Mr.
GLANVILL HIS LETTER TO Mr.
SHERLOCK.
I Lately met with Mr.
Ferguson's Book, and was a little surprized to find my self by name concern'd in it, as one of those that had been the occasion of his writing about the
Interest of
Reason in
Religion. I had in my Discourse of
Reason accus'd the Dissenters of decrying the sober use of our Faculties under the misapplied names of
vain Philosophy, carnal Reason, and the
wisdom of this
World; and some others whom he mentions, had spoke to the like purpose: He therefore thought it
necessary that they should vindicate themselves from those aspersions, and endeavour to give a stop to those groundless, and unjust clamours, page 9.
[Page 2]Now whether those Accusations are just or not, I appeal to any one that can remember but twenty years past, and hath been in the least acquainted with the Preaching, Writings, and Discourses of those men in
their times: How far they are reformed since, I do not know; but I have never heard of their Recantations, nor have they taken any care to convince the world that their private Desks are more sober then their publick Pulpits were. On this occasion, Sir, I cannot but take notice, how hard it is to deal with the people of this sort, when we speak or write against their Opinions, Practices, and Declarations, and those that have been most publick and notorious: If there happen to be two, or three, or some very few unknown persons, of a little different temper, they will be ready to flie upon us as false accusers, and such as
traduce the whole
Party for the Extravagancies of a few. Thus you know it hath hapned to some excellent late Books, that have given the most just, and lively descriptions of the humour of Non-conformists, which have been vilified and rayl'd at as slanderous Invectives and Abuses; because some few that go with them, are somewhat less foolish, and extravagant then the rest: According to which Rule, it will be untrue to say, that Lions and Bears are wild and dangerous creatures, because some of them have been tam'd and made gentle: and a man may not affirm the Crow is black, because some are greyish: and now and then a Bird of that species by extraordinary accident may be white. If among the Dissenters there are so many sober Assertors of the necessity, and usefulness of Reason in the affairs of Religion, 'tis very much that they have not all this while stood up, and reprov'd the dangerous Follies, and Extravagancies of their Brethren that have opened the door to Atheism, and Enthusiasm by their ignorant Railings against it. And since they have thought fit to be silent in this matter, how should we know that there are men of such sober principles among them. The Declamations and violent Out-cries against Reason we have heard till our ears have tingled: but the justifications of the judgments of Reason in Religion have been such private whispers, that hitherto we have heard little, or nothing of them from these men: and I might ask Mr.
F. how it comes about, that persons so zealous against error, who were still pelting each other both from Press and Pulpit upon every petty difference in opinion, should let pass so many rude Defamations of our Faculties, as they needs must frequently hear, without
[Page 3] the least reproof, or opposition of them, if so many have been so very Orthodox in this point, as he would have us to believe? But I say no more of that.
The Author hath a double justification of his Party against our Charge. We have the first, page 7.
They are a people, so far as I know, innocent of all undue reflections upon Reason. The other is, I
Robert Ferguson do acknowledge the use of Reason in Religion in 274 pages;
ergo, Our late pretended Rational Divines do traduce the Non-conformists in suggesting that they are defamers of Reason, page 62. This is the sum and strength of the whole Discourse, to which a short answer will suffice.
For my part, though I have been drawn into some Philosophical Controversies, yet I never begun any; and though I have received some publick Provocations to ingage in the Disputes of Religion, yet hitherto my disinclination to them hath kept me unconcern'd: But notwithstanding this indisposition, Mr.
Ferguson's title, and the mention he made of me, as one of the occasions of his Book, inclined me to look into his Discourse with design of further Vindication of our Faculties, if that Essay had given me any reason for it: But I soon perceived that this supposed Adversary was a Friend, and one that liked my Book so well, as to borrow the main things of his from it; though as he is pleased to say of
Des Cartes, He was not so ingenious to confess at whose Breasts he had suckt, nor out of whose Garden he had gathered his best Flowers: And 'twas a little unkindly done of him to mention my Name where he supposed I had erred; and to take no notice of it, when he thought I had done so well as to deserve to be transcribed. Indeed he hath enlarged in the proof of some Principles of Religion by Reason, in which he hath been more beholden to other men: But in the Notions that strictly appertain to the main state of the matter, he hath been pleased to credit and enforce my Observations by the addition of his Suffrage and Authority. When I saw how Affairs went, I left the close perusal of his Book, and only cursorily skim'd over his Pages, casting my eye here and there, as it hapned; and in that running reading I observ'd these following things and Expressions, in which the Gentleman very kindly, and to my great honour hath concur'd with me.
M.
Ferguson.
Knowledge
then (
viz. in the state of Innocence) inhabited our minds in no less plenty than Light doth in the universal Luminary.
p. 18.
Jos. Glanvill.
Knowledge dwelt in our undepraved natures as Light in the Sun, in as great Plenty as Purity.
Vanity of Dogmatizing. p. 13.
M.
F.
It was wonderfully advantaged by a delicate and apt disposure of bodily Organs.
ibid.
J. G.
Depending on the delicacy and apt disposure of the Organs.
Van. Dogm. p. 5.
M.
F.
There was no Jarring in our humors till the Fall caused them.
p. 19.
J. G.
There was no jarring or disharmony in the faculties till sin untuned them.
Van. Dogm. p. 4.
M.
F.
Hindred by the Distemperature of indisposed Organs.
ibid.
J. G.
Hindred in its actings by the Distemperature of indisposed Organs.
Van. Dogm. ibid.
M.
F. takes the whole substance of his Discourse about the Understanding in the state of Innocence, and after, under the Fall. p. 18, 19.
out of▪
I. G.
in his Vanity of Dogmatizing. p. 4, 5, &c.
M.
F.
The vast Volumes of the School-men are stuft with Peripatetical Depravations.
p. 246.
J. G.
The Volumes of the Schoolmen are deplorable evidence of Peripatetical Depravations.
Van. Dogm. p. 166.
M.
F.
Their Scholastick Controversies are resolved into the Subtilties of his (
Aristotle's) Philosophy.
ibid.
J. G.
These Scholastick Controversies are ultimately resolved into the Subtilties of his (
Aristotle's) Philosophy.
V. D p. 167
M.
F.
Speaking of the Union of the Soul and Body saith,—How this can be is a Knot too hard for Human Reason to untie.
p. 490.
J. G.
Saith of the same,—It is a Knot too hard for our degraded Intellects to untie.
Van. Dog. Ed. 2. p. 15.
M.
F.
How a pure Spirit should be cemented to an earthly clod,—is a Riddle that no
Hypothesis of Philosophy can resolve us about.
p. 490.
J. G.
How the purer Spirit is united to this Clod,—is a Riddle that must be left to the coming of
Elias. Van. Dog. Ed. 2. ibid.
M.
F.
To affirm it,
viz. the uniter of Soul and Body to be of a middle nature partaking of the affections and adjuncts of both, is that which our reasonable Faculties will never allow us to subscribe to.
ibid.
J. G.
To suppose an uniter of middle constitution that should partake of some of the qualities of both is unwarranted by any of our faculties.
Van. Dogm. p. 21.
M.
F.
How that which penetrates a Body without giving a jog to, or receiving any from it, should either impress a motion upon, or receive an impression from it, is unconceivable.
p. 496.
J. G.
How that which penetrates all Bodies without the least jog or obstruction, should impress a motion on any is by his own confession alike unconceivable.
Van. Dogm. Ed. 2. p. 17.
M.
F. treats of the incomprehensibility of the union of the parts of matter. p. 483, 484, &c.
the substance of all which is taken out of
I. G.
in his Scepsis Scientifica,
p. 37, 38, 39. and his Answer to White,
p. 41, 42, &c.
M.
F. endeavours to shew the unconceivableness of the union of the Soul and Body, p. 489, 490, 491, &c.
and again p. 495, 496.
all out of
I. G.
in his Scepsis Scientifica.
p. 15, 16.
M.
F.
The reproach which
Iulian slanderously fastned upon the Primitive Christians, that they had no ground for their Faith, but that their wisdom was only to believe,
[...]. p. 62.
J. G.
The charge of
Julian the Apostate against the Primitive Christians,
[...]
That their wisdom was to believe; as if they had no ground for their Faith.
Of Reason, p. 218.
M.
F.
He is worse than an Enthusiast, who affirms, that the way to be a Christian is first to be a Brute.
p. 20.
J. G.
Saith, that in the Enthusiastick Divinity,—The way to be a Christian is first to be a Brute.
Of Reason, p. 223.
M.
F.
Men being misled by their senses, affections, interests and imaginations do many times mingle errors and false conceits with the genuine Dictates of their minds, and then appeal to them as the principles of truth and reason, when they are indeed nothing else but the vain images of our Fansies, and the conclusions of ignorance and mistake.
p. 241.
J. G.
Liable to be mis-led by our senses, and affections, and interests, and imaginations, so that we many times mingle errors and false conceits with the genuine dictates of our minds, and appeal to them as the principles of truth and reason, when they are but the vain images of our Fansies, or the false conclusions of ignorance and mistake.
Of Reason, p. 196, 197.
M.
F.
Whatsoever is proved by reason we are firmly to believe it, though there be many things in the theory of it, that are wholly unconceivable.
p. 198.
J. G.
What is—clearly proved by reason ought to be believed, though there are many things in the theory and manner of it unconceivable.
Philosoph. Pia, p. 82.
Thus, Sir, I have given you some Instances among many, of the faithfulness of M.
Ferguson's Memory, or of his Phrase-Book: There is no doubt but they have furnished him as well out of other Writers, but I have neither the humor nor the leisure to make further search after stoln Goods: Only I cannot but take notice to you that this is the Man that divers of his Party glory in, as their elegant and rational Writer, and urge him as a great proof of the partiality and injustice of those who will not allow
Non-Conformists to write either good Sense or good Language; If either of these be in his Book, you may ghess by this
Specimen how little Honour is reflected upon them from it: And if others would claim their Feathers, as I have called for some of mine, I believe, he would have scarce enough left to cover theirs or his own nakedness.
I remember such Discoveries were once made upon another Champion of the Cause, M.
Hickman; who had also furnished his Pack with Lace and Ribband borrowed from his Neighbours Shops. 'Tis pity but these men had Judgments to choose, for then they would put better Books into the hands of their Admirers. But when they take this Liberty, I would advise them not to fall foul upon the Owners, while they have their Goods in their hands; nor to pick their Pockets then when they are confidently pleading their own Truth and Honesty against them: If this Gentleman had let me alone, I had likely never known this quality of his; but unluckily he hath detected himself, as
[Page 8] he did that warned his Chapman, to whom he had sold a stoln Horse, not to let him drink of such a Water, which was in a Ground out of which he had taken him.
Upon the whole matter, Sir, I desire you to deal gently with this Adversary, lest unawares you should smite some of your Friends, and among the rest,
Your affectionate Friend and Servant, Ios. Glanvill.
Mr.
SHERLOCK HIS ANSWER TO Mr.
GLANVILL HIS LETTER.
I Have received your Letter, and thank you very heartily for it. I was much puzzled before to give an account of the inequality of M.
Ferguson's Style and Reasoning: for his Words are sometimes proper and elegant, his Arguments strong and weighty, at other times his Phrase is barbarous and pedantick, and his Reasonings childish: and I always observed that he writ best upon some trite and beaten Argument, where he had no Adversary; but take him out of the road of Common Places and Phrase-Books, and he could neither write consistently with himself, nor any thing to the purpose. This gave me a great suspicion of the man, that he was a mere Collector, and that his Book was made just as the
[Page 10]
Epicuraeans fansie the World was, by the accidental Concourse of Atoms, and may serve for a Confutation of that wild
Hypothesis; it being a plain Demonstration, how impossible it is to make a good Book out of the best Common-Places and Collections, unless a wise man have the composing of it.
Upon the receipt of your Letter, which made so pleasant a discovery of the man, I had the Curiosity to enquire a little further, and in requital of your kindness, I have here sent you some of his gleanings from other Authors, though so changed and transformed, and found in such ill Company, that I fear those worthy persons will be ashamed to own them.
And because M.
Ferg. with the usual confidence of a bold
Scot, pretends a very particular Friendship with that excellent Person, Sir
Charles Wolseley, I shall first take notice how bold he has made with him; which I suppose he did upon the Authority of that old Saying,
All things are common among Friends; and therefore he might challenge as good a right to Sir
Charles his Writings, as himself.
M.
Ferg. among other things shews
the Use and Serviceableness of Reason in proving the Divinity of the Scripture, p. 56,
&c. Sir
Charles had done this before him, and had managed that Argument like a Scholar and a Gentleman, in his Book entituled,
The Reasonableness of Scripture-Belief; from whence our Author has borrowed most of his best Arguments, and many times his Words and Phrases.
M.
Ferguson premises, that
the Testimony of the Holy Ghost in the Souls and Consciences of men is the most convincing evidence, that such men can have of its (the Scriptures)
Divinity, but yet rejects it from being a proof
[Page 11] of the Scriptures Divinity to others. Interest of Reason,
p. 57
Sir
Charles likewise tells us,
the Testimony of the Holy Ghost in the minds
and consciences of men to the truth of the Scriptures (though it be the
most convincing evidence that can be given to them,
&c.) 'tis not to be urged in proof
[Page 11] of the Scriptures against its professed Adversaries.
Scripture belief, p. 79
Sir
Charles assigns two reasons for this; Mr.
Ferguson has divided the second Reason into two, and set the first Reason in the third place.
M. F.
1. The Holy Ghost convinceth no man as to the belief of the Scripture, without enlightning his mind
in the grounds and reasons upon which its proceeding from God is evidenced and established.
There is no conviction begot by the Holy Ghost in the hearts of men, otherwise than by rational evidence,
satisfying our understanding, through discovering the motives and inducements
that ascertain the truth of what he would convince us of,
Ibid. p. 57
Sir Ch. Wols.
Second Argument the latter part▪
The Illuminations of the Holy Ghost in the minds of men are no other way to be conceived of, than that he is pleased to propose
the right grounds and reasons upon which things are to be believed, and
to convince and satisfie the understanding, that they are so, and to bring men to acquiesce in conclusions
by ascertaining them of the truth of the premises.
M. F.
2. No mans particular assurance obtained thus in way
of Illumination by the Holy Ghost, is otherwise urged as
an argument of conviction to another, than
by proposing the reasons, which our Faith is erected on. The
[Page 12] way of such
mens evidence is communicable to none, unless they could kindle the same rays
in the breasts of others, which have irradiated their own, and therefore they must deal with others by producing the grounds
of their conviction, not pleading the manner of it,
Ibid.
Sir Ch. Wols.
The beginning of the second Argument.
Whatever evidence the Holy Ghost gives to any man to assure him of the truth of any proposition, that evidence, as such, can never go beyond
his own breast, nor can I ever
[Page 12] prove any thing by it, as it is a Divine and infallible Evidence, because
such evidence is no way communicable to another but in an ordinary way: Nothing is visible to another in such cases,
but the reasons I can produce, the Divine
Illumination I have within my self
to convince me, that such Reasons are cogent and prevailing can never be so demonstrated, as to convince another that has no such Illumination,
Ibid. p. 81
I am now Sir perfectly satisfied of what great use that trick is of varying phrases, which we learned at School; for this has made Mr.
Ferguson a famous Author, who by the little arts of transplacing words, of turning Nouns into Verbs, or Verbs into Participles, or converting a single word, such as
Illumination, into the phrase of
kindling Rayes, can make other mens Writings his own. But to proceed,
M. F.
3.
The Holy Ghost, as a distinct person in the Deity is not a Principle demonstrable by reason,
&c. to prove the Divine Authority of the Scripture by the Testimony of the Holy Ghost, when we cannot otherwise prove a Holy Ghost, but by the Testimony of the
[Page 13] Scripture, is to argue circularly and absurdly,
Ibid.
Sir Ch. Wols.
1 Argument,
Because the Blessed Spirit it self is not a common demonstrable principle amongst mankind,
&c. to go about to prove the Scriptures by any evidence arising from the Holy Ghost must needs be visibly absurd, because there is no other
[Page 13] way to prove that there is any such being as the Holy Ghost, but by the Scriptures themselves,
Ibid.
Master
Ferguson having premised this, proceeds to prove the Divine Authority of the Scriptures; and
First, To justifie the necessity of some supernatural Revelation in order to the conducting us in Religion,
Ibid. p. 62
Sir Ch. Wols.
First, I will endeavour to render it a thing reasonable to be believed that there should be some supernatural law revealed from God, and given to mankind,
&c. Ibid. p. 86
M. F.
His first argument is taken from the imperfection of natural light,
p. 64
This is largely managed by Sir
Charles, p. 87, &c.
His second Argument, That the Religion of men at present towards God is the Religion of sinners,
&c. but natural light cannot instruct the world how God will be atoned,
Ibid.
Sir Ch.
Mankind in every age have applied to God in a sense of sin, and of guilt contracted by it, and upon that account have adjudged it necessary to make some further offering to God for their sins,
&c. Now the reason of the world does not issue it self into any positive certainly about such things,
&c. Ibid. p. 133, and p. 145, &c.
Argument 3. All mankind hath universally consented
[Page 14] in this, that besides the light of reason, there ought to be some supernatural Revelation from God,
&c.
Sir Ch.
Discourses this at large,
p. 123. &c. to which M.
Ferguson
[Page 14] indeed refers his Reader: as also to
Camero de verbo Dei: for which he is beholden to Sir
Charles's citation of him in the same place.
Master
Ferguson's next undertaking is
to make it appear, that it is expedient, that this Revelation should be some where or other consigned to writing, ibid. p. 68. This is but just mentioned by Sir
Charles Wolseley, and therefore he is forced to have recourse to some other; and he has made a very good choice, no less person than the Reverend Dean of
Canterbury, Dr.
Tillotson, in his Rule of Faith: where you may find the sum of all Master
Ferguson's arguments upon this head, which are of any force; only sometimes to avoid those particular instances, which the Dean gives, he chuseth others with so little judgment, that it would puzzle a very wise man to defend them: And it is pretty to observe how sometimes he varies phrases, and sometimes retains the very same expressions; as to give an instance of each.
M. F. p. 69.
I readily acknowledge, that the
Articles and Precepts of Religion, may in some cases and circumstances be safely preserved and securely conveyed down from age to age by oral Tradition; namely when the things themselves to be preserved and reported are few, the number of the persons to be instructed in them small;
the age of those to whom the successive communication is given, lengthened
[Page 15]
out to several hundreds of years, &c.
Dr. Tillotson, Rule of Faith, p. 33.
We grant that oral Tradition in some circumstances may be a sufficient way of conveying a Doctrine,
&c. in the first ages of the world, when
the credenda
or Articles of Religion, and the agenda
or precepts of it were but few, and such as had the evidence of natural light; when the world was contracted into a few Families in comparison, and
the age of man was ordinarily
[Page 15]
extended to six or seven hundred years, &c.
M. F. p. 71.
I shall only add, that the tradition of the one true God, though most easie to have been preserved, being not only short and plain, but having foundation and evidence in the light of Nature, was nevertheless soon corrupted and defaced by the worlds lapsing into Polytheism.
Dr. T. Ibid. p. 187.
The tradition of the one true God, which was the easiest to be preserved of any Doctrine in the world, being short and plain; planted in every mans nature, and perfectly suited to the reason of mankind; and yet this tradition not having past through many hands,
&c. was so defaced and corrupted, that the world did lapse into Polytheism and Idolatry.
Where it is pleasant to observe, how Master
Ferguson by altering the expression a little, unawares falls into non-sense; that the tradition of the one true God was corrupted and defaced
by the worlds lapsing into Polytheism: as if men first lapsed into Polytheism, and this corrupted the tradition of one God: which is as much as to say, that men worshipped a great many Gods, while they believed there was but one; and by this means in time forgot that there was but one God. And indeed our Author is oftentimes very unhappy at varying phrases, and makes either wretched English, or wretched sense of them.
Master
Ferguson's next undertaking is, thirdly to prove,
that no written Records besides the Bible can lay claim to the priviledge of being
[...]
of Divine Inspiration: and here he considers the Ethnick Legislators, Poets, and Philosophers; and especially the Alcoran,
page 76,
&c. all which is done at large by Sir
Charles Worsely, page 164,
&c. of which Master
Ferguson has only given us a short and imperfect abstract.
The same may be truly affirmed of
those positive media (as he calls them)
by which the Divine authority of the Scripture may be rationally
[Page 16] demonstrated, which indeed he has cast into a different method; but as far as I observe, has nothing but what is particularly discours'd by Sir
Charles from
page 179. to the end of the Book.
In one thing indeed Master
Ferguson takes the confidence to differ from Sir
Charles, whether Miracles be always a certain demonstration of the truth of any Doctrine? or whether God may▪ not sometimes permit Impostors to work Miracles for the tryal of our Faith? This latter Sir
Charles affirms, Mr.
Ferguson denies; which is not civilly done to dispute such a nice point with his friend, which he confesses is not very material, when he had borrowed from him all his substantial and material notions. But the best of it is, Sir
Charles has no need to stand to his Courtesie in this matter, and it is well for him he has not.
And upon this occasion I cannot but take notice, how Master
Ferguson deals with
Des Cartes; he charges him with affirming,
Deum posse fallere, si velit, that God can deceive, if he please. Now Sir you know very well upon what occasion
Des Cartes said this; it was when in order to free his mind from the prejudices of sense and education, and popular opinions, he set himself to doubt, as far as possibly he could, as long as there was the least imaginable pretence for doubting; and therefore doubts whether there be a God, or any thing else: and whether this God be not a deceiver,
&c. And Master
Ferguson might as well challenge
Des Cartes with denying that he himself had any body, or that there were any external objects, such as the Sun, Moon, and Stars; as with affirming, that God might deceive, if he pleased; for he says the one as much as the other, while he was in this doubting humour, and only upon a design to come to some first Principle, which he could not doubt of; and to lay the foundations of a more certain knowledge: and therefore he immediately adds▪
Et certe cum nullam occasionem habeam existimandi aliquem Deum esse deceptorent, neo quidem adhuc satis sciam, utrum sit aliquis Deus, valde tenuis, &, ut ita loquar, metaphysica dubitandi ratio est, quae tantum ex ea opinione dependet; ut autem etiam illa tolletur, quamprimum occurret occasio, examinare debeo, an sit Deus, & si sit, an possit esse deceptor, hac enim re ignorata, non videor de ulla alia plane certus esse unquam posse, Medit. Tertia.
i. e. Since I have no occasion at all to think, that God is a
[Page 17] deceiver; nor as yet am certain, whether there be a God, or not, this opinion (of Gods power to deceive) is but a very slender and metaphysical reason of doubting: However that we may remove this too, as soon as things are ripe for that inquiry, we must examine whether there be a God? and if there be one, whether he can be a deceiver? for while we are ignorant of this, I cannot see how we can be throughly certain of an thing. And accordingly, when in his method he had proved the being of God, he proves too, that he cannot deceive us, and founds the truth and certainty of our faculties upon it. And in the second objections he is charged with asserting
Deum non posse mentiri aut decipere, that God cannot lye or deceive; which they say is contrary to the opinion of many Schoolmen. And in his Answer to these Objections, to which Master
Ferguson refers us, he owns the charge, and defends himself from their exceptions. By this we may see, how well skilled Mr.
Ferguson is in
Des Cartes his Philosophy, or what a brow he has, to charge that upon
Des Cartes as his professed opinion; the contrary of which he makes the ground of all certainty.
Such another wise discourse he has,
page 123. of Infallibility; the result of which is, that our Faith is infallible, though we are not infallibly assured: but this is beyond my first design, only I could not but take this occasion to show you, what a man of reason this is, when he argues at his own natural rate, and dares forsake his Masters: and it were very easie to make it appear, that he has not one good argument, but what he has borrowed from some late Modern Authors, who are far enough from being Fanaticks; which is an excellent way of proving, that Fanaticks are great friends to Reason.
But to give you some few instances more of Mr.
Ferguson's transcribing from Modern Authors.
M.
F. p. 48.
If all things be the result of matter, how comes a
principle of reason to be conveyed
[Page 18] into us, by
that which had it not inherent in it self.
Sir C. W. The unreasonableness of Atheism, page 92.
The casual conjunction of these atoms could not make the
[Page 18]
world, because it is made with a principle of Reason;
and they could not have induced such a principle by chance, unless some way or other they had it inherent in themselves before.
M.
F.
This Hypothesis supposeth, that to have been the
effect of chance which carries in it the characters of a wise contrivance. Ibid.
Dr. Til. Serm. 1. p. 40.
Nothing can be more unreasonable than obstinately to impute an effect to chance, which carries in the very face of it all the arguments and characters of a wise design and contrivance.
M.
F.
If the fabrick of the world be nothing but the result of the casual meeting, and concatenation of Atoms, how comes it to pass, that by their daily motion and
justling one another, they do not
dance themselves into more worlds. Ibid.
Sir Ch. Ibid. p. 91.
If the dancing motion
of these Atoms in this fancied space did by chance first dance the world into
this form, &c.
what is the reason these Atoms never danced themselves into any thing else.
You may see Sir, what a youthful fancy Mr.
Ferguson has to be so pleased with this metaphor of dancing, which much better becomes a Gentleman than a Divine; but yet I perceive Mr.
Ferguson has so little skill in the thing, that he spoils all these Metaphors, if he attempts to vary the least word; for I remember I have heard some say, that
justling is no very gentile way of dancing.
M. F.
p. 50.
To the fortuitous jumbles of blind matter.
Dr.
More's Antidote, p. 42.
From a blind fortuitous jumbling of the parts of matter.
And in the next words some body or other has put a trick on him: for thus he proceeds. The consideration of the Fabrick of things made
Plato say,
[...], which I may english in the words of the Holy Ghost,
that all things are made in number, weight, and measure, which are not the words of the Holy Ghost, unless he will acknowledge the book of Wisdom to be Canonical Scripture: for there it is, 2
Wisdom 20.
M.
F. p. 51.
What convictions are we furnished with of the Being of God, from
the innate harmony that is in the several parts of the Creation, and the convenient disposure of all the Creatures
to a subserviency to one another in mutual offices; chance cannot have linkt one thing to another,
nor can contraries combine into a mutual coalition without the influence of a supreme Being, who overrules them.
Sir
Charles ibid. p. 42.
The natural rectitude and innate harmony of the world,
and the due subordination of things one to another, and to the whole of the world.
Direct contraries are overruled to a perfect harmony and coalition
in the propagation of the world, p. 87.
Here Mr.
Ferg. has a little altered the phrase, but much for the worse; for
to combine into a coalition, I doubt is not good sense.
M.
F. p. 52.
Men have rather chosen to worship any thing for a God, than wholly to be without one.
Dr. Till.
Serm. p. 55.
Men will rather have any God than none; and rather than want a Deity will worship any thing.
M.
F. p. 53.
For not onely
Cicero tells us, that there is nothing so absurd, which some of the Philosophers have not maintained: But
Aristotle informs us, that there have been some who have held, That a thing might at the same time be, and not be.
Sir Charles
ibid. p. 74.
Aristotle tells us, that there were some that affirmed, A thing might be, and might not be at the same time; and
Cicero has long since told us, that nothing could be so absurd, that had not some Philosopher for its Patron.
Now though these are very familiar sayings, yet I have reason to think that Mr.
Ferg. transcribed them out of Sir
Charles, because he has not given us the Latine and Greek of these sayings, as Sir
Charles has not; which Mr.
Ferg. never fails to do, when he can come easily by it, of which we have an instance or two in the same page.
Ferg. ibid.
Reason becomes
[...], infected with those evil opinions that proceed from lust; when men are once sunk into the greatest sensualities, their reason becomes
[...], compliant with their sensual appetites.
Mr. Smith's
select Discourses, p. 15.
That reason that is within us, as
Plotinus hath well expressed it, becomes more and more
[...], it will be infected with those evil opinions that arise from our corporeal life. Their highest reason is
[...], complying with their senses.
M.
F. ibid.
Besides men living as if there were no God, can make no apology to the world, but
[Page 21] by espousing such notions, as may justifie them in their courses.
Dr. Till.
Serm. p. 104.
For when men live as if there were no God, it becomes expedient for them, that there
[Page 21] should be none.—Besides, that men think it some kind of apology for their vices, that they do not act contrary to any principle they profess.
M.
F. p. 63.
There hath been no Nation so savage, nor people so barbarous, who have not acknowledged some kind of external Performances necessary for the expressing of the inward Sentiments of Devotion and Honour, which they bear to the Deity.
Amyrald
of Religion, p. 2.
There is no Nation so savage—no people who do not essay by some kind of Performances to express the Sentiments of Devotion and Honour they bear towards him.
M.
F. p. 132.
Words that are intelligible, when they are spoken, are as intelligible when they are written.—Now as God can speak as plainly as any of his Creatures can; and as words are at least as easie to be understood when they are written, as when they are spoken; so we have no reason to think, that God affects obscurity, or envies, that men should understand him.
Dr. Till.
Rule of Faith, p. 66.
First, Whatever can be spoken in plain and intelligible words, and such as have a certain sense may be written in the same words.
Secondly, That the same words are as intelligible, when they are written, as when they are spoken.
Thirdly, That God if he please can indite a Book in as plain words as any of his Creatures.
Fourthly, That we have no reason to think that God affects obscurity, and envies, that men should understand him,
&c.
M.
F. p. 140.
Nor is it any argument, that these Texts of Scripture are not easie to be understood, because some out of prejudice or perverseness have wrested them to a corrupt sense; seeing God did not endite the Bible for the froward or captious, but for such who will read it with a free and unprejudiced mind, and are willing to come to the knowledge of the truth.
Dr. Till.
ibid. p. 87.
And what if some out of prejudice do mistake, or out of perverseness do wrest the plainest Texts of Scripture,
&c. Is this any argument that those Texts are not sufficiently plain? Can any thing be spoken or written in words so clear, which a perverse or prejudiced mind shall not be able to vex and force to another meaning? God did not write the Scriptures for the froward and the captious, but for those who will read them with a free and unprejudiced mind, and are willing to come to the knowledge of the truth.
M.
F. p. 148.
We have the attestation of Reason, which tells us, that nothing is well known, but by that, which hath a just analogy to it,
[...], every thing is best understood by that which bears a resemblance of it; things of sense and life are onely known by vital and sentient faculties.
As the eye cannot behold the Sun
[...],
[Page 23] unless it have some resemblance of the Sun in it self; no more can any man understand the things of God in a due manner,
[...], unless he be made to partake of the Divine Image.
Mr. Smith's
select Discourses, p. 2.
All things of sense and life are best known by sentient and vital faculties,
[...], every thing is best known by that which bears a just resemblance and analogy with it.
And as the eye cannot behold the Sun
[...], unless it be Sun-like, and hath the form and resemblance of the Sun drawn in it; so neither can the Soul of man
[Page 23] behold God
[...], unless it be God-like, hath God formed in it, and be made partaker of the Divine Nature.
Where by the change of one little word he has spoiled all; for it is true as Mr.
Smith says, that things of life and sense are
best known by sentient and vital faculties; but it is false to say as Mr.
Ferguson does, that they are
onely known this way: for there is a Philosophical Knowledge of Sounds and Colours, as well as a Sensitive Knowledge of them: And Mr.
Ferguson acknowledges, that a bad man may have a true knowledge of the meaning of Scripture, though he have not a vital sense of Religion. So easily may an ignorant Scribler spoil the best Sayings of Wise men.
Thus, Sir, it is pleasant to observe how Mr.
Ferguson has borrowed all his Arguments, that are worth any thing, against
Des-Cartes his Philosophy, from Dr.
More, with a little variation, that I have reason to think, that he never read ten lines in
Des-Cartes.
M.
F.
The Anonymous Author of
Philosophia Scripturae interpres after all his operose and impertinent wrangling—Only instead of Reason, we have Philosophy advanced to a Dictatorship over the Word of God, and
Des-Cartes made Master of the Chair. 158.
Dr. More's
divine Dialogues 1 part, in the Preface.
The learned Author of
Philosophia Scripturae Interpres after an operose, subtile and copious endeavour of evincing, that Philosophy is the best interpreter of Scripture, as if all that pains had been intended in the behalf of
Des-Cartes, to set him in the infallible Chair.—
M.
F. p. 249.
Nor will I press his (
Des-Cartes) discharging all spirits from place, though that seems consequentially to discharge them from being.
See Dr.
More's first Dialogue, p. 136.
&c.
M.
F.
Nor will I dwell upon his disbanding all Final Causes out of the precincts of Natural Philosophy.
Dr. More
ibid. Preface.
A third property of his Philosophy is a seeming modesty in declining all search into the final causes of the
Phaenomena of the World.—
M.
F. ibid. p. 250.
His attempting to prove, that all the
Phaenomena of the Universe might arise out of matter by meer mechanical motion, and that matter alone, supposing such a degree of motion communicated to it—could have produced the Sun, Moon, Stars, Planets, Animals, and the Bodies of Men in such Organization, Order, Beauty and Harmony, as now they are.
Dr. More
ibid.
It is a confessed principle with him, that matter alone with such a degree of motion, as is supposed now in the Universe, will produce all the
Phaenomena of the World, Sun, Moon, and Stars, Air, Water, Earth, Planets, Animals, and the Bodies of men, in such order and orginazation, as they are found.
M.
F. ibid
Neither will I dwell upon his notion of the Conflict between the Flesh and the Spirit, which the Scripture so emphatically mentions; namely, that it is nothing but the repugnancy of those motions,
[Page 25] which the Body by its Spirits, and the Soul by her Will endeavour to excite at the same time in the
glandula pinealis, or little Kernel, where he supposeth the Soul to be harboured and seated: as if the whole conflict which the Holy Ghost so solemnly describes under the notion of a war betwixt the law of our members,
&c. were nothing else, but that the Kernel in the midst of the Brain being driven on one side by the Soul, and on the other by the animal Spirits—when the corporeal Spirits by their rude joggings of the glandulous button, endeavour to excite in the Soul a desire of any thing, and the Soul repels it by the Will she hath to avoid the same thing, this constitutes the war,
&c.
Dr. More
ibid.
The Combat betwixt the superiour and inferiour part of the Soul, the Flesh and the Spirit, as they are termed in Scripture and Divinity, is at last resolved into the ridiculous noddings and joggings of a
[Page 25] small glandulous button in the midst of the Brain, encountred by the animal Spirits rudely flurting against it. This little sprunt Champion called the
Conarion, within which the Soul is entirely cooped up, acts the part of the Spirit, and the animal Spirits of the Flesh; and thus by the Soul thus ingarrisoned in this Pine-kernel, and bearing her self against the arietations and jurrings of the Spirits in the Ventricles of the Brain, must that solemn Combat be performed which the Holy Ghost calls the war,
&c.
Sometimes, Sir, our Author pretends to ancient Learning, and to give an account of the original of Heresies from the Pagan Philosophy; and for this he is beholden to Mr.
Gale, in his Preface to the Court of the Gentiles,
part 2. which I shall give you a short view of.
M. F. p. 242.
And not to insist on the ill influence that the
Phoenician
[Page 26] and
Chaldaick Philosophy had on the
Iudaick Theology, though it be of easie proof, that their Planetary Deities and Teraphims sprung from thence; not to do any more but mention, that the chief errours of the
Pharisees, Sadducees, and
Esseans took their rise from the
Graecian Philosophy, their Dogms being a mixture of
Pythagorean, Platonick, Stoick, and
Epicurean Notions.
Mr. Gale
Pref.
We shall begin with the malignant contagion, which the
[Page 26]
Judaick Church received from vain Philosophy: So long as the
Judaick Theology continuod under its own native habit—it retained its primitive Purity—But whence sprung this (declension) but from the
Phaenician and
Chaldaick Philosophy, touching Planetary Deities, and
Daemons, called by the
Phaenicians Baalim. We no way doubt but to demonstrate, that the main errours of the
Pharisees, Sadducees, and other
Judaick Hereticks received their first formation,
&c. from
Graecian Philosophy, especially the
Pythagorean.
M.
F. ibid.
Both
Irenaeus and
Tertullian affirm the errours of the
Gnosticks to have sprung from the
Platonick Idea's, though I think it not improbable, that both their
[...] &
[...] took their birth from Pythagoreanism.
Gale.
From whence borrowed they (the
Gnosticks) their
[...]—but from the Mythologick and Symbolick Philosophy of the
Pythagoreans.
M.
F. 243.
Hierom assureth us, that
Pelagius suckt all his Doctrines from the Philosophy of
Pythagoras and
Zeno, and
Iansenius fully proves it.
Gale.
Had not the
Pelagian Heresie the same pestiferous root: this is incomparably well demonstrated by
Jansenius, &c.
M.
F. ibid.
Nor did
Samosatenus and
Arrius derive their blasphemous opinions concerning the Deity of Christ, save from the
Platonick Philosophy.
Gale.
Where had
Paulus Samosatenus his blasphemous infusions but from
Plotinus? And did not
Arrius in like manner derive his blasphemous perswasions touching Christ, from the same poisoned fountain?
M.
F.
It was not therefore without cause, that
Tertullian stiled the Philosophers the Patriarks of Hereticks.
Gale.
This
Tertullian was greatly sensible of, and therefore stiles the Philosophers the Patriarks of Hereticks.
M.
F. 245.
The
Platonick School at
Alexandria was the Seminary of the chiefest and most pestilent errours vented in the Church during the four first Centuries.
Gale.
Vain Philosophy was the chief Seminary of Errours broached in the four first Centuries after Christ.—
Samosatenus learnt his blasphemies from
Plotinus, successor to
Ammonius in his School of
Alexandria,—Origen Scholar to
Ammonius in his School of
Alexandria.
M.
F. p. 243.
Holstenius hath shown us, how the
Manichean Principles were framed from the
Pythagorean.
Dr. Parker
Plat. Theology, p. 89.
Holstenius hath made a parallel between the
Pythagorean and
Manichean Principles.
M.
F. 245.
Ioannes Baptista Crispus hath wrote a Discourse of
Plato's Opinions, and hath
[Page 28] at the end of every Chapter shown, what Heresies sprung from each.
Dr. Parker
ibid.
Johannes Baptista Crispus in his discussing of
Plato's opinions, has at the end of every
[Page 28] Chapter shewn, what Heresies sprung from each opinion.
M.
F. p. 244.
The Popish
[...], or Saint-worship, is nothing but an imitation of the
[...], or Daemon-worship of the Pagan Philosophers.
Gale ibid.
The whole Papal
[...], or Saint-worship, is but an imitation of the Pagan
[...], or Daemon-worship.
M.
F. p. 245.
The purity and simplicity of the Gospel was no less corrupted by blending the Dogms of
Aristotle with the Articles of Faith, than it had been by mingling the Philosophy of
Pythagoras and
Plato with the Doctrines of Christ.
Dr. Parker
ibid.
They have in the same manner corrupted the simplicity and purity of Christian Religion by blending the Placits of
Aristotle with the Articles of Faith, as
Manes and
Valentinus did by mingling with the Christian Faith the Philosophy of
Plato and
Pythagoras.
M.
F. 247.
Corrupted into an artificial kind of wrangling, and degererated into contentions and unprofitable altercations.
Gale ibid.
Corrupted into an artificial kind of contentious disputation—and wrangling dispute.
I doubt, Sir, you already censure me for a very idle person, who can spend my time in such an unprofitable pursuit of this Author; and therefore though I can scarce open an English Author of any account, without making some new discoveries of Mr.
Ferguson's pilfering humour, I shall now for a conclusion principally confine my self to his discourse of Metaphors, Chap 2. which he has almost intirely stole from
Vossius and
Glassius, not excepting his Greek and Latine Citations, with which he makes such a flourish and boast of Learning.
M.
F. p. 283.
Origen especially seems to have made it his business to find out Mystical and Cabbalistical Senses in the plainest parts of Scripture, which made one of the Ancients themselves say of him,
Ingenii lusus pro Dei mysteriis venditat; he obtrudes the sportings of his fancy for religious and sacred Mysteries: and as another expresses it,
Ingenii sui acumina putat esse Ecclesiae. Sacramenta. This practice of some Primitive Writers in and about the Scripture influenced
Porphyrius to deride the Gospel, as containing nothing▪ certain in it.
Glass.
Philologia sacra, p. 298.
Intolerabilis est
Origenis—audacia, qui omnia omnino quantumlibet simplicitèr dicta in allegorias mutavit, unde
Hieronimus justisfimé de eo conqueritur,
Ingenium suum facit Ecclesiae Sacramentum; & alius haud ignobilis pater, Origines
sui ingenii lusus pro Dei mysteriis venditar.
At que haec Scripturas interpretandi, vel torquendi potius ratio▪
Porphyrium induxit olim, ut irrideret Christianam doctrinam, & scriberet eam nihil habere certi.
M.
F. 298.
This may serve as an apology for
Aristotle's confounding Synechdoches and Allegories with Metaphors:
[...]. Which occasioned
Cicero to observe, that
Aristotle▪ used the term Metaphor in a larger acceptation
[Page 30] than after-Rhetoricians are wont to take it.
Which account of
Cicero and
Aristotle, together with the Greek Quotation, you have in
Vossius Instir. Orat. lib. 4. p. 84.
M. F. Ibid.
Terms thus applied are called by
Hermogenes
[...]
Glass. lib. 5. p. 1045.
Unde
Hermogeni,
[...]
M. F. p. 301.
In every Metaphor three things are carefully to be attended to, the original and proper signification of the word, the signification to which it is transferred, and the similitude, analogy, and proportion,
&c.
Voss. ibid. lib. 4. p. 85.
In omni metaphorâ tria requiruntur, significatio propria, aliena, & similitudo aut proportio.
M.
F. Ibid.
Christ is not onely metaphorically stiled a Lion, but Tyrants are likewise so denominated, whereas cruelty and salvageness are the reason of transferring the term to the latter, so fortitude and victoriousness are the grounds of applying it to the other.
Glass. ibid. p. 1113.
Leo ad Christum significandum transfertur, & ad impios & tyrannos, Christus Leo dicitur ob fortitudinem & victoriam, tyranni ob atrocitatem & rapacitatem.
His distinctions between a Metaphor and other Tropes and Parables are all taken out of
Glassius and
Vossius.
M.
F. p. 305.
By a Parable I mean a Symbolick form of speech,
[Page 31] where by a well appropriated similitude from some feigned story, some moral truth is insinuated to the minds of men to make it the better apprehended and understood.
Gale
Court of the Gentiles, part 2. p. 97. cited from Diodate.
This was a fashion of teaching used among the Iews, followed
[Page 31] by our Lord, and very profitable to make the truth understood, and to insinuate the apprehension thereof into the minds of the auditors, by a well appropriated similitude, taken from a feigned story.
His discourse of Allegories, which immediately follows, is principally owing to
Glassius, p. 1395. and whether he has not taken not onely his Notions, but his Greek words and sayings concerning those descriptions of God which we call
Anthropopathies, from the same Author, I will leave any man to judge who will compare them.
M.
F. p. 315.
Under Metaphors are comprehended
[...], in which humane parts,
&c. are ascribed to God; in such forms of speech God by a
[...] or condescension, declares the infinite properties of his nature.—
[...], He decyphers what himself is, and doth by things that fall under our apprehension; and what is thus said of God
[...] &
[...], after the manner of men, must be understood of him
[...], in a way suitable to the Divine Nature.
Glassius p. 1116.
[...] est metaphora, qua quod creaturis & praesertim homini propriè competit, ad Deum transfertur, vocatur &
[...] condescensio—v—
[...] &
[...] quae de Deo dicuntur,
[...],
h. est, convenienter Deo intelligenda sunt.
I confess, Sir, I am very sick of this undertaking; for it is so far from being pleasant, that it is grievous to me, to write one line meerly to expose any man: but I thought it necessary to take down the confidence of this Author, who makes a great shew of ancient and modern Learning, by transcribing out of some late Writers, whose credit and reputation at the same time he endeavours to undermine. I am glad to find, that he reads so good Books, which I doubt not, but would make him wiser in time, if he would consider, as well as read: It is no fault indeed to use those arguments, which have been used by other men, and it is possible sometimes to hit upon the very same expressions, or some very like; but when a man shall run through a book, and take the whole Series of Arguments, without owning his Masters; when he shall take out whole Sentences and Paragraphs out of so many Authors, of so vastly different styles, it plainly discovers an empty Head, a barren Fancy, and a vain-glorious Mind▪
It were easie to transcribe a great part of
Glassius and
Vossius, concerning the nature and use of Metaphors and Allegories, and the rules of expounding them, which Mr.
Ferguson has onely translated, and from whence he has borrowed his Greek and Latine Citations, out of ancient and modern Authors, but I consider this would too much swell a Letter, and you may do it your self if you have the curiosity: And therefore I shall onely farther observe, that whereas this Author falls upon Dr.
Parker at every turn, and challenges, and provokes and scorns him; there is no Person whom he does so much Ape, as the Doctor: He borrows divers of his expressions from him,
gawdy Metaphors, phantastick Allegories▪ thwacking Contradictions, rampant and empty Schemes of Speech, and the like; and many times transcribes whole Sentences and Paragraphs from him, of which I have given some instances above, and shall adde but two or three more here.
M. F. p. 133.
Heraclitus grew famous by the onely obscurity of his writings. It is said of
Aristotle▪ that being reproved by
[Page 33]
Alexander for publishing his Acroamaticks, he should make this reply, that they were
[...] ▪ made publick, yet they were
[...], not published.
Dr. Parker
Plat. Theol. p. 70.
Neither is
Heraclitus his name
[...] because of the obscurity of his writings, less famous; and no less common is
[Page 33]
Aristotle's Epistle
[...]. Plut. in Alex. to
Alexander, that though he had made his books publick, yet he had not published them.
Where because he would not say the very same thing that the Dr. did, he runs into a very ridiculous mistake. For though
Heraclitus▪ his name
[...] was famous, because of the obscurity of his writings, yet it is a wild conceit, that the obscurity of his writings was the onely thing that made him famous.
M.
F. p. 321.
When any thing is manifested by a Metaphor, the thing it self is not fully expressed, but only some similitude between it and another.
Dr.
Parker ibid. p. 75.
When any is expressed by a Metaphor, the thing it self is not expressed, but onely some similitude observed or made by fancy.
M.
F. p. 323.
For men to discourse in metaphorical terms of things, whose nature and properties they are wholly ignorant of, is plainly to trifle; seeing while we know not the true
Idea's of things, we can onely imagine some resemblances.
Dr.
Parker ibid.
To discourse of the nature of things in metaphorical terms, is to sport and trifle; but 'tis still more phantastick, to talk metaphorically of those things, of whose
Idea's we are utterly ignorant.
Nay, Sir, it is still more pleasant to observe, that our Author cannot complement his Patron without imitating Dr.
Parker: For whoever reads Mr.
Ferguson's Dedication to Mr.
Papilion, and Dr.
Parkers to Dr.
Bathurst, will▪ find that the manner of Address, the Composition,
[Page 34] Complement, and Fancy is Dr
Parkers, though Mr.
Ferguson has a little varied the words.
M.
F. Ep. dedic.
Sir, it cost me no long deliberation to whom I should direct these discourses, the obligations I am under to you, and your Family, rendring them yours by the title of a just debt, the interest you have in me by an entail of peculiar kindnesses, gives you a right to my Studies, and the fruits of them.
Dr.
P. Ded. of his Plat. Theol.
Reverend Sir,
I shall not need to argue the decency and fitness of this address—because your absolute and unalienable right to all the fruits of my Studies, has made it due and necessary.
M.
F.
The declining the imputation of ingratitude is my plea for prefixing your name to these Papers.
Dr.
Parker.
I cannot alienate any thing that is theirs from being yours, without being guilty at once of the greatest injustice and ingratitude
M.
F.
Though the concerning you in their behalf may seem an injury, yet not to have done it, would have been a crime.
Dr.
Parker.
So that if to present you with so mean a trifle be unhandsome, yet not to have done it would have been unjust.
M. F.
You must be content to forgive such offences, as your self have made the result and effects of duty.
Dr.
Parker.
Though I do but injure your name by concerning its Authority in behalf of so worthless a trifle, yet an injury, that is the result of duty and gratitude, may hope for not onely your pardon, but (Sir, such is
[Page 35] your candour) your acceptance too.
M.
F.
Were there any indecency in this address, yet the laws of gratitude supersede those of congruity.
Dr.
Parker.
The obligations of duty cancel all the laws of indecency.
This, Sir, I hope is enough to satisfie the world of Mr.
Ferguson's great Learning, and how he came by it: It had been very easie to have given many more instances of this nature, but I took those which came first to hand: I need make no reflexions upon the whole▪ since you have done it so well already; and therefore have no more to do, but to subscribe my self
Your very affectionate Friend and Brother, VV. Sherlock.