IN the beginning of this Chapter Job dis­courseth of the knowledg of Nature, and the secret and unaccountable operations of Natural Causes, and of the unsearchable perfections of the Works of God. And en­quiring at the 12 ^th Verse, where this Wis­dom is to be found, he tells us, that it is not to be met with in any of the Creatures; It is not found in the land of the living; The depth saith, It is not in me, and the Sea saith, It is not in me, &c. Therefore he puts the question again, ver. 20. Whence then cometh Wisdom, and where is the place of understanding, seeing it is hid from the eyes of all living? To which he returns an answer, ver. 23. God understandeth the way thereof, and he knoweth the place thereof, for he looketh to the ends of the earth, and seeth under the whole heaven to make the weight for the wind, &c. The result of which discourse is, That a per­fect [Page 2] knowledg of nature is no where to be found but in the Au­thour of it; no less wisdom and understanding then that which made the World, and contrived this vast and regular frame of Nature, can throughly understand the Philosophy of it, and give a perfect account of all its motions and operations. But there is a wisdom and knowledg which is very proper to man, and lies level to a humane understanding, which is suited and ac­commodated to the end, and uses, and necessities of man: and that is, the knowledg of God, and of that duty which we owe to him; the wisdom of pleasing God, by doing what he commands, and avoiding what he forbids: This Knowledg and Wisdom may be attained by man, and is sufficient to make him happy. And unto man he said, Behold the fear of the Lord, that is Wisdom, and to depart from evil is understanding.

Which words consist of two propositions, which are not distinct in sense, but one and the same thing variously expressed; For wisdom and understanding are Synonymous words here, and though sometimes they have different notions, yet in the Poetical books of Scripture they are most frequently used as words equi­valent, and do both of them indifferently signifie either a spe­culative knowledg of things, or a practical skill about them, ac­cording to the exigency of the matter or thing spoken of. And so likewise the fear of the Lord, and departure from evil, are phrases of a very near sense, and like importance, and therefore we find them several times put together in Scripture. Prov. 3. 7. Fear the Lord and depart from evil. Prov. 16. 6. By the fear of the Lord men depart from evil. So that they differ onely as cause and effect, which by a Metonymy usual in all sorts of Au­thours, are frequently put for one another.

Now, To fear the Lord, and to depart from evil, are phrases which the Scripture useth in a very great latitude, to express to us the sum of Religion, and the whole of our duty. And because [Page 3] the large acceptation of these phrases is to be the foundation of my subsequent discourse, I shall for the further clearing of this matter endeavour to shew these two things.

1. That it is very usual in the language of Scripture, to ex­press the whole of Religion by these, and such like phrases.

2. The particular fitness of these two phrases to describe Re­ligion by.

I. It is very usual in the language of Scripture, to express the Whole of Religion by some eminent Principle or part of Reli­gion. The great Principles of Religion are Knowledg, Faith, Remembrance, Love and Fear; by all which, the Scripture u­seth to express the Whole duty of man. In the Old Testament, by the Knowledg, Remembrance, and Fear of God. Religion is called The knowledg of the holy, Prov. 30. 3. And wicked men are described to be such as know not God. So likewise, by the fear of the Lord, frequently in this book of Job, and in the Psalms, and Proverbs. And Mal. 3. 16. Then they that feared the Lord spake often one to another. And Eccles. 12. 13. the fear of God is expresly said to be the sum of Religion; Fear God and keep his commandments, for this is the whole of man. And on the contrary, the wicked are described to be such as have not the fear of God before their eyes, Psal. 36. 1. And so likewise by the remembrance of God, Eccles. 12. 1. Remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth: that is, enter upon a Religious course be­times. And on the contrary, the Character of the Wicked is, that they forget God, Psal. 9. 17. The wicked shall be turned into Hell, and all the Nations that forget God. In the New Testament, Religion is usually expressed by faith in God and Christ, and the love of them, Hence it is that true Christians are so frequently called believers, and wicked and ungodly men, unbelievers. And Rom. 8. 28. Good men are described to be such as love God, All things shall work together for good to them that love God, and [Page 4] such as love the Lord Jesus Christ, Ephes. 6. 24. Now the rea­son why these are put for the Whole of Religion, is, because the belief, and knowledg, and remembrance, and love, and fear of God, are such powerful principles, and have so great an influence upon men to make them Religious, that where any one of these really is, all the rest, together with the true and genuine effects of them, are supposed to be. And so likewise the sum of all Re­ligion is often expressed by some eminent part of it; which will explain the second phrase here in the Text, Departing from evil. The Worship of God is an eminent part of Religion; and Prayer, which is often in Scripture expressed by seeking God, and calling upon his Name, is a chief part of Religious Worship. Hence Religion is described by seeking God, Heb. 11. 6. He is a rewarder of them that diligently seek him; and by calling upon his Name, Act. 2. 21. Whosoever calleth upon the name of the Lord, shall be saved. And so by coming to God, and by departing from evil. In this fallen state of man, Religion begins with Repentance and Conversion, the two opposite terms of which are God and sin; hence it is that Religion is described sometimes by coming to God, Heb. 11. 6. He that cometh to God must believe that he is; that is, No man can be religious, unless he believe there is a God. Sometimes by departing from sin, Isa. 59. 15. And he that departeth from evil maketh himself a Prey: that is, such was the bad state of those times the Prophet complains of, that no man could be religious, but he was in danger of being per­secuted.

II. For the fitness of these two phrases to describe Religion by. 1. For the first, The fear of the Lord; the fitness of this phrase will appear, if we consider that very great influence which the fear of God hath upon men to make them religious. Fear is a passion that is most deeply rooted in our natures, and flows immediately from that principle of self-preservation which God [Page 5] hath planted in every man. Every man desires his own preser­vation and happiness, and therefore hath a natural dread and horrour of every thing that can destroy his being, and endan­ger his happiness; Now the greatest danger is from the greatest power, and that is Omnipotency. So that the fear of God is an inward acknowledgment of a Holy and just Being, which is armed with an almighty and irresistible power; God having hid­in every mans conscience a secret awe and dread of his infinite Power, and eternal Justice. Now Fear, being so intimate to our natures, it is the strongest bond of Laws, and the great se­curity of our duty. There are two Bridles or restraints which God hath put upon humane nature, Shame, and Fear. Shame is the weaker, and hath place onely in those in whom there are some remainders of Virtue; Fear is the stronger, and works up­on all who love themselves, and desire their own preservation. Therefore, in this degenerate state of man-kind, Fear is that pas­sion which hath the greatest power over us, and by which, God and his Laws take the surest hold of us: Our Desire, and Love, and Hope, are not so apt to be wrought upon by the representa­tion of Virtue, and the promises of Reward and Happiness as our Fear is from the apprehensions of Divine displeasure; For though we have lost, in a great measure, the gust and relish of true happiness, yet we still retain a quick sense of pain and mise­ry. So that Fear relies upon a natural love of our selves, and is complicated with a necessary desire of our own preservation; therefore Religion usually makes it's first entrance into us by this passion; and hence it is that Solomon, more then once, calls the Fear of the Lord the beginning of Wisdom. 2. As for the second phrase, departing from evil; the fitness of it to express the whole duty of Man will appear, if we consider the necessary connexion that is between the negative and positive part of our duty. He that is careful to avoid all sin, will sincerely endea­vour [Page 6] to perform his duty; for, the soul of man is an active prin­ciple, and busie, and will be employed one way or other, it will be doing something; if a man abstain from evil, he will do good. Now there being such a strait connexion between these, the whole of our duty may be expressed by either of them, but most fitly by departing from evil, because that is the first part of our duty: Religion begins in the forsaking of sin; Virtus est Vitium fugere, & Sapientia prima Stultitiâ caruisse; Virtue be­gins in the forsaking of Vice, and the first part of Wisdom is, not to be a Fool. And therefore the Scripture, which mentions these parts of our duty, doth constantly put departing from evil first; Psal. 34. 14. and Psal. 37. 27. Depart from evil, and do good. Isa. 1. 16, 17. Cease to do evil, learn to do well. Isa. 55. 7. Let the wicked forsake his way, and the unrighteous man his thoughts, and let him return unto the Lord. Ephes, 4. 23, 24. We are first to put off the old man which is corrupt according to deceitful lusts, and then to be renewed in the spirit of our minds, and to put on the new man, &c. 1 Pet. 3. 11. Let him eschew evil, and do do good. To all which I may add this further Consideration, That the Law of God, contained in the Ten Commandments, consisting mostly of prohibitions, Thou shalt not do such or such a thing, our observance of them is most fitly expressed by departing from evil, which yet includes obedience likewise to the positive Pre­cepts implied in those prohibitions.

From the words thus explained, the Proposition that I shall speak to is this, viz.

Or thus,

I shall first endeavour to confirm the truth of this Proposition, and then make some Use and improvement of it.

[Page 7] The Confirmation of it I shall attempt these three ways.

1. By a direct Proof of it.

2. By shewing on the contrary, the folly and ignorance of irreli­gion and wickedness.

3. By vindicating Religion from those common Imputations which seem to charge it with Ignorance or Imprudence.

I. I begin with the direct proof of this; And because Re­ligion comprehends two things, the knowledg of the Principles of it, and a suitable life and practice; (the first of which being speculative may more properly be called knowledg, and the lat­ter, because 'tis practical, may be called wisdom or prudence) therefore I shall endeavour distinctly to prove these two things.

• 1. That Religion is the best Knowledg.
• 2. That it is the truest Wisdom.

1. First, That it is the best knowledg. The knowledg of Reli­gion commends its self to us upon these two accounts.

1. 'Tis the knowledg of those things which are in themselves most excellent.

2. Of those things which are most useful and necessary for us to know.

First, It is the best knowledg, because it is the knowledg of those things which are in themselves most excellent, and desire­able to be known, and those are God, and our duty. God is the sum and comprehension of all perfection. It is delightful to know the Creatures, because they are some shadows of the divine per­fections; There are particular excellencies scattered and dis­perst among the Creatures, which 'tis very pleasant to contem­plate; But in God all perfections in their highest degree and ex­altation meet together and are united; how much more delight­ful then must it needs be, to fix our minds upon such an object in which there is nothing but beauty and brightness, what is ami­able and what is excellent; what will ravish our affections and [Page 8] raise our wonder, please us and astonish us at once? And that the finite measure and capacity of our understandings is not able to take in and comprehend the infinite excellencies and perfecti­ons of God, this indeed shews the excellency of the object, but doth not at all detract from the delightfulness of the knowledg; for it is a greater pleasure for a finite understanding to be lost in the contemplation of its object, and to view unlimited excel­lencies, which have no shore nor bounds, then to look upon those perfections of which we can see the end and utmost; as 'tis more pleasant to the eye to have an endless prospect, then to be terminated; for this is that which properly causeth admira­tion, when we discover a great deal in an object which we un­derstand to be excellent, and yet we see we know not how much more beyond that, which our understandings cannot fully reach and comprehend.

And as the knowledg of God in his nature and perfections is excellent and desireable; so likewise to know him in those glo­rious manifestations of himself in the works of Creation and Pro­vidence; and above all (though it be little spoken of by the Saints of the Old Testament, by reason of the obscure degree of its discovery in those times) the knowledg of God in his Son Je­sus Christ, in that stupendious manifestation of his wisdom and mercy in the contrivance of our Recovery, which is such a my­stery, and so excellent a piece of knowledg, that the Angels desire to pry into it, 1 Pet. 1. 12.

And as the knowledg of God is excellent, so likewise of our Du­ty, which is nothing else but vertue and goodness and holiness, which are the Image of God, a conformity to the nature and will of God, and an imitation of the Divine excellencies and perfections so far as we are capable: For to know our duty, is to know what it is to be like God in Goodness, and Pity, and Pa­tience, and Clemency, in pardoning injuries, and passing by pro­vocations, [Page 9] in justice and righteousness, in truth and faithfulness, and in a hatred and detestation of the contrary of these. In a word, it is to know what is the good and acceptable will of God, what it is that he loves and delights in, and is pleased withal, and would have us to do in order to our perfection, and our happiness. It is deservedly accounted a piece of excellent knowledg, to know the Laws of the Land, and the Customs of the Country we live in, and the Will of the Prince we live under; How much more, to know the Statutes of Heaven, and the Laws of Eternity, those immutable and eternal Laws of Justice and Righteousness? to know the will and pleasure of the great Monarch, and Universal King of the World, and the Customs of that Country where we must live for ever? This made Da­vid to admire the Law of God at that strange rate he doth in the 119 ^th Psalm, and to advance the knowledg of it above all o­ther knowledg, I have seen an end of all perfection, but thy Com­mandment is exceeding broad.

Secondly, 'Tis the knowledg of those things which are most useful and necessary for us to know. The goodness of every thing is measured by its end and use, and that's the best thing which serves the best end and purpose; and the more necessary any thing is to an end, the better it is: So that the best knowledg is that which is of greatest use and necessity to us in order to our great end, which is Eternal happiness, and the Salvation of our Souls. Curious speculations, and the contemplation of things that are impertinent to us, and do not concern us, nor serve to promote our happiness, are but a more specious and ingenious sort of idleness, a more pardonable and creditable kind of Igno­rance. That man that doth not know those things which are of use and necessity for him to know, is but an ignorant man, what­ever he may know besides; Now the knowledg of God, and of Christ, and of our duty, is of the greatest usefulness and necessity [Page 10] to us in order to our happiness: It's of absolute necessity that we should know God and Christ, in order to our being happy: Joh. 17. 3. This is life eternal (that is, the onely way to it) to know thee the only true God, and him whom thou hast sent, Jesus Christ. It is necessary also in order to our happiness, to know our Duty, because 'tis necessary for us to do it, and it is impossible to do it except we know it: So that whatever other knowledg a man may be endued withal, he is but an ignorant person who doth not know God, the Authour of his being, the Preserver and Protector of his life, his Soveraign, and his Judg, the giver of every good and perfect gift, his surest refuge in trouble, his best friend or worst enemy, the present support of his life, his hopes in death, his future happiness, and his portion for ever; Who does not know his relation to God, the duty that he owes him, and the way to please him who can make him happy or misera­ble for ever; Who does not know the things of his peace, and the way how to get his sins pardoned, and himself reconciled to an offended God; Who doth not know the Lord Jesus Christ, who is the way, the truth, and the life. So that if a man by a vast and imperious mind, and a heart large as the sand upon the Sea shore, (as it is said of Solomon) could command all the knowledg of Nature and Art, of words and things; could attain to a Mastery in all Languages, and sound the depth of all Arts and Sciences, measure the Earth and the Heavens, and tell the Stars, and give an account of their order and motions; could discourse of the Interests of all States, the Intrigues of all Courts, the rea­son of all Civil Laws and Constitutions, and give an account of the History of all ages; could speak of Trees, from the Cedar tree that is in Lebanon, even unto the Hysop that springeth out of the wall, and of beasts also, and of fowls, and of creeping things, and of fishes; and yet should, in the mean time, be destitute of the knowledg of God, and Christ, and his duty; all this would [Page 11] be but an impertinent vanity, and a more glittering kind of Ig­norance; and such a man (like the Philosopher, who whilest he was gazing upon the Stars, fell into the ditch) would but Sapienter descendere in infernum, be undone with all this know­ledge, and with a great deal of wisdom go down to Hell.

2. Secondly, That to be Religious is the truest Wisdom; and that likewise upon two accounts.

• 1. Because it is to be wise for our selves.
• 2. It is to be wise as to our main interest and concernment.

First, 'Tis to be wise for our selves. There's an expression, Job 22. 21. He that is wise is profitable to himself; and Prov. 9. 12. If thou be wise, thou shalt be wise for thy self; intimating, that Wisdom regards a mans own interest and advantage, and he is not a wise man that doth not take care of himself and his own concernments, according to that of old Ennius, Nequic­quam sapere sapientem, qui sibi ipsi prodesse non quiret; that man hath but an empty title of Wisdom, and is not really wise, who is not wise for himself. As Self preservation is the first principle of Nature, so care of our selves and our own interest is the first part of Wisdom: He that is wise in the affairs and concernments of other men, but careless and negligent of his own, that man may be said to be busie, but he is not wise; he is employed in­deed, but not so as a wise man should be: Now this is the wis­dom of Religion, that it directs a man to a care of his own proper interest and concernment.

2. It is to be wise as to our main interest. Our chief end and highest interest is happiness; Now this is happiness, To be freed from all (if it may be,) however, from the greatest evils; and to enjoy (if it may be) all good, however, the chiefest. To be happy, is not onely to be freed from the pains and diseases of the body, but from anxiety and vexation of Spirit; not onely to en­joy the pleasures of sence, but peace of Conscience and tranquill [...]ty [Page 12] of mind. To be happy, is not onely to be so for a little while, but as long as may be, and if it be possible, for ever. Now Religion designs our greatest and longest happiness; it aims at a freedom from the greatest evils, and to bring us to the possession and en­joyment of the greatest good. For Religion wisely considers, that men have Immortal Spirits, which as they are Spirits, are ca­pable of a pleasure and happiness distinct from that of our bodies and our senses; and because they are Immortal, are capable of an everlasting happiness. Now our Souls being the best part of our selves, and Eternity being infinitely the most considerable dura­tion; the greatest wisdom is to secure the interest of our Souls, and the interest of Eternity, though it be with the loss, and to the pre­judice of our temporal and inferiour Interests: Therefore Religi­on directs us rather to secure inward peace, then outward ease; to be more careful to avoid everlasting and intolerable torments, then short and light afflictions which are but for a moment; to court the favour of God more then the friendship of the World; and not so much to fear them that can kill the body, and after that have no more that they can do, as him who after he hath kill'd can destroy both body and soul in hell. In a word, our main Interest is to be as happy as we can, and as long as is possible; and if we be cast into such cir­cumstances, that we must be either in part and for a time, or else wholly and always miserable; the best wisdom is to choose the greatest and most lasting happiness, but the least and shortest mi­sery: Upon this account Religion preferrs those pleasures which flow from the presence of God for evermore, infinitely before the transitory pleasures of this world; and is much more careful to avoid eternal misery, then present sufferings. This is the Wisdom of Religion, that upon consideration of the whole, and casting up all things together, it does advise and lead us to our best Interest.

II. The second way of Confirmation shall be by shewing the Ignorance and Folly of Irreligion and Wickedness: And this I [Page 13] might do by the Rule of Contraries; for, if he that is truly Re­ligious be the wisest and most knowing person, then those that are irreligious and wicked are neither knowing nor wise. But be­cause this may sufficiently appear by applying what I have said in the direct proof of the Proposition the just contrary way, there­fore I shall not enlarge upon this in the same method, but pro­ceed upon other Heads to shew the Ignorance and Folly of such persons. Now all that are irreligious are so upon one of these two accounts; Either, First, Because they do not believe the Foundations and Principles of Religion, as, The Existence of God, The Immortality of the Soul, and Future and Eternal Rewards; and of this kind there are but few, in comparison, who do not in some sort believe these things: Or else, Secondly, Men are irreligious, because though they do in some sort believe these things, yet they act contrary to their belief; and of this kind are the far greatest part of wicked men: The first sort are guilty of that which we call Speculative, the latter of Practical Atheism I shall endeavour to discover the Ignorance and Folly of both these.

1. Speculative Atheism, is First, absurd in the Theory and spe­culation, which argues Ignorance; and Secondly, it is an impru­dent Opinion, both because it is against our present interest, and is also unsafe in the ultimate issue of it; which argues Folly.

I. It is absurd in the Theory and Speculation; and that upon these five accounts.

1. Because it gives no probable account of the Existence of things. We see a World of Creatures, and a vast Frame of things, which we who believe a God attribute to God as the Authour, (i e.) to a Being endued with infinite Goodness and Wisdom and Power, which is a very likely Cause to produce a World: For, what more likely to communicate Being to so nu­merous a progeny of goodly Creatures, then infinite Goodness? What more likely to create so vast a World, that is, to stretch [Page 14] forth the Heavens and lay the foundations of the Earth, to form these and all the Creatures in them out of Nothing, then infinite Power? What so likely to contrive all these Creatures each of them so perfect in their kind, and all of them so fitly and har­moniously suited to each other and to the whole, as infinite Counsel and Wisdom? This seems to be a reasonable account. But what account doth the Atheist give of this? Either he must say, that the World was Eternal, and that things alwayes were as they are, without any first Cause of their Being, which is the way of the Aristotelian Atheists; or else he must ascribe the Original of the World to Chance, and the casual concourse of Matter, which is the way of the Epicurean Atheists. But neither of these ways gives a probable account of the Existence of things.

First, Not the Aristotelian way; For, though we may con­ceive the same thing always to have been, yet it is utterly un­imaginable how there should have been an infinite orderly succes­sion of things, that is, a third, fourth, fifth, &c. without a first. I say, this is utterly unimaginable; But yet I will suppose that this matter doth admit of seeming and unanswerable De­monstrations both ways, viz. both That an eternal succession of things is possible, and that it is impossible; as the Question about the infinite divisibility of Quantity doth, and indeed all Questi­ons about any thing that is infinite, it being but reasonable to expect that our finite Understandings should be puzzled and lost about any thing that is infinite. Now granting this, which is the utmost any man can challenge in this Question, this Ac­count of things from an Eternal order and succession of Causes comes to just nothing; For, though it be granted, that there are plausible Arguments for the possibility of this, yet so long as they are countepoised by other Arguments every whit as strong and unanswerable, they can signifie nothing [Page 15] in the ballance of Reason, because the strength of them is whol­ly enervated and taken off by equal Demonstrations on the o­ther side; and so long as their hands are thus tied, such a sup­position is altogether useless, and nothing can be built upon it; For what man will allow it probable that there hath been an Eter­nal succession of things, without any Original, or first Cause, whilest it is an even Question, whether an Eternal succession of things be so much as possible? And besides all this, Aristotle himself (who is supposed to be the great Patron of this Opinion of the Eternity of the World) doth elsewhere in several places of his works, own it as one of the greatest absurdities that can be, to assert an infinite progress of Causes, and says, that it is unworthy of a Philosopher to resolve any thing this way, and that the mind of man can have no rest, nor any reasonable and satisfacto­ry account of things be given, but by staying in some first Cause. But I needed not have said so much to this, because the Modern Atheists do generally desert this way.

Secondly, Nor the Epicurean way, which imputes this vast pile of the World, this regular and orderly Frame of things (which it acknowledges to have had a beginning) not to good­ness, and power, and counsel, and wisdom; but to a fortunate chance, and happy casualty. Now there is nothing can be more unreasonable then obstinately to impute that to Chance, which doth plainly and apparently contain in it all the Arguments and Characters of a wise design and contrivance. Was ever any con­siderable work, in which there was required great variety of parts, and a regular and orderly disposition of those parts, done by Chance? Will Chance fit means to ends, and that in ten thousand instances, and not fail in any one? How often might a man, after he had jumbled a set of Letters in a Bag, fling them out upon the ground before they would fall into an exact Poem, yea, or make a good Discourse in Prose? And may not a little [Page 16] Book be as easily made by Chance, as this great Volume of the World? How long might a man be in sprinkling colours upon Canvas with a careless hand, before they would happen to make the exact picture of a Man? And is a Man easilier made by chance then his Picture? How long might twenty thousand blind Men. which should be sent out from the several remote parts of England, wander up and down before they would all meet upon Salisbury Plains, and fall into Rank and File in the exact order of an Army? And yet this is much more easie to be imagined, then how the innumerabe blind parts of Matter should Rendezvous themselves into a World. A man that sees Henry the Seventh's Chappel at Westminster, might with as good reason maintain (yea, with much better, considering the vast difference betwixt that little Structure, and the huge Fabrick of the World) that it was never contrived or built by any Man, but that the stones did by Chance grow into those curious Figures into which they seem to have been cut and graven; And that upon a time, (as Tales u­sually begin) the Materials of that building, the Stone, Morter, Timber, Iron, Lead and Glass, happily met together, and very fortunately rang'd themselves into that delicate order in which we see them now so close compacted, that it must be a very great Chance that parts them again. What would the world think of a man that should advance such an opinion as this, and write a Book for it? If they would do him right, they ought to look upon him as mad, with a little more reason then any man can have to say that the World was made by Chance, or that the first Men grew up out of the Earth as Plants do now. And yet they who give this account of the Original things, assume to themselves to be the Men of Reason, the great Wits of the World, the onely cautious and wary persons, that hate to be imposed upon, that must have convincing evidence for every thing, and can assent to nothing without a clear Demonstration for it.

[Page 17] 2. Because it gives no reasonable account of the Universal Consent of Mankind in this apprehension, that there is a God. That men do generally believe a God, and have done in all Ages, the present experience of the World, and the Records of former times do abundantly testifie. Now how comes this perswasion to have gained so universal a possession of the mind of Man, and to have found such general entertainment in all Nations, even those that are most barbarous? If there be no such thing as God in the world, how comes it to pass that this object doth continu­ally encounter our understandings? whence is it that we are so perpetually haunted with the Apparition of a Deity, and follow­ed with it where-ever we go? If it be not natural to the mind of Man, but proceeds from some accidental distemper of our un­derstandings, how comes it to be so Universal, that no differences of age, or temper, or education, can wear it out, and set any consi­derable number of men free from it? Into what can we resolve this strong inclination of mankind to this error and mistake? how come all Nations to be thus seduced? It is altogether un­imaginable, but that the Reason of so Universal a consent in all places and ages of the world, and among all differences of per­sons, should be one and constant; But no one and constant reason of this can be given, but from the nature of Mans mind and un­derstanding, which hath this Notion of a Deity born with it, and stamped upon it; or, which is all one, is of such a frame, that in the free use and exercise of it self, it will find out God; And what more reasonable then to think, that if we be Gods Work­manship, he should set this mark of himself upon all reasonable Creatures, that they may know to whom they belong, and may acknowledg the Author of their Beings? This seems to be a cre­dible and satisfactory account of so Universal a consent in this matter. But now what doth the Atheist resolve this into? He is not at one with himself what account to give of it; nor can it [Page 18] be expected he should; For he that will over-look the true rea­son of a thing, which is but one, may easily find many false ones, Error being infinite. But there are three which he principally rellyes upon, Fear, Tradition, and Policy of State. I shall briefly consider these.

First, He would fain make us believe that this apprehension of a God, doth spring from an infinite jealousie in the mind of Man, and an endless fear of the worst that may happen, accord­ing to that Divine saying of the Poet, (which he can never suffi­ciently admire) Primus in orbe Deos fecit Timor, Fear first made Gods. So that it is granted on both sides, that the fear of a Deity doth universally possess the minds of Men: Now the que­stion is, whether it be more likely that the existence of a God should be the cause of this fear, or that this fear should be the cause why men imagine there is a God? If there be a God who hath impressed this image of himself upon the mind of Man, there's great reason why all men should stand in awe of him; But if there be no God, it is not easie to conceive how fear should create an universal confidence and assurance in men that there is one. For, whence should this Fear come? it must be either from without, from the suggestion of others, who first tell us there is such a being, and then our fear believes it; or else it must arise from within, viz. from the Nature of Man, which is apt to fancy dreadful and terrible things. If from the suggestion of o­thers who tell us so, the question returns, who told them so? and will never be satisfied till the first Author of this report be found out; so that this account of fear resolves it self into Tradition, which shall be spoken to in its proper place. But if it be said, that this fear ariseth from within, from the Nature of man which is apt to imagine dreadful things, this likewise is liable to inex­plicable difficulties. For, First, the proper object of fear is something that is dreadful, that is, something that threatens [Page 19] Men with harm, or danger, and that in God must either be Power, or Justice; and such an object as this, fear indeed may create: But Goodness and Mercy are essential to the Notion of a God, as well as Power and Justice; Now how should fear put men upon fancying a Being that is infinitely good and merciful? No man hath reason to be afraid of such a Being as such. So that the Atheist must joyn another cause to Fear, viz. Hope, to enable men to create this imagination of a God. And what would the Product of these two contrary Passions be? The ima­gination of a Being, which we should fear would do us as much harm, as we could hope it would do us good; which would be Quid pro Quo, and which our Reason would oblige us to lay aside so soon as we had fancied it, because it would signifie just nothing. But Secondly, Suppose fear alone could do it; how comes the mind of Man to be subject to such groundless and unreasonable fears? The Aristotelian Atheist will say, it always was so; But this is to affirm, and not to give any ac­count of a thing: The Epicurean Atheist, if he will speak con­sonantly to himself, must say, that there happened in the ori­ginal constitution of the first men such a contexture of Atomes, as doth naturally dispose men to these panick fears; unless he will say, that when the first men grew out of the earth, and af­terwards broke loose from their root, finding themselves weak, and naked, and unarmed, and meeting with several fierce crea­tures stronger then themselves, they were put to such a fright as did a little distemper their understandings, and let loose their imaginatians to endless suspicious, and unbounded jealou­sies, which did at last settle in the conceit of an invisible Be­ing, infinitely powerful, and able to do them harm; and be­ing fully possest with this apprehension, (nothing being mo [...]e ordinary then for crazed persons to believe their own fancies) they became Religious, and afterwards when mankind began [Page 20] to be propagated in the way of generation, then Religion obliged them to instill these principles into their Children in their tender years, that so they might make the greater impression upon them; and this course having been continued ever since, the Notion of a God hath been kept up in the world. This is ve­ry suitable to Epicurus his Hypothesis of the Original of Men; but if any man think fit to say thus, I cannot think it fit to con­fute him. Thirdly, Whether Men were from all Eternity such timorous and fanciful Creatures, or happened to be made so in the first constitution of things; it seems however, that this fear of a Deity hath a foundation in Nature; And if it be na­tural, ought we not rather to conclude, That there is some ground and reason for these Fears, and that Nature hath not planted them in us to no purpose, then that they are vain and groundless? There is no Principle that Aristotle (the grand As­sertor of the Eternity of the World) doth more frequently in­culcate then this, That Nature doth nothing in vain; and Epicu­rus is forced to acknowledge, (and so will every man, who atten­tively considers the frame of the World) That although things were made by Chance, yet they have happened as well as if the greatest Wisdom had had the ordering and contriving of them; And surely Wisdom would never have planted such a vain prin­ciple as the fear of a Deity in the Nature of Man, if there had not been a God in the World.

Secondly, If Fear be not a sufficient account of this Universal Consent, the Atheist thinks it may very probably be resolved into Universal Tradition. But this likewise is liable to great ex­ception; For, whence came this Tradition? It must begin some time, it must have its original from some body; and it were ve­ry well worth our knowing, who that Man was that first raised this Spirit which all the Reason of mankind could never conjure down since; Where did he live, and when? In what Countrey, and [Page 21] in what Age of the World? What was his Name, or his Sons Name, that we may know him? This the Atheist can give no punctual account of; onely he imagines it not improbable, that some body long ago (no body knows when) beyond the me­mory of all Ages, did start such a notion in the world, and that it hath past for currant ever since. But whatever he imagine, that is very improbable which relies upon no stronger arguments then his own conceit: But besides, If this Tradition be granted so very ancient as to have been before all Books, and to be elder then any History, it may, for any thing any body can tell, have been from the beginning; and then it is much more likely to be a Notion which was bred in the mind of Man, and born with him, then a Tradition transmitted from hand to hand through all generations; especially if we consider how many rude and barbarous Nations there are in the World which consent in the Opinion of a God, and yet have no certain Tradition of any thing that was done among them but two or three Ages be­fore.

Thirdly, But if neither of these be satisfactory, he hath one way more; which although it signifie little to Men of sober and severe Reason, yet it very unhappily hits the jealous and suspi­cious humour of the generality of men, who from the experience they have had of themselves and others, are very apt to suspect that every body, but especially their Superiours and Governours, have a design to impose upon them for their own ends. In short, it is this; That this noise about a God is a meer State Engine, and a Politick device, invented at first by some great Prince, or Minister of State, to keep people in awe and order. And if so, from hence (saith the Atheist) we may easily apprehend, how from such an original it might be generally propagated, and be­come universally currant, having the stamp of publick Authori­ty upon it; besides, that People have always been found easie [Page 22] to comply with the inclinations of their Prince. And from hence likewise we may see the Reason why this Notion hath continued so long; for being found by experience to be so ex­cellent an Instrument of Government, we may be sure it would always be cherished and kept up. And now he triumphs, and thinks the business is very clear: Thus it was; some time or other, (most probably towards the beginning of the world, (if it had a beginning) when all Mankind was under one Univer­sal Monarch;) some great Nebuchadnezzar set up this Image of a Deity, and commanded all People and Nations to fall down and worship it: And this being found a successfull device, to awe people into obedience to Government, it hath been continued to this day, and is like to last to the end of the world. To this fine conjecture I have these four things to say: 1. That all this is meer conjecture and supposition; he cannot bring the least shadow of proof or evidence for any one tittle of it. 2. This supposition grants the opinion of a God to conduce very much to the support of Government and order in the World, and con­sequently to be very beneficial to Mankind; so that the Atheist cannot but acknowledge that it is great pity that it should not be true, and that it is the common interest of Mankind, if there were but probable Arguments for it, not to admit of any slight Reasons against it; and to prosecute all those who would se­duce men to Atheism, as the great disturbers of the world, and pests of humane society. 3. This supposition can have nothing of certainty in it, unless this be true, That whoever makes a politick advantage of other mens Principles, is presumed to contrive those Principles into them; whereas it is much more common (because more easie) for men to serve their own ends of those Principles or Opinions, which they do not put into men, but find there; so that if the question of a God were to be decided by the probability of this Conjecture, (which [Page 23] the Atheist applauds himself most in) it would be concluded in the affirmative; It being much more likely, that because Po­liticians reap the advantages of obedience and a more ready sub­mission to Government from mens believing that there is a God, that they found the minds of men prepossest to their hands with the notion of a God, then that they planted it there; and we need not doubt but that they would be very well con­tented to reap where they did not sow, and to gather where they did not strew. 4. We have as much evidence of the contrary to this supposition as such a thing is capable of, viz. that it was not an Arcanum Imperii, a Secret of Government, to propagate the belief of a God among the people, when the Governours themselves knew it to be a cheat. For we find in the Histories of all Ages of which we have any Records, (and of other Ages we cannot possibly judge) that Princes have not been more se­cure from troubles of Conscience, and the fears of Religion, and the terrours of another World, (nay, many of them more subject to these) then other men, as I could give many instan­ces, and those no mean ones: What made Caligula creep un­der the Bed when it thunder'd? What made Tiberius (that great Master of the Crafts of Government) complain so much of the grievous stings and lashes he felt in his Conscience? What mov'd that Great Emperour, Charls the Fifth, to quit his Kingdom, and retire into a Monastery to prepare for another World? What made Cardinal Wolsey (one of the greatest Mi­nisters of State that ever was) to pour forth his soul in those sad words? Had I been as diligent to please my God as I have been to please my King, he would not have forsaken me now in my gray hairs. What reason for such Actions and Speeches, if these Great Men had known that Religion was but a cheat? Now if such great and politick persons (as the three last of these were) knew nothing of this Secret, I think we may safely conclude, that the [Page 24] Notion of a God did not come from the Court, that it is not the invention of Politicians, and a juggle of State, to cozen the peo­ple into obedience. And now from all this that hath been said it seems to be very evident, that the general consent of Man-kind in this apprehension That there is a God, must in all Reason be ascribed to some more certain and universal Cause then Fear, or Tradition, or State Policy, viz. to this, That God himself hath stamped this Image of himself upon the Mind of Man, and so woven it into the very frame of his Being, that (like Phidias his Picture in Minerva's Shield) it can never totally be defaced without the ruine of humane nature.

Object. I do but know one Objection that this Discourse is liable to; it is this: The Universal Consent of Man-kind in the apprehension of a God is no more an Argument of the Being of a God, then the general agreement of so many Nations for so many Ages in Polytheisme and Idolatry is an Argument for these. Answ. To this I answer, 1. That the generality of the Philosophers and wise men of all Nations and Ages did dis­sent from the multitude in these things; they believed but one Supreme Deity, which, with respect to the various benefits men received from him, had several Titles bestowed upon him; and although they did servilely comply with the People in worship­ping God by sensible Images and Representations, yet it ap­pears by their Writings that they despised this way of Worship as superstitious, and unsuitable to the Nature of God. So that Polytheisme and Idolatry are far from being able to pretend to U­niversal Consent from their having had the Vote of the multitude in most Nations for several Ages together; because the opinion of the vulgar separated from the Consent and Approbation of the Wise, signifies no more then a great many Cyphers would do without Figures. 2. The gross Ignorance and Mistakes of the Heathen about God and his Worship are a good Argument [Page 25] that there is a God, because they shew, That men sunk into the most degenerate condition, into the greatest blindness and darkness imaginable, do yet retain some sense and awe of a De­ity; that Religion is a property of our Natures, and that the Notion of a Deity is intimate to our Understandings, and sticks close to them, seeing Men will rather have any God then none, and rather then want a Deity, they will worship any thing. 3. That there have been so many false Gods invented, is rather an Argument that there is a true One, then that there is none: There would be no Counterfeits, but for the sake of something that is real; for, though all Pretenders seem to be what they really are not, yet they pretend to be something that really is: For, to counterfeit is to put on the likeness and appearance of some real Excellency; There would be no Brass-money, if there were not good and lawful Money; Bristol-stones would not pretend to be Diamonds, if there never had been any Dia­monds; Those Idols in Henry the Seventh's time (as Sir Fran­cis Bacon calls them) Lambert Simnell, and Perkin Warbeck, had never been set up, if there had not once been a real Planta­genet and Duke of York; so the Idols of the Heathen, though they be set up in affront to the true God, yet they are a probable Argument that there is one.

3. Speculative Atheisme is absurd in the Theory, because it requires more evidence for things then they are capable of. Aristotle hath long since well observed, how unreasonable it is to expect the same kind of proof and evidence for every thing, which we have for some things. Mathematical things, being of an abstracted nature, are onely capable of clear Demonstra­tion; But Conclusions in Natural Philosophy are to be proved by a sufficient Induction of experiments; things of a moral na­ture, by moral Arguments; and matters of Fact, by credible Testimony: And though none of these be capable of strict De­monstration, [Page 26] yet we have an undoubted assurance of them, when they are proved by the best Arguments that the nature and quality of the thing will bear. No man can demonstrate to me, that there is such an Island in America as Jamaica; yet upon the Testimony of credible persons who have seen it, and Authors who haue written of it, I am as free from all doubt concerning it, as I am from doubting of the cleerest Mathematical Demon­stration. So that this is to be entertained as a firm principle by all those who pretend to be certain of any thing at all; That when any thing is proved by as good arguments as that thing is ca­pable of, and we have as great assurance that it is, as we could pos­sibly have supposing it were, we ought not in reason to make any doubt of the existence of that thing? Now to apply this to the present Case: The being of a God is not Mathematically de­monstrable, nor can it be expected it should, because onely Ma­thematical matters admit of this kind of evidence; Nor can it be proved immediately by sense, because God being supposed to be a pure Spirit, cannot be the Object of any corporeal sense. But yet we have as great assurance that there is a God as the nature of the thing to be proved is capable of, and as we could in reason ex­pect to have, supposing that he were. For let us suppose there were such a Being as an Infinite Spirit cloathed with all possible perfection, that is, as Good and Wise and Powerful, &c. as can be imagined, what conceiveable ways are there whereby we should come to be assured that there is such a Being, but either by an in­ternal impression of the Notion of a God upon our Minds, or else by such external and visible Effects as our Reason tells us must be attributed to some Cause, and which we cannot without great violence to our Understandings attribute to any other Cause but such a Being as we conceive God to be, that is, One that is infinite­ly Good, and Wise, and Powerful? Now we have this double assu­rance that there is a God, and greater or other then this the thing [Page 27] is not capable of. If God should assume a Body, and present him­self before our eyes, this might amaze us, but could not give us any rational assurance that there is an Infinite Spirit; If he should work a Miracle, that could not in reason convince an Atheist more then the Arguments he already hath for it; If he were to ask a sign in heaven above, or in the earth beneath, what could he desire God to do for his conviction more then he hath already done? Could he desire him to work a greater Miracle then to make a World? Why if God should carry this perverse man out of the limits of this World, and shew him a new Heaven and a new Earth, springing out of nothing, he might say, that innume­rable parts of Matter chanc'd just then to rally together, and to form themselves into this new World, and that God did not make it. Thus you see that we have all the rational assurance of a God that the thing is capable of, and that Atheism is absurd and unreasonable in requiring more.

4. The Atheist is absurd, because he pretends to know that which no man can know, and to be certain of that which no bo­dy can be certain of; that is That there is no God, and (which is consequent upon this, as I shall shew afterwards) That it is not possible there should be one. And the Atheist must pretend to know this certainly; for it were the greatest folly in the world for a man to deny and despise God, if he be not certain that he is not. Now whoever pretends to be certain that there is no God, hath this great disadvantage; He pretends to be certain of a pure Ne­gative: But of Negatives we have far the least certainty, and they are always hardest, and many times impossible to be proved: Indeed such Negatives as only deny some particular mode or man­ner of a things existence, a man may have a certainty of them, because, when we see things to be, we may see what they are, and in what manner they do, or do not exist; For instance, we may be certain that Man is not a creature that hath Wings, because this [Page 28] onely concerns the manner of his existence; and we seeing what he is, may certainly know that he is not so, or so. But pure Nega­tives, that is, such as absolutely deny the existence of things, or the possibility of their existence, can never be proved; for after all that can be said against a thing, this will still be true, That many things possibly are which we know not of, and that many more things may be then are; and if so, after all our arguments against a thing, it will be uncertain whether it be or not; and this is uni­versally true, unless the thing denied to be, do plainly imply a contradiction, from which I shall afterwards shew the Notion of a God to be free. Now the Atheist pretends to be certain of a pure Negative, viz. That there is no such Being as God, and that it is not possible there should be; But no man can reason­ably pretend to know thus much, but he must pretend to know all things that are, or can be; which if any man should be so vain as to pretend to, yet it is to be hoped, that no body would be so weak as to believe him.

5. Speculative Atheism is absurd, because it is self-contradicti­ons. There are these two great contradictions in the denial of a God. 1. He that denies a God, says that that is impossible which he must grant to be possible. He says it is impossible that there should be such a Being as God, in saying that de facto there is no such Being; for Eternity being essential to the Notion of a God, if there be not a God already, it is impossible now that there should be one; because such a Being as is supposed to be essentially Eter­nal and without beginning, cannot now begin to be. And yet he must grant it possible that there should be such a Being, because it is possible there should be such a Being as hath all possible per­fection; and such a Being as this is that which we call God, and is that very thing which the Atheist denies, and others affirm to be; for he that denies a God, must deny such a Being as all the world describe God to be, and this is the general Notion which all men [Page 29] have of God, That he is a Being as perfect as is possible; that is, endued with all such perfections as do not imply a contradiction, as none of those perfections which we attribute to God do; Not necessity of being, and self-existence, and eternity, and immensity or unlimitedness; these the Atheist must grant possible and free from contradiction, because he ascribes them to the World, or at least to Matter; Not Goodness, or Wisdom, or Power, or Truth, or Justice, because he ascribes these to Men, nor consequently the ut­most degrees of these that are possible; nor, lastly, doth immate­riality or the Notion of a Spirit imply a contradiction, because the Atheist must either grant that there is a Spirit in Man, that is, something that is not Matter, (and consequently, that an im­material principle is not impossible) or else give a fair and satis­factory account how meer Matter can think and understand, and how that which moves by certain and necessary Laws, that is, can­not move unless it be moved by another, and cannot but move if it be impell'd by another, is capable of Liberty and Freedom; which I think is impossible to be done. 2. Another contra­diction which attends the denial of a God, is this; Atheism de­nies such a Being to be, as doth in the essential Notion of it include necessary existence, that is, an impossibility of not being; And this in plain English, is to deny that thing to be, which cannot but be. Now that the Notion of a God doth essentially include in it necessary existence, appears from the general Notion that all men have of God, viz. that he is a Being that hath all possible per­fection; But that necessary existence is a perfection, is evident, be­cause if Being be good, it is better to have it necessarily, then con­tingently; to have it secur'd, then to be in danger of losing it: And that it is a possible perfection, the Atheist cannot deny, be­cause he ascribes it to Matter, as I shewed before. So that A­theism doth finally resolve it self into these two gross Contra­dictions, viz. That it is impossible that there should be such a Being [Page 30] as hath all possible perfections; that is, That that which may be, cannot be: And, That such a Being as necessarily exists, doth not, nor can possibly exist; that is to say, That a thing which cannot but be, is not, nor can be.

II. Atheism, as it is an absurd, so it is an imprudent Opinion; and that upon these two accounts.

First, It is against mens present Interest. Did but Men consi­der what God is, they would see him to be so lovely a Being, and so full of goodness and all desireable perfections, that even those very persons, who are of such irregular Understandings as not to believe that there is a God, yet could not (if they understood themselves) refrain from wishing with all their hearts that there were one. For, is it not every mans interest that there should be such a Being in the World as takes particular care of him, and loves him, and is able and willing to do him good, and to make him happy; to supply all his wants, and to relieve him in all his straits, when no body else can; to preserve him in the greatest dangers, and assist him against his greatest enemies, and secure him from misery and destruction? Is is not every mans interest that there should be such a Being in the World, as would govern us for our advantage, and require nothing of us, but what is high­ly for our interest, and what (if we rightly understood our own concernment) we our selves would choose to do? And God is such a Being, if he be at all. Now why should any man be aggrieved that there is such a Being as this, or count it his interest to shut Him out of the World? Why should any man be concern'd or troubled that there is a Being as good as we can possibly desire or imagine? I dare say, if a wise and considerate man were left to himself and his own choice, to wish the greatest good to himself he could devise; the sum of all his wishes would be, that there were just such a Being as God is; nor would he choose any other Benefa­ctor or Friend or Protector for himself, or Governor for the whole [Page 31] World, then infinite Power conducted & managed by infinite Wis­dom, and Goodness, and Justice, which is the true Notion of a God. I confess, it is not a wicked Mans interest, if he resolve to continue such, that there should be a God; But then it is not mens interest to be wicked: It is for the general good of humane society, and consequently, of particular persons, to be true & just; it is for mens health to be temperate; and so I could instance in all other vertues. But this is the mystery of Atheism, men are wedded to their lusts, and resolv'd upon a wicked course, & so it becomes their interest to wish there were no God, and to believe so if they can; whereas if men were minded to live righteously and soberly and vertuous­ly in the world, to believe a God would be no hinderance or preju­dice to any such design, but very much for the advancement and furtherance of it. Men that are good and vertuous do easily be­lieve a God; so that it is vehemently to be suspected, that no­thing but the strength of mens lusts, and the power of vicious in­clinations, do sway their minds, and set a byass upon their Un­derstandings towards Atheism.

Secondly, Atheism is imprudent, because it is unsafe in the issue. The Atheist doth, as it were, lay a Wager against the Religious man that there is no God; but upon strange inequality and odds; for he ventures his Eternal Interest: whereas the other ventures onely the loss of his Lusts, (which it is much better for him to be without) or at the utmost, of some temporal convenience; and all this while is inwardly more contented and happy, and usually more healthful, and perhaps meets with more respect, and faith­fuller friends, and lives in a more secure and flourishing condition, and freer from the evils and punishments of this world, then the Atheistical person does, (however, it is not much that he ven­tures;) And after this life, if there be no God, is as well as he; but if there be a God, is infinitely better, even as much as unspeakable and eternal happiness is better then extream and endless misery.

[Page 32] So that if the Arguments for and against a God were equal, and it were an even Question Whether there were one or nor, yet the hazard and danger is so infinitely unequal, that in point of pru­dence and interest every man were obliged to incline to the Af­firmative; and what-ever doubts he might have about it, to choose the safest side of the Question, and to make that the Hypothesis to live by. For, he that acts wisely, and is a throughly prudent man, will be provided in emnem eventum, will take care to secure the main chance, what-ever happens: but the Atheist, in case things should fall out contrary to his belief and expectation, he hath made no provision for this case; if, contrary to his confidence, it should prove in the Issue that there is a God, the man is lost and undone for ever; If the Atheist when he dies shall find that his soul remains after his body, and has onely quitted it's lodging, how will this man be amazed and blank'd, when, contrary to his expectation, he shall find himself in a new and strange place, a­midst a world of Spirits, entred upon an everlasting and un­changeable state? How sadly will the man be disappointed when he finds all things otherwise then he had stated and determined them in this world? When he comes to appear before that God whom he hath denied, and against whom he hath spoken as de­spightful things as he could? Who can imagine the pale and guil­ty looks of this man, and how he will shiver and tremble for the fear of the Lord, and for the glory of his Majesty? How will he be surprized with terrors on every side, to find himself thus unex­pectedly and irrecoverably plunged into a state of ruine and de­speration? And thus things may happen for all this mans confi­dence now: For our belief or dis-belief of a thing does not alter the nature of the thing; we cannot fancy things into being, or make them vanish into nothing by the stubborn confidence of our imaginations; things are as fullen as we are, and will be what they are, what-ever we think of them; and if there be a God, a [Page 33] man cannot by an obstinate dis-belief of him make him cease to be, any more then a man can put out the Sun by winking.

And thus I have as briefly and clearly as I could endeavour'd to shew the ignorance and folly of Speculative Atheism in denying the existence of God. And now it will be less needful to speak of the other two Principles of Religion, the Immortality of the Soul, and future Rewards; For no man can have any reasonable scruple about these, who believes that there is a God; because no man that owns the existence of an infinite Spirit, can doubt of the pos­sibility of a finite Spirit, that is, such a thing as is immaterial, and does not contain any principle of self-corruption in it self; And no man that believes the goodness of God, can doubt but that he hath made some things as good as may be, and for as long con­tinuance as they are capable of. Nor can any man that acknow­ledgeth the holiness and justice of God, and that he loves righte­ousness, and hates iniquity, and that he is Magistrate and Gover­nour of the World, and consequently concerned to countenance obedience to, and punish the violation of his Laws; and withal considers the promiscuous dispensations many times of Gods Providence in this World, think it unreasonable to conclude, that after this life good men shall be rewarded, and sinners punished.

And now I think I may with reason intreat such as are Athe­istically enclined, to consider these things seriously and imparti­ally; And if there be weight in these Considerations which I have offered to them to sway with reasonable men, I would beg of such, that they would not suffer themselves to be by assed by prejudice, or passion, or the interest of any lust or worldly advan­tage, to a contrary perswasion.

First, I would intteat them seriously and diligently to consider these things, because they are of so great moment and concern­ment to every man; If any thing in the world deserve our se­rious study and consideration, these Principles of Religion do; [Page 34] For what can import us more to be satisfied in, then whether there be a God, or not? whether our Souls shall perish with our Bo­dies, or be immortal, and shall continue for ever? And if so, Whe­ther in that eternal state which remains for men after this Life, they shall not be happy or miserable for ever, according as they have de­meaned themselves in this world? If these things be so, they are of infinite consequence to us; and therefore it highly concerns us to enquire diligently about them, and to satisfie our minds concerning them one way or other. For these are not matters to be slightly and superficially thought upon, much less (as the way of Atheistical men is) to be played and jested withal. There is no greater argument of a light and inconsiderate person, then profanely to scoff at Religion; It is a sign that that man hath no regard to himself, and that he is not touched with a sense of his own interest; For, He jests with edg'd tools, and plays with Life and Death, and makes nothing of his Soul. He is the very mad-man that Solomon speaks of, Prov. 26. 18. Who casteth fire­brands, arrows and death, and saith, Am I not in sport? To ex­amine severely, and debate seriously the Principles of Religion, is a thing worthy of a Wise man; but if any man shall turn Re­ligion into Raillery, and confute it by two or three bold jests, this man doth not render Religion, but himself ridiculous in the opi­nion of all considerate men, because he sports with his own Life. If the Principles of Religion were doubtful and uncertain, yet they concern us so neerly, that we ought to be serious in the exami­nation of them; and though they were never so clear and evi­dent, yet they may be made ridiculous by vain and frothy men, as the gravest and wisest Personage in the World may be abused by being put into a Fools Coat, and the most noble and excellent Poem may be debased and made vile by being turned into Bur­lesque. So that it concerns every man that would not trifle a­way his Soul, and fool himself into irrecoverable misery, with [Page 35] the greatest seriousness to enquire into these matters whether they be so or not, and patiently to consider the arguments which are brought for them; Many have miscarried about these things, not because there is not reason and evidence enough for them, but because they have not had patience enough to consider them.

Secondly, Consider these things impartially. All wicked men are of a Party against Religion; Some Lust or Interest engageth them against it. Hence it comes to pass that they are apt to slight the strongest Arguments that can be brought for it, and to cry up very weak ones against it. Men do generally and without difficul­ty assent to Mathematical Truths, because it is no bodies interest to deny them; but men are slow to believe Moral and Divine Truths, because the Lusts and Interests of men do prejudice them against them. And therefore you may observe, That the more vertuously any man lives, and the less he is enslaved to any Lust, the more ready he is to entertain the Principles of Religion.

Therefore, when you are examining these matters, do not take into consideration any sensual or worldly Interest, but deal clearly and impartially with your selves; Let not temporal and little advantages sway you against a greater and more durable in­terest. Think thus with your selves; That you have not the making of things true or false, but that the truth and existence of things is already fix'd and setled, and that the Principles of Religion are already either determinately true or false, before you think of them: Either there is a God, or there is not; ei­ther your Souls are Immortal, or they are not; one of these is certain and necessary; and they are not now to be altered; The truth of things will not comply with your conceits, and bend it self to your interests. Therefore do not think what you would have to be, but consider impartially what is, and (if it be) will be whether you will or no. Do not reason thus; I would fain be wicked, and therefore is is my interest that there [Page 36] should be no God, nor no life after this, and therefore I will endeavour to prove that there is no such thing, and will shew all the favour I can to that side of the Question; I will bend my understanding and wit to strengthen the Negative, and will study to make it as true as I can. This is fond, because it is the way to cheat thy self; and that thou mayest do, if thou likest it: We may cozen our selves as often as we please, but Res nolunt decipi, The nature of things will not be imposed upon. If then thou be as wise as thou oughtest to be, thou wilt reason thus with thy self; My highest interest is not to be deceived about these mat­ters, therefore setting aside all other considerations, I will en­deavour to know the truth, and yield to that.

2. Secondly, The Practical Atheist, who is wicked and irre­ligious notwithstanding he does in some sort believe that there is a God, and a future state; he is likewise guilty of prodigious Fol­ly: The Principle of the Speculative Atheist argues more Igno­rance, but the Practice of the other argues greater Folly. Not to believe a God and another Life, for which there is so much evi­dence of Reason, is great ignorance and folly; but 'tis the high­est madness, when a man does believe these things, to live as if he did not believe them: When a man does not doubt but that there is a God, and according as he demeans himself towards him, he will make him happy or miserable for ever; yet to live so as if he were certain of the contrary, and as no man in Rea­son can live, but he that is well assured that there is no God. It was a shrewd saying of the old Monk, That two kind of Pri­sons would serve for all offenders in the World, an Inquisition, and a Bedlam; If any man should deny the Being of a God, and the Immortallity of the Soul, such a one should be put into the first of these, the Inquisition, as being a desperate Heretick; if any man should profess to believe these, and allow himself in any known wickedness, such a one should be put into Bedlam; [Page 37] because there cannot be a greater folly and madness, then for a man in matters of greatest moment and concernment to act against his best Reason and Understanding, and by his Life to contradict his Belief; such a man does Vivus vidensque perire, perish with his eyes open, and knowingly undoes himself; he runs upon the greatest dangers which he clearly sees to be before him, and precipitates himself into those evils which he professes to believe are real and intolerable; and wilfully neglects the ob­taining of that unspeakable good and happiness which he is per­swaded is certain and attainable. But of this more in the Ap­plication of this Doctrine.

III. The Third way of Confirmation shall be by endeavour­ing to vindicate Religion from those common Imputations which seem to charge it with Ignorance or Imprudence. The profane Wits of the world cast upon Religion these three Impu­tations.

• 1. Of Credulity.
• 2. Of Singularity.
• 3. Of Making a foolish Bargain.

First, Credulity: Say they, The Foundation of Religion is the belief of those things for which we have no sufficient Reason, and consequently, of which we can have no good assurance; as the belief of a God, and of a future state after this life; things which we never saw, nor did experience, nor ever spoke with any body that did; now it seems to argue too great a facility and easiness of belief, to assent to any thing upon insufficient grounds.

To this I answer,

1. That if there be such a Being as a God, and such a thing as a future state, it cannot (as I said before) in reason be ex­pected that we should have the evidence of sense for such things: For, he that believes a God, believes such a Being as hath all [Page 38] perfections, among which this is one, that he is a Spirit, and consequently, invisible, and cannot be seen: He that believes another Life after this, professeth to believe a state of which in this life we can have no trial and experience.

2. We have the best Evidence for these things which they are capable of at present, supposing they were.

3. Those who deny these Principles must be much more cre­dulous, (that is) believe things upon incomparably less evidence of Reason. The Atheist looks upon all that are Religious as a Company of credulous Fools well met; But he, for his part, pre­tends to be wiser then to believe any thing for Company; he cannot entertain things upon those slight grounds which move other men; if you would win his assent to any thing, you must give him a clear Demonstration for it. Now there's no way to deal with this Man of Reason, this rigid exactor of Demon­stration for things which are not capable of it, but by shewing him that he is an hundred times more credulous; that he begs more Principles, takes more things for granted without offer­ing to prove them, and assents to more strange Conclusions up­on weaker grounds, then those whom he so much accuseth of Credulity. And to evidence this, I shall briefly give you an ac­count of the Atheists Creed, and present you with a Catalogue of the Fundamental Articles of his Faith, or rather Unbelief. He believes, That there is no God, nor possibly can be, and consequently that the wise as well as unwise of all ages have been mistaken, except himself and a few more. He believes, that ei­ther all the world have been frighted with an apparition of their own Fancy, or that they have most unnaturally conspired toge­ther to cozen themselves; Or that this Notion of a God is a Trick of Policy, though the greatest Princes and Politicians do not at this day know so much, nor have done time out of mind: He believes, either, that the Heavens and the Earth and all [Page 39] things in them had no original Cause of their Being, or else that they were made by Chance, and happened he knows not how to be as they are; and that in this last shuffling of Matter, all things have by great good Fortune fallen out as happily, and as regularly, as if the greatest Wisdom had contrived them; but yet he believes that there was no Wisdom in the contrivance of them. He Believes, That that which is possible is impossible, and that that is not, which cannot but be. He believes, That meer Matter can Understand and Will, and most dextrously per­form all those fine and free operations which the Ignorant attri­bute to Spirits, and consequently, that there are no such things as immortal Spirits, or a Resurrection of the Body, or everlasting Life. This is his Creed. And seriously it is a wonder that there should be found any person pretending to Reason or Wit, that can say Amen to such a heap of absurdities, which are so gross and palpable that they may be felt, So that I think it will fall to the Atheists share to be the most credulous person; that is, to believe things upon the sleightest Reasons.

II. The Second Imputation is Singularity; the affectation whereof is unbecoming a Wise man: To this charge I answer.

1. If by Religion be meant the belief of the Principles of Religion, that there is a God, and a Providence, that our Souls are Immortal, and that there are Rewards to be expected after this life; these are so far from being singular Opinions, that they are the general Opinion of Mankind, even of the most Barba­rous Nations; as Tully, Seneca, and others testifie; insomuch, that the Histories of ancient times do not furnish us with the names of above three or four at most who denied a God; And Lucretius acknowledgeth, that Epicurus was the first who did oppose those great Foundations of Religion, the Providence of God, and the Immortality of the Soul. Primùm Grajus homo, &c. meaning Epicurus.

[Page 40] 2. If by Religion be meant a living up to those Principles, (that is) to act conformably to our best Reason and under­standing, and to live as it does become those who do believe a God, and a future State; this is acknowledged even by those who live otherwise, to be the part of every wise man, and the contrary to be the very madness of folly, and height of distraction: Nothing being more ordinary then for men who live wickedly, to acknowledg that they ought to do otherwise.

3. Though according to the common course and practice of the World it be somewhat singular for men truly and throughly to live up to the Principles of their Religion; yet singularity in this matter is so far from being a Reflection upon any mans pru­dence, that it is a singular commendation of it. In two Cases sin­gularity is very commendable.

1. When there is a necessity of it in order to a mans great­est Interest and happiness. I think it to be a reasonable ac­count for any man to give, why he does not live as the greatest part of the world do, that he has no mind to die as they do, and to perish with them; he is not disposed to be a fool, and to be miserable for company; he has no inclination to have his last end like theirs who know not God, and obey not the Gospel of his Son, and shall be punished with everlasting destruction from the presence of the Lord, and from the glory of his power.

2. It is very commendable to be singular in any Excellency, and I have shewn that Religion is the greatest Excellency: to be singular in any thing that is wise, and worthy, and excellent, is not a disparagement, but a praise: every man would choose to be thus singular.

III. The Third Imputation is, that Religion is a foolish bar­gain; because they who are Religious hazard the parting with a present and certain happiness for that which is future and uncer­tain. To this I answer,

[Page 41] 1. Let it be granted, that the Assurance which we have of future Rewards falls short of the Evidence of sense; for I doubt not but that that saying of our Saviour, Blessed is he who hath believed and not seen; and those expressions of the Apostle, We walk by faith and not by sight; and faith is the evidence of things not seen; are intended by way of abatement and diminution to the Evidence of Faith, and do signifie, that the report and testimo­ny of others, is not so great evidence as that of our own senses: And though we have sufficient assurance of another state, yet not so great evidence as if we our selves had been in the other World, and seen how all things are there.

2. We have sufficient assurance of these things, and such as may beget in us a well grounded confidence, and free us from all doubts of the contrary, and perswade a reasonable man to venture his greatest Interests in this World upon the security that we have of another World: for

1. We have as much assurance of these things as things fu­ture and at a distance are capable of; and he is a very unrea­sonable man that would desire more: Future and invisible things are not capable of the Evidence of sense; but we have the greatest rational Evidence for them; and in this every reasona­ble man ought to acquiesce.

2. We have as much as is abundantly sufficient to justifie eve­ry mans discretion, who for the great and eternal things of another World, hazards or parts with the poor and transitory things of this Life. And for the clearing of this, it will be worth our considering, that the greatest affairs of this world, and the most important concernments of this life, are all conducted onely by Moral Demonstrations: Men every day venture their lives and estates onely upon Moral assurance. For instance, Men who never were at the East or West Indies, or in Turky, or Spain; yet do venture their whole Estates in Traffick thither, though [Page 42] they have no Mathematical demonstration, onely Moral assu­rance that there are such Places. Nay which is more, Men every day eat and drink, though I think no man can demonstrate out of Euclide or Apollonius, that his Baker, or Brewer, or Cook, have not conveyed Poyson into his meat or drink; And that Man that would be so wise and cautious as not to eat or drink till he could demonstrate this to himself, I know no other re­medy for him, but that in great gravity and wisdom he must die for fear of death. And for any man to urge, that though men in temporal affairs proceed upon moral assurance, yet there is greater assurance required to make men seek Heaven and avoid Hell, seems to me to be highly unreasonable; for such an assu­rance of things as will make men circumspect and carefull to a­void a lesser danger, ought in all reason to awaken men much more to the avoiding of a greater: such an assurance as will sharpen mens desires, and quicken their endeavours for the ob­taining of a lesser good, ought in all reason to animate men more powerfully, and to inspire them with a greater vigour and in­dustry in the pursuit of that which is infinitely greater: For why the same assurance should not operate as well in a great danger as in a less, in a great good as in a small and inconside­rable one, I can see no reason, unless men will say, that the great­ness of an evil and danger is an incouragement to men to run upon it, and that the greatness of any good and happiness ought in reason to dishearten men from the pursuit of it.

Use I. The Use that I shall make of this, shall be

• 1. To put men out of conceit with Sin.
• 2. To perswade men to be truly Religious.

First, If Religion be the best Knowledg and Wisdom, this challenges wicked men for their folly and ignorance; this con­viction of the great imprudence and unreasonableness of a wick­ed [Page 43] course should shame men out of Irreligion. Wicked men are in Scripture described by this Character, they are those that know not God; which argues monstrous ignorance and stupi­dity; for to have an understanding, and not to know God, is in intellectual things just such an absurdity, as it is in natural things to have eyes, and not to discern the light; for as light is pri­mum visibile, the first object of our sight, so God is primum intel­ligibile, the plainest and most obvious object of our understand­ings; He fills Heaven and Earth, every thing represents him to us; which way soever we turn our selves, we are encountred with clear evidences and demonstrations of a Deity; For the invisible things of him from the Creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things made, even his eternal Power and God-head. So that men are without excuse, as the Apostle speaks, Rom. 1. 20. [...], such men as know not God can have no Apology to make for themselves, their ignorance is utterly inexcusable: Or if men do under­stand, or believe there is such a Being as God; not to consi­der this, not to attend to the proper consequences of such a principle; not to know our Relation to him, and dependance upon him, and obnoxiousness to his Power and Justice in case we neglect, contemn, and disobey him: not to know the duty that we owe to him who hath made us, and hath an unquesti­onable right in us, and title to us, and authority over us; and is therefore our supream Law-giver, because he hath power to make us happy or miserable for ever, to save or to destroy us; and consequently that it is our highest interest to please him, to know his Will and to do it; This is gross ignorance, and in­considerateness, and stupidity as can be imagined.

He that observes the lives and actions of the greatest part of men, would verily think that they understood nothing of all this; therefore we find in Scripture that when God looks [Page 44] down upon the wickedness of men, he pronounces them to be without understanding, Deut. 32. 28. when God had reckoned up the rebellions and perversnesses of the Children of Israel, he concludes, It is a nation void of counsel, neither is there any un­derstanding in them. In the 14 Psalm at the beginning, the Psalmist represents God as looking down from heaven upon the children of men; and when he saw how they had corrupted themselves, and what abominable works they did, crying out, Have all the workers of iniquity no knowledge? Not that wicked men are destitute of the natural faculty of Understanding, but they have it as if they had it not; they have Understandings, but they do not use them, which in effect and by interpreta­tion, is all one as if they had none; Nay, happy were it for them if they had them not, for then they would not be liable to the Judgment of God, nor accountable to Him as reasonable creatures; but this ignorance is wilfull and affected; men are not blind, but they wink, and shut their eyes; they can un­derstand, and will not; or if they do understand any thing, they imprison the Truths of God, and detain them in unrighte­ousness; they thrust light into a dungeon, and hide the candle of the Lord that is in them under a bushel, they do not suffer those things that they know to have a due power and influence upon their hearts and lives: And this is an Ignorance that will be so far from excusing men, that it will aggravate their condemna­tion; and therefore Irreligion is not onely an argument of the greatest Ignorance, but of the greatest Folly. I know there are great pretensions in the world to Knowledge and Wisdom, but upon a true and just account of things, there's nothing more familiar and ordinary then Ignorance and Folly; these ill weeds are of a forward and plentifull growth in the nature of man; Nihil tam valde vulgare quam nihil sapere, Nothing is more common then for men not to be wise. We talk much of Pro­digies, [Page 45] but, as Tully sayes well, Maximum portentum est vir sa­piens, One of the greatest Wonders in the World is a truly wise and knowing person; so that it is not very easie to answer Job's Question at the 12th. Verse of this Chapter, Where shall Wisdom be found? and where is the place of Understanding? So many wicked men as there are in the world, so many Fools, and that I am afraid amounts to a great number. Men generally stand upon the credit and reputation of their Understandings, and of all things hate to be accounted Fools, because Folly is so great a reproach to the Understanding of a man, and so high a reflection upon his discretion: But I know no way for men to avoid this imputation, and to bring off the credit of their Understandings, but by being truly Religious, by fearing God, and departing from evil: For certainly, there is no such imprudent person as he that neglects God and his Soul, and is careless and slothful about his everlasting concernments, because this man acts con­trary to his truest Reason and best Interest; he neglects his own safety, and is active to procure his own ruine: He flies from happiness; and runs away from it as fast as he can; but pursues misery, and makes haste to be undone. Hence it is that Solo­mon does all along in the Proverbs give the title of Fool to a wicked man, as if it were his proper name, and the fittest cha­racter for him, because he is eminently such; There is no such fool as the sinning fool, who every time he sins ventures his Soul, and layes his everlasting Interest at the stake; every time a man provokes God, he does the greatest mischief to himself that can be imagined. A mad man that cuts himself, and tears his own flesh, and dashes his head against the stones does not act so unreasonably as a sinner, because he is not so sensible of what he does; wickedness is a kind of voluntary frenzy, and a cho­sen distraction, and every sinner does wilder and more extra­vagant things, then any man can do that is craz'd and beside [Page 46] himself, and out of his wits; onely with this sad difference, that he knows better what he does. And that wicked men are many of them wise as to the things of this world, is no vindi­cation of them any more then the more innocent actions of mad men, (as catching at shadows, and pursuing butter-flyes) about which possibly they may use as great an activity and di­ligence, as any man can do about the most weighty affairs; but this does not vindicate them from being mad, for because such actions are trifling and impertinent to the great con­cernments of life, we account such men distracted for all that. I know the world applaud themselves much in this wisdom, and cry it up as the onely prudence; but infinite Wisdom, which is the best Judge of wisdom, calls it folly. David, in Psal. 2. when he brings in the Sages and Politicians of the world consulting about a wicked design against Christ, he tells us, that as wise as they took themselves to be, He that sits in heaven laughs at them, and the Lord hath them in derision; and shall we account them wise at whom God laughs? Can we reckon that to be prudence which the Lord hath in derision? The Rich man, Luk. 12. who had enlarged his barns, and laid up goods for many years, no doubt took himself for a very prudent man; but God who calls things as they are, and does not call any body out of his name, calls this man fool, be­cause in the midst of all this care, he had neglected his soul; Thou fool, &c. To them who believe another life after this, an eternal state of happiness or misery in another world, (which is but a reasonable Postulatum, or demand among Christians) there is nothing in Mathematicks more demonstrable then the folly of wicked men; for it is not a clearer and more evident principle that the whole world is greater then a part, then that Eternity and the concernments of it are to be preferred before Time.

But it is not my work to revile sinners, and to call them [Page 47] names, but to convince them if it be possible, and to reclaim them. I will therefore put the matter into a temporal Case, that wicked men who understand any thing of the Rules and Princi­ples of worldly wisdom, may see the imprudence of a sinfull course, and be convinced that this their way is their folly, even themselves being judges.

Let me then propound some Cases to sinners, and ask them a few Questions. Is that man wise, as to his body and his health, who onely cloaths his hands, but leaves his whole body naked? who provides onely against the Tooth-ach, and neglects whole troops of mortal diseases that are ready to rush in upon him? Just thus does he who takes care only for this vile body, but neg­lects his precious and immortal Soul; who is very solicitous to prevent small and temporal inconveniencies, but takes no care to escape the damnation of Hell.

Is he a wise man, as to his temporal Estate, that lays designs onely for a day, without any prospect to, or provision for the remaining part of his life? Just thus does he that provides for the short time of this life, but takes no care for all Eternity; which is to be wise for a moment, but a fool for ever, and to act as unto­wardly and as crosly to the reason of things as can be imagi­ned; to regard Time as if it were Eternity, and to neglect Eter­nity as if it were but a short time.

Do you think him a wise man, who is serious about trifles, but trifles about the most serious matters? Just so is he who pursues the World and the petty interests of it with all his might, but minds Religion and the weighty concernments of Eternity, as if he minded them not.

Do you count him prudent, who throws himself over­board to save his goods? Just so doth he who to secure any thing in this world makes ship-wrack of his Conscience, and casts away his Soul.

[Page 48] Is he wise, who is wise in any thing but in his proper profes­sion and imployment? wise for every body but himself? who is ingenious to contrive his own misery, and to do himself a mis­chief; but is dull and stupid as to the designing of any real be­nefit and advantage to himself? Just such a one is he who is a good Trades-man, but a bad Christian; for Christianity is more our proper Calling and profession then the very Trades we live upon; and just such is every Sinner, who is wise to do evil, but to do good hath no understanding.

Is he wise, who neglects and disobliges him who is his best friend, and can be his shrewdest Enemy? who with one weak Troop goes out to meet him that comes against him with thou­sands of thousands? who shes a small danger, and runs upon a greater? Just so does every wicked man who neglects and con­temns God, who can save or destroy him; who strives with his Maker, and provoketh the Lord to jealousie; and with the small and inconsiderable Forces of a Man takes the Field against the mighty God the Lord of Hosts; who fears them that can kill the body, but after that have no more that they can do; but fears not him who after he hath kill'd can destroy both body and soul in Hell; and just such is he who for fear of any thing in this world ven­tures to grieve God; for in so doing he runs away from men, and falls into the hands of the living God; he flies from a temporal danger, and leaps into Hell.

Is he wise, who in matters of greatest moment and concern­ment neglects opportunities never to be retriv'd? who standing upon the Shore, and seeing the Tide making haste towards him apace, and that he hath but a few minutes to save himself, yet will lay himself to sleep there, till the cruel Sea rush in upon him, and overwhelm him? Just so does he who trifles away this day of Gods grace and patience, and foolishly adjourns the work of Repentance & the business of Religion to a dying hour.

[Page 49] And, to put an end to these Questions, Is he wise, who hopes to attain the end without the means? nay, by means that are quite contrary to the end? Just such is every wicked man who hopes for Blessedness hereafter without Holiness here; to gain the favour of God by offending him, and to come to the sight of him by sinning against him; and to be happy (that is) to find a pleasure in the enjoyment of God, and in the company of holy Spirits, by rendring himself as unsuitable and unlike to them as he can.

Use II. The second Use is to perswade men to be throughly and seriously Religious, as ever they would acquit themselves to be truly knowing and wise. Knowledg and Wisdom are con­fessed Excellencies among men, Eccl. 2. 13. Wisdom excels Folly as much as light doth darkness. There are some Vertues and per­fections that gain affection from men, as Truth, and Meekness, and Kindness; but there are others that cause admiration and raise wonder, among these are Knowledg and Wisdom, which if they be in any eminent degree, will cast a great lustre and glory upon a man, Eccl. 8. 1. The Wisdom of a man maketh his face to shine. Now even the shadows of these latter sort of Excellencies hit the vain-glorious nature of man more then the realities of the former, because proud Man had rather be admir'd then lov'd. And that Knowledg and Wisdom are generally acknowledged to be great Excellencies appears, in that men do so generally affect the reputation of Knowledg, and are so ambitious to be account­ed Wise. There is not any thing that men value themselves more upon then their Knowledg and Discretion: and on the contrary, Ignorance and Folly are reckoned among the greatest defects of humane nature, so that they are accounted generally a greater reproach and disgrace to a man then Vice and Wickedness; and they have got so ill a report in the world, that there are not many but had rather be accounted Knaves then Fools; hence [Page 50] it is that men generally pretend to these Excellencies of Know­ledg and Wisdom, even such as are most destitute of them, and rather then want these Perfections, they will call even their Vi­ces and Imperfections by this name: Craft, and Silence, and Se­crecy, and Reservedness, and Formality, and affected Gravity, all these put in for the Title of Wisdom; so ambitious is the nature of man of the reputation of this Excellency. Job 11. 12. Vain man would be wise, though he be born like a wild asses colt. Now this very thing that men are so forward to counterfeit these per­fections is an Argument of the Excellency of real Knowledg and Wisdom; for (as I said before) to counterfeit is nothing else but to put on the appearance of some real Excellency; com­mon and ordinary things are not counterfeited, but onely things of price and value, as Gold, and Silver, and precious Stones; And that men are so tenacious of these Excellencies, so loth to be stripp'd even of the shadow and appearance of them, is an argu­ment that men highly esteem them. So that it seems that these Excellencies are in great dearness among men, because we hold them so fast, that when we cannot possess the reality of them, yet we love to enjoy the opinion of them, and rather then be wholly disseised of them, will hold them by that sleight and fan­tastick tenure of Imagination.

Now if we account them such excellencies, we should labour to be possest of them in truth and reality, and not take up with any counterfeits of them, but use such a care and niceness about them as men do about Jewels, and precious stones, which because they are of great value, all mistakes about them are shameful and intollerable. I have shewed that Religion is the truest knowledg, and most real wisdom, therefore every man that va­lues his understanding, and stands upon the reputation of his prudence and discretion, ought to be Religious, Deut. 4. 6. Keep therefore my Statutes, for this is your wisdom and understanding in [Page 51] the sight of the nations. Those who understand and know how to manage the petty interests of this world, we account them shrewd, and cunning, and designing men; but if we would speak truly and wisely of things, the Religious man is the notable man; he that contrives to be everlastingly happy, and lays designs for all Eternity, he is a man of the deepest reach; he that takes care of his Soul, and secures his Eternal interest, he is a shrewd man. That man who by the assistance of Gods grace can over­reach his own deceitful heart, and defeat all the arts and wiles of the Devil, and escape those pollutions that are in the world, and save himself from the sins, and snares, and temptations of an untoward Generation; he is a cunning man indeed. Wouldst thou then be truly knowing? labour to know God, and thy self, thy interest, and thy end, and thy happiness, and the way of attaining it. Wouldst thou be truly wise? be wise for thy self, wise for thy Soul, wise for Eternity; Resolve upon a Religious course of life; Fear God and depart from evil; look beyond things present and sensible, unto things which are not seen, and are eternal; labour to secure the great interests of another world, and refer all the actions of this short and dying life, to that state which will shortly begin, but never have an end; and this will approve it self to be Wisdom at the last, what-ever the world judge of it now; for, not that which is approved of men now, but what shall finally be approved by God, is true wis­dom; that which is esteemed so by him who is the fountain and original of all wisdom, the first rule and measure of it, the best and most competent Judge of it.

I deny not but many that are wicked, and neglect Religion, may think themselves wise, and may enjoy this their delusion for a while, but there is a time a coming, when the most profane and Atheistical, who now account it a piece of gallantry, and an argument of a great spirit, and of a more then common wit and [Page 52] understanding, to slight God, and baffle Religion, and to level all the discourses of another world, with the Poetical descripti­ons of the Fairy Land: I say, there is a day a coming, when all these witty fools shall be unhappily undeceived, and not being able to enjoy their delusion any longer, shall call them­selves fools for ever.

But why do I use arguments to perswade men to that which is so excellent, so useful, and so necessary? The thing it self I am pressing you to, hath allurements in it beyond all argu­ments: For, if Religion be the best knowledg and wisdom, I cannot offer any thing beyond this to your understandings to raise your esteem of it; I can present nothing beyond this to your Affections that may be attractive of your love and desire. All that can be done, is to set the thing before men, and to offer it to their choice; and if mens natural desire of wisdom and knowledg and happiness will not perswade them to be Re­ligious, 'tis in vain to use Arguments: if the sight of these Beauties will not charm mens Affections, 'tis to no purpose to go about to compel a liking, and to urge and push forward a a match to the making whereof consent is necessary. Religion is matter of our freest choise; and if men will obstinately and wilful­ly set themselves against it, there is no remedy, Pertinatiae nullum remedium posuit Deus; If men will choose to befools, and to be miserable, all that can be said is this, God will leave such persons to in herit their own choice, to enjoy the portion of sinners.