§ 1. NOtwithstanding that Con­science is the best, if not the only security of Go­vernment, yet has Go­vernment never been controul'd or di­sturb'd so much by any thing as Con­science. This has ever rival'd Princes in their Supremacy, and pretends to as uncontroulable an Authority over all the Actions and Affairs of humane life, as the most absolute and unlimited Power durst ever challenge. Are Go­vernours [Page 5] Gods Vicegerents? so is this. Have they a power of deciding all Con­troversies? so has this. Can they pre­scribe Rules of Virtue and Goodness to their Subjects? so may this. Can they punish all their Criminal Actions? so can this. And are they subject and accountable to God alone? so is this, that owns no superiour but the Lord of Consciences. And of the two Consci­ence seems to be the greater Sovereign, and to govern the larger Empire. For whereas the Power of Princes is re­strain'd to the outward actions of men, this extends its Dominion to their in­ward thoughts: Its throne is seated in their minds, and it exercises all that Au­thority over their secret and hidden sen­timents, that Princes claim over their publick and visible practices. And up­on this account is it set up upon all oc­casions to grapple with the Scepters and Swords of Princes, and counter­mand any Laws, they think good to prescribe; and whenever Subjects have a mind to controul or disobey their De­crees, this is immediately prest and engaged to their Party, and does not only dictate, but vouches all their Re­monstrances. [Page 6] Do Subjects rebel against their Sovereign? 'tis Conscience that takes up Arms. Do they murder Kings? 'tis under the conduct of Conscience. Do they separate from the Communion of the Church? 'tis Conscience that is the Schismatick. Do they tye them­selves by one Oath to contradict and evacuate another? 'tis Conscience that imposes it. Every thing any man has a mind to, is his Conscience; and Mur­ther, Treason, and Rebellion plead its Authority. The Annals and Histories of all times and places are too sad a Wit­ness, that this great and sacred thing has ever been abused, either through the Folly of some, or Hypocrisie of others, to patronize the most desperate Mis­chiefs, and Villanies, that were ever acted.

§ 2. Here then we see is a Compe­tition between the Prerogative of the Prince, and that of Conscience, i. e. every private mans own judgment and perswa­sion of things: The judgment of the Magistrate inclines him to Command, that of the Subject to Disobey; and the Dictates of his Conscience countermand [Page 7] the Decrees of his Prince. Now is there not likely to be untoward doings, when two Supreme Powers thus clash and con­tradict each other? For what power would be left to Princes, if every private mans perswasion (for that is his Consci­ence) may give check to their Com­mands? Most mens minds or Consci­ences are weak, silly, and ignorant things, acted by fond and absurd principles, and imposed upon by their vices and their passions; so that were they entirely left to their own conduct, in what mischiefs and confusions must they involve all So­cieties? Let Authority command what it please, they would do what they list. And what is this but a state of perfect Anarchy, in which every man does what is good in his own eyes? And therefore whilst men contend for the Sovereign Empire of their Consciences, and invest it with the Royal supremacy, by making it subject and accountable to none but God alone, they do in effect but usurp their Prince's Crown, defie his Autho­rity, and acknowledge no Governour but themselves. For seeing that Con­science is nothing but the judgment and opinion of their own Actions, if this be [Page 8] exempt from the Commands of Gover­nours, and if men not only may, but al­ways ought to comply with their own Dictates, when they oppose their De­crees, 'tis easie to determine whether themselves or their Governors be vested with the Supreme Authority. In brief, every single person is subject to two Su­preme Powers, the Laws of his Prince, and the Dictates of his Conscience, i. e. to his own and his Princes Opinion: and therefore if the Supreme Power of the Prince must give place to that of his Con­science, it ceases upon that score to be Supreme; because there is a Superior Authority that can countermand all its Laws and Constitutions. What then is to be done in this case? Who shall arbitrate between these two mighty rival Pow­ers, and so justly assign the true bounds of their respective Dominions; that Princes may never intrench upon the rights of Conscience, nor Conscience lay waste the rights of Princes, but both may act within their proper spheres with­out invading each others Territories? For whenever their Powers happen to interfere, the quarrel quickly proceeds to all the mischiefs and confusions of War. [Page 9] For there is not any thing so tender, or so unruly as Conscience: if Authority curb it too severely, it grows wild and furious, and impatient of all restraints; if it permit it an unbridled liberty, it soon runs it self into all the mischiefs and enormities in the world. And therefore it must be managed with equal tender­ness and severity: and as it must be guid­ed by wise and sober Laws, else it grows giddy and exorbitant; so must it not be provoked to resistance by Tyranny and Oppression: for if it once put the Sword into Subjects hands, it proves of all Re­bels the most fatal and implacable, and is the best Commander of a Rebellious Army in the world. We see then that 'tis a matter of equal difficulty and im­portance to avoid all the mischiefs and calamities that naturally follow upon the Contentions of these two Supreme Pow­ers. 'Tis difficult to bring them to terms of Accommodation, because neither of them will own any Superiour that may umpire their Controversie; and yet that this should be done is absolutely neces­sary to the Peace, Settlement, and Tran­quillity of all Common-wealths.

[Page 10] § 3. And therefore 'tis the design of this Discourse by a fair and impartial Debate to compose all their Differences, adjust all their quarrels and contentions, and settle things upon their true and proper foundations. Which I think may be effectually enough perform'd by these two considerations.

1. By proving it to be absolutely ne­cessary to the Peace and Government of the World, that the Supreme Magistrate of every Common-wealth should be vested with a Power to govern and con­duct the Consciences of Subjects in Af­fairs of Religion.

2. By shewing this to be so certain and undoubted a truth, that it is and must be acknowledged by its fiercest Ad­versaries; and that those who would de­prive the supreme Civil Power of its Au­thority in reference to the Conduct of the worship of God, are forced to al­low it in other more material parts of Religion; though they are both liable to the same inconveniences and objections. And this will oblige me to state the true extent of the Magistrates power over Conscience in reference to Divine Wor­ship, [Page 11] by shewing it to be the very same with his Power over Conscience in mat­ters of Morality, and all other Affairs of Religion. Under one of which two Considerations I shall have occasion to state the most material Questions, and to answer the most considerable Obje­ctions, that occur in this Controversie. And I do not question but things may be made out with that demonstrative evi­dence, and settled upon such safe and moderate principles, as may abundantly satisfie every mans Conscience, how nice and curious soever, provided it be not debauch'd with vice, and wicked princi­ples;. but if it be, then 'tis easie to make it appear both the Magistrates Duty and Interest to punish such vicious and dis­eased Conscience as much as all other immorality.

§ 4. First then 'tis absolutely necessa­ry to the Peace and Tranquillity of the Commonwealth, which, though it be the prime and most important end of Go­vernment, can never be sufficiently se­cured, unless Religion be subject to the Authority of the Supreme Power, in that it has the strongest influence upon hu­mane [Page 12] Affairs; and therefore if the Sove­reign Power cannot order and manage it, it would be but a very incompetent In­strument of publick happiness, would want the better half of it self, and be ut­terly weak and ineffectual for the ends of Government. For 'tis certain, nothing more governs the minds of men than the apprehensions of Religion: this leads or drives them any way. And as true Piety secures the publick weal by taming and civilizing the passions of men, and in­uring them to a mild, gentle and gover­nable spirit: So superstition and wrong notions of God and his Worship, are the most powerful engines to overturn its settlement. And therefore unless Princes have Power to bind their Subjects to that Religion that they apprehend most ad­vantageous to publick Peace and Tran­quillity, and restrain those Religious mistakes that tend to its subversion; they are no better than Statues and Images of Authority, and want that part of their Power that is most necessary to a right discharge of their Government. For what if the minds of men happen to be tainted with such furious and boy­sterous Conceptions of Religion, as in­cline [Page 13] them to stubborness and Sedition, and make them unmanageable to the Laws of Government; shall not a Prince be allowed to give check to such unruly and dangerous Perswasions? If he may, then 'tis clear that he is endued with a power to conduct Religion, and that must be subject to his Dominion, as well as all other Affairs of State. But if he may not, then is he obliged in some cases tamely to permit his Subjects to ruine and overturn the Common-wealth. For if their wild and capricious humours are not severely bridled by the strictest Laws and Penalties, they soon grow headstrong and unruly, become always troublesome, and often fatal to Princes. The minds of the multitude are of a fierce and eager temper, apt to be driven without bounds and measures, whithersoever their Per­swasions hurry them: and when they have overheated their unsettled heads with religious rage and fury, they grow wild, talkative and ungovernable; and in their mad and raving fits of zeal break all the restraints of Government, and forget all the laws of order and sobriety. Religion sanctifies all their passions: anger, ma­lice, and bitterness are holy fervors in [Page 14] the Cause of God. This cancels and di­spenses with all the obligations of sobri­ety: And what has prudence to do with Religion? this is too hot and eager to be tyed up to its flat and dull formalities. Zeal for the Glory of God will both excuse and justifie any Enormity. There can be no Faction or Rebellion in carry­ing on the Interests of the Godly Party, and the great work of a thorough Refor­mation must not be trusted to the care of carnal and lukewarm Politicians. And by these and the like pretences do they easily destroy the reverence of all things Sacred and Civil, to propagate any wild Propositions; are arm'd with Religion, and led on by the Spirit of God to disturb the Publick Peace, kill Kings, and overthrow Kingdoms. And this has ever been the bane and reproach of Re­ligion in all times and places: and there is scarce a Nation in the world that has not felt the miseries and confusions of an Holy War: and the Annals of all Ages are full of sad Stories to this purpose.

§ 5. And therefore to exempt Reli­gion and the Consciences of men from the Authority of the Supreme Power is [Page 15] but to expose the peace of Kingdoms to every wild and Fanatick Pretender, who may, when ever he pleases, under preten­ces of Reformation thwart and unsettle Government without controul; seeing no one can have any power to restrain the perswasions of his Conscience. And Religion will be so far from being at li­berty from the Authority of the Civil Power, that nothing in the world will be found to require more of its care and Influence, because there is not any other Vice to which the vulgar sort of men are more prone, than to Superstition or debauched conceptions concerning God and his Worship, nor any that more inclines them to an unruly and seditious temper. It inflames their crazy heads with a Furious and Sectarian Zeal, and adopts their rankest and most untoward passions into the Duties of Religion. And when passion becomes Holy, then it can never be exorbitant; but the more fu­rious and ungovernable it is, so much the more vehement is their zeal for the Glo­ry of God; and they that are most pee­vish and refractory, are upon that account the most godly. And then all passion and stubbornness in Religious Quarrels [Page 16] must be christned Zeal, all Zeal must be sacred, and nothing that is sacred can be excessive. And now when men act furi­ously upon these mistakes (as all that are possessed with them must) what can the issue be but eternal Miseries and Confu­sions? Every Opinion must make a Sect, and every Sect a Faction, and every Fa­ction, when it is able, a War, and every War is the Cause of God, and the Cause of God can never be prosecuted with too much violence. And then all sobriety is lukewarmness, to be obedient to Go­vernment carnal Complyance, and not to proceed to Rebellion for carrying on the great work of a thorough Reformati­on, is to want Zeal for the Glory of God. And thus are their Vices sanctified by their Consciences, malice, folly, and mad­ness are ever the prevailing ingredients of their superstitious Zeal, and Religi­on only obliges them to be more sturdy and impudent against the Laws of Go­vernment; and they are now encou­raged to cherish those passions in spight of Authority, from which the severity of Laws might effectually have re­strain'd them, were it not for the cross obligations of an untoward Conscience.

[Page 17] § 6. And for this reason is it, that 'tis found so nice and difficult a thing to govern men in their perswasions a­bout Religion, beyond all the other af­fairs and transactions of humane life; because erroneous Consciences are bold and confident enough to outface Autho­rity: whereas persons of debauch'd and scandalous lives, being condemn'd by their own Consciences as well as the publick Laws, can have nothing to bear them up against the will of their Superiors, and restraints of Govern­ment. But when mens minds are possest with such unhappy Principles of Religi­on as are more destructive of the Peace and Order of civil Society than open lewdness and debauchery, and when the Vertues of the Godly are more pregnant with villany and mischief than the Vices of the wicked, and when their Consciences are satisfied in their mis­chievous and ungovernable perswasions, and when they seriously believe that they approve themselves to God by be­ing refractory and irreclamable in their Fanatick Zeal, then how easie is it to defie Authority, and trample upon all [Page 18] its threatnings and penalities? And those Laws, that would awe a prophane and ir­religious Person at least into an outward compliance, shall but exasperate a boiste­rous Conscience into a more vehement and seditious disobedience. Now when 'tis so difficult for Magistrates either to remove these Religious Vices, or to bri­dle their unruliness, they must needs find it an incomparably harder task to re­strain the extravagancies of Zeal, than of Lewdness and Debauchery. And there­fore seeing the multitude is so inclinable to these mistakes of Religion, and see­ing, when they are infected with them, they grow so turbulent and unruly, I leave it to Governours themselves to judge, whether it does not concern them with as much vigilance and severity ei­ther to prevent their rise or suppress their growth, as to punish any the foulest crimes of Immorality? And if they would but seriously consider into what exorbi­tances peevish and untoward principles about Religion naturally improve them­selves, they could not but perceive it to be as much their concernment to punish them with the severest inflictions, as any whatsoever Principles of Rebellion in the State.

[Page 19] § 7. And this certainly has ever been one of the most fatal miscarriages of all Governours, in that they have not been aware of this fierce and implacable ene­my; but have gone about to govern un­ruly Consciences by more easie and re­miss Laws, than those that are only able to suppress scandalous and confessed villa­nies, and have thought them sufficiently restrain'd by threatning punishments, without inflicting them. And indeed in most Kingdoms (so little have Princes un­derstood their own Interests in reference to Religion) Ecclesiastical Laws have been set up only for Scar-crows, being established rather for shew and Form sake, than with any design of giving them life, by putting them into Execution; and if any were so hardy as not to be scared into obedience by the severity of their threatnings, they have been emboldned to disobedience by the re­misness of their execution, till they have not only plaid with the Law it self as a sensless trifle, but have scorn'd the weak­ness of the Power that set it up. For there is nothing more certain in experience, than that Impunity gives not only war­ranty [Page 20] but encouragement to Disobedi­ence; and by habituating men to controul the Edicts of Authority, teaches them by degrees to despise it. And this is the main reason why Ecclesiastical Laws have ge­nerally proved such ineffectual instru­ments of Uniformity, because they have either been weakned through want of execution, or in a manner cancell'd by the oppositions of Civil Constitutions. For when Laws are bound under severe penalties, and when the Persons, who are to take cognisance of the Crime, have not Power enough to punish it, or are perpetually check'd and controul'd by a stronger Power, no wonder if the Laws be affronted and despised; and if, instead of bringing mens minds to compliance and subjection, they exasperate them into open contumacy. Restraint pro­vokes their stubbornness, and yet redres­ses not the mischief. And therefore it were better to grant an uncontroul'd Liberty by declaring for it, than, af­ter having declared against it, to grant it by silence and impunity. The Prohi­bition disobliges Dissenters, and that is one evil; and the impunity allows them Toleration, and that is a greater: and [Page 21] where Governours permit, what their Laws forbid, there the Common-wealth must at once lose all the advantages of re­straint, and suffers all the inconveniences of Liberty. So that as they would expect Peace and Settlement, they must be sure at first to bind on their Ecclesiastical Laws with the streightest knot, and after­ward to keep them in force and counte­nance by the severest Execution; in that wild and Fanatick Consciences are too headstrong to be curb'd with an ordinary severity; & therefore their restraints must be proportion'd to their unruliness: and they must be managed with so much a greater care and strictness, than all other principles of publick disturbance, by how much they are more dangerous & unruly.

§ 8. For if Conscience be ever able to break down the restraints of Govern­ment, and all men have Licence to fol­low their own perswasions, the mis­chief is infinite, and the folly endless; and they seldom cease to wander from folly to folly, till they have run them­selves into all the whimsies and enormi­ties, that can debauch Religion, or an­noy the publick Peace. The giddy Mul­titude [Page 22] are of a restless and stragling hu­mour; and yet withalso ignorant and in­judicious, that there is nothing so strange and uncouth, which they will not take up with Zeal and Confidence: Insomuch that there never yet was any Common-wealth, that gave a real liberty to mens Imaginations, that was not suddenly over-run with numberless divisions, and subdivisions of Sects: as was notorious in the late Confusions, when Liberty of Conscience was laid as the Foundation of Settlement. How was Sect built up­on Sect, and Church upon Church, till they were advanced to such a height of Folly, that the Usurpers themselves could find no other way to work their subversion, and put an end to their ex­travagancies, but by overturning their own Foundations, and checking their growth by Laws and Penalties? The hu­mour of Fanaticising is a boundless folly, it knows no restraints; and if it be not kept down by the severity of Gover­nours, it grows and encreases without end, or limit, and never ceases to swell it self, till it has broke down all the banks and restraints of Government. Thus when the Disciplinarians had in [Page 23] pursuit of their own peevish and unrea­sonable Principles divided from the Church of England, others upon a farther improvement of the same principles sub­divided from them; every new opinion was enough to found a new Church, and Sect was spawn'd out of Sect, till there were almost as many Churches as Fami­lies: For when they were once parted from the order & sobriety of the Church they lived in, nothing could set bounds to their wild and violent Imaginations.

§ 9. Schismaticks always run themselves into the same excess in the Church as Rebels and Seditious Persons do in the State, who out of a hatred to Tyranny are restless till they have dissolved the Com­mon-wealth into Anarchy & Confusion; and, because some Kingly Governments have proved Tyrannical, will allow no free States but under Republicks. As was notorious in all the Apologies for the late Usurpers, who took it for grant­ed in general, That all Government un­der a single Person was slavish and op­pressive without respect to its particular Constitutions; and that the very name of a Common-wealth was a sufficient [Page 24] preservation of the Peoples Liberties, notwithstanding that those who mana­ged it were never so Imperious and Ar­bitrary in the exercise of their Power. And in the same manner our Church Dis­senters, out of abhorrency to the Papal Tyranny and Usurpation upon mens un­derstandings, never think the liberty of their Consciences sufficiently secured, till they have shaken off all subjection to Hu­mane Authority: and because the Church of Rome by her unreasonable Impositi­ons has invaded the Fundamental Liber­ties of mankind, they presently conclude all restraints upon licentious Practices and Perswasions about Religion under the hated name of Popery. And some Theological Empericks have so possess'd the peoples heads with this fond conceit, that they will see no middle way be­tween spiritual Tyranny, and spiritual Anarchy, and so brand all restraint of Government in Affairs of Religion as if it were Antichristian, and never think themselves far enough from Rome, till they are wandred as far as Munster. Whereas the Church of England in her first Reformation was not so wild as to abolish all Ecclesiastical Authority, but [Page 25] only removed it from those who had un­justly usurp'd it to its proper seat, and restrain'd it within its due bounds and li­mits: And because the Church of Rome had clogg'd Christianity with too many garish and burdensome Ceremonies, they did not immediately strip her naked of all modest and decent Ornaments out of an over-hot opposition to their too flant­ing Pomp and Vanity, but only cloathed her in such a Dress, as became the Gra­vity and Sobriety of Religion. And this is the Wisdom and Moderation of our Church to preserve us sober between two such unreasonable Extremes.

§ 10. But not to run too hastily into particular disputes, 'tis enough at present to have proved in general the absolute necessity that Affairs of Religion should be subject to Government; and then if they be exempt from the Jurisdiction of the Civil Power, I shall demand, Whether they are subject to any other Power, or to none at all? If the former, then the Supreme Power is not Supreme, but is subject to a Superiour in all matters of Religion, or rather (what is equally ab­surd) there would be two Supreme Pow­ers [Page 26] in every Common-wealth; for it the Princes Jurisdiction be limited to Civil Affairs, and the concerns of Religion be subject to another Government, then may Subjects be obliged to (what is impossi­ble) contradictory Commands: and at the same time the Civil Magistrate requires him to defend his Country against an In­vasion, the Ecclesiastical Governour may command him to abandon its defence, for the carrying on an Holy War in the Holy Land, in order to the recovery of our Saviour's Sepulchre from the Posses­sion of the Turks and Saracens. But see­ing no man can be subject to contradicto­ry obligations, 'tis by consequence utter­ly impossible he should be subject to two Supreme Powers.

If the latter, then the former Argu­ment returns; and as to one half of the concerns of the Common-wealth there must be a perfect Anarchy, and no Go­vernment at all. And there is no Pro­vision to be made against all those pub­lick mischiefs and disturbances that may arise from Errors and Enormities in Religion; the Common-wealth must for ever be exposed to the follies of Enthu­siasts, and villanies of Impostors; and [Page 27] any man, that can but pretend Consci­ence, may whenever he pleases endea­vour its Ruine: So that if Princes should forego their sovereignty over mens Con­sciences in matters of Religion, they leave themselves less Power than is abso­lutely necessary to the Peace & Defence of the Common-wealths they govern. In brief, the Supreme Government of eve­ry Common-wealth, wherever it is lodg­ed, must of necessity be universal, abso­lute, and uncontroulable, in all Afairs whatsoever, that concern the Interests of mankind, and the ends of Government: For if it be limited, it may be controul'd: but 'tis a thick and palpable Contradicti­on to call such a Power Supreme, in that whatever controuls it must as to that case be its Superiour. And therefore Af­fairs of Religion being so strongly influ­ential upon Affairs of State, and having so great a power either to advance or hinder the publick felicity of the Com­mon-wealth, they must be as uncon­troulably subject to the Supreme Pow­er as all other Civil Concerns; be­cause otherwise it will not have Autho­rity enough to secure the Publick Inte­rest of the Society, to attain the ne­cessary [Page 28] and most important ends of its Institution.

§ 11. Now from these Premisses we may observe, That all Supreme Power; both in Civil and Ecclesiastical Affairs, issues from the same Original, and is founded upon the same Reason of things; namely the indispensable necessity of So­ciety to the preservation of Humane Na­ture, and of Government to the preser­vation of Humane Society: a Supreme Power being absolutely necessary to the decision of all those Quarrels and Con­troversies, that are naturally consequent upon the Passions, Appetites, and Follies of men, there being no other way of end­ing their Differences but by the Decrees of a final & unappealable Judicature. For if every man were to be his own Judge, mens Determinations would be as contra­dictory as their Judgments, & their Judg­ments as their Humours or Interests; and so must their Dissentions of necessity be endless: And therefore to avoid these and all other Inconveniences that would na­turally follow upon a state of War, it was necessary there should be one Su­preme and Publick Judgment, to whose [Page 29] Determinations the private Judgment of every single person should be obliged to submit it self. And hence the Wisdom of Providence, knowing to what passions and irregularities mankind is obnoxious, never suffered them to live without the restraints of Government; but in the be­ginning of things so ordered affairs, that no man could be born into the world without being subject to some Superior: every father being by nature vested with a right to govern his children. And the first governments in the world were esta­blished purely upon the natural Rights of paternal Authority, which afterward grew up to a Kingly Power by the in­crease of posterity; and he that was at first but Father of a Family, in process of time, as that multiplied, became Father of a City, or Province: and hence it came to pass that in the first Ages of the World, Monarchy was its only Go­vernment, necessarily arising out of the Constitution of humane Nature, it be­ing so natural for Families to enlarge themselves into Cities by uniting into a body according to their several Kin­dreds, whence by consequence the Supreme Head of those Families must [Page 30] become Prince and Governour of a lar­ger & more diffused Society. And there­fore Cedrenus makes Adam the first Mo­narch in the World, [...]. And thus afterwards in the division of the Earth among the Posterity of Noah, the heads of Families became Kings and Monarchs of the Nations of which they were Foun­ders, from whence were propagated the several Kingdoms of the first and elder times; as appears not only from the Mo­saick History, but also from all other the best and most ancient Records of the first Ages of the World: But as for Com­mon-wealths, they are comparatively of a very late discovery, being first con­triv'd among the Grecians, whose De­mocracies and Optimacies were made out of the Ruines of Monarchick Go­vernment; which was but sutable to the proud, factious, and capricious humour of that Nation, where scarce any one could pretend to a little skill in Poetry or Wrest­ling (their two greatest accomplish­ments) but he must immediately be an Vndertaker for new modelling the Common-wealth; which doubtless was one of the main causes of their perpe­tual [Page 31] Confusions, and frequent Charges in Government.

§ 12. Having thus firmly founded all Civil Government upon Paternal Autho­rity, I may now proceed to shew, That all Ecclesiastical Power bottoms upon the same Foundation: For as in the first Ages of the world, the Fathers of Fami­lies were vested with a Kingly Power over their own Posterity; so also were they with the Priestly Office, executing all the Holy Functions of Priesthood in their own Persons, as appears from the una­nimous testimony of Histories both Sa­cred and Prophane. Thus we find all the Ancient Patriarchs Priests to their own Families; which Office descended to­gether with the Royal Dignity to the first-born of each Family. And this custom of investing the Sovereign Power with the Supreme Priesthood, was (as divers Au­thors both Ancient and Modern observe) universally practis'd over all Kingdoms of the world for well nigh 2500 years, with­out any one president to the contrary.

In that among all Societies of men there is as great a necessity of publick Worship, as of publick Justice; the [Page 32] power whereof, because it must be seated somewhere, can properly belong to him alone, in whom the Supreme Power re­sides; in that he alone having authority to assign to every subject his proper fun­ction, and among others this of the Priesthood; the exercise whereof as he has power to transfer to another, so may he, if he please, reserve it to himself. And therefore this the wisdom of the elder Ages always practised, in order to the better security of their Government; as well knowing the tendency of Supersti­tion, and false notions of the divine wor­ship, to Tumults and Seditions; and ther­fore, to prevent the disturbances that might spring from Factions in Religion, they were sollicitous to keep its manage­ment in their own immediate disposal. And though in the Jewish Common­wealth, the Priestly Office was upon rea­sons peculiar to that State separated by a divine positive command from the King­ly Power; yet the Power and Jurisdiction of the Priest remained still subject to the Sovereign Prince, their King always ex­ercising a Supremacy over all persons, and in all Causes Ecclesiastical: Nothing can be more unquestionable than the pre­cedents [Page 33] of David, Solomon, Hezekiah, Iehu, Iehosaphat, Iosiah, &c. who exer­cised as full a Legislative Power in Affairs of Religion, as in Affairs of State. They alone restrain'd and punish'd whatever tended to the subversion of the Publick and establish'd Religion; they suppress'd Innovations, reform'd Corruptions, or­dered the Decencies and Solemnities of publick Worship, instituted new Laws and Ceremonies, and conducted all the concerns of Religion by their own Pow­er and Authority. Now there is nothing that can be pretended against the Eccle­siastical Jurisdiction of Christian Magi­strates, that might not with as great a shew of Reason have been urged against these Jewish Kings.

§ 13. And thus were the Affairs of Re­ligion in all Nations govern'd by the Su­preme Power till our blessed Saviour's birth, who came into the world to esta­blish new Laws of Religion, and not to set up any new Models of Politie. He came not to unsettle the Foundations of Go­vernment, or to diminish the natural Rights of Princes, and settle the conduct of humane affairs upon new Principles, [Page 34] but left the Government of the world in the same condition he found it: All his Discourses were directed to private per­sons, and such whose duty it was to O­bey, and not Command; and therefore though we find him every where highly solicitous to press men to Obedience in general, (and perhaps it would be no ea­sie task to find out any Professors of the Art of Policy, either ancient or modern, that have carried the Doctrine of Obe­dience so high as the Sermons of our Sa­viour, and the Writings of his Apostles) yet no where he takes upon him to settle, much less to limit the Prerogatives of Princes; and therefore the Government of Religion, being vested in them by an antecedent and natural Right, must without all controversie belong to them, till it is derogated from them by some Superiour Authority: so that unless our Saviour had expresly disrobed the Roy­al Power of its Ecclesiastical Jurisdicti­on, nothing else can alienate it from their Prerogative. And therefore 'tis no wonder if he left no Commands to the Civil Magistrate for the right Go­vernment of Religion; for to what pur­pose should he give them a new Com­mission [Page 35] to exercise that Power, that was already so firmly establish'd in the world by the unalterable dictates of Natural Reason, and Universal Practice, and Con­sent of Nations: it being so clearly in­separable from the Supreme Power in every Common-wealth, that it loses both its Supremacy, and its usefulness, unless it be universal and unlimited? In that the end of all Government is to secure the Peace and Tranquillity of the Pub­lick; and therefore it must have Power to manage and order every thing that is serviceable to that end. So that it being so clearly evident from the experience of mankind, and from the nature of the thing it self, that nothing has a stronger influence upon the publick Interests of a Nation, than the well or ill manage­ment of Religion; its conduct must needs be as certain and inseparable a Right of the Supreme Power in every Common­wealth, as the Legislative Authority it self; without which 'tis utterly impossi­ble there should be any Government at all. And therefore the Scripture seems ra­ther to suppose than assert the Ecclesia­stical Jurisdiction of Princes. What else means that Promise, That Kings shall be [Page 36] nursing Fathers to the Church of God, un­less by their Power they may cherish and defend the true Religion, and protect it from being destroyed by Hereticks and Seducers? What does the Scripture mean when it styles our Saviour King of Kings, and makes Princes his Vicegerents here on earth? What means the Apostle, when he says, Kings are appointed to this end, That under them we may live a quiet and peaceable life, not only in all honesty, but in all godliness too? Where we see, that the propagation of Godliness is as much the Duty of Governours, as the preser­vation of Justice; neither of which can a Prince (as such) effectually promote, but by the proper effects of his Power, Laws and Penalties.

Besides all which, all the Power of the Common-wealth our Saviour lived in, was fall'n into such mens hands, that would be so far from concerning them­selves in the defence, protection, and pro­pagation of Christianity, that he knew they would exert the utmost of their force to suppress and destroy it. Now to what purpose should he entrust them with a Commission to govern his Church, when he knew they would la­bour [Page 37] its utter ruine and destruction? And hence was there no other peaceable me­thod to propagate the Christian Faith in the world, but by the patience and suf­ferings of its Professors: and therefore our Saviour, to secure his Religion from the reproach of being Factious and Sedi­tious against the State, was sollicitous a­bove all things to arm them with Meek­ness and Patience; and to this purpose he gave them glorious promises to en­courage their submission to their unhap­py Fate, and severe Injunctions to secure their Obedience to all the Commands of lawful Superiours, except when they run directly cross to the Interest of the Go­spel; which as the posture of Affairs then stood, was incomparably the most effectual, as well as most innocent way of its propagation.

§ 14. And therefore 'tis but an idle and impertinent Plea that some men make for Liberty of Conscience, when they would restrain the Magistrates Power so, as to make use of no other means than what our Saviour and his Apostles used to convince and convert men: An Argument that much resembles that, [Page 38] which they urge with so much popular noise and confidence against that little Grandeur & Authority that is left to the Governours of our Church; because for­sooth the Apostles, by reason of the un­happy juncture of Affairs in their times, lived in a mean and persecuted condi­tion; and therefore what was their Cala­mity, these men would make our Duty: but it were to be wished they would pur­sue their Argument to all the purposes for which it may as rationally serve: and so they must sell their Lands, and bring the money and lay it at the Bishops Feet; they must pass away all their Proprie­ties, and have all things in common, and part them to all men as every man has need, because the Primitive Christians did so. At so prodigious a rate of im­pertinency do men talk, when their Pas­sions dictate their Discourses; and to so fine a pass would the Affairs of Christen­dom be brought by this trifling pretence of reducing the state of the Church to its Primitive Practice in all accidents and circumstances of things.

But yet I suppose these men themselves would scarce imitate the practice of our Saviour and his Apostles in this particu­lar; [Page 39] for if the Scribes and Pharisees were now in being, I hope they would not al­low them the liberty openly to blas­pheme the Name of Iesus, and to perse­cute all that would not believe him an Impostor; which though they did fami­liarly in his own time, yet he never went about to restrain their Blasphemies by Laws and Punishments: and therefore I only demand, Whether the Civil Magi­strate may make penal Laws against Swearing and Blasphemy, and such other Irreligious Debaucheries? If he may, why then they are matters that as direct­ly and immediately relate to Religion, as any Rites and Ceremonies of Worship whatsoever; and for the Government of which they are as utterly to seek for any Precedent of our Saviour and his Apo­stles. Nay more, if this Argument were of any force, it would equally deprive the Magistrate of any Power to compel his Subjects to obedience to any of the moral Precepts of the Gospel by secular Laws and Punishments; because our Saviour and his Apostles never did it: especially when all matters of Morality do as re­ally belong to our spiritual concerns, as any thing that relates immediately to [Page 40] Divine Worship, and Affairs of meer Religion; and therefore if the Civil Ma­gistrate may not compel his Subjects to a right way of Worship with the Civil Sword, because this is of a spiritual con­cernment (as is pretended:) upon the same ground, neither may he make use of the same force to compel men to Duties of Morality, because they also equally relate to their spiritual Interests: Be­sides, the Magistrates Authority in both is founded upon the same Principle, viz. The absolute necessity of their due Ma­nagement in order to the Peace and Pre­servation of the Common-wealth. We derive not therefore his Ecclesiastical Ju­risdiction from any grant of our Savi­ours, but from an antecedent right where­with all Sovereign Power was indued be­fore ever he was born into the world; forasmuch as the same Providence, that intrusted Princes with the Government of Humane Affairs, must of necessity have vested them in at least as much Power, as was absolutely necessary to the nature and ends of Government.

§ 15. But further yet, all the ways our Saviour has appointed in the Gospel [Page 41] for the advancement and propagation of Religion, were prescribed to Subjects, & not to Governours; and this indeed is certain, that no private person can have any power to compel men to any part of the Doctrine, Worship, or Discipline of the Gospel; for if he had, he would up­on that very account cease to be a Pri­vate person, and be vested with a Civil Power. But that no Magistrate may do this, will remain to be proved, till they can produce some express prohibition of our Saviour to restrain him: and till that be done, 'tis but a strange rate of argu­ing, when they would prove that Magi­strates may not use any coercive Power to promote the Interests of Religion, be­cause this is forbidden to their Subjects; especially when 'tis to be considered, that Christ and his Apostles acted them­selves in the capacity of Subjects to the Common-wealth they lived in, and so could neither use themselves, nor impart to others any coercive Power for the ad­vancement, and propagation of their Do­ctrine; but were confined to such pru­dent and peaceable Methods, as were lawful for persons in their condition to make use of, i. e. humble Intreaties, and [Page 42] Perswasions. Our Saviour never took any part of the Civil Power upon himself, and upon that score could not make penal and coercive Laws; the power of Coer­tion being so certainly inseparable from the Supreme Civil Power: But though he back'd not his Commandments with temporal punishments, because his King­dom was not of this world; yet he en­forced them with the threatnings of E­ternity, which carry with them more compulsion upon mens Consciences than any Civil Sanctions can: For the only reason why Punishments are annex'd to Laws, is because they are strong Motives to Obedience; and therefore when our Savour tied his Laws upon mankind un­der Eternal Penalties, he used as much force to drive us to obedience, as if he had abetted them with temporal Inflicti­ons: So that the only reason why he bound not the Precepts of the Gospel up­on our Consciences by any secular Com­pulsories, was not because Compulsion was an improper way to put his Laws in execution, for then he had never established them with more enforcing sanctions; but only because himself was not invested with any secular Power, [Page 43] and so could not use those methods of Government, that are proper to its Ju­risdiction.

§ 16. And therefore the Power, wherewith Christ intrusted the Gover­nours of his Church in the Apostolical Age, was purely spiritual; they had no Authority to inflict temporal Punish­ments, or to force men to submit to their Canons, Laws and Penalties; they only declared the Laws of God, and de­nounced the threatnings annexed to them, having no Coercive Power to in­flict the Judgments they declared, and leaving the event of their Censures to the Divine Jurisdiction. Though alas! all this was too weak to attain the ends of Disci­pline (viz. to reclaim the offending Per­son, and by example of his Censure to awe others into Obedience) and could have but little influence upon the most stubborn and notorious Offenders. For to what purpose should they drive one from the Communion of the Church, that has already renounced it? To what pur­pose should they deny him the Instru­ments and Ministries of Religion, that cares not for them? To what purpose [Page 44] should they turn him out of their Socie­ty, that has already prevented them by forsaking it? How should offenders be reclaim'd, by being condemn'd to what they chuse? How should they be scared by threatnings, that they neither fear nor believe? And if they will turn Apostates, how can they be awed back into their Faith by being told they are so? And therefore because of the weakness of this spiritual Government to attain the ends of Discipline, and because that the Go­vernours of the Church being subject to those of the Common-wealth, they were not capable of any coercive Power; 'tis wonderfully remarkable how God him­self was pleased to supply their want of Civil Jurisdiction by his own immediate Providence, and in a miraculous manner to inflict the Judgments they denounced; that if their Censures could not affright refractory Offenders into Obedience, his Dreadful execution of them might. For 'tis notoriously evident from the best Records of the Primitive and Apostoli­cal Ages, that the Divine Providence was pleased to abet the Censures of the Church by immediate and Mira­culous inflictions from Heaven. In [Page 45] those times torments and diseases of the Body were the usual consequents of Ex­communication; and this was as effectual to awe men into subjection to the Eccle­siastical Government, as if it had been en­dued with coercive Iurisdiction. For this consists only in a power of inflicting tem­poral punishments; and therefore when the Anathema's of the Church were at­tended with such Inflictions, Criminals must have as much reason to dread the Rod of the Apostles, as the Sword of the Civil Magistrate, in that it carried with it a power of inflicting temporal Penalties, either of Death, as on Ananias and Sap­phira, or of Diseases, as on Elymas the Sor­cerer. And this is that [...] wherewith St. Paul so often threatens to lash the fa­ctious Corinthians into a more quiet and peaceable temper. Thus 1 Cor. 4. 21. What will ye? shall I come unto you with a rod, or in love, and in the spirit of meekness? i. e. Consider with your selves, that seeing I have determined to visit the Church of Corinth, whether when I come you had rather I should chastise you with the Apostolical Rod by exercising my Power of inflicting punishments, and by consigning the refractory to those sharp [Page 46] and grievous Diseases that are wont im­mediately to follow Apostolical Censures; or whether I should come with a more gentle and merciful design without being forced by your stubborness upon a neces­sity of using this severity among you? As you behave your selves, so may you ex­pect to find me at my coming. And thus again, 2 Cor. 10. 6. He threatens them with his being in a readiness (if he should come among them) to revenge all their disobedience: And upon this account he immediately professes himself not a­shamed to boast of his Power and Au­thority in the Church. And in the 13. Chapter of the same Epistle, he again shakes the same Rod over them, threat­ning, that if their refractoriness force him to strike them with some Judgment, that it should be a sharp and severe one: If I come again I will not spare, since ye seek a proof of Christ speaking in me. These extraordinary inflictions were signs and evidences of his Apostleship. And he would make them know, that he was Commissioned by Christ to teach and govern their Church, by making them to feel the sad effects of his Mira­culous Power, if nothing else would sa­tisfie [Page 47] them about the right of his Autho­rity. And to the same purpose is the same Apostles command to the same Church concerning the incestuous Corin­thian, 1 Cor. 5. 5. that they should deli­ver him to Satan for the destruction of the flesh, i. e. that they should denounce the sentence of Excommunication against him, which would amount to no smaller a Punishment, than his being resign'd up to the power and possession of some evil spirit, [...], Chrysost. in 1. ad Cor. Hom. 15. to be tor­mented with Ulcers, or some other bo­dily Diseases and Inflictions, which was then the usual consequent of Excommu­nication. The end of all which is, as im­mediately follows, The destruction of the flesh, that the Spirit might be saved in the day of the Lord Iesus, i. e. that being humbled and brought to a due sense of his Sin by the sadness of his Condition, and the heavy strokes of this cruel Exe­cutioner of the Divine Justice, this might be a means of working him to Repen­tance and Reformation. And to the same end did the same Apostle deliver Hyme­neus and Alexander unto Satan, that they might learn not to blaspheme; that being [Page 48] vexed and tormented by some evil spirit, this might take down their proud and haughty stomachs, and make them cease to traduce and disparage his Apostolical Authority, when they had smarted so se­verely for contradicting it. And thus was the Divine Providence pleased in the first Ages of the Church, when it wanted the assistance of the Civil Magistrate, to sup­ply that defect by his own Almighty Power: so necessary is a coercive Juris­diction to the due Government and Di­scipline of the Church, that God himself was fain to bestow it on the Apostles in a miraculous manner. And thus was the Primitive Discipline maintain'd by Mi­racles of severity, as long as it wanted the Sword of the Civil Power. But when Christianity had once prevail'd and tri­umphed over all the oppositions of Pagan Superstition, and had gain'd the Empire of the world into its own possession, and was become the Imperial Religion, then began its Government to re-settle where nature had placed it, and the Ecclesiasti­cal Jurisdiction was annexed to the Ci­vil Power: For as soon as the Empe­rours thought themselves concern'd to look to its Government, and Protection, [Page 49] and were willing to abet the Spiritual Power of the Clergy with their Secular Authority; then began the Divine Pro­vidence to withdraw the miraculous Power of the Church (in the same manner as he did by degrees all the other extra­ordinary Gifts of the Apostolical Age, as their necessity ceased) as being now as well supplied by the natural & ordinary Power of the Prince. So that though the Exercise of the Ministerial Function still continued in the Persons, that were there­unto Originally Commissioned by our Saviour, the Exercise of its Authority and Jurisdiction was restored to the Im­perial Diadem; and the Bishops became then (as they are now) Ministers of State as well as Religion, and challeng­ed not any Secular Power, but what they derived from the Prince: who, sup­posing them best able to understand and manage the Interests of Religion, granted them Commissions for the Government of the Church under himself, and vested them with as much Coercive Power, as was necessary for the Execution of their Office and Jurisdiction: In the same manner as Judges are deputed by the Supreme Authority of every Com­mon-wealth [Page 50] to govern the Affairs of Ju­stice, and to inflict the Penalties of the Law upon Delinquents: So that Bishops neither have, nor ever had any Temporal Authority, but only as they are the Kings Ecclesiastical Judges, appointed by him to govern Affairs of Religion, as Civil or Secular Judges are to govern Affairs of Justice.

§ 17. And now that the Government of all the Affairs of the Church devolved upon the Royal Authority assoon as it became Christian, is undeniably evident, from all the Laws and Records of the Empire: Socr. l. 5. Praes. [...]: From the time that the Emperors became Christian, the Disposal and Government of Church Af­fairs depended entirely on their Autho­rity: Constantine was no sooner settled in his Imperial Throne, but he took the settlement of all Ecclesiastical matters into his own Cognizance: He called Synods and Councils, in order to the Peace and Government of the Church, he ratified their Canons into Laws, he prohibited the Conventicles of the Do­natists, [Page 51] and demolish'd their Meeting-Houses, he made Edicts concerning Fe­stivals, the Rites of Sepulture, the Im­munities of Churches, the Authority of Bishops, the Priviledges of the Clergy, and divers other things appertaining to the outward Polity of the Church. In the exercise of which Jurisdiction he was carefully followed by all his Successours: which cannot but be known to every man that is not as utterly ignorant of the Ci­vil Law, as he in the Comedy who sup­posed Corpus Iuris Civilis to be a Dutch­man. The Code, the Authenticks, the French Capitulars are full of Ecclesiasti­cal Laws and Constitutions. The first Book of the Code treats of nothing but Religion, and the Rites and Ceremo­nies of Publick Worship, the Priviledges of Ecclesiastical Men and Things, the distinct Offices and Functions of the se­veral degrees in the Ecclesiastical Hie­rarchy, and the Power and Jurisdiction of Bishops both in Civil and Religious Affairs, and infinite other things that immediately concern the Interests of Religion. And then as for the Authen­ticks, Ecclesiastical Laws are every where scattered up and down through [Page 52] the whole Volume; which being divided into nine Collations, has not above one (viz. the fourth) that has not divers Laws relating to Church Affairs. And as for the Capitulars of Charles the Great, to­gether with the Additions of Lewis the Godly, his Son and Successour, they con­tain little else but Ecclesiastical Consti­tutions; as may be seen in Lindembro­gius his Collection of Ancient Laws, to­gether with divers other Laws of Theo­dorick, and other Gothish Kings.

§ 18. And next to the Divine Provi­dence, we owe the Settlement and Pre­servation of Christian Religion in the World to the Conduct of Christian Prin­ces. For by the time of Constantine the Primitive Spirit and Genius of Christia­nity was wearing out of fashion, and the Meekness and Humility of its first Pro­fessours began to give place to a furious and tumultuary Zeal; and no sooner did the heats of Persecution begin to abate, but the Church was presently shatter­ed into swarms of Factions by the vio­lent Passions and Animosities of its Members about bare Speculations or useless Practices: And of all the quarrels [Page 53] that ever disturbed the World, there were never any perhaps so excuseless or so irregular as those of Christendom; of which 'tis hard to determine, whether they were commenced with more folly and indiscretion, or pursued with more passion and frowardness. The rage and fierceness of Christians had kindled such a Fire in the Church, that it must una­voidably have been consumed by its own Combustions, had not the Christian Emperours employed all their Power to suppress the Fury of the Flames. And though in spight of all their Prudence and Industry, Christianity was sadly impaired by its own Tumults and Sedi­tions; yet had it not been for the care of Christian Princes, it had in all humane probability been utterly destroyed; and the Flames that had once caught its Su­perstructures, must without remedy have burnt up its very Foundations. And if we look into the Records and Histories of the first Christian Emperours, we shall find that the most dangerous Di­sturbances that threatned the State, had their beginnings in the Church; and that the Empire was more shaken by the intestine Commotions that arose [Page 54] from Religion, than by Foreign Wars and Invasions. And upon this account is it, that we find them so highly concern'd to reconcile all the Discords, and allay all the Heats about Religion, by silencing needless and unprofitable Controversies, determining certain & necessary Truths, prescribing decent Rites & Ceremonies of Publick Worship, and all other wise and prudent Expedients to bring the minds and practices of men to Sobriety and Moderation.

§ 19. And by this means was the outward Polity of the Church tolerably well established, and the Affairs of Religion competently well grounded (though better or worse, according to the wisdom and vigilance of the several Emperours) till the Bishops of Rome usurp'd one half of the Imperial Power, and annexed the Ecclesiastical Jurisdi­ction and Supremacy to their own See. For taking advantage of the Distractions occasioned partly by the Incursions of the Northern Nations on the West, partly by the Invasions of the Turkish Power on the East, but mainly by the Division of the Empire it self, they [Page 55] gain'd either by force or fraud the whole Dominion of Religion to themselves, and by pretending to the Spirit of Infal­libility, usurp'd an absolute and uncon­troulable Empire over the Faiths and Consciences of mankind. And whilst they at first pretended no other Title to their Sovereignty but what they derived from Religion, they were constrain'd to scrue up their Power to an unmeasu­rable Tyranny, thereby to secure them­selves in those Insolencies and Indigni­ties wherewith they perpetually affront­ed the Princes of Christendom: And knowing the Free-born Reason of men would never tamely brook to be en­slaved to so ignoble a Tyranny, they pro­claim'd it a Traytour or (what is the same) a Heretick to the Catholick Faith, and by their lowd noises and menaces frighted it out of Christendom. In which design they at length advanced so far, till Rome Christian became little less fond and superstitious than Rome Hea­then; and Christianity it self was al­most debauched to the lowest guise of Paganism, and Europe, the Seat of the most refined and politest part of man­kind, was involved in a more than African [Page 56] Ignorance and Barbarity. And thus did they easily usher in the grand departure and Apostasie from Religion by the fal­ling away from Reason, and founded the Roman Faith as well as Empire upon the Ruines of Humane Liberty.

§ 20. In which sad posture continued the Affairs of Christendom till the Re­formation: which though it has wrought wonderful Alterations in the Christian World, yet has it not been able to reset­tle Princes in their full & natural Rights, in reference to the Concerns of Religi­on. For although the Supremacy of the Civil Power in Religious matters be ex­presly asserted in all the Publick Con­fessions of the Reformed Churches, but especially in that of the Church of En­gland; which is not content barely to affirm it, but denounces the Sentence of Excommunication against all that deny it: Yet by reason of the exorbitant Power that some pert and pragmatical Divines have gain'd over the minds of the People, this great Article has found little or no entertainment in their Practi­ces: there starting up a race of proud and imperious men about the beginning of [Page 57] the Reformation, who, not regarding the Princes Power, took upon themselves to frame precise Hypotheses of Orthodoxy, and to set up their own Pedantick Sy­stems and Institutions for the Standards of Divine Truth; and wanting, what the other had, the Authority of Prescri­ption, they pretended to the Spirit of God: and this pretence not only excused, but justified any wild Theorems they could not prove by sober Reason; and those that would be awed with it, they embraced for Orthodox, and those that would not, they branded for Hereticks: by which little device they decoyed the silly and ignorant rabble into their own party. The effect of all which has been nothing but a Brutish and Fanatick Igno­rance, making men to talk of little else but Raptures and Extasies, and filling the World with a buzze and noise of the Di­vine Spirit; whereby they are only im­pregnably possess'd with their own wild and extravagant Fansies, become saucy and impudent for Religion, confound Order, and despise Government, and will be guided by nothing but the whim­sies and humours of an unaccountable Conscience.

[Page 58] § 21. And hence it comes to pass, that most Protestant Princes have been fright­ed (not to say Hector'd) out of the Ex­ercise of their Ecclesiastical Jurisdiction by the Clamours of giddy and distem­per'd Zealots; Superstition and Enthu­siasm have out-fac'd the Laws, and put Government out of Countenance by the boldness of their Pretensions. Confident men have talked so lowdly of the Invio­lable Sacredness and Authority of their Consciences, that Governours, not throughly instructed in the nature and extent of their Power, so lately restored to them, have been almost scared from intermedling with any thing, that could upon this score plead its Privi­ledge and Exemption from their Com­mands. And how peremptory soever some of them have been in asserting the Rights of their Supreme Power in Ci­vil Affairs, they have been forced to seem modest and diffident in the ex­ercise of their Ecclesiastical Supre­macy, and dare scarce own their Legi­slative Power in Religious Affairs, only to comply with the saucy pretences of ungovernable and Tumultuary Zeal. [Page 59] One notorious Instance whereof in our own Nation, is the Iejunium Cecilianum, the Wednesday Fast, that was injoin'd with this clause of Exception, That if any person should affirm it to be im­posed with an Intention to bind the Con­science, he should be punished like the spreaders of false News. ‘Which is plain­ly to them that understand it, (as a late Learned Prelate of our own observes) a direct Artifice to evacuate the whole Law: for (as he excellently argues) all Humane Power being derived from God, and bound upon our Con­sciences by his Power, not by Man, he that says it shall not bind the Con­science, says it shall be no Law; it shall have no Authority from God, and then it has none at all; and if it be not tied upon the Conscience, then to break it is no Sin, and then to keep it is no Duty. So that a Law without such an intention is a Con­tradiction; it is a Law which binds on­ly if we please, and we may obey when we have a mind to it; and to so much we are tied before the Consti­tution. But then if by such a Declara­tion it was meant, That to keep such [Page 60] Fasting-days was no part of a direct Commandment from God, that is, God had not required them by himself im­mediately, and so it was (abstracting from that Law) no Duty Evangelical, it had been below the wisdom of the Contrivers of it; for no man pretends it, no man says it, no man thinks it: and they might as well have declar'd, That the Law was none of the Ten Commandments.’ The matter indeed of this Law was not of any great mo­ment, but the Declaration annexed to it proved of a fatal and mischievous con­sequence; for when once the unruly Consciences of the Puritans were got loose from the restraints of Authority, nothing could give check to their giddy and furious Zeal, but they soon broke out into the most impudent Affronts and Indignities against the Laws, and ran themselves into all manner of disloyal Outrages against the State. As is no­toriously evident in the Writings and Practices of Cartwright, Goodman, Whit­tingham, Gilby, Whitehead, Travers, and other leading Rabbies of the Holy Faction; whose Treatises are stuffed with as railing, spightful, and [Page 61] malicious Speeches both against their Prince, the Clergy, the Lords of the Council, the Judges, the Magistrates, and the Laws, as were ever publickly vented by the worst of Traytors in any Society in the world. And as for the method of their Polity, it was plainly no more than this, first to reproach the Church with infamous and Abusive Dialogues, and then to Libel the State with bitter and Scurrilous Pamphlets, to possess mens minds with dislikes and jealousies about Publick Affairs, whisper about reproachful and slanderous Reports, inveigle the people with a thousand lit­tle and malicious Stories, enter into se­cret Leagues and Confederacies, foment Discontents and Seditions, and in eve­ry streight and exigence of State threa­ten and beleaguer Authority: In fine, the scope of all their Sermons and Discourses was to perswade their Party, that if Prin­ces refuse to reform Religion, 'tis lawful for the People with Direction of their God­ly Ministers, (i. e. themselves) to do it, and that by violent and forcible cour­ses. And whither this Principle in pro­cess of time led them, the Story is too long, too sad, and too well known [Page 62] to be here repeated: 'tis sufficient, that it improved it self into the greatest Villa­nies, & concluded in the blackest Trage­dy that was ever acted upon this Island.

§ 22. Well then, to sum up the result of this Discourse, 'tis evident, we see, both from Reason and Experience, what a powerful influence Religion has upon the peace and quiet of Kingdoms; that nothing so effectually secures the pub­lick Peace, or so easily works its distur­bance and ruine, as its well or ill Admi­nistration; and therefore that there is an absolute necessity that there be some Supreme Power in every Common-wealth to take care of its due Conduct and Settlement; that this must be the Ci­vil Magistrate, whose Office it is to secure the publick Peace, which because he can­not sufficiently provide for, unless he have the Power and Conduct of Religi­on; its Government must of necessity be seated in him and none else. So that those persons, who would exempt Conscience and all Religious Matters from the Princes Power, must make him either a Tyrant or an impotent Prince; for if he take upon him to tye Laws of Religion [Page 63] upon their Consciences, then according to their Principles, he usurps an unlawful Dominion, violates the Fundamental Rights and Priviledges of Mankind, and invades the Throne and Authority of God himself: But if he confess that he cannot, then does he clearly pass away the big­est Security of his Government, and lay himself open to all the Plots and Villa­nies that can put on the Mask of Religion. And therefore should any Prince through unhappy miscarriages in the State be brought into such streights and exigences of Affairs, as that he cannot restrain the head-strong Inclinations of his Subjects, without the hazard of rai­sing such Commotions and Disturbances, as perhaps he can never be able to allay, and so should be forced in spight of him­self to indulge them their Liberty in their Fansies and Perswasions about Re­ligion; yet unless he will devest himself of a more material and more necessary part of his Authority, than if he should grant away his Power of the Militia, or his Prerogative of ratifying all Civil Laws; unless, I say, he will thus hazard his Crown, and make him­self too weak for Government by re­nouncing [Page 64] the best part of his Supremacy, he must lay an Obligation upon all Per­sons, to whom he grants this their Reli­gious freedom, to profess that 'tis mat­ter of meer favour and indulgence; and that he has as much Power to govern all the publick Affairs of Religion, as any other matters that are either conducive, or prejudicial to the publick Peace and Quiet of the Common-wealth. And if they be brought to this Declaration, they will but confess themselves (to say no worse) Turbulent and Seditious per­sons, by acknowledging, That they re­fuse their Obedience to those Laws, which the Supreme Authority has just Power to impose.

[Page 67] § 1. HAving in the former Chap­ter sufficiently made out my first Proposition, viz. That 'tis absolutely neces­sary to the Peace and Government of the World, that the Supreme Magistrate of every Common-wealth should be vested with a Power to govern the Con­sciences of Subjects in Affairs of Reli­gion; I now proceed to the proof of the second thing proposed, viz. That those who would deprive the Supreme Civil Power of its Authority in reference to the Conduct of the Worship of God, are forced to allow it in other more ma­terial parts of Religion, though they are both liable to the same Inconveniences and Objections: Where I shall have a fair opportunity to state the true extent of the Magistrates Power over Consci­ence in reference to Divine Worship, by shewing it to be the same with his Power over Conscience in matters of Morality, and all other Affairs of Religion. And here it strikes me with wonder and amazement to consider, That men should be so shy of granting the Supreme Ma­gistrate a Power over their Consciences [Page 68] in the Rituals and External Circumstan­ces of Religious Worship, and yet be so free of forcing it upon him in the Es­sential Duties of Morality; which are at least as great and material Parts of Re­ligion, as pleasing to God, and as indi­spensably necessary to Salvation, as any way of Worship in the World. The Precepts of the Moral Law are both per­fective of our own Natures, and condu­cive to the Happiness of others; and the Practice of Vertue consists in living suita­bly to the Dictates of Reason & Nature. And this is the substance and main De­sign of all the Laws of Religion, to oblige Mankind to behave themselvs in all their actions as becomes Creatures endued with Reason and Understanding, and in ways suitable to Rational Beings, to pre­pare and qualifie themselves for the state of Glory and Immortality. And as this is the proper End of all Religion, That Mankind might live happily here, and happily hereafter; so to this end nothing contributes more than the practice of all Moral Vertues, which will effectually preserve the Peace and Happiness of Hu­mane Societies, and advance the Mind of Man to a nearer approach to the Perfe­ction [Page 69] of the Divine Nature; every par­ticular Vertue being therefore such, be­cause 'tis a Resemblance and Imitation of some of the Divine Attributes. So that Moral Vertue having the strongest and most necessary influence upon the End of all Religion, viz. Mans Happi­ness; 'tis not only its most material and useful Part, but the ultimate End of all its other Duties: And all true Religion can consist in nothing else but either the Practice of Vertue it self, or the use of those Means and Instruments that contri­bute to it.

§ 2. And this, beside the Rational Ac­count of the thing it self, appears with an undeniable evidence from the best of Demonstrations, i. e. an Induction of all Particulars. The whole Duty of Man refers either to his Creator, or his Neigh­bour, or himself: All that concerns the two last is confessedly of a Moral Na­ture; and all that concerns the first, con­sists either in Praising of God, or Praying to him: The former is a Branch of the Ver­tue of Gratitude, and is nothing but a thankful and humble temper of mind, arising from a sense of Gods Greatness [Page 70] in himself, and his Goodness to us: so that this part of Devotion issues from the same virtuous quality, that is the Prin­ciple of all other Resentments and Ex­pressions of Gratitude; only those Acts of it that are terminated on God as their Object, are styled Religious: and there­fore Gratitude and Devotion are not di­vers Things, but only different Names of the same Thing; Devotion being no­thing else but the Virtue of Gratitude towards God. The latter, viz. Prayer is either put up in our own or other mens behalfs: If for others, 'tis an Act of that Virtue we call Kindness or Cha­rity: If for our selves, the things we pray for (unless they be the Comforts and Enjoyments of this life) are some or other virtuous Qualities: and there­fore the proper and direct use of Prayer is to be instrumental to the Virtues of Morality: So that all Duties of De­votion (excepting only our returns of Gratitude) are not Essential parts of Re­ligion, but are only in order to it, as they tend to the Practice of Virtue and moral Goodness; and their Goodness is derived upon them from the moral Vir­tues to which they contribute; and in [Page 71] the same proportion they are conducive to the ends of Virtue, they are to be va­lued among the Ministeries of Religion. All Religion then (I mean the Practical Part) is either Virtue it self, or some of its Instruments; and the whole Duty of man consists in being Virtuous; and all that is enjoin'd him beside, is in or­der to it. And what else do we find enforc'd and recommended in our Savi­our's Sermons, beside heights of Mora­lity? What does St. Paul discourse of to Felix but moral matters, Righteous­ness, and Temperance, and Iudgment to come? And what is it that men set up a­gainst Morality, but a few figurative Expressions of it self, that without it are utterly insignificant? 'Tis not enough (say they) to be completely Virtuous, unless we have Grace too: But when we have set aside all manner of Virtue, let them tell me what remains to be call'd Grace, and give me any Notion of it distinct from all Morality, that consists in the right order and government of our Actions in all our Relations, and so com­prehends all our Duty: and therefore if Grace be not included in it, 'tis but a Phantasm, and an Imaginary thing. So [Page 72] that if we strip those Definitions that some men of late have bestowed upon it, of Metaphors and Allegories, it will plainly signifie nothing but a vertuous temper of mind; and all that the Scri­pture intends by the Graces of the Spirit, are only Vertuous Qualities of the Soul, that are therefore styled Graces, because they were derived purely from Gods free Grace and Goodness, in that in the first Ages of Christianity he was pleased, out of his infinite concern for its Propagati­on, in a miraculous manner to inspire its Converts with all sorts of Vertue. Wherefore the Apostle St. Paul, when he compiles a complete Catologue of the Fruits of the Spirit, reckons up only Mo­ral Vertues, Gal. 5. 22. Love, Joy or Chearfulness, Peaceableness, Patience, Gentleness, Goodness, Faithfulness, Meekness, and Temperance; and else­where, Titus 2. 11. the same Apostle plainly makes the Grace of God to con­sist in gratitude towards God, Tempe­rance towards our selves, and Justice towards our Neighbours. For the Grace of God that bringeth Salvation hath ap­peared to all Men, teaching us that deny­ing ungodliness and worldly lusts, we [Page 73] should live soberly, righteously, and godly in this present world. Where the whole Duty of Man is comprehended in living Godlily, which is the Vertue of humble Gratitude towards God: Soberly, which contains the Vertues of Temperance, Chastity, Modesty, and all others that consist in the dominion of Reason over our sensual Appetites: Righteously, which implies all the Vertues of Justice and Charity, as Affability, Courtesie, Meek­ness, Candour, and Ingenuity.

§ 3. So destructive of all true and real Goodness is the very Religion of those Men that are wont to set Grace at odds with Vertue, and are so far from making them the same, that they make them inconsistent; and though a man be exact in all the Duties of Moral Good­ness, yet if he be a Graceless Person (i. e. void of I know not what Imaginary God­liness) he is but in a cleaner way to Hell, and his Conversion is more hope­less than the vilest and most notorious Sinners; and the Morally Righteous Man is at a greater distance from Grace than the Profane, and better be lewd and de­bauch'd, than live an honest and vertuous [Page 74] life, if you are not of the Godly Party. Bona Opera sunt perniciosa ad salutem, says Flaccus Illiricus. Moral Goodness is the greatest Let to Conversion; and the prophanest wretches make better Saints than your Moral Formalists. And by this means they have brought into fashi­on a Godliness without Religion, Zeal without Humanity, and Grace without good Nature, or good Manners; have found out in lieu of Moral Virtue, a Spiritual Divinity, that is made up of nothing else but certain Trains and Schemes of Effeminate Follies and illi­terate Enthusiasms; and instead of a so­ber Devotion, a more spiritual and inti­mate way of Communion with God, that in truth consists in little else but meeting together in private to prate Phrases, make Faces, and rail at Carnal Reason (i. e. in their sense all sober and sincere use of our Understandings in spi­ritual Matters) whereby they have effe­ctually turn'd all Religion into unac­countable Fansies and Enthusiasms, drest it up with pompous and empty Schemes of Speech, and so embrace a few gawdy Metaphors and Allegories, instead of the substance of true and real Righteousness. [Page 75] And herein lies the most material diffe­rence between the sober Christians of the Church of England, and our modern Se­ctaries, That we express the Precepts and Duties of the Gospel in plain and in­telligible Terms, whilst they trifle them away by childish Metaphors and Allego­ries, and will not talk of Religion but in barbarous and uncouth Similitudes; and (what is more) the different Subdi­visions among the Sects themselves are not so much distinguish'd by any real di­versity of Opinions, as by variety of Phrases and Forms of Speech, that are the peculiar Shibboleths of each Tribe. One party affect to lard their Discourses with clownish and slovenly Similitudes; another delights to roul in wanton and lascivious Allegories; and a third is best pleased with odd, unusual, unitelli­gible, and sometimes blasphemous Ex­pressions. And whoever among them can invent any new Language, presently sets up for a man of new Discoveries; and he that lights upon the prettiest Non­sense, is thought by the ignorant Rabble to unfold new Gospel-Mysteries. And thus is the Nation shattered into infinite Factions, with sensless and phantastick [Page 76] Phrases; and the most fatal miscarriage of them all lies in abusing Scripture-Expressions, not only without but in contradiction to their sense. So that had we but an Act of Parliament to abridge Preachers the use of fulsom and luscious Metaphors, it might perhaps be an effe­ctual Cure of all our present Distem­pers. Let not the Reader smile at the odness of the Proposal: For were men obliged to speak Sense as well as Truth, all the swelling Mysteries of Fanaticism would immediately sink into flat and empty Nonsense; and they would be ashamed of such jejune and ridiculous Stuff as their admired and most profound Notions would appear to be, when they, want the Varnish of fine Metaphors and glittering Allusions. In brief, were this a proper place to unravel all their affected Phrases and Forms of Speech, which they have learn'd like Parrots to prate by Rote, without having any Notion of the Things they signifie, it would be no un­pleasant Task to demonstrate, That by them they either mean nothing at all, or some Part or Instrument of Moral Ver­tue. So that all Religion must of neces­sity be resolv'd into Enthusiasm or Mo­rality. [Page 77] The former is meer Imposture, and therefore all that is true must be re­duced to the latter; and what-ever be­sides appertains to it, must be subservi­ent to the Ends of Vertue: such are Prayer, Hearing Sermons, and all manner of Religious Ordinances, that have directly no other place in Religion, than as they are instrumental to a vertu­ous life.

§ 4. 'Tis certain then, That the Du­ties of Morality are the most weighty and material concerns of Religion; and 'tis as certain, That the Civil Magistrate has Power to bind Laws concerning them upon the Consciences of Subjects: So that every mans Conscience is and must be subject to the Commands of lawful Superiours in the most important matters of Religion. And therefore is it not strange, that when the main Ends and designs of all Religion are avowedly subject to the Supreme Power, that yet men should be so impatient to exempt its means and subordinate Instruments from the same Authority? What reason can the Wit of man assign to restrain it from one, that will not much more re­strain [Page 78] it from both? Is not the right pra­ctice of Moral Duties as necessary a part of Religion, as any outward Form of Worship in the World? Are not wrong Notions of the Divine Worship as de­structive of the Peace and settlement of Common-wealths, as the most vicious and licentious Debaucheries? Are not the rude multitude more inclined to di­sturb Government by Superstition than by Licentiousness? And is there not vastly greater danger of the Magistrates erring in matters of Morality, than in Forms and Ceremonies of Worship, in that those are the main, essential, and ulti­mate Duties of Religion; whereas these are at highest but their Instruments, and can challenge no other place in Religion, than as they are subservient to the pur­poses of Morality? Nay, is it not still more unaccountable, that the Supreme Ma­gistrate may not be permitted to deter­mine the Circumstances and Appen­dages of the subordinate Ministeries to Moral Virtue, and yet should be allow­ed (in all Common-wealths) to deter­mine the particular Acts and Instances of these Virtues themselves? For Example, Justice is a prime and natural Virtue, [Page 79] and yet its particular Cases depend upon humane Laws, that determine the bounds of Meum and Tuum: The Divine Law re­strains Titius from invading Caius's Right and Propriety; but what that is, and when it is invaded, only the Laws of the Society they live in can determine. And there are some Cases that are Acts of In­justice in England, that are not so in Italy; otherwise all Places must be govern'd by the same Laws, and what is a Law to one Nation must be so to all the World. Whereas 'tis undeniably evident, That neither the Law of God nor of Nature determine the particular Instances of most Virtues, but for the most part leave that to the Constitutions of Na­tional Laws. They in general forbid Theft, Incest, Murther, and Adultery; but what these Crimes are, they deter­mine not in all Cases, but is in most par­ticulars to be explained by the Civil Con­stitutions; and whatsoever the Law of the Land reckons among these Crimes, that the Law of God and of Nature for­bids.

And now is it not strangely humour­some to say, That Magistrates are instrust­ed with so great a Power over mens Con­science [Page 80] in these great and weighty De­signs of Religion, and yet should not be trusted to govern the indifferent, or at least less material Circumstances of those things that can pretend to no other Goodness, than as they are Means ser­viceable to Moral Purposes? That they should have Power to make that a Par­ticular of the Divine Law, that God has not made so; and yet not be able to de­termine the use of an indifferent Circum­stance, because (forsooth) God has not determin'd it? In a word, That they should be fully impowered to declare new Instances of Vertue and Vice, and to introduce new Duties in the most im­portant parts of Religion, and yet should not have Authority enough to declare the Use and decency of a few Circum­stances in its subservient and less materi­al Concerns.

§ 5. The whole State of Affairs is briefly this; Man is sent into the World to live happily here, and prepare himself for happiness hereafter; this is attain'd by the practice of Moral Vertues and Pi­ous Devotions; and wherein these main­ly consist, Almighty Goodness has de­clared [Page 81] by the Laws of Nature and Reve­lation: but because in both there are changeable Cases and Circumstances of things, therefore has God appointed his Trustees and Officials here on Earth to Act and Determine in both, according to all Accidents and Emergencies of Affairs, to assign new Particulars of the Divine Law, to declare new Bounds of right and wrong, which the Law of God neither does nor can limit; because of necessity they must in a great measure depend up­on the Customs and Constitutions of every Common-wealth. And in the same manner are the Circumstances and outward Expressions of Divine Worship, because they are variable according to the Accidents of Time and Place, en­trusted (with less danger of Errour) with the same Authority. And what Ceremonies this appoints (unless they are apparently repugnant to their Prime end) become Religious Rites; as what particular Actions it constitutes in any Species of Virtue, become new Instances of that Virtue, unless they apparently contradict its Nature and Tendency.

Now the two Primary Designs of all Religion, are either to express our ho­nourable [Page 82] Opinion of the Deity, or to advance the Interests of Vertue and Mo­ral Goodness; so that no Rites or Cere­monies can be esteemed unlawful in the Worship of God, unless they tend to debauch men either in their Practices, or their Conceptions of the Deity: And 'tis upon one or both of these Accounts that any Rites and Forms of Worship be­come criminally superstitious; and such were the Lupercalia, the Eleusinian My­steries, the Feasts of Bacchus, Flora, and Venus, because they were but so many Festivals of Lust and Debauchery; and such were the Salvage and Bloody Sacri­fices to Saturn, Bellona, Moloch, Baal-Peor, and all other [...] of the Antient Paganism; because they suppo­sed the Divine Being to take pleasure in the Miseries and Tortures of its Crea­tures: And such is all Idolatry, in that it either gives right Worship to a wrong Object, or wrong Worship to a right one, or at least represents an infinite Ma­jesty by Images and Resemblances of finite things, and so reflects disparage­ment upon some of the Divine Attri­butes by fastning dishonourable Weak­nesses and Imperfections upon the Divine [Page 83] Nature. As for these, and the like Rites and Ceremonies of Worship, no Humane Power can command them, because they are directly con­tradictory to the Ends of Religion; but as for all others that are not so, any lawful Authority may as well enjoyn them, as it may adopt any Actions whatsoever into the Duties of Morality, that are not contrary to the Ends of Mo­rality.

§ 6. But a little farther to illustrate this, we may observe, That in matters both of Moral Vertue and Divine Wor­ship there are some Rules of Good and Evil that are of an Eternal and Un­changeable Obligation, and these can never be prejudiced or altered by any Humane Power; because the Reason of their Obligation arises from a necessity and constitution of Nature, and there­fore must be as Perpetual as that: But then there are other Rules of Duty that are alterable according to the various Accidents, Changes, and Conditions of Humane Life, and depend chiefly upon Contracts, and Positive Laws of King­doms; these suffer Variety, because their [Page 84] Matter and their Reason does so. Thus in the matter of Murther there are some Instances of an unalterable Nature, and others that are changeable according to the various Provisions of Positive Laws and Constitutions. To take away the life of an innocent Person is forbidden by such an indispensable Law of Nature, that no Humane Power can any way di­rectly or indirectly make it become lawful, in that no Positive Laws can so alter the Constitution of Nature, as to make this Instance of Villany cease to be mischievous to Mankind; and therefore 'tis Capital in all Nations of the World. But then there are other particular Cases of this Crime, that depend upon Posi­tive Laws, and so by consequence are liable to change according to the diffe­rent Constitutions of the Common-wealths men live in. Thus though in En­gland 'tis Murther for an injured Hus­band to kill an Adulteress taken in the Act of Uncleanness, because 'tis forbid­den by the Laws of this Kingdom, yet in Spain and among the old Romans it was not, because their Laws permitted it; and if the Magistrate himself may punish the Crime with Death, he may [Page 85] appoint whom he pleases to be his Exe­cutioner. And the Case is the same in reference to Divine Worship, in which there are some things of an absolute and indispensable Necessity, and others of a Transient and changeable Obligation: Thus 'tis absolutely necessary every Ra­tional Creature should make returns of Gratitude to its Creator, from which no Humane Power can restrain it; but then for the outward Expressions and Significations of this Duty, they are for the most part Good or Evil according to the Customs and Constitutions of diffe­rent Nations, unless in the two foremen­tioned Cases, that they either counte­nance Vice, or disgrace the Deity. But as for all other Rituals, Ceremonies, Po­stures, & manners of performing the out­ward Expressions of Devotion, that are not chargeable with one or both of these, nothing can hinder their being capable of being adopted into the Ministeries of Divine Service, or exempt them from being subject to the Determinations of Humane Power. And thus the Parallel holds in all Cases between the Seconda­ry and Emergent Laws of Morality, and the Subordinate and Instrumental Rules [Page 86] of Worship; they both equally pass an Obligation upon all men, to whom they are prescribed, unless they di­rectly contradict the ends of their Insti­tution.

And now from this more general Con­sideration of the Agreement between matters of meer Worship and other Duties of Morality in reference to the Power of the Civil Magistrate, we may proceed by some more particular ac­counts to discover, how his Dominion over both is of equal extent, and re­strain'd within the same bounds and mea­sures; and that in what cases soever he may exercise Jurisdiction over Consci­ence in matters of Morality, in all the same he may exercise the same Power in Concerns of Religious Worship; and on the contrary, in what cases his Power over matters of Religion is restrain'd, in all the same is it limited as to things of a Moral Nature: Whence it must appear with a clear and irresistible Evidence, That mens right to Liberty of Conscience is the same in both to all Cases, Niceties, and Circumstances of things, and that they may as rationally challenge a free­dom from the Laws of Justice as from [Page 87] those of Religion, and that to grant it in either is equally destructive of all Order and Government, and equally tends to reduce all Societies, to Anarchy and Confusion.

§ 1. FIrst then, Let all matters of meer Conscience, whether purely Moral or Religious, be subject to Conscience meerly, i. e. Let men think of things according to their own perswasions, and assert the Freedom of their Judg­ments against all the Powers of the Earth. This is the Prerogative of the Mind of Man within its own Dominion; its Kingdom is intellectual, and seated in the thoughts, not Actions of Men; and therefore no Humane Power does, or can prescribe to any mans Opinions and se­cret Thoughts, but men will think as they please in spight of all their Decrees, and the Understanding will remain free when every thing else is bound. And this Sovereignty of Conscience is no en­trenchment upon that of Princes: because 'tis concern'd only in such matters as are of a quite different Nature from their [Page 90] Affairs, and gives no restraint to their commanding Power over the Actions of men; for meer Opinion, whilst such, has no Influence upon the Good or Evil of Humane Society, that is the proper ob­ject of Government; and therefore as long as our Thoughts are secret, and lock'd up within our own Breasts, they are out of the reach of all Humane Power. But as for matters that are not confined within the Territories of meer Conscience, but come forth into out­ward Action, and appear in the Socie­ties of men, there is no remedy but they must be subject to the Cognizance of Humane Laws, and come within the Verge of Humane Power; because by these Societies subsist, and humane Affairs are transacted. And therefore it concerns those, whose Office it is to secure the peace and tranquillity of mankind, to govern and manage them in order to the Publick Good. So that 'tis but a vain and frivolous pretence, when men plead with so much noise and clamour for the Sacred and Inviolable Rights of Consci­ence, and apparently invade or infringe the Magistrates Power, by submitting its Commands to the Authority of every [Page 91] Subjects Conscience; because the Com­mands of Lawful Authority are so far from invading its proper Liberty, that they cannot reach it, in that 'tis seated in that part of Man, of whose Transactions the Civil Power can take no Cognizance. All Humane Authority and Jurisdiction extends no farther than mens outward Actions, these are the proper Object of all their Laws: Whereas Liberty of Con­science is Internal and Invisible, and con­fined to the minds and Judgments [...] men; and whilst Conscience acts within its proper Sphere, that Civil Power is so far from doing it violence, that it never can. But when this great and imperious Faculty passes beyond its own peculiar Bounds, and would invade the Magi­strates Authority by exercising an unac­countable Dominion within his Territo­ries, or by venting such Wild Opinions among his Subjects, as he apprehends to tend to the disturbance of the Publick Peace, then does it concern him to give check to its proceedings as much as to all other Invasions; for the care of the Publick Good being his Duty, as well as Interest, it cannot but be in his Power to restrain or permit Actions, as they are [Page 92] conducible to that End. Mankind there­fore have the same Natural Right to Liberty of Conscience in matters of Re­ligious Worship, as in Affairs of Justice and Honesty, i. e. a Liberty of Iudg­ment, but not of practice; they have an inviolable freedom to examine the Goodness of all Laws Moral and Eccle­siastical, and to judge of them by their suitableness to the natural Reasons of Good and Evil: but as for the Practice and all outward Actions either of Virtue or Devotion, they are equally governa­ble by the Laws and Constitutions of Common-wealths; and men may with the same pretences of Reason challenge an Exemption from all Humane Laws in Matters of common Honesty upon the score of the Freedom of their Consci­ences, as they plead a liberty from all Authority in Duties of Religious Wor­ship upon the same account; because they have a freedom of Judgment in both, but of Practice in neither.

§ 2. And upon the reasonableness of this Principle is founded the Duty (or rather Priviledge) of Christian Liberty, viz. To assert the Freedom of the Mind [Page 93] of Man, as far as 'tis not inconsistent with the Government of the World, in that a sincere and impartial use of our own Understandings, is the first and Funda­mental Duty of Humane Nature. Hence it is, that the Divine Providence is so highly solicitous not to have it farther restrained than needs must; and therefore in all matters of pure Speculation it leaves the mind of Man entirely free to judge of the Truth and Falshood of things, and will not suffer it to be usurp'd upon by any Authority whatsoever: And whatsoever Opinion any man enter­tains of things of this Nature, he injures no man by it, and therefore no man can have any reason to commence any Quar­rel with him for it; Every man here judges for himself, and not for others, and matters of meer Opinion having no reference to the Publick, there is no need of any Publick Judgment to determine them. But as for those Actions that are capable of having any Influence upon the Publick Good or ill of Mankind, though they are liable to the Determinations of the Publick Laws, yet the Law of God will not suffer them to be determin'd farther than is requisite to the Ends of [Page 94] Government: And in those very things in which it has granted the Civil Magi­strate a Power over the Practices of men, it permits them not to exercise any Au­thority over their Judgments, but leaves them utterly free to judge of them as far as they are Objects of meer Opinion, and relate not to the Common Interest of mankind. And hence, though the Com­mands of our Lawful Superiours may change Indifferent things into Necessary Duties, yet they cannot restrain the Li­berty of our Minds from judging things thus determin'd to remain in their own Nature Indifferent: and the Reason of our Obligation to do them is not fetcht from any Antecedent Necessity in them­selves, but from the Supervening Com­mands of Authority, to which Obedi­ence in all things Lawful is a Necessary Duty. So that Christian Liberty, or the Inward Freedom of our Judgments may be preserved inviolable under the Re­straints of the Civil Magistrate, which are Outward, and concern only the Acti­ons, not Judgments of men; because the Outward Determination to one Par­ticular rather than another does not abrogate the Inward Indifferency of the [Page 95] thing it self; and the Duty of our Act­ing according to the Laws arises not from any Opinion of the Necessity of the thing it self, but either from some Emer­gent and Changeable Circumstances of Order and Decency, or from a sense of the Absolute Indispensableness of the Duty of Obedience. Therefore the whole Affair of Christian Liberty relates only to our Inward Judgment of things; and provided this be kept inviolate, it mat­ters not (as to that Concern) what Re­straints are laid upon our Cutward Acti­ons. In that though the Gospel has freed our Consciences from the Power of things, yet it has not from that of Go­vernment; we are free from the matter, but not from the Authority of Humane Laws; and as long as we obey the De­terminations of our Superiours with an Opinion of the Indifferency of the things themselves, we retain the Power of our Christian Liberty, and are still free as to the matter of the Law, though not as to the Duty of Obedience.

§ 3. Neither is this Prerogative of our Christian Liberty so much any new Favour granted in the Gospel, as the [Page 96] Restauration of the mind of Man to its Natural Priviledge, by Exempting us from the Yoke of the Ceremonial Law, whereby things in themselves indifferent were tied upon the Conscience with as indispensable an Obligation, as the Rules of Essential Goodness & Equity, during the whole Period of the Mosaick Dispen­sation; which being Cancell'd by the Gospel, those Indifferent things, that had been made necessary by a Divine po­sitive Command, return'd to their own Nature, to be used or omitted only as occasion should direct. And upon this Account was it that St. Paul, though he were so earnest an Assertor of his Chri­stian Liberty against the Doctrine of the Necessity of Jewish Ceremonies, never scrupled to use them, when ever he thought it serviceable to the Interests of Christianity; as is apparent in his Cir­cumcision of Timothy, to which he would never have condescended out of Obser­vation of the Mosaick Law, and yet did not in the least scruple to do it for other Purposes as Prudence and Discretion should direct him. And though in his Discourses of Christian Liberty he In­stances only in Circumcision, Meats and [Page 97] Drinks, and other Ceremonial Ordi­nances, which were then the Particulars most in Dispute between the Christians and the Jews; yet by the clearest Ana­logy of Reason the Case is the same as to the Judicial Law, and all other things commanded by Moses, that were not either Rules of Eternal Goodness, or expresly establish'd in the Gospel: This being its clearest and most important De­sign, to reprieve Mankind from all the burdensome and Arbitrary Impositions of Moses, that were scarce capable of any other Goodness than their being Instances of Obedience; and to restore us to such a Religion, as was most suitable to the per­fection of Humane Nature; and to tye no other Laws upon us, than such whose Natural and Intrinsick Goodness should carry with them their own Eternal Ob­ligation. And therefore whatsoever our Superiours impose upon us, whether in Matters of Religious Worship, or any other Duties of Morality, it neither is, nor can be any entrenchment upon our Christian Liberty, provided it be not im­posed with an Opinion of the Antecedent Necessity of the thing it self.

[Page 98] § 4. Now the Design of what I have discoursed upon this Article of Christian Liberty, is not barely to shew the mani­fest Impertinency of all those little Ob­jections men force from it against the Civil Magistrates Jurisdiction over the outward Concerns of Religion; whereas this relates entirely to things of a quite different Nature, and is only concern'd in the inward Actions of the Mind: but withal my purpose is mainly, by exempt­ing all internal Acts of the Soul from the Empire of Humane Laws, to shew that Religion, properly so called, is of all Vir­tues the least Obnoxious to the abuse of Government, in that the whole substance of Religious Worship is transacted within the Mind of Man, and dwells in our Hearts and Thoughts beyond the reach of Princes; the Soul is its proper Seat and Temple, and there Men may worship their God as they please, without offending their Prince. For the Essence of Religious Worship con­sists in nothing else but a grateful sense and temper of Mind towards the Divine Goodness, and so can reside in those Fa­culties only that are capable of being [Page 99] affected with Gratitude and Veneration: And as for all that concerns External Worship, 'tis no part of Religion it self, but only an Instrument to express the Inward Veneration of the Mind by some Outward Action or Posture of the Body. Upon which account it is that the Divine Wisdom has so little concern'd it self to prescribe any particular Forms of Divine Service; for though the Christian Laws command us by some exteriour Signs to express our Interiour Piety, yet they have no where set down any particular Expressions of Worship and Adoration. And indeed the Exteriour Significations of Honour being so changeable accord­ing to the variety of Customs and Places, there could be no particular Forms or Fashions prescribed: for so some would have been obliged to signifie their Ho­nourable Sentiments of God by Marks of Scorn and Dishonour; because those Fashions and Postures which in some Places are Indications of Respect, are to others Signs of Contempt. So mad and Seditious is the Humour of those Men, who brand all those Forms of Divine Service, that are not expresly enjoyn'd in the Holy Volume, with the odious [Page 100] Titles of Superstition and Will-wor­ship; and so in one Sentence condemn all the Churches in the World, seeing there is not any one that has not Peculiar Rites and Customs of its own, that were never prescribed nor practised by our Saviour or his Apostles. And in all Ages of the World God has left the management of his Outward Worship to the Discretion of Men, unless when to determine some particular Forms has been useful to some other purposes.

§ 5. The Ancientest and most Uni­versally practised way of expressing Di­vine Worship and Adoration, was by Offering of Sacrifices; those First Ages of the World conceiving it a proper and natural way of acknowledging their en­tire Dependence upon, and Gratitude towards God, by publickly presenting him with a portion of the Best and most Precious things they had: and God was well-pleased with them, not because he at all delighted in the Blood of Bulls and Goats, but because they were the Pledges, and Significations of a Grateful Mind. And yet this outward Expression of Di­vine Worship, notwithstanding its Uni­versality [Page 101] and Antiquity, was only made choice of by good men as a fit way of intimating the pious and grateful Resent­ments of their Minds, and cannot in the least pretend to owe its Original to any Divine Institution, seeing there appears not any shadow of a Command for it; and to say it was Commanded, though 'tis no where Recorded, is to take the Liberty of saying any thing without Proof or Evidence. That indeed Sacri­fices became Expiatory, and that the Life of a Beast should be accepted to redeem the Life of a Man, depended purely upon Positive Institution, Lev. 17. 11. For the life of the Flesh is in the Blood, and I have given it to you upon the Altar to make an Atonement for your Souls; for 'tis the Blood that maketh an Atonement for the Soul. Now it was a Matter of Meer Grace and Favour in God to exchange the Blood of a Beast for the Blood of a Man, which was real­ly Forfeited for every Transgression of that Law, that was Establish'd upon no less Sanction than the Threatning of Death. In which Commutation of the Forfeiture was an equal mixture of the Divine Mercy and Severity, hereby he at [Page 102] once signified his Hatred to Sin, and his Compassion to Sinners; in that though he might have remitted the Offence without exacting the Penalty, yet to shew his implacable Hatred against Sin, and withal the more to affright men from its Commission, he would never remit its Guilt without some sort of recom­pence and Expiation. But setting aside this Positive Institution of Sacrifices and Consumptive Oblations, their Prime and Natural Use was only to express the Sig­nifications of a Grateful Mind, as suffici­ently appears not only in the Religion of the Ancient Jews, but Heathens too. Among whom the First and Earliest Footsteps of the Worship of God appear in their Harvest Sacrifices and Oblations, when they presented the Deity with a Parcel of their Annual Returns in ac­knowledgment of his Bounty and Provi­dence: Crying Harvest-in was their most Solemn, and most Ancient Festival, Arist. Nicomach. l. 8. c. 11. [...]. The Ancient Sa­crifices and Festival Meeting appear to have been at first Instituted upon the In­gathering of their Fruits, such were the [Page 103] Offering of their First-Fruits: which was a decent and sutable way of acknow­ledging their Homage and Gratitude to their Supreme Lord; and had they not been directed to a wrong Deity (as pro­bably they were to the Sun) they might have been no less pleasing to the Almigh­ty, than Cornelius's Alms and Devotions: because God is no respecter of Persons, but in every Nation he that feareth him, and worketh Righeousness, is accepted with him.

§ 6. In the Mosaick Dispensation in­deed God took special care to prescribe the particular Rites and Ceremonies of his Worship, not so much by reason of the Necessity of the thing it self, as be­cause of the Sottishness and Stupidity of that Age; in that all the Religions in the World were lamentably degenerated in­to the most sordid and Idolatrous Super­stition, and the Jewish Nation were sot­tishly addicted to the absurd Customs of their Neighbours; and therefore the Divine Wisdom enjoyn'd them the most contrary Usages, as a Fence to keep them from passing over to the Religion of the Gentiles. But when Mankind [Page 104] was grown up to a riper Understanding, and could discern that Religion was something else beside Customs and Cere­monies; then did God Cancel the Old Discipline of the Law, and by the Mini­stry of Iesus Christ establish'd a more Manly and Rational Dispensation; In which as he has been more solicitous to acquaint us with the Main and Funda­mental Affairs of Religion, so has he scarce at all concern'd himself in Exte­riour Rites and Significations (having Instituted only two, viz. The two Sacra­ments that are distinguish'd from all o­ther Ceremonies, by their being Federal and peculiarly significative of the Cove­nant between God and Man, seal'd by the First, renewed and confirmed by the Second) but as for all other Rites and Ceremonies of External Service, he has left their entire Disposal to the Power and Discretion of the Church it self, knowing that as long as Men had Wit and Reason enough to manage the Civil Affairs of Common-wealths, they could not want Prudence to Judge what Cir­cumstances were conducive to Order and Decency in Publick Worship. And if we take a Survey of all the Forms of [Page 105] Divine Service practised in the Christian Church, there is not any of them can so much as pretend to be appointed in the Word of God, but depend on the Au­thority of the Civil Power in the same manner as all Customs and Laws of Ci­vil Government do. And therefore to quarrel with those Forms of Publick Worship, that are established by Autho­rity, only because they are Humane In­stitutions, is at once notorious Schism and Rebellion: For where a Religion is Establish'd by the Laws, whoever openly refuses Obedience, plainly rebels against the Government, Rebellion being pro­perly nothing else but an open denial of Obedience to the Civil Power. Nor can Men of this Principle live Peaceably in any Church in Christendom, in that there is not a Church in the World, that has not peculiar Rites and Customs and Laws of Government and Disci­pline.

§ 7. But of this I shall have occasion to account elsewhere, and shall rather chuse to observe here, from what I have discoursed of the Use and Nature of Outward Worship, the Prodigious Im­pertinency [Page 106] of that clamour some men have for so many years kept up against the Institution of Significant Ceremonies; when 'tis the only Use of Ceremonies, as well as all other outward Expressions of Religion, to be significant: In that all Worship is only an Outward Sign of In­ward Honour, and is indifferently per­form'd either by Words or Actions; for respect may as well be signified by Deeds, and Postures, and Visible Solem­nities as by Solemn Expressions: Thus to approach the Divine Majesty with such Gestures as are wont to betoken Re­verence and Humility, is as proper a Piece of Worship, as to Celebrate his Greatness by Solemn Praises: And to offer Sacrifices and Oblations, was among the Ancients the same sort of Worship as to return Thanksgivings, they be­ing both equally outward Signs of In­ward Love and Gratitude. And therefore there can be no more Exception against the Signification of Ceremonies than of Words, seeing this is the proper Office of both in the Worship of God.

And as all Forms, and Ceremonies, and Outward Actions of External Wor­ship are in a manner equally Signi­ficant, [Page 107] so are they equally Arbitrary; only some happen to be more Universally Practised, and others to be Confined to some particular Times and Places: Kneeling, lying Prostrate, being Bare­headed, Lifting up the Hands or Eyes, are not more naturally Significant of Worship and Adoration than putting off the Shoes, bowing the Head, or bend­ing the Body; and if some are more generally used than others, that proceeds not from their Natural Significancy, but from Custom and Casual Prescriptions: and to Bow the Body, when we mention the Name of Iesus, is as much a natural signification of Honour to his Person, as Kneeling, or being Bare-headed, or lift­ing up the Hands or Eyes, when we offer up our Prayers to him. But if all Out­ward Actions become to betoken Honour by Institution, then whatsoever Out­ward Signs are appointed by the Com­mon-wealth, unless they are Customary Marks of Contempt, and so carry in them some Antecedent Vndecency, are proper Signs of Worship; for if Actions are made Significant by Agreement, those are most so whose signification is ratified by Publick Consent.

[Page 108] § 8. So that all the Magistrates Power of instituting Significant Ceremonies, amounts to no more than a Power of De­termining what shall or shall not be Visi­ble Signs of Honour, and this certainly can be no more Usurpation upon the Consciences of men, than if the Sove­reign Authority should take upon it self (as some Princes have done) to define the Signification of Words. For as Words do not naturally denote those things which they are used to represent, but have their Import Stampt upon them by consent and Institution, and and may, if Men would agree to it among themselves, be made Marks of Things quite contrary to what they now signifie: So the same Gestures and Actions are in­differently capable of signifying either Honour or Contumely; and therefore that they may have a certain and setled meaning, 'tis necessary their Significati­on should be Determined: and unless this be done either by some Positive Command, or Publick Consent, or some other way, there can be no such thing as Publick Worship in the World, in that its proper End and Usefulness is to [Page 109] express Mens Agreement in giving Ho­nour to the Divine Majesty: and there­fore unless the Signs by which this Ho­nour is signified be Publick and Uniform, 'tis not Publick Worship, because there is no Publick Signification of Honour. So far is it from being unlawful for Go­vernours to define Significant Ceremo­nies in Divine Worship, that it is rather Necessary; in that unless they were de­fined, it would cease to be Publick Wor­ship: And when different men worship God by different Actions, according to their different Fansies, 'tis not Publick, but Private Worship; in that they are not Publick, but Private Signs of Honour. So that Uniformity in the Outward Actions of Religious Worship is of the same Use, as certainty in the Significati­on of Words, because otherwise they were no Publick Expressions of Honour. And therefore, to sum up the whole Result of this Discourse: If all Inter­nal Actions of the Soul are beyond the Jurisdiction of Humane Power, if by them the substance of Religious Wor­ship be perform'd, if all Outward Forms of Worship have no other Use, than only to be Instruments to express [Page 110] Inward Religion, and if the Signification of Actions be of the same Nature with that of Words; then when the Civil Magistrate takes upon him to determine any particular Forms of Outward Worship, 'tis, after all that hideous and ridiculous Noise that is raised against it, of no worse Consequence, than if he should go about to define the Significa­tion of all Words used in the Worship of God.

§ 1. WHen any thing that is Apparently and Intrin­secally Evil is the Mat­ter of an Humane Law, whether it be of a Civil or Ecclesiastical Concern, here God is [Page 113] to be obeyed rather than Man: No Circumstances can alter the Rules of Prime and Essential Rectitude, their goodness is Eternal and Unchangeable. And therefore in all such Actions Diso­bedience to Humane Laws is so far from being a Sin, that it becomes an indispen­sable Duty. Where the good or evil of an Action is determined by the Law of Nature, no Positive Humane Law can take off its Morality; because 'tis in it self repugnant to the principles of right Reason, & by consequence as unchange­able as that. And therefore if the Su­preme Magistrate should make a Law not to believe the Being of God or Pro­vidence, the Truth of the Gospel, the Immortality of the Soul; that Law can no more bind, than if a Prince should command a man to murther his Father, or to ravish his Mother; because the Obligatory Power of all such Laws is antecedently rescinded by a stronger and more Indispensable Obligation. And thus has every Man a natural right to be Virtuous, and no Authority whatso­ever can deny him the liberty of acting Virtuously without being guilty of the foulest Tyranny and Injustice: Not so [Page 114] much because Subjects are in any thing free from the Authority of the Supreme Power on Earth, as because they are subject to a Superiour in Heaven; and they are only then excused from the du­ty of obedience to their Sovereign, when they cannot give it without Re­bellion against God. So that it is not originally any right of their own, that exempts them from a subjection to the Sovereign Power in all things; but 'tis purely Gods right of governing his own Creatures, that Magistrates then invade, when they make Edicts to violate or controul his Laws.

And those who would take off from the Consciences of men all obligations antecedent to those of humane Laws, instead of making the Power of Princes supreme, absolute, and uncontroul­able, they utterly enervate all their Au­thority, and set their Subjects at perfect liberty from all their Commands. For if we once remove all the antecedent obligations of Conscience and Religion, men will be no further bound to submit to their Laws, than only as themselves shall see convenient; and if they are un­der no other restraint, it will be their [Page 115] wisdom to rebel as oft as it is their Interest. In that the Laws of Superiours passing no Obligation upon the Consci­ences of Subjects, they neither are, nor can be under any stronger Engagements to Subjection, than to preserve them­selves from the Penalties and Inflictions of the Law; and so by consequence may despise its Obligation, whenever they can hope to escape its punishment. Now, how must this weaken the Power, and supplant the Thrones of Princes, if every Subject may despise their Laws, or in­vade their Sovereignty, whenever he can hope to build his own Fortune upon their Ruines? How would it expose their Scepters to the continual Attempts of Rebels and Usurpers, when every one, that has strength enough to wrest it out of his Princes hands, has Right and Title enough to hold it? What security could Princes have of their Subjects Loyalty, that will own their Power, as long as it shall be their interest; and when it ceases to be so, call it Tyranny? How shall they ever be secured by any Promises, Oaths, and Covenants of Allegiance, that have no other band but self-security, or hope of Exemption from the Penalties [Page 116] of the Law? Will not the most sacred Bonds and Compacts leave them in as insecure a condition as they found them in? In that Self-advantage would have kept their Subjects loyal and obedient without Oaths, and nothing else will do it with them; and therefore they can add no new Obligations to that of Interest: For if to perform their Covenants be ad­vantageous, they are bound to perform them by the Laws of prudence and dis­cretion without the Oath as much as with it; if disadvantageous, no Oath can oblige them, in that Interest and Self-preservation is the only enforcement of all their Covenants: and therefore when that Tye happens to cease, their Obligation becomes Null and Void, and they may observe them if they please, and if they please break them.

§ 2. But the vanity and groundlesness of this opinion will more fully appear, by discovering the lamentable Foundati­on, on which it stands; and that is a late wild Hypothesis concerning the Nature and Original of Government, which is briefly this: That the natural conditi­on of Mankind is a State and Posture of [Page 117] War of every man against every man, in that all men being born in a condition of equality, they have all an equal right to all things; and because all cannot en­joy all, hence every man becomes an Enemy to every man: in which State of Hostility there is no way for any man to secure himself so reasonable as Anticipa­tion, that is, by Force or Wiles to master the persons of all men he can, till he see no other Power great enough to endan­ger himself; so that there is no remedy but that in the State of Nature all men must be obliged to seek and contrive, in order to their own security, one ano­thers Destruction. But because in this Condition Mankind must for ever groan under all the miseries and calamities of War, therefore they have wisely chosen by mutual consent to enter into Con­tracts and Covenants of mutual trust, in which every man has, in order to his own Security, been content to relinquish his natural and unlimited right to every thing; and hereby they enter into a state of Peace and Government, in which every man engages by solemn Oath and Covenant to submit himself to the Pub­lick Laws in order to his own private [Page 118] safety. So that, according to this Hypo­thesis, there are no Rules of Right or Wrong antecedent to the Laws of the Common-wealth, but all men are at absolute liberty to do as they please; and how cruel soever they may be to one another, they can never be injurious, there being nothing just or unjust but what is made so by the Laws of the So­ciety, to which all its Members cove­nant to submit when they enter into it.

This Hypothesis, as odde as it is, is become the Standard of our Modern Po­liticks; by which men, that pretend to understand the real Laws of Wisdom and Subtlety, must square their Actions; and therefore is swallowed down, with as much greediness as an Article of Faith, by the Wild and Giddy People of the Age. And of the reality of it none can doubt but Fops and raw-brain'd Fellows, that understand nothing of the World, or the Complexion of Humane Nature. Now 'tis but labour in vain to go about to confute the Phantastick Theory of things, only by demonstrating the Groundlesness of the Conceit; it being the fashion and humour of those men I [Page 119] have to do with, to embrace any Hypo­thesis how precarious soever, if it do but serve the purposes of Baseness and Irreli­gion: and therefore I shall not content my self with barely proving the weakness of its Foundation, but shall confute and shame it too, by shewing it to be palpably false, absurd, and mischievous from these ensuing Considerations.

§ 3. First then the Hypothesis, which he lays as the Basis of all his Discourse, is infinitely false and absurd: For what can be more incongruous, than to pro­ceed upon the supposal of such a state of Nature as never was, nor ever shall be; and is so far from being sutable to the natural frame of things, that 'tis abso­lutely inconsistent with it? And though Philosophers are so civil among them­selves (with how much reason I now determine not) as to allow one another the Liberty, when they frame Theories and Hypotheses of things, to suppose some precarious Principles; yet are they never so fond as to grant such Funda­mental Suppositions, as are apparently false and incongruous, and repugnant to the Real State of things: or if any will [Page 120] take upon them that unwarrantable li­berty of Invention, yet however it would be monstrously impertinent to lay down their own lamentable Fictions, as the fundamental Reasons of the Truth, and reality of things. And yet with this gross and inexcusable absurdity is this Hypothesis most notoriously chargeable. For when it has once supposed (without ever attempting to prove it) that the State of Nature is a State of War, and that by Nature all men have a right to all things, and come into the World with­out any Obligations to mutual Justice and Honesty, it from thence concludes: That in a bare State of Nature there can be no right and wrong; That what mis­chiefs soever men may do to each other, they can do no injuries; That the first Reason and Foundation of all Natural Right is Self-preservation, and that in pursuance of this Principle men enter into Societies, bind themselves to an ob­servance of the Laws of Justice and natu­ral Equity by mutual Bonds and Cove­nants, and think themselves engaged to observe them only in order to self-inte­rest. So that if we remove this [...], this fundamental Falshood, that the [Page 121] state of Nature is a state of War and Anarchy, all the subsequent Propositi­ons will immediately appear to be as Groundless, as they are Unreasonable; and there will not remain the least sha­dow of Reason to believe private Inte­rest, the only Reason of right and wrong, or the first and fundamental Law of Na­ture; and this Authors City will appear to stand upon no firmer Foundation than a Fable and a Falshood; and his Hy­pothesis so grosly absurd and incongru­ous, as would be highly blameable in the contrivance of a Dramatick Plot.

But if, instead of conforming the Prin­ciples of Justice and Government to this false and imaginary state of the World, we take a serious view of the true and real posture of the Nature of things; the dictates of Reason that must natural­ly result from thence, will be as contra­ry to some of those this Author hath assign'd, as the Natural State of things is to this imaginary one: Namely, that there was a first Cause of Humane Kind, and that this First Cause is a Be­ing endued with Goodness and Equi­ty; and therefore that when he made Mankind, he design'd their Welfare [Page 122] and felicity; and by consequence created them in such a condition, in which they might acquire it. All men therefore having by the Divine Appointment a common Right and Title to Happiness, which cannot be obtain'd without Socie­ty, nor Society subsist without mutual Aids of Love and Friendship, because we are not self-sufficient, but stand in need of mutual assistances; from hence it follows, That as every man is obliged to act for his own good, so also to aim at the common good of Mankind, because without this the natural Right that eve­ry individual man has to happiness, can­not possibly be obtain'd; so that there will plainly arise from the Constitution of Humane Nature an Essential Iustice, that demands of every man Offices of love and kindness to others as well as to himself; in that without this that Com­mon welfare and happiness, which Na­ture, or rather that Divine Providence that made it, design'd for all and every individual of Mankind, must become utterly unattainable. And hence the sole Fountain of all the Mischiefs and Mise­ries in the World is excess of unreason­able self-love, and neglect of all other [Page 123] interests but our own; and all such, as separate their own Concerns from the Common Interest, are the profess'd Ene­mies of Mankind: and therefore 'tis the only aim of all the just Laws and wise Philosophy in the world, to assign rea­sonable allowances between Self-love and Society. And if all men would be just, and impartial between themselves and the Publick, i. e. all others, there would be no use of Laws nor Judges, this being the only Office of Publick Ju­stice, to balance every mans private in­terest.

Well then, because there is an abso­lute necessity that the Government of the World must be suited to, and establish­ed upon the Natural Condition of Hu­mane Nature; hence it is, that it is made as natural to the Being, as 'tis necessary to the preservation of Mankind; and that as we cannot subsist, so neither can we be born out of Society, he that made us, having made this our natural Conditi­on, that we could not possibly come into the World but under a state of Go­vernment, all Children being actually as soon as born under the Power and Au­thority of their Parents: and therefore [Page 124] as Mankind cannot continue without Propagation, so neither can Propagation without Government; and to be a Sub­ject is as natural upon being born, as to be a Man. Now 'tis certain, that that only can be accounted the State of Na­ture that was made and design'd by the Author of Nature (for if it be not suita­ble to that Order and Condition of things, that he has establish'd, 'tis pre­ternatural.) And therefore seeing he did not create Multitudes of men together out of each others Power, and in a State of War and Hostility, but begun the Race of Humane Kind in a Single Person, by whom the Community of Men was to be Propagated, that must be the State of Nature in which it was at first founded, and by which it is still continued: But if men will feign such an imaginary State of Nature as is utterly contradictory to the Real, and then, upon such an unnatu­ral Frame of Affairs, establish our natural Rights; 'tis no wonder if they prove contrary to our Common Interests, see­ing they are suited to a contrary State of things.

§ 4. Secondly, No man can seriously [Page 125] embrace this Hypothesis, that does not firmly believe either (1.) That there ne­ver was any Author of Humane Nature, but that a multitude of men hapned by chance to arise like Mushromes out of the Earth altogether, who out of diffidence and jealousie one of another for want of acquaintance shun'd Society, and with­drew like all other Beasts of Prey into Dens and secret retirements, where they lived poor and solitary as Bats and Owls, and subsisted like Vermine by robbing and filching from one another; till find­ing this way of living lamentably unsafe and uneasie, every man being always upon the guard against every man, and in continual fear and danger from the whole Community, they grew weary of this forlorn and comfortless way of li­ving; and thence some that were more wise, or more cowardly than others, when they chanced to meet in their wild rangings after Prey, instead of belabouring one another with Snag­sticks, and beating out each others brains, made signs of Parley, and so began to treat of Terms of mutual Peace and Assistance, and so by degrees to win others into their Party, till they hearded [Page 126] together in small Rendezvouses, like the little Common-wealths of the savage Americans, which in process of time grew up into larger Societies, from whence at length came the different Na­tions and Governments of the World. But if this fortuitous Original of hu­mane Nature be too absurd and ridicu­lous to be asserted, then (2.) It must be supposed, that there was a first Author and Creator of Mankind: and if there were, then whoever believes this Hy­pothesis, must withal believe that he con­trived things so ill, that unless his Crea­tures had by chance been more provident than himself, they must of necessity have perish'd as soon as they were made; and therefore that the Well-being of the World is to be entirely attributed to mans Wit, and not to Gods Providence, who sent his Creatures into it in such a condition as should oblige them to seek their own mutual ruine and destruction; so that had they continued in that state of War he left them in, they must have lived and died like Gladiators, and have unavoidably perish'd at one time or other by one anothers Swords; and therefore that Mankind owe the comfort of their [Page 127] lives not at all to their Creator, but en­tirely to themselves; forasmuch as the very Laws of Nature, whereby, accord­ing to this Hypothesis, the World is pre­served, were not establish'd by the Di­vine Providence; but are only so many Rules of Art, being, as all other Maximes of Prudence and Policy are, Inventions of humane Wit, and sup­pose man not in the natural state and posture of War, in which God left him, but in a preternatural one of his own contriving. But certainly the Deity that made us, if we suppose him good, made us not to be miserable; for so we must unavoidably have been in a perpetual state of War: and therefore to suppose he both made and left us in that condition, is directly to deny our Creators goodness. And then if we suppose him wise, we cannot imagine he would frame a Creation to destroy it self; unless we can believe his only de­sign was to sport himself in the folly and madness of his Creatures, by beholding them by all the ways of force and fraud to conspire their own mutual de­struction: and therefore if the Creation of man were a product of the Divine [Page 128] Wisdom or Goodness, his natural State must have been a condition of Peace, and not such a State of War that should na­turally tend to his misery, ruine, and ut­ter destruction.

§ 5. (3.) This Hypothesis irrecove­rably destroys the safety of all Societies of Mankind in the World: for if perso­nal safety and private interest be the only Foundation of all the Laws of Nature or Principles of Equity, i. e. If men endeavour Peace, and enter into Con­tracts of mutual Trust, if they invade not the Proprieties of others, if they think themselves obliged to promote the good of the Society, if they submit them­selves to the Laws of the Common-wealth, if they practise Justice, Equi­ty, Mercy, and all other Virtues, if they refrain from Cruelty, Pride, Re­venge, and all other Vices, only to secure their own personal safety and interest; then whenever this Obligation ceases, all the Ties to Justice and Equity, that de­rive all their Force and Reason from it, must also cease; and when any single Person can hope to advance his own private Interest by the ruine of the [Page 129] Publick, it will be lawful for him to ef­fect it; and War, Rebellion, and injuries will be at least as innocent as Faith, Ju­stice, and Obedience; because these are good only in order to private Interest, and therefore when those chance to be as conducive to it, they will then be as just and lawful. So that this single Principle does as effectually work the subversion of all Government, as if men were taught the most professed Principles of Rebelli­on, as, that all Government is Tyranny and Usurpation; that his Majesties pos­session of the Crown is his best Title; that whoever has wit or strength enough to wrest his Scepter from him, has right to hold it. For as men of these and the like perswasions will never act them, but when opportunity invites; and will be obedient to any Government, till they can destroy it: So will those other rebel, as soon as they think it their Interest. For when ever they can hope to mend their Fortunes by Rebellion, the same obli­gation, that restrain'd them from it, does now as forcibly invite them to it, that is self-interest, i. e. they cannot but think Rebellion lawful, as oft as they think it safe. And there are no Villains [Page 130] so mad or foolish as to attempt it upon other grounds. So that, though this Au­thor has assign'd us some not unuseful Laws of Nature, yet has he effectually enervated their force and usefulness, by resolving the reason of their obligation into self-interest; and so laying the Fun­damental Principles of all Injustice, as the only Foundation of all the Rules of Ju­stice: For as 'tis the Nature and Office of Justice to maintain the Common Right of all, and to secure my Neigh­bours happiness as well as my own; so the formal obliquity of all Injustice lies in pursuing of a private Interest without regard to the Common good of all and every member of the Society. And there­fore if private Interest be the only rea­son and enforcement of the Laws of Nature, men will have no other Motive to obey their Constitutions, than what will as strongly oblige to break them; i. e. if men are just and honest for no other reason than because 'tis their Interest, then when 'tis their Interest, they may (and if they are wise will) be unjust and dishonest. And so men that owne the Laws of [...] this Principle may be Villains, [...] of all their restraints; [Page 131] and the most lewd and profligate Wret­ches will, as well as they, be just or un­just, as it serves their turns. For this Principle, that engages men to be honest only as long as they must, will as effectu­ally oblige them to be Rogues as soon as they can.

§ 6. So that according to this Hypo­thesis, Mankind is left in as ill a conditi­on after they have by Pacts and Cove­nants united into Societies, and a State of Peace, as they were in their natural State of War. For all Covenants of mutual Trust are (according to its own Rules) in the State of Nature invalid; because under that men are under no obligations of Justice and Honesty to one another, and have no other measure of their acti­ons but their interest; and therefore as that might invite them in some circum­stances to enter into Bonds and Con­tracts, so it may in others to break them. So that in the State of Government all their Promises, Oaths, and Contracts will prove as ineffectual as in the State of Nature: Partly, because the force of all Contracts, made in the State of Govern­ment, ariseth from the validity of the [Page 132] first Compact, that was made in the State of Nature; that is, in that state in which it could have no validity; partly, Be­cause they have no other tye but that of self-interest, and so can lay no other ob­ligation upon us to observe them, than they might have done before. And there­fore if Mankind be once supposed in this natural state of War, they can never be delivered from it; and after they have enter'd into Covenants of Peace, they would remain as much as before in a po­sture of War, and be subject to all the same dangers and miseries, that would have annoyed them if they had continu­ed in their natural state. For if Justice and fidelity be not supposed to be the Law and Duty of our Natures, no Co­venants are of power enough to bring us under any obligation to them.

Now, having thus clearly blown up the foundations of this Hypothesis, 'twere but labour in vain to make particular enquiries into all the flaws and follies of its Superstructures, seeing they must of necessity stand and fall together; for if its subsequent Propositions be cohe­rently deduced from these Fundamental [Page 133] Principles, all the evidence and certain­ty they can pretend to, depends on them; and therefore the Premisses being once convicted of falshood, all pretences to truth in the conclusions must necessarily vanish. And if any of them happen to be true and rational, 'tis not by vertue of these, but other Principles. Thus though the Laws of Nature, he assigns, may be useful to the ends of Govern­ment and Happiness of Mankind; yet, because upon those grounds, on which he assigns them, they would be no Laws, that alone is sufficient evidence of the errour and vanity of his whole Hypo­thesis; seeing how good soever they may be in themselves, yet upon the Princi­ples, and in the Method, in which he proposes them, they are of no force. In that self-interest being the only reason of their obligation, the Interests of Ci­vil Society come thereby to be no better secured with, than without them: be­cause if they were not in force by vertue of any Compact, all men would chuse to act according to them, when they thought it advantageous; and when they have the utmost force his Principles can give them, no man would think they [Page 134] obliged him, when ever he apprehended them disadvantageous. So that this ma­lignant Principle of meer self-interest running through the whole Systeme, and twisting it self with every branch of his Morality, it does not only eat out, and enervate its native life and vigour, but withal envenoms their natural truth and soundness with its own malignity. Which Principle being removed, and that influ­ence it hath on other parts of this Hy­pothesis being prevented, and withal the Foundation on which it stands ruin'd, viz. his absurd and imaginary State of Nature, we have perhaps cashier'd all that is either base or peculiar in it, and restored the true accounts of natural Ju­stice and right Reason, viz. That all men have a natural Right to Happiness from the very design of their creation, that this cannot be acquired without mutual aids and friendships; and therefore right rea­son dictates, that every man should have some concern for his Neighbour, as well as himself: because this is made necessary to the welfare of the World by the na­tural state of things, and by this mutual exchange of love and kindness men sup­port one another in the comforts of hu­mane life.

[Page 137] § 1. AND now the Reason, why I have thus far pursued this Principle, is, because 'tis become the most powerful Patron of the Fanatick Interest; and a Belief of the indifferency, or rather Imposture of all Religion, is now made the most effectual (not to say most fashionable) Argument for Liberty of Conscience. For when men have once swallowed this Principle, That Mankind is free from all obligations antecedent to the Laws of the Common-wealth, and that the Will of the Sovereign Power is the only measure of Good and Evil; they proceed suitably to its Consequen­ces, to believe, That no Religion can obtain the force of a Law, till 'tis establish'd for such by Supreme Autho­rity; that the Holy Scriptures were not Laws to any man, till they were enjoyn­ed by the Christian Magistrate; that no man is under any obligation to assent to their Truth, unless the Governours of the Common-wealth require it; and that setting aside their Commands, 'tis no sin to believe our Blessed Saviour a villanous and lewd Impostor; and that, [Page 138] if the Sovereign Power would declare the Alcoran to be Canonical Scripture, it would be as much the Word of God as the four Gospels. Leviath. p. 3. c. 33. For if Sovereigns in their own Dominions are the sole Legislators, then those Books only are Canonical, that is Law, in every Na­tion, which are established for such by the Sovereign Authority. So that all Religi­ons are in reality nothing but Cheats and Impostures, and at best but so many Tales of Imaginary and Invisible Powers, Publickly allowed and encouraged, to awe the Common People to Obedience. Leviath. p. 1. c. 12. Who are betrayed into it by these four Follies, A false Opinion of Ghosts and immaterial Substances, that neither are, nor ever can be; Ignorance of Second Causes, Devotion towards what men groundlesly fear; And mistaking things Casual for Divine Prognosticks. In brief, all Religion is nothing but a Cheat of Policy, and was at first invented by the Founders and Legislators of Com­mon-wealths, and by them obtruded upon the credulous Rabble for the Ends of Government. And therefore, though Princes may wisely make use of the Fa­bles of Religion to serve their own turns [Page 139] upon the silly Multitude, yet 'tis below their Wisdom to be seriously concern'd themselves for such Fooleries; so that, provided their subjects will befool them­selves with any one Imposture, 'tis not material which they single out; in that all Religions equally oblige to the belief of Invisible Powers, which is all that is requisite to the Designs of Policy. And as long as a Prince can keep up any ap­prehensions of Religion in the minds of his Subjects, 'tis no Policy to disoblige and exasperate any of them, by interes­sing his Power for one Party more than another, and by forcing all other Sects against their own Inclinations to con­form their Belief to the Perswasions of one Faction; but rather to endear them all to himself, by indulging them their Liberty in their different Follies: and so he may with more ease secure his Go­vernment by abusing all, and yet disob­liging none.

§ 2. In answer to this Objection, 'tis not material to my present Purpose largely to examine & refute these Wild and extravagant Pretences, by asserting the Truth and Divine Authority of [Page 140] Religion, and giving a rational account of the Grounds and Principles, on which it stands: only let me observe that this Discourse lies under no less prejudice than this, That if any of the Principles of Religion be true, then is all these mens Policy false: But waving this too great advantage, I shall content my self only to discover of what noisom and pernicious consequence such Principles are to the Common-wealth, though it were grant­ed that all Religion were nothing but Imposture. And this I shall do (with­out reminding the Reader how I have already prevented this Objection in the first part of the Discourse, when I shew'd what good or bad Influence upon the State mens perswasions about Religion have) by these four ensuing Considera­tions.

First, Then methinks his Majesty is bound to con these men thanks for endea­vouring to render the truth of Religion suspected, and to possess mens minds with apprehensions of its being false; whereby they effectually rob him of the best security of his Crown, and strongest inducements of obedience to his Laws. There being for certain nothing so [Page 141] absolutely necessary to the reverence of Government, the peace of Societies, and common Interests of mankind, as a sense of Conscience and Religion: This is the strongest Bond of Laws, and only sup­port of Government; without it the most absolute and unlimited Powers in the World must be for ever miserably weak and precarious, and lie always at the mercy of every Subjects passion and private Interest. For when the obliga­tions of Conscience and Religion are cashier'd, men can have no higher in­ducements to Loyalty and Obedience, than the considerations of their own private Interest and security; and then wherever these happen to fail, and Inte­rest and advantage invite to disobedi­ence, men may do as they please: And when they have power to shake off Au­thority, they have right too; and a pro­sperous Usurper shall have as fair a Title to his Crown as the most lawful Prince; all Government will be founded upon force and violence, and Kings nothing but terrible men with long Swords. But when the ties of Conscience are super­induced upon those of Secular Interest, this extends the Power of Princes to the [Page 142] hearts of their Subjects, and secures them as much from the very thoughts, as attempts of Treason. For nothing so strongly influences the minds of men, or so authoritatively commands their passi­ons and inclinations, as Religion; foras­much as no fears are (not only to the considerate part of Mankind, but to the ruder sort) so vehement as those of Hell, nor hopes so active as those of Heaven: and therefore the Commands of Religi­on being back'd with such mighty sancti­ons, they must needs have infinitely more force to awe or allure the minds of men to a compliance, than any Secular Interests. Whereas those men that think themselves above the Follies of Consci­ence, and either believe or regard not the evils threatned hereafter (an attainment to which these our modern Politicians do not blush to pretend, though it be but an odde piece of Policy openly to owne and proclaim it) must make their present Interest the Rule and measure of all their actions; and can have no other obligation to obey their lawful Superi­ours in what they command, than they have to disobey them, viz. their own security and self-preservation. Whereas [Page 143] if these men lived under the restraints of Conscience, and the serious ap­prehensions of Religion, and believed the Laws of their Prince to be bound upon them by the Laws of God, and that under the threatnings of everlasting misery; their Loyalty would be tied up­on them by all that men can either hope or fear, and they would have all the en­gagements to obedience that the serious reflections upon a happy or miserable Eternity could lay upon them. But if the Principles of Government have so essential a dependence upon those of Religion, if nothing be powerful enough to secure obedience but the hopes and fears of another life, if all humane Laws have their main force and efficacy from the apprehensions of Religion, if Oaths, Promises, and Covenants, and whatsoever else whereby Civil Societies are upheld, are made firm by nothing but the bonds of Religion; then let Au­thority judge, how much it is beholden to those men, who labour to bring it into Publick Disreputation, and to possess their Subjects with an opinion of its falshood: whereby they not only set them loose from their Authority, but [Page 144] enrage them against it, by perswading them they are governed by Cheats and Impostures, and that the Magistrate builds his Dominion upon their folly and simplicity, there being nothing more hateful to Mankind than to be imposed upon: So that though Religion were a Cheat, they are apparently the greatest Enemies to Government, that tell the World it is so.

§ 3. But secondly, Nothing more concerns the Interest of the Civil Magi­strate, than to take care, what particular Doctrines of Religion are taught with­in his Dominions; because some are pe­culiarly advantageous to the ends of Government, and others as naturally tending to its disturbance: Some incline the minds of men to candour, mode­ration, and ingenuity, and work them to a gentle and peaceable temper, by teaching humility, charity, meekness, and obedience: Now 'tis the Interest of Princes to cherish and propagate such Doctrines among their Subjects, that will make them not only quiet, but use­ful in the Common-wealth. But others there are that infect the minds of men [Page 145] with pride, peevishness, malice, spight, and envy; that incline them to delight in detracting from Princes, and speaking reproachfully of Government, and breed in them such restless and seditious tem­pers, that 'tis next to an impossibility for any Prince to please or oblige them. Now, as for such perverse and arrogant Sects of men, it certainly concers Go­vernours to suppress them as so many Routs of Traytors and Rebels.

Religion then is either useful or dan­gerous in a Common-wealth, as the temper of mind it breeds is peaceable or turbulent: and as there is nothing more serviceable to the Interests of Go­vernment, so there is nothing more mis­chievous: and therefore nothing more concerns Princes, than to take care what Doctrines are taught within their Domi­nions. For seeing Religion has, and will have the strongest influence upon the minds of men; when that renders them averse and troublesom to Govern­ment, 'tis that all the Power nor Policy in the World can keep them peaceable, till such perswasions are rooted out of their minds by severity of Laws and Penalties. And, as long as men think [Page 146] themselves obliged, upon pain of dam­nation, to Disobedience and Sedition, not any Secular threatnings and inflicti­ons are of force enough to bridle the Exorbitances of Conscience. There is not any vice so incident to the Common People as Superstition, nor any so mis­chievous. 'Tis infinitely evident from the Histories and Records of all Ages and Nations, that there is nothing so vicious or absurd but may pass for Re­ligion, and (what is worse) the more wild and giddy Conceits of Religion are ever suckt in by the multitude with the greatest passion and eagerness; and there is no one thing in the World so difficult, as to bring the Common Peo­ple to true Notions of God and his Worship; insomuch that 'tis no Para­dox to affirm, That Religion (i. e. what is mistaken for it) has been one of the great­est Principles of mischief and wickedness in the World. And if so, then certain­ly nothing requires so much care and prudence in the Civil Magistrate, as its due conduct and management. So that the dread of Invisible Powers is of it self no more serviceable to awe the peo­ple into subjection, then to drive them [Page 147] into Tumults and Confusions; and if it chance to be accompanied (as it easily may) with tumultuous and seditious per­swasions, 'tis an invincible obligation to Villany and Rebellion. And therefore it must needs above all things concern Princes, to look to the Doctrines and Articles of mens Belief; seeing 'tis so great odds that they prove of dangerous consequence to the publick Peace: and in that case, the apprehensions of a Deity, and a World to come, makes their dan­ger almost irresistible.

Sect. 4. There are some Sects whose Principles, and some persons whose tempers will not suffer them to live peaceable in any Common-wealth. For what if some men believe, That if Princes refuse to reform Religion them­selves, 'tis lawful for their Godly Subjects to do it, and that by violence and force of Arms? What if they believe, That Princes are but Executioners of the De­crees of the Presbytery; and that in case of disobedience to their Spiritual Go­vernours, they may be Excommunica­ted, and by consequence Deposed? What if they believe, That Dominion [Page 148] is founded in Grace; and therefore that all wicked Kings forfeit their Crowns, and that it is in the power of the People of God to bestow them where they please? And what if others believe, That to puruse their success in villany and Re­bellion is to follow Providence; and that when the Event of War has deliver'd up Kings into their Power, then not to depose or murther them, were to slight the Guidance of Gods Providential Di­spensations? Are not these, and the like innocent Propositions (think you) mightily conducive to the peace and set­tlement of Common-wealths? Such Articles of Faith as these cannot but make brave and obedient Subjects, and he must needs be a glorious and power­ful Prince, where such conceits are the main ingredients of his Subjects Reli­gion. Let any man shew me, what Doctrines could have been more un­luckily contrived to disturb Govern­ment than these. And if men would study on purpose to frame and model a Rebellious Faith, these must have been their Fundamental Articles: and yet 'tis sufficiently known where they have been both believed and practised. But further, [Page 149] Is there not a sort of Melancholy Religi­onists in the World, whose very Ge­nious inclines them to Quarrels and Ex­ceptions against the State, and manage­ment of Publick Affairs? There is no­thing so malepart as a Splenetick Religi­on; the inward discontent and uneasiness of mens own minds maintains it self upon the faults and miscarriages of others: and we may observe, how this humour is ever venting it self in sighs and complaints for the badness of the times (i. e. in effect of the Government) and in telling and aggravating little sto­ries, that may reflect upon the wisdom and ability of their Superiours. 'Tis im­possible to please their fretful and anxi­ous minds; the very delights and recrea­tions of the Court shall stir their envy, and the vanities of the great Ones grieve and wound their tender Souls. How­ever Princes behave themselves, they can never win upon the affections of these people; their very prosperity shall dis­oblige them, and they are ready upon all occasions to bring them to Account for their misdemeanours: And if any of the Grandees happen to be discontented, they have here a Party ready formed for the [Page 150] purpose, to revenge their injury, and bring evil Counsellors, that seduce the King, to Iustice. And 'tis not impossible but there may be a sort of proud and haughty men among us (not over-well affected to Monarchick Government) who, though they scorn, yet patronize this humour, as a check to the insolence and presumption of Princes. Again, Are there not some whole Sects of men, all whose Religion is made up of nothing but passion, rancour, and bitterness? All whose Devotion is little better than a male-contentedness, their Piety than a sanctified fury, and their zeal than a proud and spightful malice; and who, by the Genius of their Principles, are brought infinitely and irrecoverably under the power of their passions; [...]. Now, nothing imports Governours so much as to manage mens passions; in that 'tis these, rather than our appetites, that disturb the World. A person that is debaucht and intemperate is indeed useless to the Common-wealth, but he that is turbulent and passionate is dan­gerous. But then when passion is fired with religious zeal, nothing can temper [Page 151] its outragious and Fanatick heats; but it works the minds of men into rancour and bitterness, and drives them into all manner of savage and inhumane practi­ces. Princes have never found any thing so restive and ungovernable, as Sectarian Madness; no malice so spightful and implacable, as the zeal of a Godly Party; nor any rage so fierce and merciless, as sanctified Barbarism. All the ancient Tyranny has in some places been out­done by a thorough-godly Reformation: zeal for the Glory of God has often turn'd whole Nations into Shambles, fill'd the World with continual Butche­ries and Massacres, and flesh'd it self with slaughters of Myriads of Mankind. And when men think their passions warrant­ed by their Religion, how is it possible it should be otherwise? For this ob­liges them by their greatest hopes and fears to act them to the highest: and 'tis easie to imagine what calm and peaceable things those men must be, who think it their duty to enforce and enrage their passions with the obligati­ons of Conscience. And yet alas! How few are they, who have wisdom enough to keep their zeal clean from these sowre [Page 152] and crabbed mixtures? The generality of men are scarce sensible of their spiri­tual wickednesses; and 'tis observable, That in all Ages, and all Religions of the world, few people have taken notice of them beside their Wise men and Phi­losophers. And even among the Profes­sors of Christianity it self, notwithstand­ing that our Religion has made such spe­cial provisions against all Excesses of Passion, and establish'd Love, Charity, Moderation, Patience, Candor, and In­genuity, as its Prime, and Fundamental Duties; yet the Spirit of meekness and humility soon decayed, with its Primi­tive and Apostolical Professors; and within a few Centuries of years the Church was over-run with some Sects of men, much of the same temper with some of our Modern Saints. So that even in true and innocent perswasions 'tis necessary to asswage the distempers and indiscretions of a forward zeal: The giddy multitude judge weakly, fancy strongly, and act passionately; and, un­less restrain'd by wary and sober Laws, will drive on so furiously in a good cause, till they run their Religion into Folly and Faction, and themselves into tumults [Page 153] and riotous proceedings. What Socrates once said of Vertue, That when it is not conducted by prudence, it is but Pedan­try, and a phantastick thing, is much more true of Religion; which, when it wants the guidance and ornament of this Vertue, may be folly, or madness, or any thing rather than it self. In brief, Fanaticism is both the greatest, and the easiest vice that is incident to Religi­on; 'tis a Weed that thrives in all Soils, and there is the same Fanatick Spirit, that mixes it self with all the Religions in the World. And 'tis as natural to the Com­mon People, as the proud, or ignorant, or perverse, or factious, or stubborn, or eager, or passionate: for when ever any of these vices or follies are twisted with mens apprehensions of Religion, they naturally work, and ferment their minds into a boysterous and tumultuary zeal. And yet how infinitely difficult it is to cure the Common Heard of these vices, the Experience of all Ages is too great a demonstration: so that there is nothing so apparently necessary, or diffi­cult, as to govern the vulgar Rout in their conceptions of Religion; seeing 'tis so natural for them both to mix and [Page 154] heigthen, yes, and sanctifie their passions with their Consciences. And from hence it is, that though the Fanaticks in all Nations may disagree in the objects and matters of their Superstition, according to the different Customs of their Coun­try, and variety of their Educations; yet as for their tendency to disturbance and Sedition in the State, 'tis in all places the same to all intents and pur­poses: And those unquiet Sects, that have often disturb'd, and sometimes sub­verted whole Kingdoms in Africa, if they had hapned to have been born in Europe, would have done the same here; where though their Religion might have been different, yet would their Genius have been the same, as rising from the same Conjunction of Conscience and Passion. And therefore it cannot but be a wonder to any man, that is acquainted with the Experience of former Ages, to see Go­vernours, after so many warnings, so insensible of this mischief: and however they may think themselves unconcern'd to restrain the opinions of any dissenting Sect, as being perhaps but foolish and inconsiderable in themselves; yet nothing can more highly concern them than to [Page 155] provide against their inclinations, as be­ing generally of a sad and dangerous consequence to the State. And this at present may suffice to evince, How much it concerns Authority to look to the particular Principles and Inclinations of every Sect; and to prove, That the meer Belief of Invisible Powers, is so far from being Religion enough to awe men to obedience; that unless it be temper'd with a due sense of vertue, and mana­ged with special prudence and discre­tion, it rather tends to make the rude multitude more head-strong and ungo­vernable.

Sect. 5. Thirdly, To permit different Sects of Religion in a Common-wealth, is only to keep up so many pretences and occasions for publick Disturbance; the Fa­ctions of Religion are ever the most se­ditious, and the less material their diffe­rence, the more implacable their ha­tred: as the Turks think it more accept­able to God, to kill one Persian than seventy Christians. No hinge so vehe­mently alienates mens affections, as va­riety of judgment in matters of Religion; here they cannot disagree, but they must [Page 156] quarrel too: and when Religion divides mens minds, no other Common Inte­rest can unite them; and where zeal dissolves friendship, the ties of Nature are not strong enough to reconcile it. Every Faction is at open defiance with every Faction, they are always in a state and posture of War, and engaged in a mortal and irreconcileable hatred against each other. When ever men part Com­munion, every Party must of necessity esteem the other impious and Heretical; in that they never divide but with pre­tences, that they could not agree with­out being guilty of some sin or other, as Blasphemy, or Idolatry, or Superstition, or Heresie, or the like: For all agree in this Principle, That peace ought always to be preserved, where it can without offending God, and offering violence to Conscience: and therefore they cannot but look upon one another, as lying un­der the Divine Wrath and Displeasure, and consequently, in a damnable condi­tion: and then are both Parties engaged, as they love God, and the Souls of men, to labour one another ruine. And when the Party is form'd, and men are listed into it by chance and Education, [Page 157] the distinguishing Opinion of the Party is to them the most material and funda­mental Article of their Belief; and so they must account of all that either dis­owne or deny it, as of Heathens, Infidels, and Enemies to the Faith. Besides that, all men are naturally more zealous about the Principles in which they differ, than about those in which they agree. Op­position whets and sharpens their zeal, because it endangers the truths they con­tend for; whereas those that are not op­posed are secure and out of hazard of being stifled by the adverse Party, that is concern'd equally with themselves for their preservation. And hence we see, by daily Experience, that men, who are tame and cool enough in the Fundamen­tals of Religion, are yet utterly impatient about their own unlearned and imperti­nent Wranglings, and lay a greater stress upon the Speculations of their own Sect, than upon the Duties of an absolute and indispensable necessity; only because those are contradicted by their Adver­saries, and these are not. Well then, seeing all dissenting Parties are possess'd with a furious and passionate zeal to pro­mote their own perswasions, and seeing [Page 158] they are perswaded that their zeal is in God's Cause, and against the Enemies of God's Truths; How vain is it to ex­pect Peace and Settlement in a Common-wealth, where their Religion keeps men in a state of War, where zeal is arm'd against zeal, and Conscience encounters Conscience, where the Glory of God and the Salvation of Souls lies at stake, and where Curse ye Meroz is the Word of both Parties? So that whatsoever projects fansiful men may propose to themselves, if we consider the passions of humane Nature, as long as Diffe­rences and Competitions in Religion are kept up, it will be impossible to keep down mutual hatreds, jealousies, and animosities; and so many divided Churches as there are in a State, there will ever be so many different Armies, who, though they are not always in a­ctual fighting, are always in a disposition to it.

Beside, where there are divided Inte­rests of Religion in the same Kingdom, how shall the Prince behave himself to­wards them? If he go about to ballance them against one another, this is the rea­dy way to forfeit his Interest in them all; [Page 159] and whilst he seems concern'd for no Party, no Party will be really concern'd for him, every one having so much e­steem for it self, as to think it ought to enjoy more of his favour and counte­nance than any other. And withal 'tis an infinite trouble and difficulty to poise them so equally, but that one Party shall grow more strong and numerous than the rest; and then there is no appeasing their zeal, till it has destroyed and swallowed up all the weaker Interests. But suppose he be able to manage them so prudently, as always to keep the ballance equal; he does thereby but keep up so many Par­ties, that are ready form'd to joyn with any emergent Quarrels of State: and whenever the Grandees fall out, 'tis but heading one of these, and there is an Ar­my. And let men but reflect upon all the late Civil Wars, and Rebellions of Chri­stendom, and then tell me, which way they could either have been commenced or continued, had it not been for different Factions of Religion.

If he side with one Party, and by his favour mount it above the rest, that not only discontents, but combines all the other dissenting Factions into an united [Page 160] opposition against his own: and it be­comes their common Interest, to work and contrive its ruine; its prosperity does but exasperate the competition of all its Rivals into rage and indignation: and as success makes it self more secure in its settlement, so it makes them more restless and industrious to overturn it. No Party can ever be quiet or content as long as 'tis under any other, but will ever be heaving and struggling, to dis­mount the Power that keeps it down: and therefore we find that all Dissenters from the establish'd frame of things are always assaulting it with open violence, or undermining it by secret practices, and will hazard the State, and all, to free themselves from oppression; and op­press'd they are, as long as they are the weaker Party. And therefore we never find this way of Toleration put in pra­ctice under any Government, but where other Exigences of State required and kept up a standing Army; and by this means 'tis not so difficult to prevent the Broils and Contentions of Zeal: but this is only a more violent way of go­verning mens Consciences, and instead of restraining them by Laws & Penalties, [Page 161] it does the same thing with Forts and Cittadels: So that unless we are willing to put our selves to the expence and ha­zard of keeping up standing Forces, in­dulgence to dissenting Zealots does but expose the State to the perpetual squab­bles and Wars of Religion. And we may as well suppose all men to be wise and honest, and upon that account can­cel all the Laws of Justice and Civil Go­vernment, as imagine, where there are divided Factions in Religion, that men will be temperate and peaceable in the enjoyment of their own conceits, and not disturb the publick Peace to pro­mote and establish them; when 'tis so well known from the experience of all Ages, that nothing has ever been a more effectual Engine to work popular Com­motions, than Changes and Reformati­ons in Religion.

Sect. 6. So that though the State think it self unconcern'd to restrain mens Per­swasions and Opinions, yet methinks they should be a little concern'd to pre­vent the Tumults and Disturbances that naturally arise from their propagation. And could it be secured, That if all men [Page 162] were indulged their liberty, they would use it modestly, and be satisfied with their own freedom, then (I confess) Toleration of all Opinions would not be of so fatal and dangerous consequence; as if all men were as wise and honest as Socrates, they might, as well as he, be their own Law, and left entirely to their own Liberty, as to all the entercourses and transactions of Humane life. But alas! this is made infinitely impossible, from the corrupt Passions and Humours of Men: All Sects ever were, and ever will be, fierce and unruly to inlarge their own Interests, invading or supplanting whatever opposes their increase, and will all certainly conspire the Ruine of that Party that prevails and triumphs over the rest; every Faction ever apprehend­ing it its due to be Supreme: and there will ever be a necessity of Reformation, as long as all Factions are not uppermost; and it will be crime enough in any one Party, to be superiour to another. So that if all our dissenting Sectaries were allowed their entire liberty, nothing can be expected (especially from people of their complexion) but that they should all plot together against the present Esta­blishment [Page 163] of the Church; every Combi­nation being fully perswaded of its worth­lesness in comparison to it self: for unless they had apprehended their own way more excellent, they had never divided from ours. Beside that 'tis a fundamental Principle that runs through all their Sects, That they are bound under pain of Eternal Damnation to la­bour their utmost to establish the Wor­ship of God in in its greatest Purity and Perfection; and withal apprehending that way now established by Law defe­ctive and superstitious, they cannot but be bound in Conscience to endeavour its utter ruine and subversion; which De­sign when they have once compassed, they entertaining the same Opinion of each other as they do of us, they will turn their Weapons upon themselves, and with as much Zeal contrive each others destruction as they did ours: and the result of all will be, That the Common-wealth will be eternally torn with inte­stine Quarrels and Commotions, till it grow so wise again as to suppress all Par­ties but one; that is, till it return to that wisdom and Prudence from whence it parted by Toleration.

[Page 164] And therefore nothing can be more vulgarly observable, than that though all Parties, whilst under the Power of a more prevailing interest, have cried up Toleration, as the most effectual instru­ment to shake and dissettle the present frame of things; yet have they no sooner effected their Design, than they have immediately put in to scramble for the Supremacy themselves; which if they once obtain, they have ever used with as much rigour and severity upon all Dissenters, as they ever felt themselves. So that this Principle of Liberty of Con­science much resembles that of commu­nity of Goods; for as those men cry up equality of Estates, as a most reasona­ble piece of Justice, that have but a small share themselves; yet whenever their Pretence succeeds, and they have ad­vanced their own Fortunes, and served their own turns, they are the first that shall then cry it down, and oppress their inferiours with more cruelty than ever themselves felt whilst in a lower Station; so do those whose private perswasi­ons happen to cross the publick Laws, easily pretend to Liberty of Conscience. One must yield; and because their stub­born [Page 165] Zeal scorns to bend to the Com­mands of Authority, these must be forced to give place to that: So that when Conscience and Authority happen to encounter, all the Dispute is, Which shall have most force in Publick Laws, whether my own or my Princes opinion? But how plausibly soever this Notion may be pleaded by men out of Power, 'tis ever laid aside as soon as ever they come into it; and the greatest pretend­ers to it when oppress'd, are always the greatest Zealots against it, as soon as it has mounted themselves into Power, as well knowing it to be the most effectual Engine to overturn any settled Frame of things.

In brief, 'Tis Reformation men would have, and not Indulgence; which they only seek to gain ground for the work­ing of their Mines, and planting of their Engines, to subvert the established state of things. For if we demand, where­fore they would be born with in their Dissentions from our way of Worship? They answer, Because they cannot con­form to it in Conscience, i. e. because they apprehend it sinful; for otherwise they must think themselves guilty of the [Page 166] most intollerable Schism and Rebellion, to create Factions and Divisions in a Common-wealth, when they may avoid it without any violence to their Consci­ences: But if they apprehend our way of Worship upon any account sinful, then are they plainly obliged in Conscience to root it out, as displeasing to Almighty God, and in its stead to plant and esta­blish their own. And now if this be the Issue of this Principle, let Magistrates consider how fatal and hazardous altera­tions in Religion have ever been to the Common-wealth. They cannot pluck a Pin out of the Church, but the State immediately shakes and totters; and if they will allow their Subjects the liberty of changing and innovating in Religion (as it is apparent from the Premisses they must, if they allow them their pretences to liberty of Conscience) they do but give them advantages for Eternal Popu­lar Commotions and Disturbances.

Sect. 7. Fourthly, A bare Indulgence of Men in the free exercise of any Religi­on, different from the publick profession, can lay no obligation upon the Party. Perhaps when the rigour of a Law, under [Page 167] which they have smarted a while, is at first relaxed, this indeed they may at present take for a kindness, because 'tis really a favour in comparison to their former Condition; and therefore as long as the memory of that remains fresh upon their minds, it may possibly affect them with some grateful Resentments. But alas! these affections quickly va­nish, and then what before was Favour, is now become Iustice; and their Prince did but restore them to their just and lawful rights, when he took off his Ty­rannical Laws and Impositions from the Consciences of his best Subjects. While those unjust Laws were in force, he op­press'd and persecuted the People of God; and therefore when he cancels them, all the kindness he is guilty of, is only to repent of his Tyranny and Perse­cution, which is no favour, and by con­sequence no Obligation. And (what is more considerable) all the dissenting Parties he permits, and does not coun­tenance, he disobliges. Is this all the kindness (say they) he can afford the Godly, not to persecute them by Law and force to their utter ruine? Are we beholden to him barely for suffering us [Page 168] to live in our native Soil, and enjoy on­ly our fundamental Priviledges? Is this all the reward and encouragement we deserve? Are not we the praying and se­rious People of the Nation, for whose sakes only the Lord is pleased to stay among us? And were it not for us, would he not perfectly forsake and aban­don it? And is this all our requital, to be thus slighted, and thus despised, only for our zeal to God, and serviceableness to the Publick, by that power and interest we have in him, to keep him among us; whilst vain and useless persons are coun­tenanced and encouraged with all places of Office and Employment? These are the natural results of the minds of men, who think themselves scorn'd and disre­spected, especially when flush'd with any conceit and high opinion of their own Godliness. And 'tis an eternal Truth, That for the godly Party not to be uppermost, is and ever will be Persecu­tion. For nothing more certain, than that all men entertain the best opinion of their own Party, otherwise they had ne­ver enrolled themselves in it: and there­fore if the State value them not at as high a rate as they do themselves, they are [Page 169] scorn'd and injured, because they have not that favour and countenance they deserve. And so unless they have Pub­lick encouragement, as well as indul­gence, they have reason to be discontent­ed, because they have not their due. And if the Prince do not espouse their Party, he undervalues, and consequent­ly disgusts them; and if he joyn him­self to any other (as there is a necessity of his owning some Profession) he does not only disoblige, but alienate their Af­fections, by embracing an Interest they both hate and scorn. For, where-ever there is difference of Religion, there is opposition too; because men would ne­ver divide from one another, but upon grounds of real dislike; and therefore they are always contrary in those Diffe­rences that distinguish their Parties. And this cannot but be a mighty endear­ment of their Prince to them, when he neglects and discountenances his best Subjects, only because they are the god­ly Party (for so every Party is to it self) to join himself to their profest and irre­concileable Enemies. And they will be wonderfully forward to assist a Patron of Idolatry and Superstition, or an Enemy [Page 170] to the power of godliness (for these are the softest words that different Sects can afford one another.) And withal I might adde, That they must needs be much in love with him, when they have reason to believe, that they lie perpetually under his displeasure, and that he looks upon them as little better than Enemies. So that if a Prince permit different Parties and interests of Religion in his Domini­ons, however he carries himself towards them, he shall have at least all Parties discontented but one: for if himself be of any, he displeases all but that; if of none, he displeases all: And Zealous and Religious People of all sorts must needs be wonderfully in love with an Atheist; and there is no remedy, but he must at least be thought so, if he be not of any distinct and visible profession.

[Page 174] Sect. 1. ALL things, as well Sacred as Civil, that are not already de­termined as to their Morality, i. e. that are not made necessary Duties by being commanded, or sinful Actions by being forbidden either by the Law of Nature, or positive Law of God, may be lawfully determined either way by the Supreme Authority; and the Conscience of every subject is tied to yield Obedience to all such Determinations. This Assertion I lay down to oppose the first and the last and the great Pretence of Non-conformity, and wherein (as one observeth) the very Mystery of Puritanism consisteth, viz. That nothing ought to be established in the Worship of God, but what is authori­zed by some Precept or Example in the Word of God; that is the complete and adequate Rule of Worship: and there­fore, Christian Magistrates are only to see that executed that Christ has appointed in Religion, but to bring in nothing of their own; they are tied up neither to add nor diminish, neither in the matter nor manner: So that whatever they injoin in Divine Wor­ship, [Page 175] if it be not expresly warranted by a Divine Command, how innocent soe­ver it may be in it self, it presently upon that account loses not only its Liberty but its Lawfulness; it being as requisite to Christian practice, that things indiffe­rent should still be kept indifferent, as things necessary be held necessary. This very Principle is the only Fountain and Foundation of all Puritanism, from which it was at first derived, and into which it is at last resolved. A pretence so strangely wild and humorsom, that it is to me an equal wonder, either that they should be so absurd as seriously to believe it; or, if they do not, that they should be so impudent, as thus long and thus confidently to pretend it, when it has not the least shadow of Foundation either from Reason or from Scripture; and was scarce ever so much as thought of, till some men having made an unrea­sonable Separation from the Church of England, were forced to justifie them­selves by as unreasonable Pretences. For, what can be more incredible, than that things that were before lawful and in­nocent, should become sinful upon no other score than their being commanded, [Page 176] i. e. that meer obedience to lawful Au­thority should make innocent actions criminal? For the matter of the Law is supposed of it self indifferent; and therefore if obedience to the Law be unlawful, it can be so for no other rea­son than because 'tis Obedience. So that if Christian Liberty be so awkard a thing (as these men make it) 'tis no­thing else but Christian Rebellion, 'tis a Duty that binds men to disobedience, and forbids things under that formality, because Authority commands them. Now what a reproach to the Gospel is this, that it should be made the only Plea for Sedition? What a scandal to Religion, that tenderness of Conscience should be made the only Principle of Disobedience; and that nothing should so much incline men to be refractory to Authority, as their being conscientious? What a perverse folly is it to imagine, That nothing but opposition to Govern­ment can secure our liberty? And what a cross-grain'd thing is it, to restrain things only because they are matters of liberty; and first to forbid Princes to command them because they are law­ful, and then Subjects to do them only [Page 177] because they are commanded. But to expose the absurdity of this Principle by some more particular considerations.

§2. First, The follies and mischiefs that issue from it, are so infinite, that there can be no setled Frame of things in the World, that it will not overturn: and if it be admitted to all intents and purposes, there can never be an end of disturbances, and alterations in the Church; in that there never was, nor ever can be any Form of Worship in the World, that is to all circumstances pre­scribed in the World of God: and there­fore if this Exception be thought suffi­cient to destroy one, there is no re­medy but it may, as occasion requires, serve as well to cashier all; and by con­sequence take away all possibility of set­tlement. Thus when upon this Principle, the Disciplinarians separated from the Church of England, the Independents upon the same ground separated from them, the Anabaptists from the Inde­pendents, the Familists from the Anaba­ptists, and the Quakers from the Fami­lists, and every Faction divided, and subdivided among themselves into innu­merable [Page 178] Sects, and Undersects; and as long as men act up to it, there is no re­medy, but Innovations must be endless. If it be urged against Lord-Bishops, 'tis as severe against Lay-Presbyters; if a­gainst Musick in Churches, then farewel singing of Psalms in Rhime; if against the Cross, why not against sprinkling in Baptism? and if against Cathedral Churches, then down go all Steeple-Houses: If against one thing, then against every thing; and there is nothing in the exteriour parts of Religion, but the two Sacraments, that can possibly escape its impeachment. All the pious Villanies, that have ever disturbed the Christian World, have shelter'd them­selves in this grand Maxime, that Ie­sus Christ is the only Law-maker to his Church; and whoever takes upon him­self to prescribe any thing in Religion, in­vades his Kingly Office. The Gnosticks of old so abused this pretence to justifie any seditious and licentious practices, that they made Heathen Princes look upon Christianity as an Enemy to Govern­ment; and the Fanaticks of late have so vex'd and embroil'd Christendom with the same Principle, that Christian Princes [Page 179] themselves begin to be of the same perswasion. 'Tis become the only Patron and Pretext of Sedition: and when any Subjects have a mind to set themselves free from the Laws of their Prince, they can never want this pretence to warrant their disobedience. Seeing there is no Nation in the World that has not divers Laws, that are not recorded by the four Evangelists; and therefore if all humane Institutions intrench upon our Saviours Kingly Prerogative, they are, and ever must be, provided with matters of quar­rel to disturb Government, and justifie Rebellion.

§ 3. Secondly, Nay further this fond pretence, if made use of to all the ends, for which it might as wisely serve, would cancel all humane Laws, and make most of the divine Laws useless; which have only described the general Lines of Du­ty, but left their particular determinati­ons to the Wisdom of humane Laws. Now the Laws of God cannot be put in practice, but in particular Cases and Circumstances, these cannot be deter­min'd but by the Laws of man; there­fore if he can command nothing, but [Page 180] what is already prescribed to us in the Word of God, he can have no power to see the Divine Laws put in Execution. For where are described all the Rules of Justice and Honesty? Where are deter­mined all doubts and questions of Consci­ence? Where are decided all Controver­sies of Right and Wrong? Where are recorded all the Laws of Government and Policy? Why therefore should hu­mane Authority be allowed to interpose in these great affairs, and yet be denied it in the Customs of Churches and Rules of Decency? There is no possible reason to be assign'd but their own humour and fond opinion, they are resolved to be­lieve it, and that is Argument enough, for 'tis unanswerable. How comes this Proposition to be now limited to matters of meer Religion, but only because this serves their turn; for otherwise, Why are not the Holy Scriptures as perfect a Rule of Civil, as of Ecclesiastical Poli­cy? Why should they not be as com­plete a System of Ethicks, as they are a Canon of Worship? Why do not these men require from the Scriptures express Commands for every Action they do in common life? How dare they take any [Page 181] Physick, but what is prescribed in the Word of God? How dare they com­mence a Suit at Law, without Warranty from Scripture? How dare they do any natural action, without particular advice and direction of Holy Writ?

§ 4. Thirdly, But as foolish as this Opinion is, its mischief equals its folly; for 'tis impossible but that these Sons of strife and singularity must have been troublesom and seditious in all Churches and Common-wealths. Had they lived under the Jewish Church, why then, Where has Moses command­ed the Feast of Purim, the Feast of the Dedication, the Fasts of the fourth, the fifth, the seventh, and the tenth months: What Warrant for the building of Sy­nagogues? and what Command for that significant Ceremony of wearing sack-cloth and ashes, in token of Humilia­tion? If in the primitive Ages of Chri­stianity, why then, where did our Saviour appoint the Love-Feasts? Where has he instituted the Kiss of Charity? Where has he commanded the observations of Lent and Easter? Where the Lords-Day Sabbath? and, where all their other [Page 182] Commemorative Festivals? Vide Ter­tull. de Coronâ, c. 3.

Will they retreat to the Lutheran Churches, they will there meet with not only all the same, but many more Anti­christian and superstitious Ceremonies to offend their tender Consciences, and will find themselves subject to the same Discipline and Government, saving that their Superintendents want the Anti­christian Honours and Revenues of the English Bishops, partly through the po­verty of the Country, partly through the injury of Sacriledge, but mainly be­cause the Church Revenues are in the possession of Romish Bishops? Will they to France, there, notwithstanding the unsetled state of the Protestants of that Nation, through want of the assi­stance of the Civil Power, they shall meet with their Liturgies, and establisht Forms of Prayer, and Change of Appa­rel for Divine Service, as well as at home? If they will to Geneva, there Mr. Calvin's Common-Prayer-Book is as much imposed, as the Liturgy of the Church of England; there they are en­joyn'd the use of Wafer-Cakes, the Cu­stom of Godfathers, and Godmothers, [Page 183] bidding of Prayer, proper Psalms not only for days, but for hours of the day, with divers other Rites and Ceremonies, that are no where recorded in the Word of God. In a word, What Church in the World can affirm these were the only Customs of the Apostolical Age, and that the Primitive Church never used more or less than these? So that these men of scruple, that renounce Commu­nion with the Church of England, must do the same with all Churches in the World; in that there is not any one Church in Christendom, whose Laws and Customs are not apparently liable either to the same, or as great exceptions. Now Magistrates must needs be obligd to deal wonderful gently with such tender Consciences as these, that are acted by such nice and unhappy Principles, as must force them to be troublesom and un­peaceable in any Common-wealth in the World. Nay, what is more notorious than all this, these men have all along, in pursuit of this Principle, run directly counter to their own practices and per­swasions. For, not to puzzle them to dis­cover in which of the Gospels is injoyn'd the form of Publick Penance in the Kirk [Page 184] of Scotland, or to find out the Stool of Repentance either among the works of Bezaleel, or the Furniture of the Tem­ple; We read indeed of Beesoms, and Flesh-forks, and Pots, and Shovels, and Candlesticks, but not one syllable of Joynt-stools. Let them tell me, What Precept or Example they have in the Holy Scriptures for singing Psalms in Meeter? Where has our Saviour or his Apostles enjoyn'd a Directory for publick Worship? And that which themselves imposed, What Divine Authority can it challenge, beside that of an Ordinance of Lords and Commons? What Pre­cept in the Word of God can they pro­duce for the significant Form of swear­ing (by laying their hand upon the Bible) which yet they never scrupled? What Scripture Command have they for the three significant Ceremonies of the so­lemn League and Covenant, viz. That the whole Congregation should take it (1.) Uncovered, (2.) Standing, (3.) with their right hand lift up bare. Now, What a prodigious piece of impudence was this, that when they had not only written so many Books with so much vehemence against three innocent Cere­monies [Page 185] of the Church, only because they were significant, but had also invol­ved the Nation in a civil War (in a great measure) for their removal, and had arm'd themselves and their Party against their Sovereign with this Holy League of Rebellion, that even then they should impose three others, so grosly and so ap­parently liable to all their own Objecti­ons? What clearer evidence can we pos­sibly have, That it is not Conscience, but humour and peevishness that dictates their scruples? And, What instance have we, in any Nation of the World, of any Schism and Faction so unreasonably be­gun and continued? The Rebellion of Corah indeed may resemble, but nothing can equal it.

And from hence we may discover, how vain a thing it is to make Proposals and Condescensions to such unreasonable men, when 'tis so impossible to satisfie all their demands; and suppose we should yield and deliver up to their zeal, those harmless Ceremonies, they have so long worried with so much fury and impatience; it would only cherish them in their restless and ungovernable per­swasions: For whilst their peevish tem­pers [Page 186] are acted by this exorbitant Princi­ple, the Affairs of Religion can never be so setled, as to take away all occasions and pretences of Quarrel; in that there never can be any Circumstances of Reli­gious Worship, against which this Prin­ciple may not as rationally be urged (and 'tis impossible to perform Religious Worship without some Circumstance or other: and if all men make not use of it against all particulars, 'tis because they are humoursom as well as sediti­ous, and so allow one thing upon the same Principle they disavow another: For certainly otherwise it were impossi­ble, that any men should, when they pray, refuse to wear a Surplice; and yet when they swear, (which is but another sort of Divine Worship) never scruple to kiss the Gospel. So that whoever seriously imbibes this perswasion, and upon that account withdraws himself from the Communion of the Church, he under­stands not the consequences of his Opi­nion; if it does not lead him down to the lowest folly of Quakerism, which after divers gradual exorbitances of other less extravagant Sects, was but the last and utmost improvement of this Prin­ciple. [Page 187] And therefore, whilst men are pos­sess'd with such a restless and untoward perswasion, What can be more apparent­ly vain, than to talk of Accommodati­ons, or to hope for any possibility of quiet and setlement, till Authority shall see it necessary (as it will first or last) to scourge them into better man­ners, and wiser opinions? So that we see the weight of the Controversie lies not so much in the particular matters in debate, as in the Principles upon which 'tis managed; and for this very reason, though we are not so fond as to believe the Constitutions of the Church unalte­rable, yet we deem it apparently absurd, to forego any of her establish'd Ceremo­nies out of compliance with these mens unreasonable demands: which as it would be coarsly impolitick upon di­vers other accounts, so mainly by yield­ing up her Laws, and by consequence submitting her Authority to such Princi­ples as must be eternal and invincible hindrances of Peace and Setlement. This, let them consider whom it most concerns.

§ 5. Fourthly, As for their Principle [Page 188] of the perfection and sufficiency of the Holy Scriptures, 'tis undeniably certain as to the fundamental Truths, and sub­stantial Duties of Christian Religion; but when this Rule, that is suited only to things necessary, is as confidently appli­ed to things accessory, it lays in the minds of men impregnable Principles of Folly and Superstition: For confounding them in their different apprehensions between the substantial Duties, and external Circumstances of Religion; and making them of equal value and necessity, it makes the doing, or not doing of a thing, necessary to procure the Divine acceptance, which God himself has not made so; and places a Religion in things that are not religious, and possesseth the minds of men with false and ground­less fears of God: wherein consisteth the very Essence and Formality of Supersti­tion. Whereas were they duly instructed in the great difference between things absolutely necessary, and things meerly decent, and circumstantial; this would not only preserve them in the right No­tions of good and evil, but also keep up the Purity of Religion, Decency of Worship, and due Reverence of Autho­rity. [Page 189] And therefore when these men would punctually tye up the Magistrate to add nothing to the Worship of God, but what is enjoyn'd in the Word of God, if their meaning be of new Articles of Belief, 'tis notoriously impertinent; be­cause to this no Civil Magistrate pre­tends; But if their meaning be, that the Magistrate has no Authority to deter­mine the particular circumstances of Re­ligion, that are left undetermined by the Divine Law, 'tis then indeed to the pur­pose, but as notoriously false; in that we are certainly bound to obey him in all things lawful, and every thing is so, that is not made unlawful by some prohibition; for things become evil not upon the score of their being not commanded, but upon that of their being forbidden; and what the Scripture forbids not, it allows; and what it allows, is not unlawful; and what is not unlawful, may lawfully be done: and therefore it must needs be our Duty to conform to all circumstances of Worship, that are determined by lawful Authority, if they are not antecedently forbidden by the Law of God, though they are not commanded. Things that are not determined remain indifferent; [Page 190] what is indifferent is lawful, and what is lawful the Magistrate may lawfully com­mand; and if it be sinful to obey him in these things, 'tis so to obey him at all; for all things are either lawful or unlaw­ful: 'tis a sin to obey him in things un­lawful, and if it be so in things lawful too, then is all obedience sinful.

§ 6. Fifthly, When they tell us, That the Civil Magistrate is indeed to see to the execution of the Laws of Christ, but to make none of his own: 'tis a distin­ction without a difference; for if he may provide for the execution of the Laws of Religion, then may he make Laws that they shall be executed; this being the most proper and effectual means to promote their execution: so that no­thing can be more vain than to deny the Civil Magistrate a power of making Laws in Religion, and yet to allow him an Authority to see the Laws of Religion executed; because that is so apparently implyed in this, in that whoever has a power to see that Laws be executed, cannot be without a power to command their execution: Especially if we con­sider the particular Nature of the Laws [Page 191] of Christ, that they have only determi­ned the substance and Morality of religi­ous Worship, and therefore must needs have left the ordering of its circumstan­ces to the power and wisdom of lawful Authority; & whatever they determine about them, is but in order to the execu­tion of the Laws of God; in that what­ever they enjoyn cannot be put in pra­ctice, without being clothed with some particular circumstances, and reduced to some particular Cases. Thus when the Holy Apostle sets us down a general Rule, that all things be done in order and decency, without determining what the things are that are conducive to it, the determination of this Rule when 'tis reduced to practice, must be entirely left to the Government of the Church, that must judge what things are decent and orderly; and what Laws it establishes in order to it, though they are but further pursuances of the Apostolical Precept, yet are they new and distinct Com­mands by themselves, and injoyn some­thing, that the Scripture no where com­mands. So that the Divine Laws being general, and general Laws not being to be put in Execution, but in particular [Page 192] Cases and Instances, he that has Autho­rity to look to the Execution of these general Laws, must withal be vested with a Power to determine with what particular Instances, Cases, and Circum­stances they shall be put in Practice and Execution.

And here when they tell us, that it can­not stand with the Love and Wisdom of God, not to take order himself for all things that immediately concern his own Worship and Kingdom; and that if Ie­sus Christ has not determined all parti­cular Rites and Circumstances of Religi­on, he has discharged his office with less wisdom and fidelity than Moses; who ordered every thing appertaining to the Worship of God, even as far as the Pins and Nails of the Tabernacle, with divers others the like idle and imperti­nent reasonings: One would think that men who argue at this rate, had al­ready at least discovered in the Holy Scriptures a complete Form of Religious Worship, as to all particular Rites and Ceremonies of an eternal, universal, and unchangeable obligation; and therefore till they can believe this them­selves, and prove it to others, instead of [Page 193] returning solemn Answers to such baffled and intolerable Impertinencies, I shall only advise them, to consider the unlucky consequents of their way of arguing, when instead of producing a particular Form of Publick Worship, prescribed by God himself, they with their wonted modesty prove he ought to have done it; and that unless he has done it, he has been defective in his Care & Providence over his Church: For what can the Issue of this be, but that God is chargeable with want of Wisdom or Goodness, or with some other Defect, even by certain and infallible Experience? For, if he has not determined every particular Circum­stance of Worship, then he must stand charged with all the absurdities, they ob­ject against their being left undetermin­ed; and therefore if no such prescribed form can be produced, (as 'tis infinitely certain none ever can) then let them con­sider, what follows▪ So unhappy a thing is it, when men will needs be disputing a­gainst Experience; whose Evidence is so powerful and forcible upon the minds of men, that Demonstration it self is not strong enough to cope with it: How much less the weak and puny Ar­guments, [Page 194] wherewith these men assault it?

Sect. 7. Sixthly, There is no particular Action but what is capable of a strange and unaccountable variety of Circum­stances, nor any part of outward Wor­ship but may be done after a thousand different Modes and Fashions; in that as every action is clothed with natural and emergent Circumstances, so is every Cir­cumstance with its Circumstances, every one of which may be modified in sundry ways and manners. And therefore, in this infinite variety of things, the Laws of God prescribe only the general Lines of Duty, and rarely descend to their parti­cular Determinations, but leave them to be determined by Prudence and Discre­tion, by Choice, and Custom, by Laws, and Prescriptions, and by all those ways by which Humane Affairs are governed and transacted. Thus for example, The Divine Law has made Charity a standing and eternal Duty, but has left its particu­lar way of expression undetermined, and uncommanded: and 'tis indifferent whe­ther it be done by building of Colledges, or Churches, or Hospitals; by repairing [Page 195] of Bridges, or Rivers, or High-ways; by redeeming of Slaves and Prisoners; by hospitality to the Poor, or Provision for Orphans; or by any other way of Pub­lick or Private Bounty: and when a man's own thoughts have determined his own choice to one or more of these Particu­lars, even that is vested with a strange number of Accidents and Circumstan­ces, which must of necessity be left en­tirely to the conduct of his own Reason and Discretion. And the case is the same, as in all other Duties of Moral Virtue; so in that of religious gratitude, or Di­vine Worship, this Duty it self is of a natural and essential necessity; but yet may and must be performed with an un­conceivable variety of Dresses, Customs and ways of Expression, that are left ut­terly free and undetermined in Scripture: any of which may be decently used, pro­vided they do not make debasing repre­sentations of God, wherein consists the proper folly of Idolatry and Superstiti­on. And all the advantages of Order and Solemnity, wherewith Religion may be prudently adorned, are not only lawful, but decent, although they are not warranted by any Precept in the [Page 196] Word of God; that neither has, nor in­deed can determine all particular Modes and Circumstances of Worship, they are so various, and so changeable. And men may, with as much reason, search the holy Records for the Methods of Le­gal Proceedings in our Common Law Courts, as for particular Rubricks and Prescriptions of all outward Forms and Circumstances of Publick Worship: So that what these men demand is so unrea­sonable, that, considering the nature of things, 'tis impossible.

Sect. 8. And this may suffice to demon­strate the unparallel'd follies and mis­chiefs of this Principle. Which being all I intend at present, I suppose it needless to engage in any further Scholastick Di­sputes, about the nature of indifferent Actions, and some other less material Controversies that depend upon this; partly because this Principle on which alone they stand, being removed, they become utterly groundless, and so by its Confutation are sufficiently confuted; and partly because all this has been so often, so fully, and so infinitely performed already. And of all the Controversies [Page 197] that have ever been started in the world, it will be hard to find any that have been more fairly pursued and satisfactorily decided, than this of the Church of Eng­land, against its Puritan Adversaries; that has all along been nothing else but a Di­spute between Rational Learning, and Unreasonable Zeal. And it has been no less an unhappiness, than it was a Con­descension in the Defenders of our Church; that they have been forced to waste their time and their parts, in baf­fling the idle Cavils of a few hot-headed and Brain-sick People. And there is scarce a greater Instance of the unreasonableness of Mankind, than these mens Folly, in persisting so obstinately in their old and pitiful Clamours, after they have been so convincingly answered, and so de­monstratively confuted. And indeed how is it possible to satisfie such unreasonable men, when their greatest Exception against the Constitutions of the Church has ever been no other than, That they were the Churches Constitutions? Inso­much, that if Authority should think good out of compliance with their cross Demands, to command what they now think necessary, that must then, ac­cording [Page 198] to their Principles, become un­lawful: because (forsooth) where they take away the liberty of an Action, they destroy its lawfulness. Now what pos­sibly could have betrayed men into so absurd a Perswasion, but a stubborn Re­solution to be refractory to all Authority, and to be subject to nothing but their own insolent Humours? And as long as they lie under the power of this Perswa­sion, that they are obliged in Conscience to act contrary to whatever their Superi­ours command them in the Worship of God, the Magistrate has no other way left to decoy them into Obedience, but by forbidding what he would have them do, and commanding what he would have them forbear; and then if he will accept to be obeyed by disobedience, he shall find them (good men) the most obe­dient Subjects in the world.

Sect. 9. But to return to what I was saying, instead of troubling my self with any further Confutation of so baffled a Cause, I shall rather chuse to do it more briefly, and yet perhaps more ef­fectually, by uybraiding them with their shameful Overthrows, and daring [Page 199] them but to look those Enemies in the face, that have so lamentably cowed them by so many absolute Triumphs and Victories: And, not to mention divers other Learned and Excellent Persons, I shall only single out that famous Cham­pion of our Church, Mr. Hooker; upon him let them try their Courage (though by so safe a Challenge I do but give proof of my own Cowardise.) How long has his incomparable Book of Ecclesiastical Polity bid shameful defiance to the whole Party, and yet never found any so hardy as to venture upon an Encounter? Now this Author being confessedly a Person of so much Learning, Candour, Judg­ment, and Ingenuity, and withal so highly prized, and insisted upon by the regular and obedient Sons of the Church, that they have in a manner cast the issue of the whole Cause upon his performance: What is the Reason he was never vouchsafed so much as the at­tempt of a just Reply? 'Tis apparent e­nough both by their Writings, and their Actions, that they have not wanted Zeal; and therefore that he has escaped so long free from all contradiction, 'tis not for want of good will, but ability; not [Page 200] because they would not, but because they were convinced they could not con­fute him. So that the Book it self is as full and demonstrative a Confutation of their Cause, as the matters contained in it; i. e. 'tis Unanswerable, (and I know nothing can do it more effectually, un­less perhaps a Reply to it) and shall live an eternal shame and reproach to their Cause, when that is dead; and would probably have been buried in utter for­getfulness, were it not for this Trophy of success against them: And therefore, until they can at least pretend to have re­turned some satisfactory Answer to that Discourse, they prove nothing but their own impudence; whilst they continually pelt us with their Pamphlets, and such little Exceptions, that have been so long since so shamefully and demonstratively baffled.

Sect. 10. And whereas they are wont, in order to the making their Principles look more plausibly, to stuff their Discourses with frequent and tragical Declamati­ons against Popery, Will-worship, Su­perstition, &c. I cannot perswade my self, 'tis worth the labour to wipe off such [Page 201] idle reproaches, by solemnly discoursing these matters; both because this has been so frequently and fully performed already, and because, though these out­cries have been made use of to affright silly People; yet few, if any of their Ring-leaders are still so fond either to own this Charge against us, or to plead it in their own Justification. Only I can­not but observe of all these and the like Pretences, that we need not any stronger Arguments against themselves, than their own Objections against us. For if in this Case there be any Superstition, 'tis they that are guilty of it: For this Vice con­sists not so much in the nature of things, as in the apprehensions of men, when their minds are possessed with weak and unworthy conceits of God. Now he that conforms to the received Customs and Ceremonies of a Church, does it not so much upon the account of any in­trinsick value of the things themselves, as out of a sense of the necessity of Or­der, and of the Duty of Obedience: whereas he that scrupulously refuses to Use and Practise them, takes a wrong estimate of the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, and imagines that God judges [Page 202] his Creatures by nice and pettish Laws, and lays a greater stress upon a doubtful or indifferent Ceremony, than upon the great Duty of Obedience, and the peace and tranquillity of the Church. So that the Principles upon which we proceed, are no other, than, That, as the Divine Law has prescribed the Substantial Du­ties of Religion; so it has left its Modes and Circumstances undetermined: but because every action must be done some way or other, and be vested with some Circumstances or other; and because the generality of men are not so apt to be abused with fantastick and ridiculous conceits in any thing, as in matters of Religion; therefore we think it necessa­ry, for the prevention of all the follies & indecencies, that ignorance and super­stitious Zeal would introduce into the Worship of God, That the Publick Laws should determine some Circum­stances of Order and Decency; which have at least this Advantage, that they provide against the mischiefs of Disor­der and Confusion: and therefore we place no antecedent necessity in any of the particular Rites and Ceremonies of our Church, but only think it highly [Page 203] convenient, if not absolutely necessary, that some be prescribed; that there is an handsomness and beauty in these that are prescribed: and therefore, because 'tis necessary that some be determined, and because these are, rather than divers others, already settled, we think they have an indispensable necessity superin­duced upon them, consequent to the de­terminations of Authority. No man af­firms, That we cannot serve God ac­ceptably without a Surplice; but yet, be­cause 'tis but requisite that Publick Worship should be performed with beauty and solemnity; and because the use of this Vestment is but handsom and beautiful, and prevents slovenliness and indecency, 'tis but agreeable that it should be injoin'd, as any other decent Habit might have been: and when this is singled out by Authority, it then becomes consequentially necessary: Whereas those, who forbid things in­different as sinful, and lay obligations upon mens Consciences, to abstain from what is innocent, and make that neces­sary not to be done, which God has left at liberty, and made lawful to be done; usurp upon mens Consciences, [Page 204] by imposing Fetters on them, where God has left them free, and become guilty of the most palpable piece of Su­perstition, by teaching their own Prohi­bitions for Doctrines; and so making it a necessary Duty, and part of Divine Worship, to abstain from what God has no where forbidden; and making it a mortal and damnable Sin, to do what is innocent; and supposing that God will, or at least justly may, inflict eternal Tor­ments upon men, for making their Ad­dresses to him, rather in a cleanly White Vestment, than in a Taylors Cloak, or perhaps in Mechanical Querpo.

Sect. II. And then as for their out-cry against Will-worship, 'tis the very same with that against Superstition; for 'tis one sort of it, and is criminal no farther than 'tis superstitious. Now when they exclaim against Superstition, they mean only that part of it that consists in Will-worship, and when against Will-wor­ship, 'tis only as 'tis a Branch of Super­stition: So that these two impertinent Clamours signifie but the same thing under different Denominations, and so amount but to one. But however this is [Page 205] 'tis certain, that Will-worship consists in nothing else than in mens making their own fancies and inventions necessary parts of Religion, whereby they make that requisite to procure the Divine ac­ceptance, that God has no where requi­red; and 'tis the same thing whether this be done by Injunctions or Prohibiti­ons: and they that affirm the doing or not doing of an Action which God has no where either commanded or forbid­den to be necessary Duties, are equally guilty of this Crime: And therefore if these men make it necessary to forbear what God has no where forbidden, they teach their own fancies for Doctrines, and impose something as a part of the service of God, on their own, and other mens Consciences, that the Law of God has not imposed; and withal so unwor­thily mis-represent the Divine Wisdom and Goodness, as to labour to make the world believe, That God has such an abhorrency to a thing so innocent as a White Garment, That, to worship him in it, is sufficient to bring us under his everlasting Wrath and Displeasure; for every thing that is sinful, is as well in their, as our, esteem mortal & damnable.

[Page 206] But then, as for our own parts, they cannot be more apparently guilty of this piece of folly, then we are clear and innocent from its very suspicion; be­cause all Rituals, and Ceremonies, and Postures, and manners of performing the outward Expressions of Devotion, are not in their own nature capable of being parts of Religion; and therefore unless we used and imposed them as such, 'tis lamentably precarious to charge the determination of them with Will-worship; because that consists in making those things Parts of Religion, that God has not made so. So that when the Church expresly declares a­gainst this use of them, and only in­joins them as meer Circumstances of Religious Worship, 'tis apparent that it cannot by imposing them, make any additions to the Worship of God, but only provides, That what God has requi­red, be performed in a decent and order­ly manner.

Sect. 12. And then as for Christian Li­berty, Why should we suffer them so far to invade ours, as to renounce those things as criminal, which we believe to be in­nocent? [Page 207] And if things indifferent when injoin'd lose not only their liberty, but their lawfulness; then why not when forbidden, and that by an incompetent Authority? when our Superiours im­pose Rules of Decency, and Law of Dis­cipline, they do not infringe our Christi­an Liberty; because they do not abolish the indifferency of things themselves, wherein alone it consisteth: and though they become thereby necessary Duties, 'tis not from the nature and necessity of the thing it self, but from the Obligati­ons of Obedience, or some emergent Reasons of Order and Decency: where­as nothing can be more plain, than that these men do not only abridge our Li­berty, but also lay insolent confine­ments upon the Supreme Power, by ma­king things indifferent so absolutely un­lawful, that they will not allow the just Commands of lawful Authority suffici­ent to make them cease to be sinful. How oft, and how plainly have they been told, that, when Authority injoins things left indifferent, and undetermined by the Word of God, 'tis so far from incroaching upon our Christian Liberty, that it rather confirms it? In that this [Page 208] supposes that the things themselves may, or may not be either done or enjoined, according to the dictates of Prudence and Discretion; but when they are once determined by publick Laws, though the matter of the Law be indifferent, yet Obedience to it is not. Whereas when they will not permit their Governours to injoin these things, and if they do, will not obey their injunctions, do they not apparently intrench upon our Liberty, by making what Christ has left indiffe­rent, necessary; and, under pretences of asserting their Christian Liberty, take upon them to confine the rights of Au­thority? But to all this, as evident as it is, nothing can make them attend; but they still deafly proceed in their old Cla­mours: which is too clear an Argument, that 'tis not Reason that dictates their Exceptions, but humour, prejudice, and peevishness.

Sect. 13. And then as for their Decla­mations against adding to the Law of God, to be short, I appeal to the Reason of all mankind, whether any men in the World are more notoriously guilty of unwarrantable Additions than these, [Page 209] who forbid those things as sinful, and consequently under pain of Damnation, which the Law of God has no where for­bidden? What is it to teach the Com­mandments of men for Doctrines, but to teach those things to be the Law of God that are not so? And, What can more charge the Divine Law of Imper­fection, than to teach that a man may perform all that it has commanded, and yet perish for not doing something, that it has not commanded? And so do they, who make it necessary not to do some­thing that God has left indifferent. Whereas nothing can be more Unreason­able than to tax the Church of making Additions to the Law of God, because all her Laws are imposed, not as Laws of God, but as Laws of men, and so are not more liable to this Charge than Iustinian's Institutes, and Littleton's Te­nures.

And then in the last place, as for their noise against Popery, (a term, that, as well as some other angry words, signifies any thing that some men dislike) I shall say no more, than, that we have most rea­son to raise this out-cry, when they take upon themselves (as well as the old Gen­tleman [Page 210] at Rome) to controul the Laws of the Secular Powers. And what do they, but set up a Pope in every mans Con­science, whilst they vest it with a Power of countermanding the Decrees of Prin­ces? These things cannot but appear with an undeniable evidence to any man, that is not invincibly either ignorant, or wil­ful, or both: and therefore 'tis time they should, at least for shame, if they will not for Conscience, cease to disturb the Church with Clamour, and Exceptions so miserably impertinent, that I blush for having thus far pursued them with a seri­ous Confutation. And therefore leaving them and their impertinencies together, (for I despair of ever seeing these old and dear Acquaintances parted) I shall now address my self to clear off one more material and more plausible Obje­ction, and so conclude this particular. And 'tis this.

Sect. 14. 'Tis possible, the Magistrate may be deceived in his Determinations, and establish a Worship that is in its own nature sinful and superstitious; in which case (if what I contend for be true) all his Subjects must either be Re­bels, [Page 211] or Idolaters: if they obey, they sin against God; if they disobey, they sin against their Sovereign. This is the last Issue of all that is objected in this Controversie, and the only Argument that gives gloss and colour to all their other trifling pretences: And yet 'tis no more than what may be as fairly objected against all Government of Moral and Po­litical Affairs; for there 'tis as possible, that the Supreme Power may be mista­ken in its Judgment of good and evil; and yet no man will deny the Civil Pow­er of Princes, because they are fallible, and may perhaps abuse it. And yet in this alone lies all the strength of this Objecti­on against their Ecclesiastical Jurisdicti­on, because forsooth, 'tis possible they may erre, and manage it to evil purposes. But whatever force it carries in it, it ra­ther strikes at the Divine Providence, than my Assertion, and charges that of being defective in making sufficient Provisions for the due Government of mankind, in that it has not set over us infallible Judg­es and Governours: For unless all Ma­gistrates be guided by an unerring Spirit, 'tis possible they may act against the ends of their Institution; and if this be a [Page 212] sufficient Objection against their Autho­rity, it must of necessity overthrow the Power of all fallible Judicatures, and make Governours as incompetent Judges in matters of Morality and Controver­sies of right and wrong, as in Articles of Faith and Religion. And therefore our Enquiry is, to find out the best way of set­ling the world, that the state of things is capable of: If indeed mankind were in­fallible, this Controversie were at an end; but seeing that all men are liable to Errors and Mistakes, and seeing there is an absolute necessity of a Supreme Power in all Publick Affairs, our Questi­on (I say) is, What is the most prudent, and expedient way of setling them; not that possibly might be, but that really is? And this (as I have already sufficiently proved) is, to devolve their management on the Supreme Civil Power; which though it may be imperfect and liable to Errors and Mistakes, yet 'tis the least so, and is a much better way to attain Pub­lick Peace and Tranquillity, than if they were entirely left to the ignorance and folly of every private man, which must of necessity be pregnant with all manner of Mischiefs and Confusions. So that [Page 213] this method, I have assign'd, being com­paratively the best way of Government of all Ecclesiastical, as well as Civil Af­fairs, is not to be rejected, because 'tis lia­ble to some inconveniences; but rather to be embraced above all others, because 'tis liable to incomparably the fewest. And if it so happen, that some private persons suffer wrong from this method of proceeding, yet this private injury has an ample Compensation from the Pub­lick benefit that arises from it; and when it so falls out that either the whole Society, or one individual must suffer, 'tis easie to determine, that better one honest man perish, than a million. The inconveniences of a bad Government are inconsiderable, in comparison to Anar­chy and Confusion; and the evils, that fall upon particular men from its unskil­ful or irregular Administration, are vastly too little to weigh against the necessity of its institution.

Sect. 15. And upon this Principle stands the necessity of subjection and obedi­ence to all Authority, in that, though its ill management may happen to bring many and great inconveniences upon the [Page 214] Publick; yet they cannot equal the mis­chiefs of that Confusion which must ne­cessarily arise, if Subjects are warranted to disobey, or resist Government, when­ever they shall apprehend 'tis ill admi­nistred. Perhaps never any Govern­ment was so good, as to be administred with exact Justice and Equity, nor any Governour so wise, as not to be charge­able with faults and miscarriages; and therefore if upon every quarrel every wise or honest man can pick against the Laws of the Common-wealth, he may lawfully withdraw his obedience, What can follow but a certain and unavoidable dissolution of Government, when every man will be commanded by nothing, but his own Perswasions, that is himself? And upon this account 'tis that the Law of God has tied upon us such an absolute and indispensable subjection to Authori­ty, which though it may be mischievous, yet 'tis less so than disobedience: and the world must be govern'd, as it can be, by Men, and not as it might be, by An­gels. The management indeed of Hu­mane Affairs is generally bad enough, but 'tis as well as can probably be expected, if we consider the weaknesses and imper­fections [Page 215] of humane Nature: and there­fore we must bear it as well as we can: because if we go about to alter any pre­sent Setlement, we must almost of ne­cessity make it worse: And all the effects of such attempts have seldom ended in any thing else but perpetual Confusions, till things have at length resetled in the same, or as bad, (if not a worse) condi­tion than they were in before. The mise­ries of Tyranny are less, than those of Anarchy; and therefore 'tis better to sub­mit to the unreasonable Impositions of Nero, or Caligula, than to hazard the dis­solution of the State, and consequently all the Calamities of War and Confusion, by denying our subjection to Tyrants. And there never was any lawful Magi­strate so bad, whose Laws and Govern­ment were not more conducive to the preservation of the Common Good, than his Oppression was to subvert it: and 'tis wisely eligible to suffer a less Evil, rather than lose a greater good. 'Tis a known, and a wise saying of Tacitus; Bonos Prin­cipes voto expetere debemus, qualescunque pati; & quomodo sterilitatem, aut nimios imbres, & caetera Naturae mala, sic luxum & avaritiam dominantium tolerare.

[Page 216] And this, in one word, is not only a satisfactory Answer, but an ample Con­futation of that Pestilent Book, (Vindiciae contra Tyrannos) the scope whereof is, only to invite Subjects to rebel against Tyrannical Government, by representing the evils of Tyranny: which though they were as great, as he supposes them to be; yet they are abundantly less than those that follow upon Rebellion, as himself and his Party were sufficiently taught by the Event. And for one Common­wealth, he can instance in, that has gain'd by Rebellion; 'tis easie to produce an hundred that it has hazarded, if not ut­terly ruined. And therefore this Author (not to mention Mariana, and Buchanan, and others) has perform'd nothing in be­half of his Cause, by displaying the mi­series of a Tyrannical Power, unless he had withal evinced them to be more ca­lamitous than those of War and Confu­sion. There is nothing in this World, that depends upon the freedom of man's will, can be so securely establish'd, as not to be liable to sad inconveniences; and therefore that Constitution of Af­fairs is most eligible, that is liable to the fewest. And upon this score, I say, [Page 217] it is that the Divine Law has so severely injoin'd us to submit to the worst of Go­vernours; because notwithstanding that Tyranny is an oppressing burden of Hu­mane life, yet 'tis less intolerable than a state of War and Confusion.

Sect. 16. But to speak more expresly to the particular matter in debate, 'Tis ne­cessary the world must be govern'd; go­vern'd it cannot be without Religion, & Religion, as harmless and peaceable as it is in it self, yet when mixt with the Fol­lies and Passions of men, it does not usually inspire them with overmuch gen­tleness and goodness of Nature; and therefore 'tis necessary that it submit to the same Authority, that commands over all the other affections of the mind of man. And we may as well suppose all men just and honest, and upon that ac­count cancel all the Laws of Equity, as suppose them wise and sober in their Re­ligious Conceits, and upon that score take off all restraints from the excesses and enormities of Zeal. 'Tis therefore as necessary to the preservation of Pub­lick Peace, that men should be govern'd in matters of Religion, as in all other [Page 218] common Affairs of Humane life. And as for all the inconveniences that may fol­low from it, they are no other, than what belong to all manner of Govern­ment, and such as are, and must be, un­avoidable as long as mankind is endued with liberty of Will; for so long he cannot be intrusted with any Power, how good soever, that he may not abuse. And therefore for men to go about to abro­gate the Ecclesiastical Iurisdiction of the Civil Magistrate, because he may abuse it to evil and irreligious ends, by esta­blishing Idolatry, instead of the true Worship of God; (in which case 'tis pity that good men should be exposed to ruine, only for preserving a good Con­science) 'Tis just as reasonable as if they should cashier all manner of Govern­ment, and set men free from all Oaths and Obligations of Allegiance; because 'tis possible some Usurper may gain the Supreme Power, and then force his Sub­jects to abjure all their former Oaths to their lawful Sovereign; and 'tis pity that men of the gallantest, and most honest Principles, should be fined, decima­ted, hanged, banish'd, and Murdered only for their loyalty to their Prince. [Page 219] And thus will the Parallel run equal in all Cases between the Civil and Ecclesi­astical Authority of the Supreme Pow­ers: both may be, and often are lamen­tably abused; and therefore if that be reason enough to abolish one, 'tis so to abolish both: so that the whole result of all amounts only to this Enquiry, Whe­ther it would not be a politick course to take away all Government, because all Government may be abused?

Sect. 17. Though this be a sufficient re­ply to the Objection, yet it will not be altogether impertinent or unnecessary to abet it with this one consideration more. That it may, and often does so happen, that 'tis necessary to punish men for such Perswasions into which they have per­haps innocently abused themselves: for 'tis easily possible for well-meaning Peo­ple through ignorance and inadvertency to be betrayed into such unhappy Errors, as may tend to the Publick Di­sturbance, which though it be not so much their Crime as Infelicity, yet is there no remedy but it must expose them to the Correction of the Publick Rods and Axes. Magistrates are to take [Page 220] care of the Common-wealth, and not of every particular mans concerns: And the end of all their Laws is to provide for the welfare of the Publick, that is their Charge, and that they must secure; and if any harmless and well-meaning man make himself obnoxious to the Pe­nalties of the Law, that is a misfortune they cannot prevent, and therefore must deal with him, as they do with all other Offenders; that is, pity, and punish him. Private interest must yield to Publick Good, and therefore, when they cannot stand together, and there is no remedy but one must suffer, 'tis better certainly that one, or a few, should perish than the whole Community. Neither is it possible that any Laws should be so wa­rily contrived, but that some innocent Persons may sometimes fall under their Penalties; yet, because 'tis more benefi­cial to the Publick Welfare, that now and then a guiltless person should suffer, than that all the guilty should escape; in that the former injures but one, the latter all: Therefore is it necessary to go­vern all Societies by Laws, and Penal­ties, without regard to the ill fortune that may befal a few single persons, which [Page 221] can hardly be avoided whilst the Laws are in force: and yet 'tis necessary that either the same, or some other in their stead be establish'd, that will be liable to the same inconvenience. Besides, 'tis not unworthy Observation, that it is not so properly the end of Government to punish Enormities, as to prevent Distur­bances; and when they bring Malefactors to Justice (as we term it) they do not so much inflict a Punishment upon the Crime, (for that belongs peculiarly to the cognizance of another Tribunal) as provide for the welfare of the Common-wealth, by cutting off such Persons as are Pests and Enemies to it, and by the example of their Punishment deter others from the like Practices. And therefore there are some sins, of which Governours take not so much notice, that are more hainous in themselves, and in the sight of God, than others that they punish with Capital Inflictions; be­cause they are not in their own nature so destructive of the ends of Government, and the good of Publick Societies. So that actions being punishable by Hu­mane Laws, not according to the nature of the Crime, but of their ill conse­quence [Page 222] to the Publick, when any thing that is otherwise even innocent, is in this regard injurious, it as much con­cerns Authority to give it check by seve­rity of Laws and Punishments, as any the foulest Immoralities. Temporal Punishments then are inflicted upon such persons that are turbulent against pre­scribed Rules of Publick Worship, upon the same account, as they are against those that offend against all other Pub­lick Edicts of Government: they are both equally intended, to secure the Pub­lick Peace and Interest of the Society; and when either of them are violated, they equally tend to its disturbance: and therefore as mens actings against the Ci­vil Laws of a Common-wealth are ob­noxious to the Judgment of its Gover­nours, for the same reason are all their Offences against its Ecclesiastical Laws liable to the censure of the same Autho­rity. So that the matter debated, in its last result, is not so much a question of Religion, as of Policy; not so much of what is necessary to faith, as to the quiet and preservation of a Common-wealth; and 'tis possible a man may be a good Christian, and yet his Opinion be into­lerable, [Page 223] upon the score of its being in­consistent with the Preservation of the Publick Peace, and the necessary ends of Government. For 'tis easily imagina­ble how an honest and well-meaning man may, through meer ignorance, fall into such Errours, which though God will pardon, yet Governours must punish: His integrity may expiate the Crime, but cannot prevent the Mischief of his Errour. Nay so easie is it for men to deserve to be punished for their Consci­ences, that there is no Nation in the world, in which (were Government rightly understood and duly managed) mistakes and abuses of Religion would not supply the Gallies with vastly greater numbers than Villany.

Sect. 1. THough the former Principle, viz. that no man may with a safe conscience do any thing in the Worship of God, that is not warranted by some Precept or Precedent in the Word of God, be rive­ted into the peoples minds, as the first and fundamental Principle of the Puritan Se­paration; yet their Leaders seem to be a­shamed of their own folly: and being driven from this, and all their other little [Page 227] holds and shelters, they have at length thought it the safest and the wisest course to flie to the pretence of Scandal. This is their Fort Royal, in which they have at last secured and entrench'd themselves. As for their own parts (they tell us) they are not so fond as to believe, That the Cere­monies of the Church of England are so superstitious, and Antichristian, and that themselves might lawfully use them, were it not that there are great numbers of sin­cere, but weak Christians that apprehend them to be sinful; and for this reason they dare not conform to our Ceremonial Constitutions, for fear of ensnaring and scandalizing weak Consciences; which is, in the Apostles account of it, no less than spiritual murther. And whatever is due to Authority, the Souls of men are too high a Tribute. None can be more ready, than themselves, to submit to all lawful Commands; but here they desire to be excused, when they cannot obey but at the price of Souls. 'Tis a dreadful Doom, that our Saviour has denounced against those, who offend any of his lit­tle ones, i. e. Babes and Weaklings in Christianity: And therefore, though they would not stick to hazard their own [Page 228] lives in obedience to Authority, yet no­thing can oblige them to be so cruel, and so uncharitable, as to destroy any for whom Christ died; which is certainly done by casting snares and scandals be­fore their weak Brethren. This is the last refuge of the Leaders of the Separa­tion, and therefore I cannot but think my self obliged to examine its strength and reasonableness; and I doubt not, but to make it appear as vain and frivolous, as all their other Cavils, and shuffling Pretences.

Sect. 2. Scandal then is a word of a large and ambiguous signification, and the thing it imports is not determinately either good or evil, but is sometimes in­nocent, and sometimes criminal, accord­ing to the different nature of those things from whence it arises, or of those cir­cumstances wherewith it is attended; for in the full and proper extent of the word, 'tis any thing (whether good, or evil, or indifferent) that occasions the fall or sin of another. Now if the mat­ter of the Scandal, or that which occa­sions anothers sin, be in it self good and vertuous, this casual event is not suffi­cient [Page 229] to reflect any charge or disparage­ment upon it; and therefore 'tis in Scri­pture frequently attributed to the best of things, to the Cross of Christ, to Christ himself, and to the Grace of God. If it be a thing in it self criminal, though it be chiefly blameable upon its own ac­count, yet this usually aggravates and enhances the original guilt of the action. But lastly, if it be a thing indifferent, and a matter of Christian liberty, then is it either faultless, or chargeable, according to its different Cases and Circumstances, as Christian prudence and discretion shall determine, so various and contin­gent a thing not being capable to be go­vern'd by any fix'd and setled measures. Some are scandalized out of weakness, and some out of peevishness; some be­fore due information of their mistake, and some after it; some because they do not, and some because they will not un­derstand. All which, with infinite other Circumstances, men ought to consider in the exercise of their Christian liberty, and suitably to guide themselves by the same Rules of Wisdom and Charity, that determine them in all the other af­fairs of humane life. For the action it [Page 230] self is only the remote occasion, and not the immediate cause of the scandal; in that, being in its own nature indifferent, and by consequence innocent, it cannot be directly and from it self productive of any criminal effect: and therefore, its being abused and perverted to purposes and opportunities of sin, is purely acci­dental. And the proper and immediate cause of every mans falling, is something within himself: 'Tis either folly, or ma­lice, or ignorance, or wilfulness, too little understanding, or too much passi­on, that betray some men into sin by oc­casion of other mens actions. So that the Schools distinction of scandal into pas­sive or that which is taken, and active or that which is given, is apparently false and impertinent, and is the main thing that has perplexed and intricated all dis­courses of this Article: Because Scandal, properly so called, is never given, but when it is taken; as being only an occa­sion of offence taken by one manfrom the actions of another. Now if his taking offence, where it was not given, proceeds from weakness and ignorance, then is his case pitiable, and a good-natur'd man will out of tenderness and charity for­bear [Page 231] such things, as he seizes on to abuse to his own destruction: For all the obli­gations of Scandal proceed purely from that extraordinary height of Charity and tenderness of good Nature, that is so signally recommended in the Gospel; which will oblige us to forbear any acti­on that we may lawfully omit, when we know it will prove an occasion of sin and mischief to some well-meaning, but less knowing Christians. But if it pro­ceed from humour, or pride, or wil­fulness, or any other vicious Principle, then is the man to be treated as a peevish and stubborn person; and no man is bound to part with his own freedom, be­cause his Neighbour is froward and hu­morous: and if he be resolved to fall, there is no reason I should forego the use of my liberty, because he is resolved to make that his stumbling-block. So that we see all Scandal is equally taken, but not equally criminal: in that, some take it only because they are weak, and some because they are peevish; according to which different cases we are to behave our selves, with a different demeanour in this affair.

[Page 232] § 3. And for this we have variety of Examples in the practice of the Apostles, whose actions were liable to the opposite Scandals of Jews and Gentiles. If they complyed with the Jews in their rigo­rous Observation of the Mosaick Rites, this was a Scandal to the Gentiles, by leading them into a false and mischievous opinion of their necessity: If they did not comply, then that proved a Scandal to those Iews, that were not as yet fully instructed in the right nature, and extent of their Christian liberty, and the disso­lution of the Mosaick Law; and so would be tempted to fall back from that Religi­on, that inclin'd men to a scorn and con­tempt of the Law of Moses. Now be­tween these two extremes they were for­ced to walk with great prudence and wariness, inclining sometimes to one, and sometimes to the other; as they ap­prehended most beneficial to the ends & Interests of Christianity. Thus though St. Paul condescended to the Circumcisi­on of Timothy, to humour and gratifie the Jews, who could not be so suddenly wrought off from the prejudices, and strong impressions of their Education, [Page 233] and therefore were for a time indulged to the practice of their ancient Rites and Customs; Yet, when he was among the Gentiles, he would not be perswaded to yield so far to the Jewish obstinacy, as to suffer the Circumcision of Titus, but op­posed it with his utmost zeal and vehe­mence; because this would in probabi­lity have frustrated the success of all his labour in propagating the Gospel among forein Nations; if he who had before so vehemently asserted their Christian li­berty, and instructed them in their free­dom from the Mosaick Law, and parti­cularly, from this Ceremony, should now seem inconsistent with himself, by acting directly contrary to his former Doctrine, and bringing men into a subjection to the Law of Moses, after himself had so of­ten declared its being revers'd and super­annuated. For what else could be pro­bably expected, than that his Gentile Proselytes being discouraged, partly by his prevarication, and partly by the weight of that Noke, to which they foresaw, or at least suspected, they must submit, should be strongly tempted to an utter Apostacy? And therefore, wise­ly weighing with himself, that the scandal [Page 234] was less dangerous in angring the Jews, than in hazarding the Gentiles, he chose rather to leave them to their own pee­vishness, than to hazard the revolt of these, Gal. 2. 4, 5.

§ 4. And this is the true reason (as some learned men have observed) of this great Apostles different deportment, in this particular, towards the Churches of Rome and Galatia; because in the Roman Church there lived no small number of natural Jews, who, when they were first converted to Christianity, were not so well instructed in the abrogation of the Mosaick Law. The Method, whereby the Apostles invited them at first to embrace the Christian Faith, was barely to con­vince them of its Evidence and Divine Authority; without taking any notice, whether their old Religion were thereby abrogated, or continued: For had they at the first attempt dealt roundly with them in that particular, that had been so far from winning their assent, that it had been absolutely the most effectual way to affright them from the Gospel. And from hence it came to pass, that there were dispersed among them so many Ju­daizing [Page 235] Christians, who, though they were sufficiently instructed in the positive Articles of the Christian Faith; yet not being so throughly informed as to the su­perannuating of those legal observances, they were as firmly wedded to them, as if they had still continued in the Jewish Religion: Therefore does the Apostle advise, That these weak and uninstructed Converts should be tenderly treated; and exhorts the more knowing Christians, for a while, to comply with their weakness and simplicity; till time, and better in­formation should wear off their old pre­judices, and at length bring them to a better understanding of their own li­berty.

But then, as for the Galatians, when they hapned to fall into the same error, he thought not fit to treat them with the same tenderness and Civility: But rather chides and lashes them out of their childish folly; because (as St. Chryso­stome observes) at their first Conversion they had been competently instructed in the extent of their Christian liberty, and had already disclaimed all their Jewish perswasions; and therefore, for them to relapse into the Errours of Iudaism, [Page 236] could not proceed from weakness, and want of instruction, but from lightness and giddiness of mind: a vanity that deserved to be upbraided with as much briskness and vehemence of Satyr, as St. Paul has us'd in that Epistle. And upon this account arose the Quarrel between him and St. Peter, in that St. Peter had not carried himself so prudently in the use of his Christian liberty, as he might have done; their Controversie was not about an Article of Faith, or a prescri­bed Duty of Religion, but purely about an occasional and changeable matter of prudence. But to pass by this, and divers other particular cases, to the same pur­pose, in the Writings of St. Paul, whose practice in this affair is the best Com­ment upon his Doctrine: the result of what I have discoursed from him evi­dently amounts to these two consequen­ces, (1.) That the proper obligations of Scandal are extended only to matters of an indifferent and arbitrary Nature. Those things that are absolutely neces­sary, we are bound to do, whether they offend any man or no; and those that are absolutely unlawful, we are bound to forbear, upon the score of stronger obli­gations [Page 237] than those of Scandal: and there­fore its proper Scene must lie in things that are not determinately good or evil. (2.) That the cases, in which it is con­cern'd, are not capable of being deter­min'd by any unalterable Laws and Con­stitutions; and that we have no other Rules for the Government of our actions in reference to it, but those of common prudence and discretion. And now, from this more general account may we pro­ceed, with more clearness and security, to some more close and particular consi­derations, that immediately relate to this affair, as 'tis pleaded by some men in justification of their present Schism.

§ 5. First, And here in the first place let me desire them, to consider how ma­nifestly & scandalously they prevaricate with the World, in their management of this Apology, in that the Pretence is too narrow a Covering for their Pra­ctices. For however it may serve to ex­cuse their refusal of Conformity in the Exercise of their Publick and Ministerial Function, which they must renounce, though to the ruine of their Families, to please the Brethren; yet how will this [Page 238] account for all the other disorders and irregularities of their separations? What has this to do with their private Meet­ings and Conventicles, against the Com­mands of publick Authority? They plead it only to justifie themselves in lay­ing down their Ministry, and not to keep them from being present at our Assem­blies in a private capacity: (as they sometimes are.) Why therefore should they keep up such an apparent Separati­on, by gathering people into distinct Meetings of their own, when they might without any criminal Scandal to their Brethren, or violence to their own Con­sciences, be constant at our Congregati­ons? When themselves were (or at least thought they were) in power, they did not think so slightly of unnecessary Sepa­rations, but provided against their very appearances and possibilities: Why therefore should they now make so light of exposing the Church to all the di­stempers that naturally follow, upon making Parties and Divisions? If there were nothing but Scandal in the case, they would live quietly and conformably in a private condition, though this might possibly restrain them from doing so in a [Page 239] publick Office. And one would think that such nice and tender-natur'd peo­ple, that will undo themselves to please their Neighbours, should be wonderfully tender of giving needless offence to their Governours.

And, whatever other pretences they make to excuse their Non-conformity, nothing can justifie their Separation, but the unlawfulness of being present at our Congregations. For what, if they scru­ple to renounce the Covenant; is this any reason, why they should gather peo­ple into Conventicles, keep their private Meetings in time of publick Service, af­front the Laws and Constitutions of the Common-wealth, and encourage their Followers in a down-right Schism and Separation? It would be a pretty way of arguing, to hear one of them plead: I cannot renounce the Covenant, therefore I must keep a Conventicle; and yet this is their method of acting. And therefore they can never clear themselves of some odd suspicions, unless they would frank­ly and openly declare their opinion of our Service: If they think it unlawful, then let them own, and profess, and plead it; if lawful, then let them justifie [Page 240] themselves, in that, when lawful Autho­rity requires them, and the people, to keep up a just and lawful Communion with the Church, yet they should not­withstanding keep up so wide a Schism, by gathering people out of publick Con­gregations into private Meetings. And could their credulous Disciples be but made sensible, how coarsly they are im­pos'd upon by their Leaders, and how lamentably they juggle and dissemble with the World, they would then more abhor them for their Hypocrisie, than they now admire them for their Saint-like and demure pretences. For if they would perswade them to do what them­selves would not scruple in their Cir­cumstances, (i. e. to be of their own mind) this Schism would quickly be end­ed, and the Church setled. The only reason (say most of them) why they for­sook their Ministry was, That they durst not abjure the Covenant; dispense with them for this, and they are Conformists. But if that be the only thing they scruple, then, Why are they not regular and conformable in all other Particulars, against which they can pretend no such Exceptions? And what does renouncing [Page 241] the Covenant concern the people? And therefore how shall that excuse, or justi­fie them in their Separation? This thing has no relation to the Divine Service, and therefore, however it may restrain men from something else, 'tis no motive to drive them from that. Now what can be more apparent, than that these men are resolved to comply with, and encourage, the people in a wicked and rebellious Schism (for so it must be, if it be ground­less and unwarrantable) by herding them into Conventicles for their own private ends, and that in spight of Authority? Whereas had they any true sense of Con­science and ingenuity, they would labor to dispossess the people of their mistakes, and to reconcile them to a fair and can­did opinion of the Church, when she requires nothing of them, but what they themselves are convinced in Conscience, is lawful and innocent. For, if they va­lued the Peace of the Church, the Com­mands of Authority, and the setlement of the Nation before their own selfish ends, instead of keeping up Divisions (as 'tis evident they do by their Conven­ticles) they would be as zealous, as he that is most so, to remove the grounds [Page 242] of Schism and Faction, and to reunite their Party to the Church, by perswa­ding them to an orderly and peaceable Conformity. Which if it be innocent (as themselves believe it is) it must, in the present Circumstances of Affairs, be ne­cessary; if it be any mans Duty to be peaceable in the Church, and obedient to lawful Authority.

Sect. 6. Secondly, How came the peo­ple to be scandalized? by whom were they betrayed, and affrighted into their mistakes? Who buzzed their scruples, and jealousies into their heads? And, Who taught them to call our Ceremo­nies, Popish, Superstitious, and Antichri­stian? What other inducement have they to dislike the Churches Constitutions, but meerly the example of their Lead­ers? Their practice is the only Founda­tion of the peoples opinion; and when their flocks straggle from our Churches, 'tis only to follow their Pastors: They first lead the people into an Errour, and then this must be an Apology for them­selves to follow them. And thus, whilst they dance in a Circle, 'tis no wonder, if at the same time, their Preachers follow [Page 243] their people, and the people follow their Preachers. And therefore if the Godly Ministers, who dare not conform for fear of scandalizing the weak Brethren, would but venture to do it, the weak Bre­thren would cease to be scandalized. So that these men first lay the stumbling-block in the peoples way, and then, be­cause it scares silly and timorous Souls, this serves for a pretence to startle, & be astonish'd at it themselves, and withal to increase the childish fears of the multi­tude by their own seeming & counterfeit horror. Now with what a shameless Brow do these men prevaricate with publick Authority? They have deceived the peo­ple into a publick Errour, and then will not undeceive them for fear of their dis­pleasure: And when they have possess'd their minds with unworthy scruples, and jealousies against the commands of their Superiors, then must this weakness of the people be made the Formal Excuse of their own disobedience. And by this Artifice they prostitute the Reverence of all Government to the fortuitous humor and peevishness of their own Disciples; and so by making the publick Laws sub­mit [Page 244] to the pleasure of those whom they govern, they put it in their own power to enact, or repeal them as they please; and no Law shall have any force to bind the Subject without their approbation: Because 'tis in their own power, when they please, to work prejudices, in the people against it; and therefore, if their being offended be sufficient to take off their obligation, 'tis, or 'tis not a Law, only as themselves shall think good. And thus they first govern the Common peo­ple, & then sooth and flatter their pride, by inveigling them into a conceit, that they are govern'd by them, and by this stratagem they govern all.

But however, from whomsoever these good people learn'd their idle & imagi­nary scruples, the offence they have taken against the Customs and Prescriptions of the Church, is either just and reason­able, or it is not: If the former, then they have rational grounds for their dislike & separation; and if they have, then these men that think themselves bound to com­ply with them, even against the com­mands of Authority, ought to plead those Reasons, and not meerly Scandal, [Page 245] to justifie their disobedience; because they must carry in them an obligation an­tecedent to that of Scandal; in that they are supposed sufficient to warrant and pa­tronize it; and therefore 'tis not that, but the grounds, on which their dislike is founded, that are to be pleaded in their defence and justification. But if the latter, then is their dislike groundless, and un­reasonable: And if so, 'tis easie to deter­mine that they ought rather to undeceive them, by discovering their mistake, than to encourage them in their sinful disobe­dience, (for so it must be, if it be ground­less) by compliance with them. And by this means they will fairly discharge themselves from all danger of any crimi­nal offence. For however scandal ground­lesly taken (and so it is always, because there is never any reason to be offended at an indifferent thing) may possibly lay a restraint upon my liberty, till I have in­formed the person of his Error, and dis­avowed those ill consequences he would draw from my example; and when I have so done, I have prevented the dan­ger of Scandal, which always supposes errour, weakness, or mistake of Consci­ence; [Page 246] and therefore when the Errour is discovered, and the weakness removed, so is the scandal too: And if he shall still pretend to be scandalized, 'tis not because he is weak, but peevish; and if after this I comply with them, and that against the commands of my lawful Superiors, I shall disobey Authority, only, because my Neighbour is unreasonable, i. e. for no reason at all. And this further disco­vers, how shamelesly these men shuffle and prevaricate with the world; in that when most of them have declared, in their private Discourses, that they are not so fond as to imagine our Ceremo­nies unlawful, or Antichristian, and when their Grandees and Representa­tives have profess'd to publick Authority in Solemn Conferences, that they scruple not these things upon their own account, but only for fear of giving offence to some well-meaning people that were unhappily possess'd with some odd and groundless jealousies against them. For if so, Then why are not these good peo­ple, that follow them, better informed? Why do they not instruct them in the truth, and disabuse them out of their [Page 247] false and absurd conceits? Why do they connive at their pride and presum­ption? Or at least, Why do they not more smartly reprove them, for their rashness to censure the actions of their Neighbours, to condemn, and revile the Wisdom of their Superiors, and to scorn the Knowledge of their Spiritual Instructors? Why do they not chide them out of their malepart, peevish, and impatient confidence, and, by convin­cing them at least of the possibility of their being deceived, reduce them to a more humble and governable temper? Why do they not teach them in plain terms that the establish'd way of Wor­ship is lawful, and innocent, and there­fore that they ought not to forsake it, to the disturbance of the Church, and con­tempt of Authority? If they would but make it part of their business to unde­ceive the people, how easily would all their stragling Followers return into the Communion of the Church? But they dare not let them know their Errours, lest they should forfeit both their Party, and their Reputation: And therefore, in­stead of that, they rather confirm them in their mistakes, and in their own defence, [Page 248] are forced to perswade them, that they ought to be scandalized. Insomuch, that it is not unusual to hear the foolish people pretend it concerning themselves, and to tell you that your action is a Scandal to them: By which they mean, either that it leads them into sin, or that it makes them angry. If the former, that is a ridicu­lous contradiction; for if they know how the snare and temptation is laid, then they know how to escape it; my action does not force them into the sin, but on­ly invites them to it, through their own mistake and folly: And therefore if they have discovered, by what mistake they are likely to be betray'd, they know how to provide against the danger: For, if they know their duty in the case, how can they plead Scandal, when that supposes ignorance? And however I behave my self, they know what they have to do themselves: If they do not, How can they say of themselves, that they are scandalized; when by so saying they con­fess they are not? For that implies a knowledge how to do their duty, and avoid the danger. If the latter, i. e. that they are angry, then all their meaning is, that I must part with my liberty, and [Page 249] disobey my Superiors to please them; that their saucy humour must give me Law; that I must be their Slave, because they are proud, and insolent; and that they must gain a power over me, because they are forward to censure mine acti­ons.

§ 7. Thirdly, We encounter Scandal with Scandal, and let the guilt of all be discharged upon that side that occasions the most and the greatest offences: Now all the mischief they can pretend to en­sue, in the present constitution of af­fairs, upon their compliance with Au­thority, reaches no farther than the weak Brethren of their own Party; whereas by their refractory disobedience they give offence not only to them, but to all, both to the Jew, and to the Gentile, and to the Church of God. And, not to insist upon the advantages they give to Atheism and Popery, let me only mind them, that if the accidental offence of the Judg­ments of some well-meaning, but less knowing Christians, of a private capa­city, pass a sufficient obligation upon Conscience, to restrain it from any pra­ctice in it self lawful; of how much more [Page 250] force must that scandal be, that is given to publick Authority, by denying obe­dience to its lawful commands, and by consequence infringing its just power in things not forbidden by any divine Law? Now if the Rites and Ceremonies of the Church of England were in themselves apparently evil, then their repugnancy to the Law of God were sufficient Ob­jection both against their practice, and their imposition; and their scandal to weak and ignorant Christians were of small force, in comparison to their intrin­sick, and unalterable unlawfulness: But, because this is not pretended in our pre­sent case, What a shameful scandal and reproach to Religion is it, to neglect the necessary duty of Obedience, and sub­jection to lawful Authority, under pre­tence of complyance with the weak and groundless scruples of some private men? 'Tis certainly past dispute, that the reasonable offence of some weaker Brethren cannot so strongly oblige our Consciences, as the indispensable com­mand of obeying our lawful Superiors. And it is a shame to demand, Whether the Judgment of a lawful Magistrate have not more force and power over [Page 251] Conscience, than the Judgment of every private Christian: If not, then may the Laws of Authority be cancell'd, and con­troul'd by the folly and ignorance of those that are subject to them; for meer scandal arises only from the folly and ignorance of the persons offended. For if there be any just and wise occasion of dislike, the action becomes primarily unlawful, not because 'tis scandalous, but because 'tis antecedently evil; whereas meer and proper scandal is only con­cern'd in things in themselves indifferent: So that in this case all the difficulty is, Whether is the greater scandal, to do an indifferent thing, when a private Christi­an dislikes it; or not to do it, when pub­lick Authority enjoyns it? And certainly it can be no Controversie, Whether it be a fouler reproach to Religion, to dis­obey a Christian Magistrate in a thing lawful and indifferent, than to offend a private Christian. And I may safely ap­peal to the Judgment of all wise and so­ber men, Whether the intolerable way­wardness of some nice and squeamish Consciences to the commands of just Authority, be not a fouler and more no­torious scandal to Religion, than a mo­dest [Page 252] and humble compliance with them, though in things not so apparently useful and necessary?

And then, as for their own weak Bre­thren, of whom they seem so exceeding­ly tender, they can no way more scanda­lize them, than by complying with them: By which they are tempted and betray'd into the greatest and most mischievous enormities; for thereby they encourage their folly, feed and cherish their un­grounded fancies, confirm them in a false opinion of the unlawfulness of their Superiors commands, and so lead them directly into the sins of unwarrantable Schism and Disobedience. How many feeble and deluded Souls are enticed, by the reputation of their example, to violate the commands of Authority, and that, when themselves are not convinced of their unlawfulness, and so entangle themselves in a complicated sin, by disobeying their lawful Superiors, and that with a doubtful and unsatisfied Conscience? They cannot be ignorant, that the greatest part of their zealous Disciples are offended at the Laws and Constitutions of the Church, for no other reason, than because they see their [Page 253] godly Ministers to slight them; and therefore, unless their example be suffi­cient to rescind the lawful Commands of their Governors, they give them the most criminal Scandal, by inviting them to the most criminal disobedience. So that all circumstances fairly considered, the avoiding of offences will prove the most effectual inducement to Confor­mity: For this would take away the very Grounds and Foundations of Scandal, remove all our differences, prevent much trouble and more sin, cure all our Schisms, Quarrels, and Divisions, banish our mutual Jealousies, Censures, and Animosities, and establish the Nation in a firm and lasting Peace. In brief, the only cause of all our troubles and di­sturbances, is, the inflexible perversness of about an hundred proud, ignorant, and seditious Preachers; against whom, if the severity of the Laws were particu­larly levelled, How easie would it be in some competent time to reduce the peo­ple to a quiet and peaceable temper, and to make all our present Schisms (that may otherwise prove eternal) expire with, or before, the present Age? The want, or neglect, of which method, is [Page 254] the only thing, that has given them so much strength, & so long a continuance.

§ 8. Fourthly, No man is bound to take notice of, or give place to old and inveterate scandals, but rather ought, in defence of his Christian liberty, to op­pose them with a publick defiance, and to shame those that pretend them out of their confidence. For the only ground of compliance and condescension in these Cases, is tenderness and compassi­on to some mens infirmities; and as long as I have reason to think this the only cause of their being scandalized, so long am I bound by charity and good nature to condescend to their weaknesses, and no longer: For after they have had a competent time and means of better in­formation, I have reason enough to pre­sume, that 'tis not ignorance, that is the gound of their taking offence, but pride or peevishness, or something worse. So that all that is to be done in this case, is to disabuse the weak by rectifying his judgment, removing his scruples, decla­ring the innocence of my action, clearing it of all sinister suspicions, and protesting against all those abuses, he would put [Page 255] upon the lawful use of my Christian li­berty: And when I have so done, I have cleared my self from all his ill-natured jealousies and surmises, and discharged all the offices and obligations of Chari­ty. And if, after all this, my offended Neighbor shall still persevere in his per­verse mis-interpretation of my actions, and pretend, that they still gaul and en­snare his tender Conscience; the man is peevish and refractory, and only makes use of this precarious pretence, to justifie his uncharitable censures of my inno­cent liberty; and then am I so far from being under any obligation to comply with the peevishness and insolence of his humour, that I am strongly bound to thwart and oppose it. For otherwise I should but betray my Christian liberty to the Tyranny of his wilful and imperi­ous ignorance, and give superstitious folly the advantage and Authority of Prescription. For if that prevail in the practice of the World, and I must yield and condescend to it, because 'tis stub­born, and obstinate, it must, in process of time, gain the reputation of being the custom and received opinion of the Church; and when it can plead that, [Page 256] then it becomes necessary: Inveterate Errours are ever sacred and venerable, and what prescription warrants, it al­ways imposes: Custom ever did, and ever will rule and preside in the practices of men, because 'tis popular; and being ever attended with a numerous train of Followers, it grows proud and confi­dent, and is not ashamed to upbraid free reason with singularity and Innovation. So that all I could gain, by an absolute resignation of my own liberty to another mans folly, would be only to give him a plausible pretence to claim a right of command and dominion over me, and to make my self subject to his humour by my own civility. And thus, though the Jews were in the beginning of Chri­stianity for a time permitted the Rites and Customs of their Nation; yet after­ward when the Nature of the Christian Religion was, or might be, better under­stood, the Church did not think it owed them so much civility: And if the Pri­mitive Christians had not given check to their stubborn perswasions, they had gi­ven them Authority; and, by too long a compliance, would have vouched and abetted their Errours, and adopted Ju­daism [Page 257] into Christianity; and Circumci­sion not only might, but of necessity must have been conveyed down to us from age to age, by as firm and uninterrupted a Tradition as Baptism.

And this shews us, how way-ward and unreasonable those men are, who still persevere to object Scandal against the Churches Constitutions, after she has so often protested against this Exception by so many solemn Declarations. When at first it was pretended, it might perhaps for a while excuse, or alleviate their dis­obedience; but after Authority has so sufficiently satisfied their scruples, and removed their suspicions, and so amply cleared the innocence of its own intenti­ons, if men will still continue jealous and quarrelsom, they may thank them­selves if they smart for their own presum­ption and folly. And Princes have no reason to abridge themselves in the exer­cise of their lawful Power, only, because some of their Subjects will not learn to be modest and ingenuous. And if his Majesty should think good to condescend so far to these mens peevishness, as to re­verse his Laws against them out of com­pliance with them, this would but feed [Page 258] and cherish their insolence, and only en­courage them to proceed (if that be pos­sible) to more unreasonable demands; for upon the same reason they insist upon these, they may, when they are granted them, go on to make new remonstrances, i. e. upon no reason at all. And beside, this would but give the countenance of Authority to their scruples and super­stitious pretences, and leave the Church of England under all those Calumnies to Posterity, with which themselves or their followers labour to charge it, and oblige future Ages to admire and cele­brate these peevish and seditious persons as the Founders of a more godly and thorow Reformation. Not to mention how much Princes have ever gain'd by their concessions to the demands of Fa­natick Zealots, they may easily embolden, but hardly satisfie them; and if they yield up but one Jewel of their Imperial Dia­dem to their importunity, 'tis not usual for them to rest, till they have gain'd Crown and all, and perhaps the head that wears it too; for there is no end of the madness of unreasonable men. How hap­py would the world be, if wise men were but wise enough to be instructed by the [Page 259] Mistress of Fools? But every Age lives as much at all adventure as if it were the first, without any regard to the warnings and experiences of all former Ages.

Sect. 9. Fifthly, The Commands of Authority, and the Obligations of Obe­dience, infinitely outweigh, and utterly evacuate all the pretences of scandal. For the matters wherein scandal is concern'd are only things indifferent; but nothing that is not antecedently sinful remains so, after the commands of lawful Authority are superinduced upon it; these change things indifferent, as to their Nature, into necessary Duties, as to their Vse; and therefore place them beyond the reach of the obligations of scandal, that may in many cases extend to the restraint of our Liberty, but never to the prejudice and hinderance of our Duty; so that no Obe­dience, how offensive soever, unless it be upon some other account faulty, is capa­ble of being made Criminal upon the score of scandal; the obligations where­of are but accidental and occasional, whereas those of Obedience are of a prime, absolute, and eternal necessity. Princes are Gods Deputies, and Lieute­nants [Page 260] here on earth, he vests them with their power, and by his own Law binds us to obey theirs; and though their De­crees pass no direct Obligation upon the Consciences of men, yet the Divine laws directly and immediately bind their Consciences to obey them; and God has annex'd the same Penalties to Disobedi­ence to their Laws, as to his own: So that obedience to all the lawful Commands of our Superiours is one part of our Du­ty to God, because our obligation to it is tied upon us by his own immediate Command: aud therefore if the duty of avoiding scandal, that is of Com­pliance with my neighbours weakness, be sufficient to excuse that of Obedience to Authority, 'tis so too to take off the immediate Obligations of God himself: So that when these two, the publick com­mands of a lawful Superiour, and the pri­vate Offence of an honest Neighbour countermand each other, if the latter prevail, then may it forbid what God has made a necessary Duty, and oblige us to disobey him out of Compliance with the folly and ignorance of men. How few are there of the Divine Laws more severe and peremptory, than those that [Page 261] command Obedience to Authority? And therefore if we may decline this duty on­ly to avoid scandal, Why not any? Why not all? This then is our Duty, and must be done; and as for all its casual and equivocal events, no mans Conscience is concern'd to provide against them. And if other men will be offended because I do my Duty, that is their fault and not mine; and better be the occasion of ano­ther mans sin, than the Author of mine own. No mans folly or ignorance can cancel my obligations to God, or God's Vicegerent; and in all cases where there is any competition between scandal and a Command of God, or any other law­ful Authority, there is no other difficulty to be resolved, than, whether I shall dis­obey God, or displease my foolish Neigh­bour? And 'tis (one would think) past all dispute, that when any thing is posi­tively determin'd as a matter of Duty, the obligations to Obedience in that particular are not, for that very reason, left to any man's Choice and Prudence (as all matters of Scandal are) but it must become in all Cases and Circum­stances whatsoever, a Duty of a precise absolute, and indispensable Necessity, [Page 262] And certainly God had made but odd provision for the Government of the World, if he should allow one Subject, for the pleasure of another, to derogate from the Authority of lawful Superi­ours, and permit them the liberty to dis­obey the Commands of Governours, ra­ther than displease one another: for this must unavoidably end in an utter disso­lution of all Government, & devolve the Supremacy entirely upon every private man, that either has or can pretend to have a weak and a tender Conscience. For if scandal to weak and tender Conscien­ces be of sufficient force to rescind the obligatory Power of the Commands of Authority, then whoever either has, or can pretend to a weak Conscience, gains thereby an absolute Sovereignty over all his Superiours, and vests himself with a power to dispense with or evacuate their Commands. So that in the issue of all, this pretence puts it in the power of any peevish or malevolent person to cancel all the Decrees of Princes, and make his own humour the Rule of all their Poli­ty and Laws of Government, and be­come Superior to his own Superiours on­ly by being ignorant or peevish. How is it [Page 263] possible to make Authority more cheap and contemptible (if men would study to weaken and disgrace it) than by ma­king its Commands of less force, than the folly or perverseness of every arro­gant Mechanick? And what can be more destructive of all manner of Government than to make all the Rules of Order and Discipline less sacred, than the whimsies of every phantastick Zealot? In brief, the peace and quiet of honest men is like­ly to be mighty well secured, when dis­obedience shall be thought the product of a more exact and tender Conscience; When to pick quarrels with the Laws, and make scruple of obeying them shall be made the specifick Character of the Godly Party; and when giddy and hu­morous Zeal shall not only excuse, but hallow Disobedience; when every one, that has pride enough to fancy himself a Child of God, shall have Licence to de­spise Authority and do as he list. What an irresistible temptation is this to proud and zealous Enthusiasts, to affect being troublesome to Government, and dis­obedient to all the Laws of Discipline, when it shall pass for the result of a more extraordinary tenderness of Conscience? [Page 264] What encouragement could men have to obey their Superiours, when to dispute and dislike their Laws shall be thought to proceed from a greater holiness and a more exact integrity? And what a resist­less inducement is this to all proud and phantastick Zealots to remonstrate to the Wisdom of Authority, if thereby they may gain the Renown and Glory of a more conspicuous godliness? If men would but consider the natural Conse­quences of this, and the like Pretences, they could not but see how fatally and unavoidably they lead to Anarchy, and an utter dissolution of all Government. Which mischief (as is notoriously appa­rent from the Premisses) all the World can never prevent, if the scandal of Pri­vate men may ever dispence with the Obligation of Publick Laws.

Sect. 1. THE last refuge for Godly Disobedience is the pretence of a poubtful, scrupu­lous, & unsatisfied conscience; for (say they) though we cannot positively con­demn the Ceremonial Constitutions of the Church, as things in themselves un­lawful, yet unlawful they are to us, whose Consciences are not sufficiently satisfied concerning them; because whatsoever is done with a doubting Conscience, i. e. [Page 268] without Faith, or a full perswasion of mind, is done against it: according to that clear and unquestionable Maxim of St. Paul, Whatsoever is not of Faith, is sin.

But this precarious pretence, as well as that of scandal, is but an after-game of Conscience; they first resolved to quar­rel our Constitutions, and then 'tis an easie matter to want satisfaction about them; and when mens Arguments de­pend upon their Wills, 'tis in their own power only to repeal them, and all the Reason in the world can never cure will­ful and artificial Scruples. However, if the obligation of Laws must yield to that of a weak and tender Conscience, how impregnably is every man, that has a mind to disobey, arm'd against all the Commands of his Superiours? No Au­thority shall be able to govern him, far­ther than himself pleases, and if he dis­like the Law, he is sufficiently excused from all obligations to Obedience; and no Laws shall ever be able to oblige any man, that either has, or can pretend to a weak Conscience: for seeing no man can discern the reality of mens pretensi­ons, 'tis all one to the Concernments of Government, whether the tenderness [Page 269] of Conscience, that men plead to excuse their disobedience, be serious or coun­terfeit: For, whether it be so, or so, 'tis directly contrary to all the ends and in­terests of Government. And if it be ad­mitted for a sufficient excuse to disobey, 'tis an effectual and incurable dissoluti­on of all the force of Laws, and makes them obligatory then only when every man pleases; and he that will may obey, and he that will not may chuse; seeing 'tis so easie for any man, that has no inclina­tion to the Law, to claim the inviolable Priviledge of a tender Conscience: So that to make Proviso's for tender Con­sciences, is to abate the whole Law; see­ing it gives every man liberty to exempt himself, and if he dislike the Law, he is under no Obligation to obey it. But suppose this pretence to be serious with­out design or disguise, is it fit the Laws of the Common-wealth should ask leave of every Ignorant, and Well-meaning man, whether they shall be Laws or no? A weak Conscience is the product of a weak Understanding; and he is a very subtil man, that can find the diffe­rence between a tender Head, and a tender Conscience: and therefore if [Page 270] Princes must consult their Subjects Con­sciences in all their Laws, this would make all the Wisdom of Government submit to the power of folly and igno­rance. And when any person pleads weakness or tenderness of Conscience against the obligation of any Law, his meaning is, that he is not of the same Judgment and Opinion with his Gover­nours; and 'tis wise, and handsom, and becoming the Grandeur or Authority in all its Laws, to comply with the learn­ed apprehensions of every honest and illiterate Peasant; who if he be not sa­tisfied in their determinations, may cancel their obligations as to himself, and if they offer to force this honest man to submission, they invade the sacred and inviolable liberty of a tender Consci­ence. So full of Anarchy are all these mens pretences. And therefore Gover­nours must look to the Publick, and let tender Consciences look to themselves. Laws must be of an unyielding and in­flexible temper, and not such soft and easie things, as to bend to every mans humour, that they ought to command. And unless Government be managed by some setled Principles, it must for ever [Page 271] remain weak and unfixed: Princes must not be diffident in their Rules, and Ma­xims of Policy; but as they must set down some to themselves, so they must act up roundly to them. For all Changes of the Publick Laws and Methods of Policy sadly weaken, if they do not ut­terly unsettle the Common-wealth; in that Prescription is, at least in the practice of the World, the greatest strength and security of Government: 'tis indeed the Fountain of Authority, and the thing that vests Princes with their Preroga­tives; and no Power, what right or ti­tle soever it may plead, can ever be firm­ly establish'd, till it can plead the War­rant and Authority of Prescription: And therefore if Princes will be resolute (and if they will Govern, so they must be) they may easily make the most stubborn Consciences bend to their Commands; but if they will not, they must submit themselves, and their Power, to all the follies and passions of their Subjects. For there are no conceits so extravagant, or so pernicious, that may not pass for Principles of Conscience. In brief, there is nothing so ungovernable as a tender Conscience, or so restive and inflexible as [Page 272] folly or wickedness, when hardned with Religion: and therefore instead of be­ing complyed with, they must be re­strain'd with a more peremptory and un­yielding rigour, than naked and unsan­ctified Villany; else will they quickly discover themselves to be pregnant with greater and more fatal dangers.

Sect. 2. This stale pretence comes now too late, and is so ancient, that 'tis long since superannuated: old Doubts and scruples are like old scandals worn out of date by time and experience: They are the natural products of ignorance, weakness is their Parent, and folly their Nurse; and if they improve not into Confidence, they never survive their In­fancy, but of themselves vanish and dissolve into nothing: And therefore this pretence having out-lived it self, is be­come its own Answer and Confutation: Because men ought not, nay, they cannot remain so long under Vncertainties; and 'tis impossible but they should before this time be competently determined, as to the lawfulness or unlawfulness of the things themselves: For if in so long a time they have not been able to discover [Page 273] that sinfulness in them they suspected, that is sufficient evidence of their being Inno­cent; because their scruples have occa­sioned them to be so throughly sifted and examined: And if after all that hot and vehement contention, that has been rai­sed about them, it appears not yet where­in they are criminal and chargeable, (for if it does, then the doubt ceases, and the certainty, not the suspition of sin is to be objected) that is presumption enough for any modest and sober man to con­clude their innocence; and still to re­tain the scruple, is folly and peevishness, and then the Conscience is not doubtful, but obstinate and peremptory: The man is resolved to cherish his scruple, and persist in his folly; and if he will not be satisfied, it is not because he is weak and timorous, but because he is stubborn and dis-ingenuous. And then he pretends Conscience only to vouch his humour, and his insolence, i. e. he is a villain and an hypocrite; and is so far from deser­ving pity, especially from Authority, that no offenders can more need or provoke their severity; in that, such men resolve to tire out their Governors by their in­flexible stubbornness, and to affront [Page 274] their Laws with trifles and contemptu­ous Exceptions.

At the first setlement of a Church or new Religion, then indeed mens old fol­lies, prejudices, and weaknesses, ought to be charitably considered; and they are not to be forced into new Customs and Usages, by too much rigor and se­verity; but ought to be gently and ten­derly treated, till time and better infor­mation may wear off their scruples, and little exceptions. And this was the case of the Iews in the first Ages of Christianity, who were at first indulged in their weak and trifling conceits; because then they might reasonably be presumed to arise from a pitiable igno­rance and dissetlement of Conscience: But as soon as the Abrogation of the Mosaick Institution was fully declared and acknowledged in the Church, they were brought under the common yoke of Discipline, and were not permitted to plead their Doubts and Scruples against publick Laws and Constitutions. And this too is our present case, men labour to support an old Schism by out­worn scruples and jealousies, and will persevere in their doubts, because they [Page 275] are resolved never to be satisfied; for otherwise it were impossible, that after so much time, and so much satisfaction, they could still remain unresolved. And if whole Armies of Reason have not been sufficient to chase away all their little and imaginary fears: Yet methinks so long time, and so much experience might be sufficient to convince them, that they are but shadows, and illusions of their own melancholy Fancies; for had they been real and substantial things, it is impos­sible they should ever have escaped the discovery of so long and so severe a scru­tiny. But, if nor time, nor reason can dis­abuse them, it is not their ignorance, but their obstinacy that is invincible. Thus v. g. when to kneel at the Communion, is in it self an handsom and decent acti­on, in that this Sacrament is the most solemn piece of gratitude, or worship in the Christian Religion, and a peculiar acknowledgment of our vast and un­speakable obligations to our Redeemer; and therefore to be performed with the profoundest Reverence and Humility: And when these men themselves are not only ready to observe, but also to enjoyn the same posture in their ordinary [Page 276] Prayers, and other less solemn expressi­ons of Devotion; and when the power of the Church has actually determined and required this reverent posture, to stamp a peculiar sacredness and solemni­ty upon this Duty, no man can possibly now scruple its practice without affected contempt, and wilful disobedience; because they cannot but be convinced (unless they are resolved against it) of the vanity and dis-ingenuity of their old pretence: Namely, lest they should be interpreted to give religious Worship to the Elements, and by lying prostrate be­fore the Bread and Wine, they should be­come guilty of Idolatry, in giving Divine Worship to a sensless piece of matter. For when they plead this excuse for their disobedience, they cannot but be con­scious to themselves, that by it they do not only despise, but slander and re­proach the Laws, that they out-face and traduce Authority, and would force their Governours to believe and confess that they favour what they expresly abhor; seeing the very same Law that enjoyns this Ceremony, provides so ex­presly against this abuse, and declares so industriously, That it is so far from de­signing [Page 277] any reverence to the Creatures themselves, that it abhors it; but only requires it, as it is used in all other Reli­gious addresses to Heaven. And, if not­withstanding all this, men will dread it as a piece of Idolatry, because (forsooth) it has been, or may be abused to that pur­pose, I say no more, than that if such thin and frivolous scruples may out-weigh the Laws, and evacuate our ob­ligations to obedience, there are none in the World that are not as apparently liable to as dis-ingenuous surmises; and they may as rationally forbear looking up towards Heaven in their prayers, lest they should worship the Clouds, or the Sun, Moon, and Stars. But the truth of it is, some men study for impertinent scruples, to ensnare themselves, and la­bour to raise great doubts from little reasons, and cannot be satisfied, because they will not; they have enslaved them­selves to their follies, and boared their ears to their scruples, and are resolved to grow old in a voluntary bondage to trifles and fooleries. Now it is necessary for people of this humour to streighten the Laws, till they have made them too severe and rigorous to be obeyed, to [Page 278] draw their knot, till it becomes trouble­som and uneasie; to put them upon the Wrack, and stretch them beyond, or be­side their own intention by rare and ex­traordinary cases, by harsh and unkind Interpretations, and by far-fetch'd and disingenuous suspicions; and, under the shelter of such precarious pretences as no Law can possibly avoid, they refuse the Liberty that is given them to obey the Laws, only that they may take the Licence to disobey them. In brief, the main Mystery of all this niceness (though themselves have not wit enough to ob­serve its first causes) is, for the most part, nothing but a little pride and vain-glory: It is a glorious thing to suffer for a tender Conscience, and therefore it is easie and natural for some people to affect some little scruples against the Commands of Authority, thereby to make themselves obnoxious to some little Penalties; and then what godly men are they that are so ready to be punished for a good Consci­ence? How do such men hug and nurse their dear scruple? All the reason, and all the perswasion in the World shall never be able to wrest it from them. It is their Ephod and their Teraphim, the only [Page 279] mark of their Godliness, and symbol of their Religion; and if you rob them of that, you take away their gods: And what have they more?

Sect. 3. If my Conscience be really weak and tender, What can become it more than humble obedience and submis­sion to Authority? Weakness of Con­science always proceeds in some measure from want of wit; and therefore to make this the pretence of disobedience, is in effect to say, I will controul the wisdom of my Superiours, because I have little or none my self. Certainly, where persons have any serious sense of their own ignorance, they can scarce have a stronger obligation to obedience: And they can never be so confident in any action, as when they obey; because then they have the Publick Wisdom to war­rant them, and their own Folly to ex­cuse them: That is, they follow the best guide men are capable of, in their Circumstances. And a Subject that is Conscious of his own weakness, when he resigns up himself to the Wisdom of his Superiours, in matters doubtful and disputable, is in effect governed by [Page 280] the best and safest Dictates of his own Conscience; which, unless it be hardned with pride and insolence, cannot but perswade him, that he ought to presume them more competent Judges of the fit­ness and expediency of Publick Laws, whose work and office it is to under­stand them, than himself, who is wholly ignorant of the management and trans­action of Publick Affairs. This is the most common Principle of humane life, and all men practise by it in all their concerns, but those of Religion. And that is the reason it has ever been de­bauched with so many follies and fren­zies, because silly people will not submit their Consciences to any thing but their own giddy Imaginations: Whereas, if they would but condescend to the same Rules of Government in matters of Re­ligion, as they do in all their other af­fairs, obedience to Authority might be secured without any violence to Consci­ence; seeing no Conscience, that is acted by wise and sober perswasions, will ever be stiff in doubtful and uncertain Cases, against the determinations of the Publick Wisdom: Because such men being sensible how unable they are to go­vern [Page 281] themselves, they know they can never act more safely, than when they are governed by their Superiors: And be­ing they cannot pretend to trust con­fidently enough to their own conduct, how can they proceed upon wiser and more reasonable grounds, than by com­mitting themselves to the Publick Wis­dom? In which, though possibly they might be misguided, yet they may secure themselves, that, God who values inte­grity more than subtilty, will pardon their weakness, and reward their meek­ness and humility. But for a man to plead weakness of Conscience for disobedience to Government, is just as if a Child in Minority should reject the advice of his Guardians, because he has not wit enough to know, when he is well advised; or as if a Fool should refuse to be governed, be­cause he has not reason enough to discern when he is well managed; or as if a Blind Man should not trust to the conduct of a Guide, because he is not able to judge when he is misled.

Humility and Condescension are the most proper duties of weakness and ignorance, and meekness, and simplicity the only ornaments of a tender Consci­ence: [Page 282] And one would think that men, whose confidence exceeds not their wit, should be strangely wary of censuring the wisdom of Authority. And there­fore it is but a very odd pretence to weak­ness of Conscience, when it appears in nothing but being too strong for Govern­ment; and that man that pretends to it, does not seriously believe himself, if he presumes he is wise enough to govern his Governors: And so does every one, that thinks the perswasions of his own mind of sufficient force to cancel the obligati­ons of their commands. It is an hand­som piece of modesty for one, who pre­tends to weakness of Conscience, when his Prince requires his obedience to give him counsel, to advise him how to go­vern the Kingdom, to blame and cor­rect the Laws, and to tell him how this and the other might be mended. And, What can be more fulsom, than to see men, under pretences of great strictness and severity of Conscience, to cherish stubbornness and vanity, and to endure neither Laws nor Superiours, because they are proud enough to think them­selves more Holy than their Neighbours? What a malapert and insolent piece of [Page 283] pride is it, for every Prating Gossip and illiterate Mechanick (that can mark themselves with some distinctive names and Characters of Godliness) to scoff and jibe at the wisdom of publick Au­thority, to affront the Laws and Consti­tutions of a Church, to pity and disdain the lamentable ignorance of Learned Men, and to Libel all sorts of people that are not of their own Rendez-vous (especially their Superiors) with slanders and idle stories? What strange effects are these of a diffident and timorous Conscience? A Conscience that knows it self to be acted by certain and infal­lible Principles, how could it be more head-strong and confident? And there­fore, if we compare these mens practices with their pretences, What can be more evident, than that it is not Tenderness of Conscience that emboldens them to fall out with all the World, but pride, and vanity, and insolence? For nothing else could possibly drive them on with so pe­remptory a sail, against so strong and so united a torrent. For a Conscience, that is only weak and tender, is of a yielding and pliable temper, it is soft and inno­cent modest, and teachable, apt to com­ply [Page 284] with the Commands of its Superi­ours, and easily capable of all impres­sions tending to Peace and Charity; but when it is stubborn and confident in its own apprehensions, then it is not tender, but hardy and humoursom: And, as queasie as it is in reference to its Superi­ours Commands, it is usually strong enough to digest Rebellion and Villany; and whilst it rises against a poor innocent Ceremony, it is scarce ever stirred with Schism, Faction, and Cruelty. Now to permit these men their liberty, who mistake insolence for tenderness of Conscience, (than which nothing more easie, or more natural for people, that are both proud and simple) is to suffer ignorance to ride in Triumph, because it is proud and confident; and to in­dulge zealous Idiots in their folly, be­cause they threaten Authority, to be peevish and scrupulous to their Laws, and to infest their Government with a sullen and cross-grain'd Godliness (an Artifice not much unlike the tricks of some froward Children) and therefore such untoward and humoursom Saints must be lashed out of their sullenness (as Children are) into compliance and [Page 285] better manners; otherwise they will be an eternal annoyance to all Government, with the childish and whining pretences of a weak and crasie Conscience. In brief, I appeal to all mankind (that have but any tolerable conception of the nature and design of Religion) Whe­ther it be not much more becoming the temper of a Christian Spirit, to comply with the commands of their Superiors, that are not apparently sinful, in order to the Peace and Setlement of the Church, than to disturb its quiet by a stubborn and peremptory adherence to our own Doubts and Scruples? For, What is there in Christianity of greater importance, than the vertues of meek­ness, peaceableness, and humility? And in what can these great duties more dis­cover themselves, than in the offices and civilities of humble Obedience; that contains in it all that is most amiable, and most useful in the Christian Religi­on? 'Tis modesty, 'tis meekness, 'tis hu­mility, 'tis love, 'tis peacebleness, 'tis ingenuity; 'Tis a duty so pregnant with Vertue in it self, and of such absolute necessity to the happiness of mankind, That there is scarce anything can come in [Page 286] competition with it, whose obligation it will not at the first appearance utterly cancel and evacuate, (as I shall more fully demonstrate in the ensuing Propositions.) In the mean while we see, what is to be done in the case of tender Consciences: If they are acted by calm and peaceable Principles, they will not desire liberty; if they are not, they will not deserve it. For, if they are humble and modest, they will chuse to submit to the will of their Superiors, rather than, by thwart­ing them, do what in themselves lies to discompose the publick Peace. And therefore if they will rather venture to embroil the Common-wealth, and con­tradict Authority, than forego their own peremptory Determinations, and make their Superiors comply and bend to their confidence; it is because they are cri­minally bold and imperious in their own conceits, and are of a temper too stub­born, insolent, and presumptuous to be endured in any Society of men.

Sect. 4. Doubts and Scruples are so far from being sufficient Warranty of dis­obedience, that they are outweighed by the Obligations of the Law: For if I [Page 287] doubt concerning the injustice of my action, I must also of necessity doubt of the injustice of my disobedience; and unless I am absolutely certain that the Law is evil, I am sure disobedience to it is: And therefore I am always as forcibly bound to obey a scrupled Law, for fear of the sin of disobedience, as to disobey it, for fear it commands an essen­tial evil: So that a doubting Conscience must always at least as much fright us from disobeying, as from obeying any Humane Law. Though indeed, if we would speak properly, the commands of Authority perfectly determine, and evacuate all doubtfulness and irresolu­tion of Conscience: For, if it before hung in suspence concerning the lawful­ness of the action, and unresolved, Whe­ther it were good or evil, as not having competent reason to incline to one side rather than to the other; yet when Au­thority casts its commands into the Scale (if in some mens Consciences they weigh any thing) they cannot but add weight more than enough to determine the Judgment, and incline the Balance. For if the Reasons on both sides were equal before, than thet side that gains this ac­cession [Page 288] has most reason now. So that Laws do not force us to obey them with a doubting Conscience, but remove our doubts at the same time they require our obedience; because they destroy the equal probability of the two opinions, and determine the Conscience to a con­fidence of acting, by directing it to fol­low the safest and most probable perswa­sion: In that no practice or opinion, that is capable of doubt or uncertainty, can be of equal importance with the prime Duties of obedience and humi­lity; and the matter of all doubts and scruples is ever of too small and inconsi­derable a consequence to be laid in the Balance against the great and weighty mischiefs of disobedience. If indeed the commands of Authority enjoyned any thing absolutely and apparently evil, and against the great and unalterable Rules of truth and goodness, in such exigents Da veniam Imperator would be a fair and civil excuse: But matters of a less im­portance will not pay the charges of a persecution, it is not worth the while to suffer for little things; and that man has but the just reward of his own folly, that would suffer Martyrdom in the cause of [Page 289] an indifferent Ceremony, or for the truth of a Metaphysical Notion. And the sug­gestion of Optatus to the Donatists, who were so forward to cast away their lives in defence of their little Schism, was smart and severe. Lib. 3. Nulli di­ctum est, nega Deum; nulli di­ctum est, incende Testamentum; nulli di­ctum est, aut thus pone, aut Basilicas dirue. Istae enim res solent Martyria generare. Matters, wherein the Being of Religion, and the Truth of Christianity, were di­rectly concerned, were worth the dying for, and would quit the costs of Martyr­dom; but no indifferent Rites or Cere­monies were of value enough to pay for the lives of men: And the Zealots of the Pars Donati, who were so ambitious to suffer Imprisonment, Confiscation of Goods, Banishment, and Death it self, out of a pertinacious resolution against some established customs and usages of the Church, could never be rewarded in any other Heaven, but the Paradise of Fools. Things that are essentially evil, no change or variety of Circumstances can make good; and therefore no com­mands of any Superior can ever warrant or legitimate their practice: But then [Page 290] these are always matters of the greatest and most weighty importance, and of an apparent and palpable obliquity, such as Blasphemy, Murther, Injustice, Cruel­ty, Ingratitude, &c. that are so clearly and intrinsically evil, that no end, how good or great soever, can ever carry with it goodness enough to abate or evacuate their Malice. But as for all matters, that are not so apparently good or evil, but are capable of doubt and uncertainty, their Morality is of so small importance, that it can never stand in competition with the obligations and conveniences of the great Duty of obedience. And thus when the Apostles were forbidden by the Jew­ish Sanhedrim to Preach the Name of Iesus, Acts 5. 29. they desired to be ex­cused, upon no other account but of an express command from God himself, in a matter of great importance, and ap­parent necessity. Our Blessed Saviour coming into the World with a Commis­sion from its Supream Governour to make Laws, and the Holy Apostles ha­ving an infallible assurance of his Divine Authority from his great, manifest, and undeniable Miracles (the most certain and unquestionable credentials that Hea­ven [Page 291] can send to the Sons of Men) they could not but lie under an indispensable obligation to give assent to his Message, and obedience to his Commands; and that out of duty to the Supream Gover­nour of the Universe; from whose un­questionable Laws, no other Authority can ever derogate, because it is all of an inferiour nature. But to apply this Rule, which the Apostles never made use of, but in a case of certain, absolute, and no­torious injustice, to matters of a small, doubtful, and uncertain nature, is abso­lutely inconsistent with the quiet of Go­vernment, and infinitely distant from the intention of the Apostles. Their Plea was in a case of great, evident, and un­questionable necessity: But what war­rant is that for my disobedience, when I only fear, or fancy the Law to be unjust? Which, if it were so, is not of moment enough to weigh against the mischiefs and enormities, that follow upon disobe­dience: And therefore in all doubtful and less considerable cases, that side, on which obedience stands, must ever carry it; and no man that is either wise or good, will ever trouble his Governours, with nice and curious disputes; the Au­thority [Page 292] of the Law stifles all scruples, and trifling objections. And thus where there was no apparent repugnancy to the Law of God, we find none more compli­ant and conformable in all other things than the Apostles, freely using any Cu­stoms of the Synagogue or Iewish Church, that were not expresly cancelled by some Divine Prohibition.

But further, this their Apology is as forcible a Plea in concerns of Civil Ju­stice and common honesty, as in Mat­ters of Religion; it holds equally in both, in cases of a certain and essential injustice, and fails equally in both, in doubtful and less material cases; and was as fairly urged by that famous Lawyer Papinian, who upon this account, when the Emperor commanded him to defend and justifie the lawfulness of Parricide, chose rather to die, than to Patronize so monstrous a villany: Here the wick­edness was great and palpable. But in matters more doubtful and less material, where the case is nice and curious, and not capable of any great Interest, or great reason, there Obedience out­weighs and evacuates all Doubts, Jea­lousies, and suspicions: And what wise [Page 293] or honest man will offend, or provoke his Superiours upon thin pretences, and for little regards? And if every man, that can raise doubts and scruples, and nice Exceptions against a Law, shall therefore set himself free from its obligation; then farewel all Peace, and all Government. For what more easie to any man, that understands the Fundamental Grounds and Reasons of Moral Equity, than to pick more material quarrels against the Civil Laws of any Common-wealth, than our Adversaries can pretend to against our Ecclesiastical Constitutions? And now, shall a Philosopher be excused from obedience to the Laws of his Coun­try, because he thinks himself able to make exceptions to their Prudence and Convenience, and to prove them not so useful to the Publick, nor so agreeable to the Fundamental Rules of natural Justice and Equity, as himself could have contrived? What if I am really perswaded, that I can raise much more considerable objections against Littletons Tenures, than ever these men have, or shall be able to produce against our Ce­remonial Constitutions? Though it be easie to be mistaken in my conceit, yet [Page 294] whether I am, or am not, it is all one, if I am confident. And now it would be mightily conducive to the interests of Justice and Publick Peace for me, and all others of my Fond Perswasion in this particular, to make Remonstrances to the Laws of the Land, to Petition the King and Parliament; to leave us, at the liberty of our own Conscience and Dis­cretion, to follow the best Light, God has given us, for the setlement of our own estates; because we think we can do it more exactly according to the Laws of Natural Iustice, than if we are tied up to the positive Laws of the Land. Thus that groundless and arbitrary maxim of the Law, That inheritances may lineally descend, but not lineally ascend, whereby the Father is made uncapable of being immediate Heir to the Son, would be thought by a Philosopher prejudicial to one of the most equal and most ingenu­ous Laws of Nature, viz. The gratitude of Children to Parents; which this Law seems in a great measure to hinder, by alienating those things from them, where­by we are best able to express it. What if I have been happy in a loving and ten­der Father, that has been strangely soli­citous [Page 295] to leave me furnished with all the comforts and conveniences of life, that declined not to forego any share of his own ease and happiness to procure mine, that has spent the greatest part of his care and industry to bless me, according to the proportion of his abilities, with a good fortune, and a good education; and has, perhaps out of an over-tender solicitude for my welfare, reduc'd himself to great streights and exigences: How monstrous & unnatural must the contri­vance of this Law appear to me, that, when the bounty of Providence has blest me with a fortune answerable to the good old Mans desires and endeavours, if I should happen to be cut off before him by an untimely death, all that, whereby I am able to recompence his Fatherly tenderness, should in the common and ordinary course of Law be conveyed from him to another person; the stream of whose affections was confined to an­other Channel, and who, being much concerned for his own Family, could in all probability be but little concerned for me? What an unnatural and unjust Law is this that designs, as far as it can, to cut off the streams of our natural Af­fections, [Page 296] and disposes of our possessions contrary to the very first tendencies, and obligations of Nature? So easie a thing is it to talk little Plausibilities against any Laws, whose obligation is positive, and not of a prime and absolute necessity: And yet down-right Rebellion it would be, if I, or any man else, should refuse subjection to these and the like Laws, up­on these, & the like pretences. And thus, we see, is the case all the way equal be­tween Laws Civil, and Laws Ecclesiasti­cal. In all matters greatly and notori­ously wicked, the nature of the action out-weighs the duty of Obedience; but in all cases less certain and less material, the duty of Obedience out-weighs the nature of the action. And this may suf­fice to shew, from the Subject Matters of all doubts and scruples, That they are not of consideration great enough to be op­posed to the commands of Authority. And this leads me from the matter of a scrupulous Conscience, to consider its Au­thority: And therefore,

Sect. 5. As the objects of a scrupulous Conscience are of too mean importance, to weigh against the mischiefs of Disobe­dience; [Page 297] so are its obligations too weak, to prevail against the commands of Pub­lick Authority. For when two contra­dictory obligations happen to encounter, the greater ever cancels the less; because if all good be eligible, then so are all the degrees of goodness too: And therefore to that side on which the greater good stands, our duty must ever incline; other­wise we despise all those degrees of goodness, it contains in it above the other. For in all the Rules of Goodness there is great inequality and variety of degrees, some are prescribed for their own native excellency & usefulness, and others purely for their subserviency to these: Now when a greater & a lesser vir­tue happen to clash, as it frequently falls out in the transaction of Humane Affairs, there the less always gives place to the greater, because it is good only in order to it; and therefore where its subordination ceases, there its goodness ceases, and by consequence its obligation. For no subor­dinate or instrumental dutys are absolut­ly commanded or commended, but be­come good or evil by their Accidental Re­lations; their goodness is not intrinsick, but depends upon the goodness of their end, [Page 298] and their being directed to a good end, (if they are not intrinsically evil) makes them virtuous; because their Morality is entirely relative and changeable, and so alters its colours of good and evil, by its several aspects and postures to va­rious and different ends: And therefore they never carry any Obligation in them, when they interfere with higher & more useful Duties. And hence it comes to pass, that it is absolutely impossible for any man to be reduced into a necessity of sinning; because, though two inferiour and subordinate Duties may sometimes happen to be inconsistent with each other or with some duty of an absolute and un­alterable goodness; yet the nature of things is so handsomly contrived, that it is utterly impossible that things should ever happen so crosly, as to make two essential and indispensable Duties stand at mutual opposit on: And therefore no man can ever be forc'd to act against one, out of compliance with the other: And if there be any contrariety between a na­tural and instrumental Duty, there the case is plain, that the greater evacuates the less; if between two instrumental Duties, it can scarce so fall out, but that [Page 299] some emergent circumstances shall make one of them the more necessary; but if they are both equally eligible, there is no difficulty; and a man may do as he pleases. It is indeed possible for any man, by his own voluntary choice to entangle himself in this sad perplexity; but there is no culpable Error that is unavoidable, and every sinfully erroneous Conscience is voluntary and vincible: And if men will not part with their sinful Errors, it is not because they cannot, but because they will not avoid them. And if they resolve to abuse themselves, no wonder, if their sin be unavoidable; but then the necessity is the effect of their own choice: And so all sin is inevitable, when the peremptory determination of the will, has made it necessary. But as for the nature of all the Laws of Goodness in themselves, they are so wisely contrived, that it is ab­solutely impossible any circumstances should ever fall out so awkardly, as to make one sin the only way to escape a­nother, or a necessary passage to a neces­sary Duty. Now to apply this general Rule of Conscience to our particular case, there is not any Precept in the Go­spel set down in more positive and un­limited [Page 300] expressions, or urged with more vehement motives and perswasions, than obedience to Government; because there are but few, if any, Duties of a weightier and more important necessity than this: And for this reason is it, that God has injoined it with such an abso­lute and unrestrained severity, thereby to intimate that nothing can restrain the u­niversality of its obligatory power, but evident & unquestionable disobedience to himself. The duty of Obedience is the original and Fundamental Law of Humane Societies, and the only advan­tage that distinguishes Government from Anarchy. This takes away all dissentions, by reducing every mans private will and judgment to the determination of Pub­lick Authority: Whereas, without it, e­very single person is his own Governour, and no man else has any power or com­mand over his actions, i. e. He is out of the state of Government, and Society. And for this reason is obedience, and condescension to the wisdom of Pub­lick Authority, one of the most abso­lute and indispensable duties of man­kind, as being so indispensably necessary to the peace and preservation of Humane [Page 301] Societies. Now a Conscience, that will not stand to the Decrees and Determina­tions of its Governors, subverts the very Foundations of all Civil Society, that subsists upon no other principle, but mens submitting their own judgments to the decisions of Authority, in order to the publick peace and setlement; without which there must of necessity be eternal disorders and confusions. And there­fore, where the Dictates of a private Conscience happen to thwart the deter­minations of the publick Laws, they, in that case, lose their binding power; be­cause, if in that case they should oblige, it would unavoidably involve all Socie­ties in perpetual tumults and disorders. Whereas the main end of all Divine, as well as Humane Laws, is the prosperity and preservation of Humane Society: So that where any thing tends to the disso­lution of Government, and undermin­ing of Humane happiness, though in o­ther circumstances it were virtuous, yet in this it becomes criminal, as destroy­ing a thing of greater goodness than it self. And hence, though a doubtful and scrupulous Conscience should oblige in all other cases, yet, when its commands [Page 302] run counter to the commands of Autho­rity, there its obligatory power immedi­ately ceases; because to act against it, is useful to vastly more noble and ex­cellent purposes, than to comply with it: In that every man that thwarts and dis­obeys the Laws of the Common-wealth, does his part to disturb its Publick Peace, that is maintained by nothing else but obedience and submission to its Laws. Now this is manifestly a bigger mischief and inconvenience, than the foregoing of any doubts and scruples can amount to: And therefore, unless Authority impose upon me something that carries with it more evil and mischief, than there is convenience in the peace and happiness of the whole Society, I am indispensably bound to yield obedience to his com­mands: And though I scrupulously fear lest the Magistrates injunctions should be superstitious, yet, because I am not sure they are so, and because a little ir­regularity in the external expressions of Divine Worship carries with it less mis­chief and enormity, than the disturbance of the Peace of Kingdoms, I am abso­lutely obliged to lay aside my doubt, ra­ther than disobey the Law; because to [Page 303] preserve it, naturally tends to vast mis­chiefs and confusion; whereas the in­convenience of my acting against it, is but doubtful; and though it were certain, yet it is small and comparatively incon­siderable. And therefore to act against the inclinations of our own doubts and scruples, is so far from being criminal, that it is an eminent instance of Virtue, and implies in it, besides its subserviency to the welfare of mankind, the great du­ties of Modesty, Peaceableness, and Hu­mility. And as for, what some are forward enough to object, that this is, To do evil, that good may come of it; it is a vain and frivolous exception, and prevented in what I have already discoursed; in that that Rule is concerned only in things ab­solutely and essentially evil, whose na­ture no case can alter, no circumstance can extenuate, and no end can sanctifie: But things that are only subserviently good or evil, derive all their Virtue from the greater Virtue they wait upon; and therefore where a meaner, or an instru­mental duty stands in competition with an essential Virtue, its contrariety de­stroys its goodness; and instead of being less virtuous, becomes altogether sinful; [Page 304] for though it have abstractedly some de­grees of goodness, yet when it chances to oppose any duty, that has more, and more excellent degrees, it becomes evil and unreasonable, by as many degrees as that excels it. And one would think this case should be past dispute, as to the matters of our present Controversie, that are of so vast a distance and disproporti­on; forasmuch as obedience is a virtue of so absolute necessity, and so diffu­sive usefulness; whereas the goodness of those little things, they oppose to it, is so small, that it is confessedly scarce dis­cernable; and their Consciences, as nice and curious as they are, not able to determine positively, whether they are good or evil: And therefore, what a prodigious madness is it, to weigh such trifling and contemptible things against the vast mischiefs and inconveniences of disobedience? The voice of the publick Laws cannot but drown the uncertain whispers of a tender Conscience; all its scruples are hushed and silenced by the commands of Authority: It dares not whimper, when that forbids; and the nod of a Prince aws it into silence and submission. But if they dare to murmur, [Page 305] and their proud stomachs will swell against the rebukes of their Superiors, then there is no remedy but the rod and correction: They must be chastised out of their peevishness, and lashed into obedi­ence. In a word, though Religion so high­ly consults the interests of Common-wealths, and is the greatest instrument of the peace & happiness of Kingdoms; yet so monstrously has it been abused by the folly of some, and wickedness of others, that nothing in the world has been the mother of more mischief to Government. The main cause of which has been mens not observing the due scale and subordi­nation of duties, and that, in case of com­petition, the greater always destroys the less: For hence have they opposed the Laws, and by consequence the peace of the Society, for an Opinion, or a Cere­mony, or a subordinate instrumental du­ty; whereas, had they soberly considered the important necessity of their obedi­ence, they would scarce have found any duty of moment enough to weigh against it. For seeing almost all virtues are injoin­ed us in order to the felicity of man, and seeing there is nothing more conducive to it, than that which tends to the Publick [Page 306] weal and good of all; and seeing this is the design, and natural tendency of the Publick Laws, and our obedience to them; that had need be hugely, certain­ly, and absolutely evil, that cancels their obligation, and dispences with our obe­dience; and not a Form, or a Ceremo­ny, or an outward expression, or any other instrumental part of Religion. But some menthink it better to be disputative than peaceable; and that there is more godliness in being captious and talka­tive, than in being humble and obedi­ent: It is a pleasure to them to be trou­blesome to Authority, they beat about, and search into every little corner, for doubts & exceptions against their com­mands: And how do they triumph, when they can but start a scruple? They labour to stumble at Atoms, to boggle at straws and shadows; and cherish their scruples till they become as big as they are unreasonable, and lay so much stress upon them, as to make them out-weigh the greatest and most weighty things of the Law. And it is prodigiously strange (and yet as common too) to consider how most men, who pretend (and that perhaps sincerely) to great tenderness of [Page 307] Conscience, and scruple postures and innocent ceremonies, are so hardy as to digest the most wicked and most mis­chievous villanies: They can dispence with spightfulness, malice, disobedi­ence, schism, and disturbance of the Publick Peace, and all, to nourish a weak and an impotent scruple; and in pursuit of any little conceit, they will run themselves into the greatest and most palpable enormities; and will cherish it, till it weighs down the peace of King­doms, and Fundamental Principles of common honesty. Find me a man that is obstinately scrupulous, and I will shew you one that is incurably seditious; and whoever will prefer his scruples be­fore the great duties of obedience, peace, quietness, and humility, can­not avoid being often betrayed into tumults and seditions. But if we will resolve to be tender of our obedi­ence to the great, undoubted, and unal­terable commands of the Gospel; that will defend our Consciences against the vexation of scruples, and little inadver­tencies, protect the publick from all the disturbances of a peevish and wayward godliness, and secure our acceptance [Page 308] with God, without being so punctual and exact in the Offerings of Mint and Cummin.

Sect. 6. In cases and disputes of a pub­lick concern, private men are not pro­perly sui Iuris, they have no power over their own actions, they are not to be directed by their own judgments, or de­termined by their own wills; but by the commands and determinations of the Publick Conscience. And if there be any sin in the command, he that imposed it, shall answer for it; and not I, whose whole Duty it is to obey: The com­mands of Authority will warrant my obedience, my obedience will hallow, or at least excuse my action, and so secure me from sin, if not from error; because I follow the best guide, and most probable direction I am capable of: And though I may mistake, my integrity shall preserve my innocence. And in all doubtful and disputable cases it is better to erre with Authority, than be in the right against it; not only, because the danger of a lit­tle error (and so it is, if it be disputable) is out-weighed by the importance of the great duty of obedience, that is more [Page 309] serviceable to the main ends of Religion, than a more nice and exact way of act­ing in opposition to Government; but also, because they are to be supposed the fittest Judges of what tends to the Pub­lick Good, whose business it is to un­derstand Publick Affairs: And therefore in all such matters, their commands are the supream Rule of Conscience, as being more competent Judges of Publick Concerns, than mens own private per­swasions; and so must have a Superior Authority over them, and bind them to yield and submit to their determinations. And, if we take away this Condescension of our Private Consciences to Publick Authority, we immediately dissolve all Government; for in case of dissention, unless we submit our perswasions to their commands, their commands must sub­mit to our perswasions. And then, let any man tell me, Wherein consists the power of Princes, when it may be con­trolled by every Subjects opinion? and what can follow, but perfect disorder and confusion, when every man will be go­verned by nothing but his own conceits? And if Subjects may be allowed to di­spute the prudence and convenience of [Page 310] all Laws, Government would be but a weak and helpless thing, and Princes would command at the will and plea­sure of their Subjects. And, therefore people are never curious in their excep­tions against any Publick Laws, unless in matters of Religion; and, in that case they study for Reasons to disobey, be­cause it gratifies their pride & vanity, to seem more knowing than their Gover­nours in that part of wisdom, that they think most valuable. Self-conceit and Spiritual Pride are strange Temptations to Disobedience; and, were there not something of this in it, men would find out other commands more liable to their exceptions. For how seldom is it, that any Wars are commenced upon just and warrantable grounds? And yet, how few are they, that take upon them to judge their lawfulness? All men here think their Princes command a sufficient warrant to serve him, and satisfie them­selves in this, that, in case the cause prove to be unjust, the fault liesentirely upon him that commands, and not at all on him who has nothing to do but obey. And if it were otherwise, that no Subject were bound to take up Arms till [Page 311] himself had approved the justness of the cause, Commonwealths must be bravely secured, and their safety must lie at the mercy of every humorsome and pragma­tical Fellow. And yet to this piece of ar­rogance do men tempt themselves, when they affect to be thought more godly than their Neighbors. It is a gallant thing to understand Religion better than their Superiors, and to pity their ignorance in the great Mysteries of the Gospel, and by seeming to compassionate their weak­ness, to despise their Authority. But if Princes will suffer themselves to be con­troul'd by the pride and insolence of these contentious Zealots, they do but tempt them to slight both their persons, and their Government; and if they will en­dure to be checked in their Laws Spiri­tual, and Government of the Church, by every Systematical Theologue, (and most, not to say the best, of our Ad­versaries are little better) they may as well bear, to see themselves affronted in their Laws Civil, and Government of the State by every Village-Attorney, and Solicitor.

Well then, all men that are in a state of Government are bound, in all matters [Page 312] doubtful and disputable, to submit the dictates of Private Conscience to the determinations of Publick Authority. Nor does this oblige any man to act a­gainst the dictates of his own Conscience, but only, by altering the case, alters his perswasions, i.e. though every man, con­sidered absolutely, and by himself, be bound to follow his own private judg­ment; yet when he is considered as the member of a Society, then must be go­vern'd, then he must of necessity be bound to submit his own private thoughts to publick determinations. And it is the di­ctate of every mans Conscience, that is not turbulent and seditious, that it ought in all things that are not of a great & ap­parent necessity, whatever its own private judgment of them is, to acquiesce in the determinations of its Governors, in or­der to publick peace and unity. For unless this be done, there can be nothing but eternal disorders and confusions in the Church; in that it is utterly impossible that all men should have the same appre­hensions of things, and (considering the tempers and passions of mankind) as impossible, that they should not pursue their differences and controversies with [Page 313] too much heat & vehemence: And there­fore unless whatever their own judg­ments and apprehensions be, they are bound in all such cases to acquiesce in the decisions and determinations of the Go­vernors of the Church, or Common-wealth, in order to its peace and setle­ment, there can be no possible way of a­voiding endless squabbles and confusions. And unless this be a fundamental Rule & dictate of every mans Conscience, that as he is bound in all doubtful cases to follow the [...], or the best result of his own private perswasions, where he nei­ther has, nor is obliged to have, any other guide or rule of his actions; so he is bound to forego them all (provided his plain and necessary duty be secured) out of obedience to Authority, and in order to the due Government of the So­ciety; there never can be any peace or setlement in any Church or Common-wealth in the world. And every Consci­ence that is not thus perswaded, is upon that account to be reckoned as seditious and unpeaceable, and so to be treated accordingly.

Sect. 7. He that with an implicite Faith [Page 314] and confidence, resigns up his own Rea­son to any Superior on earth in all things, is a Fool; and he is as great a Fool, (to say no worse) that will do it in nothing: For as all men are immediately subject to God alone, in matters of indispensable duty, (that are not at all concern'd in our present dispute) so are they, in all other things, to condescend to the Decrees and determinations of their lawful Superiors. Neither is this, to put men upon that supream Folly of renouncing the use and guidance of their own Reasons out of obedience to any mans infallibility. For by Reason we mean nothing but, the mind of man making use of the wisest and most prudential methods, to guid it self in all its actions; and therefore it is not confined to any sort of Maxims and Principles in Philosophy, but it extends it self to any knowledge that may be gained by Prudence, Experience, and Observation. And hence right Rea­son, when it is imploy'd about the actions of men, is nothing else but Prudence and Discretion: Now the Reason of any wise and sober man will tell him, that it is most Prudent, Discreet, and Reason­able, to forego his own private perswa­sions [Page 315] in things doubtful and disputable, out of obedience to his lawful Superi­ours; because, without this the World can never be governed. And supposing mens judgments and understandings to be never so much above the Iurisdiction of all Humane Authority, and that no man can be bound to submit his Reason to any thing but the Commands of God; yet every man ows at least so much civi­lity to the will of his Prince, and the peace of his Country, as to bring him­self to a compliance and submission to the Publick Judgment, rather than to disturb the Publick Peace, for the grati­fication of his own Fancy and Opinion. Which is no enslaving of his Reason to any mans usurpation over his Faith and Conscience, but only a bringing it to a modest compliance, in order to the common interests of Humane Society: And if it be not a duty of subjection, yet it is one of peaceableness; and if it be not grounded upon our obligations to the Authority it self, yet it is most clearly de­rived from an higher Obligation, that all men are under, to advance the welfare of mankind, and more particularly of that Society they live in, that is antece­dent [Page 316] to those of Government, which is instituted only in order to the common good: And therefore, though our duty in such cases could not be deduced from our obligation to any humane Au­thority, yet it clearly arises from that duty of Charity we owe to our Fellow Creatures. And though we are not to submit our Vnderstandings to any Hu­mane Power, yet we are to the first and Fundamental Laws of Charity: which being one of the greatest duties of man­kind, it is but reasonable to forego all more private and inferior obligations, when they stand in competition with it. And thus St. Paul, notwithstanding he declaimed with so much vehemence against the observation of the Judaical Rites and Ceremonies, never scrupled to use them, as oft as it was serviceable to the advancement of the Christian Reli­gion, and by consequence the good of mankind. And all I would perswade men to, is only that they would do as much out of duty, as St. Paul did out of civi­lity; that as he complied with the ap­prehensions of the Jews, retaining his own private judgment to himself, for the greater advantage of Religion; so [Page 317] they would, whatever their own perswa­sions are of some things not clearly and absolutely sinful, comply with the deter­minations of their Governours, when it is conducive to the nobler ends of Pub­lick Peace and Tranquillity: A thing in it self so good and so necessary, that there are very few actions, that it will not render virtuous, whatever they are in themselves, whenever they happen to be useful and instrumental to its attainment. And therefore in all matters (that are no indispensable duties of Religion) he, that acts cross to the commands of Authority, has no sense either of the great ends of Order and Government, or great duties of Humanity, Modest, Peaceableness, Meekness, and Civility, i. e. He is a proud and factious person; and has no other motive so to do, but the pleasure of being peevish and disobedient.

In fine, there is a vast difference be­tween Liberty, and Authority of Consci­ence; the former consists in the Freedom of a mans own judgment, and of this no Magistrate can deprive us, in that he can­not tie up any mans understanding from judging of things as himself pleaseth: But as for the latter, that consists in the [Page 318] power over mens outward actions, and this, as far as it concerns all publick af­fairs, every man does, and of necessity must pass away to the Rulers of that So­ciety he lives in: Because (though I have said it often enough already, yet too of­ten I cannot say it, in that it is the main Key of the Controversie, and yet but lit­tle, if at all regarded by our Adversaries) the very nature of Government consists in nothing else but a power of command over mens actions; and therefore un­less all men grant it away to their Gover­nours, they live not under Government, but in a state of Anarchy: Every man will be Prince and Monarch to himself, and as free from all commands, as if he lived out of all Society; seeing only him­self shall have any real Dominion over his own actions, and his Governours shall not have power to command him any thing, but what himself first thinks fit to do: And I hope I need not to prove, that this is a plain dissolution of all Go­vernment. So that when men will be the absolute Masters of their own actions, it is not the freedom of Conscience, but its power and sovereignty, for which they contend; they will endure none to rule [Page 319] over them but themselves, and force Princes to submit their Laws to their saucy and imperious humour: And it is this they mean by their pretence to a tender Conscience, i. e. A Conscience that scruples to be subject to Govern­ment, that will in spight of all Publick Laws be entirely at its own Liberty, that will not submit it self to any Rule but its own private perswasions, that affects to be nice and squeamish against all the commands of its Superiours, and loves to censure them upon the lightest and most slender presumptions, and that will not yield up any thing of its own phanta­stick humour to its Princes will, or the Churches Peace, i. e. in effect, the ten­derness of their Consciences (for which, forsooth, they must be born with) consists in nothing else but their being the great­est and most Notorious Hereticks. For the rankest sort of Heresie is nothing but the product of a peevish and contentious Spirit; and an Heretick is one that de­lights in Quarrels and Factions; whence Erasmus renders S. Pauls [...] Sectarum Author, a man that loves to be the Leader of a Party: It is peevishness and obstinacy of will that turns small [Page 320] Errors into great Heresies. Pride and Passion, and whatsoever can make an opinion vicious, are its Fundamental In­gredients, and give it its essential Forma­lity. This vice lies not so much in the Opinions, as in the tempers of men, it is a stubborn and refractory disposition of mind, or a peremptoriness in a mans own conceptions; and therefore it is by Saint Paul reckon'd among the Fruits of the Flesh, as being a kind of brutish peevish­ness, that is directly opposed to that leni­ty and yieldingness of mind, that is one of the choicest Fruits of the Spirit; whence he advises not to confute, but to admonish such an one, i. e. That is quar­relsome and boisterous for every trifle, and every fancy, because through Pride and Perversness he is uncapable of in­struction; and therefore can only be ad­vised, and not disputed into Sobriety. Or (to use the phrase of Saint Paul) he is [...], a fellow that is troublesome and contentious, especially about the ex­ternal Rites and Usages of the Church. And such a malapert Non-Conformist he supposes disputing in the Church of Co­rinth, that their Women ought, con­trary to their received Custom, to be un­covered [Page 321] at Divine Service: But he takes him up with this short and peremptory answer, If any man seem to be contentious, we have no such custom, neither the Churches of God, i. e. In things neither morally good nor evil (as few external Rites are) the practice of the Church is the warrant of their lawfulness, and reason of their decency; and that is satisfaction enough to any sober and peaceable mind: And he that shall refractorily persist to con­troul it, must be treated as a disturber of the Peace, i. e. pitied and punished, as are all other turbulent and seditious Per­sons. When mens Consciences are so squeamish or so humorsome, as that they will rise against the Customs and Injuncti­ons of the Church they live in, she must scourge them into order, and chastise them, not so much for their fond perswa­sion, as for their troublesome peevishness. And this use of the Churches Rods and Censures, is so absolutely necessary, that it is the only effectual way to preserve her from Factions and Contentions; not only because upon this sort of men softer me­thods can make no impressions, but also because, if we remove the limits and boundaries of Discipline, there will be [Page 322] no end of the follies and frenzies of brain-sick People: And when they are once let loose, who then can set bounds to the wildnesses of Godly Madness? For this we have too clear a proof in the fran­tick practices of our Modern Sectaries, who, when they had inflamed their little Zeal against the Ceremonial Constituti­ons of our Church, ran themselves into all manner of wild and extravagant gestures: They measured the simplicity of Christs Worship by its opposition to all the Rules of Decency; all Instituti­ons of Order were unwarrantable Inven­tions and Traditions of Men; all Custom was Superstition, and all Discipline was Popish and Antichristian. Novelty, how uncouth and fantastick soever, was their only Rule of Decency; and every Sect distinguished it self from all others, by some affected and new-fangled singula­rity.

And from hence it is, that it is so abso­lutely necessary, that Governors injoin matters of no great moment, and conse­quence in themselves, thereby to avoid the evils that would naturally attend up­on their being not injoined; so that, when they are determined, though perhaps [Page 323] they are not of any great use to the Com­monwealth in themselves, yet they have at least this considerable usefulness, as to prevent many great mischiefs, that would probably follow from their being not determined: And therefore the good­ness of all such Laws is to be valued, not so much by the nature of the things that the Law commands, as by the mischiefs and evil effects, that it prevents or redres­ses. And thus the main decency of Order and Uniformity in Divine Worship lies not so properly in the positive use of the Rites themselves, as in the prevention of all the indecencies of Confusion; which could never be avoided, if there were not some peculiar Rites positively deter­mined. So that the Law we see may be absolutely necessary, when the thing it commands is but meerly indifferent; be­cause some things necessary cannot be obtained, but by some things indifferent: As in our present case, there is an absolute necessity there should be Order and De­cency in Publick Worship, but Order and Decency there cannot be without the determination of some indifferent & particular Circumstances; because, if e­very man were left to his own fancy and [Page 324] humor, there could be no remedy against eternal Follies and Confusions: So that it is in general necessary that some cir­cumstances be determined, though per­haps no one particular circumstance can be necessary; yet when any one is singled out by Authority, it gains as absolute a necessity, as if it were so antecedently; because though the thing it self be indif­ferent, yet the Order and Decency of Publick Worship is not: Which yet can never be provided for, but by determining either this or some other Ceremony as perfectly indifferent and arbitrary. And now upon the result of these particulars, I leave it first to Publick Authority to consider, whether it be not a wonderful­ly wise piece of good nature, to be ten­der & indulgent to these poor tender Con­sciences? And then. I leave it to all the World to judge, Whether ever any Church or Nation in the World has been so wofully disturbed upon such slender and frivolous pretences as ours?

And thus have I at length finished what I designed and undertook, i. e. I have proved the absolute necessity of govern­ing mens Consciences and Perswasions in Matters of Religion, & the unavoidable [Page 325] dangers of tolerating, or keeping up Religious Differences; have shewn, that there is not the least possibility of setling a Nation, but by Uniformity in Religious Worship; that Religion may, and must be governed by the same Rules, as all other Affairs & Transactions of Humane life; and that nothing can do it but se­vere Laws, nor they neither, unless se­verely executed. And so I submit it to the consideration of Publick Authority, and am but little doubtful of the Appro­bation of all that are friends to Peace and Government. But whatever the event may prove to others, it is not a little satis­faction that I reap to my self, in reflect­ing upon that Candor and Integrity, I have used through the whole Discourse: In that, as I have freely and impartially represented the most serious result of mine own thoughts; so withal have I been not a little solicitous, not to baulk any thing material in the Controversie; have encountred all their most weighty and considerable Objections, have pre­vented all manner of escapes and subter­fuges, and have not waved any thing, because it was too hard to be answered; though some things I have, because too [Page 326] easie. And upon review of the whole, I have confidence (perhaps it may be boldness) enough to challenge the Rea­der, if he will but be as ingenuous as he ought, to be as severe as he will; and in defiance to all Enemies of Peace and Go­vernment, of what Name or Sect soever, to conclude all in the words of Pilate to the turbulent Iews, What I have written, I have written.