QUest. How far we may Indulge good and god­ly men of tender consciences dissenting from us in liberty of Conscience.

Answ. First, besides that all parties pretend to Godliness; Papists, Anabaptists, and what not? (even the late-sprung-up generation of Levellers, whose Principles are so destructive of all that Order and Justice by which publick societies are suppor­ted, do yet style themselves, as by a kinde of pe­culiarity, The Godly;) And that secondly, it is the easyest thing in the world, and nothing more [Page 46] common then for men to pretend Conscience, when they are not minded to obey: I do not believe thirdly, (though I am well perswaded of the godli­ness of many of them otherwise,) that the refusal of indifferent Ceremonies enjoyned by Lawful Autho­rity, is any part of their Godliness; or any good fruit, evidence, or sign thereof. But certain it is fourthly, that the godliest men are men, and know but in part; and by the power of godliness in their hearts, are no more secured from the possibility of falling into Errour through Ignorance, then from the possibility of falling into Sin through Infirmity. And as for Tenderness of Conscience fifthly, a most gracious blessed fruit of the holy Spirit of God, where it is really, and not in pretence only, nor mistaken, (for sure it is no very tender Conscience, though sometimes called so, that straineth at a Gnat, and swalloweth a Camel:) it is with it, as with other tender things; very subject to receive harme, and soon put out of order. Through the cunning of Satan, it dangerously exposeth men to tempta­tions on the right hand: and through its own apti­tude to entertain and to cherish unnecessary scru­ples, it strongly disposeth them to listen thereunto so long, till at the last they are overcome thereof. Needful it is therefore, that in the publick teaching the Errours should be sometimes refuted, and the Temptations discovered: And this ever to be done seasonably, soberly, discreetly, and convincingly; and when we are to deal with men whose Consci­ences are (so far as we can discern) truly tender, [Page 47] with the spirit of meekness and Compassion. For tender things must be tenderly dealt withall, or they are lost. I know it is not allwayes so done: nor can we expect it should. All preachers are nei­ther so charitable, nor so prudent, not so conscien­tious as they should be: And they that are such in a good measure, are men still; and may be trans­ported now and then through passion, and infirmity, beyond the just bounds of moderation.

Quest. Whether good men should be suspended from the exercise of their ministry, and deprived of their livelyhood, which are on all hands acknow­ledged indifferent: and inded in comparison to the work of the ministry are but trifles, however some men dote on them.

Answ. Let Ceremonies (secondly) be as very Trifles, as any man can imagine them to be; yet Obedience sure is no Trifle. They mis-state the Question, when they talke of pressing Ceremonies. It is Obedience (formally) that is required: Cere­monies not otherwise pressed, then as the matter wherein that Obedience is to be exercised. If a master appoint his servant to do some small matter that he thinketh fit to have done, though in it selfe of no great moment; yet he will expect to be o­beyed: and it is great reason he should. If in such case the servant should resufe to do the thing ap­pointed, because he hath no minde thereunto; and should receive a check or correction for such refu­sal: could he either sufficiently excuse his own fault, or reasonably complain of his master for dea­ling [Page 48] hardly with him, by saying the thing was but a Trifle? Is it not evident, that the thing which made the master angry, and the Servant an offen­der in that case, was not ( precisely and formally) the leaving of the thing undone, (which had it not been commanded, might have been left undone without any fault or blame at all;) but the refusing to do it, when he that had a right to his service commanded him? Wherefore Thirdly, rhat which is said of some mens doting so extreamely on Ceremonies, might have been well enough spared. I know no true son of the Church of England, that doteth upon any Ceremony, whatsoever opinion he may have of the decency or expediency of some of them. If any do; let him answer for himself. Among wise men, he will hardly pass for a wise man, that doteth upon any. Nor will he, I doubt, prove a much wiser man, that runs into the contrary extream, and ab­horreth all. It is true Fourthly, that there have been long and unkinde quarrels abour these things; More is the pitty! but where is the fault? To whom is the beginning, and to whom the continuance of a quarrel rather imputable? to him, that demandeth his right? or to him that with-holdeth it from him? For this is the plain Case in short: The Bishops (under the King) require obedience to the Lawes Ecclesia­stical; these men refuse to give it. So began the quarrel at first; and upon the same terms it conti­nued. If the Obedience challenged were indeed due to these Laws; then did our Brethren both be­gin the quarrel, and hold it on: if it were not, then [Page 49] must the whole blame lie upon them that claimed it unjustly, and not upon them. So that in the winding up of the business, the whole Controversie will de­volve upon this point; Whether to the Laws Eccle­siastical obedience be due or not? For the right de­termining whereof, (for so much as it is confest on all hands, that Obedience is due to Lawful authority commanding lawful things) two other points are to be resolved; the one concerning the authority by which the Constitutions were made; the other concerning the lawfulness of the things therein re­quired; The Presbyterians of the Kirk flatly and directly deny both: Ours, less forward to declare their opinion in the former point, have chosen ra­ther to stand upon the latter only. And so the point in issue is briefly this; Whether the things com­manded (and particularly the Ceremonies) be law­ful, yea, or no.

When for decency, order, or uniformity's sake any constitutions are made concerning ceremonies, there is the same necessity of obeying such Constitutions, as there is of obeying other lawes made for the good of the Common-wealth concerning any other indif­ferent things. That such necessity, either in the one or the other, ariseth not properly from the autho­rity of the immediate Lawgiver; but from the Ordinance of God, who hath commanded us to obey the ordinance of men for his sake. That such necessity of obedience notwithstanding, the things remain in the same indifferency as before; Every way in respect of their Nature, and quoad Rem, [Page 50] (it being not in the power of aecidental relations to change the natures of things:) and even in re­spect of their Vse, and quoad nos, thus far, that there is a liberty left for men, upon extraordinary and other just occasions, somtimes to do otherwise then the Constitution requireth, extra casum Scan­dali & Contemptus:. A liberty, which we dare not either take our selves, or allow to others, in things properly and absolutely necessary: Upon which very account (I mean the consideration of the indifferency of the things in themselves) and upon which account alone it is, that many of the Episcopal (that is to say, the true English Prote­stant) Divines, who sadly resent the voting down of the Liturgy, Festivals, and Ceremonies of the Church by so many former Laws established, heartily desired heretofore the continuance, and as heartily still wish the restitution, and are (by Gods help) ready with their Tongues, Pens and Sufferings to maintain and justifie the Lawful use of the same: do yet so far yield to the sway of the times, and are perswaded they may with a good Conscience so do, as to forbear the use thereof in the publick worship; till it shall seem good to those that are in place of authority either to restore them to their former state (as it is well hoped, when they shall have duly considered the evil con­sequents of that Vote, they will,) or at leastwise and in the mean time to leave them arbitrary, for men, according to their several different judge­ments, to use or not to use, which seemeth but [Page 51] reasonable, the like favour and liberty in other kinds having been long allowed to almost all o­ther sorts of men, though of never so distant per­swasions one from another. Lastly, That all Laws made concerning Ceremonies or other indifferent things, whether Civil or Ecclesiastical, are mutable: and as they were at first made by humane authority, so may they from time to time be by humane au­thority abrogated and repealed. And then and thenceforth they lose their obligation: whereby the necessity of yielding obedience thereunto wholy ceaseth and determineth; and the things thereby commanded or prohibited, return to their primitive and natural indifferency, even in their Vse also, and in respect of us.

But in the Case of our Church now it is far orher­wise. Cap, Surplice, Cross, Ring and other Ceremonies, which are the Matter of our differences, though they be things indifferent for their nature, and in themselves: yet are not so for their use, and unto us. If the Church had been silent, if Authority had prescribed nothing herein, these Ceremonies had then remained for their use, as they are for their nature, indifferent: Lawful, and such as might be used without sin; and yet Arbitrary, and such as might be also forborn without sin. But men mus [...] grant (though they be unwilling, if yet they will be reasonable) that every particular Church hat [...] power for decency an orders sake, to ordain and constitute ceremonies. Which being once ordained and by publick authority enjoyned, cease to b [...] [Page 52] indifferent for their use, though they remain still so for their nature: and of indifferent become so ne­cessary, that neither may a man without sin refuse them, where Authority requireth; nor use them, where Authority restraineth the use.

Neither is this accession of Necessity any im­peachment to Christian Liberty; or insnaring of mens consciences as some have objected. For then do we ensnare mens consciences by humane consti­tutions, where we thrust them upon men as if they were divine; and bind mens consciences to them immediately, as if they were immediate parts of Gods worship, or of absolute necessity unto salva­tion. This Tyranny and Vsurpation over mens Con­sciences, the Pharisees of old did, and the Church of Rome at this day doth exercise, and we justly hate in her, equalling, if not preferring her Constitutions to the Laws of GOD. But our Church (GOD be thanked) is far from any such impious presumpti­on: and hath sufficiently declared her self by solemn protestation, enough to satisfie any ingenuous im­partial judgement, that by requiring obedience to these ceremonial constitutions, she hath no other purpose, then to reduce all her children to an order­ly confirmity in the outward worship of God; so far is she from seeking to draw any opinion, either of divine necessity upon the constitution, or of effectual holiness upon the ceremony. And as for the preju­dice which seemeth to be hereby given to Christian liberty, it is so slender a conceit, that it seemeth to bewray in the objectors a desire, not so much of [Page 53] satisfaction, as cavil. For first, the liberty of a Christian to all indifferent things, is in the Mind and Conscience: and is then infringed, when the Con­science is bound and strained, by imposing upon it an opinion of doctrinal Necessity. But it is no wrong to the Liberty of a Christian mans conscience, to bind him to outward observation for Orders sake; and to impose upon him a necessity of Obedience. Which one distinction of Doctrinal and Obediential Necessity well weighed, and rightly applyed, is of it self sufficient to clear all doubts in this point. For, to make all restraint of the outward man in mat­ters indifferent an impeachment of Christian liber­ty; what were it else, but even to bring flat Ana­baptisme and Anarchy into the Church? and to overthrow all bond to subjection and obedince to lawful authority? I beseech you consider, wherein can the immediate power and authority of Fathers, Masters, and other Rulers over their inferiours con­sist; or the due obedience of inferiours be shewn towards them: if not in these indifferent and Ar­bitrary things? For, things absolutely necessary, as commanded by God, we are bound to do; whether humane Authority require them, or no: and things absolutely Vnlawful, as prohibited by God, we are bound not to do; whether humane Authority for­bid them, or no. There are none other things left then, wherein to express properly the Obedience due to superiour Authority, then these Indifferent things. And if a Father or Master have power to prescribe to his Child or Servant in indifferent [Page 54] things; and such restraint be no way prejudicial to Christian liberty in them: Why should any man, either deny the like power to Church-Governours, to make Ecclesiastical-constitutionr concerning in­different things? or interpret that pow [...]r to the prejudice of Christian Liberty? And again Second­ly, Men must understand, that it is an errour to think Ceremonies and constitutions to be things meerly in different: I mean in the general. For howsoever every particular Ceremony be indifferent; and every particular constitution arbitrary and alterable; yet that there should be some Ceremonies, it is necessary Necessitate absoluta, in as much as no outward work can be performed without Ceremonial circumstan­ces, some or other: and that there should be some Cinstitutions concerning them, it is also necessary (though not simply and absolutely, as the former; yet ex hypothesi, and) necessitate covenientiae. O­therwise, since some Ceremonies must needs be used; every Parish, nay every man would have his own fashion by himself, as his humour led him: where­of what other could be the issue, but infinite di­straction, and unorderly confusion in the Church? And again thirdly, to return their weapon upon themselves; If every restraint in indifferent things be injurious to Christian liberty: then themselves are injurious no less by their negative restraint from some Ceremonies, Wear not, Cross not, Kneel not, &c. then they would have the world believe our Church is by her positive restraint unto these Cere­monies of wearing, and crossing, and kneeling, &c. [Page 55] Let indifferent men judge, nay let themselves that are parties judge, whether is more injurious to Christian Liberty; publick Authority by mature ad­vice commanding, what might be forborn: or pri­vate spirits through humorous dislikes, forbidding what may be used: the whole Church imposing the use, or a few Brethren requiring the forbearance of such things, as are otherwise and in themselves e­qually indifferent for use, or for forbearance.

But they say, our Church makes greater matters of Ceremonies than thus; and preferreth them even before the most necessary duties of preaching & ad­ministring the Sacraments: in as much as they are imposed upon ministers under pain of Suspension and Deprevation from their Ministerial Functions and Charges. First, for actual Deprivation; I take it, unconforming Ministers have no great cause to complain. ‘Our Church, it is well known, hath not alwayes used that rigour she might have done. Where she hath been forced to proceed as far as deprivation! she hath ordinarily by her fair, and slow, and compassionate proceeding therein, sufficiently manifested her unwillingness thereto:’ and declared her self a Mother every way indulgent enough to such ill-nurtured Chil­dren, as will not be ruled by her. Secondly, those that are suspended or deprived; suffer it but justly for their obstinacy and contempt For howsoever they would bear the world in hand, that they are the only persecuted ones, and that they suffer for their consciences: yet in truth, they do but abuse [Page 56] the credulity of the simple therein; and herein (as in many other things) jump with the Papists, whom they would seem above all others most abhorrent from. For as Seminary Priests and Jesuits give it out that they suffer for Religion; when the very truth is, they are justly executed for their prodigious Treasons, and felonious or teacherous practises against lawful Princes & Estates: So the brethren pretend they are persecuted for their consciences; when they are in­deed but justly censured for their obstinate and per­tinacious contempt of lawful authority. For it is not the refusal of these Ceremonies they are deprived for, otherwise then as the matter wherein they shew their contempt: it is the contempt it self, which for­merly and properly subjecteth them to just Ecclesia­stical censure of Suspension or Deprivation. And contempt of authority, though in the smallest matter deserveth no smal punishment: all authority having been ever sollicious (as it hath good reason) above all things to vindicate and preserve it self from con­tempt; by inflicting sharp punishments upon con­temptuous persons in the smallest matters, above all other sorts of offenders in any degree whatsoever. Thus have we shewed and cleared the first and main difference betwixt the case of my Text, and the case of our Church, in regard of the matter: the things whereabout they differed, being every way indifferent; ours not so.

The determination of Superiours may and ought to restrain us in the outward exercise of our Chri­stian liberty. We must submit our selves to every [Page 57] Ordinance of man, saith St. Peter, 1 Pet. 2.13. and it is necessary we should do so: for so is the will of God, Ver. 15. Neither is it against Christian liberty if we do so; for we are still as free as before: rather if we do not so, we abuse our liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, as it followeth there, ver. 16. And St. Paul telleth us we must needs be subject, not only for fear, because the Magistrate carryeth not the Sword in vain, but also for Conscience sake, because the powers that are, are ordained of God. This duty, so fully pressed and so uniformly by these two grand Apostles, is most apparent in private so­cieties. In a family, the Master, or Pater familias, who is a kind of petty Monarch there, hath autho­rity to prescribe to his Children and servants in the use of those indifferent things whereto yet they, as Christians, have as much liberty as he. The servant, though he be the Lords free-man, yet is limited in his dyet, lodging, livery, and many other things by his master: and he is to submit himself to his Ma­sters appointment in these things, though perhaps in his private affection he had rather his Master had appointed otherwise: and perhaps withall in his private judgement, doth verily think it fitter his Master should appoint otherwise. If any man un­der colour of Christian liberty, shall teach otherwise, and exempt servants from the obedience of their masters in such things: St. Paul in a holy indignati­on inveigheth against such a man, not without some bitterness, in the last Chapter of this Epistle, as one that is proud, and knoweth nothing, as he should do, [Page 58] but doateth about questions and strife of words, &c. ver. 3.5.

Now look what power the master hath over his servants for the ordering of his family; no doubt the same at the least, if not much more, hath the supreme magistrate over his subjects, for the peace of the Common-wealth: the Magistrate being Pater Patriae, as the Master is Pater familias. Who­soever then shall interpret the determinations of magistrates in the use of the Creatures to be contra­ry to the liberty of a Christian: or under that colour shall exempt inferiours from their obedience to such determinations, he must blame Saint Paul; nay he must blame the holy Ghost, and not us; if he hear from us that he is proud, and knoweth nothing, and doateth about unprofitable Questions. Surely, but that experience sheweth us it hath been so, and the Scriptures have foretold us that it should be so: that there should be differences, and sidings, and part-takings in the Church: a man would wonder how it should ever sink into the hearts and heads of sober understanding men, to deny either the po­wer in Superiours to ordain, or the necessity in In­feriours to obey Laws and constitutions, so restrai­ning us in the use of the Creatures.

Neither let any man cherish his ignorance herein: by conceiting, as if there were some difference to be made between Civil and Ecclesiastical Things, and Laws, and Persons in this behalf. The truth is, our liberty is equal in both: the power of Supe­riours fo restraint equal in both, and the necessity of [Page 59] obedience in Inferiours equal to both. No man hath yet been able to shew, nor I think ever shall be, a real and substantial difference indeed, be­tween them to make an inequality. But that stil, as civil magistrates have sometimes, for just poli­tick respects, prohibited some trades, and manu­factures, and commodities, and enjoyned other­some, and done well in both: so Churnh-Gover­nours may upon good considerations, (say it be but for order and uniformities sake,) prescribe the times, places, vestments, gestures, and other Cere­monial circumstances to be used in Ecclesiastical Offices and assemblies. As the Apostles in the fi [...]st Council holden at Jerusalem in Acts 15. laid upon the Churches of the Gentiles for a time, a restraint from the eating of blood, and things sacrificed to Idols, and strangled.

Thus we see our Christian liberty unto the Crea­tures, may without prejudice admit of some re­straints in the outward exercise of it: and namely from the three respects, of Christian Sobriety, of Christian charity, and of Christian Duty and Obedi­ence. But now in the comparing of these toge­ther; when there seemeth to be a repugnancy be­tween one and another of them, there may be some difficulty: and the greatest difficulty, and which hath bred most trouble, is in comparing the cases of scandal and disobedience together, when there seemeth to be a repugnancy between charity and Duty. As for example. Suppose in a thing which simply and in it self we may lawfully according to [Page 60] the Liberty we have in Christ, either use or forbear; charity seemeth to lay restraint upon us one way, our weak brother expecting we should forbear, and Duty a quite contrary way, Authority requiring the use: in such a case what are we to do? It is against charity to offend a brother; and it is against Duty, to disobey a superiour. And yet something must be done: either we must use, or not use; forbear, or not forbear. For the untying of this knot, (which, if we will but lay things right­ly together; hath not in it so much hardness as it seemeth to have;) let this be our seventh Position. In the use of the creatures, and all indifferent things we ought to bear a greater regard to our publike Governours, than to our private Brethren; and be more careful to obey them, than to satisfie these, if the same course will not in some mediocrity satisfie both. Alas, that our brethren who are contrary minded, would but with the spirit of sobriety ad­mit common Reason to be umpire in this case: Alas, that they would but consider, what a world of contradictions would follow upon the contrary opi­nion, and what a world of confusions upon the con­trary practice. Say what can be said, in the be­half of a Brother; all the same, and more may be said for a Governour, For a Governour is a Brother too, and something more: and Duty is charity too, and somthing more. If then I may not offend my Brother, then certainly not my Governour: because he is my brother too, being a man, and a christian, as well as the other is. And the same charity, that [Page 61] bindeth me to satisfie another Brother, equally bind­eth me to satisfie this. So that, if we go no farther, but even to the common bond of charity, and re­lation of Brother-hood; that maketh them equal at the least: and therefore no reason, why I should satisfie one that is but a Private Brother; rather then the publike magistrate, who (that publike re­spect set aside) is my Brother also. When the Scales hang thus even, shall not the accession of magistracy to common Brother-hood in him, and of Duty to common charity in me, be enough to cast it clear for the magistrate? Shall a servant in a Family, ra­ther than offend his fellow-servant, disobey his Ma­ster? And is not a double scandal against charity and Duty both (for Duty implyeth charity) greater than a single scandal against charity alone? If private men will be offended at our obedience to publike Govornours; we can but be sorry for it: We may not redeem their offence by our disobedience. He that taketh offence where none is given, sustaineth a double person; and must answer for it, both as the giver and the taker. If offence be taken at us, there is no woe to us for it, if it do not come by us; Woe to the man by whom the offence commeth: and it doth not come by us, if we do but what is our duty to do. The Rule is certain and equitable; The respect of private scandal ceaseth, where law­ful authority determineth our liberty: and that re­straint which proceedeth from special Duty, is of superiour reason to that which proceedeth but from common charity.

[Page 62]Quest. Whether the King and Parliament ought to Impose any more upon us, in matters of Religion than is Imposed in the Scripture: or whether every one ought not to be left to serve God, according to his best apprehensions out of the Scripture.

Answ. The Opinion is, that to do any thing at all without direction from the Scripture is unlawful and sinful. Which if they would understand only of the substantials of Gods worship, and of the exer­cises of spiritual and supernatural graces, the asser­tion were true and sound: but as they extend it, to all the actions of common life whatsoever, whe­ther natural or civil, even so farre as to the taking up of a straw: so it is altogether false and indefen­sible. I marvel what warrant they that so teach have from the Scripture for that very doctrine: or where they are commanded so to believe or teach. One of their chiefest refuges is the Text we now have in hand: but I shall anon drive them from this shelter. The other places usually alleaged speak only, either of divine and supernatural truths to be believed, or else of workes of grace or worship to be performed, as of necessity unto salvation: which is not to the point in issue. For it is freely con­fessed, that in things of such nature the Holy Scrip­ture is, and so we are to account it, a most absolute sufficient direction. Upon which ground we hear­tily reject all humane traditions, devised and in­tended as supplements to the doctrine of faith con­tained in the Bible, and annexed as codicils to the holy Testament of Christ, for to supply the defects [Page 63] thereof. The question is wholly about things in their nature indifferent, such as are the use of our food, raiment, and the like; about which the com­mon actions of life are chiefly conversant: Whether in the choice and use of such things, we may not be sometimes sufficiently guided by the light of reason and the common rules of discretion: but that we must be able, (and are so bound to do, or else we sinne) for every thing we do in such matters, or de­duce our warrant from some place or other of Scripture.

Before the Scripture were written it pleased GOD by visions, and dreams, and other like reve­lations, immediately to make known his good plea­sure to the Patriarches and Prophets, and by them unto the people: which kind of Revelations served them to all the same intents and purposes, whereto the sacred Scriptures now do us, viz. to instruct them what they should believe and do for his better ser­vice, and the furtherance of their own salvations. Now as it were unreasonable for any man to think, that they either had or did expect an immediate revelation from God every time they eat, or drank, or bought, or sold, or did any other of the common actions of life, for the warranting of each of those particular actions to their consciences: no less un­reasonable it is to think, that we should now expect the like warrant from the Scriptures for the doing of the like actions. Without all doubt the Law of nature, and the light of reason, was the rule whereby they were guided for the most part in such matters: [Page 64] which the wisdome of God would never have left in them or us, as a principal relique of his decayed image in us, if he had not meant, that we should make use of it, for the direction of our lives and actions thereby. Certainly God never infused any power into any creature, whereof he intended not some use. Else, what shall we say of the Indies and other barbarous nations, to whom God never vouchsafed the lively Oracles of his written word? Must we think that they were left a lawless people, without any Rule at all whereby to order their actions? How then come they to be guilty of transgression? for where there is no Law, there can be no transgession. Or how cometh it about that their consciences should at any time or in any case either accuse them, or excuse them, if they had no guide nor rule to walk by? But if we must grant they had a Rule, (and there is no way, you see, but grant it we must;) then we must also of necessity grant that there is some other Rule for humane actions be­sides the written word: for that we presupposed these nations to have wanted. Which Rule what other could it be, then the Law of the Nation and of right reason, imprinted in their hearts! Which is as truly the Law and Word of God, as is that which is printed in our Bibles. So long as our actions are warranted either by the one or the other, we can­not be said to want the warrant of Gods Word: Nec differet Scriptura an ratione consistat, saith Tertul­lian; it mattereth not much from whether of both we have our direction, so long as we have it from either▪

[Page 65]You see then those men are in a great errour, who make the holy Scriptures the sole rule of all humane actions whatsoever. For the maintenance whereof, there was never yet produced any piece of an argument, either from reason, or from au­thority of holy writ, or from the testimony either of the ancient Fathers, or of other classical Divines of later times; which may not be clearly and abun­dantly answered, to the satisfaction of any rational man not extreamly fore-possessed with prejudice. ‘They who think to salve the matter by this miti­gation; that at least wise our actions ought to be framed according to those general rules of the Law of Nature, which are here and there in the Scriptures dispersedly contained; (as viz. That we should do, as we would be done to; That all things be done decently and orderly, and unto edificati­on; That nothing be done against conscience, and the like:) speak somewhat indeed to the truth ▪ but little to the purpose. For they consider not, First that these general Rules are but occasionally and incidentally mentioned in Scripture; rather to manifest unto us a former, than to lay upon us a new obligation. Secondly, that those rules had been of force for the ordering of mens actions, though the Scripture had never expressed them: and were of such force, before those Scriptures were written, wherein they are now expressed. For they bind not originally qua scripta, but qua justa; because they are righteous, not because they are written. Thirdly, that an action con­formable [Page 66] to these general Rules might not be con­demned as sinful, although the doer thereof should look at those rules meerly as they are the dictates of the law of nature; and should not be able to vouch his warrant for it from any place of Scripture, neither should have at the time of the doing thereof any present thought or considera­tion of any such place. The contrary whereunto, I permit to any mans reasonable judgement, if it be not desperately rash and uncharitable to affirm. Lastly, that if mens actions done agreeably to those rules are said to be of faith, precisely for this rea­son, because those rules are contained in the word: then it will follow, that before those particular Scriptures were written wherein any of those rules are first delivered, every action done accor­ding to those rules had been done without faith, (there being as yet no Scripture for it;) and con­sequently had been a sin. So that by this doctrine it had been a sin (before the writing of S. Matthews Gospel) for any man to have done to others as he would they should do to him; and it had been a sin (before the writing of the former Epistle to the Corinthians) for any man to have done any thing decently and orderly; supposing these two Rules to be in those two places first men­tioned: because (this supposed) there could then have been no warrant brought from the Scriptures for so doing.’

‘Well then, we see the former Opinion will by no means hold, neither in the rigour of it, nor yet [Page 67] in the mitigation.’ We are therefore to beware of it; and that so much the more heedfully, because of the evil consequents and effects that issue from it: to wit, a world of superstitions, uncharitable cen­sures, bitter contentions, contempt of superiours, perplexities of conscience. First, it filleth mens heads with many superstitious conceits, making them to cast impurity upon sundry things, which yet are lawful to as many as use them lawfully. For the taking away of the indifferency of any thing that is indifferent, is in truth Superstition: whether either of the two wayes it be done, either by requi­ring it as necessary, or by forbidding it as unlawful. He that condemneth a thing as utterly unlawful, which yet indeed is indifferent, and so lawful, is guilty of superstion, as well as he that enjoyneth a thing as absolutely necessary, which yet indeed is but indifferent, and so arbitrary. They of the Church of Rome, and some in our Church, as they go upon quite contrary grounds, yet both false; so they run into quite contrary errours, and both su­perstitious. They decline too much on the left hand, denying to holy Scripture that perfection which of right it ought to have; of containing all appertaining to that supernatural doctrine of faith and holiness which God hath revealed to his Church for the attainment of everlasting salvation: where­upon they would impose upon Christian people, and that with an opinion of necessity, many things with the Scriptures require not: and that is a Su­perstition. These wry too much on the right hand, [Page 68] ascribing to the holy Scripture such a kind of perfe­ction as it cannot have; of being the sole directour of all humane actions whatsoever: whereupon they forbid unto Christian people, and that under the name of sinne, sundry things which the holy Scrip­ture condemneth not: and that is a superstition too.

From which Superstition proceedeth in the se­cond place uncharitable censuring: as evermore they that are the most superstitious, are the most su­percilious. No such severe censurers of our blessed Saviours person and actions, as the superstitious Scribes and Pharisees were. In this Chapter the special fault, which the Apostle blameth in the weak ones, (who were somewhat superstitiously af­fected,) was their rash and uncharitable judging of their brethren. And common and daily experi­ence among our selves sheweth how freely some men spend their censures upon so many of their brethren, as without scruple do any of those things, which they upon false grounds have superstitiously condemned as utterly unlawful.

And then thirdly, as unjust censures are com­monly entertained with scorn and contumely; they that so liberally condemn their brethren of prophan­ness, are by them again as freely flouted for their preciseness: and so whiles both parties please them­selves in their own wayes, they cease not mutually to provoke and scandalize and exasperate the one the other, pursuing their private spleens so far, till they break out into open contentions and oppositi­ons. [Page 69] Thus it stood in the Roman Church, when this Epistle was written. They judged one another, and dispised one another, to the great disturbance of the Churches peace: which gave occasion to our Apostles whole discourse in this Chapter. And how far the like censurings and despisings have embit­tered the spirits, and whetted both the tongues and pens of learned men one against another in our own Church; the stirs that have been long since raised, and are still upheld by the factions opposers against our Ecclesiastical constitutions, government, ond ceremonies, will not suffer us to be ignorant. Most of which stirs, I verily perswade my self, had been long ere this either wholly buried in silence, or at leastwise prettily well quieted, if the weak­ness and danger of the errour whereof we now speak, had been more timely discovered, and more fully and freqvently made known to the world than it hath been.

Fourthly, let that doctrine be once admitted, and all humane authority will soon be despised. The commands of Parents, Masters, and Princes, which many times require both secrecy and expedition, shall be taken into slow deliberation; and the equity of them sifted by those that are bound to obey, though they know no cause why, so long as they know no cause to the contrary. Delicata est obe­dientia, quae transit in causam deliberat vam. It is a nice obedience in St. Bernards judgement, yea rather troublesome and odious, that is over curious [Page 70] in discussing the commands of superiours; boggling at every thing that is enjoyned, requiring a why for every wherefore, and unwilling ro stir until the law­fulness and expediency of the thing commanded shall be demonstrated by some manifest reason, or undoubted authority from the Scriptures.

Lastly, the admitting of this doctrine would cast such a snare upon men of weak judgements, but tender censciences, as they should never be able to unwind themselues again. Mens daily occasions for themselves or friends, and the necessities of com­mon life, require the doing of a thousand things within the compass of a few dayes; for which it would puzzle the best Textman that liveth, readily to bethink himself of a sentence in the Bible, clear enough to satisfie a scrupulous conscience of the lawfulness and expediency of what he is about to do: for which, by hearkening to the rules of reason and discretion, he might receive easie and speedy resolution. In which cases if he should be bound to suspend his resolution, and delay to do that which his own reason would tell him were present­ly needful to be done, until he could haply call to mind some precept or example of Scripture for his warrant: what stops would it make in the course of his whole life? what languishings in the duties of his calling? how would it fill him with doubts and irresolutions, lead him into a maze of uncer­tainties, entangle him in a world of woful perplex­ities, and (without the great mercy of God, and [Page 71] better instruction) plunge him irrecoverably into the gulph of despair? Since the chief end of the publication of the Gospel, is to comfort the hearts, and to revive and refresh the spirits of Gods people with the glad tidings of liberty from the spirt of bondage and fear, and of gracious acceptance with their GOD; to anoint them with the oyl of gladness giving them beauty for Ashes, and instead of sack­cloath girding them with joy: we may well suspect that doctrine not to be Evangelical, which thus setteth the consciences of men upon the rack, tor­tureth them with continual fears and perplexities, and prepareth them thereby unto hellish dispaire.

Quest. What are the dreadful consequences of scrupling some indifferent things?

Answ. Althouugh difference of judgement should not alienate our affections one from another: yet daily experience sheweth it doth. By reason of that self-love, and envey, and other corruptions that abound in us; it is rarely seen that those men are of one heart, that are of two mindes. St. Paul found it so with the Romans in his time: whilest some condemned that as unlawful, which others practised as lawful; they judged one another, and disposed one another, perpetually. And I doubt not, but any of us, that is any-whit-like acquain­ted with the wretched deceitfulness of mans heart, may easily conclude how hard a thing it is, (if at all [Page 72] possible,) not to think somewhat hardly of those men, that take the liberty to do such ‘things as we judge unlawful. As for example. If we shall judge all walking into the fields, discoursing oc­casionally on the occursences of the times, dres­sing of meat for dinner or supper, or even moder­ate recreations on the Lords day, to be grievous prophanations of the Sabbath; how can we chuse but judge those men that use them to be grievous prophaners of Gods Sabbath? And if such our judgment concering the things should after prove to be erroneous: then can it not be avoided, but that such our judment also concerning the persons must needs be uncharitable.’

Secondly, This mis-judging of things filleth the would with endless niceties and disputes; to the great disturbance of the Churches peace, which to e­very good man ought to be precious. The mul­tiplying of Books and writings pro and con, and pur­suing of arguments with heat and opposition, doth rather lengthen, then decide controversides; and instead of destroying the old, begetteth new ones: whiles they that are in the wrong out of obstinacy will not, and they that stand for the truth out of conscience dare not, may not yeild; and so still the war goeth on.

And as to the publick peace of the Church, so is there also thirdly by this means great prejudice done to the peace and tranquillity of private mens [Page 73] consciences? when by the peremptory doctrines of some strict and rigid masters, the souls of many a well-meaning man are miserably disquieted with a thousand unnecessary scruples. And driven some­times into very woful perplexities. Surely it can-be no light matter, thus to lay heavey burdens upon other mens shoulders, and to cast asnare upon their consciences, by making the narrow way to Heaven narrower then ever God meant it.

Fourthly, hereby Christian Governours come to be robbed of a great part of that honour that is due unto them from their people; both in their Affecti­ons and Subjection. For when they shall see cause to exercise over us that power that God hath left them in indifferent things, by commanding such or such things to be done; as namely, wearing of a Surplice, kneeling at the communion, and the like: if now we in our own thoughts have already pre­judged any of the things so commanded to be un­lawful; i [...] cannot be.

Quest. If these things be so, how comes it to pass that so many godly men should incline so much to this way?

Answ. But you will say, if these things were so, how should it then come to pass that so many men pretending, to Goliness, (and thousands of them doubtless such as they pretend; for it were an un­charitable thing to charge them all with hypocrisie) [Page 74] should so often and so grievously offend this way? To omit those two more universal causes; Almigh­ty Gods permission first, whose good pleasure it is, for sundry wise and gratious ends, to exercise his Church during her warfare here with heresies and scandals: And then the williness of Satan, who cunningly observeth whither way our hearts incline most, to loosness, or to strictness; and then frameth his temptations thereafter: So he can but put us out of the way; it is no great matter to him, on whether hand it be: he hath his end howsoever. Nor to in­sist upon sundry more particular causes: as namely, a natural proneness in all men to superstition: in many an affectation of singularity, to go beyond the ordinary sort of people in something or other; the difficulty of shunning one without running into the contrary extream; the great force of education and custome; besides manifold abuses, offences and pro­vocations, arising from the carriage of others; and the rest: I shall note but these two only, as the two great fountains of Errour, (to which also most of the other may be reduced,) Ignorance and Partia­lity: from neither of which Gods dearest servants and children are in this life wholly exempted.

Ignorance first is a fruitful mother of Errours. (Ye erre not knowing the Scriptures, Matth. 22. Yet not so much, Gross Ignorance neither: I mean not that. For your meer Ignaro's, what they erre, they erre for company: they judge not at all; neither ac­cording to the appearance, nor yet righteous judge­ment. [Page 75] They only run on with the herd, and follow as they are led, be it right or wrong; and never trouble themselves farther. But by Ignorance I mean weakness of judgement, which consisteth in a disproportion between the affections, and the under­standing: when a man is very earnest, but withall very shallow: readeth much, and heareth much, and thinketh that he knoweth much, but hath not the judgement to sever truth from falshood, nor to dis­cern between a sound argument and a captious fal­lacy. And so for want of ability to examine the soundness and strength of those principles, from whence he fetcheth his conclusions; he is easily car­ried away, as our Apostle elewhere speaketh, with vain words, and empty arguments. As St. Augustine said of Donatus, Ratioues arripuit he catcheth hold of some reasons, (as wranglers will catch at a smal thing, rather then yeild from their opinions,) quae considerantes, verisimiles esse potius quam veras invenimus: which saith he, we found to have more shew of probability at the first appearance, then sub­stance of truth after they were well considered of.

And I dare say, whosoever shall peruse with a judictious and unpartial eye most of those Pamplets, that in this daring age have been thrust into the World against the Ceremonies of the Church, against Episcopal Government; (to pass by things of lesser regard and usefulness, and more open to acception and abuse, yet so far as I can understand, unjustly [Page 76] condemned as things utterly unlawful; such as are lusorious lots, dancing, Stage-plays, and some other things of like nature;) When he shall have drained out the bitter invectives, unmannerly jeers, petu­lant guirding at those that are in authority, imper­tinent disgressions, but above all those most bold and perverse wrestings of holy Scripture, where­with such books are infinitely stuffels, he shall find that little poor remainder that is left behind, to contain nothing but vain words and empty argu­ments. For when these great undertakers have snatcht up the bucklers, as if they would make it good against all comers, that such and such things are utterly unlawful; and therefore ought in all reason and conscience, to bring such proofs as will come up to that conclusion: Quid dignum tanto? very seldome shall you hear from them any other arguments, then such as will conclude but an In­expediency at the most. As, that they are apt to give scandal; that they carry with them an appear­ance of evil; that they are often occasions of sin; that they are not command in the Word; and such like. Which Objections, even where they are just, are not of force, (no not taken altogether, much less any of them singly,) to prove a thing to be ut­terly unlawful. And yet are they glad many times, rather then sit out, to play very smal Game, and to make use of Arguments yet weaker then these, and such as will not reach so far as to prove a bare inex­pediency. As, that they were invented by Heathens; that they have been abused in Popery; and other [Page 77] such like. Which to my understanding is a very strong presumption, that they have taken a very weak cause in hand, and such as is wholly destitute of sound proof.

Quest. Whether what the King and Parliament have determined may be altered to satisfie private men,

Answ. While things are in agitation; private men may, if any thing seem to them inexpedient, mo­destly tender their thoughts together with the rea­sons thereof, to the consideration of those that are in authority: to whose care and wisdom it belong­eth, in prescribing any thing concerning indifferent things, to proceed with all just advisedness and moderation: that so the Subject may be encouraged to perform that obedience with [...]rfulness, which of necessity he must perform howsoever. It concern­eth Superiours therefore to look well to the expe­diency, and inexpediency of what they enjoyn in indifferent things. Wherein if there be a fault, it must lie upon their account: the necessity of obedi­ence is to us a sufficient discharge in that behalf. Only it were good we did remember, that they are to give up that account to God onely, and not to us. But after that things are once concluded and established by publick authority, Acts passed and Constitutions made concerning the same, and the will and pleasure of the higher powers sufficiently made known therein: then for private men to put [Page 78] in their vye, and with unseasonable diligence to call in question the decency or expediency of the things so established, yea with intolerable pride, to refuse obedience thereunto meerly upon this pretension, that they are undecent or inexpedient; is it self in-the most indecent and inexpedient thing that can be imagined.

For that the fear of offending a private brother, is a thing not cnnsiderable in comparison of the du­ty of obedience to a publike Governour; might be shown so apparantly by sundry arguments, if we had time to enlarge and illustrate them, as might sufficiently convince the judgement of any man not wilfully obstinate in that point. I shall only crave leave briefly to touch at some of them. First then, when Governours shall have appointed what seem­ed to them expedient; and private men shall re­fuse to observe the same, pretending it to be inex­pedient: who shall judge thereof? Either they themselves that take the exceptions must be judges; which is both unreasonable and preposterous: or else every man must be his own judge, which were to overthrow all Government, and to bring in a confusion, every man to do what is good in his own eyes: or else the known gavernours must judge; and then you know what will follow, even to sub­mit and obey.

Secondly, to allow men under the pretence of in­expediency, and because of some offence that may. [Page 79] be taken thereat, to disobey laws and constitutions made by those that are in authority; were the next way to cut the sinews of all authority, and to bring both Magistrates and Laws into contempt. For what Law ever was made, or can be made so just and so reasonable, but some man or other ei­ther did, or might take offence thereat? And what man that is disposed to disobey, but may pretend inexpediency or other, wherewith to countenance out such his disobedience.

Thirdly, it is agreed by consent of all that han­dle the matter of Scandal, that we may not com­mit any sin whatsoever, be it never so small, for the avoiding of any scandall, be it never so great. But to disobey lawful authority in lawful things, is a sin against the fifth Commandement. Therefore we may not redeem a scandall by such our disobedience; nor refuse to do the thing commanded by such au­thority, whosoever should take offence thereat.

Fourthly, though lawfulnesse and unlawfulnesse be not, yet expediency and inexpediency are (as we heard) capable of the degrees of more and lesse; and then in all reason, of two inexpedient things we are to do that which is lesse inexpedient, for the a­voiding of that which is more inexpedient, Say then there be an inexpediency in doing the thing commanded by authority, when a Brother is there­by offended; is there not a greater inexpediency in not doing it, when the Magistrate is thereby diso­beyed? [Page 80] It is not more expedient, and conducing to the common good, that a publick Magistrate should be obeyed in a just command, then that a private person should be gratified in a causelesse scruple.

Fifthly, when by refusing obedience to the law­full commands of our Superiours, we think to shun the offending of one or two weak brethren; we do in truth incurr thereby a far more grievous scan­dall, by giving offence to hundreds of others: whose consciences by our Disobedience will be embold­ned to that, whereto corrupt nature is but too too prone, to affront the Magistrate, and despise the authority.

Lastly, where we are not able to discharge both, debts of justice are to be payed, before debts of cha­rity. Now the duty of obedience is debitum justitiae and a matter of right, my superiour may challenge it at my hands as is due; and I do him wrong if I with-hold it from him. But the care of not giving offence is but debitum charitatis, and a matter but of courtesie. I am to perform it to my brother in love, when I see cause: but he cannot challenge it from me as his right: nor can justly say I do him wrong, if I neglect it. It is therefore no more law­full for me, to disobey the lawful command of a Superiour, to prevent thereby the offence of one or a few brethren: then it is lawfull for me to do one man wrong, to do another man a courtesie withall; [Page 81] or then it is lawful for me to rob the Exchequer, to relieve an Hospital.

I see not yet how any of these six reasons can be fairly avoided: and yet, (which would be consi­dered,) if but any one of them hold good, it is enough to carry the cause: And therefore I hope there need be no more said in this matter. To conclude then, for the point of practise, (which is the main thing I aimed at in the choiee of this Text, and my whole meditations thereon,) we may take our direction in these three Rules; easie to be un­derstood and remembred, and not hard to be ob­served in our practise, if we will but bring our good wils thereunto. First, If God command, we must submit without any more adoe; and not trouble our selves about the experiency, or so much as about the unlawfulness for both Abraham never dispu­ted whether it were expedient for him, not yet whe­ther it were lawful for him to sacrifice his son or no, when once it appeared to him. that God would have it so.

Secondly, If our Superiours, endued with lawful authority thereunto, cammand us any thing; we may & (where we have just cause of doubt) we ought to enquire into the unlawfulness thereof. Yet notwithstanding such anxious curiosity, as if we desired to find out some loop-hole whereby to evade; but with such modest ingenuity, as may witness God and the world the unfeigned sincerity of our desires [Page 82] both to fear God, and to honour those that he hath set over us- And if having used ordinary moral diligence bona fide to informe our selves the best we can, there appear no unlawfulness it it; we are then also to submit and obey without any more adoe never troubling our selves farther to enquire whe­ther it be expedient yea or no. Let them that com­mand us look to that: for it is they must answer for it, and not we.

But then thirdly, where authority hath left us free; no command, either of God, or of those that are set over us under God, having prescribed any thing to us in that behalf: there it is at our own li­berty and choyce, to do as we shall think good. Yet are we not left so loose, as that we may do what we list, so as the thing be but lawful; (for that were licentiousness, and not liberty:) but we must ever do that. which according to the exigence of pre­sent circumstances, (so far as all the wisdome and charity we have will serve us to judge,) shall seem to us most expedient, and profitable to mutual Edi­fication. This is the way: God give us all grace to walk in it. So shall we bring glory to him, and to our selvess comfort: so shall we further his work onward, and our own account at the last.

Quest. Whether they that have taken the Cove­nant may Renounce it?

Answ. Thirdly, beware of engaging thy left to sin. It is a fearful thing, when sin hath got a tye upon a man. Then is one properly in the snare of the Devil; when he hath him as it were in a string, [Page 83] and may lead him captive to what measure of pre­sumption he will. And sundry wayes may a man thus entangle himself: by a Verbal, by a Real, by a Sinful Engagement. He shall do best to keep himself out of all these snares. But if once he be in; there is no way out again but one: even this, To loose his pledge, to break in sunder the bonds wherein he is tied, as Sampson did the green witths, and to cast away those cords from him.

A man hath bound himself rashly by some pro­mise, vew, or covenant, to do something he may not do, or not to do something he ought to do. He is now engaged in a sin: the Devil hath got this tye upon him. And though his conscience tell him he cannot proceed without sin; yet because of his Vow, or his Oath, he is wilful, and must on. It was Herods Case; for taking of the Baptists head. It was against his conscience to do it: for he knew he had not diserved it: Ey, and it was against his minde too to do it; for the Text saith, he was ex­ceeding sarry that his neice should put him upon it. But yet, saith the story withall, for his Oath sake, and because the great ones about him should not say but the King would be as big as the word, he re­solved it should be done, and gave commandment accordingly to have it done. This I call a Verbal Engagement.

Quest. Whether we English-men may think our selves bound by the Solemne League and Covenant?

Answ. Not without betraying the Liberty, which by our Protestation we are bound, and in the third [Page 84] Article of this Covenant must swear, with our lives and fortunes to preserve. To which Liberty the imposition of a new Oath, other then is established by Act of Parliament, it expressed in the Petition of Right, and by the Lords and Commons in their De­clarations acknowledged to be contrary.

3. Without acknowledgeing in the imposers, a greater power then, for ought that appeareth to us, hath been in former times challenged; Or can con­sist with our former Protestation (if we rightly un­derstand it) in sundry the most material branches thereof.

Neither, secondly, are we satisfied; although the Covenant should not be imposed on us at al, but on­ly recommended to us, and then left to our choice.

1. How we should in wisedom and Duty (being Subjects) of our own accord and free will enter in­to a Covenant, wherein He, whose Subjects we are, is in any wise concerned, without His consent, ei­ther expressed or reasonably presumed. It being in his power (as we conceive) by the equity of the Law, Numb. 30. to annull and make voyd the same at his pleasure.

2. How we can (now that His Majesty hath by His publique Interdict sufficiently made known His pleasure in that behalfe) enter into a Covenant, the taking whereof he hath expresly forbidden; without forfeiting that Obedience, which (as we are perswaded) by our natural Allegiance and former Oathes we owe unto all such His Majesties Com­mands, as are not in our apprehensions repugnant to the wil of God, or the positive laws of this Kingdom.

[Page 85]Quest. What shall a man do that scruples in Conscience what Authority enjoyns as unlawful.

But then thirdly, if the liberty of the agent be determined by the command of some superiour power to whom he oweth obedience; so as he is not now sui juris ad hoc, to do or not to do at his own choice, but to do what he is com­manded: this one circumstance quite altereth the whole case, & now he is bound in conscience to do the thing com­manded; his doubtfulnesse of mind whether that thing be lawful or no, notwithstanding. To do that whereof he doubteth, where he hath free liberty to leave it undone, bringeth upon him (as we have already shewn) the guilt of wilful transgression: but not so where he is not left to his own liberty. And where lawful authority prescribeth in alterutram partem, there the liberty ad utramque partem contradictionis is taken away, from so many as are under that authority. If they that are over them have deter­mined it one way; it is not thenceforth any more at their choice, whether they will take that way, or the contrary: but they must go the way that is appointed them without gainsaying or grudging. And if in the deed done at the command of one that is endued with lawful authority there be a sin, it must go on his score that requireth it wrongfully, not on his that doth but his duty in obeying. A Prince commandeth his Subjects to serve in his Warres: it may be the quarrel is unjust, it may be there may ap­pear to the understanding of the Subject great likeli­hoods of such injustice; yet may the Subject for all that fight in that quarrel; yea he is bound in conscience so to do: nay he is deep in disloyalty and treason if he refuse the service, whatsoever pretensions he may make of conscience for such refusal. Neither need that fear trouble him lest he should bring upon himself the guilt of innocent [Page 86] blood; for the blood that is unrighteously shed in that quar­rel, he must answer for that set him on work, not he that spilt it. And truly it is a great wonder to me, that any man endued with understanding, and that is able in any mea­sure to weigh the force of those precepts and reasons which bind inferiours to yield obedience to their superiours, should be otherwise minded in cases of like nature. What­soever is commanded us by those whom God hath set o­ver us, either in Church, Common wealth, or Family, ( Quod tamen non sit certum displicere Deo, saith S. Bern.) which is not evidently contrary to the Law and will of God, ought to be of us received and obeyed no otherwise, then as if God himself had commanded it, because God himself hath commanded us to obey the higher powers, and to submit our selves to their ordinances. Say it be not well don of them to command it! Sed enim quid hoc refert tuâ? saith he, What is that to thee? Let them look to that whom it concerneth: Tolle quod tuum est, & vade. Do thou what is thine own part faithfully, and never trou­ble thy self further. Ipsum quem pro Deo habemus, tan­quam Deum in his quae apertè non sunt contra Deum audire de­bemus; Bernard still. Gods Vicegerents must be heard and obeyed in all things that are not manifestly contrary to the revealed will of God.

But the thing required is against my conscience, may som say, and I may not go against my conscience ▪ for any mans pleasure. Judg I pray you what perverseness is this, when the blessed Apostle commandeth thee to obey for conscience sake, that thou shouldest disobey, & that for conscience sake too: He chargeth thee upon thy conscience to be subject; and thou pretendest thy conscience to free thee from sub­jection. This by the way; now to the point. Thou sayest it is against thy conscience: I say again, that (in the case [Page 87] whereof we now speak, the case of doubtfullness) it is not against thy conscience. For doubting properly is motus in­differens in utramque partem contradictionis; when the mind is held in suspence between two ways, uncertain whe­ther of both to take to. When the scales hang even (as I said before) and inaequi [...]libero, without any notable pro­pension or inclination to the one side more than to the other. And surely where things hang thus even, if the weight of authority will not cast the scale either way: we may well suppose, that either the authority is made very light, or else there is a great fault in the beame. Know (brethren) the gainsaying conscience is one thing, and the doubting conscience another. That which is done repug­nante conscientià, the conscience of the doer flatly gainsay­ing it, that is indeed against a mans conscience, the con­science having already passed a definitive sentence the one way:) and no respect or circumstance whatsoever can free it from sin. But that which is done dubitante consci­entiâ, the conscience of the doer onely doubting of it and no more; that is in truth no more against a mans conscience than with it, (the conscience as yet not having passed a definitive sentence either way) and such an action may ei­ther be a sinne, or no sinne; according to those qualificati­ons which it may receive from other respects and cir­cumstances. If the conscience have already passed a judg­ment upon a thing, and condemned it as simply unlawfull; in that case it is true that a man ought not by any meanes to do that thing, no not at the command of any Magi­strate, no not although his conscience have pronounced a wrong sentence, and erred in that judgement: for then he should do it repugnante conscientiâ, he should go di­rectly against his own conscience, which he ought not to do whatsoever come of it. In such a case certainly he [Page 88] may not obey the Magistrate: yet let him know thus much withall, that he sinneth too in disobeying the Magistrate; from which sinne the following of the judgement of his own conscience cannot acquit him. And this is that fear­full perplexity whereof I spake, whereinto many a man casteth himself by his own error & obstinacy, that he can neither go with his conscience, nor against it but he shall sinne. And who can help it, if a man will needs cherish an errour, and persist in it? But now if the conscience be onely doubtfull whether a thing be lawfull or no, but have not as yet passed a peremptory judgement against it, (yea although it rather incline to think it unlawfull:) in that case if the Magistrate shall command it to be done, the subject with a good conscience may do it, nay he cannot with a good conscience refuse to do it, though it be du­bitante conscientiâ.

But you will yet say, that in doubtfull cases the safer part is to be chosen. So say I too; and am content that rule should decide this question: onely let it be rightly applyed. Thou thinkest it safer, where thou doubtest of the unlawfulnesse, to forbear then to do: as for example, if thou doubtest whether it be lawfull to kneel at the Com­munion, it is safest in thy opinion therefore for thee not to kneel. So should I think too, if thou wert left meerly to thine own liberty. But thou dost not consider how thou art caught in thine own net, and how the edge of thine own weapon may be turned upon thee point-blank not to be avoided, thus. If authority command thee to kneel, which whether it be lawful for thee to do, or not, thou doubtest; it cannot chuse but thou must needs doubt also, whether thou maiest lawfully disobey, or not. Now then here apply thine own Rule, In dubiis pars tutior, and see what will come of it. Judge, since thou canst not but [Page 89] doubt in both cases, whether it be not the safer of the two, to obey doubtingly, than to disobey doubtingly. Tene cer­tum, demitte incertum, is S. Gregory his rule: where there is a certainty, and an uncertainty, let the uncertainty go, and hold to that which is certain. Now the general is cer­tain, that thou art to obey the Magistrate in all things not contrary to the will of God; but the particular is un­certain, whether the thing now commanded thee by the Magistrate be contrary to the will of God: (I say uncer­tain to thee, because thou doubtest of it) Deal safely there­fore, and hold thee to that which is certain ▪ and obey.

But thou wilt yet alledge, that the Apostle here con­demneth the doing of any thing, not only with a gain­saying, but even with a doubting conscience: because doubting also is contrary to faith; and he that doubteth is even for that condemned, if he eat. Oh beware of mis-ap­plying Scripture! it is a thing easily done, but not so easi­ly answered. I know not any one gap that hath let in more and more dangerous errours into the Church, than this: that men take the word, of the sacred Text fitted to particular occasions, & to the condition of the times wherin they were written; & then apply them to themselvs & others as they find them, without due respect had to the differen­ces that may be between those times & cases, & the present. Sundry things spoken of in Scripture agreeably to that in­fancy of the Church, would sort very ill with the Church in her fulness of strength and stature: & sundry directions very expedient in times of persecution, and when believers lived mingled with Infidels, would be very unseasonably urged where the Church is in a peaceable and flourishing e­state, enjoying the favour and living under the protection of gracious and religious [...]. Thus the Constitutions that the Apostles made concerning Deacons & Widowes in [Page 90] those primitive times, are with much importunity, but ve­ry importunely withal, urged by the Disciplinarians: And sundry other like things I might instance of this kind, worthy the discovery, but that I fear to grow tedious. Briefly then, the Apostles whole discourse in this Chap­ter, and so wheresoever else he toucheth upon the point of Scandals, is to be understood only in that case where men are left to their own liberty in the use of indifferent things: the Romans, Corinthians, & others to whom S. Paul wrote about these matters, being not limited any way in the ex­ercise of their liberty therein by any overruling authority. But where the Magistrates have interposed▪ & thought good upon mature advice to impose Laws upon those that are under them, whereby their liberty is (not infringed, as some unjustly complain, in the inward judgement, but only) limited in the outward exercise of it: there the Apo­stolical directions will not hold in the same absolute man­ner, as they were delivered to those whom they then con­cerned; but only in the equity of them, so far forth as the cases are alike, & with such meet qualifications and mitiga­tions, as the difference of the cases otherwise doth require. So that a man ought not out of private fancy, or meerly because he would not be observed for not doing as o­thers do, or for any the like weak respects, to do that thing of the lawfulness whereof he is not competently per­swaded, where it is free for him to do otherwise: which was the case of these weak ones among the Romans, for whose sakes principally the Apostle gave these directi­ons. But the authority of the Magistrates intervening so alters the case, that such a forbearance as to them was ne­cessary, is to as many of [...] commanded to do this or that, altogether unlawf [...] regard they were free and we are bound: for the reasons already shewn, which I now [Page 91] rehearse not. But you will yet say, (for in point of obedi­ence men are very loth to yield so long as they can find any thing to plead,) those that lay these burdens upon us, at least wise should do well to satisfie our doubts and to inform our consciences concerning the lawfulnesse of what they en­joyn that so we might render them obedience with better cheerfulness. How willing are we sinful men to leave the blame of our miscarriages any where rather than upon our selvs! But how is it not incongruous the while, that those men should prescribe rules to their governours, who can scarcely brook their governours should prescribe laws to them? It were good we should first learn how to obey, ere we take upon us to teach our betters how to govern. However, what governours are bound to do, or what is fit for them to do, in the point of information; that is not now the question. If they fail in any part of their bounden du­ty, they shall be sure to reckon for it one day: but their failing cannot in the mean time excuse thy disobedience. Although I think it would prove a hard task, for whoso­ever should undertake it, to shew that Superiours are al­waies bound to inform the consciences of their inferiours concerning the lawfulness of every thing they shall com­mand. If somtimes they do it, where they see it expedient or needful; somtimes again (and that perhaps oftner,) it may be thought more expedient for them, and more con­ducible for the publick peace and safety, only to make known to the people what their pleasures are, reserving to themselvs the reasons thereof. I am sure, in the point of Ecclesiastical Ceremonies and Constitutions ▪ (in which case the aforesaid allegations are usually most stood upon,) this hath been abundantly done in our Church, not onely in the learned writings of sundry private men but by the publick declaration also of authority, as is to be seen at large [Page 92] in the preface commonly printed before the book of Com­mon prayer concerning that argument: enough to satis­fie those that are peaceable, and not disposed to stretch their wits to cavil at things established. And thus much of the second Question, touching a doubting conscience: whereon I have insisted the longer, because it is a point both so proper to the Text, & whereat so many have stumbled.

There remaineth but one other Question, and that of far smaller difficulty: What is to be done, when the con­science is scrupulous? I call that a scruple, when a man is reasonably well perswaded of the lawfullnesse of a thing, yet hath withal some jealousies and fears, lest perhaps it should prove unlawful. Such scruples are most incident to men of melancholy dispositions, or of timorous spirits; especially if they be tender-conscienced withall: and they are much encreased by the false suggestions of Satan; by reading the books, or hearing the Sermons, or frequenting the company of men more strict, precise, and austere in sundry points, than they need or ought to be; and by sundry other means which I now mention not. Of which scruples it behooveth every man, first, to be wary that he doth not at all admit them, if he can chuse: or, if he cannot wholly avoid them, that secondly, he endeavour so far as may be to eject them speedily out of his thoughts, as Satans snares, and things that may breed him worser in­conveniencies: or, if he cannot be so rid of them, that then thirdly, he resolve to go on according to the more profitable perswasion of his mind, and despise those scruples. And this he may do with a good conscience, not only in things commanded him by lawful authority, but even in things indifferent and arbitrary, and wherein he is left to his own liberty.