can­not be a just Ruler.

3. If God be not our Governour, he hath no Laws? and so the Law of Nature and Scripture is over­thrown.

[Page 40]4. Then man doth owe him no Obedience: for where there is no Ruler and Law, there is no obligation to Duty: and so man is not obliged by God to be pious, just, honest or sober; but if God will make him such, he will be such.

5. And then it will follow, that there is no sin: All things that men do, are such as God doth move them to: but there being no Rector and Law, there can be no trangression.

6. Hence also it will follow, that there is no ver­tue, which is but the Habit or disposition to duty: for if there be no obligation to actual obedience, the ha­bit is in vain, or is no moral good: for all moral good is denyed here at once.

7. And hence also it follows, that the Habits of Vice are nor culpable, because the Acts are not sin­ful against God, there being no Law and Governour against whom they are committed.

8. And Christianity is hereby most evidently sub­verted: For Christ cannot die for sin, nor redeem us from it, if there be no such thing; Nor can the Spirit mortifie it in us.

9. And hence it will follow, that all the Ministry and Ordinances are vain, and not of Gods appoint­ment. If he have no Laws, there is no need of any to teach them.

10. Hence also it will follow, that Scripture is false that pretendeth to be the Law of God, and tells us of all that's here denyed.

11. And therefore there can be no pardon of sin: for where there is no Governour, there is no Law: and where no Law, there's no sin; and where no sin, the'rs none to pardon.

[Page 41]12. And then there needs no confession of sin, nor prayer for pardon, nor care or means to be used against it.

13. Nor can any man ow God any thanks or praise for the pardon of his sins, if there be none.

14. And it will follow, that there is no punishment, for sin either in this life or in that to come, [...]ecept what is inflicted, by Creatures for offences against Creatures.

15. And it will follow, that there is no Reward for the obedient; for if no Governor, Law and Duty, then no Reward.

16. And then there is no Judgement of God to be expected. For their is no possibility of Judgement where there is neither King, nor Subject, nor Law, nor Right, nor Wrong, not Reward, nor Punish­ment.

17. And it will follow that sin is as good as obe­dience, and a wicked man as good and happy as an honest man: For nothing that men do is morally evill, and all things Equally, Physically good, accord­ing to their Physical Being, and God even as Physicall Governour is the chief cause, and therefore the effect cannot but be good, nor can there be an evill man in the world.

18. It will follow, that there are no Devils: for they could break no Law, nor do any evil, but the good that God, or rather the superior Intelligences made them do.

19. In a word, it hence followeth, that man is but a beast, that is, necessitated by Objects, and not a free agent governed by Laws.

20. And because I would make them twenty, let [Page 42] this be the last: It followeth hence, that (God being not our Rector, and Law-giver, and so their being no sin against him) if the Governors of the Com­mon-wealth shall hang or banish those that hold this traiterous opinion against the God of Heaven, and divulge it, or if any man that meets them, cudgel them, it is no sin against God, nor doth he need to fear any punishment for it from God.

By this time you see what those men say, that deny the Soveraignty of God.

Of this by the way, I spake before. He is his own end, so far as he may be said to have an end; (which is not as man, that is imperfect, and without his end, while he is using meanes to attain it) and he is our cheif end, on the grounds and in the sense before explained. The appearance of his glory, and the fulfilling of his Will, being the highest Universal good. Should the end be lower then the beginning, a multitude of absurdities would follow; This end therefore is principally to be respected by men of all degrees.

Other Creatures are no more subjects, then sheep and horses are subjects of any Prince: They are the matter of as proper Dominion, (I mean Propriety) as Men; and are our Provision and Possessions: but [Page 43] they are not capable of subjection, for want of rea­son and Free-will. They are as properly ordered by Gods Physical Government, as men are, but not by his Moral Policy, which is the Governement that now we treat of.

For Gods Kingdom is not constituted primarily by Contract, but his Right resulting immediately from his being our Creator, and so our Owner, our Obligation is founded in our being his Creatures, and his Own. The most absolute slave imaginable, cannot be so much obliged to you antecedently to his con­sent, as man is unto his Creator, from whom he is, and hath all that he hath.

He that is born under the most Absolute Lord, can­not by his own will exempt himself from his obliga­tions. If he could make Gods Laws not obligatory, and himself no Debtor to God for his subjection and obedience, then might he depose his Soveraign at his pleasure. And most would take this as a readier [Page 44] way to their sensual content and safety, to repeal the Law, and depose their King, to save them the trou­ble and labour of obeying him, and be from under his Judgement and punishments. No man can ac­quire benefits or priviledges by his vice: The Law supposeth that a mans faults may not advantage him. But to deny consent to the Soveraingnty of God, and to deny our own Obedience, would be our fault. But Benefits we can claim no right to, if we consent not to them and to the terms on which they are con­ferred. No man can plead for that which he refus­ed: nor can he plead against another for not doing him good against his Will. Though we may offend God, yet we cannot injure man, by not doing him the good that he refuseth. And the greatest blessings of the Kingdom of God, are such as a Refuser is not capable of; Nor is he capable, while such, of the Duties of a Subject. And therefore though he can­not exempt himself from obligation and punishment by dissent, yet may he deprive himself of the pro­tection of the Soveraign, and forfeit all his hopes of the benefits

A man would think the earth should never have bred a man that would contradict this truth that is in his wits. For by so doing God is pulled down, and man set over him, or made a beast, and all morality (as by the former opinion) overthrown. But Mr. Harrington in his Oceana, pag. 16. makes God but the Proposer, and the people the Resolvers or Confirmers of all their Laws, and saith, [they make him King, Deut. 19, They reject or depose him as Civil Magi­strate, and Elect Saul, 1 Sam. 8. 7.] adding [The Power therefore which the people had to depose even God himself as he was Civil Magistrate, leaveth little doubt, but that they had power to have rejected any of those Laws confirmed by them throughout the Scrip­ture.

Answ. They could violate a Law, and deny obedi­ence to it; but they could not nullifie it, or prevent, or destroy its obligation. So they could be Rebels against God, but they could not so reject the duty of voluntary subjection, nor escape the punishment of Rebellion. One single person may thus reject God and his Laws at any time, (to his cost) as well as the Major Vote of the people. Its a lamentable case, that such blind persons that know not such things as these, should so perversely trouble the Com­mon-wealth with their loathsom obtruded fancies. Mans consent doth not make God King, nor his dissent depose him, as to his Power, or the cheif part of his actual Government: He will be K. in spight of his proud­est enemies: and he will make his Laws; and those Laws shall actually oblige; and men shall be guilty, that first consent not to be Subjects, and then obey not: and they shall be judged as Rebels, (Luk. 19. 17.) [Page 46] and the Judgement executed: Only their consent is, 1. A proper Cause of their own Obedience. 2. And a Condition sine qua non of their Interest in the Bene­fits. A little Power will serve a man to be come a Rebel, and be hanged. Will you see the face of this Gentlemans opinion.

1. The world by dissenting may make God no God, that is, no Governor of the world: and so he holdeth his Government on our wills. 2. if his Doctrine be true, the Law of nature is no Law, till men consent to it. 3 At least where the Major Vote can carry it, Atheism, Idolatry, Murder, Theft, Whoredom, &c. are no sins against God. 4. Yea, no man sinneth against God, but he that consenteth to his Laws. 5. The people have greater Authority or Government then God. 6. Rebellion is sove­raign power in the multitude. 7. Dissenters need not fear any Judgement or punishment from God. 8. Cannibals and Atheists are free-men, as not con­senting to Gods Goverment. 9. Men owe not any Subjection, Duty, or Obedience to God at all unless they make themselves Debtors by consent. 10. The troublesome work of self-denying obedience, and all the danger of punishmenr here, and hereafter may be avoided easily by denying Gods soveraignty and deposing him, and no man need to be damned if he will but deny to be a Subject of God.

These are the apparent Consequences of the Doctrines of Mr. Harrington, if he will be under­stood according to the open meaning of his words: But if he will tell us that by [their Power of making God King, or deposing him, and of resolving on, and confirming, or rejecting his Proposals,] he [Page 47] meant only a power of voluntary subjecting them­selves to their absolute Lord and King, and of obey­ing his Laws, or else a Power of Rebelling, Diso­beying and perishing, he will turn some of our in­dignation and compassion into laughter, but his lan­guage will we not imitate.

It was not some tolerable loss, but a total ruine and undone Condition that the world was redeemed from▪ an [...] therefore Redemption is a just title to Pro [...]riety and Rule, which God will have us to ac­knowl [...]dge, if we will have the special benefits of Redemption as his title by Creation.

To Believers this is past Controversie. Scripture is plain and full, Read Psalm 2. Mat. 28. 18. [All Power is given to me in Heaven and earth.] Acts 10. 36 He is Lord of all.] Rom. 14. 9. For this end he both died, rose and revived, that he might be Lord both of the dead and living.] Ephes. 1. 21, 22. [He [Page 48] set him at his own right hand in heavenly places, far above all Principality, and Power, and Might, and Dominion, and every name that is named, not only in this world, but also in that which is to come; and [...]h put all things under his feet, & gave him to be head [...]er all things to the Church, which is his body.] John. 13. 3. [The Father hath given all things into his hand,] John 17. 2. [Thou hast given him Power over all flesh, that he should give eternal life to as many as thou hast, given him,] John 5. 22. [The Father judgeth no man, but hath committed all Judgement to the Son, that all men should honour the Son as they honour the Father: He that honoureth not the Son, honoureth not the Father which hath sent him,] Acts 5. 31. [Him hath God exalted to be a Prince and Saviour,] Mat. 25. 31, 32, 33, 34. [When the Son of man shall come in his Glory, &c. Then shall the King say to them on his right hand &c.] See Phil. 2. 9, 10, 11.

Some are Officers, and some only such as must obey: Some Officers are Civil, some Ecclesiasti­cal; Some are rich, some poor: some adult, some Infants: some weak of parts, some strong, &c.

The Israelites covenanting with God conjunctly (as Deut. 39. and oft) and distinctly (as in Circum­cision, &c.) is known. Those that would not stand to this Covenant were to die, 2 Chron. 15. 13. And those that solicited any to rebell against their Sove­raign, Deut. 13.

CHAP. IV. Of the Administration of the Univer­sal Kingdom.

HAving spoken of the CONSTITUTION of the Kingdom of God, I shall proceed to speak of the ADMINISTRATION thereof.

1. The Law of nature in the primary most proper sence, is to be found in natura rerum, in the whole Creation that is objected to our Knowledg, as it is a Glass in which we may see the Lord, and much of his [Page 50] Will; and as it is a Signifier of that Will of God con­cerning our duty. 2. The Law of nature is some­time taken for that Disposition or Aptitude that there is in mans nature to the actuall knowledg of these naturally revealed things, especially some clear and greatest Principles, which almost all the world dis­cern. 3. And it is sometime taken for the Actual knowledge of those plain and common Principles. 4. And sometime for the Actual knowledge of all that meer Nature doth reveal. When I say God hath given man this law of nature, I mean, both that he hath made an Impress of his minde upon the Creation, and set us this Glass to see himself, and much of our Duty in, & also that he hath given to the very nature of man a Capacity of perceiving what is thus revealed, and a disposition especially to the Re­ception of the more obvious Principles; so that by ordinary helps, they will be quickly known; and the rest may be known if we be not wanting to our selves.

There was the less said of this in Scripture, and the Decalogue, because it is written so deep in nature, and hath so great advantage in our natural desire to be happy.

Those Politicians therefore that say a Common­wealth in its own nature doth not participate of mo­ral good or evil, but is a thing neither commanded nor forbidden, doe fundamentally erre in their Politicks. It is possible for one or few persons in extraordinary cases to be disobliged from living under any Govern­ment. (But the Cases are so rare, that it is not one of many millions of persons that is ordinarily in that case.) But to man-kind in common, it is made a duty to live in this order of Government, where it may be had. He therefore that should think he is born a Freeman, and therefore will maintain his li­berty, and be Governed by none, (being not a Go­vernour himself) doth sin against God, in violating his Order, as Souldiers should do in an Army that would have no Officers, nor be commanded by any but the General. This is easily proved, for,

1. Nature immediately makes an inequality in our procreation and birth, and subjecteth children [Page 53] to their Parents as their undoubtedly rightful [...]o­vernours.

2. Nature doth make such inequality of persons in point of sufficiency and endowments, as neces­sitateth Government, while some are unable or un-apt to subsist comfortably without the Government of others: And therefore even in state of marriage Nature subjecteth the weaker sexe to the Go­vernment of the stronger. And its natural for persons of weak understandings, and other endow­ments to have some that are wise and able to Govern them, lest they be destitute of help and left to ruine.

3. Nature hath made man a sociable creature, both by Necessity, and Inclination; and therefore must be in ordered societies.

4. Nature hath made man a lover of man, and so far as he is good, so far to be Communicative: and theresore the wisdom and strength that any doe excell in, is for the good of others; and all things must be so ordered that the whole may be the better for the gifts of the several parts, and the weak for the strong; and therefore there must be Governed societies.

4. Providence keepeth some in such necessitie of others, as requireth their relief and protection, and Government. Some by paucity are insufficient for their own defence: some by the proximity of potent Enemies and Thieves: some by the scituation of their Countries, and some by want.

5. The vitiousness of men hath made Govern­ment now of double necessitie, to what it would be if man we [...]e innocent, when men are Wolves to one another, and the weaker can keep nothing that the [Page 54] stronger hath a minde to, and no mans life can be safe from cruelty and revenge; when there is so much backwardness to vertue and well doing, and so much vice to be restrained, it is now no more question whether Government be naturally necessary, and sub­jection a duty; then whether Physitians be necessary in a rageing plague, or food in a famine.

6. Experience tells us that Gods work, or our preser­vation cannot be well carried on without it; without it the world would be a confused crowd. It would dishonour the Soveraign Ruler, if his Kingdom were turned into a tumultuous rabble, God doth not im­mediately, that is without sutable means, exercise his Government by himself. He could have easily done it: but it is the beauty and perfection of his Kingdom that there be diversity of Orders. He could lighten the world without the Sun: but he hath cho­sen rather to communicate so much of his Splendor to a Creature: He will have men like our selves to be his Officers among men, as fittest for our familiar converse. And What would a Nation be without Government, but a company of miserable men, rob­bing and killing one another, what would an Army be without Commanders? and how would they de­fend themselves against the enemies.

7. The Law of Nature requireth Justice; that it may goe well with the good, and ill with the evill; and that vertue be encouraged, and wickedness pu­nished: therefore it requireth that there be a course of Government in the world to this end.

8. There is Government among the very Angels and Divels: therefore it is not to be avoided or thought a thing indifferent among men. [Page 55] All places have some Order.

9. The Analogicall Government in the Micro­cosme, man, doth prove a Natural need and excel­lency of Government. The Intelect in man is made to guide, and the Will to Command, & all the inferiour faculties to obey: shewing us that in soci­eties the Wise should guide, the Good should command, and the Strong and all the rest should execute and o­bey. An ungoverned man is a mad man, or a bad man.

10. The great disparity that is among all Creatures in the frame of Nature, intimateth the beauty of Or­de [...]ly Political disparity. Look but to the Sun and Moon, and Stars. and see their inequality and Order. Beasts differ in strength, and the very stones of the field are not of equal bigness and shape. The sil­ly Ants have an Order among them, and a Hive of Bees are a Natural Common-wealth.

1. The well governing of a mans selfe (which is taught by Theological Ethicks) is both necessary to his own felicity, and a principal requisite to the safe­ty, beauty, and felicity of the societies, that consist of individual persons.

2. Domestical Order is commanded of God, part­ly in nature directly, as the Rule of Parents, and o­bedience of Children: partly by the intervention of [Page 56] contracts for the application of the Law to the indi­vidual persons, as in the Relations of Husband and Wife, of Master and servant, where note, that in the first, it is one thing for Nature to give the Law, and another thing for Nature to produce the person: Nature as procreative brings forth the Childe? from whence the mutual Relations result: but it is Nature partly as Indicative of Gods will, and partly as en­dowing us with Principles or Dispositions of Mora­lity (that is, as a Law) that obliged Children to o­bey, as Parents to Govern: so also the Law of Na­ture and Scripture is it that imposeth on Wives and Servants the duty of obeying, as on Husbands and Masters the care and duty of Governing; but it is Choice that determineth of the Persons that are to Rule and to obey, that this or that shall be the man or the woman that shall be a Husband or Wife is of choice: and that this or that shall be the Master or Servant, and also (these being free Relations) it is here of choice, whether they will be Married or not, and servants or not. (To the world in general, the Relations are necessary, but not to every individual person.) But whether the Husband shall govern, and the wife obey, and whether the Master shall govern, and the servant obey, this is not of choice: so that if they should by Contract agree, that the wife shall not be subject to the Husband, it were ipso facto null, as being contrary to the divine Institution or Law.

3. As many Families cohabiting without Political or Civil Government, would want that which is is necessary to their own Wel-fare and the Com­mon good. As an Empire is divided into several Provinces, or Principalities, so God hath made it [Page 57] necessary that the world be distributed into many particular Common-wealths. An Universal humane Monarchy is impossible, it being beyond the Capaci­ty of any one so to govern; (the more to blame the Pope for pretending to it) God only can govern all the world. But men as his Officers have their seve­ral Provinces, which in due subordination to him and his Laws, must be governed by them.

4. Because men have immortal souls to save, and an everlasting life of happinesse to attain, or misery to suffer, and God himself hath a final Judgment to pass on all according to his Laws, and because men are rational free Agents that must by knowledge and choice be brought into a fitness for feliciry, and be kept in acceptable obedience to their Soveraign; therefore hath he appointed Pastors to teach and guide the people in the way of life, and to acquaint them with his Laws, and his future Judgement, and in free ordered Churches to lead them in the publick Worship of God, and exercise that spirituall Go­vernment by his Word, which shall preserve the ho­nor of his holinesse in the world, and difference be­tween his servants and the rebellious, and lead his people towards perfection.

CHAP. V. Of a subordinate Common-wealth in General.

HAving spoken of Gods Universal Kingdom, I am next to speak of the distinct, subordinate Common-wealth which God hath by institution made the parts of it. And here first I shall speak of the NATURE of a Common-wealth in General; and then of those Modal differences which have ob­tained the name of the divers species of Common-wealths: and that, 1. As the difference is in the number and quality of persons that have the Sove­raignty. And, 2. As it is in the gradually or modally diversified Matter, or Object of their power. And having spoken of the Constitutive Causes, I shall speak of the Efficient.

Many Definitions you may find in politicks, almost each one having one of his own, though most of them to the same sence. And therefore if I use not any of theirs in all the terms, I am as excusable as they.

As the best actions of Atheists, or any men that have not just Principles or ends, are not simply or properly Morally-good, but only secundum quid, and Anologically, so is it with their Politicks and Com­mon-wealths. The absence of any one of these Essential Ingredients, makes their Government ano­ther thing. If it want either Moral-dependance up­on God as absolute Soveraign, or the acknowledge­ment of his great Universal Laws which must be the Fundamentals to their own, or if they intend not any spiritual and everlasting good to the societies, or intend not the honour and pleasing of God, but begin and end their Government with their carnal selves, this is not simply or properly a Common-wealth, but secundum quid, and Analogically; even no more then an Ideot is a reasonable man. Its agreed on by Politicians, that a Company of Robbers that choose them a King, are no Common-wealth, because they deviate from the Universal fundamental Laws; Much less is a Company of Rebels a Common-wealth that seek both the subversion of King and Kingdom: and so want both the necessary Beginning, Means and End. And a Justice of Peace or Judge may as well have Power, when they have renounced their Depen­dance on the Soveraign, and Loyalty to him, as a King or any other can have just Power when they have re­nounced their Allegiance or subjection to God. (of which anon)

The Relate are Heteronyma: the Soveraign is the chief in Honour and Power, the Subjects are the Chief in real worth, and finally preferred. The Aggregate matter must be rational Creatures: for bruits are nor capable, and they must be Gods Sub­jects, and parts of the Universal Kingdom; as the Members of a Corporation in this Common-wealth, must be members of the Common-wealth and Sub­jects of the Soveraign. How far they must be subject to God shall be shewed after. The neerest Terminus or end is the good order of the body procured by the Administration. By [Order] here I mean not the Relation it self as I did in the definition, but the orderly state and behaviour of the society, which is the exercise of Government and subjection, and the obedience to God, and just behaviour unto men that is manifested therein. This end is a means to the next end, which is the Common good, and that to the ultimate end, which is the everlasting happiness of man, and the fulfilling, or pleasing of the Will of God.

There must be one Head to every Civil governed body, and but one; that one Natural may be ten Civil persons, and so the Head of ten Common-wealths is evident in that there is more necessary to individu­ate Common-wealths, then the Unity of the Head; and the Natural Unity of the Head is not necessary. One natural Subject may have many Relations: As the same man may be a King, a Generall, a Husband, a Master, &c. so he may be a King of many King­doms, The Kingdom of Scotland was not the same with the Kingdom of England. Many Kingdoms may have different Constitutions, one of them have an Emperor, another a limitted King, another a more limitted, and yet all have the same man. And as he is the Emperor, Duke or Prince of one Com­mon wealth, he is not the same Civil person, as he is, as King of another: And that many natural persons may be one Civil person, shall be further shewed when we come to the species of Government.

But this belonging to the species, we shall say more of it in the Differences of Goverments.

If the people any otherwise then by particular Constitutions, (by fundamental Contracts) be the Soveraigns, or have any Governing civil power, it must be either by nature, by accident, or by divine Institution: But none of these wayes: therefore not at all.

That they have none by nature is plain, in that they are not by nature a Community or Aggregate Body. And when they are so, they have naturally no Soveraignty, as I prove.

1. Where there is no Common-wealth, there is no Soveraignty: but in a meer Community or Aggre­gation of men before any Contracts, or voluntary Constitution, there is no Common-wealth: therefore there is no Soveraignty.

2. if a meer Aggregation of natural men did make a Common-wealth and Soveraignty, then a Fare or Market might be a Common wealth: or a ship laden with Passengers or a Prison full of Captives, or an invading Army of enemies. But the Consequent is confessed a falshood, therefore, &c.

If meer nature make an Aggregate body of men to be a Common-wealth, or to have a real Majesty, (or Soveraignty) then every aggregate Body of men are a Commonwealth, and have that Soveraignty, but the consequent is false: for there are Schools, Col­ledges, Societies of Merchants, and many other Corporations and Societies that are no Common­wealth; therefore, &c.

3. If nature make a meer Aggregation or Com­munity of men to be a Commonwealth, or to have Real Majesty, then men may be a Common-wealth, and have such Majesty without, yea, and against their own consent: (For there may be a Community of Men that consent not to be a Common-wealth.) But the Consequent is false, therefore so is the Antece­dent.

4. It will follow also, that no End intended by the people is necessary to the being of a Common­wealth; (For men may meet, or cohabit, or associ­ate, and combine for severall ends.) But the Conse­quent is false against the nature of all such Relations and Associations, therfore, &c.

5. If nature make the people Soveraignes, then either all conjunctly, or a M [...]jor Vote: But neither all, nor a Major Vote: therefore none.

1. Not All: For, 1. Where there is no Subject, there is no Soveraign: But if all conjunctly are feigned to be the Soveraign, there would be no Sub­ject: therefore, &c. The Relate cannot be with­out its Correlate. 2. If all must be conjunct in the Soveraignty, no one would be punished, nor any righted: for every man would be judge in his own cause, and every Delinquent would have a negative [Page 65] voice in his own sentence, and no Murderer would suffer, till he, and all his friends consent.

2. If it be the Major Vote that is affirmed to have the Soveraignty; I answer, 1. Nature giveth no such Power: There is nothing in nature to tell us that 1001 should have Power of Governing (and so of the lives) of 999. 2. Nature giveth them not so much as an Aptitude, much less Authority and Right. 1. The Aptitude is in a Supereminency of Wisdom, Goodness and Power: but nature giveth none of these, much less all to the Major Vote; therefore it gives not to the Major Vote so much as an Aptitude for Government. 1. The world knows that knowledge followeth not the Major Vote. A few Learned experienced men, may be wiser then a thousand times as many of the Vulgar. 2. And their Vertue will be defective as their Wisdom is. 3. And (though Power be more for execution then for proper Government, yet) it is known that ten strong men may beat twenty weak ones, and that an Army of 30000 doth often beat an Army of 40000.

3. Yea, Nature usually denyeth the Aptitude for Government to the Major Vote. For, 1. They are ordinarily most imprudent, wanting the natural and acquired parts that others have. 2. They are u­usally most vicious: The most are seldom the best, in the Best Countreys of the world. 3. They are commonly divided, and hardly kept in Unity among themselves; and therefore are unfit to be the Center of Unity to the rest.

6. If Nature place the Soveraignty in an aggregate body of the people, then either in a certain number, [Page 66] or an uncertain. Not on a Certain Number: for nature limiteth it not to such a number, nor doth any affirm it: Not to an uncertaine number, for then every member that is added to the Common-wealth may possibly alter the bent of the whole Soveraignty. E. G. If it be half Protestants, and half Papists, and one Papist be admitted into the company, he will give the Papists the Major Vote. And thus the e­nemies may at any time subvert them, and the society will wheel about like the Weather-cock, one party making Laws, and the next Repealing them, as each can get the Major Vote.

7. If Nature do make the people the real Ma­jesty, or give them any Governing power, then it is either because they are the wisest, the best, or the strongest: But it is by none of these: For, 1. It is proved, that ordinarily they are void of the two first and oft of the last. 2. If not, yet they are but an Aptitude, and not a Title. 3. Else if one Nation be wiser or better then the rest, all should be subject to them; or if an enemy stronger then we set foot­ing on our soil, they are naturally our Governors. And 4. Then there can be no Injustice, if strength or wit may carry it: for he that cheats or beats ano­ther that hath Right to all he hath, or if any man can prove too hard for the Prince, his strength would be his Title.

8. If Nature had given the chief Governing Power to the people, then God would not have gone contrary to this in the institution mentioned in his word: But he hath gone contrary to it, (as shall be shewn) therefore, &c.

9. Nor would the commonest Governments of [Page 67] [...]he Nations of the earth be contrary to it: for that which is of nature, is most common to naturall men. But no men that I hear of, are Governed by the people as set over them by meer nature: And few take them to have a naturall aptitude: and therefore most places have Monarchy or Aristo­cracy.

10. The Power of Governing a Common-wealth is not a natural thing, but a Right that must come by Commission from a Superior; therefore it is nor di­rectly conveyed by meer nature: therefore the mul­titude have it not by nature.

2. And if they have it not by nature, then either by some supervenient Accident, or by Contract: If by Accident, either by Propriety in Riches, or by acquired Prudence or by Conquest. But none of these ways can it belong to the Community, or Ma­jor Vote, as such.

For. 1. A few men many be richer then many, and have Dominion of more Lands and Cattle. 2. And this giveth no man Right to be the Governour of others.

2. Acquired Prudence is but an Aptitude, and not a Title; and yet it is such as the multitude are void of.

3. They cannot be said to be Conquerors of them­selves, or of the minor part.

3. Nothing therefore remaineth to be pleaded for the popular Soveraignty, but Contract, or Divine Institution. And if Contract do the deed, it is either a Contract about this very form and end in question, or about some other. 1. If about another, it cannot give them Power in this. [...] If a society [Page 68] Contract about Merchandize, Physick, Literature, or other subjects and ends, this makes them not a Common-wealth. 2. And if it be a Contract to this special End, then it is not by Nature, and then it belongs not to a Major Vote as such, but followeth the consent of various Republicks as each are consti­tuted by that consent.

4. And immediate Divine Institution cannot be pretended for it, as shall be shewn.

In all this dispute I mean by [Majestas realis] what the Politicians themselves profess to meane, whom I dispute against, which is not a meer splen­dor or honour, &c. but as they call it themselves, Realis Imperij Majestas, the chief radicall power of Government, by vertue of which they say, that [Ma­jestas personalis a reali Majestate judicari potest] and that [personalis Majestas a reali originem ducit] and that [Ubi contra leges fundamentales agit ideo an­nihilatur & exspirat, & realis vivificatur & in ean­dem armatur.] There is not the least degree of Go­verning Power in the people as such. This Do­ctrine hath been guilty of Rebellion and confusion in Church and State: it hath overthrown the very na­ture of Churches and Common-wealths; by turning the Governed into the Governours; and confounding the Rulers and the Subjects. It crosseth the Orders of Gods own Institution that require the Gover­nours to Rule well, and the Subjects to obey them in the Lord, and not to be the Rulers of their Ru­lers.

1. Authority is oft taken in other senses: especi­ally for the effective Interest that any man hath in the esteem of another, either for his Learning, Wis­dom, Goodness, and Fidelity, Riches or Strength. And so there is Authoritas Affirmantis, Docentis, [Page 70] Suadentis, Testantis, Minantis, Promittentis, &c. according to mens several Interests. And Power is oft taken for meere strength. But it is Civil Power or Authority that we are here to speak of, which is nothing else but [Jus Regendi] A Right to Govern with an obligation thereto: (except in God the Ab­solute Soveraign who can be obliged by none) As Government is an Honour and Dignity, and de­mandeth obedience from Inferiours, so it is [A Right:] But as it is an act of obedience it self to a Superiour Power that commandeth it as his work, so it is from an Obligation of that Superiour which is God.

2. If any of the aforesaid Power of Legislation and Judgement be reserved to the people, they have it not as people, but as participating in the Suprema­cie.

And if the King shall by Law or Custome have the sole Title or name of Soveraigne or Supream, and yet either Lords, or Senate, or people shall partici­pate in the said Legislation, or Highest Judgement, they so far participate in the Soveraignty. For it is not the Honorary names, but the thing that we en­quire after.

Yet quoad exercitium a Soveraigne may refuse to exercise his highest Judgement, and cause it con­stantly to be done by Judges, and the people may limit him therein. Legislation therefore is the chief­est work of Soveraignty; (of which more a­non.)

When a Soveraign giveth power to Corporations to make Laws they are but By-Laws, subordinate to the Laws of the Common-wealth, & are about particular [Page 71] matters, and therefore are not Common-wealth Laws, but Corporation-Laws: And yet they are Originally the Soveraignes Laws, in that the Pow­er came from him, though Proximately they are their Laws that made them. But if he should Depute ano­ther to the power of making Common-wealth-Laws, he should depute him to an act of Soveraign­ty.

Time here cannot alter the general Nature of the Power. It is really the Right of Chief or Soveraign Rule, if it be but for a year or day. As the Major or Bayliff of a Corporation is truly a Magistrate though but for a year, as well as those that have the place for life, so is a Soveraign. The Duration is not essential to the Power. As he is a King that may be cut off by Death the next week after he is Crowned, so is he that receiveth the Crown but for a limited time. If he take it for two hundred years, (which is above the usual life of man) if he should so long live, he is as truly King, as if no years were nam­ed. And if so, then no man can fix a term between two hundred years, and two hundred dayes, or two days, which must make our essential difference. And there­fore a Dictator is a temporary Monarch.

The reason of this, is evident from the nature of Soveraignty and of Laws. He that is highest hath no Higher to obey: Laws are but the significations of the Law-givers will, and therefore can go no further then his will. He commandeth others and not him­selfe. It is proper to a Subject to be obliged to o­bedience by a propet Law. And therefore if King, Lords, and Commons that had the Reall Soveraign­ty here among us, had broken a Law that threatneth death, they had not forfeited their lives by it: nor is there any Superiour to be their Legall Judge.

But for violating these, he hath none to judge him as Governour but God: if the people question him as violating the constitution, and destroying the Common-wealth, it must not be as Subjects, nor as his Soveraign: For Subjects as such, must obey, and [Page 73] not Rule: and Soveraignty they have none. But if they do it, it must be as Parties in the Contract, vin­dicating the violated Contracts upon natural self presuming grounds, as men kill their Enemies in Wars or Duells, for their own defence: which is not as Rulers of the Enemies where they kill. But whether this may be done, or in what cases, must be spoken of more distinctly by it selfe anon.

A Prince may by the Constitution be obliged to be responsible in his Courts of Justice, for Debts, or Wrongs, or Crimes and subjected to more or lesse penalties. But he is not thus obliged to duty, or suf­fering as soveraign, but as subject: and therefore it is supposed that he have not the total soveraignty; but in point of Judgment, so much of it be committed to the highest Judicature as shall put them in a capacity to judge him. And if the same person (natural) might not be subject that hath part in the Soveraignty, then in Aristocracies and Democracies, many would be from under Laws. But though this be possible, yet is it unusuall and dangerous to the Common-wealth, that any Judicature should have power to behead the [Page 74] Common-wealth: and that the Highest Judgement be in the hands of any that have not the Highest Le­gislative Power, and that to be exercised on the Le­gislators: and that a Subject (in all other respects) should have power to judge his Soveraign to death; To be responsible about matters of propriety is not so unfit. But that the Honour or Life of the Sove­raign (whether a single Monarch, or a Senate, or both in mixt Governments) should be in the power of inferiour Judges, is unmeet and unsafe to the Com­mon-wealth.

And therefore its said that Rex non moritur. For when the person is dead, (e. g. in an Elective Monarchy) the Species lives in the Constitution, and in the minds and wills of all the people, who there­fore will choose a successor.

The reason of the difference is sometimes from the difference of expressions of consent, but usually from personall differences of Aptitude and Capacity: some being children, Idiots, servants, poor, and so depending upon others, and unfit to have a hand in Government.

CHAP. VI. Of the several sorts of Common-wealths.

HAving spoken of the Universal Kingdom, and next in general of particular subordinate Com­mon-wealths, that God hath by institution made the parts of it; I must First speak of the CONSTITU­TION, and next of the ADMINISTRATION of these. And about the Constitution I shall first speak of the MODES (or SPECIES as common­ly called) and then of the Individuation.

There is a twofold diversity of Governments: One is in the Persons Ruling; Another is in the Matter of Government: whether the former do deserve the name of Specification or not, it hath by Custome ob­tained that name: And so Monarchy, Aristocracie, and Democracie are called the distinct Species of Go­vernments or Common-wealths. In the Matter of [Page 77] Government there is difference, in that some have greater power, and some have less: some Soveraigns are limited to certain things, and degrees of power; and some are unlimited: and some limited more, and some less. And one would think this difference were as great as the former.

I know some pretend to a Divine Institution for Monarchy, but they mean onely that it may from Scripture be proved to be best; but not that no other but it, is Lawfull. Thus Michael Hudson and others assert it to be Jure Divino: As for their pretences, that would make Democracie the onely Government that hath the stamp of God, I think them not worth the writing against.

Yet so do the new Popularists among us, calling Democracie only [a Common-wealth] which they should rather call [a Common-government] if it im­ply no contradiction. The Constituting Matter of every Common-wealth is the Pars Imperans, and Pars subdita: the Governours and Subjects: and the forme is their Mutual Relation as respecting the End: the neerest End is Order, and the next the peo­ples safety and welfare hereby maintained and pro­moted; together with the Honour of the Governor: the more principal End is our present pleasing of God and honouring him, and the ultimate end is our more perfect everlasting pleasing him in our fruition [Page 78] of him in glory. It is named Respublica a Common-weal, partly from the matter, because it is the publick Affaires that it is exercised about: and partly from the end, because it is the Common good that it is instituted for, and is to be intended. A Vicinity or Community, City or Society may be where there is no Common-wealth. Any Number of men in capacity are the remote subject of it. A City or Community drawn neerer by contract, are usually or oft the more neer subject of it. For usually some Contract disposeth them, and makes them a Com­munity, or City, before they become a Common-wealth, or so it may do at least. Though some call it not a City till it be headed with a Governour, and so it is a Common-wealth. Its not the Attaining but the Intention or Tendencie of the Government to the Common-good that is essential to a Common-wealth. An accidentally unhappy Common-wealth hath yet the forme, and must have the name.

Some places may have fewer persons fit, and some more: some places may lie under the advantages of one man, or of many, or of the multitude, so as that they cannot live prosperously without pleasing them, and so submitting to them. In some places the people [Page 79] are much addicted to One way, and in some to another: some Common-wealths do most intend Pre­servation, and other Increase of Riches, or of Possessions by enlargement of their Territories. And Custom may do much.

Nothing more sure or clear, then that the ultimate end doth most put the due estimate on all the means. If Government be no means to this end, it is not good, desirable, nor of God: for if it be not to and for God, it is not from him. There is nothing in all the world that can be the Object of a humane Act, but the ultimate end, and the meanes thereto. If Government be neither, we have nothing to do with it: But if it be one (as certainly it is) it cannot be the end, and therefore must be a means: and if so, that is the best means which most tendeth to the attainment of the end.

Object. But the Common corporal Prosperity is the near and proper end, and therefore that must estimate the meanes.

Answ. Even that nearer end is it self but a means to our ultimate end; nor to be any further valued or re­garded by a rational Creature, then it hath a tenden­cy thereto; and therefore that which hath no value it self, but what it hath as a means to the ultimate end, can convey no other to its subordinate means. [Page 80] Nothing more sure then that our ultimate end must turn the scales of our estimation of all means. A horse may be stronger then a man, and a dog sounder, and a Tree live longer here. The Turkish Dominion may have more riches, and Power, and larger Command then the English Common-wealth: But it is not therefore the happier: That which most advanceth the people to salvation, and keeps out sin, and keeps our holiness and pleaseth God, is the best Government. He that beleveth not this, is at the heart an Infidel. A prison with holiness and the favour of God, is better then all the Riches and Glory of the world without it: The comon cause of the Damnation of all that perish is the preferring of Riches, Honor, Pleasure, Liberty, and such fleshly accommodation before God and Glory. No men on earth therefore can more promote the Devils work, and the perdition of souls, then these that plead for corporall advantages in the framing of their Common-wealths against Gods interest, and the well-fare of mens souls! They too grosly play over again the game that the Devil playd with Christ that foiled him, Mat. 4. when he offered him all the Kingdoms and glory of the world, if he would wor­ship him. None but those that have forsaken God shall be so far forsaken by him as to follow these im­pious Principles. We will not contrive our own adversity, nor refuse Prosperity when God affordeth it: But we must estimate all with respect to our ul­timate end, and prefer the flames before a Crown when it is against this end.

The good of the world, and the whole body of Gods faithful Subjects is more to be lookt at, then the good of a particular Common-wealth. The same Principles that prove it sordid and impious to value our private personal prosperity before that of the Common-wealth, do prove it as bad to value the good of one Common-wealth before the Uni­versal Kingdom of God on earth. If a people could live most prosperously to themselves in the state of some petty Republicks and Free-Cities, but yet are thereby uncapable of doing much for the safe­ty or wel-fare of their brethren abroad, it is not the most desirable Government.

This also is plain, because the end still estimates the means. And as Millions are better then one and Gods interest more concerned in their wel-fare, so their wel-fare is more the end of the Common-wealth then his. The Prince in this respect is for [Page 82] the people, more then they for him.

Mr. M. Hudson maintaineth that this Honor of the Soveraign is the nobler end, and to be preferred before the peoples good. I think they are so ad­mirably linckt together, that we cannot fairly bring them into Competition or Dissention. Gods In­terest in other respects is most in the people: though it is only the Rulers that participate of his Govern­ing Power and Honor. Gods interest in the Magi­strates Honor, is better then the Peoples prosperity as theirs: And Gods Interest in the Peoples Wel-fare, and the Worship and Obedience that he hath from them, is better then the Magistrates Honor as his own: And the peoples Wel-fare as their own, is better then the Magistrates honor as his own: There remains there­fore no question to be decided, but this, Whether Gods Interest in the Rulers honor, or in the peoples Wel-fare, must be preferred.] Which needs no further decision, because they are never to be separated, but both to be still regarded. Honor is commanded us to our Superiors in the fifth Commandment, and if any sin of theirs do make them uncaple of their own part in the honor, still Gods part must be secured, that is, when they are bad Rulers they must have the Honor of Rulers, though not of good Rulers, and that re­sulteth unto God: and if they cease to be Rulers, [Page 83] Magistracy ceaseth not, and therefore it must still be honoured, and God in it.

Let Satans slaves think the Highest are the Happiest, who are animated with Pride, and take the admiration, applause and submission of men to be their felicity: but none will think so that are not blinded with ambition: The befooled Admirers of the glittering vain Glory, and pomp of worldly dig­nity and greatnesse, do think a trouble and grievous burden a desirable thing, and part of their felicity. And therefore as every wicked, proud and sensual man would fain be highest, and the Ruler of all, so when such proud and wicked men write Politicks, no wonder if they animate their Writings from their own spirits and principles, and make that the happi­est state to the people in which they may have most of Governing Dignity and Power which is far from Truth.

Most men believe not this, though it be most evi­dent, because Ambition and carnal Admiration of secular pomp doth bind their minds. But consider, 1. It is but one man, or a few that are the Receivers from the people, and it is the whole Community that receiveth from the Prince. 2. His cares and labors are far greater for them, then theirs for him or for the most part for themselves. He that never, was at Court, may easily know, what a miserable life it is (as to private pleasure) to have the care of a Common-wealth, and to have so many Expectants and Petitioners to satisfie, and of so contrary disposi­tions, interests & expectations, where it is impossible for the wisest or richest Prince to satisfie or gratifie all, and unavoidably necessary to displease many, & then to incur the passionate censures of those that are displeased: To have scarce time through multi­tude of businesse to look to the health of their own bodies; nor do so much for their souls as they that are out of the crowd, and have opportunity of Re­tirements. 3. And their lives are more in danger by the Plots and Passions of enemies and discontented men, then the Subjects are. 4. And worst of all, they stand in the most incommodious, dangerous station as to their own salvation: The Pomp of the world is potent to deceive, and the gteatness and multitude of Business to divert; and the words of flatterers to pervert, and their applause to puffe up; and carnal Interest to engage them against the mortifying Do­ctrine and flesh displeasing ways of Christ: so that few great, noble and mighty are saved, and its won­drous heard for the rich and great to enter into hea­ven. So that I conclude, that for wicked men that [Page 85] believe not a life to come, and intend not the com­mon good, but their own advancement, to scramble for a Crown, and clamber into honor, is no wonder, and accordingly they are like to use it. But if any good man, that knoweth what he doth, do accept of a station of so great work, and suffering, and danger, the people are more beholden to him, then he to them. Wise men know the weights of Crowns.

Let us first know what the sorts are that we speak of, and then prove the Assertion. And first I will not meddle with Domination, which looketh princi­pally to the Princes ends, & but consequently at the common good, but only at the Monarchy thats cal­led] A Kingdom.]

The very Title of Rex, a King, is the most modest and convenient that a Soveraign can have: for it signifieth but one that ruleth, directeth or guideth, whereas Imperator, an Emperour, signifying a Com­mander, is fitted to the General of an Army, and of too high importance for him that Ruleth by Laws. And Dominus a Lord, in its proper signification, is, higher then that, and signifieth one that hath a Pro­priety [Page 86] and Power of Disposing of, as well as Rulling the persons and things that are under his Govern­ment, and ordereth them for himself as his own. A Protector is a name that I may not now descant on; but I may boldly say, that a King, and a Prince, Rex, & Princeps are lower as to pretension, and have in them the least appearance of Arrogancy, or sound of Arbi­trary Power, and are most suited to a moderate Go­vernment.

Some call him also a Tyrant that wants a just Ti­tle; and so distinguish the Tyrant that wanteth Title from him that abuseth it. But, 1. No man hath a Right to proper Tyranny, or to destroy the common good. 2. The other is more usually and fitly called an Invader, Intruder, or Usurper; and so let him keep his name.

The Corruption of it is called Oligarchie, which is the confusion of the Community, when some of the strongest or richest, but not the best to get posses­sion of the supream Government, and manage it for their private Interests, and not for the common good. If they be chosen by full Suffrage, yet it may [Page 87] be an Oligarchie, as well as by Invasion: the per­sons and abuse may corrupt the form.

Some popular forms admit all the multitude to vote in Government without distinction: Most are wiser, and admit only persons thus and thus qualified, that have such Estates, or of such Ranks and Orders: some give equal power to all that have Votes: some limit the inferior sort, and give more power to those of greater riches, The Corruption of this is called Ochlocratie, which is the confusion of the Commu­nity, when the Rabble rout or multitude have the Rule, which they exercise to satisfie their giddy hu­mors, or some private Interest against the Common-well-fare: Scarce any Democracy escapes this.

It hath been a Controversie, to which of these forms our English Common-wealth was, and is to be reckoned: the uncertainty of this was one cause of our Wars: Many thought it was a pure Kingdom or Monarchy, where the whole Soveraignty is in the King. The Parliaments have affirmed it to be a mixt Common-wealth, yet denominated a Monar­chy or Kingdom from some eminent Prerogatives of [Page 88] the King: The Reasons given by them I shall not stand on, save only this One. The Legislative Power is a part, if not the highest part of the Soveraignty; but much of the Legislative Power is, and hath been in the Parliaments hands: therefore much of the So­veraignty is in their hands.

But to put all out of Controversie, the King him­self in his Answer to the Nineteen Propositions of the Parliament, averres the same himself. As to them that argue from the Oath of Supremacy, and the Title given to the King, I refer them to Mr. Lawsons Answer to Hobbs Politicks, where he shews that the Title is oft given to the single person for the honour of the Common-wealth and his encou­ragement, because he hath an eminent interest, but will not prove the whole Soveraignty to be in him: and the Oath excludeth all others from without, and not them whose interest is implyed as conjunct with his. The Laws and Customs of the Nation must ex­pound such Names. The eminent Dignity and In­terest of the King above others, allowed the name of a Monarchy or Kingdom to the Common-wealth though indeed the Soveraignty was mixt in the hands of Lords and Commons. If in the mixture the interest of the Prince had been least considerable, it should not have been called a Mo­narchie or Kingdom, but an Aristocracy or Demo­cracy from the Party that had the most eminent in­interest.

The Majestas is in one Civil person called the Head of the Common-wealth: and the Common-wealth is individuated by the Head or Soveraign: and therefore if there were more Soveraigns or Heads then one, there would be more Common-wealths.

It is certain that God himself hath appointed that some be Rulers, and some be Subjects: Now to make the Rulers and the Subjects the same, and so to make the people rule themselves, is next to the utter con­founding of the common-wealth, and nullifying Government. And therefore it is said four times over in the Judges. 17. 18, 19, and 21. That [In those days their was no King in Israel:] and twice its added; [But every man did that which was right in his own eyes,] as if there had been no Go­vernment at all. And all because the temporary Monarch was interrupted, and the Aristocracy which continued began to grow weak, and savour too much of Democracy by the usurpation or tumults of the people

Why else is every man excepted against, accord­ing to all Laws of God and Man, from being a wit­ness or Judge in his own cause? And shall we have the greater part of the people be the highest Judges in their own cause?

Multitudes in England, and more in Wales, Corn­wall, Ireland, the High-lands, are scarce able to talk reason about common things! And are these fit to have the Soveraign Power to Rule the Com­mon-wealth? I have been very sensible of this at an Assize, when I have heard the Judge and Coun­sellers industriously opening the case to the Jury, who stood by them as innocently as if they had heard nothing but Hebrew or Arabick all the while, and go their way, and bring in their Verdict, either as some one cunninger then the rest, perswades them, or else [Page 91] at random or hap hazzard, speaking that which was next the tongues end, so that I thought it much at one, as to throw the dice upon it, who should have the day. But O! if our people came to the work of Law-making, and our Senate must Rogare & Abrogare, & obrogare & subrogare, and the people resolve all as having the highest Power, what work should we have? and what a Herd would Govern us.

If we could possess them with the Holy Ghost, as Christ did his Apostles, we would call them from their fishing and tent-making to be Preachers or Ru­lers, and from their Plows, and Carts, and Dung­hills to make Laws: But till then, let us have the common Reason to conceive, that as a man that hath studied Physick, Divinity, or any Art, or Science, or Doctrine, is liker to be skilled in it, then he that was never bred up to it: so is it about the Government of Common-wealths also.

If any say that their bare Election of Governors [Page 92] may serve turn, I shall shew you anon that that is not Governing, nor any part of it. The wisest men on earth will find that the Government of a com­mon-wealth will take up the whole man, and that they need no other Trade besides. We find in the Ministry how intolerable another Calling is; and why not here also?

It is the badness of men that causeth the cor­ruption of all the forms of Government before men­tioned, and subjecteth the publick good to private; and certainly (however some dream that their Laws and Engines can hamper any men) the Devil would never Govern well by any Laws. And Scripture and all experience tells us that the most are selfish, sensu­al, Worldlings haters of Godlinesse: An enmity be­ing put from the beginning between the seed of the woman and of the Serpent, all this stir of the Re­publicans is but to make the seed of the Serpent to be the Soveraign Rulers of the earth: when God hath promised that the Kingdoms of the world shall become Christs Kingdoms, these men would have them the Babels of Satan, the seat of confusion, and the enemies of Christ to raign through the earth. When Christ told his Apostles that he sent out them as [Page 93] Lambs among Wolves, these men would have these Wolves to be the Governors of the world: even those that Christ threatneth to slay: because they would not have him to raign over them, must be the men that must every where raign themselves, even those that he threatneth to bruise for their Rebellion with Rod of Iron, and dash them in pieces as a Potters vessell, Psalm. 2. Luke 19. 27. Were not this multitude restrained, they would presently have the blood of the godly. Late experience hath told us somewhat. Their hatred to piety is so wonder­full and unreasonable, that I confess it confirms me in my belief of that Word of God, that doth affirm it of them. And if these men had once the Soveraign­ty, what a case were the World in.

But Infidels that take evil for good, may flatter these persons, and make them believe that I unjustly reproach them, and may tell them, that they are all honest men, and it is but some self-conceited persons that censure them: But this will not cure their sin, nor prevent their misery, nor make them fit to govern us: Nor can they make us believe that Wolves are sheep in the open day light.

Nor can they pretend that their Laws shall keep them from doing harm. For, 1 The Soveraign Power is the Law-giver, and therefore can change them at his pleasure: Our brutish impious rout may at any time make Laws for the banishing of piety and Christanity: and for the worshipping of Bac­chus; and if they but hoot, that [Great is Diana,] it is a Law. They have not the Soveraignty, if they cannot make and abrogate Laws. 2. And were they only inferior Governors, he is a fungus, and not a [Page 94] man that knoweth not by experience how easily bad men can make good Laws to be a nose of wax, and knock down their Adversaries with the very Manicles that we put upon their hands. It was a Proverb at Rome, that Vices had nailed the Laws to the Walls. Living Officers can easily a buse dead Laws. But of this more anon.

We have some Hopes of just and honest Gover­nors if we have Monarchy or Aristocracy: but we have so little hopes, as is next to none, if the Popular Vote must have the Soveraignty. For it is the whole humane nature that is corrupted, and is fallen into Rebellion against God the absolute Soveraign; every man is by nature a Rebel against Heaven, and at en­mity with God, and the matters of his own and others happiness, which the true common good con­sisteth in. And Scripture and experience assures us that it is in almost all places, the smalle [...] number that are converted to Loyalty and subjection to God, and by sanctification reconciled to him, and laid down their enmity: so that ordinarily to plead for a De­mocracy, is to plead that the Soveraignty may be put into the hands of Rebels, and our welfare may [Page 95] be desperate, and the common good may be in the hands of the enemies of it, and that by a certain succession.

That Unity is the companion of perfection, and Division departeth from it as it doth from Vnity, is commonly acknowledged: which caused the Py­thagorans to Curse the number of [Two,] be­cause it was the first that presumed to depart from Unity.

The Universal Kingdom hath one King: The Go­vernment of the world is Monarchial. I know that man is uncapable of a full imitation of God: And to pretend to imitate him Politically where his naturall incapacity prohibits, it is foolish Arrogancy. But yet we must not willfully depart from him beyond necessity: The similitude of God that man was made in, is judged to consist partly in this Dominion over other Creatures. Surely the further from God, and the more unlike him we are, the more imperfect.

By the mention that we find of Princes among the Devils, and of Angels that were princes of the King­doms of the earth [Dan. 10. 13, 20, 21. &c.] we may conclude that their order is Monarchical or at least not this Major Vote: therefore &c.

Art must imitate Nature. Man hath not many In­tellects, nor many wills to guide and Command with­in him, but One onely. Nor doth the Intellect sub­mit to the five senses because they are the Major Vote. Nor doth the will referre the management of our actions to the consultation or Command of all the inferiour faculties, Nor doth the eye or eare for­sake its office and resigne it to the Major Vote of the members.

It would make mad worke in a ship, if the Pilots or Captains power were committed to the Major Vote. And as mad worke would it make in an Army, if the souldiers by Vote should have the cheif Command and mannage all the designes of the Army, and rule their Commanders: And if Schollars rule their Ma­sters [Page 97] and themselves by Vote, it would not do well: And too many of our Country consist of Children in State affaires. And if a family be ruled by the Vote of the servants and Children it will not do wel; How then should this do well in the Common-wealth.

I know this age hath produced (even good men) pretenders to a Popular Church forme as of Divine Institution; running point blank against the Scrip­tures. As Christ himself is the Monarch of King of his Church, and the One Head of his Body, so did he settle in every particular Church those Bishops, Pres­biters, or Pastors whom he hath commanded the people to obey as their Rulers, [Heb. 13. 7, 17, 24. Act. 20. 28. 1 Tim. 5. 17. 1. Thes. 5. 12, &c.] And its strange if he should set Rulers over the peo­ple and Command them to obey them, and at the same time make the people Rulers, and Consequent­ly Command the Pastors to obey the Major Vote. Let them think on't againe that owne such absurdi­ties.

What great advantage the Enemy hath by knowing the secrets of a state before hand both in the times of Peace and Warre; and also that Popular Govern­ment is least able to keep their Counsels secret, are both things so evident as need no more words.

Its a most easie matter for masked Enemies to be members of a Democratical Body, and there in every case to make a party and trouble all things, and at least hinder others and tye their hands, we have no Popular Government in England, and yet it is so ea­ [...]ie for masked Papists, and Infidels, &c. to get in­to our Parliaments and there make disturbance that we feel the evill of it, but feare much more, if not prevented.

Armies know, and wise Governours know the dif­ference between expedition and delays: while we de­lay, our Counsels are opened: the enemy hath time to prepare & prevent us. And among a Crowd where [Page 99] multitudes have to doe, and that perhaps by long winded speeches; no wonder if Church and State be lost while we are consulting, and if Reformati­ons be yet in the birth that many years ago were rea­dy to be brought forth. There is scarce any such societies but have secret enemies among them that at least can finde them bones to picke on, and inge­niously divert them and frustrate their Consultations. If Rom [...] could say that [Unus homo nobis cunctando re­stituit rem;] yet one Swallow makes no summer, and extraordinary accidents are not the Rule of or­dinary Government, The [...]e are times to delay: But there are also times for haste.

Any man may know that thousands are hardlyer a­greed, then a few or one. And long experience hath told the world that the Ocean is not more lya­ble to tempests, and waves, then the people to tu­mults, factions, and seditions. The reading of those Romane histories, that draw some into love with popular Government, doth make my stomack rise against it.

O what a mad and raging beast is this that some would commit the Soveraignty to. It Judgeth much by opinion, but little by truth, saith Cicero pro Roscio. [Nullum fretum; nullus Euripus tot motus [Page 100] tantas ac tam varias habet agitationes fluctuum, quan­tas perturbationes & quantos aestus habet ratio commi­tiorum,] saith he Pro Murae. Non Commitiis judicat semper populus, sed movetur plerun{que} gratia, cedit pre­cibus, facit eos a quibus est maxime ambitus: deni{que} si judicat, non delectu aliquo, aut sapientia ducitur ad ju­dicandum; sed impetu nonnunquam, & quadam etiam temeritate: Non est enim consilium in Vulgo, non ratio, non discrimen, non diligentia: semper{que} sapientes ea quae populus fecisser, ferenda, non semper laudanda duxerunt: Cicero pro Plauco. Shall we not believe the wisest man that had the experience of the most glorious, li­mited, regulated Democracy?

Is Seneca more to be believed? Hear his Judge­ment of the people. Epist. 39. [Nunquam volui populo placere. Nam quae ego scio, non probat populus: quae probat populus, ego nescio. Quis placere po­test populo cui placet virtus? (N. B. This is not only the Puritans Censure, nor only the Christians.) Malis artibus popularis favor quaeritur: similem te illis facias oportet: Non probabunt nisi ag noverint;—Conciliari nisi ratione, amor turpium non potest: Quid ergo illa laudata & amnibus praeferenda actibus rebus{que} Philosophia praestabit? scilicet, ut malis tibi placere quam populo: ut aestimes judicia, non numeres: ut sine metu Deorum, hominum{que} vivas: ut aut vineas mala, aut finias. Caeterum si te videro celebrem secun­dis vocibus vulgi: si intrante te clamor, plausus & platonimica Ornamenta obstrepuerint si tota civitate te faeminae pueri{que} laudaverint, quidni ego tui miserear cum sciam quae via ad istum favorem ferat.]

Populus saepe magis voluntatem quam rationem du­eem sequitur,] saith Guicciard. li. 9.

Populus rerum graviorum plane rudis & imperitus, at{que} ubi minus est opus saepenumero profusus; ubi autem res ipsa largitatem poscit, ut{que} adeo tenax ut dum mi­nimis parcere vult, in maximos sumptus gravissima{que} pericula incurrat.] Idem li. 2.

Qui multitudini placeat, is sapientibus displiceat necesse est; inquit Plutar. de Educ. lib.

Talis est quaelibet plebs & turba, ut facile fallatur, & ad quodvis adducater: unde illa frequenter idem quod mari accidit: Quemmadmodum enim mare na­tura sua innoxium est recte utentibus, & tutum, si ve­ro violenti flatus in illud irruerint, tale redditur utenti­bus, quales sunt venti a quibus circumqua{que} impellitur: ita vulgus, &c. Polyb. lib. 11.

A Hundred such Descriptions of the people are given us by such Writers. Go but to the Election of Knights for a shire, or any such Concourse, and compare it with a Governed Army, and see the difference, and the worth of a Government over the multitude.

The Instability and Mutability of the people is known to the world: It hath been their Epithet in all ages, to be mutable and unstable. They may be in a good mood this year, and make good Laws, and destroy all the next; saith Cicero, pro do­mo sua, [In imperita multitudine est varietas [Page 102] & inconstantia, & crebra tanquam tempestatum, sio sententiarum commutatio.]

Dies intermissus unus, aut nox interposita saepe per­turbat omnia, & t [...]tam opinionem parva nonnunquam commutat aura rumoris: saepe etiam sine ulla aperta causa fit aliud, at{que} existimamus; ut nonnunquam ita factum esse etiam populus admiretur, quasi vero non ipse fecerit;] Idem pro Muraena.

Nihil est sacilius quam in quem libet affectum mo­vere populum, inquit Quintil. De. 11.

Snapte naturaest ingratus rerum{que} novarum cupidus populus, inquit Guicciard. Et in populi auxilio in re­bus inopinatis ac periculosis ob multitudinis naturam firmum fundamentum jaci non potest. Idem lib. 15. This is the Vote of the Learned world concerning the world or multitude. And he never tryed them that knoweth it not by experience: how they will wheel about like the weather-Cock with the change of wind.

I know Monarchy or Aristocracy, makes not bad men good, (of themselves) and therefore among them have been Cruelties: but nothing so many as have been exercised by the multitude when they do rise up, no cruelty seems too great to them in their tumults; When the Roman soul­diery [Page 103] did but know their strength, how few of their Emperours died in their beds: what abundance, both Heathen and Christian have been murdered by them? Populari multitudine nihil est insipienti­us ne{que} insolentius. Ita{que} eos qui Tyranni insolent­am fugiunt, in plebis effrenae insolentiam incidere; nequ aquam tolerandum est. Nam Tyrannus si quid facit intelligens facit, at plebi nulla inest intelli­gentia: Unde enim ei intelligentia adsit, qui nec edoctus est, nec novit honestum quicquam, ne in sua quidem familia, & qui ad res agendas sin consilio praeceps ruit torrenti similis,] inquit Herodotus, lib. 3. And Pausanias applauds one speech that said, [Hominem nimis Reipublicae administrationi deditum, & populari aura fidentem, haud nunquam feliciter diem extremum claudere.]

If God and our Governors did not bridle them the sober godly people in England would soone taste of the Cruelty of the vulgar, before they come to the Supremacy.

If one man turn Tyrant, or a few be corrupt, they are easilyer restrained then the heady multi­tude. For if the greater part or main body of [Page 104] the people do miscarry, there is none but God that is ordinarily able to correct them, or save the Com­mon-wealth from their rage: for the strength is theirs. A horse may be mastered by a man, but not by mee [...] strength: Let him know his strength, and its hard to rule him: Nothing so unfit for Go­verning, as that which hath most strength with the smallest wisdom and vertue. The Block was not so bad a King to the frogs as the Storck. A few may fear the strength of the multitude, and be more wary in their Government, because of a possibili­ty of suffering: but the multitude are out of dan­ger of any, but God and their own folly; and therefore when they know their impunity, they will fear none, but be the more encouraged to in­justice and impiety.

I conclude therefore that this ignorant, impious, mutable cruel, violent rout, shall never have my consent for the Soveraignty. Plebi non judicium, non Veritas, saith Tacitus, lib. 1. Hist. Vulgus & est mutabile subitis, & tam pronum in Misere­cordiam quam immodicum saevitia fuerat. Idem. 16. [Multitudo ex incertissimo sumit animos, saith Livy De [...]ad 1. lib. 6. Defensores suos in praecipitem sem­per locum favore tollit; deinde in ipso discrimine periculi destituit. Idem 16. Haec natura multi­tudinis est, aut servit humiliter, aut superbe dominatur libertatem, quae media est, nec spernere modi­ce, nec habere sciunt: & non firme desunt irarum indulgentes ministri qui avidos atq intemperantes plebeiorum animos ad sanguinem & caedes irritent.] Liv. Dec. 3. lib. 4. Multitudo omnis, sic natura [Page 105] maris, per se immobilis. est, ut venti & aurae cient aut tranquilli aut procellosi.] Idem, Dec. 3. lib. 8. Nihil tam incertum, nil tam inestimabile est quam ani­mi multitudinis. Idem Dec. 4. lib. 1. Vulgus est ad de­teriora promptum. Tacit. Anal. lib. 15.

Christians and Heathens have thought thus of the vulgar. Polycarp being required to defend himself be­fore the people, refused, because [Principibus & Ma­gistratibus honos debetur, modo Deo non sit contrarius: populo autem furenti satisfacere nemo potest: Euseb. Hist. lib. 4. c. 15. Phocion feared not to tell the Athenians that he was the singularist that their Oracle told them of, [Mihi enim ea omnia displicent quae vulgus ait] And Demades told him, [Laniabit te plebs si paululum insanierit.] Plut. which made him ask, Quid? Num mali dixi imprudens? What hurt have I spoken? When he perceived all applauded his speech. And Var. Hist. lib. 4. tells us of a Piper that beat his boy for piping naught, because the people applauded him. But I have said enough in so plaine a case.

CHAP. VII. Of the Foundation efficient and con­veying causes of Power.

1. All Beings besides the first, must have a foun­tain and beginning: and therefore so must Power. But it can have no Beginning but from God; nor can any other be the fountain, or first cause, therefore it is from God. Man is not the first cause of his own being: therefore not of his Power.

2. Moreover we have no natural Power, called Strength, but from God; therefore we can have no Civil Power, called Authority, or Right of Gover­ning, but from God: Eor we can no more have one without him, then the other.

3. To ascribe Power to any other as the first efficient cause, then God, is to make more Gods then one; for that which hath a independent underived Power, and is the first cause, is God. And if this be ascribed to any creature, it is an Ido­latrous deifying of that Creature.

4. It belongeth to the absolute Lord and Sove­raign to be the fountain of all inferiour Power: But God is the absolute Universal Lord and So­veraign, therefore, &c,

[Page 122]5. The Holy Scripture seconds the Light and Law of nature in this and tells us, that [There is no Power but of God, the Powers that be, are ordained of God: whosoever therefore resisteth the Power, resisteth the Ordinance of God, Rom. 13. 1, 2. And verse 4. [He is the Minister of God to thee for good,—He is the Minister of God, a Revenger, to execute wrath upon him that doth evil.] It is Authority, that [...] which is Jus regendi, that the Apostle here speaketh of, and not meer strength.

It is therefore Treason against the God of hea­ven, for any man or Angel to pretend to a Power that is not derived from him, who is the Cause of Causes, and Original of Power.

In the fore-cited Text, the Roman Emperors (as its commonly judged by Commentators) are called [The Ministers of God.] All higher Powers are so called, I am sure▪ And he that is [...], and a [...]ointed to attend on this very work, is doubtless an Officer of God, and as such to be esteemed.

2. They that deny the prince to be Gods Of­ficer, rob him of that Beam of divine Excellency, which is the highest part of all his Dignity, from whence Princes have been called Metaphorically [Page 123] Gods. The least beam of Majesty derived from God, hath greater splendor then all the world as from it self is able to communicate. To make a Free-man a slave, is not so great an abatement, as to make a Prince that is an Officer of God, to be meerly a terrestrial Animal.

3. They that deny Princes to be Gods Officers, do tempt them to be Traitors, both in denying the derivation of their Power from their Soveraign, and in denying to use it to his service and honour. The end must be no higher then the beginning: If God be not the efficient, he need not be made the end of Magistrates Power: By which you may see, that there cannot be a more unreasonable, impious, and trai­terous Opinion divulged among the sons of men, then that Magistrates have not their Power from God, as his Officers: for it is to deny God to be God.

4. Moreover, if this Opinion were true, then peo­ple need not obey their Magistrates as Gods Officers, and so would abate the cheif part of their Reve­rence to them, and their Obedience would be but meerly humane, and not participatively divine.

5. And thence it would follow, that no punish­ment is due from God to the Disobeyers of Magi­strates: For if God appoint them not, he will not punish us for not obeying them: for his Sanction is affixed to his own Laws. But we are commanded to obey them, not onely for wrath, but for conscience sake, Rom. 13. 5, 6, 7.

We commonly place the fifth Commandment in the second Table: but some of the antient Doctors of the Church did place it in the first, as command­ing our Duty to Rulers, not as men, but as the Of­ficers of God: and so each Table had five Command­ments. Me thinks it is according to the infinite Wis­dom of God, placed so between both, as that it should be left dubious to us, which of them it belongs to, as participating of both in its nature. And some think, that part of it was written on the first Table of stone, and part on the second. But certainly Power is a Ray from God.

This is proved before. If all [...]e world agreed to [Page 125] depose their Rulers, or live without, it would not become lawful by the agreement, but an act of diso­bedience against God. This therefore is not left to mans decision, but they are prevented by Gods Law.

So that if all men should agree that Magistrates shall not respect the honor or pleasing of God, or the common good, it were but treachery and folly, and an agreement of no validity at all. The end being essentiall to the Relation here, it followeth, that whoever is a Magistrate, must use his power to these ends, though all men should gain say it.

All the Laws of men are in two respects different from these of God. First, Gods Laws are Universal for all the world; but mans are patticular, or limited for their several Common-wealths. As the Sove­raign Powers make Universal Laws for the Common-wealth, but may give a Corporation power to make by Laws for that Corporation about inferior things.

And secondly, Gods Laws are superior fixed Laws, above the highest Prince on earth, which bind them as Subjects to God, & they cannot dispense with; & therefore they are limited by them in their own Le­gislations and Jurisdiction, yea all that they do must subserve them, whereas Princes, or others that have Soveraign Power are above their own Laws as such. He that is bound by a Law, is so far subject: He that is a Subject, is a Subject to some Superior: Sove­raigns have no earthly Superiors; but they are as much subject to God as others. As no Justice of Peace hath any power against the Laws of the Com­mon-wealth, so neither have Kings against the Laws of God.

The King or State may give Power to a Corpo­ration to choose their Major or Bayliffe, but the Charter expresly or implicitely limiteth them what men to chuse. If they chuse a Drunkard or a Swear­er, it is not a Nullity, though a fault: but if they chose an open out-lawd Rebel, it is a Nullity: or if their Go­vernor after he is chosen, renounce the Soveraign Power, he nullifieth his own Authority. What are a [Page 127] Rulers necessary qualifications, I shall touch anon.

That which is done already by the great Law-giver of the world, cannot be left to the will of men, nor become their works: but its their work to obey the Lord.

Though Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy are commonly called the distinct species of Com­mon-wealths and Governments, yet it is indeed no more then to determine who shall be the persons Governing: The Election of individuals doth it as to the individual persons, and the constitution doth it simul & semel as to Successors, determining also of the number. So that the substance of the Office is all predetermined of by God in his own Laws; and this specificat [...] and choice of individuals do but de­termine of the persons. The Reason why God hath not himself in his standing Universal Laws determin­ed of either of these, is, because they were not capa­of [Page 128] such a dettermination: For the Individuals were not existent, when God made his Laws: the names of Caesar, Alexander, Alphonsus, &c. were not to be inserted into those Laws, they being unborn when the Law of nature was made, and are of short con­tinuance, and must presently resign their Crown to their Successors: & if all that ever should Govern in the world had been forenamed by God in his Laws, it would have brought as great inconveniences on the world, as if every man before hand should be told how long he shall live and whether he shall be rich or poor. God is not to be taught by man how to govern the world.

Government in the exercise hath somewhat essen­tial, or of absolute necessity, and somewhat that is but for the melius esse, and therefore Governing Power hath so too; and what the latter is must be known, by knowing what the former (the necessary exercise is) for the Power is for the use & exercise.

1. If the Being of the Common-wealth be not preserved, the Government it self will cease. 2. As it is essential to the Relation, that the Common-good be the end professedly intended by the Consti­tutors, and which the Administrators are obliged to intend, so in the exercise that it be actually sought in the degree here mentioned is necessary; For if the end be wholly overthrown, the means is no means, and the Relation ceaseth. They that are in a worse condition, or as bad as if they had no Government, indeed, have none: only here note, to avoid mistakes, 1. That this is spoken of the body of the people, and not of a few particular persons: for if unjustly they be so used as to be worse then without Government, yet that dissolveth not the Common-wealth. 2. That this is spoken of the stated case of a people, and not what case they may be in, in some sudden or short strait, which as Physick may tend to a state of health, 3. That therefore as the [...]onis publicum hath many degrees, it doth not dissolve the Government, if only such and such higher Degrees of the Common-good be crossed or overthrown; for no Prince is perfect, and therefore none can perfectly seek the Common-good, & while men have sin they will do some hurt, or neglect some good. But when they do more Hurt [Page 130] then good, they are no true means to the common good: And there is no such thing as Government of Gods allowance, which is not a means to the common good.

3. If Injustice be predominant in the stated ex­ercise of Government, it is but a Combination of Robbers or Deceivers: But if in the main course of Government justice be carried on, it is not Injustice to a few that will null the Government.

4. If the Vniversal Soveraign be denyed, or stated­ly opposed, the body dyeth as being cut off from the head, & the power ceaseth in man, because the con­veyance ceaseth from God. A Traitor that openly renounceth his Soveraign, doth thereby renounce his own Authority effectively. But because many objections lie against this last, I desire the Reader to suspend them, till I come anon to open it more fully.

As a man cannot be a Physitian that is unable wholly, or in the main for a Physitians work, nor a Lawyer that knoweth not the Law, nor a Preacher that cannot preach, nor a Pastor that cannot do the essential works of a Pastors office, nor a Pilot that cannot guide the ship, nor an Artificer that cannot (as to skill) do the works of his art at all: so he cannot be at that time a Ruler, that cannot do the essential parts of a Rulers work.

As Vnderstanding, Will, and executive Power are the grand Primalities, (as Campanella calls them) in nature, which are transcendently, eminently, necessarily, originally in God, and derivatively in the rational creature in his kind and measure; and as Wisdom and Goodness are the perfections of the Intellect and Will, and in God are the transcendent supereminent fountain of all the Wisdom and moral goodness in the Creatures; so are these three the Primalities of Government, and of necessity in the degree aforesaid to its be­ing in that subject. As it is no currant coin that is made of lead, though it have the Soveraigns Image, when he hath made the matter necessary as well as form; so here, Ex quovis ligno non fit Mercurius.

1. Without the foresaid degree of Reason and Wisdom, there is not materia disposita & capax, because the persons are uncapable of the worke, and so of the end, and so of the Power: And therefore Ideots, Fools and Infants cannot be the actual Soveraigns, that is, in statu & relatione, be the present Governors. Indeed they may have the name of Soveraignty, while others have the Ezercise and Power of that Exercise, and they may be in a distant capacity, or the way to a ca­pacity, and may have some foundations laid by the constitution, that the actual Government shall be by them, when they are actually capable: which some call a Jus ad rem, but is but an Hypothetical Right to a future actual Right: if they live to the use of Reason, and to be of capacity; they shall have actual Right to Govern: or if you will call [Page 132] the one [A right to govern when they are capable.] and the other, [A Right to present Government.] For the peace and safety of the Common-wealth, the constitution may determine, that all Govern­ment shall be exercised in the name of an Infant and Ideot Prince, and so they may, if they please, decree, that after the death of an elective King, till another be elected, the Admjnistration shall be in the name of him that's dead: But neither will make the name to be the Thing. We speak of the total Soveraignty. If in a mixt Common-wealth a Prince be an Infant, the Senate or who­ever hath the other part of the Soveraignty, may have the exercise of the whole during his Infancy: But if Senate, and all be Infants, they are no actual Governors: When a Counsell, or other Administrators appointed by the constitution, do exercise the whole Soveraign Power or part, they have Power so to exercise it: And if they have Power and Exercise. they are really pro tempore the Soveraign, though the right of present, nominal, and future real Soveraignty may be in an Infant Prince.

2. If the persons be wise, and yet not good so far as is necessary to the foresaid degree of the ends of Government, they are uncapable of the Form or Being: for he that is so wicked as to pro­fess or practise the common ruin, cannot be the common Father and Preserver: And he that hath not will or goodness enough to make him seek the common good in the main, cannot be in that office or power, which essentially is for the seeking of it. An open enemy of the people may be their Op­pressor, [Page 133] but not their Governour. He may be a Tyrant that ruleth for himself, but not a lawful Ruler, if he Rule not for them.

3. Another necessary Dispositio materiae is execu­tive Power, For he that hath not Power (by which I here mean that called [...], or natural strength) is not capable of Protecting the innocent, or the Common-wealth, or of executing Justice on Of­fenders, but his own Laws will be ridiculous Scar­crows, without Execution, and a company of thieves will combine, and forbid Judgement: yea, as long as there is in depraved nature a desire of Superiority and Ruling those that are stronger then he, will put him, and keep him out of pos­session, and rule themselves, and decide the Con­troversie: so that it is most evident, that he that is utterly impotent, is uncapable of Govern­ment. But then note, that though the Skill and Will must in a tolerable measure be in him­self, yet it is the people or his Armies that are his Executive Power: for these have the natu­ral strength, and are as the inferior faculties, that are to obey and execute the Commands of the Will; But as the natural Powers that obey the Will must be our own, that they may be un­der its Command, so there must be an Interest of the Soveraign in those others that are his strength, which may tie them to himself so far that the may subserve him. And thus it is evi­dent ex natura rei, that whosoever hath not (the foresaid measure of Wisdom, Goodness, (in himself) and Strength, or Executive Power, by his Interest in others) as is necessary to [Page 134] the ends of Government, is Materia indisposita & in capax formae, and therefore no Soveraign, (if statedly as aforesaid, and as we shall further open.)

Great Disputes there are, whether Dominium fundatur in Gratia, vel in providentia, or in what? Thin [...]s that are co-ordinate or subordinate, are faigned to be contraries, or inconsistent in casality or interest: and in that way ment may quarrel as long as they live about any thing, where they would have wise men see their weakness. As the earth and the Creatures in it are rescued by Christ from that higher mea­sure of curse then is executed, and our penalty abated, and we and the Creatures reprieved be the Interposition of the Mediator, so far Common Grace doth found the common dominion: And as the Providence that layeth the foundation or rather the occasion of Propriety, is an Act of Common mercy in God, so Grace (even such a Com­mon Grace) is the Cause or Occasion of Propriety, (For by Dominion I still mean Propriety) And as Speciall Grace bestoweth Propriety, (though in it self a common Mercy) with an intention [Page 135] to use it for some special good, so Propriety is caused or occasio [...]d by that Speciall Grace (I take Grace here actively, and not passive­ly, or for the Gratia operans, not the operata.) But the immediate proper Foundation of Pro­priety is the Law, or Gift of God, that gi­veth all the Creatures on such and such terms, directing men to the just meanes of acquiring and possessing: And the Causa sine qua non of Propriety is various: sometime Occupancy, and somtime Contract, or other just Alienation from others, and Conveyance unto us. Where no one hath a Right before the Occupant, the Generall Donation, by which God gives the earth to the sons of men, is enough to make it ours: and there the gift is the Fundamen­tum, and the Occupancy is the Copula, or Causa sine qua non, or appropriating meanes: But were another hath Right before us, there the Gift of God stil is the proper Fundamen­tum Juris: But another man quitting of his Right, or some just alienation is prerequisite, and then the meanes of conveying it rather to us then to another, is the Causa sine qua non of our Right; and in foro humano may be cal­led our Title or Fundamentum Juris it self; many have a Title, which is, 1. Good in foro humano. 2. And which in foro divino, will disable another from dispossessing them 3. And yet in foro divino will not warrant their own possession. 4. And some that are warranted as to the bare Possession, have yet no Right coram Deo to the benefits which the [Page 136] things possessed in the [...]selves have a ten­dency to: This is the true decision of the case, ubi fundatur Dominium? (which is di­rectly in Gods Gift, or Law, and occasionally in gracious Providence, common or speciall, and sometime in judicial Providence) and Whether wicked men have Propriety or are U­surpers (who have Right in foro humano, and if lawfully got, coram Deo, as to bare Possessi­on, but not as to the final good or benefit ac­cruing from the thing possessed) But all this is but briefly touched, because it is but on the by.

But I have mentioned the interest of Provi­dence in Dominion, because it tendeth to illu­strate the point of the interest of Providence in Authority, (or Right to Government) which is the case in hand. Many hot Disputes there have been, Whether Providence convey Right of Government or not: and some say, it doth, and some say, that it doth not; and some have the wit to distinguish, and shew how far it may conduce to it, and yet doth not effect it. I think not that wisdom▪ or necessity, or any thing else oblige me, to take all, or any of these men to task, and confute their Reasonings: it is more suitable to my ends to content my self with a naked delivery of what I take to be the truth, and a sufficient proof of it.

This is the first way by which Providence dis­possesseth. Nebuchadnezzar was thus dispos­sessed: but retaining his remote conditional Right was restored when his understanding was restored. But the Soveraign Power and Ex­ercise was the mean while in others. And thus Providence working upon nature can dethrone men.

As I before shewed that so much Moral and Civill Goodness is necessary to Govern­ment, so now I shew you, how men are dis­possest, and become uncapable. Though all vice or wickedness make not a Prince uncapable, yet to say that none doth, is to flatter them against God, and Reason, and the common Wel-fare of the world. He that turneth ene­my to the people, and seeks their ruine, is un­capable of Governing them. But the great cases I will reserve till I come to speak of Re­sistance.

For a Governor so impotent, is none. A Ca­pacity for the work and end is necessary in the person: and when that ceaseth, the Power Iceaseth. Not by such a Cessation alwayes as eaveth the people innocent; for its possible, and likely that the guilt is, or may be theirs, who have disabled their Ruler by deserting him: But, 1. If they do it sinfully, yet he is dissmissed and disobliged from the charge of Government. 2. And particular innocent Members are disobliged from being Governed by him, though through the sin of others. But it is not every actual temporary dispossession that disobligeth statedly, as I shall shew more anon.

For Bonum est ex Causis integris: There must be matter and form to constitute the Being: and after the matter is in it self ex­istent, there must be somewhat more to in­troduce the form (in most cases.) But the destruction of either of them destroyes the Be­ing. [Page 139] And therefore Death is the stroak of Providence, extinguishing with the life the Power of the Prince, and so is Infatuation habitual (with the exceptions abovesaid) and so is the Permission of the fore-mentioned Impiety, or Enmity, and Impotency of [...]he Prince. If a Prince be statedly made a Beg­gar, or forsaken, or ejected by a Conqueror, and so uncapable of Governing, if it be but pro tempore, the Subjects for that time (that have no oportunity to restore him) are dis­obliged from his actual Government (except such as can go with him) But if it be his fix­ed stated case the Subjects are statedly disob­liged: for he cannot be obeyed that governeth not.

And so as the Law describeth the Subject of Power, so Providence giveth the described quali­fications. So that by Law and Providence con­junct, God taketh down one, and setteth up another, Psalm 75. 7. And the Alteration pro­ceeds from Providence: the Law changeth not, but according to its first sense hath a vari­ous aspect upon various persons, places, times, as Providence doth diversifie them. And doubtless it is notably the works of Providence that are meant in those Scriptures which fore­tell [Page 140] of the Changes in Kingdoms and Powers, that God will make in the world. Dan 2. 44. The God of Heaven shall set up a Kingdom that shall never be destroyed.] And how if, not by Providence, (though here withall is in­tended the New Law) Dan 4. 17. [To the in­tent that the living may know that the most high ruleth in the Kingdom of men, and giveth it to whomsoever he will, and setteth up over it the bese [...]t of men,] And verse 25. [They shall drive thee from men, and thy dwelling shall be with the beasts, till thou know that the most High ruleth in the Kingdom of men: and giveth it to whomso­ever he will.] And how? but by disposing Providence? so again, Dan. 5. 20, 21. [But when his heart was lifted up, and his minde har­dened in pride, he was deposed from his Kingly Throne, and they tooke his Glory from him,—till he know that the most High [...]uled in the king­dom of men, and that he appointeth over it whom­soever he will. Dan. 2. 37. [Thou O King, art a King of Kings: for the God of Hea­ven gave thee a Kingdom, Power, Strength and Glory.] that is, by disposing Providence. verse 38. He hath given them into thy hand, and made th [...]e Ruler over them all.] Jer. 27. 5. [I have made the earth, the man and the beast,—and have given it unto whom it seemed meet unto me.] And how? but by over-ruling disposing Provi­dence. Dan. 5. 28. Thy Kingdom is divided, and given to the Medes and Persians.] which proveth not that they justly seized on it, nor that God gave it otherwise then by disposing [Page 141] Providence. Dan. 7. 6. [The beast had four heads, and Dominion was given to it.] Many such places shew that Providence giveth Kingdoms, and is the changing cause.

Where another hath Right already, it is not an higher degree of Aptitude that can warrant any to aspire to the Throne. If I know a man, that is fitter then my self for my Pastoral charge all things considered, it is my duty to resign it [...]o him, or procure his joynt power and assistance, [Page 142] (because the good of souls requireth it) But no man may upon the presumption of such a diffe­rence seek to dispossess me against my Will.

A man may have Possession of the seat and land, and not of the Government: for he Po­sesseth not that till he exercise it, and he can­not exercise it, but upon a consenting people. The people may choose to live in slavery, or be de­stroyed in a state of Hostility, if they please, rather then to submit to the Usurper. And in these cases it is meet that they should do so. The first is, if he would force them else to violate their Covenants to God or man, or to commit any sin against God: so that consenting to his Government must contain a consent to sin: The second is, if his Government will do more hurt then our refusing him or perishing would do, to that nation. Or thirdly, if consenting might be better to that Nation, yet if it be more injurious to the common good of the world, or the common Interest of God, then our dissent.

But I will say no more of this, because Mr. Edward Gee hath in two books said so much, whose Arguments against the meet Possessors claim are thus far good.

If the war was unjust, then the conquest is but the success of Robbery and murder, and therefore can give no Title. If the war were just against the Prince only, and not against the people, there is no appearance of a Title to Rule them from the suc­cess. If the war was just against Prince and people, yet as is said, they may in some cases choose to die, or be used as the Conqueror please, and continue their hostility with unconquered minds. And if so, till they yield to be his Subjects, he is not their So­veraign, though Conqueror.

This was the case of David and the people, when Absolon had got possession of the City, and his houses, and many of the people, it was the duty still of the people to restore him: For, 1. The Possession of Abs [...]lon was but of the Place, and a party, and so but [...] military state: David having an Army and a Party too, 2. David was the person to whom they were by Gods Election and their Covenants obliged: and therefore while there was hope, they were to prosecute it for his restitution. And if half prove false to him, it disobligeth not the rest.

This shall be anon more fully manifested when we speak of the Dissolution of Government.

I have before intimated by what wayes men be­come incapable: As by loss of Understanding, by becoming an Enemy to the common good, or to God, and by loss of Power for the ends of Govern­ment, which they are unable to restore him to. An Incapacity al [...] may be accidental, as if he cannot be restored but by the Arms of the enemies of God, or the Common-wealth, who will afterwards have the Power of disposing of him & the Government so that the Common-wealth hath no securety but the word of enemies: or if a faction of enemies within must needs be (or appar [...]ntly will be) the Masters of all when he is restored. He that is in­capable of promoting of the Common good, is un­capable of Governing, (which way ever it come to pass:) and he that is become uncapable of Govern­ing, ought not to be restored, unless we can restore his capacity.

The reason is, because it is essential to Government to be for the common good; and he is for the people finally, rather then they for him: And Government ceaseth to be just Government, when it ceaseth to be a means to its end: much more when it is destructive to it. The jus regendi is not like meer Dominion (I mean Propriety,) which is but a power or right to use and dispose of things as our own, and for our selves. But it is like the office of a Physitian, School-master, Pilot, &c. who are principally for the good of others, and but secondarily for their own reward and honour. And therefore no man on earth can pretend propriety in his Kingdom, or Government, against the common good, and ends of that Government. For that is to change the nature of the thing, and then plead an in­terest in it, as Government, when they have made it no (just) Government at all.

These five or six last propositions I have taken in on the by, but to prepare for those that follow, by remo­ving objections that stand in the way.

1. The right of persons is in subserviency to the Government it self and the ends of it: and therefore if any man will set the means against the end, or a cir­cumstance of humane determination against a Law of God, and say, Because we cannot have such a man, we will have none, but be ungoverned; this is to break an express commandment, and to cast off the order and ordinance of God, for a persons sake.

2. If people have no Government, vice will reign, and every mans estate and life will be at the mercy of his enemy, or him that hath a mind to it, and is the stronger: And therefore no people can long subsist without Government.

This is a truth known by the light of nature: no man that is assaulted by a robber, but would have his neighbour help him: And he that will pass by him, and not succour him if he can, doth not do a neigh­bours part: He that seeth his brother in need, danger, or distress, and shutteth up the bowels of his compas­sions from him, how dwelleth the Love of God in him? Duties of charity, especially to a Nation, are indispensable.

A people without a particular Soveraign, are still parts of Gods universal Kingdom, and from him they are to receive their officers, if he appoint them; for still they are under the obligation of his Laws. Though the peoples consent (explicite or implicite) be ne­cessary to the Soveraigns actual Government, and consequently to his right of governing them, by which he must himself be warranted and justified; yet are the people usually under a previous obligation from the Lord, whom they shall consent to, and whom not. And Conquest is the most usual means of the determination: not by giving Right to govern, but by making the Conquerour materiam dispositam, [Page 164] the only capable subject of that right, and object of the peoples choice. The same may be said of any other possession of such power as the Conquerour hath. Ordinarily did the Roman Emperours (formerly at Rome, and since at Constantinople) die or suffer de­position, by an Usurper; and yet the subjects obeyed the Usurper, and the Christian Bishops took it to be their duty so to do. If his Conquest or Occupation be sinful, yet if he thereby become the only capable person to Govern, the people are to consent (sup­posing no special impediment to forbid it.) If they be (though through anothers sin.) disobliged from their former Governour, (by his death, incapacity, &c.) they are bound by God to consent to such as are most capable.

Because being supposed uncapable of Governing them, their Government would be as hurtful as to be without a Government. And if Gods honour and soveraignty must be traiterously despised, and the common good destroyed, it is better that it be done without the peoples consent, then with it.

God being the chooser of his own Officers, and the universal King, who bindeth us to obey his choice, doth make known his will to man by signs: For we cannot immediately see his essence, and therefore not his will. All his Laws that oblige us, are but so many signs of his will: and he may choose his sign.

Here are several acts of Gods Law, and several acts of Providence, necessary in concurrence, to con­stitute a Soveraign. 1. There is presupposed the ge­neral Law, for Government and obedience, distribut­ing the subjects of Gods Kingdom, into particular subordinate Soveraigns, and their Subjects. 2. There is supposed Gods Laws, that cut them out their princi­pal work, and describe the substance of the office, and limit them. 3. The Law of God describeth the per­sons, in the points necessary to the Being, and the well being of their Government. 4. The same Law ob­ligeth the people to consent to such, (in case they are called to such a work, as choosing or consenting.) Thus far the Law goeth.

And then Providence, 1. Doth qualifie the per­son, [Page 166] 1. With tolerable wisdom. 2. And Goodness (so far as to be a capable Instrument for the Ends of Government.) 3. And with Power to defend the people and execute Laws. And many acts of Provi­dence may concur to this: especially it is by giving a man such Interest in the Affections of the stronger part, that by them he may be put into a capacity. 2. And when he is qualified, to bring him upon the stage to the peoples observation, that they may ob­serve his Qualifications, is an Act of Providence for the discovery of Gods Will; and so to bring the peo­ple under an Obligation to consent. 3. And when they are so obliged, the bringing of their hearts to consent and accept him, is another Act of Providence antecedent to his Possession, and ordinarily to such a Title as will justifie his Government.

So that the peoples Obligation is thus inferred and induced by God.

Whomsoever I thus and thus Qualifie, and declare to be the fittest person, you shall consent to.

But this man (or these men) I have so qualified and declared: therefore to them you shall consent.

The Major is in Gods Law (of Nature and Scri­pture, most express.) The Minor is the voice of Pro­vidence (taking the word for Actual disposal of Events) and both together infer the conclusion, and induce the Obligation, but with the difference follow­ing.

For Providence saith but [This is the qualified per­son] which words have not the nature of a Law, nor do themselves oblige; but of a Nomination: so that it is the universal Law that doth oblige, though not without the Nomination of Providence.

What a Lot may do, another Providence may do; but the lot may determine of the persons: therefore so may other Providence. God hath many wayes of signifying his mind to us, and nominating the persons, and hath not tyed himself to any one; nor must we limit him.

This is counted the freest Choyce, when people are not plainly pre-obliged: but indeed there is no more desirable freedom, but oft-times less, in this Case then the other. If God do for our good so plainly [Page 168] qualifie and declare our Governours as to leave it out of doubt to us, and so to pre-oblige us, it is a mercy, and not a depriving us of any desirable liberty: And if there be none of such Eminency, but that we are left to a choyce out of many equals, it doth but make us the more work.

Co [...]querours or men of strength may not obtrude themselves on a free people, how fit soever they are, but must leave them as free-men, to a free consent.

The first branch (which denyeth freedom of choice to some whole Nations) is all that is lyable to controversie, which yet is so plain, that it needs not many words.

1. Sometimes divers Nations may constitute One Common-wealth. And then there is as much reason why a whole Nation, as a mixed part, should be thought Capable of forfeiting their liberties.

2. Sometimes divers Nations may be under the same Princes Government. And then if he can for­feit his Crown as to them, by any Covenant-break­ing [Page 169] on his part, no doubt but part of them may for­feit their Liberty, by Treason and Covenant-break­ing on theirs, and he may Rule them by the power of his other Kingdoms; As the Romans did many of the Nations that they Conquered.

3. Sometime the Neighbourhood of unjust, im­placable enemies, is not to be tolerated, without the ruine of the Righteous Nations round about them, unless they be kept under by meer force; and so self-preservation may warrant it. Men that choose to live as enemies in war with us, must be used upon mi­litary terms. Till they shew themselves worthy of Trust, they are not to be used as free Subjects.

4. Sometimes men may forfeit their Liberties to God and men so notoriously, that the Law of Na­ture and Nations warranteth Neighbour Princes to subdue them, and govern them by force. As 1. In Case they should turn Atheists, and defie the univer­sal King, and seek to poyson the Neighbour Nations with this Treason against God. 2. In Case they live as Canibals, that eat mans flesh, and are as wild beasts, that hunt for men to devour them, whether it be their fellow-natives, or the Neighbour Nations. 3. In Case they professedly design the Conquest of all others about them, and will live upon no other terms in peace, but as Conquerers or Conquered. 4. Specially in Case they claim a right to the King­doms about them, and specially a Divine Right; that all Princes should obey them, and make it their unal­terable Religion, as the Pope doth. He that thus claims a Right to dispose of Crowns and Kingdoms, though but in ordine ad Spiritualia, proclaimeth war with all the World; and warranteth any Prince that [Page 170] is within his danger to make war against him.

5. The Law of Nature may bind a Christian Na­tion in Charity to Rule some Nations by force. If a poor barbarous Indian-Nation, like the Canibals, would not consent to hear the Gospel, or suffer Prea­chers to come among them, and speak to a minor part that would hear, I am sure it hath an apparent tendency to their salvation to master them, and force them to admit the Preachers, and to restrain them from murdering the Christians among them that had received the Gospel: And as long as we did them no hurt, but govern them, and did not deprive them of their Possessions, I know not what should ex­empt us from the Obligation to this as a work of Charity. Doubtless a meer Neighbour, by the Law of Charity, is bound to hold a mans hands that would kill himself, or pull him out of the water that would drown himself, and to quench his house though against his will, which he sets on fire, and to save his Children, or Neighbours persons or houses from his fury, in case of the like attempts: And why then a work of ten thousand times greater benefit, should not on the same grounds be done, I know not. If the Prince and major part of the people, in a neigh­bour petty Common-wealth would put to death the minor part, because they are Christians, and a Potent neighbour Prince were easily able to restrain them, I doubt not but he would be guilty of the murder and extirpation of Christianity, if he do not: And if he cannot continue their preservation, without a continued restraint, or subduing the malignant par­ty, the Laws of Neighbourhood, and Charity, and the Common good of mankind, and the Ends of the [Page 171] Universal Government require him to do it.

If any say that upon such pretences Atheists and Heathens that are the stronger part, may invade a weaker Christian State to force them to deny God, or Christ, or acknowledge Idols, &c. I answer, 1. Con­found not the Jus and the factum: the natural and the legal Power. They may do it de facto per potentiam Naturalem, which is nothing to the case, but they may not do so de jure per potentiam Legalem, because God hath given them no such Power.

Object. But you will give them occasion to pretend Authority; and if they are the stronger party, they will be the Judges. Answ. No duty can be done, from whence the wicked cannot fetch pretences for their sin. If a righteous Judge shall hang Murderers or Thieves, he is not therefore to be blamed, because an unrighteous Judge may take occasion by it to hang the innocent as guilty of their crimes. If our Ar­mies may destroy the plundering Enemies, and rescue the oppressed Countrey men, and the Enemies Ar­mies may thence fetch a pretence to destroy ours as guilty of that crime, though they be innocent, we must not therefore neglect the defence of the op­pressed. Malignant enemies will not be reduced to reason, if we should neglect our duty for it; but the wicked will do wickedly: some inconveniences will still attend the imperfections of humane Administra­tions. But the final Judgement will set all strait. Let us do our Duty, and stay till God do Justice up­on those that by Power are out of the reach of Justice, from the hand of man.

But that which nearlier concerneth us (and as near as any thing in our frame of Government) is the [Page 172] latter part of the Thesis; that all the people in the same Common-wealth should not have the freedom of choosing Governours, which I shall therefore more distinctly handle.

I grant that all these may be Subjects: and fur­ther then by course of Justice they are deprived of them, let them enjoy their Possessions as much as any other Subjects, allowing for the securing of them, the same Tributes and Taxes as all others. But it is a Burgeship, or freedom of Governing, or choosing any Governours, Parliament-men, Justices, &c. that we speak of.

Nature maketh Infants and Ideots uncapable: and women choose not members of Parliament.

Servants are commonly judged uncapable, and so are the poor: not only because they have not those faculties necessary to support the Government, but principally because necessity maketh them dependant upon others; and therefore it is supposed that they are not free in their Elections. How far the reason reacheth to Tenants, the Law-givers, though they are Land-Lords, seem not to be insensible, when all that have not Leases for life are excluded from the number of free-holders.

But that multitudes of wicked criminous persons, how rich soever, should much rather be excluded then honest beggars, and that this, this, this, is the great point that the welfare of most Common-wealths [Page 173] doth depend upon, I shall now make manifest.

Argum. 1. If many Vices make persons less fit to go­vern or choose Gnvernours, then poverty doth, conjoyned with honesty, then should such vicious persons, rather be excluded from both: But the Antecedent is most cer­tain: E [...]go.

Argum. 2. If men should lose their lives or estates by way of Punishment for some crime, then should they lose their liberty of Governing and choosing Governours by way of punishment for those or other crimes to which such punishment is proportionable (for there is a parity of Reason.) But the Antecedent is practically confest: Ergo, &c.

Argum. 3. If confessedly crimes should deprive men of a capacity to Govern, so also they must do of a capaci­ty of choosing Governours: (for there is a parity of Reason in ordinary cases, though not in all) But the Antecedent is granted by our Parliaments, who sentence some as disabled to be members any more: Ergo, &c.

Argum. 4. That course which equalleth the worst with the best in the Priviledges of freemen, is not just: But so doth the equal admitting the innocent and the cri­minous to govern and choose Governours: Ergo &c. Ver­tue is better then wealth, & Vice worse then Poverty.

Argum. 5. That course that tendeth to the dishonour of Princes, Parliaments, or other Magistrates under them that are Elective, is not to be maintained. But such is the liberty of the criminous to Elect them: For nothing more natural then for freemen to choose such as are agreeable to their wills and wayes: and if they be not free, they should not choose. It will therefore raise suspitions on our Parliaments and Magistrates, that they are friends at least to wicked men and [Page 174] wayes, when they are ordinarily and freely chosen by such men: especially if it be by their own Laws and desires, that such shall be the Choosers.

Argum. 6. Those that are known enemies to the com­mon good in the cheifest parts of it, are unmeet to Go­vern or choose Governours: (else give us up to our enemies, or to Satan:) But such are multitudes of ungodly vicious men. Ergo.

He that thinketh that wealth is the only common good, or a greater part of it then Vertue, Piety, and mens salvation; and that Rulers have nothing to do with the latter, but with mens Bodily prosperity on­ly, is fitter to be a member of a Herd then a Repub­like, and to be dimitted with Nebuchadnezzar into a company suitable to his judgement: yea and to be used as a Traytor of the highest and most odious strain, that destroyeth and brutifieth the very office of every Prince and Magistrate, and casteth them into the dirt.

And that ungodly vicious men are Enemies to the greatest part of the common good directly, and to the rest indirectly, is known to every wise and sober honest man. 1. They hate Godliness, which is the truest Honesty; and Holiness, without which none shall see God: and therefore if they can, will choose such as hate it. 2. They hate good Laws, which would encourage the Piety and Vertue which they hate, and punish the Vices which they love. 3. They hate Good Magistrates, and therefore are unlike, if they be free, to choose them. 4. And they are all men of Private spirits, and value their private Interests be­fore the Publike Good, and would sell the chief feli­city of the Common-wealth for a little money, if [Page 175] they can scape themselves. 5. They are ready to betray the Common-wealth to a forraign enemy, in meer malignity, to have their wills: As the Papists that joyned with Stanley in 88. and the Powder-plot­ters after, and so in many Countries else. Are the Irish fit to govern or choose Governours? If not, and if experience forceth us to exclude the man body of the Natives there, we have reason to exclude such here as forfeit their Liberties. We do them nei­ther wrong nor hurt, but preserve our selves from ruine, and them from greater guilt. To govern us, does them no good.

Arg. 7. Such as God commanded to be put to death, or cut off from the Common-wealth of Israel, should not be Governours or Choosers of such, in any Christian Common-wealth (supposing an equality in guilt.) But such are many vicious ungodly persons among us. There­fore—

I speak not of them that broke some ceremonial abrogated Law, further then the Reason of the Law remaining may direct us to judge of crimes among our selves. But I speak of such as for the like facts are now as culpable as they. And in general I may lay this ground, that the more abundant light of the Gospel, and the greater helps and grace, and the greater Ho­liness now required, do all shew that the same sins (caeteris paribus) are much more haynous now [...]hen they were then. But because the point is fundamen­tal, and all our peace lyeth much upon, I shall proceed to Instances.

Levit. 24. 11, 15, 16, 23. The son of an Israelitish woman and a man of Israel strove together in the camp: and the Israelitish womans Son Blasphemed the Name of the Lord and cursed—And the Lord spake unto Moses saying, Bring forth him that hath cursed without the camp, and let all that heard him lay their hands on his head, and let all the Congregation stone him. And thou shalt speak unto the Ch [...]ldren of Israel, saying; whoso­ever curseth his God, shall bear his sin: and he that Blasphemeth the Name of the Lord, he shall surely be put to death, and all the Congregation shall certainly stone him; as well the stranger, as he that is born in the Land, when he blasphemeth the Name of the Lord, shall be put to death.

Deut. 13. Wholly proves the point expresly.

So that Godliness it self in Profession was here ex­acted of all, by a solemn oath and covenant, between the Lord, the King and the people, as you may read at large. 2 Chron. 15. 11, 12. 13, 14, 15. Therefore those that will not seek the Lord, should not be free men in a Christian state: which Law must be execu­ted, before we shall be well.

In all these Collections I mention so great an in­equality of punishment, that no adversary can mo­destly quarrel with my cons [...]quence. Cu [...]ting off, and putting to death is another kind of punishment then depriving men of the liberty of governing or choosing Governours, which addeth to their case, and diminisheth not their wealth, but is a necessary means to the common peace and welfare. Those that Gods Law put to death, should be no Choosers of Maiors, Bayliffs, Parliament, &c. with u [...], especially when the sin is greater now. Those that would fetch the form of Government from the Israelites, above all men, can have no reason to contradict any of this.

I conclude therefore, that all that are fit to be sub­jects, are not fit to be Burgesses, and to govern or choose Governours, though they may keep their possessions, and be secured in them.

If Phocas e. g. kill his Soveraign, and become Em­perour, it followeth not that its a sin in all the people that afterward consent; nor in Gregory Mag. that speaketh so respectfully to him. A people that detest and are innocent of the Treason, perfidiousness, hy­pocrisie, &c. of an usurper, may after become obliged to obey him, and take him for the Governour whom the people of the Common-wealth are bound to obey.

If Posterity were not obliged by their Progenitors Acts, all Common-wealths would be short-lived. And frequent mutations would keep up continual distra­ctions and confusions. And though the Maxime of some is, that Parents can oblige their Posterity, when the Covenant is for their good only, and not to their loss and hurt; yet these considerations must be here admitted for the due application of it. 1. In a mutual Covenant or Contract, it is supposed that the wel­fare of both Parties is taken in. And as the people receive more from the Soveraign then he from them, and therefore are more beholden to him; so his Con­tract supposeth something on his own side to be thereby secured, as well as on theirs. 2. And it is not every tolerable incommodity that disobligeth Poste­rity from the Covenants of their Ancestors; but such as makes them worse then to be without the Go­vernour, and that over weigheth the Benefits that by his Government they receive. No wise man would be the Ruler of such a people that are able and willing to cast him off, whenever they conceive they incurr any incommodity by his Government.

Deny this, and you overthrow all humane con­verse. For if men may go from their Covenants on this pretence, then on many the like, and the pre­tence will be common. Man is a free Agent, and his Will cannot properly be compelled: If you threaten him with death, he may suffer it: It is supposed therefore that whatever he promiseth, he freely pro­miseth. We use to say, a man is forced, when fear moveth him to consent: But this is not a proper force: It taketh not away the Liberty of the Will. He that consenteth, doth it to avoid some greater evil, which he thinks would else have befaln him; and it is his own Good that moveth him to it; [He that sweareth to his own hurt, and changeth not] is the person that is accepted of God, Psalm. 15. 4. It every incommodity would warrant men to break Cove­nants, no man would trust each other, and Cove­nants would lose their force.

Object. But Divines determine it, that if a Thief compel me to conceal him, I am not therefore to conceal him; therefore they think a forced Oath bindeth not.

Answ. 1. They truly judge that if you promise a Thief to bring him so much money such a day, to save your life, you are bound to perform it. I add, un­less the case be such (which is possible) that to pub­lick use the money is of more worth then my life; and then as it was unlawful to promise, so is it to per­form: But what you may lawfully promise, you may [Page 182] and must perform. 2. If the concealing of the Thief will do more hurt to the Common wealth, and wrong to God, then the yeilding up of my life, I may not promise it: and if I promise it, I may not per­form it, because it is evil, and not in my power; But if it be otherwise, I may promise or perform it. So that it is not force that disobligeth a man from his Cove­nants.

Thus war useth to prepare for change of Govern­ments. And if all such contracts should be null, most Common-wealths on earth were null, and the sub­jects disobliged, and warranted to rebel.

For, 1. These are they that lay the foundation of Government, as is before more fully opened. 2. These are they that Princes are bound by, and none can change. 3. These are they that limit all the Laws of men, and nullifie such as contradict them. Properly therefore these are the true (if not only) Fundamen­tal laws of Common-wealths.

Proved. 1. All Laws properly so called, are the acts of such as have Governing power, obliging the sub­jects: But no such Acts do constitute a Common-wealth (besides Gods Laws:) therefore no Laws constitute a Common-wealth (but Gods Laws.)

The Major Proposition is past doubt. Lycurgus or any that are commonly called Legislators, may call their Models and Proposals by the name of Laws, be­fore they are enacted: But they are indeed no more so, then my words are Laws, till they shall become the acts of Authority. Those Models commonly have two parts; the first for constituting the Soveraignty; and the second fixing some immutable determinations for regulating his Government, which he may not change. But first, the constituting of the Soveraign is an act of Contract, and not of Law: And secondly so are the limitations of his Power and Rule, which are part of the Constitution, and the terms on which he doth receive it. It is no Law, till it become the Rulers act, as such.

The Minor is plain. For before the Soveraignty is constituted, there is no Soveraign: For what need we make that which is already made? And where there is no Soveraign, there is no Acts of Sove­raignty: that is, no Laws.

Argu. 2. Legislation is a proper part of Govern­ment: therefore it supposeth the Governour consti­tuted.

Note, 1. That we take Laws here in the strict and proper sense, as distinct from Covenants: For impro­perly, as a mans Covenants oblige himself, he may be said to impose a Law upon himself.

2. That we still here separate the Divine Govern­ment from mans. Gods Authority is before and without mans consent; and he maketh by his Laws subordinate Governours over men when he pleases, obliging them to consent beforehand, being himself the Universal Soveraign, neither by Law nor Con­tract. But it is only so much of the Constitution as is left to man, that I speak of.

If they that have the strength, do not resist and cast off their pretender, it is to be supposed to be because they do consent: For being not from disability to re­ject him, it is to be judged to be from unwillingness. And if there were some hazard of a battle in the way, yet they that consent to scape a danger, do yet consent: But it is not all silence and non-resistance that may be called [an implicit consent.] A non-resistance forced by a Colonie or forreign Power, is no signification of consent. A non-resistance forced by Mercenary Natives that are souldiers, is no significa­tion of consent. A non-resistance forced by Servants or others that are not Burgesses or Cives in the Com­mon-wealth, is no signification of consent. A non-resistance forced by a Kindred or Faction, inconsider­able comparatively for interest or number, but that's [Page 185] strong by an accidental advantage, is no signification of consent. But yet it is not the consent of the whole people that is necessary; nor alwaies of a major part: Common wealths are not alwaies to follow a Major Popular Vote. Otherwise in most cases there would be much uncertainty, which way the Major Vote inclineth. And when most are worst, and of the weaker sort, the wiser and the better will think there is no Law that subjecteth them to a Vote that's car­ried by an inconsiderable part. If a people were with­out a Prince, and a Major Vote choose a person to­lerable, but yet so weak and bad as might much haz­zard the Common-wealth; and the wiser, stronger, but Minor part, do choose a wiser, better man, there appeareth no reason why the choice of the first only should be valid. (We are speaking all this while of the Constitution of a Common-wealth, where the way of Election is not yet Constituted by Agreement.) 1. The smaller number are oft of greater Interest and Possession. An hundred Lords may have more to save or lose then a thousand Peasants. 2. Nature, saith the Philosopher, made the wise to Govern the unwise; that is, They are most apt: But the smaller number are oft the wiser. 3. And the smaller num­ber is oft the better, and true to the common good. 4. And also they are oft the stronger. Ten thousand prudent valiant men, especially that are animated by the greatest interest, are usually too hard for twenty thousand silly Peasants. And I see no Reason but the Part that is both Wisest, Best, and Strongest, should be accounted the People of that Nation. Nature va­lueth not parts by bulk or number, but by Worth and Use: One Heart, one Stomake, one Liver, is [Page 186] more to be regarded then ten toes or fingers.

Object. But who shall be Judge which part is Best if once you forsake a Major Vote, when every part think themselves the best?

Answ. The Question is either of the Jus or Fa­ctum: Who Ought to Judge, or who will Judge? In a company that hath no Legal Judge, the Wisest, though the Weakest, ought to Judge: For Natural Aptitude is there instead of Office, and the ignorant are obliged by God to regard his gifts in others, and to hearken to the Wise: And if the people refuse, that proveth not that they justly do refuse. But the strongest usually will Judge, though the wisest should Judge; and therefore Voting oft determineth it, because the most are supposed to be strongest, and to have most wit and Interest among them. But when it is not so, (as oft it is not) the Reason of the Voting Prevalency ceaseth (except in such cases where it is meerly for Unity and Concord) and no such stress is laid upon the Vote, but that the wise for Peace may safely yield to the unwise. When the Best by Prudence and ad­vantage have the greatest strength, and by Valour over-top a greater number of the bad and foolish, I know not why they should give up their welfare to their Elections. In a Ship full of Mariners and Pas­sengers that have lost their Pilot and Commanders, the valiant and skilful will be loth to commit their lives to the major vote of ignorant and cowardly men, that would deliver the Vessel to the enemy, or the Rocks, or Sands.

If in such a case (when there is no preobligation by Law or Contract) a Prince be chosen by the Minor Better part, (net Mercenary Souldiers, not a Facti­on [Page 187] animated by a private Interest, nor as before ex­cepted) and that Part be strong enough by the advan­tage of their nobler Education, Prudence and Valour to enable him to Defend the Nation, and execute his Laws, against any opposition that the Rabble or rude Majority can make, I know not, (caeteris paribus) but that he hath a better Call, then if he had been called by the rest that were more in number.

When we speak of an Implicit Consent, complying with custom, we use an improper phrase, it being a Less-express Consent that is meant by it: For if it be in no degree expressed, it falls not under humane cog­nizance.

As we constantly determine against the Separatists, that such an Implicit Consent of the people, as is sig­nified only by actual submission to Ministerial Offi­ces, is all that is necessary (herein) to prove the Being of a Church: So the Reason will do as much and more as to the Common-wealth; the peoples Consent being more necessary in Church matters, then in the other, because Church-Government is exercised only on Consenters. And as he may be a Pa­stor that hath but such an Implicit Consent; so may he be a Prince that hath no more. When the Body of the people submit to the Government in its exercise, seeking for Justice to the Officers of him that is in Possession, and actually obeying his administrations, it importeth in foro exteriore a Consent; at least for the avoiding of greater evil; and if this be stated or in the ordinary Current as Governours are obeyed, it sufficeth to satisfie particular persons that they are obliged to obey.

For it cannot be expected that all the Real Body should be called to Vote, and the Major Vote be well discerned, unless the disproportion be very great. Their Number, their dispersedness, and their incapa­cities shew them very unfit to manage such a business by themselves: Their welfare requireth that it be ra­ther managed by Prudent Representers chosen to such Ends. And then as All are Represented, so All are obliged by the consent of their Representers.

1. As to themselves, if former violated Promi­ses excuse men from latter, then might men by one sin be free from the incommodities of an hun­dred after; for such a man that hath broke a former promise, might make an hundred inconsistent ones [Page 189] afterward without being obliged by them: But no man is to have benefit by his crimes. The first Cove­nant and the second may be impossible to be both Performed. But yet its possible they may both ob­lige. A man by contrary Covenants and Vows may oblige himself to Impossibilities, though he cannot perform them. He that makes an hundred covenants inconsistent with one another in the performance, sinneth as a Covenant-breaker in not performing all: though he should sin in other respects if he did perform many of them that are possible: Promises oblige whether just or unjust; But if they be unjust, they frequently cast men into a necessity of sinning; e. g. he that promiseth to give away an Orphans Por­tion committed to his Tutelage, sinneth if he do it, against the Law of fidelity and mercy; and he sinneth if he do it not as a Covenant-breaker. But when men have by contrary Covenants, cast themselves into such a Necessity of sinning, it may be a duty to choose the lesser sin, or rather to avoid the greater: And which that is, the circumstances of the Case must determine.

2. And as to others, it is most evident, that if I be innocent of the violation of a Covenant to a former Governour; then the peoples Engagement to a lat­ter, may make him the just Governour, and so I may be obliged to obey him. Otherwise, 1. Few Princes on earth should be acknowledged, or people obliged to them. For the original of the succession of most or very many, was a consent that was forced from them by Power, when they were engaged to another by a former Consent. And if this obliged not the Consenters to obey the present Prince, it could not [Page 190] oblige their progeny, nor convey any Title to suc­cessive Princes. 2. If the latter Covenant bind the guilty, it may draw an obligation on the innocent, that have a necessity of abiding in the same Common-wealth. He that cannot quit the Common-wealth, must obey the Powers that are sinfully chosen by others, as well as if they were lawfully chosen, it be­ing not his sin.

That man that will conclude that the Peoples con­sent is necessary to the Princes Title, and that no con­sent of a people pre-engaged is valid, shall null the Title of most successive Governours (at least) on earth, and ravel the state of most Common-wealths to their confusion, contrary to all Reason.

Nero and other Roman Emperours, that the Apo­stles and other ancient Teachers of the Church obey­ed, and commanded others to obey (with that strict­ness as we find in Rom. 13.) were some of them cho­sen but after possession by a party, some but implicite­ly by that party; none of them more fully then such as I have here described; and few of them by a people that were not pre-engaged.

It is the groundless confounding principle of Le­vellers in the State, and (as Mr. Cawdrey notes) of the Church-Levellers or Separatists, that Power of Government is originally in the people, and from [Page 191] and by them must be conveyed to the Rulers. An opi­nion against Nature and Scripture; against the very essence of a Republike, that distinctly containeth So­veraign and Subjects. I have sufficiently confuted this before by many Arguments; and shewed that the people as such, have no Power of Government. And even now I shewed you, that we discern our Ruler by such a syllogism; That person who is most agreeable to the description, and so to the will of God, must be con­sented to as Soveraign: But this is that person. Ergo, &c.—

So that the Law leaveth nothing but the determin­ing of the person here undone. And therefore the people certainly doing no more but to determine of the person, do convey no power, but only do that without which it will not be conveyed; some call them Instruments; properly they are not so much, though we need not contend about the Notion; when this Corporation choose their Bayliff, they give him not a jot of Power: They are but the Causa sine qua non: the Charter is the Instrumental cause; and the Soveraign is the principal efficient cause (under God.)

The people cannot give what they never received, nor had: But they never received nor had a power of Go­verning a Common-wealth, therefore they cannot give it. That it is not contained in each mans self-governing power, I have before shewed. As when a man is chosen in marriage by a woman, she giveth him not the Power of an Husband, but only chooseth the per­son who shall from the Law of God receive it; so is it between Prince and people. God hath said in his Law, The Husband shall Rule the Wife; The woman [Page 192] only adds the Minor, This man shall be my Husband. So that she gives him not the Rule, but by choosing him to be the man, is à Causa sine qua non. And if she should agree with him not to Rule her, it were ipso facto null, as being against the Law that specifieth the Relations: which sheweth that she giveth him not the power; otherwise she might restrain it or limit it. Yet here is this difference from our present case; that a woman may choose whether she will have a Husband or none: but so cannot a man choose whether he will be a member of a Common-wealth or not, except in some rare extraordinary case, that befalleth not a man among many millions.

Object. But a servant may give his Master power over him, and what degree he please; therefore a people may give a Prince power over them: And any man may oblige himself, and thereby give another power over him.

Answ. 1. The cases are much different. Govern­ment is founded in the Law of Nature. Angels have such Order, that have no sin: But servitude is a penal fruit of sin: and no man is to choose a punishment to himself that may well avoid it: He that may be free, should choose and keep his freedom. So that the Relation of a servant is such, that a man may avoid if he can and will; and when he is necessitated to submit to it, he may limit his Master in the governing of him as far as he can and will in the matter of ser­vitude: And therefore here is a greater appearance (at least) of mans giving another the power over him, then in Political Relations constituted by God himself: And yet indeed, the matter here must more distinctly be considered. A servant is considered partly [Page 193] as one obliged to Work for another, and partly as the inferiour or subject in a family to be Governed by another in order to the ends of Family Government, which is the good order of the Family, for its own, and specially the Governors welfare, and the Pleasing of God that hath appointed that Order. These two are oft sepa­rated, and ever distinct: Some servants are but day-Labourers, and no members of the Family, and some are members of it. Every man having a certain Power of himself and his own Labours, may alienate what he hath to another, and so by Contract sell his labour to his Master. But as he is a member of a Family sub­ject to a Master in point of Morality, bound to obey him in points of duty to God and man, of the first Ta­ble and second, and the due circumstantiating of these duties, so the servants consent is no proper efficient cause or giver of the Masters power, but only maketh himself the object of it: So that it comes [immedi­ately] from God, as [immediately] excludeth an intervening second efficient cause, but not [immedi­ately] as the word excludeth all kind of Means for determination of the Object, without which the Power would not be in that person over that other person.

So in point of Political Government, if there be a Domination conjunct, and the subjects submit them­selves to a servitude, that indeed may be their own self-resignation, disposal or selling themselves so far to another, which is when the Governours Benefit is the principal end: (For we are not born for him.) And therefore Tyrannie and Domination of Princes are penal to the subjects, and they may escape them if they can. But proper Political Government, that [Page 194] is exercised over meer subjects for the publick order and Good; and the pleasing of God by Governing Justice, is Gods own Ordinance, and the Power wholly flows from him as the universal Soveraign.

So that if it would hold true that from the self-in­terest and self-governing power that each individual hath by resigning all to one, he may efficiently be made a Prince or Ruler over them (which yet would be false, as I have shewed, if God were not supposed that way to convey the power, which he hath not done; Political Power being totâ specie distinct from that of self-interest, and self-Government) yet God hath left no room for this imagination and dispute, because he hath as universal King, himself instituted the Offices that shall be under him, leaving only the modifying and limiting of Circumstantials, and the determination of the persons to the will of man. And as it would be but a foolish or Trayterous arguing for a Corporation to say, [Every man hath a self-pro­priety or interest, and a self Governing Power, which resigned to another maketh him a Governour by conveying the Power from us to him: therefore our Major or Bayliff whom we elect, doth thus receive his Authority from our gift or authorizing Act] (they having nothing left to them but the nominati­on of the man that shall receive the Authority from the Princes Law or Charter;) Even so it would be no better in any that should argue thus in the other case. If no superiour Power had gone before them by his Laws, but a City were all free from Soveraign­ty, then indeed they might make to themselves a Prince, without the offending of any higher. And so if there were no God, (and yet man could be [Page 195] man) and if the world had no universal King, that had instituted offices under him by Law, and distin­guished the world into Rulers and Subjects, then in­deed the people might pretend to give the power as far as they have it to give, and be the Original of it: But when God hath given it already by a stated Law, to those that shall be lawfully nominated, the peoples claim comes in too late.

1. That the Constitution is not by humane Funda­mental Laws, but by Contracts between Prince and People (explicit or implicit) I shewed before; and its plain in the nature of the thing. If a meer Con­querour should say, [I claim the Empire, and Com­mand you as Subjects to acknowledge me] yet this were no Law, because proceeding from no Authority; and the peoples Acknowledgment, though forced by such words, would be but a forced Contract. So on the other side, if a people should make a pretended Law, that such a man or company of men shall Govern them, it were indeed no Law, because from no Authority: For be­fore the Constitution there is no Legislative Power; either in Prince or People: Not in the Prince; for he is then no Prince; not in the People, for they are then no Governours, and therefore no Legislators: What have they to do to command any man to command [Page 196] them, or Govern them against his will? He is as free by nature as they, and cannot justly be compelled; (much less by a Law when there are no Law­givers.)

2. It is a known Rule, that Obligations are dissol­ved as they are Contracted: And therefore from the way of Constitution the Thesis is plain, that nothing but Gods Authority, and mens Consent, can alter it. If it be altered by proper Law, then either by the Sove­raign (whether Prince or Senate) or the Subjects: But neither by the Soveraign nor Subjects; therefore by no man. Not by the Soveraign; for 1. He is bound up by Covenant to the Constitution, and cannot by pretended Authority break his Covenants, but must stay till God or the people Contracted with, release him. 2. And his Legislation is a part of his Govern­ment, consequential to his Power, and so to the con­stitution in which he received it; and therefore hath nothing to do with that constitution, to destroy or al­ter it that is the cause of his power, and gives it life, or is the means thereto. Else Princes when by the Constitution they are limited, might remove their bounds at pleasure. And if a Senate do it, it must be either as Rulers, or as Subjects. As Rulers they cannot alter the Constitution: For if they be Inferiour Rulers, they have no Power but from the Soveraign: If they be the Soveraign, or (as in England) have part of the Soveraignty, then they have as was proved before, no power as such to do it, any more then a Soveraign King. And as subjects they have no Power to do it: For subjects have none such. 1. They had not Power by Law to Constitute the Government, nor by any force, but by Consent of him or them [Page 197] whom they chose to Rule them; therefore they have no other Power to dissolve it. 2. Subjects are bound to obey, and have as such no Legislative Power; therefore much less have they any to alter the Con­stitution by.

But of this more, when we come to speak of the Dissolution of Common-wealths.

1. That Constitutions may be gradually and an­nually changed (possibly, but not fitly) is evident: Because as Consent of the chief Governour and peo­ple sufficed to the Constitution, so doth it suffice to the alteration. The same cause may produce the like effect; for here is no impediment. And therefore we need not in this Land go to the Original of the Com­mon-wealth to know the Constitution: For where­ever it is to be found that Prince and people have thus [Page 198] or thus Consented, so much of the Constitution is there found.

2. In a Law this change of the Constitution may be found: but it is not it self any part of a Law. A Parliament may have a double capacity: To be Soveraign (in whole, or part) and to be the Represen­tatives of the people: They Represent the people, ei­ther simply as people, to preserve their Rights accord­ing to the Constitution; or else as subjects. A Repre­sentative of subjects, as such, have no Power of making Laws, nor by Contract altering the Constitution: A Representative of People, or a Community, as such, may have power to preserve their Rights, and by Contract to change the Constitution, but none to make Laws: A Parliament as Soveraign, have Power to make Laws, but none by a Law to alter the Con­stitution. But when the Parliament hath several ca­pacities, their Instrument may accordingly have a various nature and use, and in part it may be a Con­tract with the Prince, themselves Representing the people, and so it may Gradually alter the Constituti­on; and in part it may be a Law imposed by the whole Soveraignty. And in the Instrument called a Law, al­terations of the Government may be made by Con­sent of both parties.

If Lycurgus by the peoples consent shall settle a form of Government; and say in it, that it shall be unchangeable, this will not disable successive Princes and people by Consent to change it; seeing they have as much power to change it, as he and the people then had to establish it. But if the next age change it, it will be Treason in them that will go about to violate the new establisht Government, under pretence of stick­ing to the old.

Else there must be a new Common-wealth at the death of every Prince: and posterity should not be obliged by ancestors for their good.

For there are many (if not most Princes on earth) that seeking Crowns by unjust means, or receiving them as so acquired, or being themselves unfit, &c. do want such a Title as may justifie them before God; and yet have such a Title as is valid among men, and will require obedience from all the subjects.

Paul took not all he wrote to for obedience, to be c [...]pable of Judging Nero's Title. If Consent of the Romans were proved, the Senate and City were a small part of the Roman world; Who made them Repre­sentatives of the whole?

CHAP. 8. Of the best form of Government, and Happyest Common-wealth.

AT his first Creation man was subjected to none but God: though it was provided in Nature, that there should have been Government and Subje­ction though man had continued innocent: but that would have been only a Paternal assisting Govern­ment for our good▪ having nothing in it that is penal, or any way evil. When God immediately Ruled, and man obeyed, all went right: Had this continued, the world had not felt those fractures and wounds, nor been troubled with rapines, wars or confusion, as it is. God being most perfectly Wise and Just, could not err in Commanding: Man was innocent and able to obey, but free and mutable: and so was tempted from his Obedience. Satan by disobedience having overthrown himself, did know it was the way to overthrow man. God could not be corrupted, nor tempted to unwise or unrighteou [...] Government: And if neither King no [...] subject were corrupted, the King­dom [Page 201] could not have decayed. But Satan knew which was the weakest link in the chain: Man was frail, though holy; and not confirmed yet, though up­right: and therefore defectible. The attempt of breaking his rank, and forsaking his due subjection, was the Devils fall: and by the same way he assaulted man, inciting in him a desire to be as God, and then provoking him to seek it by disobeying God: A foolish means to an impossible or impious end. The breach being thus made between man and his universal King, the joynts of holy order were loosed; and a breach was made also between man and himself, and man and the inferiour creatures, and enmity and confusion took possession in the world. The creatures Rebell against their M [...]ster turned Rebell: His own pas­sions and [...]ppetite Rebell against his Reason: and the seeds of all the Confusions that have followed in the world, were sown with in us. As the enmity between the womans and the Serpents seed being propagated to posterity, is the great quarrel of the world; so all those vices in which the Malignant enmity doth con­sist, are propagated and by custom receive an increase. The Root of them all is Selfishness, which much con­sisteth in Pride; still man would be a [...] God. Every man would be Highest, and have the eyes of others set upon him, and be the Idol of the world. The sin that bro [...]k Order, is still at work to widen the breach. He that is a subject, would fain be in Autho­rity; and [...]e that is of [...] lo [...]er rank, is ambitious to be higher [...] and be that is in Soveraign Power with just limitations, doth hate restraint, and take it for imprisonment or subjection; and striveth till he hath broak all bonds, and hath no guide but his own under­standing, [Page 202] and nothing to moderate his impotent will. So that in all Ages and Nations Subjects are still dis­posed to murmurings and rebellions, and Princes to transcend their bounds by Tyrannie: and all because we are all the aspiring brood of Adam, that was made little lower then the Angels, but fell to be too near the Devils, by desiring to become as God. If the advantage of Greatness, the gate of Temptation, or the warmth of Prosperity, do but heighten this am­bition, and hatch it to maturity, men will be then the sons of the Coal, and as so many Granado's thrown by Satan among the people where they live, to en­flame, and trouble, and confound the world: The worm of Ambition will restlesly crawl within their stomachs, and make them by a troublous stir to seek for honour as food to quiet it, and keep it from gnaw­ing on their hearts: But this greedy worm is unsati­able, crying as the Hors-leech, Give, Give.

The cure of this mischief hath long busied the peo­ple and Polititians of the world: and yet it is uncu­red. Princes that have strength, do make some shift with much ado, by [...]everity to restrain the Subject from Rebellion. But how to restrain the Prince from Tyrannie without disabling him from necess [...]ry Go­vernment, is much yet undiscovered, or the discove­ries unpractised. The world hath had more Diony­siu [...]'s and Nero's, then David [...], Solom [...]ns or Constan­tines. Rehoboam is no warning to them, but hath most Imitators, though with bad success. In most of the world, their doleful case doth tell u [...] what their Government is; we see among them Tyrannie is He­reditary: and Princes live among their Subjects as the Pike among the smaller fishes; [...]s if the people [Page 203] were made for them. They divide their Interest from their Peoples; and live as if their peoples welfare were not theirs; but rather all that is taken from the Subject, is added unto them. The soul and body of most Common-wealths fall out; and the Head and Heart have such diseased obstructions and oppositi­ons, as are their mutual torment, and the Progno­sticks of their hastening dissolution: when the Ivie hath kill'd the tree that bore it, it must perish with it. And if they are first themselves dismounted, they seldom ever get into the saddle, and sit fast after it.

Some Nations have thought that the way, to pre­vent this, was to be free; that is, to be Self-gover­nours; and so when All governed, they found that none Governed, but Tyrannie and all Vice did raign in popular confusions: and there was neither peace nor safety to the whole or parts; No waves being greater then the Sea [...], nor any Tyrant so cruel as the many-headed Tyrant: and it being the surest way to be [...]lwayes miserable, to be Governed by them that are alwayes naught▪ that is, by the multitude, in most parts of the world.

The sence of the mischief of Democracie hath made others think that the best way is to leave Kings to their wills, and let them use their Power arbitrari­ly: They think it costeth the world more to limit Princes then its worth: and that if they are absolute, their Interest will lead them to cherish their people: Or if they should grow cruel, God will protect us, and turn it to the best: A hundred sheep will flye from a little curre; and yet the Shepherd takes care that few of them are destroyed.] I could the easier digest this Doctrine, were it not for these Reasons. [Page 204] 1. The Heart of man is deceitful and desperately wick­ed; and what will it not do, if it may do what it will? 2. When men know that they are lyable to no Re­straint, it will let loose their lusts, and make them worse. 3. We may not tempt them thus into a life of sin, to their own destruction. 4. Nor must we tempt God by pretending to trust him in a neglect of means. 5. It is against the light of Nature that one mans will should ruine a Nation. 6. If we may give away our Bodily welfare, yet not our souls. The Princes interest may lead him to have some regard to the Bodily welfare of the people, but he will not re­gard their souls. Greatness will have great tempta­tions: And when there is no restraint, this will make the Greatest to be the worst. And the worst men are enclined to the worst opinions, and to be the greatest enemies to Piety and Honesty; and so would banish Christianity into corners, or from the earth. 7. If we might give away our own Interest, we may not so give away Gods; nor encourage or suffer every deceived wicked Prince to do as the Infidel Princes do, and per­secute Christianity out of their Dominions. 8. At least we may not be guilty of Treason against God, by consenting to an Idol, or Usurper that claimeth his prerogative, and pretendeth to an absolute unlimi­ted Power, as if he were from under the Laws and Government of the Almighty: we must know no Power but whats from God; and therefore none against his undoubted Interest and Laws. As it is un­lawful to submit to the Pope that thus usurpeth in the Church, so as unlawful to consent to any Anti-Gods usurpation in the Common-wealth. 9. And the experience of the world hath caught them to ab­hor [Page 205] unlimited Government, even as intolerable to the people: For though they should no [...] destroy the whole penple, yet at their pleasure their particular Sub­jects must be the fuel of their rage & lust. Every mans Estate, Wife or Daughter that they have a mind to, must be theirs; and their word must command the Heads of the best deserving Nobility to the block: And however the distant vulgar speed, those that are nearest them will be as Lambs before the Wolf. 10. And experience hath told the world, that there is many, and very many bad Kings for one good one throughout the world; and the wicked will do wick­edly when they have no restraint. And therefore this were to deliver up the Kingdoms of the earth to Satan, who Ruleth by the wicked; when we have a promise that they shall be the Kingdoms of the Lord and of his Christ, that Ruleth especially by the holy and the just.

Others have thought it a hopeful way of Cure, to have the Government elective, and either quam diu bene se gesserint, or for a short continuance by Ro­tation. But these have found that the Remedy was insufficient. The Nations of the earth have but few men that are wise and good: and if those must Rule but a little while, the bad will succeed them: And if it must run through many, and so there be many bad Rulers for one good one, the bad ones will do more hurt then the good ones can do good. And it will be next impossible so to temper the Govern­ment, as that bad Rulers may have power to pre­serve the Common-wealth, and yet not have power to perpetuate themselves, and invade a perpetual Di­ctatorship with Caesar; For Armies they must have; [Page 206] and those that can get sufficient interest in them, may use them to their own ends. Some think that the wealthier peoples bearing Arms would prevent all this: for they would never serve a Tyrant against their Liberties. Much should be done I confess more then is, this way, to preserve the peoples Liberties: but yet the Remedy is inconsiderable. For 1. We must have our Armies abroad, and those will be the poor, and those will be mercenary, and return to serve their Commanders minds. 2. Flattering words will mislead them that are not mercenary. 3. Pro­sperity and Wealth doth effiminate men and make them cowardly. 4. Experience told us in our late Wars, that the trayn'd Bands were as ready, at least in most places, to follow the stronger side that was in place, as the poorer Volunteers were: For they thought they had somewhat more to lose then their younger sons or servants had; and therefore they would not venture to disobey the strongest.

Some think a Lot being a Divine decision, to be the only way to choose the Prince: which hath its place, but solveth not the difficulty without more ado. To use Lots among a company of bad or un­just men to find one good one, is a tempting God; and but like the casting a Net among Frogs to catch Fish. The materials must be first prepared, and the main secured.

In a word, many models have been devised, and most of them have their excellencies, and defects: Some of them secure the peoples wealth and liberty from a Tyrant, and lay them open to an invading enemy: Some of them free the people from oppres­sion by a Prince, and leave them under a multitude [Page 207] of Oppressors: Some so secure Liberty as to intro­duce in justice and confusion: and certainly cast away the means of spiritual everlasting good, in order to preserve their temporal good. And most of them tread under foot the Government and Interest of the Universal King, and pretend the means agai [...]st the end. They that can do most to mend the people, and secure us of good Rulers, and so to secure us in the main matters of Religion and Peace, are the best Po­lititians, though they leave us many inconveniences. And to that end he that could cull out the best of eve­ry Mode, and leave the worst, woold shew his Wis­dom. Because I pretend not to such skil, nor intend any accurate Tract of Politicks, nor the discovery of an Ʋtopia, or City of the Sun, nor intend to bestow that time and labour which is necessary to improve that little knowledge that I have, to any such ends; but only to urge upon the world the great Divine neglected Principles, that we may be secured of the main; I shall readily give place to any of their new devised Models that are consistent with these Princi­ples; and leave them to beautifie the Common-wealth in their own wayes, if the Life of it may be se­cured by Gods way.

And yet I must say that for ought I see, the Go­vernment of this Common-wealth is already ballan­ced with as much prudence, caution, and equality, (though with less ado) as the curiousest of the Mo­dels that self-conceited men would obtrude with so much ostentation. Might we but see the Foundati­on of Parliaments Reformed, by an exclusion of tru­ly Ʋnworthy persons from the Elections (from [Page 208] choosing or being chosen) that so we were out of danger of having Impious Parliaments chosen by an impiou [...] Majority of the people, we should then build all the Fabrick of our Government on a Rock, that else will have a foundation of Sand: And a multitude of errours would be thus corrected at once, and more done for our Happiness then a thousand of the new Fanstatical devices will accomplish. Of this having spoken before, I shall yet add somewhat more, to shew you how the Kingdoms of the world may be made the Kingdoms of the Lord, and of his Christ.

The Ultimate End is the chief Good: This deno­minateth all the Means to be more or less Good, and all things to be Indifferent, as to Amiableness, that are neither for it, nor against it; and all things to be Evil that are against it. That which is neither our End, nor a means to our End, is not Good or Ami­able to us. Food and rayment and our outward wealth, are to furnish our own and others bodies with such requisites as fit them for the serving of our souls, that both may serve God, and enjoy and please him. He that takes down this End (the Pleasing and Enjoying of God in Glory) takes down all the world as a means to it, and destroyeth the very use and Re­lative nature of all things under the Sun, and makes [Page 209] another thing of himself and all things. As his flesh­ly Brutish End is below the high and Glorious End that God appointed all things for, so doth he accord­ingly brutifie and debase them all. For the Means re­ceive their excellency from their End, and their Apti­tude thereto. An Atheistical Infidel Polititian, that makes not these heavenly glorious things the Ends of his Policy, doth set Kings, and Common-wealths, and Laws as far below a Christian King, Common-wealth and Law, as earth is below heaven, and almost as a dog is below a man; and commit the higest Trea­son almost that men are capable of committing; de­stroying (doctrinally) Gods Kingdom and mens, and setting up a Mawkin in the place: And indeed are intolerable in a Christian Common-wealth.

This needs no proof to any that do believe that to be the Ultimate End.

None can deny this, that denyeth not God: if he have more Authority then man, and be wiser and bet­ter, and more Powerful to defend his subjects, and re­press his enemies, and do Justice in the execution of his Laws, then as no man should dare to compare with God, so no Government with his.

It is the first part only that in order I should here treat of, because I am not come to the Administra­tion of Common-wealths; but preferring the me­thod that sutes my Ends, I shall touch briefly of some­what of this here in the way: I take it for granted that every man except the Atheist, (alias, the Fool or Bruit) doth consent that we should desire the Best, that is, the most Divine Common-wealth that we are able to procure.

The Majestas or pars imperans, is essential to the Common-wealth: and that God be King, is essential to a Theocracie. If any Infidel say that God will not condescend to be our King, and therefore this suppo­sition deludeth us, and lifteth us up too high; I an­swer that he contradicteth not only the stream of Scripture that calleth God our King, but the clearest Light of Nature, which from his Creation and sole capacity, shews that by necessary Resultancy, he must Rule, (as I have shewed.)

Others may possibly be permitted as incolae, on the terms as Catechumens in or among the Church. But only the voluntary subjects of God should be the proper Cives or free subjects of a Divine Common-wealth; and only Christians of a Christian Common-wealth.

As I shewed in the beginning, as they are Obligati ad Obedientiam, the Law of Nature is the Fundamen­tum, or cause, as they have Right to the Benefits of the Common-wealth, and are free of it; Gods pro­mise or Covenant as on his part is the Fundamentum and the Cause; and their Consent or Covenant on their part, is the sine qua non or Condition: As they are self-obliged, (or bound by their own Consent) it is the efficient or Foundation of that secondary ob­ligation.

Though God choose not his Officers now in the same manner as in Moses and the following Judges dayes, (as to the extraordinary Call) yet are they now as truly his Officers as then. And therefore the people are first to be engaged in Covenant with God, and then with the Prince as Gods Officer: and on these terms are Princes to hold their power.

For it is much denominated à termino vel fine: that which is but for earthly Ends, is but an earthly Socie­ty: The Body that is not for the soul and subject to it, is not the Body of a man, but of a bruit: And the Kingdom that subjecteth not, corporal felicity to spiritual, and temporal to eternal, and looketh not to that, is but a brutish sensual Kingdom. For though Rational men are the subjects of it, yet while that Reason is subjected to the flesh and appetite, they are à fine to be denominated brutish: For that is a mans predominant faculty, which is next that which he makes his chiefest End: And therefore if he have a Brutish End, his Brutish appetite is predominant, though Reason serve it: And the man, and so also the Society and Government is denomnated from that which is predominant; and therefore from this End and brutish Ruling faculty it must be called Brutish.

The Kingdom of Christ is proved before. If any man will but read the Scripture, he need no other confutation of Hobbs that from Scripture would prove that the Kingdom of Christ is only at his second coming, and not at present.

If the Inferiour Magistates be Infidels, or ungodly men, they are false to their highest King: And how then can they be fit to Govern for him, and promote his interest?

Of these I shall anon speak somewhat more fully in order to practice.

Though the Law of Moses as such oblige us not; yet the matter of it under another form may oblige; that is, the Moral Law still bindeth us, both as the Law of Nature, and of the Redeemer: And the Rea­sons of the Law commonly called Political, (though indeed the Moral were Political) do still bind, so far as our case agreeing with theirs, we can perceive in those Laws how God would have such a case deter­mined. If Gods Laws keep not the preheminency, his Government is rejected. He ruleth by Laws; and to reject them is to reject his Rule. All the world have the Law of Nature; Christians also have the Law of Grace, and the Law of Nature in the most legible Characters. These are to be the principal statutes for the Government of the Common-wealth: and mans Laws should subserve them.

The offence against the highest Authority must needs be the greatest offence (caeteris paribus.) And though the chief punishment be reserved for the life to come, yet that will not excuse the Magistrate from the due punishing of it here. For Magistrates exe­cutions are for the publick Good of that particular Common-wealth; which will not frustrate Gods exe­cutions for the Glory of his Justice and other ends that are to man unknown. The chief punishment for Murder, Theft and other injuries to man, are re­served for the life to come: And yet we will not let them here goe unpunished, least present impunity encourage them to invade mens lives and estates. No more should notorious Impiety go unpunished here; least impunity encourage men to destroy their own and others souls, and by their examples and temptations to undo men everlastingly and bring down Gods temporal judgements on the place.

King David saith Psal. 16. 3. That his Good ex­tended to the Saints that are in the earth, and to the ex­cellent in whom was all his delight. Psal. 101. 6. he pro­sesseth that his eyes shall be upon the faithful of the Land, that they may dwell with him: he that walketh in a perfect way, he shall serve him: but vers. 8. A fro­ward heart shall depart from him, and he will not know a wicked person, and that he [will early destroy all the wicked of the Land, that he may cut off all [Page 216] wicked do [...]rs from the City of the Lord.] This is a Theocraty, when Princes govern From God, By God, and for God in all things.

1. That the materials or subjects should be the same, appeareth from what is said: They must all be such as enter the Covenant with God, which in a Christian Common-wealth can be no other then the Baptismal Covenant which entereth them into the Church; Circumcision entered them by the holy Cove­nant into Church and Common-wealth, which among the Jews were materially the same. He that is by the Covenant given up to God in Christ, is a member of Gods Universal Church and Kingdom. Yea in­deed the Universal Church, and the Universal King­dom in the strict sense, are both materially and form­ally all one; though the particulars are not so. There are three senses of Gods Universal Kingdom. 1. As the word signifieth all that are obliged as subjects to obey him; and so all men, even Rebels are members of his Kingdom. 2. As it signifieth those that obey him secundum quid, or analogically, but not simply and acceptably, (nor profess so much.) And so Turks and many Infidels that worship God, but not by Christ, are in his Kingdom. 3. As it comprehendeth only faithful accepted subjects, and those that by pro­fession seem to be such: And thus his Kingdom, and [Page 217] his Church Universal are all one formally.

2. But the [...]eason why particular Churches and Commonwealths are not formally the same, but distinct Pol [...]ties, is, because though the Universal being United in One undivided Head is but One, as being denomi­nated from that Head, yet from unity proceedeth multiplicity: God doth not communicate all that Power in kind which is Eminently and Transcendent­ly in himself to any one man, or sort of Officers; but distributeth to each their part; Civil Power to Civil Rulers, and Ecclesiastical to Church-Rulers. When we are once come down below God the fountain in our observation, we find a present Division of that Communicable Power into many hands, which flow­eth from the incommunicable Power that is in God alone. For man hath not Gods sufficiency to be all. The Popes flatterers may extol him as an Universal V [...]ce-God, or V [...]ce-Christ; but as Sctipture tells us that he wants the Form, that is, the Authority: So Nature tells us that he wants the Aptitude and Capa­city of matter. And therefore though the Ʋniversal Kingdom (in the strict sense) and the Universal Church are One, in O [...]e God, yet particular King­doms and Churches are diversified in specie, as shall anon be shewed.

When I say that the matter (ordinarily) should be the same, I mean not to tye the Governours of Church or State, to a necessary conformity of their administrations as to the matter, in taking in or cast­ing out of members (save only in point of advan­tage and conveniency, to be mentioned in the next chapter.) For each sort of Governours have the charge of their own distinct administrations. It is [Page 218] not only possible, but too common, that one sort is much more careless and unsaithful to God and men then the other. If a good Magistrate have bad Pa­stours over the same people, and the Pastors will not difference between the precious and the vile, but will keep the impious and filthy in the Church, the Magistrate is not therefore bound to keep such as Free men in the Commonwealth, but must make it (as containing Free men) narrower then the Church. And if faithful Pastours live under a careless Prince that takes the filthyest and most impious as Cives, the Pastours must not do so in the Church; for they must be accountable to God for the discharge of their own trust.

But that which I mean, is, that the same Qualifica­tion maketh a man capable of being a member both of a Christian Church and Common-wealth, which is, his Covenant with God in Christ, or his Membership of the Universal Church, supposing the other cir­cumstantials or accidental capacities which are indeed distinct.

Lastly, Note that I exclude not some just excepti­ons of ordinary or extraordinary Cases, in which the Members of one sort of Society may be excluded from the other. Persons that are through scruples (innocent or sinful) kept from joyning with a par­ticular Church for a time, being yet capable of their Communion, may be yet members of the Common-wealth. Want of Riches may do more also to keep men out of Freedom in the Common-wealth, then out of the Church. And yet I think that in a Theo­cracie care should be taken to keep some members from swelling to excess, and others from extremity [Page 219] of want, as among the Israelites there was; yet so as no mans industry be discouraged, nor propriety in­vaded, nor idleness in any cherished. And Riches and Poverty should not make altogether so great a diffe­rence as they do in Prophane societies. If mens Pover­ty be not so great as to make them the servants of others, and deprive them of ingenuous Freedom, it should not deprive them of Civil Freedom: especially where Criminal and Civil cases have different Judges, they may have more Freedom about Criminals then Civils. Where wealth is concerned, men of wealth should have the power: but where Vertue or Vice, Honesty or Dishonesty is the matter of debate, the Honest though poor, should have more power than the Impious that are rich.

I conclude therefore that though variety of out­ward States, and the neglects of either Magistrate or Pastours, may be an exception to the Rule, yet as to in­ward qualifications, ordinarily the same persons are fit to be Members of Church and Common-wealth.

But as the Church hath only the members within, and yet the Competentes, and Catechumens, and in a more distant sort, the excommunicate, and the Neigh­bour Infidels, under her care, as owing them some help; so a Christian Common-wealth, though it own none as Cives, (or free subjects, commonly called Burgesses, or enfranchised persons) but such as are fit to be Church-members, yet hath it many that are meer subjects, and are to have the protection of the Laws for their lives and possessions, that are of a low­er form.

2. And yet that Church and Common-wealth are not formally (nor de facto alwayes, nor usually mate­rially [Page 220] in a great part) the same societies, appeareth. 1. From the difference of Governours. Magistrates Rule the Common-wealth, and the Church as in the Common-wealth, but not the Church with that pecu­lia [...] Government proper to it as a Church. And Ministers may Teach in the Common wealth, but as Pastours they Govern only the Church as such. 2. From the manner of Government and administra­tions. The Magistrate Ruleth imperiously, and by force, having power upon mens estates and persons: But the Pastours have none such, but govern only by the Word of God explained and applyed to the Conscience. 3. From the nearest Foundation. The Common-wealth is constituted by a (virtual or actu­al) contract between the civil Soveraign and the People: But the Church (particular) is constituted, by a consent between the Pastours and the Flock. 4 From the extent. The Common-wealth containeth all the people in a whole Nation or more, as united in one Soveraign. But particular Churches (distinct from the universal united in Christ) have no general Ecclesiastical Officers in whom a Nation must unite as one Church; but as Corporations in one Kingdom; or as so many Schools, that have a peculiar form and Government; but such only as is under the Magi­strates Government in its kind: or as several Col­ledges in one University. 5. From the accidental in­capacities of men to be members of each. A Servant or Beggar is to be a free member of the Church, that is to be limited much more in his freedom in the Com­mon-wealth. And a man that lives as a Carryer or Messenger, in constant travail from place to place, (specially if he have no home) is scarce capable of [Page 221] being a member of a particular Church, who yet may be a member of the Common-wealth. 6. From the Nearest end. Civil Order is the Nearest end of civil Polity: but Church Order, for holy Communion in Gods worsh [...]p, is the Nearest end of Church Policy. So that formally they are divers, though materially, if Princes and Pastours would do their duties, in refor­mation and righteous Government, they would be if not altogether, yet for the most part the same, as consisting of the same persons.

Whether there be any other reign of Christ on ear [...]h to be expected, that is, by his visible personal abode (which I perceive some Papists of late very busy, under their several maskes, to indigitate, part­ly in order to perswad [...] men that the Church is a Body that hath an Universal visible Head, which must be Christs V [...]car, but in the interspace betwixt his first and second coming,) this controversie I do not now determine. For my own part, I reverence the Anci­ents that were of that mind, and many later that have followed them. I am my self as meerly Neutral in it as in almost any point of so great moment so often propounded to my consideration: I oppose them not in the least, nor am I for them: Not from a carelesness or unwillingness to know the truth, but the difficulty of the case, and the weakness of my [Page 222] understanding. I live in hope of the coming and ap­pearance of our Lord Jesus Christ, and pray that he may come quickly: But that he will after his coming raign Visibly on earth, and if so, in what manner, are things that I have read much of, but am uncertain af­ter all, and scarce can perceive which way my judge­ment most inclineth.

But in the mean time, why should we not all con­spire in our longings after that Raign of Christ, and Dignity of the Saints, and Reformation of the world, which is undoubtedly our duty, and which all agree about that have the fear of God?

If there be such a thing as a visible Raign of Christ here to be expected, he will surely elevate his servants in their Capacities of Soul and Body, as well as in their Dignity of Rule: And therefore we have little now to do study, and wait, and pray for that Kingdom that is to come. For till we have the Capacity, we can have no exercise of that Dig­nity.

But in our present Capacity, I would fain know of them that talk of the Ruling of the world by the Saints, what more they can desire or expect in Rea­son than I here propound. 1. They cannot with­out factio [...]s uncharitableness and immodesty say, that it must be only the Saints of this or that party or Opi­nion, that shall subdue and Rule the rest: nor only the stronger sort that shall be dignified, excluding them that are babes and weak in the Faith. 2. Nor can they rationally dream that the most uncharitable (that is, in Christs sense, the most graceless sort) that can censure and condemn all others as no Saints, and appropriate holiness causlesly to themselves, [Page 223] should therefore have the Rule of others. If Cha­rity Rules not, Christ Rules not. 3. Nor can they expect sure that all and only Saints shall be Princes, Judges, or other Magistrates: For then the World were worse an hundred fold then now. For now we have thousands of Saints that are Subjects; and then all the Subjects must be supposed wicked, and no Saints, and we must have no more Saints but enow to Rule: And if we had materially such wicked Common-wealths, it would bring the plagues of God upon us: And if Government of Saints do no more Good in the World but to leave all the Sub­jects wicked, it were liker Satans Government then Christs. It is certain therefore that it is not all, but some of the Saints that must be Governours; and so it is already; and that it may be much Better, and that secured to our Posterity, should be now our joint de­sire. And let us wait for the coming of Christ in his own way.

It is a special part of our wisdom to know what is our Health by our Diseases, and to learn Truth from the erroneous, and Duty from them that swerve into extreams. The Antinomians have called us to preach [Page 224] more the Dominion of Love, and the Riches of Grace, and divers other things: The Arminians have called us to take heed of a causeless narrowing of Grace in its extent, or of fathering our sins directly or indirectly upon God. The Anabaptists have called us to restore and practise Confirmation, and not take all into the number of Adult members that were bap­tized in Infancy, and never knew Christ nor a godly life. I could say the like of other Parties that have lately risen up. One sort runneth to them, and ano­ther part raileth at them; but he is the wise man that knoweth how to receive from them so much as is good, and leave the rest: could we duly improve them, we might have cause to thank God (though not them) that ever he permitted such occasions of our Reformation. So may I say in particular of the Millenaries: If we could by them be awakened to promote the unquestionable Raign of Christ, what a mercy would ensue?

A great stir is made by Mr. Harrington and other self-conceited Polititians for their several forms. No contrivances are of much moment to our happiness, but those that secure us of a succession of good Go­vernours. These particulars I shall here briefly [Page 225] manifest. 1. That their contrivances tend not to se­cure us of such a succession, nor a present faithful Government. 2. That imprudent and bad men in their contried form will undo the people. 3. That prudent faithful men in other forms, are likely to be a blessing to the people.

1. That Hobbs his Leviathan, or way of absolute Impious Monarchy, making us, our Religion, &c. tendeth not to secure us of a Righteous Govern­ment, is a point that needeth no proof with any reasonable man; were it but because the irreligious Author pretendeth not to any such thing as the se­curing a succession of the Christian Religion, without which a Righteous Government is not to be ex­pected.

That Mr. Harringtons Oceana, and Venetian Bal­lot, have no such tendency, is plain. 1. In that it is such a Government as Heathens have been our Ex­amples in, and in which he thinks they have excelled us, that he propoundeth. And therefore doubtless he intendeth not that his frame shall secure us the Chri­stian Religion, without which we can have no happy Government.

2. And he professeth himself that his Common-wealth is most inconsistent with a Clergy: without which the Christian Religion never was maintained in any Nation upon earth. And Christ saith to his Ministers, whom he promised to be with to the end of the world, that he that despiseth them, despiseth him, Luke 10. 16. And as Christ never Ruled since his Ascension but by his Officers, Word and Spirit; so he that purposely designeth the extirpation of his Officers, intendeth not his Raign, or at least promo­teth [Page 226] it not. And he that is an enemy to the Raign of Christ, at he is the heir of wrath himself, Luke 19. 27. so would he make others, and therefore murder the Common-wealeh.

3. He thinketh Venice, where Popery Ruleth, and whoredom abounds, is the perfectest Pattern of Government for us, now existent: therefore he in­tendeth not sure that his Model should keep us from the Raign of Popery (or whoredom.) I doubt not but the same Model among better men, might do much against them: which doth but shew that it is not the Model, but the better men that must do most.

4. The whole scope of the design is by the Ballot and Rotation to secure us from the danger of a pro­bability of being Ruled by Wise or Honest men, and put the business out of doubt, that strangers to Pru­dence, and enemies to Piety shall be our ordinary Ru­lers, and consequently Christianity be expelled. Can you doubt of this? 1. He knoweth not what Prudence and Piety are, or knoweth not England or mankind, that knoweth not that the Major part of the vul­gar are scarcely Prudent and Pious men. 2. He knoweth not what Piety is, that knoweth not that Impious men abhor it; and he is not a Christian, that neither believeth the Prologue to the first Covenant of Grace; that saith, God will put enmity between the Womans and the Serpents seed, which the first born man shewed in killing his brother, because his own works were evil, and his brothers Righteous. 1 John 3. 12. Nor yet believeth the words of Christ, that his servants will be hated of all men for his sake, be­cause they are not of the world, &c. 3. And he know­eth [Page 227] not Oceana (Mr. Harringtons Common-wealth) that knoweth not that the ignorant and ungodly rabble are made the Lords and Rulers of all.

Go to the Foundation, and follow it up to the Head, and Judge. In his first Order, pag. 58. in the distribution into freemen and servants, all are free­men that can live of themselves. 2. In his second Order, the younger sort are made the marching Ar­my, and the Elder the Garrisons. 3. In the third, by their estates they are distributed into the Equestrian Order and the foot; only those that have prodigally spent their estates are excluded Suffrages and Go­vernment. 4. His fourth Order settleth the Pari­shes, Hundreds and Tribes. 5. His fifth Order be­gins with the Parish Ballot; where all above thirty years of age are to choose their Deputies by suffrage: when in most Parishes its too well known that the Major part are Ignorant men, and too many enemies to Piety, and many to common sobriety and Civi­lity. In some Parishes you may go to five, if not ten families, before you meet with one that can so much as read (though I hope that is not the common case) And in abundance of them, the multitude are so edu­cated, that beyond the matters of their Ploughs, and Carts, and Trades, they are scarce men, and can scarce speak sense. And of all men, the rabble hate both Magistrates and Ministers that would bring them up to Piety, and restrain them from a licentious sen­sual life. And of all their Neighbours, they most hate them that live an holy Heavenly life, and condemn them by their difference.

And operari sequitur esse; such as men are, so they will act; and such if they are freemen, they will [Page 228] choose: will they choose wise and Godly men that partly hate them, and partly know not the worth of Wisdom? Would they choose those Magistrates that they know would punish them, and whom they ab­hor for strictness, and for punishing Vice?

6. In his sixth Order, two parts in three in every Parish must be for the Minister: And how many Pa­rishes be they where a bad man that will suit their humours, shall sooner have two parts, then a godly faithful Pastor? And pag. 65 He provideth that there be no excommunication to make a difference, but Heaven and Hell must be confounded; forsooth be­cause that excommunication is not clearly proved out of Scripture to such capacities as his.

7. His seventh Order gives us Justices of Peace, Jury-men, Captains, &c. by these suffrages. And the choosers may tell us what kind of Justices and Cap­tains they will be. 8. His eighth Order giveth us Horse and Foot-Captains by a Ballot, that its ten to one, know as well how to perform their trust as I know how to guide a ship that was never in one. And as wisely might our Parishes and their Deputies by the Major Vote elect us Pilots and Captains of ships out of stables, and barns, and Cow-houses, as thence elect us Land-Captains and Magistrates. So his ninth and tenth Orders carry on the same work, by giving us Magistrates out of Shops and Threshing­floores. They must elect us the Philarch, the Lord Lieutenant (perhaps my Lord Ale-seller, or my Lord Plow-jogger) the Custos Rotulorum, &c. the Philarch must keep the Quarter-Sessions, and hear causes in order to the protection of Liberty of Con­science, who partly know not what Conscience is, and [Page 229] partly hate nothing more then Conscience, though they love nothing more then Liberty. No Tribe may Petition a Parliament, unless the Philarch at the Councel frame the Petition, and propose it by clau­ses, unto the Ballot of the whole Tribe, &c. We are like then to have good Petitions, and comfortable re­lief from Parliaments: When a pack of the rabble are got together, that lately had got the name of [Damn-me's] that took him for a Puritane that spoak a sentence without [God damn me] in it; and no man shall put up a Petition to the Parliament, but by their Counsel and proposal and Consent; then we have a perfect Common-wealth! Were it not for fear of abusing the name of God and Holiness, I would here by prediction, draw you up one of their Petitions; but I dare not so far defile my Paper, and the Readers eyes. I am ashamed and a weary to fol­low this gang any further, and shew you what Par­liaments we must have, that being fetched from the Dung-cart to make us Laws, and from the Ale­house and the May-pole to dispose of our Religion, Lives and Estates, can scarce tell whether the Lan­guage of a rational Law be humane and intelligible; and if they read such a Law, they scarce know whe­ther it be English, but better understand them that bleat and bellow, then they do these Law-terms. Or if there be a cunning Knave among them, its he that shall be the Prince and lead the rest. When I lately heard a description of the Irish, I was thinking how gallantly they would Rule or choose us Rulers by Vote, especially in Religion; when they know so much of Christ as to tell us that he is a better man then Saint Patrick; and so much of the Devil, as to [Page 230] call him Knave, and thats a great part of their Reli­gion. And yet this is not all; but Mr. Harrington will give the people the supremacy and last resoluti­on. Thats better of the two, then to give it to the Devil, or to worship the old Egyptian gods, an Ox or an Onion: Get all the Nobility and Gentry first to put it to the Countreys Vote, who shall be possessors of their Lands and Lordships: Or get all the learned and Wise men in Philosophy, Physick, Law, Theology, to put it to the Vote how these shall be regulated and used▪ The best use that we have in England for popular power of judging, is by Juries, that we think preserve our Liberties: And yet (I shall say again) I have thought of the excellency of a Democracie, when I have sat and heard a Learned Judge opening a hard case of Titles to the Jury, and they have stood by him all the while as if he had been talking Greek and Hebrew to them, and gone their way and brought in a Verdict for Plaintiff or Defendant at a venture, as it first came to their Tongues-ends, before they understood the cause any more then the man in the Moon; unless there were a crasty fellow among them, and then he ruled all the rest, and he had the day that had his voyce. Which when I saw, I thought it in such difficult cases almost as good to throw the Dice to decide the Contro­versie.

But Mr. Harrington doubts not but the people will be wise enough to choose the wise, and good enough to choose the good. As if we knew not what hard, and scornful, and censorious thoughts the vulgar have of Nobility, Learning, and all that is above them. W [...]at reproaches do we daily hear from them, [Page 231] not only against Divines, but against Lawyers, Phy­sitians, Princes, and all whose waies they are unac­quainted with? Many a time have I heard them say, [It will never be a good world, while Knights and Gentlemen make us Laws, that are chosen for fear, and do but oppress us, and do not know the peoples sores: It will never be well with us till we have Parlia­ments of Country-men like our selves, that know our w [...]nts.] Nothing more natural, then that the propa­gation should be of the kind: and that sensual and ungodly men should choose such as themselves, and as will fit their ends: Especially being now exaspe­rated by a war and some attempts of Reformation, they will be more virulent then heretofore, and no­thing will satisfie them but the extirpation of those that have crost them, and would have reformed them.

It is easie to bring such on the stage in a dreaming Model, and put a golden Oration into their mouthes, and feign a fool more eloquent then Demosthenes: but when it comes to the execution (if the Nation be so distracted as to try) it will not be found so easie a matter to reach the Elected to speak sense: but the Senate and the Prerogative tribe must presently be put upon wielding the great affairs of Government, Civil and Religions, of Peace and War, which they are utterly ignorant of, as never being exercised in before. If these Polititians will scorn to be equalled in the reputation of their Learning with unstudied men that never took any pains to get it; (yea or to be matcht in point of Prudence by Divines that study its likely much more then themselves, if so be they have but read more of some parts of History or Poli­ticks, [Page 232] though they are ignorant of the principal parts of solid learning;) why then should we equalize unskilful Rusticks that never studied Politicks a day, but are suddenly chosen from the Plough or Alehouse by the vulgar vote, with men that have studied and been trayned up to the skill of Governing, and been exercised in it? Surely if Mr. Harrington be so much a wiser man as he proclaims himself then the Clergy, as may warrant him to give it us as the suffrage of the Nations (pag. 223.) that [An ounce of Wisdom is worth a pound of Clergie] and that [Ministers of all others least understand Political Principles]; if all the Clergy, though they are men of the same Country and complexion with himself, and have studied many hours for his one, cannot yet come near the eminence of his wisdom, no nor attain to so much knowledge of Political Principles as all others have (in his ac­count;) we must then expect to be Governed by a constant Miracle, or by constant folly, when men that never studied such things are made our Governours. Are Divines all such fools for all their studies? and will the Plough-mens Vote immediately give us a Senate and Prerogative tribe of wise men! wise in matters of highest moment, that they never heard of or med­led with before.

And lest we should have any hope they should grow wiser by experience, the Rotation must turn them out before they well know where they are, and what it is they were Called to do; and from the Academy of the Shop or Alehouse, we must have freshmen in their rooms that are as wise as they were. What Ship was well Governed that was thus used in choice of Pilots? What Army was prosperous that [Page 233] was thus used in choice of Commanders? What School was well taught that was thus used in choice of School-masters? to have the ignorant and un­exercised introduced, and then turned out before they can grow wise, to secure us against all possibility of remedy.

But though the National Religion and Conscience must be thus disposed of; yet Mr. Harrington and his Brethren (they know why) do haply secure us of libtrty of conscience, and that of a sufficient latitude that [No gathered Congregations be molested or inter­rupted in their way of worship, being neither Jewish nor Idolatrous, but vigilantly and vigorously protected, &c. pag. r 30.] Popery had been before excepted, but that found place for repentance; and now Mr. H. and his fraternity have Liberty, either never to worship God at all (for that's supposed to be free) or to set up Deism, and worship God without a Saviour, or to set up Mahometanism, or cry down Christ and Chri­stianity, or to make a worship of preaching up impie­ty and vice, and crying down the Scriptures and all true Worship. I will not talk of such low things as Liberty to preach down the Godhead or manhood of Christ, the Creation, the Resurrection and Life to come, and other Articles of the faith, by parts. But if he felt not some extream necessity of such Liberty, there need not this excessive care to secure it. What need all this ado for liberty of such Consciences, when the major Vote of the impious Rule, who will not only grant you Liberty, but extirpate those that for the defence of Christianity would deprive you of it?

Argu. To exclude the heavenly treasure of vertue, [Page 234] piety and prudence, is an evil, which Government must be secured against, or it cannot be good.

But Mr. H^s. government is not secured against it, (but certainly bindeth it upon us:)

Therefore Mr. H^s. government cannot be good.

The Major is his own, page 10. saith he [Sad com­plaints, that the Principles of Power and Authority, the goods of the mind and of fortune do not meet, and twine in the wreath or Crown of Empire! Wherefore if we have any thing of Piety or of Prudence, let us raise our selves out of the mire of private Inte [...]est, unto the contemplation of Vertue, and put an hand to the removal of this evil from under the Sun; this evil against which no Govern­ment that is not secured, can be good; this evil from which the Government that is secure must be perfect: So­lomon tells us, that the cause of it is from the Ruler, from those principles of Power, which ballanced upon earthly trash, exclude the heavenly Treasures of Vertue, and that influence of it upon government, which is Au­thority. We have wandred the earth, to find out the bal­lance of power; but to find out that of Authority, we must ascend nearer Heaven, or to the Image of God, or the soul of man.] Thus Mr. H.

Out of his own mouth are men invited to oppose his Policy, as they would do the Devil, or at least, the most destructive plague of a Common-wealth. It is not more certain that the earth doth bear us, then that the rabble vulgar multitude are for the greater part not only void of solid Piety and Prudence, and this Heavenly Treasure, but enemies to it: and that all men are byassed and Ruled by a private selfish spi­rit, till saving grace make God their Center, or com­mon [Page 235] help do elevate one of many to prefer the com­mon good before their own. Is his Common-wealth secure, yea perfect (as he saith it must be, if secure) from this selfish evil? Must we be Ruled by the rabble that (as I before said from the words of Augustine) had rather there were two Stars fewer in the Firma­ment, then one Cow less in their pastures, or one tree less in their hedges, and this to secure us from Pri­vate interest, and the exclusion of the heavenly Trea­sure? Let us then go to a Brothel-house for a pat­tern of Chastity, or to Mr. H. for a pattern of Hu­mility.

Argu. 2. That Government is next to Hell, that as­certaineth us of a constant succession of impious enemies of heavenly vertue in chief Power. But such is Mr. H^s. Government, that giveth the Major Vote the power, and calleth ignorant men to places of highest trust, and great­est work; and is inconsistent with a Clergy; there­fore, &c.

Argu. 3. A people, saith Machiavel, that is corrupt, is not capable of a Common-wealth. (They are Mr. Harringtons words, pag. 45.) But the Major Vote of almost all Nations are corrupt; therefore they are un­capable of a Common wealth.

I know Mr. Harrington is here involved (as he speaks) by Machiavel. No wonder. But if Machia­vel be become a Puritan to him, what is Mr. Har­rington to us?

But perhaps some will say, [Was not David a Shep­herd, and yet a person meet to be a King?]

Answ. 1. It seems then there is an Instance of a worthy King that was taken from a Sheepfold: But to have many hundred persons so prepared for Govern­ment, [Page 236] is not ordinarily to be expected. Amo [...] a Pro­phet, was called from the herd: but argue not thence if you love the reputation of your reason; that the major Vote of our Herdsmen should judge the spirits of the Prophets, or be accounted Prophets as well as he.

2. God can fetch a Ruler from a Sheepfold: but the vulgar Rabble are not so good choosers as God is: At least not so much better then God, as to choose five hundred good ones for one that God did choose.

3. But its well known that in those dayes, when Countries lay open, and mens treasure lay in Cattle rather then in Gold, that Herdsmen and Shepherds were the greatest men, and fittest for Riches to be Princes.

Object. But do not our common people choose good Parliaments by a Major Vote, &c.

Answ. 10. Mr. Harringtons Model hath not yet made them Independants; and therefore they ordi­narily choose such as their Landlords do desire them to choose; and therefore it will go according to the quality of the Landlords, and not according to the quality of the people, 2. Formerly when the peoples Liberties were encroacht on, and no divisions made in the Land among the Gentry, they were all ready to joyn for the common liberty, with some more una­nimity then now. But now by the late wars they are divided, and one part think themselves oppressed, and the attempts of Reformation have irritated the sen­sual gang; there wants nothing but Liberty, to tread these Reformers in the dirt. Let Mr. H. and his party get down the Army, and take off all the late restraints, [Page 237] and let Parliaments be chosen by unrestrained Votes, and that party that hath most tenants, and that is most against Puritans, that will carry it. 3. And even before the divisions and exasperations, the divided Parliament and the war ensuing, and Major part of the Nobility and Gentry adhering to the King, (who by a minor part were conquered) did shew us what a Vote would have done. So much to Mr. H.

2. Having shewed that these new Models secure us not of a Righteous Government, (though there is much good interwoven, which by righteous Gover­nors might be made good use of,) I should next shew that the Imprudent and Evil will not be hindred by these Forms, from undoing the Common-wealth. And for that, what need I more, then, 1. That men at liberty will rule according to their dispositions? An evil tree bringeth not forth good fruit. Men gather not grapes of thorns, nor figgs of thistles. Folly will not do the works of Wisdom, nor Impiety cherish Godliness which it hateth. Why else do not Heathens, Turks and all Infidels set up Christianity, but because they are against it? and as much are ungodly sensual men, though called Christians, against true Piety. 2. What is there to hinder them? Is it Laws, who made them? It is they themselves that are the Law-givers. Whe­ther it be a Monarchie, Aristocracie, or Democracie, the Soveraign is the Law-giver. They are also the Judges of the Law, having none above them: So that in making, repealing and executing Laws, what mischief may they not do, especially which the sen­sual multitude can but bear?

Name us that Common-wealth on earth that is pi­ously Ruled by impious Rulers, and Prudently [Page 238] Ruled by fools, whatever the Model of Government may be.

And to what use are all their Models, if not to se­cure us of good and righteous Governours? Is it any better to be impiously and unrighteously Governed by a thousand then by one? If therefore it secure not this, but rather certainly destroy it, their Model is poor relief or comfort to an oppressed undone people.

3. The next part of my task here is to shew you, that in every Form, whether Monarchy, Aristocracie, or Democratie, wise and pious righteous Governors will make the Government a blessing to the people. For, 1. They will act according to their Principles: But the Principles of all wise and pious men, do lead them to prefer God and the Common Good, before any private interest of their own; there­fore, &c. 2. They will act according to their Dispositions: But honesty and wisdom disposes them to prefer God and the common good, &c. 3. Gover­nors will Rule according to the attraction of their Ultimate End. But every wise and honest man doth make God his Ultimate End, (and the nearer End the Common Good.)

Holiness is a new Nature: and therefore a constant Monitor and mover unto Good. They that Love God and Vertue, and hate all evil, will Rule accordingly.

Its true, they are imperfect, and have their faults: but that which is predominant in their hearts, will be predominant in their Government.

Answ. It is as if you should ask, Is it better be warmed by cold snow, or cooled by the fire? Laws are nothing but acts of Government; effects and significations of the Go­vernours will concerning what shall be the subjects Duty. Laws antecedent to the Soveraigns will, are effects before the cause. Good Rulers will make & continue good Laws, and bad ones the contrary. All the world have good Laws already made them by God: But if you will needs suppose a separation, I say, that Good Laws with bad Rulers will do little good, but restrain a little of their evil: But if the inferiour Magistrates only be bad, the Good Rulers and Laws that are over them may force them to do good.

Gods Laws are the effect and significations of his Will. And his Will and Power are before his Laws: The Laws of the Common-wealth that are made by men, are the effects and signs of the Wills of the Law givers: Leg [...]slation is the chief act of Govern­ment, and highest prerogative of Governing Autho­rity. Contracts may be antecedent to Government, but Law cannot. When the Individual Ruler dyeth, the Laws survive, not as effects of Contract, or effect without a cause, nor as his Laws that is dead, but as his Laws that doth succeed, who owneth them (as by the Contract he is obliged) as soon as he succeed­eth: The Soveraign liveth in specie in the Constituti­on; and to whomsoever the Power is divolved, his acts do the Laws become, and as soon as he disown­eth them, they are null (though the constitutive Contracts are not so.) Where Kings only are the Law-givers, or Senates only, or both conjunct, they have power over the Laws, to repeal them. And bad Soveraigns, (if no restraint be in on them) will make [Page 240] bad Laws, and good ones will make goods Laws.

And if fundamental Contracts limit the Soveraign, if he can, he will violate them, if vice dispose him to it, and carnal Interest entice him. And how hard it is to execute limiting Contracts effectually for his re­straint that hath got possession of strength and Soveraignty, is commonly known.

And if the Laws were good, and the superiour power so good as to make them, but not so good as to be much regardful for the execution, then if the infe­riour Magistrates be naught, they will make nothing of the Laws. Who knoweth not how easily impious Judges and Justices can destroy the just, and turn most righteous Laws against them, by mis-interpre­tations and mis-applications? Saith Plautus in Trin. act. 4. Mores leges jam perduxerunt in potestatem su­am; Eae miserae etiam ad parietem sunt fixae clavis ferreis; Ʋbi malos mores affigi nimis fuerat aequius, &c.—

I conclude therefore that God having already given us the best fundamental Laws, let us have good Sove­raigns, and we shall have good humane Laws, and let us have good Magistrates, and we shall have good exe­cution, which is the end or use of Laws: But if we have bad Soveraigns, we shall have bad Laws, in part, and the good will be uneffectual; much more if also we have bad Magistrates. This is past doubt.

CHAP. 9. How a Common-wealth may be re­duced to this Theocratical temper, if it have advantages, and the Rulers and People are willing.

R. I. That the Ministers of Christ that are to teach and guide the people by the Word of God, be generally able, judicious, godly, faithful, diligent men.

We cannot expect the people to be good, if the Teachers be bad, unable, or negligent. It is Gods Word that's managed by them, that must reform the people, and work out their vice. As mens Laws sup­pose the Laws of God, and mens Government presup­poseth Gods Government; so the true methodical obedience to mens Laws, presupposeth obedience to Gods Laws, and consequently some understanding of them; and a right subjection to man presupposeth subjection to God. The first work therefore being the Ministers, the true reformation of the Ministry, making them indeed Divine, is the first thing to the making a Common-wealth Divine.

Much hath been done already to this of late in this [Page 242] Nation, through the blessing of God: (though much is yet to be done, especially for ripening the Ministry in Judgement and Charity, & bringing them to neer­er Unity, which time must do.) And the principal hopes that we have in this Land of a faithful suc­cessive Election of Parliaments, from any thing that is yet before us, is the happy success of the Ministry upon the Souls of many, by which the people being much reformed (though yet too little) are more enclined to prudent pious men to be their Gover­nours in Parliament, then they have been heretofore. So that this hath made a hopeful beginning, and if it be cartyed on, will do much more.

This is not unknown to the Enemies of Christiani­ty, or to the Papists, that all conspire against the Mi­nistry, as knowing that to make them odious, and their labours vain, or get them down, is the likelyest way to attain their ends.

Let these enemies note, that I am not here plead­ing for Lordly greatness, nor Riches to the Ministry, nor an aliene Power in State affairs, or any coercive Power at all: (and would they have a Clergie lower?) but only that they may be Learned, Judicious, Godly, Able, faithful men, provided with their daily bread, or food and rayment: And can they for shame oppose this?

The true Reformation must here begin; and if the Foundation be well laid in the people, the building will be firm and safe.

And here let me presume to speak a few words of the Necessity, and of the Ʋtility of this course, and then, How it should be done.

1. It is known that Parliaments qua tales, are not Divine, Religious, Protestant or just. The six Arti­cles by which the Martyrs were burnt, were made by a Parliament. All the Laws for the Papal interest in the dayes of Popery have been made by them. They have often followed the wills of Princes to and fro. And therefore they are not indefectible, nor immuta­ble as such.

2. It is known that there are Members of various minds in them all, and sometime the miscarrying par­ty is so strong, that by a few more voices they might bring misery on the Common-wealth.

3. It is well known that in most p [...]s, the Major Vote of the Vulgar that are Choosers are Ignorant, selfish, of private Spirits, ruled by mony; and there­fore by their Land-lords, and other great and power­ful men; and withal they are bitterly distasted against the serious diligent practice of Religion, according to the Rules of Christ.

4. It is therefore apparent that if they had their Liberty, they would choose such as are of their minds; and it was by providence and accident that heretofore they did not so.

5. And it is certain, that the wars, the change of Church government and forms of worship, the differences of Religious men, and the many Sects that have lately risen up among us, and the strict Laws of Parliament about the Lords day, &c. and specially their Taxes, have deeply discontented them and exas­perated them against such as they think have caused [Page 244] these, so that many would now purposely design their ruin.

6. It is known that in the late Elections, the ex­clusion of Delinquents, and the Countenance of the times made terrible by many late successes against all sorts of enemies, and the present existence of the Army that hath so prevailed, hath been their re­straint, so that they durst not go according to their inclinations.

7. It is known that the restrained Gentry, with those that are enemies to serious holy living accord­ing to the Christian Rules, are in most places strongest in popular Interest; having most Tenants, and most of the affections of the vulgar: And that they can this day, were they but as free from fear of sufferings as others, bring more voyces into the field in most pla­ces then any others can: And that even many well meaning honest men are of cowardly Spirits, and dare not displease their Landlords or great Neigh­bours, but will vote with the stronger side.

8. And its known that the Leaders never less want­ed all upon the grounds fore-mentioned.

And what followeth upon all this, but either still to keep an Army over them (which should not be) or to Regulate the Election, is necessary to save us from ruine by a Parliament? For what probability is there but the next that is chosen by such a Majori­ty of Votes with absolute freedom, will undo all that hath been done, and be revenged to the full on all that were so odious to them, and settle our calamity by Law? The effect lyeth so obvious to a discerning eye, (and almost to all) in the Moral Causes, that we may reckon it as done already, if not prevented.

[Page 245]2. But could a Prudent course be taken now for the Regulating of future Elections, we should have a moral security of good Parliaments to all Genera­tions, who would make good Laws, and see to the execution, and be under God, the sum of Blessings for the Common-good; We should have Parliaments of the wisest and most pious men; and such as are least for private Interest, but would devote them­selves to God and to their Countrey; The Parlia­ment would be the Princes Interest; so that he nei­ther would nor could divide from them. And they would be the peoples Interest, so that they could not disown them, but would lift them up in their esteem, and set them with the first in their daily prayers and praises unto God. And Parliaments would be more Honourable, when they were more Divine, and cho­sen only by vertuous men, and not by prophane de­bauched persons. In a word, Piety and Peace were more likely to be secured to Posterity, certainly, ea­sily, and honestly this way then any way.

And then the effecting of it will be an Actual most excellent Reformation of the Common-wealth it self; and the Regulating Laws, excluding the vici­ous, would engage the people against Vice, and so conduce to their salvation.

The first and second reform the very substance of [Page 246] the Republike, and are the most necessary excellent part of its Reformation.

It is an erroneous and impious assertion that all Gods Political Laws are repealed. Ʋniversal Policy must be distinguished from Particular: And the Ge­neral Laws and Principles from the Application of them to a particular people and case. As the world is still Gods universal Kingdom, so hath he univer­sal Laws to Govern them. The fifth Commande­ment set in the Head of the second Table, is the summary or ground of humane Politicks, command­ing the duties of Princes and people, though Pa­rents and children only are expresly mentioned. The following Commands agaainst Murther, Adultery, Theft, and false witness, were part of the Jews Po­litical Laws, and are still part of Gods Universal Po­liticks, and belong to every Common-wealth in particular to enforce, and see them executed, as well as Ethically to private Consciences. Princes are the keepers of Gods Laws, and must see them executed; to promote which, their Laws must be Subservient: where any of these Morals by a penalty annexed is applyed to the Jews in particular, though quatenus Mosaica & Judaica, the Law be ceased, yet as it is the Law of Nature, or as Christ hath taken it into his Law, it doth remain: And not only so, but the Rea­son of many other Jewish Laws may still be significa­tive of Gods Will to us, and so be Obligatory.

Where there is nothing in the difference of their state and ours that varieth the case so as to destroy to us the Reason of the Law, it may thus indirectly bind us still, by shewing us what God would have men in such a case to do.

Here are but two things required in the Moral Qualification, which no man that hath the name and face of a Christian can except against. First, that he be one that owneth God the Father, Son and Holy Ghost, in personal Covenant; that is, that he pro­fess himself a Christian: Others are excluded from Liberty, I think, by our Laws already. This there­fore cannot be denyed. That he was Baptized in Infan­cy is not enough, because choosing Parliament men is not a work for Infants, but the Adult; and he at age that owneth not his Baptismal Covenant, doth re­nounce it, or at least is not to be reckoned among believers. The second point is, that he live not in such sins as God would have men cut off for. And who can except against this? But here note 1. That it is not the oft committing such sins only that ma­keth him uncapable; but being at that time under the Guilt; For a man must be hanged for one Murder, [Page 248] though he daily live not in it. 2. It is the Guilt in fo­ro humano that I speak of, and not of his conscience as to God. If the Magistrate pardon him, and fully par­don him, he is not under Guilt before him. 3. Note that it is not only cutting off by Death, but also by an extermination, or disfranchising, or excommunica­tion, that I speak of. He is unfit for the Priviledge of a Chooser, that God would have any of these wayes to be cut off, but specially by Death.

4. And note, that a capital offender may have pardon for his life, when yet the Ruler may not per­haps restore him to his freedom herein.

There are many enumerated in the Ordinance that setleth the Government of the Church, and if the Parliament please, they may add more, as they see cause.

And that much well executed, would do the Nation very much right, and free us from much guilt and danger. And there is no Reason that Lords and Knights should be disabled, and Pesants let alone in their Priviledges that are guilty of the same things.

To be an ordinary despiser of Gods pub [...]ike wor­ship, or a neglecter of it, and of the Guidance of Gods Ministers, was Death or cutting off in the Jew­ish times: And no man can tell us why it should not be at least a cause of disfranchizing now. A man by disfranchizing is not a penny the poorer, but only kept from hurting the Common-wealth. And its a [Page 250] hard case, if we must commit our lives and Religion to the Votes or Government of them that God would have had then cut off, and put to Death! Let men have liberty freely in all lesser doubtful things that good and sober Christians differ about: and if they be Impious or Infidels, (unless by particular crimes they incur any penalty) I urge not the Ma­gistrate now to deprive them of their Estates or per­sonal Liberties: But let them have nothing to do with Governing us. A man would think this should be a fair and moderate motion: It is not an Ana­baptist, nor an Independent, nor any upon such kind of differences that I am motioning an exclusion of: But those that are Members of no Approved nor To­lerated Church. And there is great Reason. For 1. They Live like Atheists and Infidels, and therefore they may be numbred, if not with such, yet with them that are near them. Faith is practical, and tendeth to holy living and obeying. He that refu­seth to give God his publike Worship, and so denyeth him the chief part of his homage, is an Atheist in life. 2. There were no Christians in the Apostles dayes that had a fixed abode, that were not members of the Christian Churches in the places where they li­ved: and those that were unruly and walked disor­derly, were to be avoided and cast out. 3. If they believe not that God is to be worshipped publikely by his servants, and would perswade others against all publike worship, they are not fit to live among men; therefore if they themselves forsake it, they are unfit for to meddle with our Government. 4 He is not ordinarily fit to choose a Governour, that as to his Morals is not capable of Governing (allow­ing [Page 251] a gradual difference.) But the neglecters of all Church-order, and Communion, and Discipline, are unfit to Govern: for they would destroy Christs In­terest in the world: therefore they are unfit to choose. 5. If it be because they know not of a true Church to joyn with, its a sign they doubt of the Head when they doubt of the body, and know not that Christ in­deed is King, that know not his Kingdom: Or else are justly to be suspected for Romish Juglers, whose design is to take down all, that they may set up them­selves. 6. However it be, they that excommunicate themselves from Christian Churches, can blame none but themselves for it, and have no reason to expect to be taken for Rulers or choosers in a Christian Common-wealth. 7. He that refused all publike Worship under the Priests, would not have been judged to seek the Lord, nor be one of their Com­mon-wealth. 8. God hath no ordinary publike wor­ship but by his Ministers; and therefore to live under the Guidance of no Pastor, is to reject the stated way of worship; nor can he (ordinarily) be numbred with the flock of Christ, that is under no particular Shep­herd. Every one therefore should be a member of some Church.

This course is equal: For it is not meet that Mi­nisters should be the disposers of the Liberties of the Common-wealth, nor will it help but hinder their Ministry that they should mix it with any secular Power; and though the penalty were but conse­quential, it would be inconvenient for them to use that Power. And yet on the other side, it is not Par­liament Orders any further then as they are subor­dinate to Gods Laws, that they must Guide the Church by. Now in this way the disfranchized per­son hath no more trouble through the Minister then [Page 253] if he had nothing to do in it, but some more ease and benefit: For if the Censors alone should judge him criminous, he would have no benefit by the Churches more favourable Judgement, in case the Censors should be too rigid: Or if they should bear any man a Grudge, it is unmeet they should disable him alone: And therefore when the Judgement of the Church and of the Censors must concur to any mans Conviction, he will be further from the danger of any injury: The Church shall have no power to con­vict him with Relation to his civil Liberty; but only the Censors shall not do it without their consent, that his Liberty may be the better secured.

If you think that this power of Church and Cen­sors is too great to be exercised over Justices of Peace, or persons of greater place: I answer, 1. Where ever there are Justices of Peace, it is sup­posed that they be themselves the Censors; and therefore that fear is vain: And for Riches, they should priviledge no man in impiety. 2. You may leave your Greater men (if you will be partial) to some higher Judgement, or leave them the Liberty of an Appeal.

Of the Office of these Censors I shall speak more under the last Rule.

Quest. But what shall be done in the Tolerated Chur­ches? Answ. As you please, either let them also cast out none from his Common-wealths Priviledges without the consent of the Censors of that Parish; or rather let them alone to do with their own mem­bers as they list in this respect; Because 1. They will be so eager to keep their strength and number, that they will dispriviledge none of their own, with­out [Page 254] great cause. 2. And if they do, it is usually best of all; for it will drive them to the approved Churches.

Quest. But what if Ministers will not admit of wor­thy persons into their Churches? shall they therefore want their civil Priviledges? Answ. 1. If Ministers grosly miscarry in their Office, the Magistrate hath power to punish them, or cast them out; and what would you have more? 2. If one Church will not receive them, another will, either Approved or Tolerated. 3. If all this will not serve, let your Censors in this also have the Judgement, or a Negative voyce. Let the Qualifications already given by the Parliament concerning those that are to be debarred from the Lords Supper for Ignorance or scandal, be the Cen­sors Rule (with what else they think meet to add) and if any man publikely offer himself to be a mem­ber of the Approved Church of that Parish where he liveth, and be refused, if the Censor Judge the Refusal injurious (according to the Parliaments Rules) let it not injure him in his civil Liberties, but let him be Registred inter Cives; Though I think this caution should be unnecessary, because the Ministers themselves are under your Power. But it is only men that are utterly uncapable of Church-commu­nion, or that wilfully refuse it, that we desire may be no Choosers or Cives (though Subjects still.)

Quest. But what if your Pastors will neglect Disci­pline, and let in the most scandalous men; will not the Common-wealth be polluted and hazarded by their neg­ligence? Answ. 1. It can be no worse for that, then it is; and therefore thats no reason against the thing. 2. I confess there lyeth the greatest danger; And therefore Parliaments should not by any causeless [Page 255] jealousies of Ministers doing overmuch, restrain, dis­able or discourage them from that duty which flesh and blood is most against of all their work; But let the wilful neglect of Discipline (and if you will, ex­cessive rigour too) be punishable according to the quality of the offence. And let there be a Court of Commissioners in every County (those that are for ejecting scandalous Ministers) empowred thereun­to; For Ejection should not be the punishment of smaller faults, especially before obstinacy; nor yet should such faults be unpnished; But of this more anon. But that here the Censor should have power alone to deprive him of his civil Liberty (as we grant him alone to preserve it) will be injurious to mens Rights.

The confusion that is now at Elections, is very great; and without abundance of cost to the Coun­trey or the Elected Gentlemen, so great a multitude cannot be brought to the Pole; which if they be not, the uncapable rout may intrude and carry it. And therefore for every Parish or Hundred, either to send in their written Votes by Officers, or rather to send their sworn Deputies with power to Vote in their stead, will more orderly dispatch the work, and with much less charge and trouble. Every Deputy may bring in a list of the names which he representeth; and so he that representeth a Parish of an hundred men, shall have the voices of an hundred; and he or they that represent a Parish of a thousand men, shall have the voices of as many.

Where there is danger lest the Greatness of any over awe the people from their liberties, the Ballot is somewhat the safer way then the open Vote; and yet not much; both because Juglers by slight of hand might convey in five for one; and specially be­cause those great men will beforehand be engaging the people to Promise them their suffrages, and they dare not deny the Promise, if they are such as dare not de­ny them their Vote; And yet in all these things indif­ferent, we would not stick to gratifie Mr. Harrington, or any rational Modeller, that can get the Parliaments consent. But 1. We must have our Cives, the matter of our Republick first reformed. 2. And we would have no more change then needs must, but things done with as little stir as may be, about circumstanti­als; and not have the Venetian painted dress and toy­ish [Page 257] gawds, to cover a defiled people; nor with a great deal of cost, and labour, and pomp, to set up an adorned Image; Et magno labore nugas agere, ut materiam superares opus. We are somewhat indiffe­rent for the dress; but cannot be indifferent, whether we have a pious or impious, Christian or Infidel Com­mon-wealth. Reform and secure us in the main, and we will not quarrel about such variable unnecessary modes and circumstances.

They may consider and debate it before-hand, for better information, but not promise.

The said Petition and Advice determineth, that under the Penalty of a thousand pound, and imprison­ment till it be paid, no person be elected and sit in Parliament but [such as are persons of known Integrity, fearing God, and of Good conversation—Not such as are guilty of any of the Offences mentioned in an Act of Parliament of Aug. 1650. entituled, An Act against [Page 258] several Atheistical, Blasphemons and execrable opi­nions, derogatory to the honour of God, and destru­ctive to humane Society. No common scoffer nor revi­ler of Religion, or of any person or persons for professing thereof: No person that hath married or shall marry a wife of the Popish Religion; or hath trained or shall train up his child or children, or any other child or children under his tuition or Government, in the Popish Religion; or that shall permit or suffer such child or children to be trained up in the said Religion, or that hath given or shall give his consent that his Son or Daughter shall marry any of that Religion: No person that shall deny the Scri­ptures to be the Word of God; or the Sacraments, Prayer, Magistracy and Ministry to be the Ordinances of God: No common prophaner of the Lords day; nor prophane swearer or curser; no drunkard, or common haunter of Taverns or Ale-houses.]

They are sworn also for the true Protestant Christian Religion in the purity of it, as contained in the Holy Scri­ptures, and for fidelity to the Protector, and for the Peo­ples Rights and Liberties.] A more excellent Act hath not been made for the Happiness of England, con­cerning Parliaments, at least since the Reformation. O that it may be but effectually put in execution.

1. The Law must describe them according to their necessary qualifications. 2. The choosers of them (especially where Parliaments choose) may be sworn [Page 259] as near as they can to choose according to that De­scription. 3. Themselves are to be sworn to act ac­cordingly.

Where he is Elective, a Description is presupposed as existent in Gods General Laws already, which must be observed.

In elective Principalities, it must be supposed that a Council of State have a sufficient power to keep the Peace till a due Election: and yet that they be suffici­ently disabled from perpetuating their Supremacy, or delaying the Election.

The Persons to be Elected may be either left to themselves as to their Rank, or they may be limited, either to take four of the Council (as men first ap­proved by the Parliament, and acquainted best with State affairs); or else the General of the Army (if [Page 260] he be not of the Council) and one of the Nobility, and two of the Council. But however let them at their admission into Council, be strictly sworn to choose the fittest according to the described Qualifi­cations, if they shall be called to a choice.

Here are divers things expressed as necessary, or much conducible to the propounded end. (Supposing still that we speak of those Nations that are setting up, or have already an Elective Prince, that is not ab­solute, nor hath the whole Soveraignty, but in con­junction with a Parliament or Senate) 1. That the Senate choose the Council, or at least approve of them. And so themselves being first composed as aforesaid, there will be great hopes of a Prudent Pi­ous Council. 2. That the Council (or the Parlia­ment, if then sitting) choose four, being swore to a faithful choice aforehand.

And here let it be observed, that Election is to be preferred to a Lot, where it may be performed upon grounds of Judgement and Freedom, and that a Lot is not to be brought into use, but in cases of Ne­cessity, where judgement faileth. For, 1. Else men shall neglect the Law of God, which is propounded to them as the Rule of Judging. 2. And they shall neglect their Reason and Gods gifts, by which they are qualified for Judging. 3. And they will tempt God, and therefore provoke him to afflict them by the Lot, while they take his name in vain. 4. And if they elect not fit persons in preparation to the Lot, but turn loose a Lot among a number that are most unfit; they betray the Common-wealth to ruine. Is our new Modellers should carry their Lotteries among the vulgar rowt, whesr there's one or two [Page 261] wise men among a multitude, and expect that their Lot should find out those few, thay might be convin­ced by experience, that God made them no promise of such success, nor appointed Lots to spare men the use of their Reason. Till I have Gods command or promise to shew for our encouragement, I must be­lieve, that he that casts a Lot to find out one wise and godly man among an hundred simpletons or un­godly men, is likely an hundred to one to be deceived. The Apostles chose two of the meetest men, to be Judas his successor, before they made use of the Lot: and then the Lot did choose Matthiae one of the two.

3. It is here taken for a matter of great necessity, that yet a Lot should finally determine. (In an ex­traordinary case indeed, as after a Conquest, usually One only is capable: but we are not giving Rules for extraordinaries.) And the need of this Lot is thus apparent. 1. It will prevent Confederacies and making parties and friends for the succession, which else will hardly ever be prevented. 2. It will avoid the odium that else will lie upon the Council, from the rejected party: Men will easier take a rejection from God then from man. 3. It will prevent the dis-satis­faction and consequent rebellious contrivances of the rejected. For it seemeth a dishonour to be rejected by choosers, but its no dishonour to miss it upon a Lot. 4. It is a most rational suitable course, that he that stands next God, should be chosen by God, and God should have the principal hand in the choice. The Apostles gave God the choice of Matthias an Apostle by Lot, because no power under God was fit to con­vey (or choose a man to) the highest Ecclesiastick [Page 262] power: But they chose not inferiour Officers by Lot. 5. It will more comfortably satisfie the Prince, to do or suffer in his office, when God calls him to it. 6. It will very much satisfie the people in their submission and obedience, and prevent rebellions, and hinder suspitions of the Princes ambitious aspiring to the power. A [...] his choice was Divine, their estimation and obedience will be towards him as towards an Of­ficer of God.

4. It is here taken also as necessary, that the Lot be carefully regulated by a Law, e. g. as to be done before many, in the publickest Church of the City, in such and such order, which is easily contrived; that so they that would creep in by unrighteous means may have no hope.

5. That the chief City or all that are near, that can so speedily meet, may by fasting and prayer seek Gods merciful determination, is a thing of apparent need, by reason of the great weight of the case, and that the Government may be more purely Divine, and the people the fullyer satisfied in the person, and the blessing of God procured thereby.

The Prince that will not Consent to this, for fear of losing his Interest in his own children, in reason should not desire that they should hereditarily suc­succeed [Page 263] him in the Government. If he govern not for the common Good as his end, he is a Lord or Ty­rant, and not Governour of the Common-wealth. If he do govern for the common good, then the Common-wealth hath a far greater Interest in his children that must succeed, then he can have. If they be so his own, as to be principally for him, or for themselves, they are then unfit to be the Governours of a Common-wealth. If they be not; then the Laws must dispose of their Education. The subordinate Rules for this Education, I will not be so presumptu­ous as to set down.

The Reason of this is, 1. Because of the imper­fection of all Princes (as of all men) who therefore must be supposed to have some evil or imprudence, whose evil fruits should be prevented, that they may not produce the common hurt. 2. Because it is sup­posed possible that Princes may espouse a private In­terest, from which the publick Interest must be secu­red. And being not Absolute and Arbitrary, he will be less capable to hurt.

Every point of a Princes duty is not to be put into his Oath, but so much as is necessary to the common safety, and consequently to the being of his Govern­ment. For else it will tempt the people so think that they are disobliged when he violate [...]h his Oath in any of those particulars. But the substance of his Cove­nant should be in it.

1. M [...]. Harrington truly tels you the necessity of [Page 265] Arming the freemen: men of best Education and Interest, will be most valiant and most trusty; and if Reformed as I forementioned, they will be truest to their Country, in matters of everlasting consequence: It is reason that men of greatest Interest and suffici­ency should be trusted with the defence of themselves and their own. The cowardliness of Freeholders is the undoing of their Country: To save their own skin they arm their servants, and so make them their Lords. Especially when it comes to fighting indeed, and they dare not venture their lives: Or else in for­raign Wars, where they use to employ their servants only, except in command, and then they return up­on them as their Conquerers. Many that are ser­vants may be sent abroad, but not so many as may be able to master their Commanders, and the junior sort of Freemen, that should still be mixt in competent numbers. The most servile and base are usually through the disadvantage of their education the most impious. And so much wickedness as usually dwelleth in such Armies, is worse then the enemy to them. None of the Forces in pay, that intend the common good, and deserve the name of Christians, or Common-wealths-men, will be unwilling to have the faithful people of the Land to be possessed of a strength sufficient to ballance them for their necessary preservation.

The rest also are so plainly rational, necessary and conscionable, that I shall think it needless to give Reasons for them distinctly, there being nothing but ignorance, ungodliness, or a treacherous selfish design to master the Common-wealth, that can have any thing considerable to say against them.

Two things more I add, 1. Let the old tryed faith­ful Souldiers of the Army be the chief Commanders of part of the Militia of the Countries; yet none but the faithful, and men of Interest, that have some­what to lose by the ruine of the Common-wealth: nor yet so as to strengthen any to a dangerous re­dundancy of Power. 2. That every Regiment of Foot have one faithful Minister to teach them, and every Regiment of Horse two at least (because quar­tering very distant, one man can be but with few at once.) Seducers are the seditions disturbers and de­stroyers, who will creep in and prevail, if there be none to gain-say them.

It is a great mistake in many Law-makers, that are more solicitous incomparably to restrain both Inferi­our Magistrates and Ministers from going too far, and doing too much, then to put them on to do that which is indeed the business of their Office, when yet flesh and blood will do as much (and in the Ministry abundance more) to bring us to the defective Ex­tream, then to the excessive. The benefit of Law is attained by the Execution: And if we have not faith­ful Judges and Justices, we can look for little exe­cution. If the Magistrate be naught, it is an easie [Page 267] matter for him, by discouraging Plaintiffs and Accu­sers, and by hiding the sence, or wresting the Law, or a hundred wayes to make nothing of them, if not worse then nothing; and turn our defensive Arms against us.

It is in vain to make Laws describing such as shall be Tolerated, unless there be a way to put them in execution. If all be Tolerated without difference, why should the Law make a difference? It is as ne­cessary therefore that by the Rule of those Laws, Commissioners grant an Instrument of Toleration, as of Approbation. And that the Commissioners of Eje­ction have power to deprive them that forfeit it of their Toleration, as others of their Approbation. But of this elsewhere. The rest I hope is all granted.

God hath in wonderful Holy Wisdom so nearly joyned the Church and Commonwealth, and the Magistracy and Ministry, that both are of necessity to the welfare of each Nation; and it hath occasi­oned many ignorant men to contend about their pre­eminence, [Page 269] as if it were a controversie among sober Christians, which of them were the chief: when it is no controversie, nor is there any room for the com­parison, they being qua tales of distinct co-ordinate kinds, and each is chief in his proper Office. The Magi­strate is as truly the Governour of Ministers by the Sword or coercive power, as he is of any other of his Subjects: And the Minister is as truly the Magi­strates Church-guide by the Word of God, as he is of any other of his Flock: yet indirectly he may frequently be bound from exercising any such dis­graceful acts of Discipline on them, as may tend to diminish their Authority, or disable them to their proper work. Government is a divine Act, which imitateth Nature. Aristotle and Galen could not agree whether the Head or Heart was the Principal member and first seat of Life. And why may they not be conjunct and co-ordinate, each being the principal in its kind; the Head of the animal spirits and operations, and the Heart of the Vital? Philo­sophers have troubled themselves with disputing, whether the Intellect or Will be the first Principle of the souls operations? But by this time they are for the most part agreed, that the Intellect is the first quoad specificationem actus, and the Will quoad exerci­tium. But if any will make a tough dispute of it, whether Specification or Exercise be first, he will do it to no profit. It is a dead Commonweath (and that is none, but a meer carkass) that is without the Ma­gistrate: And it is a mad Commonwealth (which is lit­tle better then none) that is without a Church and Ministry. I think they that would separate the In­tellect from the Will, the Brain from the Heart, the [Page 270] Directive power from the Imperial, are no better friends to the Common-wealth, then he that would deliver a man from the presumption of his phantasie by cutting off h [...]s Head, or from the passions of his Heart by pulling it out of his Body. Some Diseases may warrant me to cut off my finger; but none will warrant me to cut off my Head, or to pull out my Heart. Some say the Intellect so participateth of In­clination, and is so near kin to the Will, that we may properly say, Intellectus vult verum; and that the Will hath so much participation of Intelligence that we may well say, that Voluntas intelligit bonum; whe­ther that be so or not, I am sure that it is no humane Body that hath not both Heart and Brain; nor a hu­mane soul that wants either Will or Intellect. The Priests sat with the Civil Judges in Moses time, and had Judicial Power, much further then we now de­sire. The Ministers sat with the Magistrates in Eng­land before the dayes of William the Conqueror. If any would exempt the Ministry from being under the civil Governours Jurisdiction, or would put into their hand the civil Power, or Sword, even any de­gree of a proper coercive forcing Power, I would Petition with the first against it: But if any Parlia­ment would have some chosen Ministers sit in both Houses without any Votes or Power at all, but only a Liberty to speak when the cause of Religion and Conscience is on the Stage; or if they would have them sit with Judges on the Bench, and Justices at their Sessions, without any power, only with a Li­berty of speaking to a case of Conscience, as I would never Petition for it, so I would not think that Com­monwealth the less Wise, or Pious, or Happy, or safe [Page 271] that did admit it. But we are all for extreams. Some must have a Pope to carry both swords, and trample upon Kings and Common-wealths; or at least they must have Lord Bishops to set and Vote among the Lords: And others must think them unworthy to speak in the Cause of Christ, which sometime is tost up and down by men that little understand it; and some think them not worthy to stand in their pre­sence, but make them as the scum and scorn of man­kind: And what have they but their holy Relation to Christ and his service, to make them so contem­ptible? They are of the same Nation, blood and pa­rentage as other men: For their lives, though they are imperfect, if any one relation and rank of men be more upright and blameless and holy, let us be bani­shed or die the death. For their studies, unless it be Divine things that make men fools, or much learning and studie that make them less wise then other men, and unless the way to wisdom be to lay asleep our Reason, and cast off study, or at least to study no­thing higher then the Moon, undoubtedly they have the advantage by far of any one rank of men. If Di­vinity be True and Good, then certainly the Students of it are likely to be the wisest and the best of men: For the object ennobleth, and the employment per­fecteth the faculties.

Kings themselves were commanded by God of old, to study Divinity continually, and so were other Commanders, yea and all. Deut. 17. 18, 19, 20. Josh. 1. 8, Deut. 11. 19, 20. & 6. 6, 7, 8. Psalm. 1. 2, 3. If it debase the Teachers, it cannot honour Princes nor any of the Learners.

The Nation therefore that vilifieth and despiseth [Page 272] the Ministry, despiseth Christ. And the Magistrates that grow jealous of their interest, and set against the work that Christ hath set them to do, do but pluck out their own eyes, and destroy themselves, and unchristen their Common-weath. Magistrates and Ministers therefore must joyn together in the work of God: yet so that we will not meddle at all with their work; much less desire their Riches and honour: Let them take the Pomp, and Rule, and wealth of the world: We desire them so much splendor as may countenance them in their work. For our selves, we would have nothing but leave to labour, and the Devil chained up from hindering mens salvation, as far as by the Magi­strate can be procured.

In every Corporation that hath a Maior or Bayliff, and other Justices, let them also be the Censors. And in small Countrey Parishes where no Justice of Peace abideth, let the sufficientest person or persons be ena­bled by the Magistrate to this Office: And let him have no further Power. If the Church may pro­pound the fittest persons, and the Rulers accept or reject them as they see cause, and so authorize such as they accept, it may fully satisfie their interest. If they refuse this, we are well content that they choose them as they see meet. This will further the Mini­stry, and stop the Erastians mouthes, and take away the jealousies that are usually by Magistrates kept up against the Pastors: Their Censors shall be pre­sent, and see whether we meddle with State matters, or go beyond our line. But still let this introduce no confusion of the Offices by the conjunction. Let the Churches acts be valid to meer Church respects (as Absolution or Excommunication) whether the Cen­sors shall consent or not: but let them be of no in­fluence upon Civil Rights, if he consent not. As Magistrates are Civil Rulers of Pastors and Churches, and must help them with their power against obsti­nate untractable ones; so there is no reason that we should desire them to be meerly the Executioners of our Sentence; but they must take cognizance of the cause, and Judge where they must execute: If therefore their Officers be with us, and have notice of the whole proceeding, they may be satisfied how far to own our acts.

If Magistrates force not, or Ministers cause not the grosly ignorant to hear and learn, and submit to Conference, or Catechizing, and such necessary means of Instruction till they are confirmed, or by the Ap­probation of the Pastors admitted into the Communi­on of the Church with the adult, their Infant-Baptism will but let in corruption and confusion into the Churches, while men are commonly taken for mem­bers of it, that know not what Christianity is, or live in the open violation of their Baptismal Covenant. Mi­nisters therefore should be by Law restrained from ad­mitting the uncatechized and unconfirmed to Com­munion.

Two extreams are here to be avoided. The first of them, that will give Liberty or Forbearance to none [Page 275] but those of one opinion or way, in points where dif­ference is tolerable. And while they think by this to secure Unity and Peace, they most effectually destroy them both: while they put a necessity on many good and sober men, to suffer the execution of their pe­nalties, and then move compassion in others to the sufferers, and provoke many to hazard all for their impunity. The other extream is theirs that either purposely cherish divisions to weaken the people, that they themselves may hold the ballance, and make advantage of their dissentions, or at least do careles­ly permit intolerable Heresie, infidelity or impiety to be propagated or practised without due restraint. And these Rulers will find in the issue, that obeying God, and looking to his Interest, and the common good in greatest things, was their greatest duty, and would have most conduced to their own security: and that when these Factions have a while contended with each other, some of them will fall on the Magistrate himself, and however he behave himself, he shall never be without some perilous enemies. A broken, divided, contending people will never be long true to him, nor strong enough to defend him: but their strength is most exercised in winceing at each other, till perhaps they have unhorst the rider.

Necessary points must be held as necessary; and unnecessary things must not be made necessary. This is the great Engine that hath torn the Churches and battered their Peace. If men Zealous for opinions cry out against errours, and for security of the Orthodox profession, let them have leave to be as Orthodox as they will, and to do as much against errour as they can: but let them not be the common Judges of Truth, nor have every thing done that fansie or fury shall think necessary to secure the Truth. The Scri­pture is acknowledged to be certainly true by us all; and therefore none will scruple the subscribing it; but so are not the doubtful collections of all that think their opinions must needs be Articles of their neighbours Creed. He is Orthodox that holds but so much Truth as is contained in the Scripture. He that believeth explicitly, and obeyeth but so much as is there delivered in plain expressions, is fit to be a Minister, and to have Communion with the Churches. He that subscribeth to the Truths which are plainly expressed in Scripture, and yet perverteth them by Heresie, or understandeth them not through igno­rance, may as easily pervert or not understand the same truths plainly delivered by men. Let therefore the holy Scripture be the National Confession and Religion: and let the antient Creeds be expresly pro­fessed [Page 277] by all that are Baptized, or admitted to Church-Communion. And if any special occasion make more seem necessary, which must be imposed, let that more be no more but a Confession expressed in Scripture-phrase, at least in every controvertible point which godly men do differ about. Let men enlarge their vo­luntary Confessions, and spare not; but not impose them, nor make them the ballance of their Commu­nion.

If any say that [It is meet that Pastors explicitly understand more then the antient Creeds, though no more may be of necessity to every member: and therefore a more large Confession is to be subscribed or owned, seeing by subscribing to the Scriptures, he professeth but an Im­plicit belief as to the particular truths.]

I answer, 1. I can as truly and wisely say that by subscribing to the National Confession he professeth but an Implicit belief of the particular truths therein contained. They are as plain and as well exprest in the Scripture as in the Confession. And therefore the subscribing of one is as good a proof of an Explicit belief, as of the other. 2. You know that subscri­bing to your Confession proveth not that men under­stand it. And therefore you take another course to try the sound understanding of the Preacher: It is supposed that he is a known tryed man, and that the Examiners have questioned him in order to discover his understanding, besides what his preaching must discover. And cannot the Examiners as well try him by a Question about some Scripture Text, as by a Question about an Article of a Confession that no more plainly containeth the same truth? 3. And then if he contradict the necessary Scripture-truths, which [Page 278] he doth confess; Church-Discipline and the Magi­strate, according to the quality of the Errour and offence, must restrain him; which they may as well do, if the Scripture only be the Rule, as if it be a Con­fession.

As Liberty in things where Liberty may be grant­ed, is necessary to the Churches peace; so is restraint in things intolerable. It is not Liberty of Conscience that I speak of, but Liberty of tongue and p [...]actice. Mens consciences are not under the inspection or cognizance of the Magistrate. He that will be an Infidel, must have liberty of conscience to damn him­self, and then to torment himself whether the Ma­gistrate will or no: But if he have liberty to infect and seduce others, the Magistrate shall answer for it. If any Libertine here interpose, and ask me, By what Law a Magistrate shall meddle in matters of Religion to restrain men against their consciences? I shall fully answer him elsewhere, if God will, in a more seasona­ble Discourse on that Subject.

Let Approved or Tolerated Ministers (that have an Instrument of Approbation or Toleration) have leave to allow of private meetings, subordinate to the publike, so they be well regulated by Laws. But if unlimitedly private Assemblies be permitted, then 1. It is in vain to limit Toleration; for all will be Tolerated. 2. And then it will be impossible to re­strain Heresie, Infidelity or impiety. 3. Yea they may meet to plot against the Magistrate, and who can discover or hinder them? To force them to keep open their doors is some Remedy, but a poor one: for they can do it at such times as none will trouble them. What honest man will be with them on the Lords Day at the time of publike Worship, or in the night unseasonably? &c. And they can tell when any more then their own company are there. Ma­sters of Families must be encouraged in their Fami­ly-worship, and honest Neighbours in helping each other in holy Exercises in their proper places. But no Assemblies should be Allowed by the Magistrate, but what an Approved or a Tolerated Pastor will Over-see and take care of, and in some sort be ac­countable for, as under his charge.

If other men for foul words shall be bound to the good behaviour, and scolding Women shall be put in the gumble stool: there is no reason that the people shall have leave to rail and scold on pre­tence of their Opinions in Religion.

2. In publike Disputes the Magistrate should be Moderator in point of peaceable modest carriage. And therefore he should be present in Synods usually to keep peace. No Synods have been so peaceably managed since the Magistrate withdrew from them, as they were before when he bore sway.

3. It is supposed that the Magistrate judgeth the Tolerated Churches to be erroneous, though he judge them tolerable; and therefore it is not fit that he give them leave to draw people to their way by busie publike importunity, which may both corrupt and disquiet the Churches; nor to pour out contempt and scorn upon the Approved Ministers or Churches. But 1. They may have leave in their own Assem­blies soberly and modestly to plead their own cause. 2. And also to defend it modestly in print, if it be assaulted. 3. And also to give to the Magistrate or others an account of their faith and worship when they are justly called to it. 4. And also to manage publike Disputes when the Magistrate shall License them.

The Servants of the Lord must not strive: and therefore Logomachies and perverse disputings that gender strife, and quench Charity, especially when they kindle a publick flame, are not to be permit­ted: Magistrates must not here unnecessarily inter­pose: but when it is necessary, they must use their Authority, especially in over-seeing the press, and restraining passionate intemperate men.

I speak not of Associations of parties to bandy against each other, nor of Synods directly and pro­perly for Government of the particular Pastors: for this is controverted among wise men, whether they have such a Power. But as Scripture and Na­ture require Ʋnity and Communion of Churches, and [Page 282] concord in Gods Work, so do they require the means that Nature it self maketh necessary to these ends: But of this elswhere.

Dividers therefore that refuse Communion with the Approved Churches, should have less of the Ma­gistrates Countenance; and the Unanimous, chari­tably peaceable men, that are Lovers of concord and brotherly communion, should from the Magistrate have some special countenance and encouragement.

It would long ago have quieted the Churches, if the Magistrates had kept their Power to themselves, and also had not made themselves the Prelates Exe­cutioners. If the Pope had not got the Sword into his hand, nor into the hands of his Prelates, and Ma­gistrates made not themselves his Lictors, he could not so much disturb the peace. If his Excommuni­cations were not seconded by violence, and he could not meddle with mens bodies or estates, he would be at last aweary of thundering against them that care not for it. And no Prelate hath any face of a Title to a forcing Power: who made them Magistrates! What they can do, must be by the Word upon the [Page 283] Conscience; by spiritual, and not by carnal Wea­pons. And for a Magistrate to punish or destroy a man eo nomine, because he is excommunicate, before he knows whether it be just or unjust, is but to make himself the Prelates Hangman, and renounce his Rea­son with his Authority, and to do he knows not what or why, at the command of another; who yet cannot save him from the wrath of God if he prove a persecutor. As scolds in the street endan­ger not the Peace of the Land, because they are un­armed, and go to it but with Tongues, or Nails and Fists: so if Divines be kept unarmed, and have no power to persecute one another, they will at last be weary of contending, and when the fray is over, they will be as they were: Or if they passionately excommunicate each other, experience will convince them of their folly, and drive them to return to Unity, when they have felt a while that they are but weakened by it, and hindred in their work, and made the contempt and scorn of their enemies. But if a Prelate, or a Synod, or any of them have power to displace and cast out, or fine, or imprison, or banish others when they are angry with them, there will be no peace.

Be awakened then, ye Christian Magistrates, to keep your Sword in your own hand, and use it for God, according to his Law, discerned by your own understandings (though taught by Ministers) and put an end to the quarrels of Popes, and Prelates, and Councils, that are partly contending for your power to be in them; and partly disturbing and destroying our peace by your Sword which they have got into their hands, or at their Commands.

So much for the Rules by which a Common-wealth may be made a Theocrasie, or truly Divine, and the Kingdom of Christ may come among us, and his Will be done to the Glory of God and happiness of the people: Which I have, though not wholly, yet chiefly fitted to this Common-wealth, out of a desire of its felicity.

Blessed are the people that are in such a case, yea blessed are they that have the Lord for their King and God. Grant us but these Substantials, and secure us these great things which our happiness consisteth in, and we will not contend either for or against such jingles as Mr. Harrington and others do lay so great a stress upon. Monarchy, Aristocraty, or Democraty will secure us (though a mixt Government, or limi [...]ed Monarchy we judge best; and Democraty worst, in most places;) so we may be secured in the main. Let us pray, and in our places peaceably endeavour, that we may see the day when the great Voice in Heaven shall say, [THE KINGDOMS OF THIS WORLD ARE BECOME the Kingdoms OF OUR LORD, AND OF HIS CHRIST] R [...]v. 11. 15.

And then if all these Christian Common-wealths were but by Association conjoyned for their mutual defence, and promoting he Interest of their common King, the earth would be in its nearest resemblance of Heaven.

CHAP. 10. Of the Soveraigns Power over the Pa­stors of the Church, and of the dif­ference of their Offices.

There are common actions that either of them may do: but they are distinctly obliged and autho­rized to special works, which are therefore proper to their several Offices: and forbidden to usurp each others office. Ʋzziah the King was smitten with le­prosie for medling with the works of Priests.

A Church may possibly be without a Magistrate, but not well: And a Common-wealth may possibly be without the Pastors of the Church or other Ministers of Christ; but not well.

Magistrates are not the Institutors of the Ministry: They set them not up, nor can take them down: Christ hath not put the Ministerial Power into the Magistrates hands as a conveying Cause, that they might give it Ministers. Nor do Ministers give the Prince his Power, though they have been used oft to Crown them. They are twisted together, and joyned as the Soul and Body, or rather as the Brain and Heart, the Intellect and Will, as I said before: but one is not the others root.

It is a great Question with many, Whether the same man may be a Magistrate and a Minister? and a greater, Whether one man may be a Soveraign or the highest in both Powers in a Nation? And yet a great­er, Whether one man may be the Spiritual and Tem­poral Head of the whole world?

1. The Papists commonly think, and so did our Prelates, that inferiour Magistracy may be ordinari­ly held by a Bishop, and a Bishoprick by a Magi­strate. Necessity I doubt not may make it lawful, to [Page 287] which all Laws of meer Order do very much submit. If there were no man capable of the Ministry there but the Magistrate, or no man capable of the Magi­stracie but the Minister, no doubt but they might re­ceive the respective Offices conjunctly, rather then the Church or Common-wealth should be ruined, or receive any hazardous detriment. This I stand not to prove, as supposing the Evidence obvious to the Reader. But without such necessity, it seems to me they may not be conjoyned. For 1. Christ hath plain­ly separated them. 2. Yea and forbid temporal Rule to his Ministers. 3. And he hath prescribed to Magi­strate and Minister so much work as will take up the whole man and time. 4. And he hath forbidden Mi­nisters to entangle themselves with the affairs of this life, 2 Tim. 2. 4. And 5. the antient Church univer­sally was of this mind, as is well known, not only by Can. Apostol. 6. 81, 83. but by the Council of Calce­don, Can. 3. & 7. and divers others. Synesius Epist. Cont. Andronicum, & Athanas. ad vitam solitar. agen­tes, write expresly against it, and say that God hath separated the Offices, and that its not lawful for Bi­shops to play the Magistrate, nor for Magistrates to play the Bishop. Cyril of Alexandria is branded by Socrates with a black Mark, as being the first Bishop there that did usurp a coërcive power. What Pope Gelasius saith against it, you may read in Grotius de Imperio sum. Pol. p. 37. He that will do one of the works faithfully, I warrant him will have no mind to have another Office to answer for, unless necessity re­quire it, which is nothing to the ordinary case.

2. For the second Question, I deny the subject of it on one part: There is not to be a Soveraign Pastor [Page 288] in a Nation, as there is a Soveraign Prince. If there were, and one man could manage both, I confess Reason would say much for the great convenience that both should be in one hand. But we must not use our Reason to tell Christ what he should have instituted, but to find out what he hath insti­tuted.

3. And for the third, there is no need of Argu­ment (but where pride and faction makes men mad) to prove that no meer man is capable of an universal Episcopacy, or an universal Mo­narchy; much less of both; which yet the flat­terers of the Pope would give him. If Pope Gre­gory so abhorred the name of universal Patriarck in John of Constantinople; how are they to be thought of that not only usurp both Name and Office, but also make it Essential to the Catholick Church, and necessarily to be believed to salvation? O horrid pride and faction! saith Gregory, Epist. Jon. Constant. c. 82. p. 208. [Tu quid Christo, Universalis scilicet Ecclesiae capiti, in extremi judicii es dicturus examine, qui cuncta ejus membra tibimet conaris Universalis appellatione supponere? Quis rogo in hoc tam per­verso voc [...]bulo, nisi ille ad imitandum proponitur qui despectus Angelorum legionibus secum socialiter constitutis, ad culmen conatus est singularitatis erum­pere, ut & nullibi subesse, & solus omnibus praeesse videretur?] He meaneth [the Devil.] And doth not the Pope now do the same, and much more? What need we any other testimony to prove the no­velty of Popery? And how will the Pope any better answer it to Christ the true Universal Head, then the Bishop of Constantinople could do? [Page 289] But I have said more to these men in due place.

This is unquestioned among all sober Christians: save that the Papists put in some excepions for the exemption of their Clergy. There is no prudent Chri­stian Magistrate that dare or will deny, that Pastors Authoritatively exercise their Office towards him, as well as towards other men. To exempt them from the Pastoral Power, is but to except them from their care and charge, and so from the benefits of their work: which is no greater a favour then to be exempted from all other helps from God by man: Was it Alex­anders servitude to be taught by Aristotle? Would not that flatterer be kickt out of doors by a Prince, that should perswade him not to Obey his Physitians for his bodily health and life, as if it were a debase­ment of his Majesty? Or that should perswade him not to let his Son be Guided by School-masters and Tutors?

The Government of Pastors is much like a Physiti­ans Government of his Patients, especially in Hospi­tals, or Cities where Physitians know their charge: Though a man be authorized by the Prince to be a Physitian, it is but unto voluntary Patients: every man may choose whether he will take their medicines or not. If the greatest Prince or the poorest man ac­count it his Liberty, to die or be sick, rather then to [Page 290] submit to the Rule of a Physitian, they may use that Liberty. If they refuse to obey the Physitian, his Punishment is to deny them his help, and let them take their course. If God have inrrusted Pastors as his Officers, with a pardon to be by them delivered to the Penitent, and sealed by Baptism or the Lords Supper, or published by Absolution from particular sins, it is not in the power of any Prince here to in­terpose and force the Pastors to deliver this pardon or the seals to whom he please; or to the Impenitent, contrary to the will o [...] Christ. We must be faithful dispensers of the Messages, Pardon, Seals, and all Or­dinances committed to our trust. Nor will I at the command of a Prince, be the Pastor of a Church that will have Church priviledges, and refuse Church-Discipline. If the Prince himself will have me to be his Physitian, and yet will Rule himself, and refuse my directions, and command me to gve him my Me­dicine that he may take it how and when he list him­self, I will disobey him, (if the Medicine mis-used be dangerous) lest I [...]end him poyson instead of Phy­sick; that may be poyson in his ungoverned way, that may be health in mine. And as long as he is free, whether he will use me as his Physitian or not, it is no injury to his Dignity, that I require him to submit to my direction, upon the penalty of being without my help. I need not tell you of Ambrose his usage of Theodosius, or Chrysostoms freedom with Eudoxia, and his resolution rather to lose his hand, then give the Sacrament to the proud contemners of God and dis­scipline: the nature of the office may satisfie any; he that hath said [A man that is an Heretick, after the first and second admonition reject] and [put away from [Page 291] am [...]ng you that wicked person] and [with such, no not to eat] hath not said, [except the Magistrate com­mand you otherwise] or [except he be a Magistrate.] Though accidentally (as I shall shew anon) he may be excepted.

The Minister indeed may Command, but only as an Embassador of Christ in his name; and not by a pro­per Imper [...]al power. We may Command a wicked man to Repent in the name of Christ; but [...]anno [...] touch his Body or Estate if he disobey: but by the same power bind him over to answer it at the Bar of Christ. The Pastoral Power is but that of Preaching and Applying the word of God, and administring his holy Worship. His jurisdiction is no other but this managing of the Keyes of the Kingdom of hea­ven. Excommunication and Absolution are but the Application of the Law of Christ to the persons and cases before us. But yet a Message from the Eternal God hath so much authority on the well-informed soul, that it can prevail without a rod or sword. We desire not to meddle with the sword or violence; but desite the Magistrate to vindicate his power from all invaders, not only for his honour, but for the Chur­ches Peace.

It is God that hath Instituted both the Offices, and therefore neither of them can change his Institutions; not wrong the Office of each other, by any depra­vation.

It is not enough for a Minister to say, The Keyes of the Kingdom of Heaven are committed to me, and therefore I may use them as I please: For he that did commit them to him, did also leave him a Law to use them by. And so is with the Magistrate.

1. How plainly by Gods own Command the Pro­phets dealt with Princes of old, and the Apostles with all men, and the ancient holy Bishops with the great­est, is a thing so well known as needs no proof. If Princes sins be greatest, and their souls as precious as other mens, and their sins as dangerous to them­selves, [Page 293] and much more to the Commonwealth then others, there is then great reason why they should be as closely and faithfully dealt with. And he that meets with the reward of a Zechariah or John Bap­tist, is as true a Martyr, and may as comfortably give up his soul to Christ, as he that dyeth in defence of an Article of Faith.

2. But the Honour of Magistrates must be tender­ly regarded by the Reprover; and therefore his Re­proof should be in secret, till meer necessity call it out into publike audience. Not out of fear, or flat­tery: but 1. The honour of God is much con­cerned in the Magistrates honour, for his Office-sake. If they should not too harshly uncover the naked­ness of Ministers, no more should Ministers do theirs.

2. If the Magistrate be once under dishonour, he will be less capable of serving God, and managing his calling for the Common good, because of the con­tempt. It is therefore necessary to the Common good, that the Magistrates honour be preserved. But if he openly offend, and own it, and openly perse­cute the Reprover, and leave himself uncapable of more secret Reproofs, he may be openly Reproved, so it be with that submission and modesty that may signifie that we Honour him as a Magistrate, while we reprove him as an impenitent offender.

It is therefore an insipid Question of the Papists and Libertines, Who made the Magistrate Judge of Heresie? Or, Who sh [...]ll be Judge of Controversies in Religion? For Judgement about the same case is not all of the same kind: but is distinguished from the distinct Executions which are the end. There is a Judgement about Corporal punishing, or not punishing; and this belongeth to that Power that punishing [...]o belongeth to: And there is a Judgement about Church-communion and Priviledges; and this belongs to them to whom it belongeth to admit to, or ex­clude from that Communion and these Priviledges; which is not a Pope or distant Metropolitane or Dio­cesane, but the present Pastors of the Church, the People also having a Judgement of discretion, so far as is necessary to their own part in the Execution, and no more.

For instance: 1. It seldom if ever fals out, but that an Excommunication of a Soveraign will so dis­honour him, as to make against the Common-good, by making him less capable of improving his Office. 2. And it seldom fals out but that it will provoke the Magistrate to persecute not only a particular per­son, [Page 295] but all the Church that shunneth his Communi­on. 3. And it seldom fals out that the Prince is [...] member of that particular Church that moveth the doubt. 4. It is an hundred to one that the Church may as securely for their own Consciences, silently withdraw themselves from the Communion of such a Prince, without any Publication of an Excommuni­cation to his dishonour. All this considered, and withall that Affirmatives bind not ad semper; and that Positives give place to greater duties, and by weighty Accidents may be suspended (as Christ shews, in the case of the Sabbath and eating the shew-bread) I think it will follow, that seldom, if ever, doth it fall out, but that by Accident, it will be unlawful to ex­comunicate the Soveraign, though Church-power simply extend to him as well as others.

Much less may men lay hands on him, or dispossess him of his Dominions, as the Pope doth by Christi­an Princes, or allow the Subjects to rebell, or to mur­ther him. Wonderful! that Princes will so long en­dure that Power, that not only teacheth this, but hath so often executed it.

The Ministerial Power is but an Obligation and Authority to administer these mercies in the name of Christ: and therefore the first Question is, Whether Magistrates have Right to the Blessings or not? If they have not, they are the most miserable: If they have, they must be so far under the Power of him that doth administer them, as the ends and application doth require. As if the Turk [...]sh Emperour were converted, and did believe in Christ, he had Right to Baptism for Remission of sins: And therefore he must be so far under the Ministers Power, as to be judged by him, whether he be indeed a Believer, and fit for Baptism, or not. And so for Communion in the Lords Supper, and Absolution, and the rest.

Such are the Administration of Sacraments and other publick Worship, and all contained in the Keys of the Kingdom of Heaven: The Example of Saul, Ʋzza, and many Scripture passages are plain in this. [No man taketh this Honour to himself, but he that is called of God, as was Aaron] Heb. 5. 4. Yet Ma­gistrates must worship God with their families and people as they have opportunity. Though they are not [separated to the Gospel] and have not a charge of being the Teachers of a people, yet must they joyn Instruction with their corrections; and Judges on the Bench, and other Magistrates, may teach the people [Page 297] the Laws of God. Constantine usually made such Orations as we call Sermons. And that they may pray with them, is as much past doubt; but yet not do the Pastors part.

When Will. Barclay was pleading against the Popes Supremacy over Princes in Temporals (which in de­spite of all the Sophisms of Bellarmine he hath well performed) cap. 33 pag. 265. he begins with an [Am­plius dicam, & veritatem, licet odium fortassis mihi parituram, &c.—Dicam ergo, & grande verbum perloquar, cujus forte aut nondum meminit quis­quam, aut, si memini [...], saltem eos quos intererat id scire, non ut debuit commonefecit: Clericos scilicet per totum orbem, quocun{que} ordine vel gradu sint, non esse adhuc ullo modo exemptos & liberatos à potestate temporali P [...]incipum secularium in quorum regnis ac regionibus vitam degunt, sed perinde ac cae [...]ericives ijs subjectos esse in omnibus quae ad po­liticam & temporalem administrationem & jurisdi­ctionem pertinent, in{que} eos jus vitae ac necis, &c.

O fearful, doleful state of the Papal Nations! when among them, yea even in France, the Power of Princes over the Clergy, and the duty of Pastors to obey the Prince in secular things was so unknown, as that so wise a man must begin with a [forte aut non­dum meminit quisquam]—

It is one of the intolerable usurpations of the Pa­pal [Page 298] Clergy, to plead an exemption for such a nume­rous potent party, from municipal Laws and Magi­strates Judgement: Though Christ paid Tribute, and commanded Peter to do the like: and Peter and Paul have given such express commands to all the Church without exception, yea to every soul, to be subject to the Highers Powers, to honour them, to pay them tri­bute, &c. yet all this is nothing to men that have got the mastery of Gods Laws. Is it possible that they that plead Antiquity and Tradition for their Religion, can believe that they have either of them for this? Were the ancient Bishops exempt from the Judgement of the Magistrates, though Heathens? Or did ever any of them plead for such exemption? Nay, do they not with one consent profess the con­trary? Doth not Scripture and all Antiquity speak as plain for the Magistrates power over Bishops (that is, the Pastors of the Churches) and for the Churches subjection to Magistrates, as its possible for words to express? And yet these Novelists traiterously pre­tend exemption. Persecution by unrighteous Judg­ment indeed the ancient Christians did deprecate and declaim against: but never against Magistrates judg­ing of the Clergy. They did indeed condemn those Christians that were so worldly, uncharitable, and contentious, as to go to Law about personal inju­ries which Christ had commanded them to forgive, and about the trifles of this world, when they all believed an everlasting glory: especially seeing they were Infidels that must be their Judges, who were their common enemies and persecutors! They made several Canons to restrain them from such unchari­table courses, requiring them to avoid such incon­veniences, [Page 299] to refer the matter to some among them­selves. And so the Bishop became by their volunta­ry consent, instead of the Magistrate to them: but this was as well to the People as the Pastors of the Church: And when Magistrates turned Christians, the Churches kept their custom; and hence the Pa­pists would plead exemption from the Laws. It is still desirable that those that live in holy Communion, should forbear Law-suits about personal matters, while a reference to sober pious Neighbours may decide the difference, and prevent the uncharitable and costly consequents. But what? Shall we hence conclude that Christians are not subject to the Ma­gistrate? Yea, even to a Christian Magistrate that is a shelter and a Nursing Father to us? Must every soul be subject, and yet all the Papal Clergy be exempt? Saith. Bernard to them [Si omnis, & vestra: quis v [...] excipit ab universitate?] Saith Chrysostom in Rom. 13. [Every soul, though an Apostle, though an Evangelist, though a Prophet.] How is the Soveragin Power highest, if the Pope, even about the corporal penal­ties of the Clergy, be above him? Who knows not the an [...]ient Christians profession? such as that of Tertullian ad Scap. [Colimus Imperatorem sic, quo­modo nobis licet & ipsi expedit, ut hominem à Deo secundum, & quicquid est à Deo consecutum, sola Deo minorem. Hoc & ipse volet, sic enim omnibus ma­jor est, du [...] sol [...] vero Deo minor est] So Optatus adv. Parm. lib. 3. Super Imperatorem non est nisi solus De­ut qui fecit Imperatorem.] But of this there is so much written by Bilson, Chamier, Spalatens [...]s de Repub. Ec­cles. Sarravia, and abundance more, that all the Papists in the world may sooner multiply their guilt [Page 300] and shame, with maintaining their treacherous crime, then ever justifie so palpable an impiety. Mich. Gol­dastus hath done good service to the Church & Chri­stian Common-wealths, in rescuing and delivering us so many learned antient Treatises against their usur­pation. And smartly they are lasht for it by Sigeber­tus, Aventine, Benno, Matth. Paris, and many antient Chroniclers, but not so much as they deserve.

Only one thing I crave the Magistrates of England to see, that the masked Papists are now pleading the same cause by the Libertines, which where they have better opportunity they do in their own names. He is too blind that seeth not who is the Spirit and life of all our common Paradoxes, [That the Magistrate go­verneth us but as men, and not as Christians: That he hath nothing to do with matters of Religion: nor may punish men for their consciences] that is, for sinning and desending it as just. The meaning of it is Originally and Finally, that all these things belong only to the Church, that is, to the Pope and Pre­lates.

As a Magistrate doth not only Govern Physitians as men, but as Physitians, with his kind of Govern­ment; nor Academies and Colledges only as men, but as Schollars and Societies; nor Merchants only as men, but as Merchants; nor School-masters only as men, but as School-masters: So do they also by Mi­nisters [Page 301] and Christians. David, Solomon, Jehosophat, Hezekiah, Josiah, governed the Priests as Priests, and the Levites as Levites, and that in the matters of Gods worship. When Constantine sat in the Council of Nice, did he not govern Bishops as Bishops? The same may we say of Martian, Theodosius, and other Emperours.

For Magistrates are the guardians of the Church, and must see to the execution of Gods Laws by all their Subjects in their places: And therefore Gods Laws were first given to the Prince and Priest, and by them to the people, as Isychius saith, in Levit. 15. pag. 329. Rectè Moysi quidem & Aaron loquutus est, sed tradi filiis Israel, id est, omni populo, manda­tum jubet: quia quaecunque per doctrinam divinam scilicet sanciuntur, seu scribuntur, primum quidem principibus egent populi, quia ipsis maximè divina est credita doctrina, &c.] How could the Magistrate be Custos utrius{que} tabula, if he might not punish all his subjects that violate them? He that may punish a parent for neglect of his own children, and a hus­band for the neglect or abuse of his own wife, or a master for wronging his servants, no doubt may pu­nish a Pastor for wronging his flock, and abusing the Ordinances of God.

If a Pastor preach false Doctrine, the Magistrate [Page 302] cannot therefore forbid him preaching, and yet con­tinue him a Pastor: and if he misadminister Sacra­ments or any holy Worship, the Magistrate may not forbid him the administration of those Ordinances, and yet allow him the rest of his Office: and if he abuse his power about Church-censures, he cannot take Church-Government from him, and yet con­tinue him in the free exercise of other parts of the Ministry; for this is to abuse and alter the Office: Nor is it necessary that the Magistrate form him a Law of his own by which to exercise his Ministry; But the Magistrate must first rebuke those that mis­carry, and then punish them if they amend not, and cast them out, in cases that make them more hurtful then helpful to the Church. Yet in this casting them out, the Magistrate doth not Degrade them. As he Ordaineth not Ministers, so neither doth he nullifie their Ordination; but only prohibiteth them to exer­cise the Ministry in his dominions: and this no que­stion but he may do.

Object. But Magistrates are seldom competent Judges of Doctrine and Administrations, as having not will or time to study as divines have.

Answ. 1. It should be the principal part of all their studies to know the Laws of God; and there­fore it is their own fault if they are ignorant. 2. Wil­ful or negligent omissions of a person, may not allow us to alter the Office. 3. It is supposed that Magi­strates have the counsel of Divines in such matters. Though a Magistrate be uncapable of Judging in matters of Physick and Astrology, yet may he Go­vern, and [...]or their offences punish Physitians and Astrologers, upon the counsel of such as better under­stand the matter.

Object. By this means Magistrates will be led to wrong judgement, and so persecute the Church.

Answ. 1. So you may say of his Governing the Professors of any Arts or Sciences. 2. Whoever go­verneth may be lyable to such inconveniences. That part of the world that hath escaped the plague of be­ing blinded by selfish interest and partiality, do know that the Pope and Prelates have been far more guilty of this mis-judging and persecution, then Princes have been: and that Princes have been drawn into almost all their guilt by Popes and Prelates (suppo­sing we speak of Christian Princes.) 3. We must not be deprived of the blessing of Government for fear of abuse through humane frailties: No more then we must be against eating, and drinking, and apparel, to avoid gluttony, drunkenness and pride. God hath commanded Magistrates to do their duty: They can­not so far mistake as to become dangerous persecutors of the Church without some grievous negligence or malignity of their own; which if they are guilty of, and will know no mean between Negligence and Per­secution, they shall bear the blame and punishment from God.

If Pastors will cast off the work of Preaching, or be negligent in it, all grant that the Magistrate may punish them. And so he may, if they cast off Disci­pline, and corrupt the Church by admitting and re­taining the prophane and scandalous: And so may he punish them that will exclude the faithful to the detriment and hazzard of the Churches, or the great injury of the persons themselves. As if a Pastor will gather a Church in a Parish, and exclude the greater part of them that are meet to be received [Page 304] and desire it, submitting to any reasonable terms, when perhaps no other Church is near for them to joyn with. It is meet in this case that the Magistrate allow them a Pastor that will Govern them according to the Word of God. And so in other cases.

It is therefore an injurious clamour of them that say, [If Pope and Prelates be laid by, Presbyters will be lawless, and will be every man a Pope in his own Parish; and who shall govern them, or punish them if they offend?]

Answ. Is the Christian Magistrate no body with these men? Are his Laws and Government nothing? Who hath to do with corporal punishing but he? I would we could once see a Pope and Prelates that had no other arms but spiritual: I doubt not but the world would quickly find, how little their Authority will uphold their Kingdom, or maintain their Unity or Strength. If Pastors are to be rejected from Commu­nion, it concerneth them with whom thev had Com­munion: If they are to be fined or punished corpo­rally, it concerneth the Magistrate alone.

This being commonly consest by Protestants, and plain in it self, I shall take as granted.

1. That they are to be obeyed in the first case is plain; because it belongeth to them to govern and order the worship of God. David, S [...]l [...]mon, and other Kings of Israel or Judah, did take down and set up Priests, and order the Officers of the house of God. The deposing of Abiathar and setting up of Zado [...], was just: And therefore when it is but Ordering and not destroying that they are about, we must obey them. Besides the Ministry may not lawfully be taken up or held for person [...]l commodity (principally) but for God and the common good: If therefore nothing but personal commodity be crost, and the Church not hazarded or much damnified by it, we have no reason to disobey: Much less when personal commodity it self doth also invite us to consent. And I am of the opinion that the Minister that doth not serve the Lord upon terms of self denial, and suffereth not (one way or other) more to his flesh by the Mini­stry, then he should do if he were put out of it, (un­less in some extraodinary case) hath greater reason to suspect that he is either a self-seeking man, or at least doth serve God with much unfaithfulness and carnal complyance. We are sure, Obedience to Rulers is a Duty, and therefore we must not disobey them till we have such reason as may justifie it.

2. But yet that we must not obey in the other case, (when it tendeth to the destruction of the Church, or notable damage of mens souls) is plain. 1. Because the Magistrates as well as the Ministers have their Power to Edification and not to destruction. No man hath [Page 306] authority from Christ to destroy his Church or the souls of men. 2. Because our office dependeth as im­mediately upon Christ, as the office of the Magistrate, and therefore men cannot dispence with us against his will. 3. The Apostles have gone before us with their example, preaching and exercising all their office, though they were both prohibited and beaten; and have taught us to say, [Whether it be better to obey God or men, judge ye.] 4. Else it would also warrant all Christians to for bear praying and other worship of God, when the Magistrate commandeth it: which neither Daniel (Dan. 6.) nor the Apostles, or any good Christians did believe. 5. And it would excuse men on these accounts from Martyrdom.

Quest. But must we not obey the Magistrate forbid­ding us the exercise of our office, if any hurt accrew by it to the Church?

Answ. We must prudently consider, Whither the hurt of our silence and forbearing our office, or the hurt of our not obeying the Magistrate, is like to be greater as to the Church; and whether the Benefit of our Ministry, or of our submissive silence, is like to be greater to the Church, and the honour of Christ, and accordingly our choise must be deter­mined.

E. G. If he disable me only from casting out from the Church or its Communion, a wicked impenitent person, in case of necessity, I must obey him; and may yet continue in that Church, (unless I be called [Page 307] to another) but if he require me to apply Absolution, or the Sacrament personally to that man, I may not obey. Or if he require m [...] to preach false Doctrine, or renounce any truth of God (and yet some may be silenced for a time.) For sin must not be committed for the pleasure of man.

Magistrates may not make God any new worship-Ordinances. Circumstances of worship are Deter­mined by God, or Ʋndetermined. The former (as the Lords Day) the Magistrate must second by Laws, requiring obedience to Gods Laws. The second sort are Necessary or Ʋnnecessary to be determined: If unnecessary, the Magistrate should not put it into a Law (N. a thing may be necessary to be determined, that is not it self comparatively necessary, but ano­ther might have served in its stead.) If the determi­nation be Needful or Profitable, then either Ordinarily to a whole Nation, or only mutably pro hic & nunc. The later should be left to the Pastors determination: The former the Magistrate may determine: As e. g. what Translation of holy Scripture shall be of pub­like use; What Version of Psalms shall be Sung, &c. We need no Bishops for these, if the Magistrate, please.

God hath done the first already. That the Magi­strate may do the second, is plain, in that he may de­termine of that which is his work: And so he may circa sacra make officers, as Church-Wardens to see to the building, and Porters to keep the doors, and Sextons to toll the Bells, look to the utensils, &c. and Censors to keep peace and order.

If any Give maintenance to the Church, the Ma­gistrate may not lawfully alienate it, no more then he may destroy other p [...]ous or charitable works: But yet all Churches, Colledges, Hospitals, so erected, are under his Government for the common good. If the Magistrate command us to forsake the Temples, and put others in possession of them, we must obey. If he take from us the publick maintenance, we must sub­mit: When yet (if the Churches good require it) we may be bound to preach without maintenance from him in some other place. Bishops have nothing to do with Temples or Maintenance, but under the Magistrate, by his grant: And yet both are (in ge­neral at least) jure divine, of Gods ordination, which cannot be denyed the Church without sin.

1. Christ hath left the foresaid Power to the Pa­stors and people: and therefore the Magistrate may not take it from them. 2. Yet as he hath left the power of Governing all men to the Magistrate, so no man can take this from him. And he is not to leave people to choose what Ministers they please, nor to Pastors to ordain whom they please; but to see that they do all to the Churches good: None of them can claim a fuller power in his place, then a parent hath over his own children, who yet must be hindred by the Magistrate from wronging them, and forced by him to feed and cloath them, if he deny it.

1. Truly saith Grotius de Imperio sum. Pot. p. 8, 9. [Haec [...]nim e [...] vera civitatis felicitas, u [...] Dei sit amans, & amata Deo; illum sibi Regem, se illius populum ag­noscat: quemadmodum praeclarè loquitur Augusti­nus de Civit. Dei. l. 5. c. 14. qui & faelices dicit Re­ges si su [...]m potestatem ad Dei cul [...]um maximè dila­tandum, [Page 310] majestati ejus famulam faciant.] So the Em­perours Theodosius and Honorius in Ep [...]t. ad Marcel. Neque enim aliud aut belli laboribus agimus, au [...] pacis consiliis ordinamus, nisi ut verum Dei cultum orbis no [...]ri plebs devota custodiat.] Et Theodosius ad Cyril. Caesarei est muneris, ut no [...] solum pacifi [...]è, sed pie etiam subditi vivant.] See what Grotius cites out of Augustine and others, pag. 11, 12, 13, 14. and the Confessions of Homer, Livie, Horace, Valer, M [...]x. &c. p. 18, 19 That it religiousness [...]nd the contempt of Gods worship, is the ruine of Gover­nors, &c.

2. To be custos Tabular [...]m, is not to change them. Some think if Magistrates may not make Indifferent things necessary, and so make new Church-Ordinance, they have nothing to do: As if it were no hing to promote the obedience of Gods Laws? Have all the Judges and Justices of England nothing to do because they have no Legislative power? One Legislator is enough in a Common wealth.

His charge against the Presbyterians as such, is false, that feigneth them to set up Imperium in Im­perio, if Imperium be taken for any Civil forcing power. But the two parties that I now mention do plainly hold a doctrine intolerable in a Common-wealth. 1. I shall, God willing, more fully shew you in a short Treatise by it self, how they debase the office of the Magistrate, and teach people to value him but as the dirt of the earth, and incomparably below the Mi­nistry, that would make him so terrestrial as to have nothing to do with the matters of Religion, nor the promoting of mens salvation as such.

2. The Papists are of three sorts herein. 1. Some of them hold (as Hostiensis, Bozius, &c.) that the Pope is directly intrusted with both Swords by Christ, and is the spiritual and Temporal Monarch of the world. 2. Others of them (as Bellarmine, that sai [...]h, It is the common judgement of Catholick Divines, de Rom. Pont. lib. 5. cap. 1.) say, that the Pope indi­rectly in order to spirituals, hath the supream power in Temporals through the world; even as the soul hath over the body: This comes all to one with the former. 3. Barclay and others more moderate, as­sert the Soveraignty of Princes against the Pope: and so do the Learned Lawyers of France. But all they that do depose the Pope from his usurped So­veraignty over the Laity, yet leave him the sole Judge of the Clergy, or take them from under the Magistrat [...] power, do plainly set up a Monarchy in every Common-wealth, besides its proper Go­vernment, and give the Pope a Civil Govern­ment [Page 312] in every Christian Nation in the world. For is not that a Civil Government that punisheth men by fines, imprisonment, or death? Though it be about Clergy-men, surely it is a Civil Govern­ment. It is long of facile unfaithful Princes, that give up half their Power to the Pope and his Prelates, that the Christian world is so divided. Had not they arm­ed the Pope, he could not have done it. If Princes will not be wiser, let them take heed lest they excite the people to enquire, Whether a Prince have Power to give away his Soveraignty or part of it to another? and what the introducing of a forreign Soveraign should be esteemed, and how avoided?

CHAP. 11. Of the Soveraigns Prerogatives, and Power of Governing by Laws and Judgement.

THe Reader need not tell me here, either that the whole should have been handled before the parts, and the Genus before the Species, or that Laws and Judgement are parts of Administration, and not of the Constitution of a Common-wealth: For I intend not exactness of Method, and I purposely past over the Jura Regalia generally before, and resolve to say nothing (here at least) of the Administration, but what falls in upon the by in the description of the Po­wer and therefore shall somewhat the fullyer here de­scribe the Power with respect to its acts, which I avoid the fuller handling of, and say no more of the Jura Regalia then is necessary hereunto.

I know that Polititians use to treat of this part before they treat of the Species of Common-wealths: and therefore I took in briefly so much of it in the fifth Chapter as I thought there necessary: and shall speak a little more fully of it, for the foremen­tioned [Page 314] Reasons: especially because I omit that part where the nature of Laws should more fully be open­ed; I know also that Polititians much differ in de­scribing the Jura Regalia; and that those that rather enumerate then describe them, agree not about the Enumeration. They are usually distinguished into the majora & min [...]ra. I think they may best be re­duced all to these two Heads: Of which the latter shall be first spoken of, because it is but for the for­mer.

For the Common good is so much concerned in the Soveraigns life, that it is not to be left so open to the stroak of malice as another mans. It is requisite therefore for the safety of the Commonwealth, 1. That there be special Laws against Treason; and 2. That the Soveraign have a sufficient safe-guard.

As the welfare of the people lyeth much on the Soveraigns life, so will it therefore have more ene­mies: and therefore there is reason that those espe­cially should be engaged to the utmost to fidelity and defence, for whom it is that he incurs the danger. As he is sworn to Govern them faithfully, so must they to defend him.

Though some peop [...]e limit their Soveraigns in this, because their welfare lyeth so much on it; yet when a Parliament of their own choosing have a part in the Soveraignty, it is not fit at all to limit them. For it is not to be supposed that so many persons chosen by themselves should willingly sell their lives to the ene­my, or ruine the Common-wealth: And its known that all men are too selfish, and ready to prefer their private good before the publike: & therefore the com­mon Subjects must be forced to [...]ecure the Common-wealth, and not be suffered to put in such Reserves as may endanger the whole, under pretence of secur­ing their several private Interests.

This in some respect belongs to this Head of se­curity and strength, and in some respect to the other Head of Government. For the commanding of Ar­mies is a part of Government. Though where the Soveraignty is divided between a Prince and Parlia­ment or Nobles, there may be contests about the Power of the Forces; yet between the Soveraign and the Subject there can be none, save only about the securing of any Liberties, which by Limitations in the Constitution by his own consent he is bound to [Page 316] grant them, and faithfully preserve: No doubt the Soveraign hath the chiefest command of the Nations Arms: And he that may not command them to fight, doth in vain command them to obey in civil cases, and in vain undertake to be their Governor.

Without this the Government could not be ex­ercised. Christ payeth tribute, and so doth Peter: and Paul saith, Rom. 13. 5, 6, 7. [Ye must needs be subject, not only for wrath, but also for conscience sake: for, for this cause pay you tribute also: for they are Gods Mi­nisters attending continually upon this very thing: Ren­der therefore to all their dues: tribute to whom tribute, custom to whom custom, fear to whom fear, honour to whom honour] The [...]ations I before mentioned.

If Magistracy be not kept from contempt, the common safety and peace will not be preserved, nor vice restrained: As Majesty is a beam from the Hea­venly Majesty, so must it participate of the Splendor in a necessary measure, as well as of the Power. This is principally needful for the honour of God from whom it flows; as an Embassadors Honour is the [Page 317] Honour of the Prince: next it is needful to the pub­like good, the end of Magistracy. And therefore the dishonorers of Majesty must be more severely punish­ed, then those that defame or dishonour private men, though personally perhaps of more excellent quali­fications.

Some call this Essence of Majesty its Prerogative, and some think that Title belongeth but to the Ac­cidents: but it being the principal Jus Majestatis, Magistracy it self being essentially a Jus Regendi, we shall therefore so call it, leaving to all the Liberty of their own phrase. And though it may be thought to be out of place, I shall here stay a while, and en­quire into the nature of Laws, under this Head of Legislative Power, and then speak of the Properties of Supremacy herein: and then of Judgement, but ve­ry briefly.

Yet even the Internal Disposition, considered not as a Disposition, but a sign of Gods Will, I number with the Laws of Nature. But In [...]ernal Acts or Dis­spositions as such, are but figuratively called Laws: But properly the Nature of things (within us or without us) as revealing the will of God de Debito, is the Law of Nature: and properly no other.

So the Law written on our hearts and put into our inwards parts; that is the holy effects of the Law up­on us, in themselves are no Law, but the effects of a Law; unless as secondarily, they become the signs of the will of God imposing further duty.

Let those men that are not the Masters of Lan­guage, be content to express their own minds by their own terms, and give us leave to do the like. If any think that the [Name of a Law] should be used more Laxely or more strictly then I use it, he hath his Liberty: Let him have the patience also to suf­fer me to use mine: and to tell him that my words are to explain my own mind, and not his. It is Things and not words that I am here to open: And it is that Thing which I here define that I treat of, and mean by the word Law. So various are the Definitions of Laws among Polititians and Lawyers, that its not easie to meet with many that agree in one and the same Definition. And therefore among such varie­ty I may have the freer leave to thrust in mine, then if the gowned Tribe had been agreed on some other: especially when 1. I never yet saw many, if any other that I could see reason to be satisfied in. 2. And yet I pretend to no Infallibility; or that mine shall be more perfect then other mens, but only that it is more satisfactory to me: To confute other mens [Page 320] various Definitions would be but odious & tedious.

Because the word [Law] is sometime taken for the sign or eff [...]ct alone, and sometime as comprehending the act of Legislation, I use the word [Signification] as appliable to both acceptions. But it being not Le­gislation (the efficiency being presupposed) but [the Law] as the effect that I define, therefore it is Pas­sively, or pro ipso signo that I here take the word [signification.] Were it Legislation that I defined, I should make the Genus an Act of the Ruler: But I judge [signum] to be the true Genus of a Law (whe­ther prae [...]icamentale, or transcendentale. Lawyers would not thank me to discuss.) It is not the will of the Ruler in it self, for thats unknown, but as Re­vealed; And the will of God or man can be no other­wise revealed to another but by some sign, whether it be word, writing, fact, or whatever, saith Fr. Su [...] ­riz truly (de Legib. lib. 1. c. 5. pag. 20.) Assero, re­sp [...]ciendo ad nominis Legis Impositionem, videri prius positum ad significandum externum Imperium & sig­num ostensivum voluntatis praecipientis. Ideo enim A­ristot. 10. Ethic. dixit Legem esse sermonem à sapien­tia profectum, &c.]

So cap. 4. pag. 14. Lex consideratur—3. in aliquo alio signo, seu alia materia exteriore, ut in scripto, vel etiam in voce manifestante voluntatem superioris.

So Gabriel. 3. d. 37. q. un. calls it [signum verum creaturae rationali notificativum rectae rationis dictan­tis, ligari eam, &c.

Object. Signum is an adjunct, and belongs to Logick, but a Law doth properly belong to the second part of Poli­ticks, and ought to have its Genus thence as being an act of the supream power, &c.

Answ. 1. If Politicks banish Logick, they must ba­nish Definitions and rational debates. Wesenbechius and others have evinced, that the Civil Law it self is not fallen out with Logick. 2 An Act is a Logical term as well as a sign. 3. I say not simply [a sign] but [a sign of the Rulers will] which are terms that Law abhors not. 4. I never saw any fit one put in the stead of this, but what doth more darkly express the same thing, which is therefore less fit.

Object. That it is signum, is better expressed by men­tioning the Promulgation.

Answ. Not so: Promulgation is usually taken for the act of Publication, which followeth the Enacting and Essence of the Law; and is implyed as necessary to the effect of the sign; Of which I shall next speak.

Some had rather distinguish between the Represent­ing and Informing act of Laws, and make the former essential to them, and not the latter, and so reject the distinction of Aptitudinal and Actual signs here: but groundlesly. To Represent, is as ambiguous as to [Page 322] signifie, and is of the same importance: And there­fore if we have need to distinguish of one, so we have of the other. To Represent Aptitudinally, by contain­ing that expression of the Superiours will as is Apt to Inform if Revealed, is one thing; and to Represent actually to another by the means of Revelation or fit approximation, is another thing. A shilling in my pocket Aptitudinally signifieth, or Representeth the Soveraign whose Image it beareth: but not actually till I take it out and shew it; Nor then neither, nisi ex parte revelantis, that is, it is but in Potentia pro­ximâ, till the beholder perceive it. So here, 1. A Law Enacted is truly a Law, as a signum aptitudinale is a sign: but it obligeth not yet. 2. A Law En­acted and Promulgate obligeth, because the Law-giver hath done his part to the full effect. 3. A Law Received is yet in a nearer capacity for the full effect; but Reception or Actual understanding it, is not ne­cessary to the obligation.

Some affirm that Promulgation ls essential to a Law. Let them that think so, define it accordingly: I quar­rel not with them, because I come so near them as that the difference is of no great moment: But yet I consent not: For its one thing to make a Law, and another to promulgate it. Yet the last is a Condition sine quanon, as to obligation. As in Belief, the Reve­lation it self is not the formal object of Faith, (that is Veracitas Revelantis) nor part of it; nor yet the material Object (that is the Truth Revealed) but a naturally necessary condition of both, which some call the vinculum; so promulgation is not essential to Law, nor is it the formal object of our obedience (that is, the Power of the Law-giver) nor the mate­rial [Page 323] (that is, the Law it self) but a necessary means and condition to induce the Obligation; the enacted Law having but the Potentiam & Aptitudinem obli­gandi, which must thus be made actual.

It is a great controversie whether it be the Reason or the Will as signified that informeth Laws. On the one side are T. Aquin. Cajetan. Alens. Richard. An­tonio, Sot [...], and many more: and on the other side, Henric. Gabr. Occam. and others, as Suarez reckoneth them: but doubtless many of them hold as he doth, and as the plain truth is, that it is both: As a man is not man without an Intellect and Will, and as an act of command is not humane that proceedeth not from both: and as the Law it self hath both an Informing and Compelling power; and as it is by the subject to be received both by the Intellect and Will; so must it proceed from both in the Law-giver, add signifie both; Yet differently: For it proximately proceedeth from his will, and signifieth that as Obligatory, not suspend­ing mens Obedience upon their discerning the Rea­sonableness of the Law, which is to be supposed.

The Law 1. Signifieth the will of the Legislator, as words express the speakers mind. And therefore some make [the will of the Governour] to be the Genus of a Law; and as signified, so it is: but not as existent in it self. 2. The Law is a sign respecting the understanding and will of the subject, as the Terminus or finis cui: It notifieth to the subject the Legislators will. 3. It respecteth the matter signified, e. g. that Chastity, Sobriety, Temperance, or this or that duty is the matter to which we are obliged. 4. The Law respecteth the form produced by signification, that is, the Debitum or Right, that is or that shall be Due: All these significations are essential to a Law; suppo­sing that as to the subject, the Aptitude is enough, and the Representation, whether the person receive infor­mation by it, or not.

Gods Reason and will revealed, is the Universal Light and Law of the whole world: The Soveraigns Reason and will, is the subordinate Light and Law of that people whom he governeth; and is the publick Reason and Will of the Common-wealth: Yet with this two-fold limitation. 1. That he have no power [Page 325] against the Light and Law of God. 2. That all the people have a Reason and Will that is private and personal, for the discerning their Duty, and choosing accordingly. But doubtless Gods appointing that the Laws, that is, the Reason and Will of the Soveraign, shall rule the subjects, doth hereby require much sub­mission in us, even so far as that we disobey not his highest will.

And consequently, in many doubtful cases, the Soveraign may be guilty for mis-commanding, when the subject is innocent that obeyeth him.

Authority is the efficient cause of Law, or is the Power of the efficient. Authority is sometime taken for meer Interest, by Wisdom, strength, goodness, &c. by which one man can prevail with others. This is no Law-giving Power. But the Authority that must make Laws is nothing else but Jus regendi, a Right to Govern, which is originally and primitively in God, and Derivatively in the creature. Remember still, that this is it that I mean by Authority, or Power; and not meer power of Interest by Reputation, nor yet meer nature, strength or force. Jus pracipientis, the Right of commanding is the only sufficient cause of Jus praecepti, of imposed Right. Yet Jus concessum may arise from a more private cause.

Analogically as man is called a Governor of him­self, so his will and word are called a Law to himself: But this is no such Law as we treat of.

If Ly [...]urgus or any wise man draw up the System [Page 326] of Laws for Governing a Common-wealth; or if in any Nation, some that have no part in the Soveraign­ty may be the Proposers, these are no Laws, till they have the stamp of Soveraign Command. But as a Prayer in a Book is usually Called a Prayer, which in­deed is no Prayer (for the name is given it ftom the matter, which should follow the form): So also a Law proposed is no Law, but the matter of a Law without the form.

Contracts are but self obligations, and such as may Occasi [...]n a divine or a publick humane obligation, but are no proper Laws. But if any will call his buying and selling or any other Contract a L [...]w, as he hath the liberty of mispeaking, so let him grant us the liberty of more strict expressions. Hence we say, that Fundamental Constitutions, as by man, are by meer Contract, and not by proper Laws of men, because they are antecedent to Governing Power, the cause of Laws.

The Laws of a Father to his children, and a master to his servants, are truly and properly Laws: Yet, 1. They are not eminently such as Political Laws are. 2. And custom hath (but causlesly) confined the name to Political Laws: All that is Essential to a Law, is found in Laws Occonomical.

Some make a great Question of it, Whether Le­gislation be not proper to the Soveraign. 1. Univer­sal Laws for the whole Commonwealth in the main parts of Government, must be made Immediately by the Soveraign: (Though its possible, e. g. a modal or circumstantial universal Law, as about Excise, Meetings, &c. may be made by a derived power.) 2. Local and subordinate Laws may be made by others; but only by a Power so Derived from the Supream Ruler, that Originally and mediately they are his Laws, though proximately theirs. That sub­jects may make such Local Statutes by the Soveraigns grant, is maintained by Polititians commonly (Bocer. Camman Besold. and abundance more;) But still it is but by a Derived Power; and it is but pro modo propriae jurisdictionis; and it must not be against the Common Laws. So Maiors with their Corporation-Burgesses are enabled to make Corporation-Laws: And Physitians, and other students in Colledges, may make Colledge Laws: And a General by Commission may make Laws Military for his Army.

Some will needs call nothing a Law but whats in writing: and some will add custom only: By which [Page 328] the Law of nature it self is made no Law. But how are Nations Governed that have no writing? Doub­less any signification of the Soveraigns will de Debito, may be a Law.

The Command of a Parent is an Oeconomical Law: the Command of a S [...]veraign is a Political Law. Where there is no writing, this is easily perceived. They take the word [Law] abusively, too strictly, that exclude these smallest Laws that have somewhat of the com­mon nature. If a commission or precept to a single person, be not a Law, they will find it impossible to determine just how many must be the subjects of a Law. Its not necessary that it be the whole Common-wealth. Laws are oft made to enable a particular per­son to sell his Lands, to innaturalize him, &c. It doth not therefore prove it no Law, because it is about but a single person, or case, or fact.

Some will call no temporary Precept [a Law]: They may use their liberty, though without Reason. It is not Essential to a Law, that it be for continuance. If not for a thousand years, then not for an hundred, [Page 329] not for seven, not for one, not for a day. The Prince and Pa [...]liament may make a Law for a certain fact (as the beheading of a Traitor, dispossessing the Gover­nour of a Garrison, a Commander in an Army, &c.) which may be executed, and ended in an hour, and yet be a true Law. And if the same Prince and Par­liament speak the word by way of Command, it is as truly a Law, though not so eminent.

The word [Law] is taken Actively or Passively: and so may the word [Constitution] accordingly. Most properly it is taken both passively in respect to God the principal Cause: and Actively (by Moral action) as to the Constitution of Right: It is signum Arbitra­rium, & Instrumentale, non formale; and so it is not only signum theoricum, sed practicum. So that it is essential to it to be both signum notificans, vel manife­stans, and also Constituens vel Instrumentale.

The very summ of Morality, and therefore of all Law, is in this one word [Debitum] (to which [inde­bitum] is reduced) more exactly expressed then in the usual Metaphors and Circumlocutions. Right and wrong is the summe of all: which are themselves Re­lations resulting from the Instrumental sign, (for we speak not of them as in the acts of men.)

Object. Debitum constitutum is but the effect of a Law, and therefore not to be put in the Definition.

Answ. 1. Then your obligatio ad rectum must b [...] left out, which is the same: For it is in obligation all contained. 2. As if the Terminus must not enter the Definition of a Relation! Or as if [the Law] must not be put into the definition of Legislation; nor a Son be in the Definition of humane generation; not the Creature be in the Definition of Creation; nor health in the Definition of Healing; because they are all effects! This is new Logick, to make new Poli­ticks. Debitum is the Product and Terminus of Law, and must be in its Definition.

1. Metaphors may be used in cases of Necessity, or for Ornament: but not in Definitions without Ne­cessity.

2. I conceive it defective. 1. because obligare ad poenam] is an unmeet or harsh expression. It is not ad poenam inferendam: for that were but to oblige to [Page] Duty: but ad poenam forendam. And [to bind a man to suffer] is nothing so fit an expression as to make it due to him.

2. Because there are many proper Laws that con­stitute the Jus habendi vel possidendi, and do not pro­perly oblige at all, either ad obedientiam, aut ad poe­nam, (unless by some other conjunct act or part) 1. So God did divide the Inheritance of the Tribes of Israel by Law; and Laws of Possession in a new Plantation, are ordinary: which constitute only (by this act) the Debitum habendi, or give Right to such and such Land; but oblige not ad obedientiam, aut ad poenam, by this act.

Object. These Laws do also constitute the Jus non auferendi, and so oblige. Answ. 1. Thats done by another Law against Theft, which was pre-existent or concomitant. 2. If such an act were found in this, that nothing to the Question. The Question is, Whe­ther the act of the Lawgiver constituting meerly the Jus habendi by a distribution, or setling division, be not a Law?

2. Is not Lex pramians, as such, a Law? As if [...] King make a Law that every man that discovereth any new art, or Engine for the Common good, as Waterworks, Military Engines, &c. or doth any no­table act against the enemy for the Commonwealth, shall be made a Knight or Lord, or be thus or thus rewarded.

Object. These bind himself to give, and are but pub­like Promises. Answ. But they bind not the Subject to obey or suffer: They only constitute the Debitum prae­ [...]j; and such publike Promises being made by a Legis­lator for the Common good, are properly publike Laws. [Page 332] The same I say of abundance of Priviledges; As if there be a Law that he that hath served so long in the Wars, shall have such Priviledges in the Common-wealth: He that hath served seven years Appren­tiship, shall be free to set up the Trade: He that is of so long standing in the University, and Learned, shall be free to profess Law, Physick, &c. He that hath so many children, shall be exempt from Tax­es; &c. These oblige not at all, either to duty or pu­nishment: but constitute the jut habendi only, though consequentially, or by other acts, the Subjects be obli­ged not to disturb them in their just possessions. And such acts as these I think are the [Permission] that is commonly said to be an act of a Law; For if a Concession be not meant by a Permission, it will prove no act of Law, but the Negation of an Act, as Gro­tius, Suarez and others truly Note. But certainly Permission is not Obligation.

Such also are the Laws for Naturalizing, enfran­chising, &c.

And it is no wonder if some Politicians know not whent to place Priviledges and acts of grace, when they have thrust them injuriously out of the number of Laws, by confining the word to the eminent sort of Laws.

Nay in some cases, (as in the first Dividing of Countries, in a General act of Oblivion after a civil War, &c.) I think that may be a most eminent Law, that neither obligeth ad obedi [...]utiam, aut ad poenam, but only constituteth the Debitum habendi.

But it is objected that I contradict the Scripture that excludeth all works of supererogation, &c. Answ. 1. I contradict it not: for I assert upon such towards [Page 333] God: but there may be such towards men. 2. But what though the work be not commanded by a Law; may not the Jus habendi be constituted by a Law?

3. Yea moreover in the same Laws that do com­mand Duty, and second it with a premiant Sanction, the premiant acts is part of the Law: And premiare as well as punire is commonly called an act of a Law.

But (saith the Objector) A Benefit is the act of a Benefactor as such, and not of a Legislator.

Answ. And so beating and killing in Revenge, is the act of a Revenger as such. But yet as it is part of the sanction of the Law, you confess that obligare ad poenam is an act of Law. And you can give no Rea­son, why the premiant part, as well as the Commina­tory, is not a proper act of Law; and why the making a Reward for Obedience, is not an act of Law as well as making suffering Due for Disobedience. The same man that is a Benefactor, is a Prince: And as a Benefit, it proceedeth from him as a Benefactor; But as consti­tuted Due by a Law-giver for the ends of the Law, so it is a effect of Law.

It is added by the Objector [If any by giving a Benefit dotb constituere Jus publicum, then he doth this as Legislator, and the Subject is bound observare Jus à Legislatore constitutum, non beneficium, quatenus à Benefactorc Collatum.] Answ. 1. I shall yet be­lieve that a publick Law may give many personal Re­wards as a Law, that are all terminative private. 2. If it be but a Jus habendi that is constituted, it is no Obligation to obedience or punishment (though such acts may be concomitant.)

I instance in Gods own most excellent Law of Grace, when Christ and life eternal are given by a Pro­mise, [Page 334] which yet is truly a Law, and will be the Rule of Judgement. To this is answered, that [To give Christ was to give a Benefit, and a Law-giver, not a Law: and to make a grant of Eternal life with a precept of faith as a Condition, was to give a Law, and not a meer bene­fit] To which I reply. To give Christ to the world in his Incarnation, was to give a Benefit absolutely, and not a Law (who dreamt of that?) To give Christ to particular souls for their justification and salvation on condition of Faith, and to give Heaven on conditi­on also of persevering obedience, is an act of Law, though a Gracious Law. And it is not only the Obli­gation to believe that is an act of Law, but also the Constitution of the Jus habendi or Debitum praemij.

But all this I speak with submission to better Judg­ments about Laws.

The first act of most publick Laws in order, is the constituting (primarily, or by confirmation) the Right of possessions as Antecedent to obedience or disobedience: The next is de officiis in the Precepts and prohibitions. The last is de poenis & praemiis, an­nexed to the second for the promoting of obedi­ence.

It is no proper Law by which any Soveraign binds himself, unless he have also a private or Inferiour ca­pacity. To himself it may be a Promise or Cove­nant; but to himself as Soveraign it can be no Law: God binds him to keep his Covenants: and he binds his Subjects to their duties. His Commands also to men of another Land, that are no Subjects, are no Laws.

To make this or that a Duty, is his work, to which his Law is presently effectual: but to perform that Duty, is the Subjects work; and the best Laws of the wisest Lawgiver may be broken: yet must he en­deavour so to compose his Law as may amend or restrain the Subjects: for they are not only Directing Rules, but compulsive for obedience.

Justice will punish but by the Law that is violated: It must be a Rule of Life, before we can be judged by it. Its the Judges Rule too, though in a different sort, when the Lawgiver himself is Judge, of which more afterwards.

Quest. What if a Soveraign make a Law for per­petuity, and call it fundamental, may his Successour change it? Answ. As a Law, they are not obliged by it from a change, but have the same Power to al­ter it as he had to make it. But yet his Promise ex­pressed in that Law, or his Consent, may oblige his Successors, if they succeed upon his terms, before a Change in the Constitution; if he pass a Law of great necessity for the Publike good, and oblige himself and posterity not to change it, his Covenant obligeth him and them. If the Subjects Covenant must oblige their Posterity, the Princes must also bind his Successors.

Quest. But where the Soveraignty is in Prince and Parliament, may they not change a Law which a former Prince and Parliament obliged Posterity not to change? Answ. If it be Parliament that hath meerly a part in the Supremacy, they may not; because their Pre­decessors Covenants bind them till God or the Peo­ple (to whom they are bound) shall disoblige them. But if it be a Parliament that also Representeth the People, and is thereby enabled to act in such cases on their behalf, then they may change any Laws or Contracts, (except when a Divine Obligation doth prohibite) Because the people can acquit the Prince of his promises to them, and he can discharge them of theirs to him. But when any Law appeareth to be inconsistent with the Laws of God, or End of Government, God himself then doth dissolve it by [Page 337] his dissent, without whom it can be of no true Au­thority.

Judges make particular Interpretations, in order to the Decision of particular cases. But to make an Interpretation which shall be the stated sense of the Law, obliging the subjects as subjects universally, or per modum Legis, Regularly, this none but the Law-givers themselves can do.

The Law-giver is above the Law; yet not so that he may dispence with it at his pleasure, because he is not above the End of Laws. The Law is but the will of the Law-giver signified: If he have power of his own will, he hath power of his Laws. He may not alwaies revoke the Decrees of his own will: but that's by accident. It hath ever belonged to the Soveraign to grant a pardon, even for Life: And this is to Re­lax the Law: and to Dispence with it as Penal. If Soveraigns are limited from pardoning in certain cases, that is because those cases are exempted from [Page 338] their Power, and so their Soveraignty extends not to them: None but God is an Absolute Soveraign: Man is but Analogically called so, in respect to God: And therefore where he is limited, his Power faileth.

Penal Laws do make the Penalty Due to the offen­dor; but do not bind the Law-giver to inflict that penalty directly: but yet à fine, &c. he may be ob­liged.

He that makes an house, doth not say expresly, that it shall be inhabited: but interpretatively he doth: For being a wise man, it is supposed that he labour­eth not in vain, nor useth a means when he intendeth not the end; which is indeed not to use it as a means. He that maketh a Law, doth interpretatively say, By this I will govern: And therefore he doth in prudence and fidelity oblige himself to Govern by it, and not to dispence with it, but seldom, and upon weighty cause, and alwaies with a sufficient salvo as to the end of the Law and Government.

1. A clause may be joyned to a Law that speaketh de Eventu; as well as de Debito; and then the veracity of the Speaker lieth on the fulfilling of it. 2. As was last said, interpretatively the Governour intimateth that ordinarily he will Govern by it. 3. But yet a Law as a Law doth not speak directly de Eventu, nor engage the Governour in point of Veracity alway to fulfill it. As for instance: The Law that saith, [He that committeth Treason, Felony, &c. shall be put to death:] doth not mean de eventu, that it shall [...]o come to pass: but doth only say, [Death shall be his Due: and all Judges shall proceed according to this Rule in administring Justice, till it be dispenced with.] So that if a Traytor be pardoned, the Prince or Parliament are not therefore Lyars, much less offenders against that Law: For as they did constitute this Due, so Due it is; and the Law is verified: And as they obliged Judges and Magistrates to administer Justice accord­ing to this Rule, so are they obliged, till they that have power disoblige them.

Here are many cases in which a Ruler may not dis­pence. 1. He may not dispence with Gods Laws, because he hath no Authority thereto. 2. The com­mon [Page 340] Good he may not overthrow, because it is also above and contrary to his Authority. 3. His Cove­nants he is bound to obey in point of fidelity, to which he is obliged by the Law of God. 4 He cannot take away any mans Right from him: for that were in­justice and injury to the person: And therefore he cannot Dispence with a Donation or full promise, as he can with a Penal Law. A Pollicitation may be re­voked: for it doth but express a Purpose to Give such or such a Benefit, and doth not give it: And a man upon sufficient cause, may change his Purposes: But a f [...]ll promise is of the nature of a Donation, and alienateth the Right, or obligeth in point of fidelity to do it. Grotius de jure Belli, l. 2. c. 11. sect. 2, 3, 4. distinguisheth, 1. Inter assertionem explicantem ani­mum de futuro qui nunc est. 2. Et pollicitationem. 3. Et promissionem perfectam quae jus proprium alteri confert. The first obligeth no man further then as he is bound to constancy. The second may bind him in point of meer Fidelity or Veracity▪ The third bindeth in point of Justice, and allows a man an Action, as for his Right. See also Grotius de jure Belli, li. 1. c. 3. sect. 7. p. 61, 62. 5. The Soveraign may not ordina­rily (for the Reasons, Thes. 304.) dispence with his own Laws; but that is not for want of Power, but because Prudence doth prohibit him. 6. Unless the common safety would be overthrown by the Relaxa­tion, and then he hath not Power to that.

When the reason ceaseth, he may withdraw the Priviledge, unless he be restrained by promise, plena­ry grant, or otherwise, of which Politicians com­monly treat.

Its easier to agree of the number as well as nature, in Generals, then in particular: And its as found in the General, that the Particulars may best be judg­ed of.

As Soveriagns can have no Power but from God, so Magistrates can have none but from the Soveraign; We here take the name [Magistrate] strictly for an Officer to execute Laws, and not laxly as it also com­prehendeth the Soveraign. The People in a Corpora­tion may choose their Magistrates, but it is the Princes (or wh [...]ver is Soveraign's) Charter that giveth him the Power. If the Souldiers might choose their Captains, yet their Power is from the General. Choice (as I have aforesaid) may determine of the person that shall receive the Power from the Soveraign. [Page 342] But the great Officers he usually chooseth him­self.

If we have a just and pious Soveraign, and have impious unrighteous Judges or Justices, &c. the peo­ple may groan and languish in continual oppression and misery. Dead Laws will not preserve them against Living Wolves and Foxes. Poverty, and distance, and friendlesness doth usually disable the poor oppres­sed people to prosecute an Appeal to an higher Tri­bunal. From whence it comes to pass that Laws themselves grow odious; and poor men think it is at any time better, if a Rich man do but demand of them half their estates, to let him take it, rather then by seeking to preserve it at Law, to lose all. All vice will flourish under impious Magistrates: Piety and honesty will be mens outward calamity. If Soveraigns look not exceeding strictly to their Officers, the peo­ple will be unhappy: And discontents will be raised against the Government: and the people will easily think that the Soveraign chooseth such as himself, or as are most agreeable to his mind: And when once the Soveraign is brought into a common distaste with the people, the Common-wealth is sick of such an [Page 343] Head-ake as threatneth some worse disease. Nothing scarce ever lost Princes more then impious, flattering, unrighteous Officers. And scarce any thing doth more ingratiate a Prince with the People, then to find that he sets faithful Magistrates over them; and also to hear that he enquireth after, and feverely punish­eth the unjust: This greatly endeareth him to the people.

With most Princes few have Honour and Power but those that seek it, and ambitiously turn every stone to attain it: And few that are Ambitious of it and seek it, are worthy of it: And consequently few worthy persons are in Power, in comparison of what might be, if Princes did their duty. As the Chri­stians were wont to repell the seekers of the Pastoral office, and to seek after them that hid themselves or fled from it, somewhat of this is imitable by Princes in the choice of Magistrates. First they must be sure to choose such as are most worthy: and next, such as are not unacceptable to the people; that is, to the generali [...] of good and sober men; For the impious and vicious would have Governors like them, that will destroy the common good.

1. I here determine not this last excepted case, be­cause I leave [...]t to the next Chapter. 2. An inferiour Judge may judge in his own cause, if such Power be derived to him. But it is not fit that usually it should be so, if it be personal and properly his own. 3. The Prince may depute another to be Judge in his cause, and sometime Prudence may tell him it is best to avoid censures: But the Power is in himself.

No subject, and therefore no Judge, is exempted from the Soveraigns Judgement: Supposing still that it is by a civil Judgement proper to himself that he judgeth, and not by Ecclesiastical censure: There he may command the Church to do that which he may not do himself.

I know that no Sentence is absolutely final but Gods: and that the Judgement of men is of small moment, if it be not the Judgement of God by them. The Judge of all the world is at the door. The judge­ments of the Princes of the earth shall be there Judged. Thats the day that turns the scales to an everlasting Happiness or misery. It is the Joy [Page 345] of Believers, that under all the oppressions of the unjust, and the persecutions of the Malignant, they have room for an Appeal to the Barr of God, where no injustice shall find place. But till then there is no removing of our Cause to an higher Court then that where the Soveraign power is the Judge. Though it is not meet for Princes to allow Appeals to themselves too commonly, yet should they do their utmost to relieve oppressed innocency. Of the controversies about the Soveraigns Judgment, I have spoke in part before. As we must reverence the sentence of these earthly Judges, because they are Commissioned by the Lord, and the Judgement is his, who hath promi­sed to be with them in his work: So must we be com­fortably patient under all those injuries from men, which temporal judgements will not, or cannot right us against, because that we are the subjects of the Heavenly King, and that the Judge of all the world will do righteously, and that we are near, yea very near the day, when all will be set straight, and the in­jured shall have full relief: and they that have cryed day and night to God for help and Justice, shall find that he will avenge them speedily: and the expecta­tion of the righteous shall not be in vain, nor will their Rock, their King, their Father fail them.

CHAP. 12. Of due Obedience to Rulers, and of Resistance.

Because the right understanding of these com­mands of God, is of great use for our guidance in these weighty points, I shall stay a while upon the search of that Rom. 13. which saith most; and if we understand that, it will be the easier to understand the rest.

Many occasions concurred to make this document of the Apostle necessary to the Romans. 1. There were Hereticks crept in among them that abused the doctrine of Christian Liberty, and perswaded them that subjection to the Rule of Magistrates was against their Liberty. 2. And the weaker Christians were the easier induced to entertain this doctrine in part, because they were Heathen Magistrates that they were under. And the Christians, being (justly) pro­hibited by the Apostles to go to Law about personal in [...]juries, before Heaten Judges, but to agree them among themselves, they were readyer to have low thoughts of such Judges as useless or burdensom, or [Page 347] not fit to be the Governors of Christians. 3. And espe­cially because many of the Christian had been Jews, that were hardly brought to any but a forced submis­sion unto Gentile Rulers; and were ever prone to re­bell against them, thinking it an honourable vindica­tion of their holy state and Church, which they thought no Heathen had right to Rule over. The first Hereticks rising from the Jewish Christians, and Ju­daizing so palpably in this and other things, and the weaker sort of the Jewish Christians being so prone to hearken to them, gave great occasion to the Apostle thus to press the doctrine of subjection.

Where note, that the main question here resolved, is, Whether Magistracy, and Heathen Magistrates should be submitted to as Gods Ordinance for conscience sake? And so it was about the very state of subjecti­on: which among us Christians is a matter past doubt; though we are not all agreed about obedience in some particular cases.

The Precept it self is laid down in the first verse, [Let every soul be subject to the higher powers] The first moving Argument is drawn from the efficient cause, which is God. 1. In general Magistracy is his Institution [There is no power but from God] And so it is he that sets up Magistrates, and they are subordi­nate to him, and have a power derived from him [The Powers that be are ordained of God.] The con­clusions hence inferred are v. 2. that therefore 1. Who­ever resisteth the power, resisteth Gods own Ordinance, that is, both breaks his Law, and resisteth a Power de­rived from him, and consequently resisteth God. 2. And so great a sin as resisting Gods Officers and Ordinance, deserveth a grievous punishment. In the [Page 348] third vers [...], the Apostle doth conjunctly bring in his second Argument, (from the end of Government;) & also answer an objection which thence was brought against it. [What can be expected from Heathens (might the Christians say) but acts of enmity? They will still be persecuting us] The Apostle at once answering this, and arguing à fine for subjection, tells them, that Magistrates have their office to be a terrour to evil works, and not to good: And therefore let us do good, and if the office be used but according to its instituted nature, we shall have praise from Magi­strates, and need not fear them. For it is for our good that God hath appointed them. Here the Apostle conjoyneth his two Arguments, from the Author and the End [He is Gods Minister for thy Good] Its pos­ [...]ible a wicked man may abuse his office: but this is the End for which God hath appointed Magistracy in the world; and this even Heathen Magistrates profess that they intend; and such vice and vertue as they are acquainted with, they do in some measure deal with accordingly. But if men do evil, then they have cause to fear the Magistrate; [for he is Gods Mini­ster, a Revenger to wrath, to inflict punishment on him that doth evil:] But men must blame themselves and not the Magistrate, if they suffer for ill-doing. Here­upon the Apostle repeateth the Conclusion, that there is a necessity of subjection, not only to escape punishment, but to obey God, even for conscience sake; And hence infers a further Conclusion, that for conscience sake also we must pay them tribute, because they are Gods servants, employed in his work for our good: And therefore on these grounds Tribute, Cu­stom, Fear, Honour must be given to all to whom they [Page 349] are due. Where he sheweth that it was the Govern­ors in actual possession then that he commanded subje­ction to, when he argueth from their actual Labour for the Subjects good.

[ [...] every soul] is the Synechdoche for [every person,] [ [...], be subject] or subordi­nate, extendeth both [...]o a state of subjection, and to the exercise of a Subjects duty; q. d. Let him keep his sta­tion as a subject, and live as such: The Apostle puts [ [...], Powers] in the abstract, though it have existence but in a subject; and so it is in the concrete that he meaneth: but subjection is due to the man for the sake of his Authority, and not on any other ac­count: and therefore it is in order of nature first to the Authority, and then to the man. And is is not [...], natural power or strength, that he speaks of; but that Civil Power which is Jus Regendi. Whether [ [...]] be translated as a comparative or super­lative, is not considerable in point of doctrine, there being no doubt but the Apostle intendeth our obedi­ence to more then the Soveraign, and yet to none other but those that receive their power from him. But yet why literally [ [...]] should be trans­lated [the highest] rather then [high, or higher, or superiour] I know not: Nor have I any mind to tempt men to think that it was only Nero, that he Apostle speaks of, or only the Senate, it being more that wait and labour in this very work, and to whom tribute, custome, fear, honour were to be paid.

For the right understanding both of the Text and Subject, let these Questions be briefly answer­ed.

Quest 1. What is meant by [Power?] Answ. Any [Page 350] men in the Office of Governours, having Autho­rity.

Quest. 2. What is meant by [Higher Powers?] Answ. All that are in Government, and so above us, but principally the Soveragin.

Quest. 3. What is meant by [every soul?] Answ. Every person except those to whom we are com­manded to be subject. For in that all are put under them, it is manifest that they themselves are excepted to whom all are subjected. So far as they are Rulers, they are excepted, though the same persons may be both Rulers and Subjects in several respects.

Quest. 4. What is meant by being [subject?]

Answ. Perturb not the Order of the Common-wealth. Yield your selves voluntary subjects to your Governours, and behave your selves according­ly.

Quest. 5. What is meant by [ [...]] Gods ordaining them? Is it an Ordaining by Decree, by Law, or by Providential disposal of Event? Answ. The internal eternal Decrees of God are no Rule of Duty to us, nor the thing here meant: But his Institution of the office by the Ʋniversal Law, to­gether with those Providential disposals that make over the Power to the individual persons.

Quest. 6. But is it not enough to oblige us to subjecti­on, if the Power have bu [...] the Ordination of Decree, and Disposing-Providence de Eventu? Answ. Tha [...]s a con­tradiction. It must have a Law, Grant, Commission, or other Moral Donation, or it is no Power, that is, no Right of Governing. The Kings that give up their Kingdoms to the Beast, may fulfill Gods Decreeing and Providential will de Eventu: The death of Christ [Page 351] by the Jews, may fall under a certain Decree and Providence: But it is a Grant of Right that must prove the Right. Possession of strength is separable from possession of true Governing Right. If a Plague come upon us, it is by Decree and Disposing Provi­dence: And yet we may do our best to resist it. The Devil rules the children of Disobedience, not without Gods permissive Decree and Providence: but yet he hath no Right to Rule them, nor they any warrant to obey him.

Quest. 7. What is meant by [the Powers that be?] Is it all that be in present Possession? Answ. 1. It is di­rectly all persons that are in Power. But then remem­be [...] that Power is Jus reg [...]ndi, and not meer strength. 2. Yet it implyeth, that to you and me, and other single private persons, he that is stated in the Possession of the office, and exerciseth it, is to be taken to have the Right of Government, unless the contrary be no­torious. And therefore the Apostle argueth for obe­dience and tribute from their exercise of the office; [They attend continually, or labour about this very thing.] Of this more anon.

Quest. 8. When did God [ordain] the Powers? and by what act? Answ. By the act of Law or Institution he ordaineth the office; and by Acts of disposing Pro­vidence he determineth of the person (usually by the Instrumentality or means of men.) 1. In the begin­ning in the Law of nature, he subjected man to him­self, and the woman to the man, and (by appoint­ment) children to their parents, and in general, at least after the fall, made Magistracy and Subjection necessary to the world. The more men sinned, the more he gave them up to humane Government, and [Page 352] as they rebelled and departed from him, so he forsook them, as to his special Government in way of mercy. He kept himself the Soveraignty over his peculiar people of Israel in a more eminent way of exercise then over any other. 1. He made their common Laws for Government. 2. He chose himself their Sove­raign Magistrate; a limited Monarch to be his Depu­ty or chief Officer. 3. He appointed a course for choice of the Sanbedrim. 4. He enabled them for their work. 5. He kept the chief Judicature in his hands, resolving their doubts, and deciding their most difficult cases by his Oracles. But when they were aweary of this Theocracy, he withdrew from them according to their corrupt desires, and left them to their desired King: Yet did he not wholly forsake them, but only in that measure as they had forsaken and cast off him.

Quest. 9. Who is meant here by [ [...]] Answ. The Contraordinate, that break out of the rank o [...] subjects, and set themselves against Government, as Army is set against Army in fight: All is here prohibited that is contrary to subjection; but not all Resistance; no [...] is the word properly translated by Resisting: There is a Resistance that is contrary to subjection, and that is forbidden: and there is a Re­sistance not contrary to subjection: and that is not for­bidden.

Quest. 10. What is meant by [Damnation] which the contraordinate or rebellious do receive? Answ. Not only punishment from man, but a most heavy punish­ment, even everlasting misery from God, whose or­der and power they oppose: unless by faith and Re­pentance it be prevented.

Quest. 11 Must we obey no Rulers but such as are here described, as are not a terrour to the good, but the evil? Answ. If the very drift and work of their Govern­ment were for evil works and against good, then they acted as the Devils substitutes, and could not be Ma­gistrates, nor servants of God, but nullifie their office as to them. But if it be but in some particular cases that they are against Good, and for Evil, and such as nullifie not their office; then we must not deny subje­ction to them: but how far we may or may not resist, shall be shewed anon.

Quest. 12 How could Nero be said to be an encourager of Good, and a terror to evil, and such an one as is here described? Answ. 1. It is directly to Magistracy as such that Paul requireth subjection: And therefore he describeth it as it is in Gods Institution. 2. Yet it is also Magistracy as in those particular men: But then the Apostle considereth them partly as obliged to be such as he describeth, and partly as professing to be such; for so did Nero: and partly as being actually such in many things. In matters of common equity, and against moral evil, and for that good which the Law of Nature revealeth, the Roman Laws might well in the main be said to be a terrour to evil works, and not to good; though in the matters of supernatu­ral revelation they were perverse: And Nero was to Govern by these Laws: And there were multitudes of Officers besides Nero that were to be Judge and ex­ecute according to these Laws: And the Apostle had respect to these. And the Senate had part still in the Soveraignty it self. But of this more anon.

Quest. 13. But how could Nero he said to be the [Page 354] Minister of God, and a Power set over them by God, (especailly as to the Jews) when he had no lawful Call? Answ. 1. The Apostle lookt at the whole frame of Government, Laws, Senate, Officers, as well as at Nero. 2. Nero had the Consent of Senate and peo­ple before Paul wrote this. 3. Settled possession sig­nifieth a Consent: For the people are the strength: and the strongest can resist, if they will: and they that can and do not, shew that they will not. 4. The Apostle supposeth that the private Christians to whom he writeth, were not the Judge [...] of the Titles of Princes, Senates or People.

He that obeyeth upon any other account excluding this, doth not obey a Magistrate as a Magistrate, but as an Idol, or as one that is able to do him good or hurt: and so it is himself that he serveth in his obe­dience; and there is no Divine obedience in it. But a Christian understandeth that God is the Alpha and Omega, the first and last; and that of him, and through him, and to him are all things, Rom. 11. 36. And therefore he intendeth God in all, and dependeth on him in all; and doing all for him and by his command, all things are sanctified that he doth, and from God he shall receive his reward. Our Obedience is princi­pally denominated and estimated from the principal Authority. In the last Resolution all the Obedience of a Christian to whomsoever is Divine: and all the Obedience of a wicked man is to an Idol, or [Page 355] to carnal-self; to which he subjecteth even God himself.

Beza on the Text citeth Chrysostoms exposition before mentioned, viz. [That this is commanded to all, even Preists and Monks, and not only to them that are employed in the business of this life, as the Apostle in the very entrance declareth, when he saith, Let every soul be subject to the higher Powers: though an Apostle, though an Evangelist, though a Prophet, or whoever else thou be: For this subjection overthrow­eth not Piety,] Upon which Beza with exclamation saith, [Good God, if he had but lived at this time, how sharply would that man inveigh against him, that not on­ly refuseth subjection to Kings, but transferreth also Kingdoms and Empires, and yet would seem the Vi­ [...]ar of Christ!] But of this before.

That is, in all things that God hath not disabled them to oblige us in, and hath not obliged us himself to the contrary.

So much of the circumstances of Worship as God hath left to be determined by men, we must obey a Magistrate in if he determine them: And much more when he doth but enforce Gods own Command­ments: Of this also before.

I bring not the Pope or any unlawfull Prelates into question; who are not as such to be obeyed at all: But it is the lawful Pastors of the Church, that I speak of: In the substance of their office, which God himself hath made necessary, they are not to be disobeyed, whatever Princes say, because it were a disobeying God: As if we were forbid to Hear, Pray, Receive the Sacraments, live in Church Communion, &c. But the circumstances of Time, Place, Uten­s [...], &c. though ordinarily they should be left to the Pastors determinations, yet are such things as a Magi­strate may determine of, and must be obeyed in. And in these works common to both, he is the higher Power.

[Page 357]1. It is not our erroneous conceits that a Lawful Command is unlawful, that will excuse any man from the guilt of disobedience: For that very errour is our sin: If you say, that we must go according to our consciences: I answer; Not according to an erring Conscience (it being doubtful whether that be truly Conscience:) unless you will make man a God to himself, as setting him above the Laws of God, and that by vertue of his errors. If you say, that at least we must not go against Conscience; I answer, In sensu diviso you must: In sensu composito you must not. And yet you must not go according to it. So that er­rour intangleth you in a necessity of sinning, if you will not depose it. What then must be done? Answ. Gods Law stands still the same, and varyeth not with your erring mind. It binds you first to lay by your errour, and then to Obey. Object. But in case I can­not lay it by, what am I bound to? I answer, you are still bound to lay it by, and to use the means that are necessary thereto, with a right disposed mind, that you may be able or apt to do it. You cannot be inno­cently impotent to your Duty.

2. We know that Obedience to Magistrates is a Duty: If therefore we know not, nor have sufficient reason to believe, that the thing is sinful to the obeyer, we must obey.

I have given many instances in cases about Wor­ship, in my fifth Disput. about Ch [...]ch-Government [...] [Page 358] It may be sinful in a Governour to lay an unnecessa­ry Tax upon the people; who yet may be bound in conscience to obey the imposition. If the thing be not evil in it self, nor by a more weighty accident, then the Magistrates command is to the doing it, we must obey. Of this more in the Negatives.

1. If it be needful to perform it, it is lawful and just that we promise and swear it. For why should we deny to be engaged to that which we must per­form? 2. It is just as to the Prince, who is sworn to the Common-wealth; and obligations here should be mutual. Why should he hazard his life for a People that will not swear fidelity to him? Princes, and Parliaments, and all Soveraign Princes go in con­tinual danger by reason of the plots and malice of the enemies. And shall we not swear fidelity to them? 3. If every husband expecteth it in marriage from his wife; and if Abraham made his servant swear to be faithful in one particular duty, much more is it neces­sary in this case.

Yet upon a sudden change, while times and Consci­ences are unsetled, it is a more prudent course for Princes to forbear exacting oathes, left it occasion seruples and divisions (unless some urgent necessi­ty require it) and to stay till Consciences are settled.

The way of defence they may be limited in by the Law: Every man is to do it in his place and calling. Fidelity requireth it. The common good requireth it. Else no man that is wise would be a King or Gover­nor. For if the people be not bound to defend him, he is but set up to be the object of envy, and a bait to the ambitious to entice men to invade him, and exe­cute their fury on him.

That this is their Religion, I have already shewed in the express words of the Council at the Laterance un­der Innocent the 3. And that it hath been their practice, Germany, France, England and many Nations know. Many Popes have done so against the German Empe­rors. Math. Paris calls it the [Papal Rebellion] against Frederick; which Christian people then la­mented and detested. Roger Hoveden (that flatters the Pope more then M. Paris) tells us (H. 2. pag. 284.) that the Pope undertook to damn the Laws and Customs of England, in perpetuum, and anathema­tized all that held them, or any way favoured them] not excepting the King himself. These Laws and cu­stoms were no Novelties; but such as the King and Nobles called avitas consuetudines & Leges; the cu­stoms and Laws of their Ancestors, (And yet the Pa­pists pretend that Papacy is no Novelty, nor the Fa­ther [Page 360] of Novelties.) Math. Paris (in Hen. 2.) tells you what these Laws were. And Becket himself (that was Sainted for such stuff) telleth the King, [Quia cer­tum est, Reges potestatem suam ab Ecclesia accipere, & non ipsam ab illis—ergo non haberetis Epi­scopis praecipere absolvere aliquem, vel excommuni­care, trahere Clericos and Secularia examina, judicare de decimis, de Ecclesiis—& multa alia quae in hunc modum scripta sunt inter consuetudines vestras, quas dicitis avitas.] Here's holy Doctrine! that Kings receive their power from the Church, and may not­judge of Tythes, or Churches, nor bring Clergy­men to examination at their Barr! Rog Hoveden H. 2. p. 285. And the same Prelate of Canterbury Epist. ad suffragan. absolveth all Bishops from their obedience, and condemneth and excommunicateth all the Exact­ers, Counsellors and Observers of the English Laws, [Omnes{que} vos Episcopos à promissione qua contra in­stitutionem Ecclesiasticam, & ad earum observationem tenebamini, auctoritate Dei & nostra absolvimus. Quis enim dubitat sacerdotes Christi Regnum & Princi­pum, omniumque fidelium patres & Magistros cense­ri? Nonne miserabilis insaniae esse cognoscitur, si fili­us Patrem, discipulus Magistrum sibi conetur subjuga­re, & iniquis obligationibus Potestati suae subj [...]cere? à quo credit, non solum se in terra, sed etiam in coelis li­gare posse, & solvi?] O how would Paul and all the antient Church have detested this doctrine of the Pa­pal Saint, that makes it madness for Priests to be sub­jected to Kings, forsooth because (in another kind) they are their Masters, and can bind or loose them? And so their Tutors in Musick, Physick or any Sci­ence should be no subjects? Yea a Prelate we see as [Page 361] well as a Pope can absolve the Subjects from their pro­mises and fidelity. The King himself he had yet mercy on, and forbore to excommunicate (which was then to depose him) but [in proximo eam laturi] he was ready next to do, if he did not the sooner repent; of what? Of the Laws of England against the Pope, and his Clergies pretended liberties. And these great ene­mies of Novelty and Friends to Antiquity, made Ri­chard the first swear at his Coronation, [to blot out these ill Laws and perverse customs] R. Hoved. p. 374. yea when the good Bishop Rob. Grosthest had writ­ten a faithful Letter to the Pope, the Pope sweareth by Peter and Paul [Nisi moveret nos innata in­genuitas, ipsum in tantam confusionem praecipitarem, ut toti mundo fabula foret, stupor, exemplum, & prodigium. Nonne Rex Anglorum noster est Vassal­lus, & ut plus dicam mancipium, qui potest eum nutu nostro incarcerare & ignominiae mancipare? that is, [Is not the King of England our Vassal, and to say more, our slave? who can with our nod imprison him, and enslave him to ignominy (or shame)] Math. Paris in H. 3. an. 1253. pag. 872. Here was plain dealing with Kings: And the Papal practises have been as plain, that is, plain Hostility against all Christi­an Kings and States.

He that hath read but Math. Paris, and the Histo­ries of Germany collected by Pistorius, and those by Freherus, and those by Reuberus, and Goldastus de Monarch. and his Imperial Constitutions (to name no more) hath seen trains and successions of Papal Treasons and Hostilities against Christian Princes, as may make him wonder that Princes suffer such a thing as a Pope upon the earth.

Saith the Apolog. Henr. 4. Imperatoris (in Marq. Freheri Tom. 1. pag. 172.) Scripsit Hildebrand Papa,—quod ipse exemplo alicujus Romani Pontificis Potestatem habuerit solvere à Sacramento Principes Regni, immo solvere in eis Sacramentum, quo fidem vel pactum promiserant Reg [...]suo. Misere­mini O Principes regni coelestis, populus Dei, si tamen estis pacifici, & si estis in Unitate Ecclesiae Dei: vos inquam miseremini & indignemini, quod aestimavit vos talis momenti, ut putaret vos posse in hanc senten­tiam adduci, ut id quod non potest fieri, credatis posse fieri. Nam Sacramentum dicitur quoque jusjuran­dum,—Jurabis inquit Dominus, in veritate, in judicio & in justitia: Quis potest haec solvere, quae sunt opera manum tuarum Domine? Opera quippe virtutis Dei sunt veritas, judicium & justitia—] Et pag. 174. Sed Hildebrand Papa sic scripsit, & sic praedicavit [Quidam (inquiens) Romanus Pontifex Regem Francorum non tam pro suis iniquitatibus, quam pro eo quod tantae potestati non erat utilis, à Regno deposuit, & Pipinum Caroli Magni patrem in ejus loco substituit, omnes Francigenas à juramento fidelitatis quam illi fecerunt absolvit.] Mira qui­dem videntur nobis quae astruit! ut scilicet Religio­sus aliquis Romanus Pontifex Sacramentum fidei in aliquo absolvere tentaverit: quia fides Dei ma­gis quam alicujus aestimatur, quae alicui in ejus no­mine datur, atque promittitur—Quando au­tem à fide aliquis solutus fuerit, & fidem non ha­buerit, proculdabio mendax est, insuper & perjurus, qualis regnum Dei non possidebit.—] Read the rest ibid. But of this I have said more in other writings.

1. The guilt of blood is so heavy a thing that no man should draw it upon himself or his Prince: un­just war is murdering: And no man should murder in obedience to a Prince, when God condemneth it. 2. The Accidental exceptions à fine, &c. I shall speak of among the Affirmative Propositions. 3. Wilful ignorance will not excuse a man from the guilt of murder, though a King command it. But the person is at once obliged to use means for his better informa­tion, to lay by his errour, and to forbear the sin. 4. But when the sin or unjustness of the war is not notorious, nor within our reach to know it, then we must obey our Rulers that are the Judges or discern­ers of the case: For, 1. Rulers may not open all causes of a war to all the Souldiers: Sometime the case requireth such secrecie and expedition, as will not consist with that. 2. Subjects by reason of di­stance and disacquaintance are usually incompetent Judges of such cases. 3. And if they should never fight till they know the Justness of the cause, they [Page 364] would neglect the Necessary Defence of their Sove­raign and Countrey.

Yet, if there be not competent knowledge that it is a good cause, men should not thrust on them­selves, nor go to war without some kind of Ne­cessity.

If it concern the Common-wealth directly (or nearly) he must suspend his execution till he have competent satisfaction: As if he were commanded to put to death some persons of great Eminency and Interest in the Common-wealth. But if it be but against a private person (as the hanging a man con­demned for felony, the shooting to death a Souldier condemned for mutiny) here if the unjustice be not notorious, and you see no great cause to suspect it, and be not negligent in doing what concerneth you in your place, for due information, you may do exe­cution, if you are commanded. But not, if the un­justice be notorious, or such as you may well discover, without transgressing your bounds in the enquiry. In such cases, Princes should find no Executioners: And the Executioners are guilty of the crime: For God is to be obeyed more then man. Doeg was cursed for slaying the Priests at King Saul's command. It cost the Captains and Souldiers their lives that would have surprized Elias at the Kings command. Obadiah is blessed that saved the Prophets; and so are the Aegyptian Mid-wives that saved the Israelites chil­dren, [Page 365] whom the King commanded to destroy. Many that have been Executiones in the Martyrs death, have had exemplary plagues. Its the Legal way of re­straining Kings from unjustice, to punish their Execu­tioners that are subjects, that others may fear obey­ing them in wickedness.

I shall open this together with the next Thesis.

We have here one of the weightyest and difficultest cases about Obedience, before us. It is very hard to conceive how an Infidel or Heathen can have any Right of Government, because they deny the Uni­versal Soveraign from whom they must derive their Right, or they can have none: And how can a Rebel receive Authority? And why should we obey him that hath no Authority? Nay is it not impossible, when Authoritas Imperantis is the formal object of Obe­dience? Also will it not follow that the Pope should be obeyed that is no Infidel or Heathen?

And yet Christ, and Paul, and Peter have so plainly decided the case, that the Heathen Magistrates that were in their daies were to be obeyed, that we must needs take that for a certain truth. And therefore we [Page 366] have only to consider upon what ground, and how f [...]r they are to be obeyed, and to answer the obje­ctions.

Aquinas 22^a. q. 10. a. 10. doth first well distinguish between a Governor to be chosen, and a pre-existent Governour: And then well concludeth that an Infidel is not to be made a Governour, (that is, if he be elective;) but if he be already a Governour—what then? Why then he ill concludeth that the Church having God authority, can take away from them their Jus Domini [...] & praelationis; but till the Church do depose them, (which it forbeareth sometime to avoid scandal) we must obey them, and pay them tribute to avoid scandal too] And so he interpreteth the Texts of Scripture that command subjection to Infidel Prin­ces, as being only to keep us from offence. But this agreeth not with the words of Paul, that saith, Eve­ry soul must be subject even for conscience sake, and as to the Ministers of God. To obey only to avoid offence, is not to obey at all: It is but the matter of that which is Obedience in another: For the Form and Being is wanting, if it be not done for the Authority of the Commander: Even as that is no Belief which is not for the Authority or credit of the affirmer. But sure it is true subjection that is commanded us.

The Truth, as I conceive, lieth thus. 1. If the In­fidelity of a Prince be not notorious, he is no Infidel to you and me, and then there is no doubt. As in the Ministry, so in the Magistracy, if he be in the place, and not a notorious Ʋsurper, he is an Officer to me: The Benefit of the subject from Magistracy (and Mi­nistry) is first considerable: They are means to our good. The Duty is in order to the Benefit. We have Title [Page 367] to the Benefits of the office, though an Usurper be in the place. And having right to the Benefit, must do the Duty.

2. If the Ruler be notoriously an Infidel or Heathen, yet he is supposed to own a God, even one highest God, that is most perfect in Power, Wisdom and Goodness, and to profess himself a subject of God, and an Offi­cer under him to punish evil doers, and encourage well-doers: This the Heathens did profess. But withall they knew not the Redeemer, nor the True God aright, with a saving knowledge, but dishonoured him by worshipping many Idols in conjunction with him. And in the execution of their offices, they per­secuted Christianity, though they encouraged Moral Vertue. What then must we think of such? 1. It is better for the world to have such Governours then none. And therefore they did more good then hurt. There never was among those Heathens so bloody a persecutor, that did not save the lives of many from persecution, for one that they destroyed. For it is the rabble rout of the Vulgar that are the bloodyest per­secutors: Where the Emperours killed an hundred Christians, had they but turned loose the vulgar rabble, they would have killed a thousand, or made an end of them. We should have ten thousand Persecu­tors for one, if there were no Rulers to restrain the Serpentine Malignant enmity that is in the multitude of the ungodly. 2. Seeing therefore that we have preservation and benefit by them as Governours, we owe them duty as Governours. 3. They are Analo­gically Rulers, having an Analogical Authority im­perfecti generis. As they own a God, and pro­fess to worship God, and to preserve peace [Page 368] and order in the world, and punish vice, and promote vertue, according to the Law of Nature, so they are in tantum truly Magistrates. But as they deny the Redeemer, and corrupt the doctrine of the God-head, so they fall short of that depend­ance on the fountain of Authority; that should make them fully men of power. 4. They are accordingly to be obeyed with obedience proportioned to their Authority, and no more. 5. How far an Atheist or Infidel is to be rejected, I shall mention anon under the Affirmatives. 6. Even those that by Atheism, or doing more hurt then good, do nullifie their Magistracy, may yet be materially, though not formally obeyed to avoid evils that else would fall upon our selves, or upon the Church or Common-wealth. 7. And pri­vate men may not lay hands on them, as long as God and the Common-wealth (or body of the Nation) forbear them. If a Justice of Peace renounce the King, and yet go on to execute the Laws, and if the King be one that can seize on him at his pleasure, and willingly forbeareth him, the subject must let him alone, and obey all that he commandeth according to Law, till the King lay hands on him, or forbid obedi­ence to him. 8. Such persons therefore have no right Coram Deo to govern, which will justifie them against the accusation of Usurpation or Treason against God: But yet the people may be bound to obey them (though they know this) not as so Authorized, but as being in the seat or place of Go­vernment, and commanding in Gods name by his vo­luntary permission. If a Traytor come and charge me to obey the Kings Laws, I will obey them as the Kings, though formally I obey not him; But if he be one [Page 369] that the King permitteth in a place of power, I will obey him also, so it be not against the King. So is it in this case, about Infidel and Heathen Gover­nors.

And now the objections need no further answer. The grand Ob [...]n (that they are Traytors against God, and ha [...] Power from him, because they deny him) is answered in this that hath been said. The other Objection (that this would infer obedi­ence to the Pope) is easily answered: The Office it self of the Papacy is erected by man against the Will of Christ. An Infidel King is in an Office of Gods in­stitution, though the person be half unfit: But the Pope is in an Office that God condemneth, whatever the person be. And therefore a sinful office may not be obeyed by us at all.

For we are commanded to subject our selves one to another, 1 Pet. 5. 5. and in honour to prefer each other. I may obey any man that commandeth me, even if it be to give him my Cloak, or Coat, or go with him so many miles: So be it there be not some accident that makes it sinful: As if it seem to own an unjust Authority to the publick scandal; or if it will encourage the Usurper in his sin, &c.

But this also is no plea for the lawfulness of obey­ing the Pope, whose Office is unlawful, and who is the enemy of Common-wealths, while he proclaim­eth himself the Lord of Princes. Saith an old Poet [Page 370] and Historian, Gunther. Ligurin. Lib. 6. pag. 376.

When Princes ruled Popes, and placed and displa­ced them as they saw meet, there was some Peace to be had; but since Popes have placed and displaced Princes, Peace and Honesty are sacrificed to odious pride and arrogancy: and if Princes will not re-as­sume their right, they shall answer for betraying the people committed to them. Its a part of the Praise of the Emperour Otho, given him by an antient female Poet, that he in a right zeal deposed a faulty Pope, and put a better in his place. Hroswithae Histor. fin. p. 101. ex collect. Reuberi.

Private men conjunctly are the Body of the Com­mon-wealth, who being his strength, must defend their Princes right: and therefore must Judge of it, in order to such defence. But while the Body (real and re­presentative) submit, it belongeth not to private members to try or judge of controverted Titles of their Princes. For their distance and unacquainted­ness with State-affairs, doth usually leave them un­capable of Judging. e. g. In the time of the Roman Emperours, there were few private persons fit to judge of their Titles, and therefore the Apostle sup­posing this, commandeth them to obey the powers that then were. If a private man must first know his Princes Genealogie, or have satisfactory evidence of his Title to the Crown, before he be obliged to obey, then obedience would be rare, and Princes must take another course to acquaint their subjects with their Titles, then hitherto they have thought meet to use. How few in England of the common people were ac­quainted with King James his Title? or with Henry the sevenths, or many of their Predecessors, from whom they pretended that theirs was derived. The vulgar must see much by the eyes of the Nobles and Senate in these things.

Of the case of injuring another, and of the change of Government from person to person, I have spoken before. But out of that case, there is no prohibition of God to subject our selves to an Usurper.

Yet those misunderstand the Apostle Paul, that think by the [...], Rom. 13. 2. is meant only violent Resisters: meer disobedience may make a man a Resister in the Apostles sense. It is Antisubjecti­on, or breaking out of the rank of subjects, which the Text forbids. And he that unwarrantably disobeyeth, may do that, though he forcibly resist not. But when obedience in the thing commanded is unlawful, yet submission to suffering may be a duty: The excepted cases are after to be mentioned.

I shall only instance now in this general; In case the Law or will of the Soveraign allow us to Resist his Officers upon supposition of such or such mis­carriages; but not to resist himself.

As there is great difference between his injustice in a particular act, and the Nullity of his Power; so is there great difference between Resisting an unjust act, and Resisting his office in the main, and denying him our subjection. When the former may be a Duty, the later may be a damnable sin. A man that holds the hands of an angry Prince from killing himself, or ano­ther in his passion, may yet honour him and obey him as faithfully as another man; and do him neither wrong nor hurt.

In two cases this is evident, (which contain the particular cases.) 1. The Covenants between Prince and people contain some particulars oft times that are [Page 374] not of Necessity to the Being of the common good, but only to the melius esse, or to the good of some particular persons. If the Prince or Senate, or who­ever is Soveraign, break such Covenants, they offend, but do not thereby forfeit their Soveraignty; unless (which is not to be supposed) it were agreed between them, that this should be a forfeiture: Nor may men resist, in such a case of breach, in smaller things, un­less the Covenants, or Law allow it them. 2. If the Soveraign should violate his Covenants, or the Con­stitution it self in matters Fundamental, which the common good doth lie upon, and yet do this but in some one Act, which he persisteth not in, but return­eth into his way, and is not a stated habituated offen­der in this kind; it cannot be taken for a forfeiture of his Power, nor sufficient to warrant men to with­draw subjection, unless it were so expressed in the Covenants or Laws. Such a destructive Act of his may be hindred, that is, Resisted, and yet the Regal estate not subverted, while the crime is not stated.

So much for the Negative, How far Resistance is unlawful. Now of the Affirmative, how far it is law­ful. A tender point: but so weighty, that conscience should not be unsetled in it.

Else we should be bound to take every man for our Soveraign that calleth himself so: And so the peo­ple should be bound to Treason, and to have many Soveraigns, when many pretend to it. Materially men may be obliged to obey (that is, to do the thing commanded) in prudence to avoid an evil to the Nation or themselves. But formal obedience is due to none but such as are in Authority, or seem to have Authority, and so quoad nos are truly Governours, though perhaps their Title ceram Deo may not be good. Even as I am not to take any man for a Pastor of the Church that is not lawfully called to it, or being in Possession and Administration doth [...]eem so to the Church.

The Resistance of a person in power, in a point wherein he hath no Power, is not to resist Power, (that is, Jus regendi) but the will of a private man: For he is a private man in all things exempted from his Power. 1. A School-master hath nothing to do to command his Scholars in matters about their trades [Page 376] and callings in the world, but only in matters of learning and manners, because it belongeth not to his Office. A Captain hath no Power (as such) about mens estates, but only about the manners and milita­ry actions of his Souldiers, in order to his military ends. If a Judge of one Court step into another without Commission, in alieno foro, his Sentence is null, and no man bound to obey it. So if the Mini­ster presume to command in things belonging to the Magistrate, and not to him, his act is private, vain and null. So if a Soveraign will turn Physitian, and command all men to take this or that Physick only, not in order to publike good, but private health; or if he will turn Pastor and do things proper to a Pastor of the Church, his acts are private and null, as being without the verge of his vocation.

2. And where his Covenants with his people limit him, he hath no power in the excepted points; e. g. if he be restrained from raising Taxes without the peo­ples consent, if he yet command the payment of such taxes, he doth it not by Authority: For nei­ther God nor man did ever give him Authority there­to. If the Constitution restrain him from raising war without the consent of the Senate, and yet he under­take to do it, it is not an act of Authority, for he never had Authority thereto.

Object. Wbo hath Power to limit a Prince, when he is the Officer of God?

Answ. 1. God hath limited him. 2. God hath not determined in Nature or Scripture of the species of Government, nor of the person or family that shall Govern: The People therefore being his Instruments or means, may l [...]mit their Soveraigns in things that [Page 377] God hath not determined of. 3. His own Covenants may limit him. And the people having strength and liberty, may force him to such Covenants as are ne­cessary to their security, before they choose him to be their King. No man or family hath Originally more right to Govern a Nation then the rest, till Provi­dence and Consent allow it them. Few Princes will plead a successive Right of Primogeniture from Noah. If the people then say, [We choose you, (and your fa­mily successively) to Rule us on these and no other terms; Accept these terms, or we accept not you.] If he thus ac­cept them, he obligeth himself, and all his successors, that will Rule on that foundation. And therefore he hath no more Authority then another man, in the ex­cepted points.

Not obeying, is the first and chief Resisting; And that is proved lawful before, which proveth this also. He Resisteth not Power or Authority, that Resisteth only the will of a man, that (in that) hath no Au­thority: Indeed if the Constitution should be (which is not to be imagined) that the Prince shall have no Power in this or that, and yet if he assume it, none shall resist him, then men are restrained from re­sistance. Otherwise in those points he is a private man. Yet accidentally Resistance may become a sin [Page 378] or a Duty. If it cannot be done without the com­mon loss and hurt, by dishonouring and deposing the Governour, it is a sin by accident. If it be necessary to restrain his usurpation, and to secure the publick good, it will be a duty, and no indifferent thing.

If I be bound to obey or not resist, where there is no Authority to require my obedience, then it must be somewhat distinct and separated from Authority that I am bound to: And what that is, must be dis­covered. It can be but Accidental: and that's no­thing to the point.

If there be a Law forbidding Resistance, how un­due soever the penalty be, that Law must restrain us. But that Law it self that obligeth aut ad obedientiam, aut poenam, obligeth not to punishment, but in case of disobedience. The action therefore of such an unjust afflicter, is without Authority: And therefore it can­not be formally in obedience unto him that I must submit (unless to some other Law.) But it may be an act of formal obedience to God, that requireth me to submit to the unjust afflictions of men, when they cannot be resisted without deturbing or dishonouring the Governours, to the injury of the Common­wealth. Rulers are not authorized to hurt the inno­cent at pleasure.

They are Private men in matters without the verge of their Commissions. If a Constable usurpe the Office of a Justice, or a Justice of a Judge, or one Judge of another, their commands are null and may be resisted by disobedience, and by force too, unless where the Law for Peace and order doth forbid it. No man doubts but the Soveraign may authorize us to resist his Officers, when they transgress their bounds.

A Constable or Justice may a thousand-fold more excusably pretend Authority against the King, or in­dependent on him, then a King can claim Authority against God, or independent on him. There is no Power but from God; God giveth none against him­self. All Laws or commands of men are null, or void of true obliging Authority, which are against his Laws. They are not words of Authority but of Re­bellion or Ʋsurpation, that command us to disobey the God of heaven. To resist such a command, is not to [Page 380] Resist an act of Power, but of Ʋsurpation. For there can be no Power without, much less against the fountain of all power, the universal Soveraign. It may be this is the meaning of the School-men and Polititians, that say it is no Law which is unjust; and of Augustine that makes Justice essential to the Com­mon-wealth, de Civit. Dei li. 19. [Ʋbi ergo Justitia vera non est, nec jus potest esse: Quod enim jure fit, pro­fecto juste fit: quod autem fit injuste, nec jure fieri po­test. Non enim jura dicenda sunt vel putanda quaelibet iniqua hominum constituta: Quocirca ubi non est vera justitia, juris consensu sociatus coetus hominum non potest esse, & ideo nec populus: Et si non populus, nec res popu­li, sed qualiscun{que} multitudinis quae populi nomine digna non est. Ac per hoc si Respublica Res est Populi, & Populus non est qui consensu juris sociatus non est; non est autem jus ubi nulla est Justitia, proculdubio colligitur, ubi Justitia non est, non esse Rempublicam.] Of this more anon.

Yet as God requireth us to yield for peace sake to men that have no Authority, and rather then be re­venged or break Charity and Peace, to go two miles with him that would compell us to go one, and to give our coat to him that takes away our cloak; so much more finis gratia, for the sake of Charity, Peace and Order, he requireth us to suffer wrongs from Kings and Magistrates, and not disturb the publick peace for our private interest. But yet for all this, their acts against God and his Laws, are not acts of Au­thority, nor oblige to formal Obedience; nor are we tyed from Resistance when the publick good requireth it, and so the end is such as we cannot dispence with.

But yet if upon this pretence any private subjects [Page 381] or others take on them to judge the Soveraigns acti­ons, that are uncapable, or not called to it, or shall conclude that to be contrary to Gods Law that is not, and shall resist Authority under pretence of resisting a private Will, their temerity and errour will not ex­cuse them from the guilt.

Christ himself alloweth his Disciples to fly in case of persecution, unless when accidentally the confes­sing of his name requireth them to stay. He that fly­eth doth not obey, or suffer: and yet offendeth not, because he doth not disobey a Command of Autho­rity, but of usurping Will, nor doth resist to the di­sturbance of the common peace, nor to the discou­ragement or di [...]paragement of Governours. And if flight, then any other lawful means may be used to avoid unrighteous sufferings, as by intreaty, and by mediation of friends, or as Paul by an Appeal; and why not by forcible escape out of prison, or the infe­riour officers hands? The Apostles went out of Pri­son when the Angel let them loose; and the fear of the People often rescued Christ and them. Basil was violently rescued from the Tribunal by the multitude, and many antient Bishops have so escaped: This is Resisting, and violent Resisting: but when it is but an escape from the hands of persecution and injustice, and is no injury to the Governour, nor a disturbing of publick order or peace, it is not the resisting that God forbis, nor any resisting of Authority.

1. As to their persons, they are subjects, and have not themselves the Soveraign Power. 2. Every man that saith he comes in the Kings name, is not to be be­lieved. 3. Unlawful commands should have no Exe­cutioners, if they may be known to be unlawful: And therefore the Executioners deserve punishment, and not obedience. 4. A King may be limited him­self, and then cannot give the Power to his Officers that he hath not. And when they are sent by meer Will without Authority, they may be dealt with as pri­vate invaders of our rights. Elias destroyed two Captains and their Companies with fire from Heaven, that came to command him to come to the King, 2 King. 1. 9, 10. Though the manner was extraor­dinary by Miracle, yet the matter (destroying the Kings Souldiers) was the same as if it had been done by war; and was done by his voluntary Resistance. Every souldier is not the King: and the command of obeying the higher Powers, obligeth us not to obey them that have no Power high or low; but are the meer Instruments of will and Arbitrary invasion, and not of Power. A Kings will cannot justifie his own acts that proceed not from Power but usurpation: Much less his Officers or Souldiers acts.

David hewed in pieces him that killed Saul in obe­dience to him. He was a Traytor that obeyed the King to his destruction. Doeg was a branded wicked wretch that obeyed the King in killing the Priests. It was Joabs sin to set Ʋriah in the place of danger, and be Davids instrument to murder him, though by the enemies sword. Daniel would not forbear open pray­ing in his house for a few daies time at the will of the King: The three witnesses, Dan. 3. boldly told the King to his face, that they would not worship the Image that he commanded them to worship. Man may not be obeyed against God.

1. If a King (as Saul) would make away him­self, the Subject is a Traytor that doth not Resist him, and preserve him, though against his will. Nature and the common good require it. We must do so for a fellow-subject; much more for a Prince. If in his sickness he would eat or drink that which would kill him, he may be hindred even by force. 2. If in his Passion he would kill his wife or servants, or faithful subjects, he is to be resisted even by force: and he that holds bis hands, and taketh the sword out of his hands, may expect that he will praise him when the Passion is over: But if he do not, God and good men will praise him; and the wickedness of an obstinate [Page 384] King, cannot make the good action to be evil. He is not [ [...]] that only hindreth a King from murder.

No man is bound to love his neighbour, but as himself. We are bound to preserve our own lives as well as anothers: It is as great a sin in a King to mur­der you as another: And therefore you should equal­ly endeavour to prevent that sin. You may hold his hands, or take away his sword, in case you cannot flie or otherwise escape. For, 1. It is not Authority but Passion that you resist. 2. You hurt him not, nor de­rogate from his authority, nor disturb the Order and Government of the Common-wealth. 3. You are bound to preserve your life by lawful means. 4. And also to preserve him from such deadly sin. David fl [...]d from Saul with an Army to defend him: And his question, [Will the men of Ke [...]lah deliver me into the hands of Saul?] doth intimate that he would have de­fended that town against him, if the Townsmen would but have stuck to him. The people rescued Jonathan resolutely from the sword of a King and Father, en­gaged by Oath to have put him to death, 1 Sam. 14. 45. [And the people said unto Saul, Shall Jonathan die who hath wrought this great salvation in Israel? God forbid. As the Lord liveth, there shall not one hair of his head fall to the ground—So the people rescued Jo­nathan that he dyed not.] The other is, 1 Sam. 23. 12.

For 1. To ravish her is no act of Authority, and therefore to Resist is no Resisting of Authority, but of lust. 2. Else the Woman should be guilty of Adul­tery, being bound by God, to preserve her chastity, and so should those that being bound to assist her, do neglect it.

The Reason is most evident; 1. Afortiore: If the life and chastity of a single person may be rescued by force from the Will and Instruments of a destroying and unchast King, much more may a Nation or Par­liament be so rescued.

2. We have a concurrence of many greatest obli­gations to such a rescue. 1. Parliaments we call out about our work, and trust them to secure our Interest, and therefore to forsake them to the will of the unjust is to betray them. 2. There is the highest Reason for Natural self-preservation, to preserve a whole Nati­on. 3. The honour and interest of God, is most concer­ned in publike interest. He that thinks a Parliament or Nation should lay their necks upon the block, or qui­etly perish whenever a King would have it so, hath soft so much of humanity, that he is unfit to be Civis, a member of a Commonwealth. Jonathan was not [Page 418] more worth than a Parliament of faithfull Patriots, or than a Nation.

The Reason is most evident: For, if the King will justly destroy the people, he must do it as a Governour by Vindictive Justice, or as a self-defender, or as an Enemy by warre: But none of these wayes must he do it. An enemy he is not, if a King: or no King, if an enemy. It cannot be a necessary means to self-defence: For he that can destroy a Nation, can much easier re­move from them: Nor may the lives of so many be cut off as a meanes to preserve one. And by way of Governing Justice, it may not be: For that punitive Justice, being an act of Government, is to the common end of Government: and that is ever, the common good: and the common hurt (in a vindictive or destructive sort) cannot be sought and used for the common good, they being contraries. All punishment is of particular members for the common good. The lives of particular persons are cut off, for common good. But it is contra­ry to the end, and so to the essence of Government, and therefore of Governing Justice, to destroy the common good. It's true that Amalek and the Canaa­nites were cut off, and Nations destroyed; but 1. That was for sin against the Ʋniversall King, that had power over them; 2. And it was by his speciall com­mand; 3. And that to the Israelites, and not to their [Page 419] own Kings. A Nation so wicked and implacable, as that their peace or lives is inconsistent with the peace and lives of the neighbour Nations, do warrant them to destroy them for the safety of themselves. And if one Province in a Kings Dominions, were such to all the rest, if he could finde no other remedy to preserve the more excellent parts of his Dominions, he might do it by the destruction of the implacable. But the destroying of his own people, even the greatest or most excellent part, cannot be made just or lawfull by any meanes or pretence whatever, without a special command from God.

1. No King hath any power, but what is for God and the common good: therefore he hath no power to make warre against the common good. His Office essentially is to Govern for the common good there­fore it is not only besides, but contrary to his Office to fight against it therefore he can give no such power to his Souidiers: therefore it is no Resisting of Power, but of Injustice, to fight against him and his Souldiers in that case, in defence of the Common­wealth.

2. Every subject is by nature, and Relation, bound to preserve the Commonwealth in his place, as well as the King: and therefore none of them can be his in­struments against it.

[Page 420]3. If warre be just, either as a meanes, or as an end: The later no man is so void of reason as to pretend (that is fit for us to dispute with.) If as a meanes, it is either as a meanes to the common good, or to something better, or to something worse: If warre be a meanes to the common good, or else unlawfull, then have we that granted which we seek: then the warre is sinfull that is against the common good. If it be undertaken for a lesser good, it must needs be sinfull: for a greater good is not to be cast away in order to a less. Reason will cry shame on this. Though it were the Right and Prerogative of the King, it cannot be justly preferred before the common good: For even his Prerogative, as his Office and Government it self, are the meanes to this.

Two things indeed are above the common good of a Nation: One is the Interest, Pleasure and Honour of God himself. The other is the good of the world; or of many and greater Nations round about. And the welfare of these (and of the Church universal) may be a higher end then a Nations good, but no­thing else.

The Reason it is plain in what is said: 1. If not on­ly his Rights, but his very Office and Administration be propter bonum publicum, then may he not plead or defend those Rights contra bonum publicum: But the [Page 421] Antecedent is past controversie: therefore so must be the consequent.

2. An excessive penalty beyond the proportion of the offence, may make that cause bad, that else would have been good; The danger or ruin of the Common­wealth, or its felicity is such a punishment. If a King be wronged, he must be righted according to the pro­portion of his wrong: whatever is against the Com­monwealth, especially in the great matters of its safe­ty and felicity, is incomparably above the proportion of his wrong: It is more injustice to seek the destru­ction of the common good, for a real injury to a sin­gle person, then it was in them to do that injury.

Reasons of the Antecedent: 1. The very miseries of a warre do hazzard all the saftety and felicity, yea the being of the Commonwealth.

2. He that raiseth warre proclaimeth hostility with them he warreth against. He that proclaimeth hostili­ty against the Nation, deposeth all friendly Relations, and is supposed to be one that will deal as an enemy. An enemy is to be supposed to be one that intendeth not the good or felicity of the Commonwealth.

1. Otherwise they should never use meanes for their security: For it's easie to say, I intend not the common hart: And who will not say it, how hostile soever his actions be.

2. Quid verba audiam, cum facta videam? War is not an act of Government, but Hostility. Men are not in reason to be supposed to intend their enemies good. If they fight, we are to believe they would kill: and nature believeth not killing to be an act of friendship.

3. He that raiseth War but against a faction of Re­bels, that hinder or disturb the common Peace, doth not make the Nation or Commonwealth it self, but those Rebels to be a Party: He that makes the Na­tion the adverse Party, cannot be supposed to intend only a Party of Rebels.

4. A Nation conquered by the sword, hath no se­curity for their safety, liberty or felicity: If they ever have it, it must be from the mercy of the Conquerour. He that puts himself into a garb and state of Hostility, is not to be trusted to for mercy, but when there is no other remedy. When a Nation hath lost their just security for safety, liberty and felicity, they have in­terpretatively lost their safety, liberty and felicity it self. In the Constitution it is now supposed, that they provided for the security of the Common good, and put not the lives and states of all men, into the ar­bitrary [Page 423] power of one man, that all should live or die at his beck, and the Nation perish, if he fell into a phren­sie. Now Conquest depriveth them of their security. They are then at the mercy of the Conquerour: therefore the Constitution is altered; and interpreta­tively all is gone. The King may mean better: But Kingdoms and common Felicity are not all to be ven­tured, upon the secret unknown good meanings and good wills of Kings.

5. A Prince is not his own strength. If he govern by his own Wisdome and Vertue, yet must he execute by others strength. If it be by the People, it cannot be against them; for they will not be against them­selves. If by Strangers, or a Faction at home, (es­pecially Delinquents, or irritated impious men) the Nation is not to trust them with its felicity. Those that the King conquereth by, may master him when they please: They are stronger then he. His good meanings therefore are no security to the Nation, if he conquer them by such as mean them hurt, or as the Nation hath no cause to trust. Especially when it is so commonly, that the Conquerours have a self-inte­rest opposite to that of the conquered; and that self-interest so much ruleth the world. It is a plain case then, that whatsoever is secretly intended, the Nation is to suppose it to be against their felicity, when they are the Party that War is raised against. And con­sequently that no War can be lawfully raised by a King against his people (that is, the Body of the Na­tion) because none can be lawfully raised against the common Good.

Object. But then Princes are left without remedy, if they are injured by the people.

Answ. 1. They think it meet that the People be left without remedy, if injured by them: and there­fore they say, they are responsible to God alone.

2. A remedy is to be sought by Government or by War: By Government they may have remedy against particular persons, or the whole by such light and le­gal penalties, as are not against the Commonwealth. But if this will not do, if their injury be too great to be born, they may lay down their Crowns at pleasure, Crowns are not like Lands, that men hold primarily, Jure Dominij: They are not primarily the matter of Propriety. Government (that's Lawfull, and not Ty­ranny) is a meanes to publike good. When any mans possession of his Crown doth cease to be a meanes to the publike Good, and this without the peoples injury, it is then his duty to resign it, and no injury to be de­prived of it. For the meanes is no meanes when it is against the end. If the Nation injuriously deprive themselves of a worthy Prince, the hurt will be their own, and they punish themselves: But if it be necessarily to their welfare, it is no injury to him.

But the King that by War will seek reparations from the body of the People, doth put himself into a hostile state, and tell them actually that he looks to his own good more then theirs, and bids them take him for their enemy, and so defend themselves if they can.

This is a plain consequent of the former.

1. They resist no true Authority, in resisting him that warreth against the Commonwealth, which is the end of Government.

2. All are engaged to defend it.

3. It being the end, no meanes can be pleaded a­gainst it.

4. A simili. If my own Father or Mother wrong another by a foul word, and the injured person seek their ruine for it: I must not forbear defending my parents, because they were offenders; so be it I pro­test against their wrong doing.

2. A Lawyer at the Bar may plead against an ex­cessive mulct or penalty, that would be imposed on a culpable Client. If his Client have done a trivial wrong, and another would therefore take away his estate or life, the party that had the worse cause quo­ad culpam, hath the best quoad paenam, and the Law­yer may defend him: And so must a Subject the Com­monwealth from hurt and danger.

3. If our own King had wronged the Pope or King of Spain, or a savage Indian King; and a War begin upon it; Is it be justly supposed that the enemy if he should prevail, would destroy the happiness of the Commonwealth, we may and must all fight against them, for the defence of the Commonwealth; but not for the justifying of the Princes cause, which we may possibly be called to protest against. Every wrong that's done by a King, doth not forfeit the peoples happiness, nor warrant the enemies to invade it, nor exempt them from defending it.

Proved. If they must discern their danger either with their own eyes immediately, or with others; it is not necessary that it be by their own immediately. For Countrymen are unacquainted with State-affairs, and with enemies contrivances at home and abroad: And nothing more easie then to bring them past all remedy, before they can see the evil themselves. And what need they Trustees, if themselves immediately were capable. If it must be by others, either by the King, or their Trustees. If they do trust the King absolutely and entirely, they must stand to it: But then what need they choose Trustees. Kings being much trusted against strangers, our case supposeth, that the people do not absolutely trust him, but that in the Constitution, they have provided, that the publike peace and felicity shall be held by reasonable security, and not meer trust in the Princes will: And that Par­liaments are appointed to that end. And if so, they are to be trusted accordingly.

And as the Constitution and our Choice requireth it, so their Interests require it; they being many, and their Interest great, and not lying so much within the temptation of an opposition to the peoples interest, as the Princes doth: And it is supposed that the Con­stitution of the Government, appointeth them for [Page 427] this very end, to secure the people from the usurpati­on and tyranny of Kings: and therefore in that case Kings are not by the people to be credited before them; for then they should not appoint or choose them.

For 1. This supposeth them in fullest capacity to [...]ern them. They that are legally the Kings chief Council, are to be supposed acquainted with State-affairs, and how things stand between him and the people. 2. And the King himself having not his office for himself, but for the people, is to see their danger and remedies by the Council, which the Constitution doth appoint him. The Law therefore supposeth them to be the most credible Judges.

The Reasons are plain: 1. Because the dangers of the Commonwealth were first declared by competent Judges, and credible Witnesses. 2. Because all their own dangers and oppositions is justly supposed to be [Page 428] for the sake of the Commonwealth. 3. Because they are the Commonwealth, or people Representative. 4. Because being the only legal Trustees appointed for the Nations security from tyranny, when they are conquered, our security is conquered, and the ve­ry Constitution overthrown.

This case is plain: For 1. It is Subjects here that the War is raised against. 2. It is in a legal execu­tion of Justice. 3. It is against no Authority: For it is in a case, where it is supposed that the King hath no power to pardon or protect, it's supposed that his protecting power is restrained unto certain cases, of which this is none. 4. If all Delinquents or enemies shall scape, that will but rise in Arms for their securi­ty, Commonwealths are destroyed, and Justice and Judgement are idle names, when a few Thieves may easily kill the Judge. And if Kings shall have power to pardon all Delinquents without limitation, the common good is wholly intrusted to their wils, where the King is absolute and above all Laws, he may pro­tect all offendors. But where the Laws are above the [Page 429] King, they must be obeyed though his will be against it, and he forbid it: For his will is not his Autho­rity.

1. If the Rights be but such as are needfull ad meli­ [...]s esse, or the loss of them be tolerable, the defence of them must not be by deposing the Prince, but by gentler meanes: Though as Thieves are hanged for robbing one man, so divers Subjects may be destroy­ed for robbing the Commonwealth at the Kings com­mand, of its Rights and Liberties. 2. But if people to avoid a civil War, have expresly tyed themselves not to resist a King or Subjects, that by his command do deprive them of their Liberties, then they are wholly at his will. 3. But such a Consent or Obliga­tion is not to be supposed, unless it be expressed. For 1. The very Covenanting for our Rights importeth, that we secure them, and leave them not meerly to the Princes will. 2. And in Covenanting for them, we exempt them from his power; so that in invading them he is but a private man; and in resisting him we resist not Authority, but Will. For if he have power of our excepted Rights, it is either immediately from God, or mediately by Consent of men. Not the for­mer: For we suppose it to be in cases that God hath [Page 430] left undetermined. The people can have no Right to that which God himself takes from them: Nor by man: For it is supposed that the people have excepted these things from the Princes power, and he consented.

Though every breach of Covenant forfeiteth not the Crown, yet every Covenant or Consent of [...] Prince doth shew the limits of his Power. If he (that naturally had no more right than other men) do ac­cept the Government on such and such termes, or afterward Consent to them, he hath no power be­yond or against those termes: and therefore he may not break his Oaths.

I spake before of the peoples Rights reserved from the Kings power: I speak now of the allowance of the Law. If the Law be above the King, then may be do what the Law alloweth, though against his will. If it allow us to sue the King in his Courts of Justice, we may do it: If it allow us to sue his Agents, as subjects that have broke the Law, though by his command, we may do it. If the King bid a man murder another, I [Page 431] may sue him, and hang him against the Kings will, if the Law allow it. If the Kings Tenant keep an un­just possession against me, it is lawfull for me to sue him at Law, and at last, if he forcibly resist, the She­riff may raise the Power of the County to eject him, though against the Kings will, when the Law allow­eth it. And if the Law allow us to resist his Armies, we may do it: and so doing, we Resist no Power, but strength and will. But where the King is Absolute above the Laws, as being meerly his own Acts, there we may Resist, till he repeal the Law, or forbid us, and no longer (on that account.)

The Conclusion needs no proof; because Sove­raignty as such hath the Power of Arms, and of Laws themselves. The Law that saith the King shall have the Militia, supposeth it to be against enemies, and not against the Commonwealth, nor them that have part of the Soveraignty with him. To Resist him here, is not to resist Power, but Usurpation, and pri­vate will. In such a case, the Parliament is no more to be Resisted than he; because they also are the high­er Power.

A people may give an honorary Title to the Prince, and not give the same to others that have part in the Soveraignty: and this is ordinary: sometimes for the Nations honour, which they would have to be abroad conspicuous in their Prince: and sometimes to please him instead of fuller power. Those therefore that will judge of the power of Princes by their Ti­tles or Names, and thence fetch Arguments to re­solve mens consciences, know not what a narrow foundation they build on: Of which see Mr. Lawson against Hobbs his Politicks.

The Reason is plain: Because though they are ma­ny natural persons, they are all but one civil person; and because that all the power of Arms here is either defensive against Enemies, or vindictive and punitive against offending Subjects. But none in soveraignty while such, are to be taken as enemies: And neither [Page 433] part that have the Soveraignty, as such, can be offend­ing Subjects; for they are no Subjects. Indeed in such a Senate, the persons considered disjunctly may be Subjects: but it is conjunctly as a house or body, that they have the Soveraignty. Moreover, all lawfull War is for the common good: But the dissolution of the fundamental Constitution, is not to be taken for the common good, but grievous hurt and ruine, though when necessity dissolveth it, the best parts must be first secured from perdition.

1. It is notorious to the Nation, when the King and Senate (that are now supposed to be sharers in the Soveraignty) do disagree, and fall into hostility and open War, that the frame of the fundamental Constitution is dissolved. And when the ship is split or sinking, it's time for the passengers to save them­selves and their goods as well as they can: When the house is on fire, we must shift for our selves and that we have: When the Government dissolveth it self, they that possessed it turn us loose to rule our selves, and defend our selves. If a man fight against himself, he is to be held as a distracted man: And so should King and Senate be in such a case, being but one civil person: But if any will rush in, and help one hand a­gainst [Page 434] the other, the people must either fall on them, or otherwise secure themselves. In this case the Prince hath no offensive power against the Senate, nor the Senate against the Prince: and therefore we should so obey neither, nor help neither, as such: But if we see that all will not be so wise or honest, but some De­linquents will adhere to one of the parties, and some foolish people to the other, we must then look to the Commonwealth.

And here if one party have the juster cause caeteris paribus, we must adhere to that part; not as authori­zed primarily against the other, but as justly defend­ing themselves against them. But si caetera non sint pa­ria, that is, if the welfare of the Commonwealth lie on one side more then the other, yea though that side had at first begun the wrong, (much more if that par­ty were just and innocent) we must joyn with that part: yea or against both, if the safety of the Com­monwealth require it. For then we go not against Authority; neither King nor Senate having Authori­ry (unless to defend themselves and the Nation) a­gainst the other. And surely whether we may save the Commonwealth against Authority or not, there is no doubt but we may save it without any governing Authority, when it is not against it. Nature that al­loweth self-preservation to all, that sorseit not their lives, doth eminently require a Nation to preserve themselves; their common welfare being a thing that can be forfeited to none but God, and neighbour Na­tions; not to any within themselves. It is not the falling out of King and Parliament that forfeiteth the Nations happiness, or can make [...] unlawfull to pre­serve it. If you suppose them both to be guilty of an [Page 435] unjust War, as having no power against each other, then may the people de [...]end themselves against the Souldiers of both, as being but praedones & grassato­res: Or make use of either to further their defence. But if one of them as a defender, or on other ac­counts have the more righteous cause, the people may joyn with them so farre as it is righteous, securing still the Commonwealth. A King may have cause to blame a Parliament, when he hath no cause that will justifie raising a War against them; and a Parliament may have cause to blame a King, and yet none to raise War against him. In this case, when one is originally in the fault, or it's ten to one, both of them in some fault before a War, but neither of them in such fault as will warrant a War against the other, (which is a dissolving of the Government it self, and is an injury to the Commonwealth, more then to themselves) the people may joyn with neither of them as offenders a­gainst the other, but must first look to themselves and the common safety which the contenders do forsake, and next consider what use may be made of either to that end; and in subserviency to it, rather to defend the innocent then the guilty: The Law knowes not a Division, but supposeth an Ʋnity; and therefore it hath nothing to do in directing any of the Subjects to fight against either King or Parliament: When it comes to this, the business is resolved into the funda­mental Lawes of God and nature, antecedent to all humane Lawes. The Defender may have a just War against the Invader, by the grounds of nature: But neither of their causes is to be preferred to the Com­monwealth. And if finis gratia for the common safety, the people should take part with the more culpable [Page 436] side, not as owning their original causes, but as joyn­ing with them for the common sasety; this maketh not the people guilty of the ill beginning or cause of those they joyn with. e. g. As I said before, if the King abuse the Pope or Turk, and they raise War a­gainst him for it, the people taking his part to prevent the Nations overthrow, do not thereby engage them­selves in the original of the quarrel, nor become guil­ty of his fault, nor of any unlawfull War; for they manage it but as defensive, against such as would take unjust revenge of the innocent. And so if a Parlia­ment should somewhat dishonour or abuse a King, (when yet neither of them should go to War for it) the people joyning with the Parliament, are not guilty of that abuse; nor of an unlawfull War, while they interesse themselves only in the business of their own preservation, and not in the original of the dif­ference. The Law of nature stands, when men do sin­fully dissolve the Commonwealth.

If it be said in the fundamental Contracts, that in case the King and Parliament differ, the Subject shall adhere to King against Parliament, or to Parlia­ment against King; then in that case the other loseth his Authority, or rather had but a diminutive part, which might be resisted. But this is a case that sel­dom happens: For were there such a determination, that one must not be obeyed, they would not enter [Page 437] into the contention, unless by force to make a change.

This is most evident from all that is said before, and needeth no more proof. But I suppose some will say here, that then the case is hard with Kings that have Parliaments to joyn with them in the Soveraign power: for the people must alwayes take part with the Parliament, though they do the wrong, because it is they that are their Trustees and Representatives, and so Kings must ever be at their mercy.

I answer, 1. Where this is the Constitution, it is supposed that a King must never fight against his peo­ple, or Parliament: and if he receive the Crown on these termes, he meeteth with nothing but what he consented to; he might have refused it, and may leave it when he will. He must never expect upon any pretence of self-preservation, to have the peoples consent, that he shall have power to destroy them, or make War against them or their Trustees.

2. But yet there are cases in which we all must take part with a King against a Parliament: As 1. If they would wrong a King, and depose him unjustly, and [Page 438] change the Government, for which they have no power, the body of the Nation may refuse to serve them in it, yea may for [...]ibly restrain them. 2. If they notoriously betray their trust, not in some tolerable matters, but in the fundamentals, or points that the common good dependeth on, and engage in a cause that would destroy the happiness of the Common-wealth; it is then the peoples duty to forsake them, and cleave to the King against them, if they be ene­mies to the Commonwealth: But this is not to be sus­pected till it be notorious. But Parliaments are inde­fectible: Should they ever be so corrupt as to seek our ruine, we should not think our selves obliged to obey them or defend them. They may forfeit their power as well as Kings: But no such thought must be enter­tained of either, till necessity force it.

1. 'Tis not a change in smaller matters, but the substan [...]ials of the Government that we speak of. 2. It is not a sudden passionate act, but a setled en­deavour that we speak of. 3. And so the case is plain. [...]or 1. In Contracts each party is conditio­nally obliged: And we are bound to him, on condi­tion [...]e be true to us. If one party shall remain bound, though the other violate their fidelity, the Cove­nants are vain. In other Relations i [...] is so, and there­ [...]ore [Page 439] in this. 2. He dissolveth the Government: and then he can be no Governour. 3. He becometh an enemy, and therefore can be no King. A destroyer cannot be a Ruler and Defender. He proclaimeth hostility, and is not to be trusted.

That the Nation is thus to have a Judicium discre­tionis is evident: 1. Because it is their interest that is principal in the business: the good or hurt will be principally theirs. 2. If they do not judge (discern­ingly) they cannot execute: And then the people must not help their Soveraign against usurpers. But if they must, (and who else shall) then must they discern whose cause is right, that they may know whom to help, and whom to resist.

Not only because the Commonwealth cannot be called Christian when the Head is a Heathen, but be­cause it is treachery against God and the Redeemer, for a People that have their free choise of their Governours to choose such as are enemies to the U­niversal Soveraign: They should hereby be guilty of [Page 440] some degree of a National Apostacy: The Kingdoms of the world should be the Kingdoms of the Lord and of his Christ: therefore they must not be given up to Infidelity. But if a Nation be not free to choose their Governours, but are by the Sword or otherwise for­ced to submit, then whether they should submit to an Infidel to avoid destruction, is a case that I am not now to determine: But it is to be decided, not by the perso­nal present suffering which the Nation by such sub­mission may avoid; but by the interest of their po­sterity and the Nations round about them. If the present spoil and ruine of a Nation might prevent the captivating of posterity or neighbour Nations more considerable to perpetual Infidelity, or tyranny of Infidels, it should be born: But if they can make better terms for themselves and posterity (without greater hurt to the Christian cause and Nations) by such submission, then without, I see not but they may submit to the Government of Infidels: And if they submit and promise obedience, they must obey in lawfull things, and be faithfull to them: But if Chri­stians live (as the primitive Christians did) in a Com­monwealth where Prince and people are Infidels, there they owe obedience whether they promise it or not: For their being subjects, and members of the Commonwealth containeth their obligation. While they have the protection, they owe obedience.

The Liberties, Goods, and other accommodations of the flesh, which worldlings so much value and con­tend for, are dung and dross in comparison of the things of everlasting life. If therefore we may not fight for Religion, much less for Liberties or Lives that are contemptible in comparison thereof. It is therefore either confusion and ignorance of the state of the Question, or palpable errour, in them that maintain, that it is unlawfull to fight for Religion. It is one thing to fight to make others Religious, and a­nother thing to fight to preserve our own Religion, and to preserve the meanes of Religion to us and the Nation and our posterity. They grant themselves what they deny, when they say that we may fight for our Lives and Liberties: For though all that fight for their Li­berties, fight not for their Religion; yet all that thus fight to preserve Religion, do fight for their Liberties also. Persecutors will take away our Lives or Liber­ties, if we worship God according to his will, and use the necessary meanes of salvation. In fighting against this persecution, we fight principally and ultimately for our own and posterities salvation, and next for the necessary means thereto, and proximately for our lives and liberties.

And it is but a delusory course of some in these times, that write many volumes to prove, that subjects may not bear Arms against their Princes for Religion, As if those that are against them did think that Reli­gion only as the end, yea or life or liberty, would [Page 442] justifie Rebellion? or that the efficient authorizing Cause were not necessary as well as the final? It's as true that subjects may not fight against their Princes for their Lives or Liberties, as that they may not for Religion.

There are other things necessary to warrant an a­ction besides the final Cause. All things are not a means to a good end: nothing can be a means that's against the end: but many things may be unwarran­table, and no just meanes, which by man are intended to the best end. No man may do any thing against his salvation, nor against the publike good, especially in matters of their salvation: But yet all is not law­full that men do with an intent to further their own or other mens salvation. Where bearing Arms a­gainst Princes is warrantable quoad fundamentum, this will warrant it quoad finem. No better end, but there must be a good ground also.

And yet as to the end, it is not every matter of Re­ligion, much less every erroneous conceit of men, that is sufficient. If men that are Equals, yea or Superi­ours, should think indifferent things to be necessary, or those that are necessary only ad melius esse, to be simply necessary; or those that are evil to be good, and hereupon shall force them by fire and sword on other men, they shall answer for their errour, arro­gance and cruelty together. If Papists will first believe their fond opinions to be articles of faith, and necessa­ry to salvation, and then will think that the salvation of men, and the publike good dependeth on them, and therefore will propagate them by the sword, or rebell against Princes to maintain them, their errour will not justifie their wickedness. It must be truly the [Page 443] cause of God, and the truly necessary meanes of life, and of the common good, and not mistakes or smaller matters, that must be the sufficient end of Warre, even in Princes themselves, that fight for Religion: Much more in people; of which in the next.

Note here 1. That I speak not of an Infidel Nation, where the people never make such Covenants with their Princes, but would doubly persecute, were they not restrained: There an Infidel Prince may be a protection and blessing to those few among them that believe. Whereas in a truly Christian Nation, either no Governour would be better then a persecuting Infi­del, (the people associating in Communityes) or at least, they may easily choose a better. 2. I speak not of those Christian States and Nations, that have al­ready promised obedience to known Infidels. But of those that have limited the power of their Princes, in these things: And if the Constitution limit them, their Acceptance of the Government is an implicite Con­sent and Covenant though there were no more. [Page 444] 3. I say not yet that every private man may resist, but that the body of the Nation in this case may. And the Reason is evident: because 1. They are naturally bound to preserve the common good, especially in the greatest points. 2. And in so doing, it is no pow­er, but arbitrary usurpation which they resist. For God giveth Kings no power against himself; and it is here supposed that the People have excepted this power from their Princes: And therefore in this they have no power, and to resist them is to resist no pow­er.

And to break the Covenants, and reject the termes on which they did receive their Crowns, is to disoblige the people to whom they Covenanted, and cast away their Crowns, and turn into a state of enmity, if it be habituate, and if it be in the Essentials of the Cove­nant; and especially if they prosecute it by a Warre. What man can pretend to be so independant, and a­bove the God of Heaven, as to have an Authority a­gainst him, and consequently not from him, which no men may resist. But if the Cause be Gods, and the Prince disabled to oppose it by the Constitution, the case is then most clear.

Here I shall again annex a Caution, and then an­swer some Objections.

If private men in doubtfull cases will take on them to be judges of their Governors, and conclude them to violate their Covenants, or their Constitution, or the Common safety when it is no such matter, they grievously sin against the Ordinance of God, and the publike Peace. And in case of a private or less publike injury, it is rebellion to make a publike resistance, by raising a warre. A woman may by personall private [Page 445] resistance defend her Chastity against a King; but she may not raise a warre to defend it. The Priests did lawfully (Azariah with fourscore more valiant men) withstand Ʋzziah the King when he went into the Temple to burn incense; and told him it belonged not to him, and bid him go out of the Sanctuary: yea when the Leprosie rose upon him, they thrust him out, 2 Chron. 26. 16, 17, 18, 19, 20. But if they had raised a warre against him for this, they had done ill.

And when a people are necessitated to a defensive warre; if thy will proceed beyond a just defence, and [...]pose their Kings or Governours that have not de­posed themselves, nor notoriously made themselves uncapable, they will be Rebels in deposing them, though their defence was just.

A Civil warre doth hazzard the happiness of a Na­tion, and therefore is not to be enterprized for any smaller crimes, or for the avoiding of any tolerable evil, but for that which is notoriously more dan­gerous to the Nation than the warre it self.

Indeed where all the Nation agree (as in the de­fence of Jonathan against Saul) or so many that there is no party to make warre against them, then if the King would break his Covenants, or violate their Liberties in a lower case (as Jonathans death was) they may as one man say, This shall not be: and hin­der the execution of the evil, without a warre; yet so that they nevertheless obey and honour the King in all things else.

And now concerning a Peoples defence of their happiness and safety against a King, that was restrain­ed by the Constitution or his Consent; I must answer some of the Learned Hadrians Saravia's Objections, [Page 446] de Imperan. author. & Obed. li. 4. cap. 4. He argueth from the state of Marriage, 1. That many Covenants about Dowry, Joyntures, &c. may be violated, without dissolving the marriage. 2. That the essential condi­tions may be violated without such dissolution. 3. That no stipulation can be made that will warrant the offend­ed party to separate.

To these I answer: 1. I grant him, that till a King do actually cast away his Government and become an Enemy, or else habitually make himself incapable or be made so by God, the people may not depart from their subjection. It is not casting off subjection [...] in state, but resisting in a particular case that is now in question.

2. The case of Marriage and Civil Government so much vary, that the Objection is of no force. For

1. God hath already stated the power of Husband and Wife, and subjected the Wife to the Husband by his Laws, and that for all alike; so that they are not left at liberty to make any alterations, nor several Species of Husbands, as Commonwealths may have several Species of Government. God hath not deter­mined in his Word, whether this or that Nation shall be governed by a Monarch, by the Optimates, or by a mixt Government. He hath left it free to them to put the Soveraignty into the hands of one, or two, or an hundred, or a thousand; and to make the divi­sion equall or unequall: much more to limit Rulers in the things that God hath left to their prudentiall determination. 2. Moreover God hath determined that Marriage shall be for life, and not for a limited time; and that it shall not be dissolvable on any terms but those of his description: But he hath not done so [Page 447] by Governours. He hath no where made it neces­sary that Kings shall be for life, and unremoveable: A Dictator for a year, or two year is not forbidden: A King for seven year, is not contrary to Gods Word. If a people that are free, may choose whether they will have a King or none, then may they say, If you will accept the Crown for seven years, we will subject our selves to you, else not. If they resolve to have Kings by Rotation as Rome had Consuls, that every year or seven year they might have a new one, though I think it not fit, yet it is not against any word of God. And if they may absolutely stipulate with them, to be Kings but for such a time, then may they conditionally stipulate to be Kings no longer then they do so or so. e. g. To forfeit their Crowns, if they shall raise War against the Nation, or if they introduce a forraign power, or if they set up infidelity, or banish the Gospel, or if they dispossesse the people of their Proprieties. There is liberty for such contracts here, when there is none in Marriage, which God hath not left so much to the will of man.

3. And yet even in the case of marriage, I deny his conclusion, that the violation of the essential Con­ditions doth not warrant a separation. He confesseth that Adultery and wilfull desertion, are just Causes of divorce: and these are the violations of the essential Conditions. An obstinate perpetuated negatio congres­sus, is a desertion, His instances of sterility, morosi­ty, and adventitious impotency, are not instances of a violation of the essential Conditions. A scold vio­lateth not the essential Conditions and voluntary ste­rility, and impotency subsequent were never Cove­nanted against. Voluntary self-debilitation (yea in­voluntary) [Page 448] in many Christian States, is allowed as a just cause of Divorce. But if it be not so, yet

4. The case differeth in this: A Nation must needs have Government: But a man or a woman are not in such necessity of marriage: If a Husband be impotent, the woman may lawfully live without his use. But a Nation may not live ungoverned: And therefore if a King fall distracted, or statedly incapa­ble, they must be governed by others.

5. And lastly I answer, That even about Joynture, and Peace and outward Priviledges, though a Wo­man may not be divorc't for injury in these, yet hath she her remedy from the Magistrate, who is superiour to her Husband. By your similitude then, you should allow a Nation their remedy, in as great and much greater cases, which yet will not warrant a divorce, or withdrawing of their subjection.

There is somewhat in exercitio, that is essential to Governing; and somewhat that pertaineth but to better Governing. As he that useth not the former is no Governour, so he that is uncapable of it, is uncapa­ble of Governing. If the essential qualifications be wanting, or the essential conditions violated, and the essential ends be statedly subverted, the Government is nullified: Or else the essence is not the essence. If that part of the happiness of the people be subverted that is next to the essential end, they may retain and exercise the power of seeking a due Reme­dy.

The commonest remedy that Nations have thought meet to use in this case is, to keep all Subjects under the known Laws, and Courts of Justice, that they [Page 449] may not dare to execute unlawfull Commands, and to restrain Kings from pardoning or defending such ma­lefactors as do endanger the Nations Rights and Peace: And so to let the Person of the King alone, and to punish the Subjects that break the Laws, though he command them. This is a resisting the Lusts, and the Wills of Princes, but not them, as to their Persons or their Power.

Augustine thought that some Justice was Essential to a Commonwealth (Lib. 11. de Civitat. Dei. cited by a great defender of Kings, Apolog. Henrici. 4. Im­peratoris in Freher. Vol. 1. pag. 177.) [Populum non omnem coetum multitudinis, sed coetum juris consensu & utilitatis communione sociatum esse determinant; & dicunt, tunc esse Rempublicam, id est, rem populi quum benè ac justè geritur, sive ab uno Rege, sive à paucis optimatibus; sive ab universo populo. Quum verò injustus est Rex, quem Tyrannum more Graeco appellant, aut injusti optimates, quorum consensum dicunt esse factionem, aut injustus ipse populus, cui nomen usitatum non reperiunt, nisi etiam ipsum Tyran­num vocent, non jam dicunt Vitiosam sicut prius fue­rat disputatum, sed sicut ratio ex his illis rationibus connexa docuisset, Omnino nullam esse Rempublicam: Quoniam non esset Res Populi quum Tyrannus eam factione capesseret. Nec ipse Populus jam Populus esset si esset injustus. Quoniam non esset multitudo Juris consensu & utilitatis communione societas, sicut Populus fuerat definitus.

To conclude this point: If Princes violating their Covenants, and changing the Constitution, be not to be resisted, then all Princes have equal power, that is, their power is absolute and unlimited as to man: [Page 450] For then they may all do what they list; which if we tell them, their list to exalt their Wills and Interest will be insatiable: And Covenants are vain, and af­ford not the least security for our Peace or Welfare, when in foro exteriori, the keeping and breaking them is all one. If Princes were sent down from Heaven, or meer Nature produced Governing Families, this Doctrine might have some pretence, which now hath none.

I here respect the Senate as the remaining Sove­raignty, and not as the Peoples Representative: And [Page 451] so the case is plain: Because, 1. They conquered not the Species, but the Individual. 2. They conquer­ed not the People, but the Prince: And therefore they have no Power to change the Constitution, which was formed by Contract with the People. The Com­monwealth hath not forfeited its form of Government when a Prince hath forfeited his Interest: And there­fore Rex non moritur: The Constitution remains good; and the Conquerours have no power to change it, without the Peoples Consent.

When one party in Covenant is dead (naturally or civilly) the other is free: Subjects as such, have nothing to do to change the Government: nor Subjects while such, unless they expresly reserve that liberty. But when a whole Royal Family is extinct, or all that they were in Covenant with for succession, they are disob­liged, and may offer the next, what terms they please, that are consistent with the Laws of God. But they cannot settle the new Government, either as Subjects, or as Rulers, but by Contract: For they can command no man to become their Governour, and submit to their terms; but they may offer it to any that is fit, who is as free to accept it, or refuse it.

For it must be some private men that must be the beginners, whose actions are not the actions of the Nation; nor can they know whether the Nati­on approve of them, and would concurre: so that the Possibility and Lawfulness of Defence will be questionable, where there are no Tru­stees.

Every man is naturally selfish and proud, and apt to break the bounds that God hath set us, and to be Kings and Laws unto ourselves. This Rebelling dis­obedient disposition, therefore should be first resisted and subdued, as a greater enemy to the peace of Na­tions (at least of many) then the faults of Princes are.

The most ignorant Country people are exceeding prone to pass their censures upon the actions of Kings and Parliaments, and shoot their bolt before they ever saw the Mark. How confidently will they blame and reproach their Superiours, as if they were able themselves to Govern better, or at least were so much honester then their Rulers, that their honesty would supply their lack of wit. In all ages, mur­muring against Superiours, and ignorant censuring them, have been the common sinne of the people: Though alas, Princes have given them too much oc­casion and provocation.

This will engage the Lord to own them, that is the King of Kings, and the disposer of all, in whose favour alone their safety lieth. And this will endear them to all that are good, and cause them to be as zealous in loving and honouring them, as children to [Page 454] their Father. Yea, it will breed much Reverence in the minds of common and ungodly men, who will speak highly of Godliness in a Prince, though they like it not for themselves. And when they see that Princes are Fathers of their Countreys, and seek not themselves, but the common good: it is the most excellent means to procure them common Love and Reverence.

Oh how few Joshuah's, David's, Josiah's, Constan­tine's, Theodosius's, &c. have the Kingdoms of the world enjoyed! At this day alas, how few are the Princes that have any zeal for God, and preferre his Kingdom and Interest before their own! How many are fighting their own warres, arising from the lusts that warre in their members, and making havock of the Church of God? But how few are studious to promote the Gospel, and the union of the Churches, and Peace of Christians, and the Conversion of the unbelieving world! Let them that God enricheth with so great a mercy, value it highly, and take heed of murmuring and ingratitude, or of neglect of those earnest prayers, and cheerfull obedience, by which so great a mercy may be continued and im­proved. How sad a blow was it to England that [Page 455] Edward the Sixth was so soon taken away! How many would have after redeemed his life with the dearest price, that before too much undervalued their happiness! One serious thought of the state of most of the Nations of the world, should turn the murmuring humour of too many into hearty Praise, and earnest Prayers to God for our Superiours. If that Nation that is most happy of any upon Earth, in a Government suited to the highest Interest, and to Gods Description, (Rom. 3. 3.) should yet murmure and despise that Government, it would be a most hainous sin, and a terrible, Prognostick, especially to the guilty souls.

CHAP. XIII. Of the late Warres.

HAving laid down these fore-going Grounds, it would not be here unseasonable to render a publick account of my own actions, in an­swer to that Question, which I have been urged with by so many, [By what Reasons was I moved to engage my self in the Parliaments Warre?] But (though I have not leisure to render so full an account to each particular Quaerist, as may be satisfactory, and therefore could be content to dispatch it here at once for all, yet) it will require so long a Hi­story of my own affairs, and also so many ungrate­full recitals of the abuses and evils of those times, that I shall not undertake so unpleasant a task, till I am called to it by such necessity, as will ex­cuse these inconveniences: but only cursorily shall cast in these following brief accounts instead of a ful­ler Declaration.

§. I. The malignant hatred of seriousness in Reli­gion, did work so violently in the rabble where I li­ved, that I could not stay at home with any probable safety of my life. My life was sought before I went away: Sober, pious men of Neighbour-Parishes, that thought the rabble had been upon my head in a [Page 457] tumult (when indeed I was out of Town) were knockt down in the streets, to the hazzard of their lives, when they went among them to look after me; and meerly because they were accounted Puritans. And all this was but on a false rumour, that the Churchwardens were about to obey the Parliaments Order, in taking down the Images of the Trinity about the Church. The Warre was begun in our streets before the King or Parliament had any Ar­mies. The hatred of the Puritans, and the Parlia­ments Reformation, inflamed the ignorant, drunken, and ungodly rout, so that I was forced to be gone even before the Warres; but when I returned, and the Armies came among us, I could then stay no longer; nor had I any place of safety from their rage, but the Armies and Garrisons of the Parlia­ment: And multitudes of my Neighbours as well as I, were forced into Garisons to save their lives, that else would have lived at home in peace. And I only propose it, Whether those Subjects, that are utterly undeservedly deprived of the protecti­on of Magistrates and Laws, are not discharged of their obligations, and turned out of their Relati­ons to them, and are put to seek for other Pro­tectours?

§. II. A Parliament (as farre as I have been able to learn) hath all these four or five capacities 1. It is a Representative of the People as free. 2. It Representeth the People as Subjects. 3. By the Constitution they have part in the Sove­raignty. 4. They are the Kings chief Councel. 5. And they are the Kings chief Court of Judi­cature.

Of the Antiquity of their Power, and its Extent, I referre you to Mr. Bacons Treatise of Parliaments, and Mr. Prin's Book of the Power and Priviledges of Parliaments (to pass by others.) But it is no way necessary to the cause in hand to prove the Antiquity of their Being, or their Power. When ever they were established in that Power, it was by an Explicite or Implicite Contract, between the Prince and Peo­ple, there being no other Ground that can bear them, except an immediate Divine Institution, which none pretend to. And the Prince and People have as much power in this Age to make such a Contract, and al­ter the Constitution, as they had three thousand years ago. And therefore if I find them in possession of the Power, and can prove but a Mutual Consent of Prince and People, I need no other proof of their Power.

§. III. When I say that the Parliament Repre­senteth the People as free, I take it for undeniable, that the Government is constituted by Contract, and that in the Contract, the People have not Absolutely subjected themselves to the Soveraign, without re­serving any Rights or Liberties to themselves; but that some Rights are reserved by them, and exempt­ed from the Princes power: And therefore that the Parliament are their Trustees for the securing of those exempted Rights, and so Represent the People as free; not as wholly free, but as being so farre free as that exemption signifies. The Rights and Freedom of the People as a People, are in order of nature before the Constitution, and excepted, and so established and se­cured in it. And this is the first Capacity of Parlia­ments, [Page 459] To Represent the People as a People, to secure their Liberties as Trustees: If any man deny them this Capacity, he makes us absolutely subject to an unlimited arbitrary power, contrary to all Law, and our long possessions, and to all reason. To have no Rights, and to have none but what are wholly at the Princes will, and which we have no security for, is in effect all one.

2. The Parliament as they Represent the People as Subjects, can do nothing but humbly manifest their grievances, and Petition for Relief.

3. The Parliament as having part in the Soveraign­ty by the Constitution, hath part in the Legislative power, and in the final Judgement.

4. As it is the Kings chief Councel, he is ultimate­ly to hear them in cases that concern the safety and Peace of the Commonwealth.

5. As it is his highest Court of Justice, they have power of judgement and execution, over all the Sub­jects; so that from them there is no Appeal: The King being to judge by his Judges in their several Courts, this is his highest Judicature; yet so as that the Power of Judging was not equally in both Houses.

The Disputers that oppose the Parliaments Cause, do commonly go on false suppositions, about the ve­ry Being and Power of Parliaments, and take it for granted, [That the Soveraign Power was only in the King, and so that it was an Absolute Monarchy, and not a mixture of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Demo­cracy; and that the Parliament had but the proposing of Laws, and that they were enacted only by the Kings Authority, upon their Request, and so that the Power [Page 460] of Armes, and of Warre, and Peace, was in the King alone; and therefore they conclude, That the Parlia­ment being Subjects may not take up A [...]mes without him, and that it is Rebellion to resist him; and most of this they gather from the Oath of Supremacy, and from the Parliaments calling themselves his Sub­jects.

But their Grounds are sandy, and their Superstru­cture false, as I shall manifest.

1. The Oath of Supremacy secureth the Kings Title against all forrain claim, either of the Pope or any other, and consequently against all home-bred Usurpers: But the Name of Supream, or Soveraign, given peculiarly to the King, is no sufficient discovery of the constitution of the Commonwealth, nor any proof that it is an absolute Monarchy, and not a mixt Government, and that the soveraign Power is wholly in him: When the contrary is known in the Constitution, the Name or Title is no disproof. It's usual to honour the Prince with the Title of Sove­raign, (for divers weighty Reasons) when yet the Senate or Nobles have a part in the soveraign Power. Such Oathes therefore bind us only to acknowledge the Kings Soveraignty as it is in the constitution, im­plying the Power of the Parliament, and they cannot be interpreted to be against the Constitution: Politi­cians and Lawyers commonly warn us to take heed of judging of the Power in the Commonwealth by meer Titles.

2. That the Parliament are Subjects is confessed; but as they are Subjects in one capacity, (both in their personal private states, and as the Representative of the Subjects as such) so have they part in the Sove­raignty [Page 461] also, in their higher capacity, by the Constitu­tion, as shall be proved. The same Persons may have part in the Soveraignty, that in other respects are Subjects.

3. Some go further, and would prove from Scrip­ture, the full Soveraignty of the King, as from 1 Pet. 2. 13, &c. As if the Species of Government were uni­versally determined of in Scripture; and so all forms of Government made unlawfull, except absolute Mo­narchy. If they could prove this, they might dis­patch many Controversies in Christian States about their Constitutions, and all must be reduced to one form: But there is nothing in Scripture against other forms, but somewhat for a mixt Government in Is­rael. God hath not told us whether England and all other Nations shall be Governed by One or Two, or four Hundred: but where the King is the Supream, it is the will of God that the people should obey him, which is all that Peter requireth. The Romans hated the Name of a King: It was neither the intent of Pe­ter here, or of Paul, Rom. 13. to determine whether the Emperour or the Senate were Supream: much less to determine that Kings must have the full Suprema­cy through the world.

This folly possesseth the Democratical party also, (that call themselves Commonwealths men:) they imagine that God himself hath given the Soveraign Power to the people; and consequently that no Go­vernment, but Popular is lawfull. Whereas it's cer­tain, that God hath not tyed the Nations of the world to Monarchy, Aristocracy, Democracy, or any one form, but left that free to their own choice, under the Direction of his general Rules, and the or­dering [Page 462] of his Providential disposals.

2. And as the Objecters Grounds are manifestly rotten, so that their superstructure is unsound, and that indeed the Parliament hath a part in the Suprea­macy, I shall undeniably prove.

1. Legislation is the most principal eminent part of the Soveraigns Right: But Legislation belonged to the two Houses of Parliament as well as to the King: therefore the Right of Soveraignty belonged to the Par­liament in part, as well as to the King.

The Legislative Power, is not only essential to So­veraignty, but is the one half of its essence, and the first and chiefest part. He that denyeth this renoun­ceth Policy and Reason. But that the Parliament had a part in the Legislative power, (even of Enacting, and not only of proposing,) is undoubted. I will not run to Records, or to Writers for proof, because here a contradicting wit may find some work; but I will give you two proofs, that nothing but immode­sty can contradict. The first is, Common Experience de facto. Parliaments do make Laws: the King was sworn to Govern by those Laws, quas vulgus elegerit: the Lawes expresly speak their Authors, [Be it Enacted by the Authority of Parliament] or [by the Kings Majesty, and the Lords, and Commons in Par­liament Assembled, &c.] It is not [upon their Peti­tion or Proposal] only, but [by them] or [by their Authority.]

2. The King himself (by the advice of his delin­quent Council in the time of his separation from Par­liament) doth confess as much as I desire: 1. That the Government of England is mixt of Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy. 2. That it is not an [Page 463] Absolute Monarchy. 3. That the Ballance must hang even between the three Estates. 4. That the King, the Lords, and the Commons, are these three Estates. 5. That the Laws are made in England by a King, by a House of Peers, and by a House of Commons chosen by the people joyntly. 6. That the House of Com­mons are an excellent Conserver of the Peoples Li­berties. 7. That they are solely entrusted with the first Propositions concerning the Levies of Monies, the sinews of Peace and Warre; and the Impeaching of those that violate the Law. 8. That the King is bound to protect the Law. 9. That he may not make use of his power to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it. 10. That the Commons are to Advise him for the Protection of the Law. 11. That the Lords are trusted with a power of Judicature. 12. That they are a Screen or Bank between the Prince and people, to assist each against the Encroachments of the other and by just Judgement to preserve the Law, which ought to be the Rule of every one of the Three. 13. That the Parliament have a Legal power, more than sufficient to restrain the power of Tyran­ny. 14. That the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the others power, is unhappy in the effects to all.] All this you shall have in the Kings own words in his Answer to the Parliaments 19 Propositions.

[There being three kinds of Government, Absolute Monarchy, Aristocracy, and Democracy; and in all these their particular conveniences and inconveniences; the experience and wisdome of your Ancestours hath moulded this out of a mixture of these, with the con­veniences of all three, without the inconveniences of any one, as long as the Ballance hangs even between the [Page 464] three Estates; and in their proper channell (begetting verdure and fertility in the meddows on both sides,) and then overflowing of either on either side, raised no de­luge or inundation: The ill of Absolute Monarchy is Tyranny: The ill of Aristocracy is Faction, and Di­vision: the ills of Democracy are Tumults, Violence, and Licentiousness. The good of Monarchy is the Ʋniting of a Nation under one Head; to resist Invasion from abroad, and Insurrection at home. The good of Aristocracy is the conjunction of Councils in the ablest Persons of a State for the publique benefit: The good of Democracy is Liberty, nad the courage and industry which Liberty begets.

In this Kingdome the Laws are joyntly made by a King, by a House of Peers, and by a House of Com­mons chosen by the People, all having free Votes, and particular Priviledges; the Government of these Laws are intrusted to the King; Power of Treaties of War and Peace, of making Peers, of choosing Officers and Counsellors of State, Judges for Law, Commanders for Forts and Castles, giving Commissions for raising men to make Warre abroad, or to prevent or provide against Invasions or Insurrections at home, Benefit of Confisca­tions, power of pardoning, and some more of the like kind are placed in the King. And this kind of regula­ted Monarchy having the power to preserve that Au­thority, without which it would be disabled to preserve the Laws in their force, and the Subjects in their Liber­ties, is intended to draw to him such a respect and rela­tion from the great ones as may hinder the ills of Divisi­on and Faction, and such a fear and reverence from the people; as may hinder tumults, violence, and licentiousnes. Again, that the Prince may not make use of this high, [Page 465] and perpetual power, to the hurt of those for whose good he hath it, and make use of the name of publick necessity for the gain of his private Favorites and Followers, the House of Commons (an excellent Conserver of Liberty, but never intended for any share in the Go­vernment, or the choosing of them that He meaneth the execu­tive part. should Govern) is solely intrusted with the first Propositions, concerning the Le­vies of Mo [...]s (the sinews of Peace and War) and the impeaching of those, who for their own ends have violated that Law, which he is bound to protect, and to the protection of which they were bound to advise him. And the Lords being trusted with a Judicature power, are an excellent Screen or Bank, between the Prince and People, to assist each against the Encroachments of the other, and by just Judgements to preserve that Law which ought to be the Rule of every one of the three—since therefore the Legal power in Parliaments is more than sufficient to restrain the power of Tyrannie—since the encroaching of one of these Estates upon the power of the other, is unhappy in the effect to all.]

You see here all the Parliaments capacities acknow­ledged: 1. That the Commons are chosen by the people, as Trustees for their Liberties, (and that they represent them as Subjects none deny.) 2. That they are the Kings Advisers. 3 That the Lords have the power of Judicature, as the Commons of im­peaching, &c. 4. That the Legislative power, (that is, the Soveraignty) is joyntly in King, Lords and Com­mons as three Estates; and so that the Government is mixt of Monarchy, Aristocracy and Democracy. And thus far we are agreed of the Constitution.

3. And if it were not thus confessed, we might [Page 466] prove the Parliaments interest in the Supremacy, by some Judicial Instances, with the restraints of the King; (but that it's needless to debate a confessed thing.) Grotius saith, de Imperio summar. Potestat. circa sacra c. 1. p. 7, 8. [Sunt qui objiciant, Reges quaedam im­perare non posse, nisi conscensus Ordinum accesserit: sed hi non vident quibus in locis id juris est, ibi summum Imperium, non esse penes Reges, sed aut penes Ordines, aut certe penes id corpus, quod Rex & Juncti constitu­unt; ut Bodinus, Suarezius, Victoria, alijque abunde demonstrarunt. Certè summum Imperium totum ha­bere, & aliquid imperare non posse, ideo tantum quod alter vetat aut intercedat, plane sunt [...].] But) in this last I dissent from him, unless that aliter ille po­testatem habeat illud imperandi, quod Rex imperare non potest: For meerly to limit the power of the Ruler in things not necessary unto Government, proveth not a Copartnership in the Limiters: for it may be done by Contract and Reserve, by a people that will be Go­verned so farre and no further.)

§. IV. I was satisfied by Reason, and consent of Lawyers, even those that are most zealous for Monar­chy, and most judicious, that in many Cases a King may be resisted: I will Instance these following out of Grotius (and Barclay, with whom in divers of them he consents, and adds the rest:) de Jure Belli & Pacis, li. 1. c. 4. pag. 86, 87, 90, 91. which I will not so much as translate, that none may suspect me to cor­rupt the words by the translation, or to tempt the vulgar to misunderstand them.

[Gravior illa est Questio, An Lex de non Resisten­do nos obliget in gravissimo & certissimo discrimine. [Page 467] Nam Leges etiam Dei quaedam, quanquam generaliter prolatae, tacitam habent exceptionem summae necessitatis.—Quae exceptio probata est ipsi Christo: utet in lege al­tera de non edendis panibus propositionis. Et Hebraeorum Magistri legibus de cibis vetitis, alijsque nonnullis ex veteri traditione eandem addunt exceptionem; recte quidem: Non quod Deo jus non sit ad certam mortem subcundam nos obstringere; sed quod Leges quaedam ejus sint argumenti, ut non credibile sit datas ex tam ri­gida voluntate, quod in legibus humanis magis etiam procedit. Non nego à lege etiam humana quosdam vir­tutis actus posse precipi sub certo mortis periculo; ut de statione non deserendâ: sed nec temerè ea voluntas legis condentis fuisse intelligitum neque videntur homines in se, & alios tantum jus accepisse, nisi qu [...]tenus summa necessitas id exigat. Ferri enim leges ab hominibus solent & debent eum sensu humane imbecillitatis. Haec autem Lex de qua agimus pendere videtur à volunta­te eorum, qui se primum in societatem civilem consoci­ant, à quibus jus porro ad imperantes manat. (He meaneth that it is a contract between the Constitutors of the Policy, and not a proper Law, that must de­cide this case.) Hi vero si interrogarentur, an velint omnibus hoc onus imponere ut mori preoptent, quam ullo casu vim superiorum armis arcere, nescio an velle se fini responsuri, nisi forte cum hoc additamento, si re­sisti nequeat nisi cum maxima reipublicae perturbati­one, aut exitio plurimorum inncentium. Quod enim tali circumstantia Charitas commendaret, id in legem quoque humanam deduci posse, non dubito. Dicat aliquis, rigidam illam obligationem, mortem potius fe­rendi, quam ullam unquam superiorem injuriam repel­lendi non ex lege humana sed divina proficisci, sed [Page 468] notandum est, primo homines non Dei praecepto, sed sponte adductos experimento infirmitatis familiarum se­gregum adversus violentiam, in societatem civilem coijsse, unde ortum habet potestas civilis, quam ideo hu­manam ordinationem Petrus vocat: (but here he is out, or dark, in his Politicks, and Exposition: Men are (ordinarily) obliged by the Law of Nature and Scripture, to Political Relations and Duties, and sin if they joyn not to some Commonwealth, when they may,) quanquam alibi & divina ordinatio voca­tur, quia hominum salubre institutum Deus probavit, (This is true of the Species of Policy, and of the In­dividual Rulers, though not of Government in gene­re) Deus autem humanam legem probans, sensetur probare ut humanam, & humano modo. Barclaius, Regijimperij assertor fortissimus, huc tamen descendit ut populo, & insigni ejus parti jus concedat setuendi ad­versus immanem saevitiam, cum tamen ipse fateatur totum populum Regisubditum esse. Ego facile intelligo, quo pluris est id quod conversatur, eo majorem esse aequi­tatem, quae adversus legis verba exceptionem porrigat: attamen indiseriminatim damnere aut singulos, aut partem populi minorem, quae ultimo necessitatis praesidio s [...]c cl [...]m usa sit, ut interim & communis boni, respe­ctum non deserat, vix ausim. Nam David, qui ex­tra pauca facta testimonium habet vitae secundum leges exactae, armatos circa se primum quadringentos, de­inde plures aliquando habuit: quò nisi ad vim arcen­dam si inserretur? Simile potest videri factum Mac­ [...]abaeorum.—Nihil est quod Maccabaeos tueat ur prae­ter summum certissimumque periculum.—Illa interim cautio tenenda est, etiam in tali periculo persone Regis pa [...]endum.—

Dixims summum imperium tenentibus resisti jure non p [...]sse: Nunc quaedam sunt quae Lectorem monere debemus, ne putet in hanc legem delinquere eos, qui re­vera non delinquunt.

Primum ergo, qui principes sub populo sunt, sive ab initio talem acceperunt potestatem, sive postea ita con­venit, ut Lacedaemone, si pecc [...]nt in leges ac Rempublicā, non tantum vi repelli poss [...]nt, sed si opus sit, puniri morte.

2. Si Rex aut alius quis imperium abdicavit, aut manifestè haber pro derelicto, in eum post id tempus om­nia licent quae in privatum—

3. Existimat Barclaius, si Rex regnum alienet, aut alii subjiciat, amitti ab eo regnum. Ego hic subsisto—si tamen Rex reipsa etiam tradere Regnum aut sub­jicere moliatur, quin ei resisti in hoc possit, non dubito. Aliud est enim, Imperium; aliud habendi modus, qui ne mutetur obstare potest populus (N. B.) id enim sub Imperio comprehensum non est. Quo aon male aptes il­lud senecae in re non dissimili: [Et si parendum in omni­bus Patri, in eo non parendum quo efficitur ne Pater sit.]

4. Ait idem Barclaius, amitti Regnum si Rex vere hostili animo in totius populi exitiam feratur: quod concedo. Consistere enim simul non possunt voluntas imperandi, & voluntas perdendi. Quare qui se hostem populi totius profitetur, is eo ipso abdicat Regnum, sed vix videtur id accidere posse in Regementis compote, qui uni populo imperet: Quod si pluribus populis imperet accidere potest, ut unius populi in gratiam alterum velit, perditum, ut colonias ibi faciat.

5. Si Regnum committatur, sive ex felonia in eum cujus f [...]udum est, sive ex clausula posita in ipsa delati­one imperii, ut si hoc aut hoc Rex faciat, subditi omni obedientia vinculo salvantur, tunc quoque Rex in pri­vatam personam recidit.

[Page 470]6. Si Rex partem habeat summi Imperij, partem alteram Pop. vel Sen. Regi in partem non suam involanti vis justa opponi poterit; quia eatenus Im­perium non habet: Quod locum habere censeo, etiamsi dictum sit, Belli potestatem penes Regem fore (N. B.) Id enim de bello externo intelligendum est: Cum alioqui quisquis Imperij partem habeat, non possit non jus habere eam partem tuendi. Quod ubi fit, po­test Rex etiam suam Imperij partem belli jure amit­tere.

7. Si indelatione Imperij dictum sit, ut certo even­tu resisti Regi possit, etiamsi eo pacto pars imperij re­tenta censeri non possit, certe retenta est aliqua Libertas naturalis, & exempta Regio imperio. Potest autem qui jus suum alienat, id jus pactis imminuere.

You see here divers Cases in which Resisting is law­full. In general, it's lawfull for them that have part in the Soveraignty, to defend their part: and it's lawfull for the people to defend their Liberties; in points exempted from the Princes Power: (but this must be with the exceptions, limitations and Cauti­ons, which I have before expres't.)

§. V. The Laws in England are above the King: Because they are not his Acts alone, but the Acts of King and Parliament conjunctly, who have the Le­gislative (that is, the Soveraign) Power. This is confessed by the King in the forecited Answer to the 19 Propositions.

§. VI. The King was to execute Judgement ac­cording to these Laws, by his Judges in his Courts of Justice: and his Parliament was his highest Court [Page 471] (as is said) where his personal will and word was not of sufficient Authority to suspend or cross the Judge­ment of the Court, except in some particular cases submitted to him.

§. VII. The peoples Rights were evidently inva­ded: Ship-money, and other impositions were with­out Law, and so without authority: The new Oath imposed by the Convocation, and the King: the ejecting and punishing Ministers for not reading the Books for Sports on the Lords Daies, for not bowing towards the Altar, for preaching Lectures, and twice on the Lords Day, with many the like, were without Law, and so without authority. If Bishops jure Ec­clesiastico might have commanded them, yet could they not lay any corporal penalties or mulcts for them, nor should any man have lost his temporal live­lihood or liberty, which Ecclesiasticks have no power over. Many thousands have suffered, or been forced to remove out of the Land, upon the account of illegal impositions.

§. VIII. The Parliament did Remonstrate to the Kingdom, the danger of the subversion of Religion, and Liberties, and of the common good and interest of the people, whose Trustees they were. And we were obliged to believe them both as the most compe­tent Witnesses and Judges, and the chosen Trustees of our Liberties. We are our selves uncapable of a full discovery of such dangers till it be too late to re­medy them: And therefore the constitution of the Government having made the Parliament the Tru­stees of our Liberties, hath made them our eyes by [Page 472] which we must discern our dangers. Or else they had been useless to us.

§. IX. The former proceedings afforded us so much experience as made the Parliaments Remonsirance credible. We had newly seen a general endeavour to change the face of things among us. Many new or­ders in the Church; abundance of the most painfull Preachers (though peaceable) cast out: Abundance of ignorant, idle, scandalous Readers kept in; and practical serious godliness made the common scorn, though found in the conformable to all the legal Or­ders. I will forbear to rake any further into those calamities. Only I shall say, that I suppose my Reader to have been acquainted with those times, and with the course of the High Commission, and the Bishops Courts, and to have read the Articles in Parliament against Bishop Land, Bishop Goodman, Bishop Wren, Bishop Pierce, &c. and the charge against the Judges about Ship money; and Mr. White's Centuries: and Mr. Prin's Introduction, or Works of Darkness brought to Light; and his Canterburies Tryal, and his Popish Royal Favorite, and his Romes Master piece; and especially the sworn Articles of the Spanish and French Match.

§. X. It was time for us to believe a Parliament concerning our danger and theirs, when we heard so many impious persons rage against them; and when the Army then in the North was (by the confession of the chief Officers) about to have been drawn up towards London; to what end is easie to conjecture: when so many Delinquents were engaged & enraged [Page 473] against them, who all took refuge with the King. And when we say the odious Irish Rebellion broke forth, and so many thousand barbarously murdered; no less (by credible testimony) then an hundred and fifty thousand murdered in the one Province of Ʋl­ster only: I suppose him that I dispute with to have read the Examinations by the Irish Justices, and Mr. Clarks Persecution of the Church in Ireland: else he is incompetent for the debate. If you say, What was all this to England? I Answer, We knew how great a progress the same party had made in England, and it was them that we were told by the Trustees of our safety, that we were in danger of, and the fire was too near us to be neglected; and our safety too much threatned, to be carelesly ventured in the heat of the peril; or to be wholly taken out of our Trustees hands, when thousands were thus suddenly butchered by the Papists in our own Dominions, and those Papists likely to have invaded England, when they had conquered Ireland, and their Friends were so powerfull about the Court, & through the Land, and the Parliament hated by them for opposing their at­tempts (the Irish professing to raise Arms for the King, to defend his Prerogative & their own Religion against our Parliament) I say, in such a time as this, we had reason to believe our entrusted Watchmen, that told us of the danger, & no reason to suffer our lives and liberties to be taken out of their Trust & wholly put into the hands of the King. We had rather of the two be put upon the inconvenience of justifying our defence, then to have been butchered by thousands, or fall into such hands as Ireland did: For then com­plaining would have been vain. It would not have [Page 474] made dead men alive, nor recovered England out of their hands, for the survivers to have accused them of perfidiousness or cruelty. It was then no time to discredit our Watchmen.

§. XI. We saw the King raise Forces against the Parliament, having forsaken them, and first sought to feize upon their Members, in a way which he confest a breach of their priviledge.

Obj. The Tumults at Westminster drove him away.

Answ. Only by displeasing him; not by endangering him, or medling with him.

Obj. The Parliament was not free by reason of them.

Answ. The Parliament knew best when they were free. If the major part had thought so, why did they not Vote against those tumults, and forbid, and bring the rude Petitioners to Justice? The disorders on both sides among the tumultuary, were unexcusa­ble: but no just cause to cast the Nation into a Warre. A Prince may not raise War against his people, be­cause Apprentices shew some rudeness in their beha­viour.

Object. But the Parliament began the War.

Answ. For my part, I am satisfied of the contrary: but the cause dependeth not on that. And the debate is not easily managed to satisfaction on either side, be­cause we agree not what was the beginning of the Warre. If the Apprentices tumultuous petitioning were a Warre, then it was begun long before on the other side, when the Army was to have been drawn up towards London, and by other waies; as when the King set a Guard on them against their wills, when the Lord Digby raised Forces near the City; and the King [Page 475] afterward in Yorkshire, the Parliament had no Army: so that if actual raising force was the beginning of the Warre, it seems he begun. But yet he saith, Their Commissions were dated before his. It may be so: (I knew nothing of that.) But Forces may be raised before they have any written Commissions. It was long before that the Lord Digby wrote to him to withdraw into a place of safety, to these ends which he pursued. If you say, that those began the War that gave the first occasion; 1. We must follow that so high as will make the discovery difficult, and the debate irksome. 2. And when we have done, no doubt (as in most fallings out) we shall find that both sides were too blame, though not equally too blame.

§. XII. All the Kings Counsellours and Souldiers were Subjects, and legally under the Power of the Parliament. They had Power to try and Subject, and judge them to punishment for their crimes. The Of­fendors whom they would have judged, fled from Ju­stice to the King, and there defended themselves by force.

Object. But the Parliament would have injured them.

Answ. Who should be Judge of that, if not the Supream Court of Justice? The Laws are above the King.

Object. The Parliaments Souldiers were Subjects of the King, as well as the Kings Souldiers to the Parlia­ment.

Answ. True: but if Subjects break the Laws, the King is to judge them by his Courts of Justice, and so the King can do no wrong.

§. XIII. If inferiour Courts of Justice may prosecute the execution of their sentences, in several cases a­gainst the Kings Will, and the Sheriff may raise the Power of the County to assist that execution, much more may the Highest Court do thus: But the An­tecedent is commonly acknowledged to be true: Therefore.

§. XIV. The Parliament did not raise War against the Person or Authority of the King; nor did I ever serve them on any such account: But their cause was, 1. To defend themselves and the Common­wealth from evil Subjects, that flying from Justice, had made up an Army by the Kings consent. 2. To bring Offenders to a Legal Trial. 3. And conse­quently to Defend themselves against the Kings mis­guided Will. So that their War was directly against Subjects, but remotely against the Will of the King, but not against his Authority or Person. And Sub­jects cease not to be Subjects, when they get into an Army, and procure his consent to their illegal enter­prise. Unless every one of his Souldiers was a King, or some of them at least, I know not that I ever fought against the King. Nor really do I believe that every man is against him, that is against a Subject that hath His Commission, when by the Law which is above the Will and Commission of the King, he is a Subject still, and answerable for his offences.

That it was Subjects that the War was raised against, and not the King, appeareth, 1. In all the Parliaments Declarations of their Cause (though his misdoings they alledge as the occasion of their ne­cessity.) [Page 477] 2. In their Commissions to their Souldi­ers. All that ever I saw were for King and Parlia­ment: Yea it was the common word of their Soul­diers, if they were asked, Who they were for? to say [For King and Parliament.] 3. We had two Protestations, and a Solemne League and Covenant imposed on the Nation, to be for King and Parlia­ment. And if Declarations, Professions, Commissi­ons, and National Oaths and Covenants will not tell us, what the Cause of the War was, then there is no discovery. I refer the Reader that would know the Parliaments Cause, to their Remonstrance of the state of the Kingdom; and A Declaration of the Lords and Commons assembled in Parliament, set­ting forth the Grounds and Reasons, that necessitate them at this time to take up Defensive Armes, for the Preservation of his Majesties Person, the main­tenance of the true Religion, the Laws and Liber­ties of this Kingdome, and the Power and Privi­ledges of Parliament. August 3. 1642.] These fully tell you the Parliaments Cause, being their pro­fession of it.

§. XV. When the Parliament commanded us to obey them, and not Resist them, I knew not how to Resist and disobey them, without violation of the Command of God, Rom. 13. Let every soul be sub­ject to the Higher Power, &c. And without incur­ring the danger of the Condemnation there threat­ned to Resisters. I think none doubts but that Com­mand obliged Christians to obey the Senate as well as the Emperour. When it was confessed by the King, that the Legislative Power was in the three Estates [Page 478] conjunct, and the State was Mixt, and conseqently that the Parliament had a part in the Soveraignty, I thought it Treason to Resist them, as the Enemy did, apparently in order to their subversion, and unlawfull to disobey their just Commands, such as I thought these were.

§. XVI. When the Subjects were in doubt of the sense of the Law, (into which most of the Contro­versie was resolved) I took the Parliament to be the Highest Interpreter of Lawes that was then existent in the Division. And therefore that it was Law to us, which they declared to be Law, so it were not di­rectly and clearly against our own Knowledge, or against that truth which in our callings we might well attain the Knowledge of. I knew no higher Judge of the Law then to appeal to. If in case of Ship-money the Judges of inferiour Courts did satisfie the King, then in case of the safety or danger of the Common­wealth, I thought the Judgment of the highest Court should satisfie me.

§. XVII. I had great reason to believe, that if the King had conquered a Parliament, The Nation had lost all security of their Liberties, and been at his Mercy, and not only under his Government: and that Warre is an act of Hostility: and that if he had conquered them by such persons as he then imployed, it had not been in his power to have pre­served the Commonwealth if he would: His impious and popish Armies would have ruled him, and used him as other Armies have done those that entrusted them. And therefore when Ireland was so used be­fore [Page 479] our eyes, and the Papists there so strong, and the Queens, and the Earl of New-castles forces (be­sides others) so many of them Papists, and the com­mon Souldiers of the King were commonly known, where ever they came, by horrid Oaths and Curses, being called Damn-me's, because [God damn me] was their common word, and when a man was used by them as a Traitor, that was but noted for a Puri­tane, or was heard to read the Scripture, or to sing a Psalm in his Family; I say, when these were they that were imployed to conquer us, I knew that the safety of the Commonwealth lay in resisting them, and that they could have conquered the King, when they had conquered us.

§. XVIII. I had sufficient ground from what is cited before from Grotius (and more such like) to conclude that the Parliament having a part in the So­veraignty, might defend their part against any that invaded it: and exercise it upon any Subject. And that their part was invaded, the fore-mentioned evi­dences, with what is in their Remonstrances shew: And the very intermission and almost extinction of Parliaments sheweth it yet more. The King was en­trusted with the Calling of Parliaments, on suppositi­on that called they must be: The seasonableness which he was entrusted with, was but a circumstance; and if under pretence of seasonable calling them, he will call none, or to no purpose, or break them up before they can do the work to which they were appointed, this is but to betray the trust of the Commonwealth. Parliaments by Law were to be held yearly, and say some, before the Conquest [Page 480] twice a year. See An. 36. E. 3, & 4. E. 3. Et in­ter leges Edgar. cap. 5. Cook Institut. part 4. p. 7. (Of their Honour and Antiquity, see Mr. Bacon and Pryn, and Cook Instit. Part 1. Sect. 164. & Praefat. lib. 9. Of Reports, fol. 1. 2, 3, 4, &c. & 7. H. 6.) They that trusted the King to call a Parliament, there­by expressed that they were to be called, & it was not in his power to extinguish them, by not calling them.

§. XIX. I knew, that as the Parliament was the Representative Body of the People of the Common­wealth, who are the subject of the Common Good, so that the Common Good is the Essential End of Government, and therefore that it cannot be a just War that by their King is made against them (ex­cept in the fore-excepted Cases: And that the end being more excellent than the means, is to be preser­ved by us, and no means to stand in competition with the End. And therefore if I had known that the Par­liament had been the beginners, and in most fault, yet the ruine of our Trustees and Representatives, and so of all the Security of the Nation, is a punish­ment greater, than any fault of theirs against a King can from him deserve; and that their faults cannot disoblige me from defending the Commonwealth. I owned not all that ever they did; but I took it to be my duty to look to the main end. And I knew that the King had all his Power for the Common Good, and therefore had none against it; and there­fore that no Cause can warrant him to make the Commonwealth the party, which he shall exer­cise Hostility against. And that War against the Par­liament (especially by such an Army, in such a Cause) [Page 481] is Hostility against them, and so against the Com­monwealth; all this seemed plain to me. And espe­cially when I knew how things went before, and who were the Agents, and how they were minded, and what were their purposes against the people.

§. XX. When I found so many things Conjunct, as two of the three Estates against the Will of the King alone; the Kingdoms Representative and Trustees assaulted in the guarding of our Liberties, and the highest Court defending themselves against offending Subjects, and seeking to bring them to a Legal Tryal, and the Kingdoms safety, and the Common Good involved in their Cause (which may be more fully manifested, but that I would not stir too much in the evils of times past.) All these, and many more concurring, perswaded me, that it was sinfull to be Neutrals, and Treacherous to be against the Parlia­ment in that Cause. These were my apprehensions, and on such grounds as these here briefly hinted. And it somewhat moved me to see what the Parties on both sides were, of whom I will now say no more, but that it were a wonder if so many humble honest Christians, fearfull of sinning, and praying for dire­ction, should be all mistaken in so weighty a case, and so many Dam me's all in the right. But yet this was not the Rule I went by, but some Motive on the by.

So that the Cause of the Parliament which they engaged us to defend, 1. Was not the Sovereign Power of the People, as above the King, and the Original of Authority; as if the State of the Com­monwealth had been Democratical. 2. Nor was it [Page 482] to procure a change of the Constitution, and to take down Royaltie, and the House of Lords, but clean contrary, it was the Defence of the old Constitution against the changes which they affirmed were attem­pted. 3. Nor was it the altering of Laws, which is not to be done by force, but freely by the Law-givers. And therefore it was not to procure a cessation of the Magistrates Power in Religion, for encouraging well-doers, and restraining intollerable Deceivers, which some call Liberty of Conscience. 4. Nor was it to offer any violence to the Person of the King; but to rescue him from them that had seduced him into a War against his Parliament, to his peril. These were the Grounds that we were engaged on, and I knew no other.

And therefore whereas some Pamphlets now flie abroad, that would defame the Parliament and their Adherents, as having engaged in a Treasonable Cause, and make that Cause to have been, 1. The Changing of the Government into Popular. 2. Or the Defence of it as Popular already, as if the People had been the Sovereign Power. 3. The deposing or destroying of the King. 4. The vindicating of an illegal or unlimited exemption from the Magistrates Power in matters of Religion, which they call, Reli­gious Liberty; these need no further confutation then the reading of the Parliaments Remonstrance and De­claration aforesaid, and the rest of their published Professions, and Oaths, and Covenants. The clean contrary to these they openly professed: As, 1. That King, Lords and Commons in Parliament were the Legislators, and so had highest power. 2. That it was the Peoples Proprieties and Liberties, [Page 483] (and not their personal Sovereignty) that they defen­ded. 3. That it was the Defence and not the destructi­on of the Laws that they endeavoured. And, 4. That it was former connivance at Popery that they were offended at, and not a Liberty for Popery that they fought for; and that Heresie and Popery were Cove­nanted against by them, is well known; though the Liberty of Truth and Godliness they defended. And, 5. That they intended no hurt, but preservation to the King. This was their professed Cause.

I know Grotius in the fore-cited passages goeth higher, That a King may lose his own part in the So­vereignty in a War, in which he invadeth the part of those that had a share with him: And I know that he concludeth that Hostility is inconsistent with Go­vernment; and that other Learned Politicians con­clude, That if a King will make himself the Enemy of the People, and engage in War against them; he deposeth himself, and may be used by them as an Enemy. But these things belong not to the Old Cause of the Parliament; nor, for my own part, have I ever in­teressed my self in any such Cause, and therefore am not to be accountable for it. Every man must answer for himself. It is only that Old Cause that I have been engaged in. And many things that since have been done, my soul lamenteth and disclaimeth.

Yet must I add, That though I own not all the ways of men, that have had a hand in our Changes, 1. I am confident that these that have been cast down, had great cause to acknowledge the Justice of God against them, especially for their encouraging the scorn of Holiness through the Land, and the perse­cution of multitudes fearing God, which the righ­teous [Page 484] God would not put up.

2. That I am bound to submit to the present Go­vernment, as set over us by God, and to obey for Conscience sake, and to behave my self as a Loyal Subject towards them. For, 1. A full and free Parliament hath owned it, and so there is notoriously the Consent of the People, which is the evidence that former Princes had to justifie their best Titles. They that plead Inheritance and Law, must fetch the origi­nal from Consent (Though, as I have shewed before, that Consent doth but specifie, and then design the Persons, on whom God himself doth confer the Power.)

When Grotius questioneth even invasores Imperii (De Jure belli. lib. 1. pag. 91.) he excepteth from any Question the Case, 1. Postquam long a possessione. 2. Aut Pacto, jus nactus est invasor; and even of others, he acknowledgeth some obligation to obey them. And ib. cap. 4. pag. 93. §. 20. he giveth that safe and general Rule, which such as I that are private men, and not made Judges of the controver­tible Title of Princes must be guided by, and which Paul commended, it seemeth to the Christians in his times, yea and before him, Christ himself [Maxime autem in re controversà judicium sibi privatus su­mere non debet, sed p [...]ss [...]ssionem sequi, sic tributum solvi Caesari Christus juvebat (Mat. 22. 20.) quia ejus imaginem nummus praeferebat, id est, quia in Possessione erat Imperii.] That is, Especially in a contr [...]verted matter, a private man ought not to be­come a Judge, but to follow Possession. So Christ commandeth that Tribute be paid to Caefar, be­cause the Money had his Image, that is, be­cause [Page 485] he was in possession of the Government.]

I have made this Confession to the world of my former actions, and the reason of them, 1. At once to satisfie the Many that demand satisfaction. 2. That if I have erred, I may not die without Repentance, but may be recovered by their advice.

And therefore I will further confess how I stand affected to these actions in the review, 1. The expe­riences of War, and the evils that attend and fol­low it, hath made me hate it incomparably more than I did before I tried or knew it: and the name of Peace, much more the Thing, is now exceeding amiable to me. 2. I unfeignedly believe that both Parties were too blame in the late Wars: The one Party in the things forementioned: and the other in too impatient undergoings Se [...] the Life of Mr. Her­bert Palmer in Clarks Mar­tyrology, pag. 438. about the Kings Death. the Prelates persecutions, and some in too peevish scrupling and quarrelling, where there was no cause, or not so much as was pretended. But who can be free from some causle [...]s scruples, that hath any Faith of his own, and is not careless of his soul. 3. I think that all of us did rush too eagerly into the heat of Divisions and War, and none of us did so much as we should have done to prevent it: And, though I was in no capacity to have done much, yet I unfeignedly Repent that I did no more for Peace in my place, then I did, and that I did not pray more hearti [...]y a­gainst Contention and War before it came, and spake no more against it than I did; and that I spoke so much to blow the Coals. For this I daily beg for­giveness of the Lord, through the precious blood of [Page 486] the great Reconciler. 4. The hatred of Strife and War, and love of Peace, and observation of the lamentable miscarriages since, have called me oft to search my heart, and try my ways by the Word of God, Whether I did lawfully engage in that War or not? (which I was confident then was the great­est outward service that ever I performed to God:) And whether I lawfully encouraged so many thou­sands to it? And the issue of all my search is this, and never was any other but this, 1. The case of blood being a thing so dreadfull, and some wise and good men being against me, and many of their Ar­guments being plausible, and my understanding be­ing weak, I shall continue with self-suspition to search, and be glad of any information that may convince me, if I have been mistaken; and I make it my daily earnest prayer to God, that he will not suffer me to live or die impenitently, or without the discovery of my sin, if I have sinned in this matter: And could I be convinced of it, I would as gladly make a publick Recantation, as I would eat or drink: And I think I can say, that I am truly willing to know the truth.

2. But yet I cannot see that I was mistaken in the main Cause, nor dare I repent of it, nor forbear the same, if it were to do again in the same slate of things. I should do all I could to prevent such a War; but if it could not be prevented, I must take the same side as then I did. And my judge­ment tells me, That if I should do otherwise I should be guilty of Treason or Disloyaltie against the Sovereign Power of the Land, and of perfi­diousness to the Commonwealth, and of prefer­ring [Page 487] offending Subjects before the Laws and Ju­stice, and the Will of the King above that safety of the Commonwealth, and consequently above his own welfare; and that I should be guilty of gi­ving up the Land to blood (as Ireland was) or too much worse, under pretence of avoiding blood, in a necessary defence of all that is dear to us.

And it were too great folly, by following acci­dents, that were then unknown, for me to judge of the former Cause. That which is calamitous in the event, is not alway sinfull in the enterprise. Should the change of times make me forget the state that we were formerly in, and change my judgement by losing the sense of what then con­duced to its information, this folly and forgetful­ness would be the way to a sinfull. and not to an obedient Repentance. Nor can I be so unthank­full as to say, for all the sinnes and miscarriages of men since, that we have not received much mercy from the Lord: When Godliness was the common scorn, the prejudice and shame most la­mentably prevailed to keep men from it, and so encouraged them in wickedness: But through the great mercy of God, many thousands have been converted to a holy upright life, proportionably more than were before, since the reproach did cease, and the prejudice was removed, and faith­full Preachers took the places of scandalous ones, or ignorant Readers. When I look upon the place where I live, and see that the Families of the ungodly, are here one, and there one in a Street, as the Families of the godly were hereto­fore [Page 488] (though my own endeavours have been too weak and cold) it forceth me to set up the Stone of Remembrance, and to say, [HITHERTO HATH THE LORD HELPED ƲS.]

And now I must say (to prevent the Cavills of malicious Readers,) That though I have here laid down the Grounds upon which I think my E [...]gagement in the late War to have been justi­fiable, yet I intend not that every one of these distinctly, is a sufficient Medium to inferre the Conclusion: But all together shew you on what Grounds I shall proceed with any man that will ingenuously dispute the Point. I must profess, that if I had taken up Arms against the Parlia­ment in that Warre, my Conscience tells me I had been a Traitor, and guilty of Resisting the Highest Powers. And such Writings, as the (pretended) French Discovery of the Scotch and English Presbyterie, abound with so much Igno­rance of our Cause, or Serpentine malice, that they are much uncapable of changing mens judge­ments that know their vanity. But the Reading of such Books doth make me lament the misery of the World, through the partiality of Histori­ans: This Book, and Sanderson's History, and many more that I have lately seen, upon my knowledge do abound with falshoods, and delu­sory omissions, and are (in my judgement) as unfit to give Posterity a true Information of our late affairs, as the Alcoran is to tell them the [Page 489] right way to Heaven. I know I shall highly of­fend the Authors with saying so; but not so much as they offend God and wrong Posteritie by their falshoods. The foresaid (pretended) French Anti-Presbyterian, takes it for granted, that the total Sovereignty was in the King, and upon that, and many such false suppositions, he makes the Presbyteri­ans the odiousest Traitors under Heaven; So that I do not wonder that Forreign Nations do spit at the very name of an English Protestant, as at the name of the Devil: And that Papists make their Ideots believe, That the Protestants in England are run stark mad, and turn'd such Rebels as can never more for shame upbraid them with their Laterane Decrees, their Powder-plot, or their mur­dering of Kings: And what have those Protestants to answer for, that by odious lies do feed these reproaches of the ways of truth, and of the in­nocent servants of the Lord? Yea the said (Eng­lish) French Calumniator, most palpably contra­dicteth himself, and telleth all the world that he lieth: When he hath charged the Presbyterians with Hypocrisie and Treachery in their Oaths and Covenants for the safety of the King, the Privi­ledges of Parliament, &c. he proves by the breach of those Covenants, that they were false in ma­king them: And yet confesseth, that it was other men that broke them, and pull'd them down, to enable them thereto. Our only comfort is, That malice and lying shall not carry it at last, nor pass the final sentence on us.

If any of them can prove, that I was guilty of hurt to the Person, or destruction of the power [Page 490] of the King, or of changing the Fundamental Con­stitution of the Commonwealth, taking down the House of Lords, without Consent of all Three Estates that had a part in the Sovereignty; or that I violated the Priviledges of Parliament by im­prisoning or excluding the Members, and invaded the Liberties of the People, I will never gainsay them, if they call me a most perfidious Rebel, and tell me that I am guilty of far greater sin than Mur­der, Whoredom, Drunkenness, or such like. Or if they can solidly confute my Grounds, I will thank them, and confess my sin to all the world. But mali­cious railings of them I take for Rebellions them­selves, I shall not regard.