THis Book doth contain a Philosophical Disqui­tion concerning a state of Happiness; wherein the Wise man doth par­ticularly discuss each of those Subjects, which according to the various opini­ons [Page 2] and tempers of men, are believed to have any pretence to it.

The precedent Verse (as I have formerly shewed) doth contain the Conclusion of the whole matter; The chief inference and result from all the former Debates and Enquiries; where­in he asserts, That every man's true happiness doth consist in being reli­gious, In fearing God, and keeping his Commandments.

And though this Conclusion had been sufficiently proved by great va­riety of Arguments, in the foregoing Discourse; yet he thinks fit here in the close of all, to back and enforce it with one Argument more; which above all others is most apt to make deep impression upon the minds of men; and (if any thing can) to perswade them to the Duties of Religion: And that is the consideration of the [Page 3] last Judgment, in the words of the Text, For God shall bring, &c.

That which I intend from these words, is to prove, against the Infi­dels and Scoffers of this Age, The Reasonableness and the Credibility of this great Principle of Religion, con­cerning a future state of Reward and Punishment.

Though the Principal Evidence for this do depend upon Scripture, especi­ally the New Testament, where it is said, 2 Tim. 1, 10. That life and immortality is brought to light by the Gospel. Yet in a point of so great moment and consequence as this is, it is not to be imagined, that God should have left himself with­out a witness to all the Nations of the World, but that all men should be endowed, with such natural Capacities and Notions, as being improved by Consideration, will afford sufficient [Page 4] evidence for the belief of this great Fundamental Principle.

As for such men, who live under the sense of Guilt, whose Interest it is that there should be no future account, It cannot be otherwise expected from such, But that they should be willing to dis-believe this. And from hence it is, that some of the Ancient Phi­losophers have employed their Learn­ing and Subtilty, to dispute them­selves into some kind of doubts and uncertainty about it. And yet the ge­nerality even of these have been forced to acknowledg it much more proba­ble than the contrary. And as for the Vulgar sort of people, who are gui­ded by the more simple dictates of Nature, These have in all Ages and Nations submitted themselves to this Doctrine, and professed a firm be­lief of it. And though Vulgar Opi­nion [Page 5] be but a very bad Topick about such matters as may gratifie men in their ease and sensual appetites; yet in such other Opinions as are cross to their Worldly Interests, it may argue such things to be from some na­tural impression upon their minds, which they must believe, and cannot otherwise chuse.

The Arguments I would make use of to this purpose, may be reduced to these three general Heads:

1. From the suitableness of this Principle, to the most natural Notions of our Minds.

2. The Necessity of it, to the go­vernment of mens Lives and Actions in this World.

3. The Necessity of it, for the vin­dication of Divine Providence.

[Page 6] 1. I begin with the first: The suita­bleness of it to the most natural No­tions of our Minds, and those kind of Impressions which belong to us, as we are Reasonable Creatures. We see by experience, that all other things (so far as we are able to judg) Mi­nerals, Plants, Beasts, &c. are naturally endowed with such Principles, as are most fit to promote the perfection of their natures in their several Kinds. And therefore it is by no means cre­dible, that Mankind only, the most excellent of all the other Creatures in this visible World, for the service of whom, so many other things seem to be designed, should have such kind of Principles interwoven in his very Na­ture, as do contain in them meer cheats and delusions. And therefore whatsoe­ver those things are, which the gene­rality of Mankind, especially the [Page 7] most wise and the most considerate part of them, do agree in, ought to be allowed for highly credible; other­wise it must follow, that we are fra­med with such kind of Faculties, as in our most cautious exercise of them, are more likely to seduce us, and ex­pose us to Error, than to direct and lead us to the Truth.

But I shall endeavour to manifest this more particularly, by these three Considerations.

1. This Principle is most suitable to the general Apprehensions of Man­kind, concerning the nature of Good and Evil.

2. To those natural Hopes and Expectations which the generality of good men have, concerning a state of future Happiness.

3. To those natural Fears and Ex­pectations, which the generality of [Page 8] wicked men are possessed with, concer­ning a future state of Punishment and Misery.

1. This Principle is most suitable to the general Apprehensions of Man­kind concerning the nature of Good and Evil. All men heretofore have agreed, that there is such a Thing as the Law of Nature, whereby things are distinguished into Good and Bad; according to which, the Actions of men are determined to be either Vir­tuous or Vicious. And as the one of these, doth in the essence of it imply Comeliness and Reward; so doth the other denote Turpitude and Punish­ment. These things being implied in the very definitions of Virtue and Vice. And from hence it will follow, That as there is some Superior Power who hath put this Law into our Natures; so will he take care to enforce the ob­servance [Page 9] servance of it, by rewarding and punishing men accordingly. This be­ing implied in the nature of a Law.

If there be nothing in the naked es­sence of things that makes them to dif­fer, but what doth meerly arise from Custom and Positive Laws; why then Custom and Law would be able to render it a very virtuous and com­mendable thing for a man to be in­grateful, a breaker of Compacts, a false Witness, a Perjured person; which is so monstrous a Position, that the common Reason of Mankind will ab­hor it upon the first proposal. No­thing is more obvious, than that there is a universal desire amongst men, of seeming honest: The most impudent and profligate Wretch being loth to be esteemed to be, what really he is. The very Sin of Hypocrisie, so gene­ral amongst men, doth give a large [Page 10] Testimony to the Beauty of Good­ness, and the Deformity of Vice. Nor is there any account to be given, why there should be impressed upon the nature of men such a value for the one, and dislike for the other, if there were not in the things themselves, something suitable to those contrary affections.

We see by experience, that there is such a kind of Rest and Acqui­escence in the mind, upon the disco­very of Truth, and the doing of Vir­tuous Actions, as belong to natural Bodies, when they are in their pro­per places: Which may argue these things to have some peculiar suitable­ness to the Soul of man, and that the opposites to them do offer violence to some natural Principle belonging to it.

2. This Principle is most suitable to those natural Hopes and Expectati­ons [Page 11] which the generality of good men have concerning a state of future Hap­piness. From whence doth arise that Confidence and Courage, whereby those of meanest Quality and Abili­ties (if otherwise Virtuous persons) can support themselves in their suffer­ings for that which is good: Which doth necessarily suppose in them a strong, and even a natural belief and perswasion of such a future state, wherein their sufferings shall be consi­dered and rewarded.

Besides that, there is a natural de­sire in all men, after a state of Hap­piness and Perfection. And if we con­sider the utter impossibility of attain­ing to any such condition in this life, This will render it highly credible, That there must be another state where­in this Happiness is attainable: other­wise Mankind must fail of his chief [Page 12] End, being by a natural Principle most strongly inclined to such a state of Happiness as he can never attain to. As if he were purposely framed to be tormented betwixt these two Passions, Desire, and Despair; an earnest Pro­pension after Happiness, and an utter incapacity of ever enjoying it. And, which is yet more considerable, The better and the wiser any man is, the more earnest desires and hopes hath he after such a state of Happiness. And if there be no such thing, Not only Nature, but Virtue likewise must contribute to make men misera­ble; Than which, nothing can seem more unreasonable to those who be­lieve a Just and a Wise Providence.

3. This Principle is most suitable to those Fears and Expectations which the generality of wicked men are pos­sessed with, concerning a future state [Page 13] of Misery. Witness those natural sug­gestions of Conscience in the worst of men, that upon any wicked action (though never so private) are often­times startling of them, with the ap­prehensions of another Judicature and Tribunal, before which they shall be called to an account for their Closest sins. All that secret regret, and those inward smitings, Laniatus & Ictus, which are so often felt in the Minds of men, upon the commission of any great sin, do argue some common in­timations, even in the Light of Na­ture, of another Judgment after this life, wherein they shall be accounta­ble for such Actions, which men do not punish or take notice of.

And these natural Fears do usually seize upon all kind of men promiscu­ously, even those who are most Potent, who by their own Wills can give Laws [Page 14] to Nations, and command mighty Armies, yet cannot they avoid these Checks and Lashes of Conscience, but that they will seize upon them, and shake them, as well as the poorest meanest Subject. Nor can such as are most obstinately wicked, who with their utmost study and endeavour, apply themselves to the suppressing and dis­belief of these Notions, so wholly stifle them, but that they will be con­tinually rising up in their Minds, and pursuing of them.

Now as there is no man whatsoe­ver, that is wholly freed from these fears of future misery after death, so there is no other Creature but Man, that hath any fears of this kind. And if there be no real ground for this, then must it follow, That he who framed all his other Works with such an ex­cellent congruity, did yet so contrive [Page 15] the Nature of Man, the most noble amongst them, as to prove a needless torment and burden to it self.

If it be said, That these Notions may proceed from such Principles as men have derived from Institution, and the Teaching of others, and do not imply a Necessity of any such Natu­ral impressions.

To this it may be answered, That it is sufficient to denominate them Na­tural Notions, if they have such a suita­bleness to the Minds of men, as makes them to be generally owned by all those who apply their thoughts to the con­sideration of them. And that they have such a natural suitableness, may appear, Because Institution cannot so easily eradicate these notions, as it can fix them. Now if the meer teaching of others were it self sufficient to im­press these Notions, without any such [Page 16] peculiar congruity in the things them­selves, It would be as sufficient to de­face them again: Especially consider­ing the advantage on this side, from that natural repugnancy we have, against any thing which brings disquiet to our Minds. And nothing is more troublesome in this kind, than the Fear which follows upon Guilt.

But now, though there have been several men, of no mean Abilities, in several Ages, who have made it their business to root out of the Minds of men all such troublesome notions about a future state, endeavouring to per­swade themselves and others, That as there was a time before they were born into the world, when they were not; So at their dying, or going out of it, they shall exist no more. And yet, though it be their interest to believe this, though they make it their study [Page 17] and business to perswade themselves and others to it; It may reasonably be doubted, whether ever yet, there hath been so much as one person that hath hereby become absolutely free from these Fears: But for the most part, Those who would have them esteemed vain and imaginary, without any foundation in Nature, These are the persons who are most assaulted with them.

Hi Sunt qui trepidant & ad omniaful­gere pallent. So powerful and uncon­querable are these impressions, and therefore natural.

2. The second Reason I proposed to speak to, was from the Necessity of this Principle, to the right government of mens Lives and Actions in this world, and the preserving of Society amongst them.

Nothing can be more evident, than that the Human Nature is so framed, [Page 18] as not to be regulated and kept within due bounds, without Laws; and Laws must be insignificant, without the San­ctions of Rewards and Punishments, whereby men may be necessitated to the observance of them. Now the temporal Rewards and Punishments of this life, cannot be sufficient to this end; and therefore there is a necessity, that there should be another future state of Happiness and Misery.

All the Rewards and Punishments of this life, are to be expected either from the Civil Magistrate, who by virtue of his Place and Calling is ob­liged to the duty of distributive Ju­stice: Or else from Divine Providence, according to that most usual course which we find by experience to be ob­served by Him, in his dispensation of these Temporal things. Now neither of these can afford sufficient Motives [Page 19] for the government of Mens Lives and Actions.

1. Not all that may be expected from the Civil Magistrate, Because there may be many good and evil Acti­ons, which they cannot take notice of; And they can reward and punish only such things as come under their cogni­zance. And if this were the only re­straint upon men, it could be no hin­drance from any such Mischief or Vil­lanies which men had the opportunity of committing secretly. Nor would it extend to those who had Power and Strength enough to defend themselves from the Law, and escape the penalty of it, but that such might without any kind of check or fear, follow the inclinations of their own Appetites. Nor would it afford any remedy in the case of such wicked Magistrates as should invert the order of their Insti­tution, [Page 20] proving Terrors to well-doers, and Encouragers to those that do ill.

2. Not all that may be expected from Common Providence; For though it should be granted, that according to the most usual and general course of things, both Virtuous and Vicious Actions are rewarded and punished in this life; yet there may be many par­ticular cases which this Motive would not reach unto; namely all such cases where a man's Reason shall inform him, that there is far greater probabi­lity of safety and advantage, by com­mitting a sin, than can be reasonably expected, (according to his experience of the usual course of things in the world,) by doing his duty. Suppose the case of the three Children, or of any others called to Martyrdom, who may be threatned with torments and death, unless they will blaspheme God, and re­nounce [Page 21] their Religion, If it appear to them very probable, suppose a hun­dred to one, that upon their refusal, Their Persecutors will really execute what they threaten: And if on the other side it appear very improbable, suppose ten thousand to one, that they shall not be delivered by a Miracle: In such cases, it is not to be expected that the consideration of the ordinary course of Providence in the dispensa­tion of Rewards and Punishments, should be sufficient to restrain a man from any kind of Blasphemy or Vil­lany whatsoever.

But the thing I am speaking to, will more fully appear, by consideration of those horrid Mischiefs of all kinds, that would most naturally follow from the denial of this Doctrine.

If there be no such thing to be ex­pected as Happiness or Misery here­after, [Page 22] Why then the only business that men are to take care of, is their pre­sent well-being in this World; There being nothing to be counted either Good or Bad, but in order to this. Those things which we conceive to be conducible to it, being the only du­ties; and all other things that are cross to it, being the only sins. And there­fore whatever a man's Appetite shall incline him to, he ought not to deny himself in it (be the thing what it will) so he can have it, or do it without probable danger.

Suppose it be matter of Gain or Pro­fit he is disposed to, if he can cheat or steal securely, this will be so far from being a fault, that it is plainly his duty, Because it is a proper means to promote his chief End.

And so for other cases of Anger, Hatred, Revenge, &c. according to [Page 23] this Principle, a man must take the first opportunity of satisfying these Passi­ons, by doing any kind of mischief to the persons he is offended with, whether by false Accusations and Per­jury; or (if need be) by poysoning or stabbing of them; provided he can do these things so, as to escape the suspition of others, and Humane Pe­nalty.

Now let any man judg, what Bears, and Wolves, and Devils, men would prove to one another, if every thing should be not only lawful, but a duty, whereby they might gratifie their im­petuous Lusts, if they might either perjure themselves, or steal, or mur­der, as often as they could do it safely, and get any advantage by it.

But these things are so very obvi­ous, and undeniable, that the most prophane Atheistical persons do own [Page 24] the truth of them. And upon this, they are willing to acknowledg, That Re­ligion and the belief of another life, is a very politick invention, and need­ful for the well-governing of the world, and for the keeping men in awe, from the doing any secret mischiefs. Which (by the way) is a concession of no small advantage to the honour of Re­ligion, considering that it proceeds from the greatest professed Enemies to it. Whereby they grant, that it is fit these things should be true, if they are not; or at least that it is fit, that the gene­rality of men should believe them to be true. And though they themselves pre­tend to believe otherwise, yet are they not so far out of their wits, as to be willing that those with whom they con­verse, their Wives, and Children, and Servants, should be of the same opinion with them, Because then they could [Page 25] have no reason to expect any safety a­mongst them. What security could any man have of his Estate, or Ho­nour, or Life, if such with whom he is most familiar and intimate, might think themselves at liberty to do all the secret mischiefs to them, that they had opportunity to commit?

But there is one thing more, which those, who profess to dis-believe this Principle, should do well to consider; and that is this, That there is no ima­ginable reason, why (amongst those that know them) they should pretend to any kind of Honesty or Conscience, because they are wholly destitute of all such motives as may be sufficient to ob­lige them to any thing of this nature. But according to them, that which is called Virtue and Religion, must be one of the most silly and useless things in the world.

[Page 26] As for the Principle of Honour, which some imagine may supply the room of Conscience, This relates only to external Reputation, and the esteem which we have amongst others; And therfore can be of no influence to restrain men from doing any secret mischief.

From what hath been said, it will follow, That those who have any re­gard to their own safeties, ought to abandon all kind of society with such pernicious persons, who according to their own Principles, must take all op­portunities of doing any mischief to others, which they are able to effect, with any advantage to themselves.

Now if this be so (as I have pro­ved), that the nature of man is so fra­med, as not to be effectually perswa­ded and wrought upon, without the consideration of such a future state. If it be necessary to put in everlasting mo­tives, [Page 27] as the Sanctions of that Law, by which the Humane Nature is to be go­verned; This must render it highly credible, that there is such a state. Be­cause it must needs be very unworthy of God, to conceive of Him, that he hath contrived the nature of one of his best and most noble Creatures, after such a manner, as to make it incapable of being governed without falshood and deceit.

3. The third and last Argument I pro­posed to speak to, was from the necessity of this Principle to the vindication of Divine Providence. Nothing is more universally acknowledged, than that God is Good and Iust. That well-do­ing shall be rewarded, and evil Actions punished by Him. And yet we see that his dispensations in this life are many times promiscuous and uncertain; so that a man cannot judg of love or ha­tred [Page 28] by all that is before him. The worst men are sometimes in the best condition. If in this life only we had hope, 1 Cor. 15. 19. we should be of all men the most miserable, saith the Apostle, speaking concerning those pri­mitive times of Persecution, when the better any man was, the more was he ex­posed to sufferings.

Now the greater Vncertainty there is as to the present Affairs in this world, By so much greater is the Certainty of a future Iudgment.

What could be a greater disparage­ment to Divine Providence, than to permit the Calamities and Sufferings which good men undergo in this world, many times upon the account of Re­ligion, to pass unrewarded; and the many Mischiefs and Prophanations, which wicked men take the advantage of committing, by their Greatness and Prosperity in this world, to go unpun­ished?

[Page 29] What great glory would it be, to preside over this Material World, Starrs and Meteors, Sea and Land, Plants and Beasts, to put these things into such a regular course, as may be suitable to their natures, and the ope­rations for which they are designed; and in the mean space to have no propor­tionable regard, either for those that re­verence the Deity, or those who con­temn Him?

'Tis very well said to this purpose by a late Author, Amyraldus. That not to conduct the course of Nature in a due manner, might speak some defect of Wisdom in God: but not to compensate Virtue and Vice, besides the defect of wisdom, in not adjusting things suitably to their qualifications, but crosly coupling Pro­sperity with Vice, and Misery with Virtue, would argue too great a defect of Goodness and of Iustice. And per­haps [Page 30] it would not be less expedient (saith he) with Epicurus, to deny all Providence, than to ascribe to it such defects. It being less unworthy of the Divine Nature, to neglect the Uni­verse altogether, than to administer Human Affairs with so much Injustice and Irregularity.

And therefore 'tis necessary for the vindication of Divine Providence, that there shold be a future state and day of Account, wherein every man shall be forced to acknowledg, that ve­rily there is a reward for the righteous; Psal, 58, 11. doubtless there is a God that judgeth the earth.

I crave leave for a word of Appli­cation, and I have done. If this be so, it will concern us then to enquire,

1. Whether we do in good earnest believe this, That there shall be a fu­ture state of Reward and Punishment, [Page 31] according as mens Lives and Actions have been in this world. If not, why do we profess our selves to be Christi­ans? Why do we not renounce the Articles of our Creed? Nay, why do we pretend to any Religion? Nothing can be more false and unworthy, than in a solemn and religious manner to own that in our outward Profession, which we do inwardly dis-believe and deny.

2. Do we at any time seriously con­sider this? and revolve upon it in our minds? Do we bethink our selves, what our own condition is like to be at that time, what preparations we have made for it, what grounds we have for hope? There cannot possibly be any greater stupidity, than for a man to be slight and careless in a business of so great mo­ment. 'Tis the want of believing and considering this, that is the chief cause of all the viciousness and disorder in the world.

[Page 32] 3. What impression doth the belief and consideration of this make upon our hearts and lives? Doth it stir up in us, vebement desires, and carefulness of mind in preparing for that time? If a man were to be tryed for his life at the next Assizes, How would his thoughts be taken up about his defence, what an­swer he should make, what the main plea is which he should insist upon, by what evidence it might be strengthned and cleared up? He would as soon forget to eat his meat, or to go to bed, as to let a business of this nature slip out of his mind.

There is nothing more hard to be restrained, than the Impetuous and wild Exorbitances of Youth; And yet such persons would not, durst not in­dulge themselves, according to the ways of their own hearts, and the sight of their eyes; If they did really believe and con­sider, [Page 33] that for all these things God would bring them to judgment. Eccles. 11. 9.

The business of Religion, must therefore be above all other things of greatest consequence to us, because 'tis the only means to secure us, as to our future conditions. The affairs of this life are but of short continuance, and full of uncertainty: And therefore 'tis not much material what a man's condi­tion may be in that respect. But there is another state and time which will more nearly concern our care; and that is the great day of Account. And till a man hath in some measure provided for this, he cannot live comfortably, or sleep quietly, or have any solid peace in his mind; but must upon every seri­ous reflexion be continually haunted with frightful apprehensions about his everlasting condition.

'Tis scarce credible that any man [Page 34] should be so sottish, as to think, he shall escape dying: and when we do come to depart out of this world, It will then be no advantage to us, that we have had Riches, or Honour, or Power. These things will then vanish away, as to our Possession of them; and the Remembrance of them may prove a torment to our thoughts, rather than a comfort; espe­cially if we have reason to suspect, that these things were our portion in this life, and may be reckoned upon as our good things which we have had already. Cer­tain it is, that they will render our Ac­counts the more difficult: For to whom much is given, of them much shall be required. We must be answerable not only for our doings, but for the fruit of our doings. Jet. 17. 10. All the sins, or evil con­sequences which have been occasioned by our Miscarriages, shall be set upon our score.

[Page 35] And if these things be so, 2 Pet. 3. 11, 12. What man­ner of persons ought we to be in all holy conversation and godliness, looking for, and hastning unto the coming of the day of God. If any thing can prevail with men to live soberly, Tit. 2. 12. 13 righteously, and godly in this present world, It must be from the consideration of that blessed hope and glorious appearing of the Great God, our Saviour Iesus Christ: To whom with the Father, &c.