FEBR. 27. 1666.

Tractatus cui Titulus, The Rule of Faith, A doctis­simo Viro Iohanne Til­lotson scriptus Imprima­tur una cum Appendice.

Humfr. London.

THE Rule of Faith: or an ANSWER to the TREATISE of Mr. I. S. entituled, Sure-footing, &c.

By JOHN TILLOTSON, D.D. Preacher to the Honourable Society of Lincolns-Inn.

To which is Adjoined A REPLY TO Mr. I.S. his 3 d APPENDIX, &c.

By EDW. STILLINGFLEET D. D. One of His Majesties Chaplains in Ordinary.

The second Edition.

LONDON, Printed by H.C. for O. Gellibrand, at the Golden-Ball in St. Paul's Church-yard, 1676.

To my Honoured and Learned Friend, Mr. Edward Stillingfleet.

SIR,

I Have with a great deal of pleasure and satisfaction read over your Book, which I find in every part answerable to its Title, viz. A Ra­tional Account of the Grounds of Pro­testant Religion. And now I thank you for it, not only as a private favour, but a publick benefit. No sooner had I per­used it, but I met with a Discourse en­tituled, Sure-footing in Christianity. And although I have no small prejudice against Books with conceited Titles, yet I was tempted to look into this, because it pretended to contain Animadversions on some Passages in your Book which I had so lately read over. Vpon perusal of which Animadversions, I found that the Author of them had attaqued (and in his own opinion confuted) a page or two in your Book. This drew me on to take a view of his main Discourses; which because they are in great vogue [Page] among some of his own Party, and do with an unusual kind of confidence and ostentation pretend to the newest and most exact fashion of writing Contro­versie, as being all along demonstrative and built upon self-evident Principles: Therefore I resolved throughly to ex­amine them, that I might discover (if I could) upon what so firm and solid Foun­dations this High and Mighty Confi­dence was built.

But before I had entred upon this undertaking, I met with a Letter from the Author of Sure-footing to his An­swerer, directing him how he ought to demean himself in his Answer. In which Letter, though there be many things li­able to great exception, yet because I am unwilling to be diverted from the main Question, I shall not argue with him about any of those matters, only take leave to use the same liberty in mana­ging my Answer, which he hath assumed to himself, in prescribing Laws to me about it: Therefore without taking any further notice of his Letter, I address my self to his Book.

THE RULE of FAITH.
PART. I. The Explication and State of the Question.

SECT. I.

§ 1. THe Question he pro­pounds to himself to debate, is, The Ex­plication of the Terms of the Que­stion. What is the Rule of Faith? In order to the re­solution wherof, he endeavours,

First, To fix the true notion of these two Terms, Rule, and Faith. Which way of proceeding I cannot but allow to be very proper and reasonable; but I can by no means think his explication of those Terms to be sufficient. He tells us, That a Rule is that which is able to regulate, or guide him that useth it: In which descripti­on, as in many other passages of his Book, he is plainly guilty of that which he taxeth [Page 2] in Mr. P. 180. Whitby, that is, the confounding of a Rule and a Guide, by making Regula­ting and Guiding to be equivalent words. But for this I am no further concerned, than to take notice of it by the way: The fault which I find in this definition is, that it doth not make the thing plainer than it was before; so that no man is the wiser for it, nor one jot nearer knowing what a Rule is. He pretends to tell English-men what a Rule is; and for their clearer understanding of this word, he explains it by a word less remov'd from the Latine, A Rule is that which is able to regulate him that useth it; just as if a man should go about to explain what a Law-giver is, by saying, he is one that hath the power of Legislation. Of the two, he had much better have said, that a Rule is a thing that is able to rule him that useth it, though this be nothing but an explication of the same word by it self.

§ 2. Not much better is his explication of the term Faith, which he tells us, in the common sense of Mankind, is the same with Believing. P. 4. He declar'd indeed before-hand, that he did not intend to give rigorous School-definitions of either this or the former word; and (to do him right) he hath not in [Page 3] the least swerv'd from his intention. It were to be wish'd he had prefac'd some such thing to his Demonstrations; for the Reader will find, that they are not one whit more rigorous than his Definitions; the latter of which doth very much resemble the Coun­try-man's way of defining, who being ask'd by his Neighbour what an Invasion was, after some study, told him very grave­ly, that an Invasion was as if he should say an Invasion: In like manner Mr. S. tells us; that Faith (or which is all one, Belief) is the same with Believing; which in my appre­hension is but a Country-definition, unless the interposing of those solemn words [ in the common sense of Mankind] may be thought to mend the matter. This puts me in mind of what Mr. S. says in his P. 159 [...] Transition (as he calls it) where he gives the Reader an account what feats he hath done in his Book: He will see (says he) I take my Rise at the meaning of the words Rule and Faith; this known, I establish my First Principles in this present matter, to be these, viz. A Rule is a Rule, Faith is Faith. This is the right self-evident method he talks so much of, and his Principles agree admirably well with his Definitions. If he had but proceeded in the same method, and [Page 4] added, that A Rule of Faith is a Rule of Faith; that Oral Tradition is Oral Tradi­tion; and that to say, Oral Tradition is the Rule of Faith, is as much as to say, Oral Tradition is the Rule of Faith, the whole business had been concluded without any more ado; and I think no body would have gone about to confute him.

§ 3. Rejecting then his way of Defini­tion, as inept and frivolous, and no ways tending to give a man a clearer notion of things, I shall endeavour to explain a little better (if I can) the meaning of these Terms.

A Rule (when we speak of a Rule of Faith) is a Metaphorical word, which in its first and proper sense being applied to ma­terial and sensible things, is the Measure ac­cording to which we judg of the straight­ness and crookedness of things. And from hence it is transferred by analogy to things moral or intellectual. A moral Rule is the Measure according to which we judg, whe­ther a thing be good or evil; and this kind of Rule is that which is commonly called a Law, and the agreement or disagree­ment of our actions to this Rule, is suit­ably to the Metaphor called rectitude, or [Page 5] obliquity. An intellectual Rule is the Mea­sure according to which we judg whether a thing be true or false; and this is either general, or more particular. Common no­tions, and the acknowledged Principles of Reason, are that general Rule, according to which we judg whether a thing be true or false. The particular Principles of eve­ry Science are the more particular Rules, according to which we judg whether things in that Science be true or false. So that the general notion of a Rule is, that it is a measure, by the agreement or disagree­ment to which we judg of all things of that kind to which it belongs.

§ 4. Faith, though both among sacred and prophane Writers, it be used many times more generally, for a perswasion or assent of the mind to any thing wrought in us by any kind of argument; yet, as it is a Term of Art used by Divines, it sig­nifies that particular kind of assent which is wrought in us by Testimony or Authority. So that Divine Faith, which we are now speaking of, is an assent to a thing upon the testimony or authority of God, or, which is all one, an assent to a truth upon Divine revelation.

[Page 6]§ 5. A Rule of Faith is the Measure, ac­cording to which we judg what matters we are to assent to, as revealed to us by God, and what not. And more particularly, the Rule of Christian faith is the Measure, ac­cording to which we are to judg what we ought to assent to, as the Doctrine revealed by Christ to the world, and what not.

§. 6. So that this Question, What is the Rule of Christian faith? supposeth a Doctrine revealed by Christ to the world; and that that Doctrine was intelligibly and entirely delivered by Christ to his Apostles, and sufficient confirmation given to it; that this Doctrine was in the same manner published to the world by the Apostles, who likewise gave sufficient evidence of the truth of it. All this is neces­sarily supposed in the Question: For it would be in vain to enquire whether this or that be the Rule of Christian Faith, if such a thing as the Christian Faith were not first supposed. When therefore we enquire what is the Rule of Christian Faith? the meaning of that enquiry is, by what way and means the knowledg of Christ's Doctrine is conveyed certainly down to us, who live at the distance of so [Page 7] many Ages from the time of it's first delive­ry; For this being known, we have the Rule of Faith; that is, a measure by which we may judg what we are to assent to, as the Doctrine of Christ, and what not. So that when any Question ariseth about any particular Proposition, whether this be part of Christ's Doctrine, we may be able by this Rule to resolve it.

SECT II.

§ 1. THe next thing to be considered is his resolution of this Question; Mr. S's Rule of Faith. by which we shall know what his opinion is concerning the Rule of Faith; for that being known, the Controversie between us will easily be stated.

His opinion in general is, that oral or practical Tradition (in opposition to wri­ting; or any other way that can be assigned) is the Rule of Faith. By oral or practical Tradition, he means p. 41. a delivery down from hand to hand (by words, and a constant course of frequent and visible actions, conformable to those words) of the sense and faith of Fore­fathers.

§ 2. Now, that I may bring the Contro­versie between us to a clear state, I am first [Page 8] to take a more particular view of his Opini­on concerning the Rule of Faith, that so I may the better understand how much he at­tributes to Oral Tradition, and what to the Scriptures, or written Tradition. And then I am to lay down the Protestant Rule of Faith, that so it may appear how far we a­gree, and how far we differ. The sum of what he attributes to Oral Tradition, so far as can be collected out of so obscure and confused a Discourse, may be reduced to these five Heads.

§. 3. First, That the Doctrine of Christian Religion was delivered by Christ to the A­postles, and by them published to the World; and that the Age which first re­ceived it from the Apostles, delivered it as they received it, without any change or cor­ruption to their Children, and they to theirs, and so it went on solely by this way of Oral Tradition. This is the sum of his Explication of Tradition, Disc. 5 th.

§. 4. Secondly, That this way alone is not only sufficient to convey this Doctrine down to all Ages certainly, and without a­ny alteration; but it is the only possible way that can be imagined, of conveying [Page 9] down a Doctrine securely from one Age to another. And this is the natural result of his Discourse about the Properties of a Rule of Faith: For if the true Properties of a Rule of Faith do belong to Oral Tradition, then it is a sufficient means; and if those Properties do solely and essentially apper­tain to it, and are incompatible to any thing else (as he endeavours to prove) then it is impossible there should be any other way.

§. 5. Thirdly, That it is impossible this means should fail, or miss of its end; that is, the Doctrine of Christ being once put into this way of conveyance, it can neither cease to descend, nor be at any time corrupted or changed in its descent. This is that which his Demonstrations pretend to prove.

§ 6. Fourthly, That the infallibility of Oral Tradition, or the impossibility of its failing, is a first and self evident principle. This he frequently asserts throughout his Book.

§ 7. Fifthly, That this way of Oral Tradition, hath de facto in all Ages been acknowledged by Christians, as the only way and means whereby the Doctrine of [Page 10] Christianity hath been conveyed down to them. And this is that which he attempts to prove from the Consent of Authority.

§ 8. As for the Scriptures, he grants them indeed to have been written by men divinely inspired, and to contain a Divine Doctrine, even the same which is delivered by Oral Tradition; so he tells us P. 117., 'Tis certain the Apostles taught the same Do­ctrine they writ. But then he denies it to be of any use without Oral Tradition, because neither the letter, nor sense of it, can with­out that be ascertain'd; so he saith in his Letter to Dr. Casaubon P. 337., As for the Scrip­tures (ascertaining their letter and sense, which is done by Tradition) 'tis clear they are of incomparable value; not only for the Divine Doctrine contained in them, but al­so for many particular passages, whose source or first attestation not being universal, nor their nature much practical, might possibly have been lost in their conveyance down by Tradition. Where, though he give the Scrip­tures very good words, it is to be under­stood, provided they will be subordinate, and acknowledg that they owe their sense and their being intelligible and useful to Oral Tradition. For if any man shall pre­sume [Page 11] to say, That this Book hath any cer­tain sense without Oral Tradition; or that God can write plainly and intelligibly, and that this Book which he hath endited is so written, and doth not depend upon Tradi­tion for its sense and interpretation; then the most scurrilous language is not bad enough for the Scriptures; then what are those Sa­cred Writings Append. 4th. p. 319., but Ink variously figured in a Book P. 68., unsensed Characters, waxen na­tur'd words, not yet sensed, nor having any certain Interpreter, but fit to be plaid upon diversly by quirks of wit; that is, apt to blunder and confound, but to clear little or nothing. These, with many other disgrace­ful terms, he very liberally bestows upon Divine Oracles; the consideration where­of, did it not minister too much horrour, would afford some comfort; for by this kind of rude usage, so familiar with him to­wards his Adversaries, one may reasonably conjecture, that he doth not reckon the Scriptures among his Friends.

§ 9. And whereas he saith, That the Scrip­tures have preserv'd many particular pas­sages, which because their source or first attestation was not universal, nor their na­ture much practical, might possibly bave been lost in their conveyance down by Tradition; [Page 12] this is impossible, according to his Hypothe­sis. For if neither the Scriptures letter, nor the certain sense of it, as to the main body of Christian Doctrine, could have been se­cured without Oral Tradition; that is, if we could not have known that those passages which contain the main points of Christs Doctrine, either had been written by men divinely inspired, or what the sense of them was, but from the consonancy and a­greement of those passages with the Do­ctrine which was orally preached by the A­postles; how can we be certain either of the letter or sense of other particular pas­sages which must necessarily want this con­firmation from Oral Tradition; because their first attestation was not universal, nor their nature much practical? Nay, his discourse plainly implies, that we can have no security at all either of the letter or sense of any other parts of Scripture, but only those which are coincident with the main body of Christian Doctrine, as is evident from these words p. 116., Tradition established, the Church is provided of a certain and infal­lible Rule to preserve a copy of the Scrip­tures Letter truly significative of Christs sense, as far as it is coincident with the main body of Christian Doctrine preached at [Page 13] first; because sense writ in mens hearts by Tradition, can easily guide them to correct the alteration of the outward letter. This I perceive plainly is the thing they would be at, they would correct the outward letter of Scripture by sense written in their hearts; and then, instead of leaving out the second Commandement, they would change it into a precept of giving due worship to Images, according to the Council of Trent; and a thousand other alterations they must make in the Bible, to make it truly significative of the sense of their Church. But surely the outward letter of other passages of Scrip­ture, which were not intended to signifie points of Faith, is equally liable to alte­rations; and yet the Church is not by Tradition provided of any way to correct these alterations when they happen; be­cause Tradition doth, as this Corollary im­plies, only furnish the Church with a cer­tain and infallible Rule of preserving a copy of the Scriptures letter, so far as it is coin­cident with the main body of Christian Doctrine.

§ 10. Again, he tells us p. 117., Tradition establi­shed, the Church is provided of a certain & infallible Rule to interpret Scripture letter [Page 14] by, so as to arrive certainly at Christs sense, as far as the letter concerns the body of Christian Doctrine preached at first, or points requisite to Salvation. So that whatever he may attribute to Scripture for fashions sake, and to avoid Calumny with the Vulgar, as he says very ingenuously in his explication of the 15 th Corollary; nevertheless 'tis plain, that according to his own Hypothe­sis, he cannot but look upon it as perfectly useless and pernicious. That 'tis altogether useless, according to his Hypothesis, is plain; for the main body of Christian Doctrine is securely conveyed to us without it, and it can give no kind of confirmation to it, be­cause it receives all at its confirmation from it; only the Church is ever and anon put to a great deal of trouble to correct the al­teration of the outward letter, by traditi­on and sense written in their hearts. And as for all other parts of Scriptue which are not coincident with the main body of Christian Doctrine, we can have no certain­ty, either that the outward Letter is true; nor, if we could, can we possibly arrive at any certain sense of them. And that it is intolerably pernicious, according to his Hypothesis, is plain, because * every silly and upstart Heresie fathers it self upon it; and [Page 15] when men leave Tradition (as he sup­poseth all Hereticks do) the Scripture is the most dangerous engine that could have been invented; being to such Persons on­ly * waxen natured words, not sensed, nor having any certain Interpreter; but fit to be play'd upon diversly by quirks of wit; that is, apt to blunder and confound, but to clear little or nothing. And indeed, if his Hypothesis were true, the Scriptures might well deserve all the contemptuous language which he useth against them; and Apology for tradi­tion, p. 165. Mr. White's comparison of them with Lilly's Almanack, would not only be par­donable, but proper; and (unless he added it out of prudence, and for the Peoples sake, whom he may think too superstitiously conceited of those Books) he might have spared that cold excuse which he makes for using this similitude, that it was agreeable rather to the impertinency of the Objection than the dignity of the Subject. Certain it is, if these men are true to their own Principles, that notwithstanding the high reverence and esteem pretended to be born by them and their Church to the Scrip­tures, they must heartily despise them, and wish them out of the way, and even look upon it as a great oversight of the Divine [Page 16] Providence to trouble his Church with a Book, which, if their Discourse be of any consequence, can stand Catholicks in no stead at all, and is so dangerous and mischie­vous a weapon in the hands of Hereticks.

SECT. III.

§ 1. HAving thus taken a view of his opinion, The Pro­testant Doctrine concern­ing the Rule of Faith. and considered how much he attributes to Oral Tradition, and how little to the Scriptures; before I assail this Hypothesis, I shall lay down the Pro­testant Rule of Faith; not that so much is necessary for the answering of his Book; but that he may have no colour of objection, that I proceed altogether in the destructive way, and overthrow his Principle, as he calls it, without substituting another in its room. The opinion then of the Protestants concerning the Rule of faith, is this in general, That those Books which we call the Holy Scriptures, are the means where­by the Christian Doctrine hath been brought down to us. And that he may now clearly understand this, together with the grounds of it, (which in reason he ought to have done before he had forsaken us) I shall declare it more particularly in these following Proposi [...]ions.

[Page 17]§ 2. 1. That the Doctrine of Christian Religion was by Christ delivered to the Apostles, and by them first preached to the World, and afterwards by them committed to Writing; which Writings, or Books, have been transmitted from one age to another down to us. So far I take to be granted by our present Adversaries. That the Christian Doctrine was by Christ delivered to the Apostles, and by them publish'd to the World, is part of their own Hypothesis. That this Doctrine was after­wards by the Apostles committed to wri­ting, he also grants, Corol. 29. P. 117. 'Tis certain the Apostles taught the same Doctrine they writ; and if so, it must be as certain that they writ the same Doctrine which they taught. I know it is the general Tenet of the Papists, that the Scriptures do not con­tain the entire body of Christian Doctrine; but that besides the Doctrines contained in Scripture, there are also others brought down to us, by oral or unwritten Tradi­tion. But Mr. S. who supposeth the whole Doctrine of Christian Religion to be cer­tainly conveyed down to us solely by oral Tradition, doth not any where, that I re­member, deny that all the same Doctrine is contained in the Scriptures; only he de­nies [Page 18] the Scriptures to be a means sufficient to convey this Doctrine to us with certain­ty, so that we can by them be infallibly assured what is Christ's Doctrine, and what not. Nay, he seems in that passage I last cited, to grant this; in saying, that the Apostles did both teach and write the same Doctrine. I am sure Mr. White (whom he follows very closely throughout his whole Book) does not deny this, in his Apology for Tradition; P. 171. where he saith, that it is not the Catholick position, that all its Do­ctrines are not contained in the Scriptures. And that those Writings or Books which we call the Holy Scriptures, have been transmitted down to us, is unquestionable matter of fact, and granted universally by the Papists, as to all those Books which are owned by Protestants for Canonical.

§ 3. Secondly, That the way of Writing is a sufficient means to convey a Doctrine to the knowledg of those who live in times very remote from the age of its first deli­very. According to his Hypothesis, there is no possible way of conveying a Doctrine with certainty and security, besides that of oral Tradition; the falshood of which will sufficiently appear, when I shall have shewn, [Page 19] that the true properties of a Rule of Faith do agree to the Scriptures, and not to oral Tradition. In the mean time, I shall only offer this to his consideration, that what­ever can be orally delivered in plain and intelligible words, may be written in the same words; and that a Writing or Book which is publick, and in every ones hand, may be conveyed down with at least as much certainty and security, and with as little danger of alteration as an oral Tra­dition. And if so, I understand not what can render it impossible for a Book to convey down a Doctrine to the knowledg of after-ages. Besides, if he had looked well about him, he could not but have ap­prehended some little inconvenience in ma­king that an essential part of his Hypothe­sis, which is contradicted by plain and con­stant experience: For that any kind of Do­ctrine may be sufficiently conveyed, by Books, to the knowledg of after-ages; pro­vided those Books be but written intelli­gibly, and preserved from change and cor­ruption in the conveyance, (both which I shall be so bold as to suppose possible) is as little doubted by the generality of man­kind, as that there are Books. And surely we Christians cannot think it impossible to [Page 20] convey a Doctrine to posterity by Books, when we consider that God himself pitched upon this way for conveyance of the Do­ctrine of the Jewish Religion to after-ages; because it is not likely that so wise an Agent should pitch upon a means where­by it was impossible he should attain his end.

§ 4. Thirdly, That the Books of Scrip­ture are sufficiently plain, as to all things necessary to be believed, and practised. He that denies this, ought in reason to instance in some necessary point of Faith, or matter of Practice, which is not in some place of Scripture or other plainly delivered. For it is not a sufficient objection to say, P. 38, 39. that the greatest wits among the Protestants differ about the sense of those Texts, wherein the generality of them suppose the Divinity of Christ to be plainly and clear­ly expressed: Because, if nothing were to be accounted sufficiently plain, but what it is impossible a great wit should be able to wrest to any other sense; not only the Scriptures, but all other Books; and (which is worst of all to him that makes this ob­jection) all oral Tradition would fall into uncertainty. Doth the Traditionary Church [Page 21] pretend that the Doctrine of Christ's Di­vinity is conveyed down to her by oral Tradition, more plainly than it is expressed in Scripture? I would fain know what plainer words she ever used to express this point of Faith by, than what the Scripture useth; which expresly calls him God, the true God, God over all, blessed for ever­more. If it be said, that those who deny the Divinity of Christ have been able to evade these and all other Texts of Scrip­ture, but they could never elude the defini­tions of the Church in that matter; it is easily answered, that the same Arts would equally have eluded both; but there was no reason why they should trouble them­selves so much about the latter; for why should they be solicitous to wrest the de­finitions of Councils, and conform them to their own opinion, who had no regard to the Churches Authority? If those great Wits (as he calls them) had believed the sayings of Scripture to be of no greater authority than the definitions of Coun­cils, they would have answered texts of Scripture, as they have done the definitions of Councils; not by endeavouring to in­terpret them to another sense, but by downright denying their Authority. So [Page 22] that it seems that oral Tradition is liable to the same inconvenience with the writ­ten, as to this particular.

§ 5. And of this I shall give him a plain instance in two great Wits of their Church, the present Pope, and Mr. White; the one the Head of the Traditionary Church, as Mr. S. calls it; the other the great Master of the Traditionary Doctrine. These two great Wits, notwithstanding the plainness of oral Tradition, and the im­possibility of being ignorant of it, or mistaking it, have yet been so unhappy as to differ about several points of Faith; in­somuch that Mr. White is unkindly cen­sured for it at Rome, and perhaps here in England the Pope speeds no better; how­ever, the difference continues still so wide, that Mr. White hath thought fit to disobey the summons of his chief Pastor, and like a prudent man, rather to write against him here out of harms-way, than to venture the infallibility of plain oral Tradition for the Doctrines he maintains, against a pra­ctical Tradition which they have at Rome of killing Hereticks.

Methinks Mr. S. might have spared his brags, that he hath evinced from clear rea­son, [Page 23] P. 54. that it is far more impossible to make a man not to be, than not to know what is rivetted into his soul by so oft repeated sen­sations, (as the Christian Faith is by Oral and Practical Tradition) and that it ex­ceeds all the power of Nature (abstracting from the cases of madness, and violent disease) to blot knowledg thus fixt out of the soul of one single Believer; insomuch, that sooner may all mankind perish, than the regulative vertue of Tradition miscar­ry; nay, sooner may the sinews of entire nature by overstraining crack, and she lose all her activity and motion, that is, her self; than one single part of that innume­rable multitude which integrate the vast testification, which we call Tradition, can possibly be violated; when after he hath told us, P. 116. that the City of Rome was blest with more vigorous causes to imprint Christ's Doctrine at first, and recommend it to the next Age, than were found any where else; and consequently, that the stream of Tradition in its source and first putting in­to motion, was more particularly vigorous there than in any other See; and that the chief Pastor of that See hath a particular Title to Infallibility built upon Tradition, above any other Pastor whatsoever; not [Page 24] to dilate on the particular assistances to that Bishop, springing out of his divinely constituted Office; when, I say, after all this quaint Reason and rumbling Rhetorick about the infallibility of Oral Tradition, and the particular infallibility of the Bishop of Rome built on Tradition; we cannot but remember, that this great Oracle of Oral Tradition the Pope, and this great Master of it Mr. White, who is so peculiar­ly skill'd in the Rule of Faith, have so ma­nifestly declar'd themselves to differ in points of Faith. For that the Pope and his Congregation general at Rome have con­demn'd all his Books for this reason, be­cause Mr. Wh. Exetasis. P. 9. they contain several Propositions manifestly heretical, is a sign that these two great Wits do not very well hit it in matters of Faith; and either that they do not both agree in the same Rule of Faith, or that one of them does not rightly un­derstand it, or not follow it. And now, why may not that which Mr. S. unjustly says concerning the use of Scripture, be upon this account justly apply'd to the bu­siness of Oral Tradition P. 39.? If we see two such eminent Wits among the Papists (the Pope, and Mr. White) making use of the self-same, and as they conceive, the best ad­vantages [Page 25] their Rule of Faith gives them; and availing themselves the best they can by acquired skills, yet differ about matters of Faith; what certainty can we under­takingly promise to weaker heads, that is to the generality of the Papists, in whom the Governors of the Church do profes­sedly cherish ignorance for the increasing of their devotion.

§ 6. Fourthly, We have sufficient assurance that the Books of Scripture are conveyed down to us, without any material corrupti­on or alteration. And he that denies this, must either reject the authority of all Books, because we cannot be certain whether they be the same now that they were at first; or else, give some probable reason why these should be more liable to corruption than others. But any man that considers things, will easily find that it is much more impro­bable that these Books should have been either wilfully or involuntarily corrupted, in any thing material to Faith or a good Life, than any other Books in the World; whether we consider the peculiar Provi­dence of God engaged for the preservation of them, or the peculiar circumstances of these Books. If they were wrirten by men divinely inspired, and are of use to Christi­ans, [Page 26] as is acknowledged (at least in words) on all hands; nothing is more credible, than that the same Divine Providence which took care for the publishing of them, would likewise be concerned to preserve them en­tire. And if we consider the peculiar circum­stances of these Books, we shall find it morally impossible, that they should have been materially corrupted, because being of universal and mighty concernment, and at first diffused into many hands, and soon after translated into most Languages, and most passages in them cited in Books now extant, and all these now agreeing in all matters of importance, we have as great assurance as can be had concerning any thing of this nature, that they have not suffered any material alteration, and far greater than any man can have concerning the incorruption of their oral Tradition, as I shall shew when I come to answer the thing which he calls Demonstration.

§ 7. Fifthly, That de facto the Scripture hath been acknowledged by all Christians, in former Ages, to be the means whereby the doctrine of Christ hath with greatest certainty been conveyed to them. One good evidence of this is, That the Primi­tive [Page 27] Adversaries of Christian Religion did always look upon the Scripture as the standard and measure of the Christian Do­ctrine, and in all their writing against Chri­stianity, took that for granted to be the Christian Faith which was contained in those Books; there having not as yet any Philosopher risen up who had demonstrated to the World, that a Doctrine could not with sufficient certainty and clearness be conveyed by writing from one Age to ano­ther. But how absurd had this method of confuting Christian Religion been, if it had been then the publick profession of Chri­stians, that the Scriptures were not the Rule of their Faith? How easie had it been for the Fathers, who apologized for, and de­fended Christian Religion, to have told them they took a wrong measure of their Do­ctrine; for it was not the principle of Chri­stians, that their Faith was conveyed to them by the Scriptures, and therefore it was a fond undertaking to attaque their Religion that way; but if they would effectually argue against it, they ought to enquire what that Doctrine was which was orally delivered from father to son, without which the Scriptures could signifie no more to them than an unknown Cipher [Page 28] without a Key; being of themselves, with­out the light of Oral Tradition, only an heap of unintelligible words, unsensed Cha: racters, and Ink variously figured in a Book; and therefore it was a gross mistake in them, to think they could understand the Christian Religion (like their own Philoso­phy) by reading of those Books, or confute it by confuting them. Thus the Fathers might have defended their Religion; nay, they ought in all reason to have taken this course, and to have appealed from those dead sense­less Books, to the true Rule of Faith, the living voice of the Church Essential. But doth Mr. S. find any thing to this purpose in the Apologies of the Fathers? If he hath discover'd any such matter, he might do well to acquaint the World with it, and make them wiser; in the mean time, I shall inform him what I have found, that the Fathers never except against that method, but appeal frequently from the slanderous reports and misrepresentations which were made of their Doctrine to the Books of Scripture, as the true standard of it.

§ 8. Another evidence that Christians in all Ages since the Apostles times, have owned the Scriptures for the Rule of their [Page 29] Faith, is, That the Fathers in their Homilies did use constantly to declare to the People what they were to believe, and what they were to practise, out of the Scriptures; which had been most absurd and sensless, had they believed not the Scriptures, but something else to have been the Rule of Faith and Man­ners. For what could tend more to the se­ducing of the People from Mr. S's supposed Rule of Faith Oral Tradition, than to make a daily practise of declaring and confirming the Doctrins of the Christian Faith from the Scriptures? Had the antient Fathers been right for Mr. S's way, they would not have built their Doctrine upon Scripture; per­haps not have mentioned it, for fear of giving the people an occasion to grow fami­liar with so dangerous a Book; but rather (as their more prudent Posterity have done) would have lock'd it up from the people in an unknown Tongue, and have set open the stores of good wholsome Traditions; and instead of telling them (as they do most frequently) thus saith the Scripture, would only have told them, this is the voice of the essential Church; thus it hath been deliver­ed down by hand to us, from our Fore­fathers.

[Page 30]§ 9. I might add for a Third evidence, the great malice of the Enemies and Perse­cutors of Christianity, against this Book; and their cruel endeavours to extort it out of the hands of Christians, and destroy it out of the World, that by this means they might extirpate Christianity. For it seems they thought, that the abolishing of this Book would have been the ruine of that Religion. But (according to Mr. S's opinion) their malice wanted wit; for had all the Bibles in the World been burnt, Christian Religion would nevertheless have been en­tirely preserv'd, and safely transmitted down to us by sense written in mens hearts, with the good help of of Mr. S's Demonstration. Nay, their Church would have been a great gainer by it: For this Occasion and Pa­rent of all Heresie the Scripture, being once out of the way, she might have had all in her own hands, and by leading the people in the safe paths of Tradition, and consequently of Science, might have made them wise enough to obey. Well, but sup­pose the Persecutors of Christianity mistook themselves in their design, how came the Christians in those days to be so tenacious of this Book, that rather than deliver it, they would yield up themselves to torments [Page 31] and death? And why did they look up­on those who out of fear delivered up their Books, as Apostates and Renouncers of Christianity, if they had not thought this Book to be the great Instrument of their Faith and Salvation, and if it had really been of no greater consideration than Mr. Wh. and Mr. S. would make it? Why should they be so loth to part with a few unsens'd Characters, waxen natur'd words, fit to be play'd upon diversly by quirks of wit, that is, apt to blunder and confound, but to clear little or nothing? Why should they value their lives at so cheap a rate as to throw them away for a few insignifi­cant scrawls, and to shed their blood for a little Ink variously figured in a Book? Did they not know, that the safety of Chri­stianity did not depend upon this Book? Did no Christian then understand that, which (according to Mr. S.) no Christi­an can be ignorant of, viz. that not the Scripture, but unmistakeable, indefectible Oral Tradition was the Rule of Faith? Why did they not consider, that though this Letter Rule of Hereticks had been consum'd to ashes, yet their Faith would have lain safe, and been preserved entire in its * Spiritual Causes, Men's minds, [Page 32] the noblest pieces in Nature? Some of them indeed did deliver up their Books, and were call'd Traditores, and I have some ground to believe, that these were the only Traditionary Christians of that time, and that the rest were Confessors and Martyrs for the Letter Rule. And if this be not evidence enough, that the Scrip­tures have always been acknowledged by Christians for the Rule of Faith, I shall, when I come to examine his Testimonies for Tradition, (with the good leave of his distinction between Speculators and Testi­fiers) prove by most express Testimony, that it was the general opinion of the Fa­thers, That the Scriptures are the Rule of Christian Faith; and then, if his demon­stration of the infalliblity of Tradition will enforce that as Testifiers, they must nesds have spoken otherwise, who can help it?

SECT. IV.

§. 1. HAving thus laid down the Protestant Rule of Faith, How much Protestants allow to Oral Tra­dition. with the grounds of it; all that now remains for me to do, towards the clear and full stating of the Controversie between us, is to [Page 33] take notice briefly, and with due limita­tions:

1. How much the Protestants do allow to Oral Tradition.

Secondly, What those things are which Mr. S, thinks fit to attribute to his Rule of Faith, which we see no cause to attribute to ours; And when this is done, any one may easily discern how far we differ.

§ 2. 1. How much Protestants do allow to Oral Tradition.

First, We grant that Oral Tradition in some circumstances, may be a sufficient way of conveying a Doctrine; but withall we deny, that such circumstances are now in being. In the first Ages of the World, when the credenda or Articles of Religion, and the agenda or Precepts of it, were but few, and such as had the evidence of Na­tural light; When the World was con­tracted into a few Families in comparison, and the age of man ordinarily extended to six or seven hundred years; it is easie to imagine, how such a doctrine, in such cir­cumstances, might have been propagated by Oral Tradition, without any great change or alterations. Adam lived till Me­thuselah was above two hundred years [Page 34] old, Methuselah lived till Sem was near an hundred, and Sem out-liv'd Abraham: So that this Tradition needed not pass through more than two hands, betwixt Adam and Abraham. But though this way was sufficient to have preserved Religion in the world, if men had not been wanting themselves; yet we find it did not prove effectual. For through the cor­ruption and negligence of men after the Flood, (if not before) when the world be­gan to multiply, and the age of man was shortned, the knowledg and worship of the one true God was generally lost in the world. And so far as appears by Scripture-History, (the only Record we have of those times) when God called out Abra­ham from Vr of the Chaldees, the whole world was lapsed into Polytheisme and Idolatry. Therefore, for the greater secu­rity of Religion afterwards, when the po­sterity of Abraham was multiplied into a great Nation, the wisdom of God did not think fit to entrust the Doctrine of Religion any longer to the fallible and uncertain way of Tradition, but committed it to wri­ting. Now that God pitched upon this way, after the world had sadly experienced the unsuccesfulness of the other, seems to [Page 35] be a very good evidence that this was the better and more secure way: it being the usual method of the Divine dispensations, not to go backwards, but to move towards perfection, and to proceed from that which is less perfect to that which is more. And the Apostles Hebr. 8.7. reasoning concerning the two Covenants is very applicable to these two methods of conveying the Doctrine of Religion; if the first had been faultless, then should no place have been sought for a second.

§ 3. So likewise, when Christ revealed his Doctrine to the world, it was not in his life-time committed to writing; because it was entertained but by a few, who were his disciples and followers, and who so long as he continued with them had a living Oracle to teach them. After his death the Apostles, who were to publish this Doctrine to the world, were assisted by an infallible Spirit, so as they were secured from error and mistake in the delivery of it. But when this extraordinary assistance failed, there was need of some other means to convey it to posterity, that so it might be a fixt and standing Rule of Faith and Manners to the end of the world. To this end the [Page 36] providence of God took care to have it committed to writing. And that Mr. S▪ may see this is not a conjecture of Prote­stants, but the sense of former times, I shall refer him to St. Chrysostom, (Homil. 1. in Matth.) who tells us, That Christ left nothing in writing to his Apostles; but in stead thereof did promise to bestow upon them the grace of his holy Spirit, saying, John 14. He shall bring all things to your remembrance, &c. But because in progress of time there were many grievous miscar­riages both in matter of Opinion, and also of Life and Manners; therefore it was requisite that the memory of this Doctrine should be preserved by writing. So long then as the Apostles lived, who were thus infallibly assisted, the way of Oral Tradi­tion was secure, but no longer; nor even then from the nature of the thing, but from that extraordinary and supernatural as­sistance which accompanied the deliverers.

§ 4. And therefore it is no good way of Argument against the way of Tradition by writing, which he lays so much weight up­on, P. 40. That the Apostles and their Successors went not with Books in their hands to preach and deliver Christ's Doctrine, but [Page 37] words in their mouths; and that primitive antiquity learned their faith by another method, a long time before many of those Books were universally spread among the vulgar. For what if there was no need of writing this Doctrine, whilst those living Oracles, the Apostles, were present with the Church? Doth it therefore follow that there was no need of it afterwards when the Apostles were dead, and that extraor­dinary and supernatural assistance was cea­sed? If the Preachers now adays could give us any such assurance, and confirm all they preach by such frequent, and publick, and unquestionable miracles as the Apostles did; then we need not examine the Do­ctrines they taught by any other Rule, but ought to regulate our belief by what they delivered to us. But seeing this is not the case, that ought in all reason to be the Rule of our Faith, which hath brought down to us the Doctrine of Christ with the greatest certainty: And this I shall prove the Scriptures to have done.

§ 5. So that in those circumstances I have mentioned, We allow Oral Tradition to have been a sufficient way of conveying a Doctrine; but now considering the great increase of mankind, and the shortness of [Page 38] mans life in these latter ages of the world, and the long tract of time from the Apo­stles age down to us; and the innumera­ble accidents whereby, in the space of 1500 years, Oral Tradition might receive in­sensible alterations, so as at last to be­come quite another thing from what it was at first, by passing through many hands: in which passage, all the mistakes and corruptions which (in the several Ages through which it was transmit­ted) did happen, either through Igno­rance, or Forgetfulness, or out of inte­rest and design, are necessarily derived into the last: So that the further it goes, the more alteration it is liable to▪ be­cause as it passeth along, more Errours and Corruptions are infused into it. I say, considering all this, we deny, that the Doctrine of Christian Religion could with any probable security and certainty have been conveyed down to us by the way of Oral Tradition. And therefore do reasonably believe, that God fore-seeing this, did in his wisdom so order things, that those persons who were assisted by an infallible spirit in the delivery of this Doctrine, should before they left the world commit it to [Page 39] writing; which was accordingly done: And by this Instrument, the Doctrine of Faith hath been conveyed down to us.

§ 6. Secondly, We allow, that Oral Tradition is a considerable assurance to us, that the Books of Scripture which we now have, are the very Books which were written by the Apostles and Evangelists; but withall we deny, That Oral Tradition is therefore to be accounted the Rule of Faith.

The general Assurance that we have con­cerning Books written long ago, that they are so ancient, and were written by those whose names they bear, is a constant and uncontroll'd Tradition of this, transmitted from one Age to another; partly Orally, and partly by the Testimony of other Books. Thus much is common to Scripture with other Books. But then the Scriptures have this peculiar advantage above other Books, that being of a greater and more universal concernment, they have been more common and in every bodies hands, more read and studied than any other Books in the World whatsoever; and consequently, they have a more universal and better grounded at­testation. Moreover, they have not only [Page 40] been owned universally in all Ages by Christians (except three or four Books of them, which for some time were que­stioned by some Churches, but have since been generally received) but the greatest Enemies of our Religion, the Jews and Heathens, never questioned the Antiquity of them, but have always taken it for grant­ed, that they were the very Books which the Apostles writ. And this is as great an assurance as we can have concerning any ancient Book, without a particular and immediate Revelation.

§ 7. And this Concession doth not, as M. S, supposeth, make Oral Tradition to be finally the Rule of Faith; for the mea­ning of this question, ( What is the Rule of Faith?) Is, What is the next and imme­diate means whereby the knowledge of Christs Doctrine is conveyed to us? So that although Oral Tradition be the means whereby we come to know that these are the Books of Scripture, yet these Books are the next and immediate means whereby we come to know what is Christs Doctrine; and consequently, what we are to be­lieve.

§ 8. Nor doth this Concession make [Page 41] Oral Tradition to be the Rule of Faith, by a parity of Reason; as if because we ac­knowledge that Oral Tradition can with sufficient certainty transmit a Book to Af­ter ages, we must therefore grant that it can with as much certainty convey a doctrine consisting of several Articles of Faith (nay very many, as Mr. White acknowledges Rushw. Dial. 4. Sect. 9.) and many Laws and Precepts of Life: So because Oral Tradition sufficiently assures us that this is Magna Charta, and that the Statute-Book, in which are contain'd those Laws which it concerns every man to be skilful in; therefore by like parity of Rea­son it must follow, that Tradition it self is better than a Book, even the best way ima­ginable, to convey down such Laws to us. Mr. S. saith p. 93. expresly it is; but how truly, I appeal to experience, and the wisdom of our Law-givers, who seem to think other­wise. Tradition is already defin'd to us, a delivery down from hand to hand, of the sense and faith of Fore-fathers; i. e. of the Gospel, or message of Christ. Now sup­pose any Oral message, consisting of an hundred particularities, were to be delivered to an hundred several persons of different degrees of understanding and me­mory, by them to be conveyed to an hun­dred [Page 42] more, who were to convey it to o­thers, and so onwards, to a hundred descents; Is it probable this Message, with all the par­ticularities of it, would be as truly con­veyed through so many mouths, as if it were written down in so many Let­ters, concerning which every Bearer should need to say no more than this, That it was delivered to him as a Letter written by him whose name was subscribed to it? I think it not probable, though the mens lives were concerned every one for the faithful deli­very of his Errand or Letter. For the Let­ter is a message which no man can mistake in, unless he will; but the Errand so dif­ficult, and perplexed with its multitude of particulars, that it is an equal wager a­gainst every one of the Messengers, that he either forgets, or mistakes something in it; it is ten thousand to one, that the first Hundred do not all agree in it; it is a Mil­lion to one, that the next Succession do not all deliver it truly; for if any one of the first Hundred mistook, or forgot any thing, it is then impossible that he that received it from him should deliver it right; and so the farther it goes, the greater change it is liable to. Yet after all this I do not say, but it may be demonstrated, in Mr. S's [Page 43] way, to have more of certainty in it than the Original Letter.

§ 9. Thirdly, We allow, That the Doctrine of Christian Religion hath in all Ages been preached to the People by the Pastors of the Church, and taught by Christian Parents to their Children; but with great difference, by some more plainly, and truly, and perfectly; by o­thers, with less care and exactness, ac­cording to the different degrees of ability and integrity in Pastors or Parents; and likewise with very different success, ac­cording to the different capacities and dispositions of the Learners. We allow likewise, That there hath been a constant course of visible actions, conformable in some measure to the Principles of Christi­anity; but then we say that those out­ward acts and circumstances of Religion may have undergone great variations, and received great change, by addition to them, and defalcation from them, in several Ages. That this not only is possible, but hath actually happened, I shall shew when I come to answer his Demonstrations. Now that several of the the main Doctrines of Faith contained in the Scriptute, and actions therein commanded, have been [Page 44] taught and practised by Christians in all Ages (as the Articles summed up in the Apostles Creed, the use of the two Sa­craments) is a good evidence so far, that the Scriptures contain the Doctrine of Christian Religion. But then if we consi­der, how we come to know that such points of Faith have been taught, and such ex­ternal Actions practised in all Ages, it is not enough to say, there is a present mul­titude of Christians that profess to have received such Doctrines as ever believed and practised, and from hence to infer that they were so; the inconsequence of which Argument, I shall have a better occasion to shew afterwards: But he that will prove this to any mans satisfaction, must make it evident from the best Monuments and Records of several Ages, that is, from the most Authentick Books of those times, that such Doctrines have in all those Ages been constantly and universally taught and practised. But then if from those Records of former times it appear, that other Doctrines, not contained in the Scriptures, were not taught and practised universally in all Ages, but have crept in by degrees, some in one Age, and some in another, according as Ignorance, and Superstition in [Page 45] the People, Ambition and Interest in the chief Pastors of the Church, have ministred occasion and opportunity; and that the Innovators of these Doctrines and Pra­ctises, have all along pretended to con­firm them out of Scripture, as the ac­knowledged Rule of Faith; and have likewise acknowledged the Books of Scrip­ture to have descended without any materi­al corruption or alteration, (all which will sufficiently appear in the process of my Discourse) then cannot the Oral and pra­ctical Tradition of the present Church, con­cerning any Doctrine, as ever believed and practised, which hath no real foundation in Scripture, be any argument against these Books, as if they did not fully and clearly contain the Christian Doctrine. And to say the Scripture is to be interpreted by Oral and Practical Tradition, is no more reasonable, than it would be to interpret the antient Books of the Law, by the pre­sent practise of it; which every one, that compares things fairly together, must ac­knowledg to be full of deviations from the antient Law,

SECT. V.

How much Mr. S. attri­butes to his Rule of Faith, more than Prote­stants to theirs.§ 1. 2 dly. HOw much more he attri­butes to his Rule of Faith. than we think fit to attribute to ours.

1. We do not say, that it is impossible in the nature of the thing, that this Rule should fail, that is, either that these Books should cease to descend, or should be cor­rupted. This we do not attribute to them, because there is no need we should: We believe the providence of God will take care of them, and secure them from being either lost, or materially corrupted; yet we think it very possible, that all the Books in the World may be burnt, or otherwise destroyed. All that we affirm concerning our Rule of Faith, is that it is abundantly sufficient (if men be not wanting to them­selves) to convey the Christian Doctrine to all successive Ages; and we think him very unreasonable, that expects that God should do more than what is abundantly enough, for the perpetuating of Christian Religion in the world.

§ 2. Secondly, Nor do we say, that that certainty and assurance which we [Page 47] have, that these Books are the same that were written by the Apostles, is a first and self-evident Principle; but only that it is a truth capable of evidence sufficient, and as much as we can have for a thing of that nature. Mr. S. may, if he please, say that Traditions certainty is a first and self-evident Principle; but then he that says this, should take heed how he takes upon him to demonstrate it. Aristole was so wise as never to demonstrate first Principles, for which he gives this very good reason, be­cause they cannot be demonstrated. And most prudent men are of opinion, that a self-evident Principle, of all things in the World, should not be demonstrated, be­cause it needs not. For to what purpose should a man write a Book to prove that which every man must assent to, with­out any proof, so soon as it is propounded to him? I have always taken a self-evident Principle to be such a Proposition; as ha­ving in it self sufficient evidence of its own truth, and not needing to be made evident by any thing else, If I be herein mistaken, I desire Mr. S. to inform me better.

§ 3. So that the true state of the Con­troversie between us, is, Whether Oral [Page 48] and Practical Tradition, in opposition to Writing and Books, be the only way and means whereby the Doctrine of Christ can with certainty and security be con­veyed down to us, who live at this di­stance from the age of Christ and his A­postles? This He affirms, and the Prote­stants deny; not only that it is the sole means, but that it is sufficient for the certain conveyance of this Doctrine; and withall affirm, that this Doctrine hath been conveyed down to us by the Books of holy Scripture, as the proper measure and standard of our Religion: But then they do not exclude Oral Tradition from being the means of conveying to us the certain knowledg of these Books. Nor do they exclude the authentick Records of former Ages, nor the constant teaching and practise of this Doctrine, from being subordinate means and helps of conveying it from one age to another. Nay, so far are they from excluding these concurrent means, that they suppose them always to have been used, and to have been of great advantage for the propagating and explain­ing of this Doctrine, so far as they have been truly subordinate to, and regulated by these sacred Oracles, the Holy Scrip­tures; [Page 49] which, they say, do truly and fully contain that Doctrine which Christ deli­vered to his Apostles, and they preached to the world. To illustrate this by an in­stance; suppose there were a Controversy now on foot, how men might come to know what was the true Art of Logick which Aristotle taught his Scholars; and some should be of opinion, that the only way to know this would be by oral Tradition from his Scholars; which we might easily understand by consulting those of the pre­sent age, who learned it from those who re­ceived it from them, who at last had it from Aristotle himself: But others should think it the surest way to study his Orga­non, a Book acknowledged by all his Scho­lars, to have been written by himself, and to contain that Doctrine which he taught them. They, who take this latter course, suppose the authority of oral Tradition, for the conveying to them the knowledg of this Book; and do suppose this Do­ctrine to have been taught and practised in all Ages, and a great many Books to have been written by way of Comment and explication of this Doctrine; and that these have been good helps of promoting the knowledg of it. And they may well [Page 50] enough suppose all this, and yet be of opi­nion that the truest measure and standard of Aristotle's Doctrine is his own Book; and that it would be a fond thing in any man, by forcing an interpretation upon his Book either contrary to, or very for­reign and remote from the obvious sense of his words, to go about to reconcile this Book with that method of disputing which is used by the professed Aristotelians of the present age, and withal that scholastick Jargon which Mr. S. learn'd at Lisbon, and has made him so great a man in the Science of Controversie, as to enable him to demon­strate first and self-evident Principles; a trick not to be learn'd out of Aristotle's Organon. The Application is so easy, that I need not make it.

THE RULE of FAITH.
PART. II. Concerning the Properties of the Rule of Faith; and whether they agree solely to Oral Tradition.

SECT. I.

§ 1. HAving thus endeavoured to bring the Controversy between us, to its clear and true state, that so we might not quarrel in the dark, and dispute about we know not what; I come now to grap­ple more closely with his Book. And the main foundations of his Discourse may be reduced to these three Heads.

First, That the essential Properties of such a way and means, as can with cer­tainty and security convey down to us the Doctrine of Christ, belong solely to Oral Tradition. This he endeavors to prove in his five first Discourses.

[Page 52] Secondly, That it is impossible that this way of Oral Tradition should fail. And this he pretends to prove in his four last Discourses.

Thirdly, That Oral Tradition hath been generallly reputed by Christians in all Ages, the sole way and means of convey­ing down to them the Doctrine of Christ. And this he attempts to shew in his last Chapter, which he calls The Consent of Authority to the substance of his foregoing Discourses. If he make good these three things, he hath acquitted himself well in his undertaking. But whether he hath made them good or not, is now to be ex­amined.

§ 2. First, Whether the essential Pro­perties of such a way and means, as can with certainty and security convey down to us the knowledge of Christ's Doctrine, belong solely to Oral Tradition?

The true way to measure the essential Properties of this or that means, is by considering its sufficiency for its end. For whatsoever is necessary to make any means sufficient for the obtaining of its end, is to be reputed and essential Property of that Means, and nothing [Page 53] else. Now, because the end we are speak­ing of, is the conveyance of the knowledg of Christ's Doctrine to all those who are concerned to know it, in such a manner as they may be sufficiently certain and secure that it hath received no change or corrup­tion from what it was when it was first de­livered. From hence it appears, that the means to this end must have these two Properties. 1. It must be sufficiently plain and intelligible. 2 ly. It must be sufficiently certain to us, that is, such as we may be fully satisfied concerning it, that it hath received no corruption or alteration. If it have these two conditions, it is sufficient for its end; but if it want either of them, it must necessarily fall short of its end. For if it be not plain and intelligible, it cannot convey this Doctrine to our know­ledg; if it be not certain, we cannot be assured, that that Doctrine which it brings down to us for the Doctrine of Christ, is really such.

§ 3. I know he assigns more Properties of this Means which he calls the Rule of Faith; but upon examination it will ap­pear, that they either fall in with these two, or do not at all belong to it. As,

[Page 54] First, That P. 11. it must be plain and self-evident to all, as to its existence. Nothing can be more frivolous, than to make this a Property of any thing; because whoso­ever enquires into the Properties of a thing, is supposed to be already satisfied that the thing is.

Secondly, That it be P. 11. evidenceable, as to its Ruling power, that is, as he explains himself, P 3. that men be capable of knowing, that it deserves to be relied on as a Rule. By which he must either under­stand, the certainty of it; and then it falls in with the second Property I mentioned, and is the same with the sixth, which he lays down. Or else he means more ge­nerally, that it is the property of a Rule, that men be capable of knowing that it hath the Properties of a Rule. For I under­stand not, how a man can know that any thing deserves to be relied on as a Rule, otherwise than by knowing that it hath the properties of a Rule, that is, that it is sufficient for its end. But at this rate, a man may multiply the Pro­perties of things without end, if the evi­dence of a thing, as to its existence, be one Property; and then, that we be capable of knowing that it is such a thing, be ano­ther.

[Page 55]§ 4. Thirdly, That it be P. 12. apt to settle, and justifie undoubting Persons. What he means here, by setling undoubting Persons, I am not able, on the sudden, to comprehend; because I understand not what unsettles a man besides doubting: for if a man be but so well satisfied about any thing, as to have no doubt concerning it, I do not easily apprehend how he can be setled better, that is, how his mind can be more at rest, than not to doubt. But if by undoubting Persons, he means those who do not doubt for the present, but after­wards may doubt, then I perceive what he means by apt to settle undoubting Persons, viz. apt to settle Persons when they do doubt, that is, when they are not undoubt­ing Persons. As for justifying undoubting Persons, if he means that whosoever se­curely relies on this Rule, ought of right to be acquitted, as acting rationally in so doing; this is plainly consequent upon the two Properties I have laid down. For, if the means of conveying Christ's Doctrine be sufficiently plain and certain, every man that relies upon it is justified in so doing, because he trusts a means which is suffici­ent for its end.

[Page 56]§ 5. Fourthly, That P. 12. it be apt to sa­tisfie fully the most Sceptical Dissenters, and Rational Doubters: For it's aptitude to satisfie Rational Doubters, that plain­ly follows from the sufficient certainty of it. But why it should be a necessary property of a Rule of Faith, to be apt to satisfie the most Sceptical Dissenter, I can no more divine, than I can, why he should call a Dissenter Sceptical, which are repugnant terms: For a Sceptick is one who neither assents to any thing, nor dissents, but is in a perpetual sus­pence; because he looks upon every opi­nion, as balanced by a contrary opini­on of equal probability, without any incli­nation of the Scales either way. But if by the most Sceptical Dissenter he means only a Sceptick, one that doth not believe the Doctrine of Christ, nor any thing else; then would I fain know, what that is which in reason is apt fully to satisfie such a person. If any thing will, sure a Demonstration will; but there is no aptitude at all in a De­monstration, to satisfie him who doubts whether there be any such thing as a De­monstration; and likewise questions the certainty of all those Principles, from [Page 57] whence any conclusion can be demonstra­ted. And those who are most Sceptical, profess to doubt of all this.

§ 6. Fifthly, That it P. 11, 12. be apt to convince the most obstinate, and acute Adversary. If the Rule be plain and certain, the most acute Adversary may be convinced by it if he will, that is, if he be not obstinate; but if he be obstinate, that is, such a one as will not be convinced, but will persist in his Error in despite of all evidence that can be offered him, then I must profess that I do not know any kind of evidence that is apt to convince that man that will not be convinced by any reason that can be propounded to him. And that he ought not to have expected this from any Rule of Faith, though never so self-evident, he might have learn't from the same Author, in whom he may find his chief Properties of the Rule of Faith, if he had but had the patience to have consider'd his Expli­cation of them; I mean Dr. Holden Analys. Fid. L. 1. c. 3., who layes down the second Property of the Rule of Faith, (or, as he calls it, the means whereby we come to the knowledge of Revealed Truth) in these words, Another (viz. Condition of this Means, &c.) is, That it be apt of its own Nature, to afford [Page 58] the greatest true and rational certainty, to all men without exception to whom the knowledg of it shall come; provided they be furnish'd with the faculty of Reason, and have their minds purified from all Passion and Lust, which do (as he tells us, Cap. 6.) often hinder the most sagacious Persons from understanding the most evi­dent and manifest Truths. Now I suppose Obstinacy to be the effect of Passion and Lust.

If Mr. S. mean, that the Rule of Faith must be apt to conquer Obstinacy, and make men lay it aside, I cannot understand this neither; unless he mean, that the Rule of Faith must be a Cudgel, which the Tra­ditionary Church have been good at, and may use it again when occasion serves; for none but they have Title to it upon a Church-account, as Mr. S. tells us, Corol. 10. But setting aside this, I do not know any thing else that is apt to conquer Obstinacy: Not the clearest Reason, or the strongest Demonstration; for that I am sure is no ways fitted to combat a wilful and unrea­sonable humour with any probability of success. And if any one doubt of this, if he will but make trial, he may easily be con­vinc'd by experience, how unapt obstinate [Page 59] Persons are to be convinc'd by Reason. I do not know any thing that ever carried greater evidence than the Doctrine of Christ, preached by himself and his Apo­stles to the obstinate Jews, and confirmed by multitudes of unquestionable miracles; and yet we do not find by the success of it, that it was so very apt to convince those that were obstinate. And no man can judg of the aptitude of a means to an end, otherwise than by the usual and frequent success of it when it is applied. Nor do I think that the Doctrine of the Gospel was ever intended for that purpose. God hath provided no remedy for the wilful and per­verse, but he hath done that which is suf­ficient for the satisfying and winning over of those who are teachable and willing to learn: And such a disposition supposeth a man to have laid aside both Scepticism and Obstinacy.

§ 7. Sixthly, That P. 12. it be certain in it self.

Seventhly, That P 12. it be absolutely ascer­tainable to us.

These two are comprehended in the se­cond Property I laid down; so that I have nothing to say against them, but that the [Page 60] last looks very like a contradiction, abso­lutely ascertainable to us; which is to say, with respect to us, without respect to us; for absolutely seems to exclude respect, and to us implies it.

Having thus shewn, that the seven Pro­perties he mentions, are either coincident with those two I have laid down, or conse­quent upon them, or absurd and imperti­nent; it remains, that the true Properties of a Rule of Faith are those two which I first named, and no more.

SECT. II.

That the Properties of a Rule of Faith belong to Scriptute.§ 1. LEt us now see how he endeavors to shew, that these Properties agree solely to Oral Tradition: He tells us there are but two Pretenders to this Title of being the Rule of Faith, Scrip­ture, and Oral Tradition; these Properties do not belong to Scripture, and they do to Oral Tradition; therefore solely to it. A very good Argument, if he can prove these two things, That these two Properties do not belong to Scripture; and that they do to Oral Tradition.

§ 2. In order to the proving of the First, [Page 61] that these Properties do not belong to Scripture, he premiseth this Note, P. 13. That we cannot by the Scriptures mean the sense of them, but the Book, that is, such or such Characters not yet sensed, or interpre­ted. But why can we not, by the Scriptures, mean the sense of them? He gives this clear and admirable reason; because the sense of Scripture, is, the things to be known, and these we confess are the very points of Faith, of which the Rule of Faith is to ascertain us. Which is just as if a man should reason thus: Those who say the Statute-Book can convey to them the knowledg of the Statute-Law, cannot by the Statute-Book mean the sense of it, but the Book; that is, such or such Characters not yet sensed or interpreted: Because the sense of the Statute-Book is the things to be known; and these are the very Laws, the knowledg whereof is to be conveyed to them by this Book; which is to say, that a Book cannot convey to a man the know­ledg of any matter, because if it did, it would convey to him the thing to be known. But that he may farther see what excellent reasoning this is, I shall apply this Para­graph to Oral Tradition; for the Argu­ment holds every whit as well concerning [Page 62] that. To speak to them in their own lan­guage, who say that Oral Tradition is their Rule, we must premise this Note, that they cannot mean by Oral Tradition, the sense of it, that is, the things to be known; for those, they confess, are the very Points of Faith, of which the Rule of Faith is to ascertain us; when they say then, that Oral Tradi­tion is the Rule of Faith, they can only mean by Oral Tradition, the words where­in it is delivered, not yet sensed or interpre­ted, but as yet to be sensed; that is, such or such sounds, with their aptness to signifie to them assuredly God's mind, or ascertain them of their Faith; for abstracting from the sense, and actual signification of those words, there is nothing imaginable left but those sounds, with their aptness to signifie it. When he hath answered this Argu­ment, he will have answered his own. In the mean while this Discourse, that he who holds the Scriptures to be the Rule of Faith, must needs by the Scriptures mean a Book void of sense, &c. Because otherwise, if by Scripture he should understand a Book, that hath a certain sense in it, that sense must be the Doctrine of Christ, which is the very thing that this Book is to con­vey to us; I say, this Discourse tends only [Page 63] to prove it an absurd thing for any man, that holds Scripture the means of convey­ing Christ's Doctrine, to understand by the Scripture, a Book that conveys Christ's Do­ctrine. This being his own reason, put into plain English, I leave the Reader to judg, whether it be not something short of per­fect Science and Demonstration. Nay, if it were throughly examined, I doubt whe­ther it would not fall short of that low pitch of Science which he speaks of in his Preface, where he tells us, that the way of Science is to proceed from one piece of sense to another.

§ 3. Having premised this, that by the Scriptures we must mean only dead Cha­racters, that have no sense under them, He proceeds to shew that these dead Chara­cters have not the Properties of a Rule of Faith belonging to them. Which, although it be nothing to the purpose when he hath shewn it, yet it is very pleasant to observe, by what cross and untoward Arguments he goes about it: Of which I will give the Reader a tast, by one or two instances.

In the first place he shews, that it cannot be evident to us that these Books were written by men divinely inspired, because [Page 64] P. 14. till the seeming contradictions in those Books are solved; which to do, is one of the most difficult tasks in the world, they cannot be concluded to be of God's enditing. Now how is this an Argument against those, who by the Scriptures, must mean unsensed letters and characters? I had always thought contradictions had been in the sense of words, not in the letters and characters; but I perceive he hath a pecu­liar opinion, that the four and twenty let­ters do contradict one another.

The other instance shall be in his last Argument P. 17., which is this, that the Scrip­ture cannot be the Rule of Faith, because those who are to be ruled and guided by the Scriptures letter to Faith, cannot be cer­tain of the true sense of it; which is to say, that unsensed letters and characters cannot be the Rule of Faith, because the Rule of Faith must have a certain sense, that is, must not be unsensed letters and characters; which in plain English amounts to thus much, unsensed letters and characters can­not be the Rule of Faith, that they can­not.

§ 4. And thus I might trace him through all his Properties of the Rule of Faith; [Page 65] and let the Reader see, how incompara­bly he demonstrates the falshood of this Protestant Tenet (as he calls it) that a sensless Book may be a Rule of Faith. But I am weary of pursuing him in these airy and phantastical combats, and shall leave him to fight with his own fancies, and batter down the Castles which him­self hath built. Only I think fit here to acquaint him, once for all, with a great Secret of the Protestant Doctrine, which it seems he hath hitherto been ig­norant of (for I am still more confirmed in my opinion, that he forsook our Re­ligion before he understood it) that when they say, the Scriptures are the Rule of Faith, or the means whereby Christ's Doctrine is conveyed down to them, they mean by the Scriptures, Books writ­ten in such words as do sufficiently ex­press the sense and meaning of Christ's Doctrine.

§ 5. And to satisfy him, that we are not absurd and unreasonable in suppo­sing the Scriptures to be such a Book, I would beg the favour of him to grant me these four things, or shew reason to the contrary.

[Page 66] First, That whatever can be spoken in plain and intelligible words, and such as have a certain sense, may be written in the same words.

Secondly, That the same words are as intelligible when they are written, as when they are spoken.

Thirdly, That God, if he please, can endite a Book in as plain words as any of his creatures.

Fourthly, That we have no reason to think that God affects obscurity, and en­vies that men should understand him, in those things which are necessary for them to know, and which must have been written to no purpose, if we cannot un­derstand them. St. Luke Luke 1.3, 4. tells Theophi­lus, that he wrote the History of Christ to him, on purpose to give him a certain knowledg of those things which he writ. But how a Book which hath no certain sense, should give a man certain know­ledg of things, is beyond my capacity. St. John John 20.31. saith, that he purposely com­mitted several of Christ's miracles to Writing, that men might believe on Him. But now had Mr. S. been at his elbow, he would have advised him to spare his labour, and would have given him this [Page 67] good reason for it; because when he had written his Book, no body would be able to find the certain sense of it with­out oral Tradition, and that alone would securely and intelligibly convey both the Doctrine of Christ, and the certain know­ledg of those miracles which he wrought for the confirmation of it. If these four things be but granted, I see not why, when we say that the Scriptures are the means of conveying to us Christ's Do­ctrine, we may not be allow'd to under­stand by the Scriptures, a Book which doth in plain and intelligible words ex­press to us this Doctrine.

SECT. III.

6 1. ANd now, Mr. S's Ex­ceptions against Scripture examined. although this might have been a sufficient Answer to his Exceptions against the Scriptures, as being incapable of the Properties of a Rule of Faith; because all of them suppose that which is apparently false and absurd, as granted by Protestants, viz. That the Scriptures are only an heap of dead letters, and insignificant characters, without any sense under them; and that oral Tradition is that [Page 68] only which gives them life and sense; Yet because several of his Exceptions pretend to shew, that the true Proper­ties of a Rule of Faith do not at all ap­pertain to the Scriptures; therefore I shall give particular Answers to them; and as I go along, shew that Tradition is liable to all or most of those Exceptions, and to far greater than those.

§ 2. Whereas he says, P. 13. it cannot be evident to Protestants, from their Prin­ciples, that the Books of Scripture were originally written by men divinely in­spired; I will shew him that it may, and then answer the reasons of this Excep­tion.

It is evident, from an universal, con­stant, and uncontrolled Tradition among Christians, not only oral, but written, and from the acknowledgment of the greatest Adversaries of our Religion, that these Books were originally written by the Apostles and Evangelists. And this is not only a Protestant Principle, but the Principle of all mankind, That an un­doubted Tradition is sufficient evi­dence of the Antiquity and Author of a Book, and all the extrinsecal Argu­ment [Page 69] that can ordinarily be had of a Book written long ago.

Next, it is evident, that the Apostles were men divinely inspired, that is, se­cured from error and mistake in the wri­ting of this Doctrine, from the miracles that were wrought for the confirmation of it. Because it is unreasonable to imagine that the Divine power should immediately interpose for the confirma­tion of a Doctrine, and give so eminent an attestation to the Apostles to con­vince the World that they were imme­diately appointed and commissioned by God, and yet not secure them from er­ror in the delivery of it. And that such miracles were wrought, is evident from as credible Histories as we have for any of those things which we do most firmly believe. And this is better evidence that the Apostles were men divinely inspired, than bare oral Tradition can furnish us withal. For setting aside the authen­tick relation of these matters in Books, it is most probable, that oral Tradition of it self and without Books, would scarce have preserved the memory of any of those particular miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles, which are recorded in [Page 70] Scripture. And for the probability of this, I offer these two things to his con­sideration.

First, No man can deny that memo­rable persons have lived, and actions been done in the world innumerable, whereof no History now extant makes any men­tion.

Secondly, He himself will grant, that our Saviour wrought innumerable more miracles, than are recorded in Scripture. And now I challenge him to shew the single vertue of oral Tradition, by giving an account of any of those persons, or their actions, who lived 1500 or 2000 years ago, besides those which are men­tioned in Books; or to give a catalogue but of ten of those innumerable mira­cles wrought by our Saviour, which are nor recorded by the Evangelists, with circumstances as punctual and particular as those are clothed withal. If he can do this, it will be a good evidence that oral Tradition singly and by it self can do something; but if he cannot, 'tis as plain an evidence on the contrary, that if those actions of former times, and those miracles of our Saviour and his Apostles, which are recorded in Books [Page 71] had never been written, but entrusted solely to oral Tradition, we should have heard as little of them at this day, as we do of those that were not writ­ten.

§ 3. Now to examine his Reasons for this Exception:

First, He saith, P. 13. 'tis most manifest that this cannot be made evident to the vul­gar, that Scripture was written by men divinely inspired. This Reason is as easily answered, by saying 'tis most ma­nifest that it can: But besides saying so, I have shewed how it may be made as evident to the vulgar, as other things which they do most firmly and upon good grounds believe. Even the rudest of the vulgar, and those who cannot read, do believe upon very good grounds that there was such a King as William the Conqueror; and the miracles of Christ and his Apostles are capable of as good evidence as we have for this.

Secondly, He says, P. 13, 14. this cannot be evi­dent to the curious and most speculative Searchers, but by so deep an inspection in­to the sense of Scripture, as shall discover [Page 72] such secrets, that Philosophy, and hu­man Industry could never have arrived to. As if we could not be assured that any thing were written by men divinely inspired, unless it were above the reach of human understanding; and as if no man could know that this was our Sa­viours Doctrine, Whatever ye would that men should do unto you, that do ye likewise unto them, because every one can understand it. But if there were more mysteries in the Scriptures than there are, I hope a man might be satis­fied that they were written by men di­vinely inspired, without a clear com­prehension of all those mysteries. The evidence of the inspiration of any per­son doth not depend upon the plaine­ness or sublimity of the things revealed to him, but upon the goodness of the arguments which tend to perswade us that the person is so inspired: And the Argument that is most fit to satisfy us of that is, if he work miracles. Now I would gladly know why a learned man cannot be assured of a miracle, that is, a plain sensible matter of Fact done long ago, but by so deep an inspection into the sense of Scripture, as shall discover such [Page 73] secrets that Philosophy and human In­dustry could never have arrived to.

§ 4. Thirdly, Because P. 14. all the seem­ing contradictions of Scripture must be solved, before we can out of the bare letter conclude the Scripture to be of God's enditing; to solve which literally, plainly, and satisfactorily (he tells us) the memory of so many particulars, which made them clearer to those of the Age in which they were written, and the matter known, must needs be so worn out by tract of time, that it is one of the most difficult tasks in the World. As if we could not believe a Book to be of God's enditing, because there seem now to be some contradictions in it, which we have reason to believe could easily have been solved by those who lived in the Age in which it was written. Or as if oral Tradition could help a man to solve these contradictions, when the me­mory of particulars necessary for the clear solution of them is (as himself confesses) worn out by tract of time. If Mr. S. can, in order to the solution of the seeming contradictions of Scripture, demonstrate, that oral Tradition hath to [Page 74] this day preserv'd the memory of those particulars (necessary for that purpose) the memory of which must needs be long since worn out by tract of time, then I will readily yield, that his Rule of Faith hath in this particular, the advan­tage of ours. But if he cannot do this, why does he make that an Argument against our Rule, which is as strong against his own? This is just like Capt. Everard's Friend's way of arguing against the Protestants, That they cannot rely upon Scripture because it is full of plain contradictions, impossible to be reconciled; and therefore they ought in all reason to submit to the in­fallibility of the Church. And for an instance of such a contradiction, he pitched upon the three fourteen Genera­tions mentioned in the first of St. Mat­thew, because the third Series of Gene­rations, if they be counted, will be found to be but thirteen. Not to men­tion now, how this difficulty hath been sufficiently satisfied both by Protestant and Popish Commentators, without any recourse to oral Tradition; that which I take notice of, is the unreasonableness of making this an Exception against the [Page 75] Protestants, when it comes with every whit as much force upon themselves. Suppose this Contradiction not capable of any solution by Protestants (as he af­firms) and I should submit to the infal­libility of the Church; can he assure me, that infallibility can make thirteen, four­teen? If it cannot, how am I nearer sa­tisfaction in this point, by acknowledg­ing the infallibility of the Church? The case is the very same, as to Mr S's. Ex­ception, if I owned oral Tradition, I should be never the nearer solving the seeming contradictions of Scripture, and consequently I could not in Reason con­clude it to be of God's enditing. So that in truth, these Exceptions if they were true, would not strike at Protestan­cy, but at Christian Religion; which is the general unhappiness of most of the Popish Arguments; than which there is no greater evidence, that the Church of Rome is not the true Mother, because she had rather Christianity should be destroyed, than it should appear that any other Church hath a claim to it. It was a work very proper for the Here­tick Marcion, to assault Religion this way; who, as Tertullian L. 1. contr. Marcion. tells us, writ a [Page 76] whole Book, which he call'd Antitheses, wherein he reckoned up all the Contra­dictions (as he thought) between the Old and New Testament: But methinks it is very improper for the Papists who pretend to be the only true Christians in the World, to strain their wits to disco­ver as many contradictions as they can in the Scripture, and to prove that there is no way of reconciling them: The natural consequence of which is, the exposing of this sacred Instrument of our Religion, and even Christianity it self, to the scorn of Atheists. There­fore, to be very plain with Mr. S. and Captain Everard, I am heartily sorry to see, that one of the chief fruits of their Conversion is to abuse the Bible.

§ 5. Secondly, He says P. 14. that Prote­stants cannot know how many the Books of Scripture ought to be, and which of the many controverted ones may be se­curely put in that Catalogue, which not; This he proves, by saying, 'tis most pal­pable, that few, or at least the rude vul­gar, can never be assured of it. And if this be a good Argument, this again is a good Answer, to say it is not most pal­pable. [Page 77] But I shall deal more liberally, and tell him, that we know that just so many ought to be received as uncontro­verted Books, concerning which, it can­not be shewn there was ever any Con­troversy; and so many as controverted, concerning which it appears that Que­stion hath been made: And if those which have been controverted, have been since received by those Churches which once doubted of them, there is now no further doubt concerning them, because the Controversy about them is at an end. And now I would fain know, what greater certainty oral Tradition can give us of the true Catalogue of the Books of Scripture. For it must either acknowledg some Books have been con­troverted, or not; if not, why doth he make a supposition of controverted Books? If oral Tradition acknowledg some to have been controverted, then it cannot assure us that they have not been controverted; nor consequently, that they ought to be received as never ha­ving been controverted; but only as such, concerning which those Churches who did once raise a Controversy about them, have been since satisfied that they [Page 78] are Canonical. The Traditionary Church now, receives the Epistle to the Hebrews as Canonical. I ask, Do they receive it as ever delivered for such? That they must, if they receive it from oral Tradi­tion, which conveys things to them un­der this notion, as ever delivered; and yet St. Hierom speaking, (not as a Spe­culator, but a Testifier) saith expresly of it, Com. in Esai. c. 6, &c. 8. That the custom of the Latin Church doth not receive it among the Canonical Scriptures. What saith Mr. S. to this? It is clear from this Testimony, that the Roman Church in St. Hierom's time, did not acknowledg this Epistle for Canoni­cal; and 'tis as plain, that the present Roman Church doth receive it for Ca­nonical. Where is then the infallibili­ty of oral Tradition? How does the living voice of the present Church as­sure us, that what Books are now re­ceived by her were ever received by her? And if it cannot do this, but the matter must come to be tried by the best Re­cords of former Ages, (which the Pro­testants are willing to have their Cata­logue tried by) then it seems the Pro­testants have a better way to know what Books are Canonical, than is the infal­lible [Page 79] way of oral Tradition; and so long as 'tis better, no matter though it be not called Infallible.

§ 6. Thirdly, He says P. 15. the Prote­stants cannot know, that the very Ori­ginal, or a perfectly true copy of these Books hath been preserved. It is not ne­cessary that they should know either of these, it is sufficient that they know, that those copies which rhey have, are not materially corrupted in any matter of Faith or Practice; and that they have sufficient assurance of this, I have already shewn. And how doth he prove the contrary? By his usual Argument, with saying it is manifestly impossible. But how do the Church of Rome know that they have perfectly true copies of the Scriptures, in the Original Languages? They do not pretend to know this, the learned men of that Church acknow­ledg the various Readings as well as we, and do not pretend to know otherwise than by probable conjecture, (as we also may do) which of those Readings is the true one. And why should it be more necessary for us to know this, than for them? If they think it reasonable to [Page 80] content themselves with knowing, that no material corruptions have crept into those Books, so may we. And that there have not, we know by better Argu­ments than oral Tradition, even by the assurance we have of God's vigilant pro­vidence; and from a moral impossibili­ty in the thing, that a Book so univer­sally dispersed, and translated into so ma­ny Languages, and constantly read in the Assemblies of Christians, should have been materially corrupted, so as that all those copies and translations should have agreed in those corruptions. And this reason St. Austin Ep. 48. gives of the preserva­tion of the Scriptures entire rather than any other Book. If Mr. S. likes it not, he may call St. Austin to account for it.

§ 7. Fourthly, He says P. 15., the Prote­stants, at least the rudest vulgar, can have no assurance that those Books are rightly translated, because they cannot be assured either of the ability or inte­grity of Translators.

Fifthly, Nor can they (says P. 16, 17. he) be assured, that the Transcribers, and Prin­ters, and Correctors of the Press have [Page 81] carefully and faithfully done their part, in Transcribing and Printing the several Copies and Translations of Scripture aright; Because, they only can have evidence of the right letter of Scripture, who stood at their elbows attentively watching they should not err in making it perfectly like a former Copy; and even then, why might they not mistrust their own eyes and aptness to oversee? I put these two Exceptions together, be­cause the same Answer will serve them both. The grounds of these Exceptions, if they have any, are these: That no man is to be trusted, either for his skill, or honesty. And, that it is dangerous for men to trust their own eyes. Unless both these be true, these Exceptions are of no force: For if we can be assured, that other men have sufficient skill in any thing which we our selves do not sufficiently understand, we may be as­sured, that those who translated the Bible had skill in the Original Languages; be­cause very credible persons tell us so; and we have no reason to doubt their testimony in this particular, more than in any other matter. So that if we can have sufficient assurance of mens in­tegrity [Page 82] in any thing, we have no reason to doubt of the skill of Translators, or Transcribers, or Printers. And if we can have no assurance of mens integrity in any thing, then no man can be assured that there was such a man as Henry the Eighth; and yet I hope the Church of Rome makes no doubt of it: Nor can any man be assured there is such a City as Rome, who hath not seen it; nay, if he have P. 16., why may he not mistrust his own eyes? And which is the saddest in­convenience of all, if no body be to be trusted, nor mens own eyes, (and for the same reason, sure not their ears) what becomes of the Infallibility of oral and practical Tradition? Which necessarily supposeth a competent understanding, a faithful memory, an honest mind, in the generality of those who delivered Christs Doctrine down to us: And by what means soever a man can be assured of these, by the same he may much more easily be assured of the ability and in­tegrity of Translators, Transcribers, and Printers. But above all, it supposeth that mens ears and eyes cannot deceive them in those things which they are taught, and see practised.

[Page 83]Is it not very pretty to see what piti­ful shifts men that serve an Hypothesis are put to? When to maintain Infalli­bility they are forced to run to the ex­tremities of Scepticism; and to defend the certainty of oral Tradition, (which depends upon the certainty of mens senses, and an assurance of the ability and integrity of those who were dead 1500 years before we were born) are glad to take refuge in Principles quite contrary; such as these, That we can have no assurance, but that whole Pro­fessions of men P. 16. might hap to be Knaves; that we can have no sufficient evidence that any man made his Copy perfectly like the former, unless P. 16. we stood at his elbow, attentively watching him: Nay, and if we did so, we have still reason to distrust our senses. In short, all human Faith supposeth honesty among men; and that for matters of Fact, and plain objects of Sense, the general and uncon­trolled testimony of mankind is to be credited; and for matters of peculiar skill and knowledg, that the generality of those who are accounted skilful in that kind, are to be relied upon: For, as Aristotle well observes, there is no [Page 84] greater sign of an undisciplin'd wit (or, to use one of Mr. S's. fine phrases Preface., of a man not acquainted with the paths of Science) than to expect greater evidence for things than they are capable of. Eve­ry man hath reason to be assured of a thing which is capable of sufficient evi­dence, when he hath as much evidence for it as the nature of that thing will bear, and as the capacity he is in will permit him to have. And, as Mr. White says well Answ. to the Lord Falkland. P. 33. Satisfaction is to be given to every one according to his capacity; it is sufficient for a Child to believe his Parents; for a Clown to believe his Preacher. And this is universally true in all cases, where we have not better or equal evidence to the contrary. But such is the unhappiness of the Popish Doctrines, that if people were permitted the free use of the Scripture, they would easily discern them to have no probable foundation in it, and some of them to be plainly contrary to it; so that it can­not be safe for their Preachers to tell the people that the Scripture is the only Rule of Faith, lest they should find cause not to believe them, when they teach Doctrines so plainly contrary to that Rule.

[Page 85]§ 8. Lastly, He says P. 17., the Protestants cannot be certain of the true sense of Scripture. Does he mean of plain Texts, or obscure ones? Of the true sense of plain Texts, I hope every one may be certain; and for obscure ones, it is not necessary every one should. But it may be there are no plain Texts in the Scrip­tures; then the reason of it must be (till Mr. S. can shew a better) either be­cause it is impossible for any one to write plainly; or because God can­not write so plainly as men; or be­cause we have good reason to think that he would not write things necessary for every one to believe, so as men might clearly understand him.

But he tells us P. 17., The numerous Com­ments upon Scripture are an evidence that no man can be certain of the true sense of it. I hope not; for if those numerous Commentators do generally agree in the sense of plain Texts (as 'tis certain they do) then this Argument signifies nothing as to such Texts: And as for those which are obscure, let Com­mentators differ about them as much as they please, so long as all necessary [Page 86] Points of Faith and matters of Practice are delivered in plain Texts. He adds P. 17., There are infinite disputes about the sense of Scripture, even in most concerning Points, as in that of Christ's Divinity. But are not Commentators, both Prote­stant and Popish, generally agreed about the sense of Scripture in that Point? And what if some out of prejudice do mistake, or out of perverseness do wrest the plainest Texts of Scripture for the Divinity of Christ, to another sense? Is this any argument that those Texts are not sufficiently plain? Can any thing be spoken or written in words so clear from ambiguity, which a perverse or preju­diced mind shall not be able to vex and force to another meaning. God did not write the Scriptures for the froward and the captious, but for those who will read them with a free and unprejudiced mind, and are willing to come to the knowledg of the Truth. If Mr. S. had been conversant in the writings of the Fathers, he could not but have taken notice with what confidence they at­tempt to prove the Divinity of Christ out of Scripture, as if that did afford convincing arguments for this purpose. [Page 87] St. Chrysostom Hom. 32 de Consubstant. professes to demon­strate out of Scripture, That the Son is of the same substance with the Father; and relies upon Scripture alone for this, without mentioning any other kind of Argument. So that it seems, St. Chryso­stom was not acquainted with the insuf­ficiency of Scripture for the convicti­on of Hereticks in this Point; and that he was either ignorant of the ( infallible) way of Demonstrating this point from Oral Tradition, or had no great opinion of it. The same Father elsewhere Hom. 7 de Sanctc Phoca., arguing against Hereticks about the Divinity of Christ, says, That they pervert the Scriptures, to strengthen their Heresie from thence. But then he does not (with Mr. S.) blame the Scripture, and say that this Doctrine is not there deliver'd with sufficient clearness; but contrarywise he says, That the Scripture is clear enough, but the corrupt minds of Hereticks will not see what is there contain'd. Had St. Chrysostom been a true Son of the Tra­ditionary Church, he would have lain hold of this occasion, to vilifie the Scrip­tures, and to shew the necessity of re­gulating our faith not by such uncer­tain [Page 86] [...] [Page 87] [...] [Page 88] Records, but by the infallible Re­ports of Oral Tradition.

§ 9. But because Mr. S. lays great weight (in several parts of his Book) upon this Exception against Scripture, viz. That Protestants cannot be certain of the true sense of it: Therefore I shall not content my self, only to have shewn that we may be sufficiently cer­tain of the sense of Scripture, so far as to understand all necessary matters of Faith and Practice, and that more than this is not necessary; but shall likewise return this Exception upon him by en­quiring into these two things.

1. How the Traditionary Church can be more certain of the true sense of Scripture, than the Protestants?

2. How they can be more certain of the true sense of Tradition, than Pro­testants of the true sense of Scripture?

1. How the Traditionary Church can be more certain of the true sense of Scripture, than Protestants? They pre­tend to have an Oral Tradition of the true sense of it, delivered down from Father to Son. But this only reacheth to those Texts, which are coincident with the main body of Christian Do­ctrine; [Page 89] as for all other parts of Scrip­ture, they are as useless to Papists, as they suppose they are to us; because wanting the help of Oral Tradition, they cannot be certain of one tittle of them. And as for those Texts, the sense whereof is conveyed down by Oral Tradition; this sense is, I hope, deliver­ed in some words or other; And have all Preachers, and Fathers, and Mothers, and Nurses, the faculty of delivering this sense in words so plain as cannot possibly be mistaken or wrested to ano­ther sense? I am sorry that when every one hath this faculty of speaking their thoughts plainly, the Holy Ghost should be represented as not able to convey his mind to men in intelligible words. And does not his own Objection re­bound upon himself? If the Church have a certain sense of Scripture orally delivered, whence are the numerous Comments of the Fathers upon it and of later Writers in their Church, and the infinite Disputes about the sense of it, in the most concerning Points? viz. The efficacy of Gods grace, the Suprema­cy of St. Peter. the infallibility of a Pope and Council by immediate assistance of [Page 90] the Holy Ghost? What a stir is made about the sense of Dabo tibi Claves, Tu es Petrus, & super hanc Petram, &c. Pasce oves? Do not they differ about the mean­ing of these Texts among themselves, as much as they do from the Fathers, and from the Protestants? Some under­standing them of St Peters Supremacy only; others of his infallibility; others of his infallibility only in and with a general Council; which yet others do not allow to Pope or Council, from any immediate assistance, but only from the rational force of Tradition, supposing that the Pope and Council hold to it. If oral Tradition have brought down a certain sense of these Texts, why do they not produce it, and agree in it? If it have not (to use a hot phrase of his own P. 17.) 'tis perfect phrenzy to say they can be certain of the true sense of Scrip­ture.

If he say, they are by Tradition made certain of the true sense of Scripture, so far as it concerns the main body of Christian Doctrine, and do all agree in it, and that is suffcient; then I ask him, What are those points of Faith which make up the body of Christian [Page 91] Doctrine? He will tell me, they are those which all Catholicks agree to have descended to them from the Apostles by a constant and uninterrupted Tradi­tion. I enquire farther, how I shall know what is the certain sense of Scrip­ture so far as it concerns these points? He must answer as before, that that is the true sense which all Catholicks agree to have descended to them by Tradi­tion. Which amounts to this, that all Catholicks do agree in the sense of Scripture so far as they do all agree in it. It is to be hoped, that the Prote­stants (how much soever at present they differ about the sense of Scripture) may in time come to as good an agreement as this. This brings to my remem­brance a passage or two of Mr. Cressy; the one in his Appendix Exomo­log. 2 d. E­dit. p. 554., where he tells us, That as it is impossible that He­reticks should agree any other way than in Faction; so it is impossible that Catho­licks should differ in points of Faith. Why so? Were not those Catholicks first, who afterwards became Hereticks; and when they became so, did they not differ in points of Belief? Yes; but here lies the conceit, when they began to [Page 92] differ, then they ceas'd to be Catholicks; therefore Catholicks can never differ in points of Faith. The other passage is where he says Exomo­log. c. 53. Sect. 2., That he hath forsaken a Church where Vnity was impossible, &c. and betaken himself to a Church where Schism is impossible. This last Clause, That Schism is impossible in their Church, cannot possibly be true but in the same absurd and ludicrous sense, in which it is impossible for Catholicks to differ in points of Belief. For he cannot deny, but that it is possible for men to break off from the Communion of their Church, which in his sense is Schism; but here is the subtilty of it, No Schis­matick is of their Church, because so soon as he is a Schismatick he is out of it; therefore Schism is impossible in their Church. And is it not as impossible in the Church of England? Where Mr. Cr. might have done well to have continued, till he could have given a better reason of forsaking Her.

§ 10. But to return to our purpose. Mr. Rushworth Dial. 2. Sect. 12. acknowledgeth, that the Scripture is of it self sufficiently plain, as to matters of practice; for he [Page 93] asks, Who is so blind, as not to see that these things are to be found in Scripture by a sensible, common, and discreet reading of it; though perhaps by a rigorous and exact balancing of every particular word and syllable, any of these things would vanish away we know not how? So that for the direction of our lives and actions, he confesseth the Scripture to be sufficiently plain, if men will but read it sensibly and discreetly; and ( he sayes) that he is blind that does not see this. But who so blind as he that will not see, that the sense of Scripture is as plain in all necessary points of Faith? I am sure St. Austin makes no difference, when he tells us De Doctr. Christ. L. 2., That in those things which are plainly set down in Scrip­ture, we may find all those things in which Faith and Manners of life are comprehended. And why cannot men, in reference to matters of Faith as well as of Practice, read the Scriptures sen­sibly and discreetly without such a ri­gorous balancing of every word and syl­lable as will make the sense vanish away we know not how? If the Scrip­ture be but sufficiently plain to such as will use it sensibly and discreetly, I do [Page 94] not understand what greater plainness can be desir'd in a Rule: Nor can I imagine what kind of Rule it must be that can be unexceptionably plain to captious Cavillers, and such as are bent to play the fool with it.

Well, suppose the Scripture be not sufficiently clear as to matters of Faith; and hereupon I have recourse to the Church for the true sense of Scripture: Must I believe the Churches sense to be the true sense of such a Text, though I see it to be plainly contrary to the ge­nuine sense of the words; yes, that I must, or else I make my self and not the Church judg of the sense of Scripture, which is the grand Heresie of the Pro­testants. But then I must not suppose, much less belive, that the Churches sense of such a Text is contrary to the genuine meaning of it; no, although I plainly see it to be so: This is hard again on the other hand; especially if that be true which is acknowledged both by Dr. Holden, and Mr. Cressy, viz. That though general Councils cannot mistake in the Points of Faith which they decree, yet they may mistake in the confirmation of them from Texts of [Page 95] Scripture, that is, they may be mistaken about the sense of those Texts. And if Mr. S. think his Brethren have gran­ted too much, he may see this exempli­fied in the second Council of Nice (to mention no other) which to establish their Doctrine of Image-worship, does so palpably abuse and wrest Texts of Scripture, that I can hardly believe that any Papist in the World hath the fore­head to own that for the true sense of those Texts which is there given by those Fathers.

§ 11. Secondly, How the Traditio­nary Church can be more certain of the true sense of their Traditional Doctrines, than the Protestants can be of the true sense of Scripture? And this is worthy our enquiry, because if the business be search'd to the bottom, it will appear (besides all other inconveniences, which oral Tradition is much more liable to than Scripture) that the certain sense and meaning of Traditional Doctrine is as hard to come at as the sense of Scrip­ture. And this I will make appear by necessary consequence from their own Concessions. Mr. White, and Mr. S. say [Page 96] that the great security of Tradition is this, that it is not tied to certain phrases, and set-forms of expression, but the same sense is conveyed and setled in mens hearts by various expressions. But ac­cording to Mr. Rushworth, this renders Tradition's sense uncertain; for he says Dial. 2. Sect. 6., 'Tis impossible to put fully, and beyond all quarrel, the same sense in di­vers words. So that if men do not re­ceive Tradition in a sensible, common, discreet way (as Mr. Rushw. speaks con­cerning reading the Scriptures) but will come to a rigorous and exact balancing of every particular phrase, word, and syllable, the sense of Tradition will be in the very same danger of uncertainty, and be liable to vanish we know not how. Dr. Holden Analys. Fidei. L. 1. c. 9. lays down these two Principles. First, That no truth can be conveyed down from man to man but by speech; and speech cannot be but by words; and all words are either equi­vocal in themselves, or liable to be dif­ferently understood by several persons. Secondly, That such is the frame of mans mind, that the same truths may be differently apprehended and understood by different persons. And if this be [Page 97] true, then Traditional Doctrines, if they be deliverd by speech and words, will be liable to uncertainties and ambiguities as to their sense, as well as Scripture. Mr. Cressy Append. c. 6. tells us, That Reason and Experience shews, that differences will arise even about the Writings of the Fathers, and any thing but the Testimony of the present Church. If this be true, Tradition wholly falls into uncertain­ty. For if difference will arise about the Writings of the Fathers how they are to be interpreted, I suppose the Writings of Councils will be liable to the same inconvenience: And if the whole present Church cannot declare her sense of any Traditional Doctrine otherwise than by a Council, (unless with the Jesuites they will epitomize the Church into the Pope), and the Decrees of a Council cannot be univer­sally dispers'd (or at least never use to be) but by Writing: And if Differences will arise about the interpretation of that Writing, as well as any other; then this present infallible Authority (which Mr. Cressy magnifies so much for ending Differences) leaves all Controversies ari­sing [Page 98] about the sense of Tradition, as indeterminable as ever; and they must for ever remain so, till general Councils have got the knack of penning their Decrees in words which will so infalli­bly express their meaning to the most captious Caviller, that no difference can possibly arise about the interpretation of them; or else (which will be more suita­ble to this wise Hypothesis) till general Councils (being convinc'd by Mr. S's De­monstrations) shall come to understand themselves so well, as not to entrust their Decrees any more to the uncertain way of Writing, but for the future to communicate them to the World by the infallible way of oral Tradition. And to mention no more, Mr Knott Answ. to Chilling. c▪ 2. Sect. 6., (who agrees with the other thus far, that the certain sense of Scripture is only to be had from the Church) speaks to this pur­pose, That before we can be certain that this is the sense of such a Text, we must either be certain that this Text is capa­ble of no other sense, as Figurative, My­stical, or Moral; or if it be, we must have some certain and infallible means to know in which of them it is taken, [Page 99] which can be known only by revelation. If this be true, then by a fair parity of reason, before I can be certain that this is the sense of a Doctrinal Tradition de­livered down to me, I must either be certain that the words, in which this Tradition was expressed when it was delivered to me, are capable of no other sense (as Figurative, Mystical, or Moral) besides that in which I understood them; or if they be (as certainly they will be) capable of any of these other senses, then must I have some certain and infal­lible means whereby to know in which of these they are taken: And this can no more be known without a revela­tion, than which is the true sense of such a Text of Scripture. If it be said, that the sense of a Traditional Doctrine may by different expressions be still fur­ther and further explained to me till I come certainly to understand the sense of it; this will not help the matter: For if these kind of cavils be good, that a man cannot be certain of the meaning of any words, till he can by an infallible argument demonstrate either that they cannot be taken, or that they [Page 100] are not taken in any other sense; I say, if this cavil will hold, then every new expression whereby any one shall endea­vor to explain any Traditional Do­ctrine, is liable to the same inconveni­ence which those words in which it was first delivered to me were liable to. From all which it is evident, that the Traditionary Church can be no more certain of the sense of their Traditional Doctrines, than Protestants may be of the sense of Scripture.

§ 12. These are his Exceptions con­tained in his second Discourse; and of what force they are, hath been examined. But because he foresaw that it might be replied that these defects might in part be provided against by History, by the Providence of God, by Testimonies of Councils and Fathers, and by the suffici­ent clearness of Scripture as to Funda­mentals; He endeavors to shew that these signifie little to this purpose.

First, Not History P. 17, 18.; because few are skilled in History, and they that are not, cannot safely rely upon those that are skill'd, unless they knew certainly that [Page 101] the Historians whom they rely on had secure grounds, and not bare hear-say for what they writ, and that they were not contradicted by others either extant, or perished. How much credit is to be given to uncontrolled History by the learned, and how much by the vulgar to men of skill, I have already shewn. I shall only add now, that if this reason­ing be true, it is impossible for any man to be certain by History of any ancient matter of Fact, as namely that there were such persons as Julius Caesar, and William the Conqueror, and that they invaded and conquered England, be­cause (according to him) we cannot know certainly that the Historians, who relate these things, and upon whose au­thority we rely, had secure grounds, and not bare hear-say for what they writ: And that they were not contradicted by others either extant or perished, is, I am sure, impossible for any man to know: For who can tell now what was con­tained in those Books which are perish­ed? So that if this be requisite, to make every Historical Relation credible, to know certainly that it was not contra­dicted [Page 102] by any of those Books which we do not know what they were, nor what was in them, we can have no cer­tainty of any ancient Fact or History; for who knows certainly that some Books that are perished did not contra­dict whatever is written in Books that are extant? Nay, if this reasoning hold, we can have no certainty of any thing conveyed by oral Tradition. For what though the Priest tell me this was the Doctrine of Christ delivered to him? unless I know that all others agree with him in this Tradition, I cannot rely up­on his testimony: Nor then neither in Mr. Knott's Answ. to Chilling. c. 1. Sect. 33. opinion, because the testi­mony of Preachers or Pastors is human and fallible; unless (according to his Jargon) a conclusion, deduced from Pre­mises, one of which is only probable, may be sufficient to bring our under­standing to an infallible act of Faith, viz. if such a conclusion be taken Speci­ficative; whereas, if it be taken Redu­plicative, as it is a conclusion, it can on­ly beget a probable assent; which is to say, that considered barely as a conclu­sion, and so far as in reason it can de­serve [Page 103] assent, it is only probable; but considered as it serves an Hypothesis, and is convenient to be believed with reason or without, so it is infallible. But to carry the supposition further, put the case, that the whole present Age assem­bled in a general Council, should declare that such a Point was delivered to them: yet (according to Mr. S.) we cannot safely rely upon this, unless we knew certainly, that those whom they relied on had secure grounds, and not bare hear-say for what they delivered, and that they were not contradicted within the space of 1500 years by any of those that are dead; which it is impossible for any one now to know.

But to shew how inconsistent he is with himself in these matters, I will pre­sent the Reader with a passage or two in another part of his Book; where he endeavors to prove that men may safely rely on a general and uncontrolled Tra­dition. He tells us P. 49., That the com­mon course of human Conversation makes it a madness not to believe great multitudes of knowers, if no pos­sible considerations can awaken in our [Page 104] reason a doubt that they conspire to de­ceive us. And a little after Ibid., Nor can any, unless their brains rove wildly, or be unsetled even to the degree of mad­ness, suspect deceit where such multitudes agree unanimously in a matter of Fact. Now if men be but supposed to write, as well as to speak, what they know, and to agree in their Writings about matter of Fact; then it will be the same mad­ness not to believe multitudes of Histo­rians, where no possible consideration can awaken in our reason a doubt that they have conspired to deceive us; and mens brains must rove wildly and be unsetled even to the degree of phrenzy, who sus­pect deceit where such multitudes una­nimously agree in a matter of Fact. And this seems to me to be the great unhap­piness of Mr. S's Demonstrations, that they proceed upon conrtadictory Prin­ciples; so that in order to the demon­strating of thc uncertainty of Books and Writings, he must supopse all those Principles to be uncertain, which he takes to be self-evident and unquestion­able when he is to demonstrate thc In­fallibility of Oral Tradition.

[Page 105]§. 13. Secondly, He tells us P. 18., the Pro­vidence of God is no security against those contingencies the Scriptures are subject to; because we cannot be cer­tain of the Divine Providence or assi­stance to his Church, but by the Letter of Scripture; therefore that must first be proved certain, before we mention the Church, or Gods assistance to her. As if we pretended there were any promise in Scripture that God would preserve the Letter of it entire and uncorrup­ted, or as if we could not otherwise be assured of it; as if the light of natural Reason could not assure us of Gods Providence in general, and of his more especial care of those things which are of greatest concernment to us, such as this is, That a Book containing the me­thod and the terms of Salvation should be preserved from any material corrup­tion. He might as well have said, That without the Letter of Scripture we can­not know that there is a God,

§. 14, Thirdly, Nor (says he P 18, 19.) can Testimonies of Councils and Fathers be sufficient Interpreters of Scripture. We [Page 106] do not say they are. Our Principle is, That the Scripture doth sufficiently in­terpret it self, that is, is plain to all ca­pacities, in things necessary to be belie­ved and practised. And the general consent of Fathers in this doctrine of the sufficient plainness of Scripture (which I shall afterwards shew) is a good evi­dence against them. As for obscure and more doubtful Texts, we acknowledge the Comments of the Fathers to be a good help, but no certain Rule of in­terpretation. And that the Papists think so, as well as we, is plain; inasmuch as they acknowledge the Fathers to differ among themselves in the interpretation of several Texts: And nothing is more familiar in all Popish Commentators, than to differ from the ancient Fathers about the sense of Scripture. And as for Councils. Dr. Holden, and Mr. Cressy (as I said before) do not think it ne­cessary to believe that alwayes to be the true sense of Texts which Councils give of them, when they bring them to confirm Points of Faith. Nay, if any Controversie arise about the sense of a­ny Text of Scripture, it is impossible [Page 107] (according to Mr. Rushworth's Princi­ples) for a Council to decide either that, or any other Controversie: for he Dial. 2. Sect. 8. makes it his business to prove, That Controversies cannot be decided by words; and if this be so, then they can­not be decided at all, unless he can prove that they may be decided with­out words, and consequently that Coun­cils may do their work best in the Qua­kers way, by silent Meetings.

§. 15. Fourthly, Nor can (says he P. 20, 21.) the clearness of Scripture as to Funda­mentals, be any help against these de­fects. Why not?

First, Because a certain Catalogue of Fundamentals was never given and a­greed to by sufficient Authority, and yet without this all goes to wrack. I hope not, so long as we are sure that God would make nothing necessary to be believed but what he hath made plain; and so long as men do believe all things that are plainly revealed (which is every ones fault if he do not) men may do well enough without a precise Cata­logue. But suppose we say, That the [Page 108] Articles of the Apostles Creed contain all necessary matters of simple belief, what hath Mr. S. to say against this? I am sure the Roman Catechism, set forth by the Decree of the Council of Trent, says Praefat. as much as this comes to, viz. That the Apostles having received a command to preach the Gospel to every creature, thought fit to compose a form of Christian Faith, namely to this end, that they might all think and speak the same things, and that there might be no Schisms among those whom they had called to the unity of Faith, but that they might all be perfect in the same sense, and the same opinion: And this Profession of the Christian Faith and Hope, so fram'd by them, the Apostles called the Symbole or Creed. Now how this end, of bringing men to unity of Faith, and making them perfectly of the same sense and opinion, could proba­bly be attained by means of the Creed, if it did not contain all necessary Points of simple belief, I can by no means un­derstand. Besides, a certain catalogue of Fundamentals is as necessary for them as for us; and when Mr. S, gives [Page 109] in his, ours is ready. Mr. Chilling­worth had a great desire to have seen Mr. Knott's catalogue of Fundamentals, and challenged him to produce it, and offered him very fairly, that when ever he might with one hand receive his, he would with the other deliver his own: But Mr. Knott, though he still persisted in the same demand, could never be pre­vailed with to bring forth his own, but kept it for a secret to his dying day. But to put a final stop to this Canting demand of a Catalogue of Fundamentals (which yet I perceive I shall never be able to do, because it is one of those expletive Topicks which Popish Writers, especialy those of the lowest Form, do generally make use of to help out a Book) however to do what I can towards the stopping of it, I desire Mr. S. to an­swer the reasons whereby his Friend Dr. Holden Analys. Fid. L. 1. c. 4. shews the unreasonableness of this demand, and likewise endeavours to prove that such a Catalogue would not only be useless and pernicious if it could be given, but that it is manifestly impossi­ble to give such a precise Catalogue.

Secondly, He asks P. 21., Is it a Funda­mental [Page 110] that Christ is God? If so, Whether this be clearer in Scripture, than that Gad hath hands, feet, &c? To which I answer by another question; Is it clear that there are Figures in Scripture, and that many things are spoken after the manner of men, and by way of conde­scension and accomodation to our capa­cities; and that custom and common sense teacheth men to distinguish be­tween things figuratively and properly spoken? If so, why cannot every one easily understand, that when the Scrip­ture saith God hath hands and feet, and that Christ is the Vine and the Door, these are not to be taken properly, as we take this Proposition, that Christ is God, in which no man hath any reason to suspect a Figure? When Mr. S. tells us, That he percheth upon the specifical na­ture of things, would it not offend him, if any one should be so silly as to con­clude from hence that Mr. S. believed himself to be a Bird, and nature a Perch? And yet not only the Sciptures, but all sober Writers are free from such forc't and phantastical Metaphors.

I remember that Origen L. 4. taxeth Celsus his wilful [Page 111] Ignorance in finding fault with the Scriptures, for attributing to God hu­mane affections, as anger, &c. and tells him, ‘that any one who had a mind to understand the Scriptures, might easily see, that such expressions were ac­comodated to us, and accordingly to be understood; and that no man, that will but compare these expressions with other passages of Scripture, need to fail of the true sense of them.’ But (ac­cording to Mr. S.) Origen was to blame to find fault with Celsus for thinking that the Scripture did really attribute humane affections to God; for how could he think otherwise, when the most funda­mental Point is not clearer in Scripture, than that God hath hands, feet, &c? How could Origen in reason expect from Celsus (though never so great a Philosopher) that he should be able without the help of Oral Tradition, to distinguish between what is spoken lite­rally, and what by a certain Scheme of speech? Theodoret Haeret. Fabul. l. 4. tells us of one Au­daeus, who held that God had a hu­mane shape, and bodily members; but he does not say that the reason of this Er­ror [Page 112] was, because he made Scripture the Rule of his Faith, but expresly because he was a fool, and did foolishly under­stand those things which the Divine Scrip­tures speak by way of Condescension. So that although Mr. S. is pleas'd to make this wise Objection, yet it seems, (ac­cording to Theodoret) that men do not mistake such Texts, either for want of oral Tradition, or of sufficient clear­ness in the Scriptures, but for want of common reason and sense. And if Mr. S. know of any Rule of Faith that is secure from all possibility of being mis­taken by foolish and perverse men, I would be glad to be acquainted with it.

SECT. IV.

§. 1. IN his next Discourse he endea­vours to shew, That Scripture is a sufficient Rule to the Un­learned, and to the most Rational doub­ters. that unlearned Persons cannot be justified as acting ra­tionally in receiving the Scripture for the Word of God, and relying upon it as a certain Rule; because they are not capable of satisfaction concerning these matters. But I have already shewn that they are, and shall not repeat the same over again. And whereas he says P. 24., That several Professions all pretend to Scripture, and yet differ, and damn, and persecute one another about these differences; the answer is easie: That they all pretend to Scripture, is an argument that they all ac­knowledg it to be the Word of God, and the Rule of Faith; and that they are generally agreed about the sense of those plain Texts which contain the funda­mental Points of Faith is evident, in that those several Professions acknow­ledg the Articles contained in the A­postles Creed to be sufficiently deli­vered in Scripture: And if any Profes­sions differ about the meaning of plain Texts, that is not an argument that [Page 114] plain Texts are obsure, but that some men are perverse. And if those Pro­fessions damn and persecute one ano­ther about the meaning of obscure Texts, the Scripture is not in fault, but those that do so.

§. 2. And whereas he pretends P. 25.26, 27., That the Scripture is not able to satisfie Scep­tical dissenters, and Rational doubters, because nothing under a demonstration can satisfie such persons so well concerning the incorruptedness of Originals, the faith­fulness of Translations, &c. but that searching and sincere Wits may still main­tain their ground of suspence with A Might it not be otherwise? This hath been answered already: partly, by shew­ing that the Scripture was not intended to satisfie Scepticks, and that a Demon­stration is not sufficient to give satisfa­ction to them; and partly, by shewing that Rational doubters may have as much satisfaction concerning those mat­ters, as the nature of the things will bear; and he is not a Rational doubter that desires more.

But that he may see the unreasonable­ness of this Discourse, I shall briefly shew him, That all Mankind do in mat­ters [Page 115] of this nature accept of such evi­dence as falls short of Demonstration; and that his great Friends and Masters from whom he hath taken the main grounds of his Book (though he ma­nageth them to less advantage) do fre­quently acknowledg, that it is reasona­ble for men to acquiesce in such assu­rance as falls short of Infallibility, and such evidence as is less than Demon­stration. Do not mankind think them­selves sufficiently assured of the Anti­quity and Authors of several Books, for which they have not Demonstrative evidence? Doth not Aristotle say, that things of a moral and civil nature, and matters of Fact done long ago, are inca­pable of Demonstration; and that it is madness to expect it for things of this Nature? Are there no passages in Books so plain, that a man may be sufficiently satisfied that this and no other is the certain sense of them? If there be none, can any thing be spoken in plainer words than it may be written? If it cannot, how can we be satisfied of the certain sense of any Doctrine Orally delivered? And if we cannot be so satisfi'd, where's the certainty of Oral [Page 116] Tradition? But if Books may be writ­ten so plainly, as that we may be abun­dantly satisfied that this is the certain sense of such and such passages; then we may reasonably rest satisfied in evi­dence for these matters short of De­monstration. For was ever the sense of any words so plain as that there did not remain this ground of suspence, that those words might be capable of ano­ther sense. Mr. Rushworth Dial. 2. Sect. 7. says, That disputative Scholars do find means daily to explicate the plainest words of an Au­thour to a quitc different sense: And that the World might be furnish't with an advantagious instance of the possibi­lity of this, Raynaudus De bonis & malis Libris. (a Writer of their own) hath made a wanton expe­riment upon the Apostles Creed, and by a sinister (but possible) interpreta­tion, hath made every Article of it Here­sie and Blasphemy, on purpose to shew that the plainest words are not free from ambiguity. But may be Mr. S. can out-do the Apostles, and can deliver the Christian Doctrine so clearly, that he can demonstrate it impossible for any man to put any other sense upon any of his words than that which he inten­ded. [Page 117] I do not know what may be done, but if Mr. S. doth this, he must both mend his style, and his way of Demon­stration.

Is Mr. S. sufficiently assured that there is such a part of the World as America? and can he demonstrate this to any man, without carrying him thi­ther? Can he shew by any necessary Ar­gument, that it is naturally impossible that all the Relations concerning that place should be false? When his De­monstrations have done their utmost, cannot P. 27. a searching and sincere Wit at least maintain his ground of suspence with A Might it not be otherwise? and with an, Is it not possible that all men may be Lyars, or that a company of Travellers may have made use of their Priviledg to abuse the World by false Reports, and to put a Trick upon Man­kind? or that all those that pretend to go thither, and bring their Commodities from thence, may go to some other Parts of the World, and taking pleasure in abusing others, in the same manner as they have been imposed upon themselves, may say they have been at America? Who can tell but all this may be so? and yet [Page 118] I suppose, notwithstanding the possibi­lity of this, no man in his Wits is now possessed with so incredible a folly as to doubt whether there be such a place. The case is the very same as to the certainty of an ancient Book and of the sense of plain expressions: We have no demon­stration for these things, and we expect none; because we know the things are not capable of it. We are not infallibly certain, that any Book is so ancient as it pretends to be, or that it was written by him whose name it bears, or that this is the sense of such and such passages in it, it is possible all this may be otherwise; that is, it implies no contradiction: But we are very well assured that it is not; nor hath any prudent man any just cause to make the least doubt of it. For a bare possibility that a thing may be, or not be, is no just cause of doubting whether a thing be or not. It is possible all the peo­ple in France may dye this night, but I hope the possibility of this doth not en­cline any man in the least to think it will be so. It is possible the Sun may not rise to morrow morning, and yet for all this I suppose that no man hath the least doubt but that it will.

[Page 119]§. 3. But because this Principle, viz. That in matters of Religion a man can­not be reasonably satisfy'd with any thing less than that infallible assurance which is wrought by Demonstration, is the main Pillar of Mr. S's Book; therefore, be­side what hath been already said to shew the unreasonableness of this Prin­ciple, I shall take a little pains to mani­fest to him how much he is contradicted in this by the chief of his Brethren of the Tradition, viz. Mr. Rushworth, Dr. Holden, Mr. Cressy, and Mr. White, who besides Mr. S. and one I. B. are (so far as I can learn) all the publick Patrons that ever this Hypothesis of Oral Tra­dition hath had in the World; and if Mr. White (as I have reason to believe) was the Authour of those Dialogues which pass under Rushworth's name, the number of them is yet less. Now if I can shew that this Principle (esteem'd by Mr. S. so fundamental to this Hypo­thesis) is plainly contradicted by the principal Assertors of Oral Tradstion, I shall hereby gain one of these two things; either that these great Patrons of Oral Tradition were ignorant of the true foundation of their own Hy­thesis, [Page 120] or that this Principle is not ne­cessary for the support of it. Not that I would be so understood as if I did deny that these very Persons do sometimes speak very big words of the necessity of Infallibility: But if it be their pleasure to contradict themselves, as I have no reason to be displeased, so neither to be concerned for it; but shall leave it to Mr. S. to reconcile them first to them­selves, and then (if he pleases) afterwards to himself.

§. 4. I begin with Mr. Rushworth of immortal memory, for that noble at­tempt of his to perswade the World that notwithstanding he was the first Inventer of this Hypothesis of Oral Tradition, yet he could prove that the Church had in all Ages owned it, and proceeded upon it as her only Rule of Faith. He in his third Dialogue Sect. 3. & 4., when his Nephew objects to him, That perhaps a Protestant would say that all his fore­going Discourse was but probability and and likelyhood, and therefore to hazard a mans Estate upon Peradventures, were something hard, and not very rationally done: Replies thus to him, What security do your Merchants, your States-men, your [Page 121] Souldiers, those that go to Law, nay, even those that Till your grounds and work for their livings, what security, I say, do all these go upon? Is it greater than the security which these grounds af­ford? surely no. And yet no man esteems them foolish. All humane Affairs are hazardous, and have some adventure in them. And therefore who requires evi­dent certainty only in matters of Reli­gion, discovers in himself a less mind to the Goods promised in the next life, than to these which he seeks here in this World upon weaker assurance. Howsoever, the greatest evidence that can be to him that is not capable of convincing Demonstra­tions (which the greatest part of Man­kind fall short of) is but conjectural. So that (according to Mr. Rushworth) it is not reason and discretion, but want of love to God and Religion, which makes men require greater evidence for matters of Religion, than for Hu­mane Affairs, which yet (he tells us) are hazardous, and have some adven­ture in them, and consequently are not capable of Demonstration. Besides, if demonstrative evidence be an essen­tial Property of the Rule of Faith (as [Page 122] Mr. S. affirms) then this Rule cannot (according to Mr. Rushworth) be of any use to the greatest part of Mankind, because they are not capable of convin­cing Demonstrations. Again, Do but consider (says he Ibid. Sect. 6.) how unequal and unjust a condition it is, that the claim of the present Church shall not be heard, unless she can confute all the Peradven­tures that Wit may invent, and solve all the Arguments which the infinite vari­ety of time, place, and occasions may have given way unto; and then you will see how unreasonable an Adversary he is, who will not be content with any satis­faction, but such as mans nature scarcely affords. And is it not equally unjust in Mr. S. not to let Scripture's claim be heard, unless we can confute every Per­adventure [and might it not be other­wise] that Wit may invent? See then how unreasonable an Adversary Mr. S. is, who will not be content with any satis­faction, but such as (according to Mr. Rushworth) mans nature scarcely af­fords.

Dr. Holden (I confess) states the matter somewhat cautiously, when he tells us L. 1. c. 1., That it shall suffice for present [Page 123] to determine, that the Wisdom of the Cre­ator hath afforded us such an assurance, especially of Truths necessary to Salva­tion, as is sutable to our nature, and best fitted for the safe conduct of our lives in Moral and Religious Affairs: But if we interpret these general expressions by the passages I before cited out of Mr. Rushworth (as in reason we may, since the Doctor is beholding to him for the best part of his Book) then nothing can make more against Mr. S's Principle.

§. 5. Mr. Cressy in his Exomologesis C. 19. Sect. 5. says, That such Teachers, as approached nearest to the fountain of Truth, Christ and his Apostles, had means of inform­ing themselves in Apostolical Tradition incomparably beyond us. Mr. S. may do well to shew what those means were which are so incomparably beyond his Infallibility and Demonstration. The same Author C. 32. Sect. 4. does very much applaud Stapleton's determination of the questi­on concerning the Churches Infallibili­ty, which is as follows, That the Church does not expect to be taught by God im­mediately by new Revelations, but makes use of several means, &c. as being go­vern'd not by Apostles, &c. but by ordi­nary [Page 124] Pastors and Teachers. That these Pastors in making use of these several means of Decision, proceed not as the Apostles did, with a peculiar infallible direction of the Holy Spirit, but with a prudential collection not always necessa­ry. That to the Apostles who were the first Masters of Evangelical Faith, and founders of the Church, such an infallible certitude of means was necessary: not so now to the Church, &c. If this be true, That an infallible certitude of means is not now necessary to the Church, and that her Pastors do now in deciding matters of Faith proceed only with a prudent collection not always necessa­ry; then it should seem that a searching Wit may maintain his ground of sus­pence, even against their Church also, with A Might it not be otherwise? Again, Mr. Cressy Append. c. 5. tells us, That truth and our obligation to believe it, is in an higher degree in Scripture, than in the Decisions of the Church, as Bellarmine acknowledges: which is to say, that we may have greater assurance of the truth of Doctrines contained in the Scrip­tures, than we can have of any Doctrine from the determination of the Church. [Page 125] But if we have the greatest assurance that can be of Truths deliver'd to us by the Church, as Mr. S. affirms, then I would fain learn of him what that greater degree of assurance is which Stapleton speaks of, and whether it be greater than the greatest? Not to insist upon that (which yet I cannot but by the way take notice of) that Mr. Cressy, by his approbation of this determination of Bellarmine's, doth advance the Scripture above the Church as to one of the most essential Properties of the Rule of Faith, viz. the certainty of it.

But the most eminent Testimony to my purpose in Mr. Cressy, is that famous passage C▪ 40. Sect. 3, &c. (which hath given so much of­fence to several of his own Church) wherein he acknowledges the unfortu­nateness (to him) of the word Infal­libility, and tells us, That he could find no such word in any Council; That no ne­cessity appear'd to him that either he or any other Protestant should ever have heard that word nam'd, and much less press'd with so much earnestness as of late it has generally been in Disputations and Books of Controversie; and that Mr. Chillingworth combats this word with too [Page 126] to great success, insomuch that if this word were once forgotten or but laid by, Mr. Chillingworth's Arguments would lose the greatest part of their strength; and that if this word were confin'd to the Schools where it was bred, there would be still no inconvenience: And that since by manifest experience the English Prote­testants think themselves so secure, when they have leave to stand or fall by that word, and in very deed have so much to say for themselves when they are pressed unnecessarily with it: Since likewise it is a word capable of so high a sense that we cannot devise one more full and pro­per to attribute to God himself, &c. Since all this is so, he thinks he cannot be blamed, if such Reasons move him to wish that the Protestants may never be invited to combat the Authority of the Church under that Notion. A very in­genuous acknowledgment, and as cross to Mr. S's Principle as any thing can be. But the word Infallibility was not so unfortunate to Mr. Cressy, as is his unto­ward Explication of the fore-cited pas­sage, in his Appendix which he after­wards published chiefly by way of Vin­dication of himself against the Learned [Page 127] Author of the Preface to my Lord Falk­land's Discourse of Infallibility. There he Append. Sect. 2. & 3. tells us, That there are several de­grees of Infallibility. And that we may know what degree of Infallibility he thinks necessary to be attributed to the Church, this following passage will in­form us: Methinks (says he) if God have furnished his divine and superna­tural Truth, with evidence equal to this, that the Sun will shine to morrow, or that there will be a Spring and Harvest next year, we are infinitely obliged to bless his Providence, and justly condemn­ed, if we refuse to believe the least of such Truths, as shewing less affection to save our souls, than the dull Plow-men to sow their Corn, who certainly have far less evidence for their Harvest, than Ca­tholiques for their Faith; and yet they insist not peevishly upon every capricious Objection, nor exact an infallible secu­rity of a plentiful reaping next Summer, but notwithstanding all difficulties and contingencies proceed chearfully in their painful Husbandry. So that according to this Discourse, whatever degree of assurance the Church hath, or can give to those who rely upon her, it is plain [Page 128] that no further degree is necessary than what the Husbandman, when he sows, hath of a plentiful Harvest; and that men are justly condemned if they re­fuse to believe the least truth upon such security, which yet (by his own ac­knowledgment) is liable to Contin­gencies: Nay further, that men are not reasonable, but peevish, in exacting in­fallible security, and insisting upon eve­ry capricious Objection, such as is Mr. S's Might it not be otherwise? Now as to this degree of Assurance, or (as he calls it) Infallibility, I cannot but grant what he says of it to be most true, viz. That in a severe acception of the word it is not rigorously infallible, that is (as he explains it) it is not absolutely im­possible, nor does it imply a flat contra­diction that the thing whereof we are so assured may be otherwise: But then I utterly deny that according to any true acception of this word, such a de­gree of Assurance as he speaks of can be called Infallibility; and withall I af­firm, That none of those several degrees of Infallibility which he mentions, ex­cepting that only which imports an ab­solute impossibility, can with any tole­rable [Page 129] propriety of speech or regard to the true meaning and use of the word, have the name of Infallibility given to them. For Infallibility can signifie no­thing else but an utter impossibility that one should be deceived in that matter as to which he is supposed to be infalli­ble; and to say such a thing is impossi­ble, is to say that the existence of it im­plies a flat contradiction. So that who­soever asserts degrees of Infallibility, is obliged to shew that there are degrees of absolute impossibilities, and of per­fect contradictions; and he had need of a very sharp and piercing wit that is to find out degrees where there neither are nor can be any. Indeed, in respect of the objects of knowledge, it is easie to conceive how Infallibility may be extended to more objects or fewer; but in respect of the degree of assurance (of which Mr. Cressy speaks) it is al­together unimaginable how any one can be more or less out of all possibility of being deceived in those things wherein he is supposed to be infallible; for no one can be more removed from the possibility of being deceived, than he that is out of all possibility of being [Page 130] deceived, and whosoever is less than this, is not infallible; because he only is so, who is out of all possibility of being deceived in those matters wherein he is supposed to be infallible. So that Mr. Cressy's lower degrees of Infallibility are no degrees of that assurance which may properly be called infallible (for that can have no degrees) but of that assurance which is less than infallible. And he needed not have raised all this dust about the degrees of Infallibility, had it not been that by the means of such a cloud he might make the more convenient escape out of that strait he was in between the clamours of his own Church, and the advantage which his Adversaries made of his free and open discourse against Infallibility. For any one that carefully reads his Book, will find that he understands nothing by the Infallibility of the Church, but an Authority of obliging all Christians to submit to her Decisions, which is no more but what every Supreme Civil Judg hath in Civil matters, viz. a power to determine those Controversies that lie before him as well as he can or will, and when that is done every one is [Page 131] bound to submit to such determinati­ons; but yet for all this, no man ever dream't a Supreme Civil Judg to be in­fallible more than another man. I do not now dispute the extent of the Churches Authority; but if she have no other In­fallibility but what a full Authority of decision does suppose, I am sure she hath none at all.

Before I leave Mr. Cressy, I cannot but take notice how unfortunate and disingenuous he is in explaining the meaning of these words of his own, viz. [Against this word of Infallibility Mr. Chillingworth 's Book especially combats, and this with too too great success] which in his Appendix C. 5. Sect. 6. he interprets thus, Suc­cess, I mean, not against the Church, but against his own Soul, and the Souls of his Fellow-English Protestants, &c. As if one that had wished well to Caesar should have said, That Pompey had fought against him with too too great success; and being afterwards challen­ged by Caesar's Party, as having said that Pompey had Conquered Caesar, he should explain himself thus, Success, I mean, not against Caesar, but against his own life, and the lives of his followers. Can [Page 132] any thing be finer than for a man to say that by Pompey's success in fighting against Caesar, he means that Caesar had beaten Pompey? which is no more than if one should take the liberty to interpret white by black.

§. 6. Lastly, Mr. White doth most expresly contradict this Principle of Mr. S's in these following passages. In his Preface to Mr. Rushworth he says, That such a certainty as makes the cause always work the same effect, though it take not away the absolute possibility of working otherwise, ought absolutely to be reckoned in the degree of true certain­ty; and that those Authors are mistaken who undervalue it. So that it seems Mr. S. is mistaken in affirming that a man cannot be certain of any thing so long as there is any possibility that it may be otherwise. In his Answer to my Lord Falkland, he says P. 14, 15., That in Moral matters, and such as are subject to humane action, we must expect such assurance as humane actions bear. If for the government of your spiritual life you have as much as for the manage­ment of your natural and civil life, what can you expect more? Two or three [Page 133] witnesses of men beyond exception will cast a man out of not only his lands, but life and all. He that among Mer­chants will not adventure, where there is a Hundred to one of gaining, will be accounted a silly Factor. And among Souldiers, he that will fear danger where but one of a Hundred is slain, shall not escape the stain of Cowardize. What then shall we expect in Religion, but to see a main advantage on the one side which we may rest our selves on? and for the rest, remember we are men sub­ject to chance and mutability, and thank God he hath given us that assurance in a supernatural way, which we are con­tented withall in our civil ventures and possessions, which nevertheless God know­eth we often love better, and would ha­zard less than the unknown good of the life to come. Again P. 30., If God Al­mighty hath in all sorts and manners provided his Church that she may en­lighten every man in his way, that go­eth the way of a man, then let every man consider which is the sit way for himself, and what in other matters of that way he accounteth evidence. And if there be no interest in his Soul to [Page 134] make him loth to believe, what in ano­ther matter of the like nature he doth not stick at, or heavy to practise what he sees clearly enough, I fear not his choice. Once more; directing a man in his search after rational satisfaction in mat­ters of Religion, he hath this passage; P. 46. Besides this, he must have this care; that he seek what the nature of the sub­ject can yield, and not as those Physi­tians, who when they have promised no less than Immortality, can at last only reach to some conservation of health or youth in some small degree: So I could wish the Author to well assure himself first, that there is possible an Infallibili­ty, before he be too earnest to be conten­ted with nothing less; for what if hu­mane nature should not be capable of so great a good? Would he therefore think it fitting to live without any Religion, because he could not get such a one as himself desired, though with more than a mans wish? Were it not rational to see, whether among Religions some one have not such notable advantages over the rest, as in reason it might seem hu­mane nature might be contented with­all? Let him cast his account with the [Page 135] dearest things he hath, his own or friends lives, his estate, his hope of posterity, and see upon what terms of advantage he is ready to venture all these; and then return to Religion, and see whether, if he do not venture his soul upon the like, it be truly reason, or some other not con­fessed motive, which withdraws him. For my own part, as I doubt not of an Infallibility, so I doubt not but setting that aside, there be those Excellencies found on the Catholick party, which may force a man to prefer it, and to venture all he hath upon it, before all other Re­ligions and Sects in the World. Why then may not one who after long searching findeth no Infallibility, rest himself on the like, supposing mans nature affords no better?

Are not these fair Concessions, which the evidence and force of Truth have extorted from these Authors? So that it seems that that which Mr. S. calls Letter to his Answerer. p. 5. a civil piece of Atheistry, is advanced in most express words by his best Friends, and therefore I hope he will (as he threatens me) be smart with them in opposi­tion to so damnable and fundamental an Error. And whenever he attempts this, [Page 136] I would entreat him to remember that he hath these two things to prove. First, That no evidence, but demonstration, can give a man sufficient assurance of a­ny thing. Secondly, That a bare possi­bility that a thing may be otherwise, is a rational cause of doubting, and a wise ground of suspense; which when he hath proved, I shall not grudge him his In­fallibility.

SECT. V.

That Scripture is sufficient to convince the most acute Adversaries: and that it is sufficiently certain.§. 1. THE last part of this Third Discourse endeavours to shew that the Scripture is not convictive of the most obstinate and acute Adversa­ries. As for the obstinate, he knows my mind already. Let us see why the most acute Adversary may not be convinced by Scripture. Because as he objects P. 28., First, We cannot be certain that this Book is Gods Word, because of the many strange Absurdities and Heresies in the open letter as it lies, as that God hath hands and feet, &c. and because of the contradictions in it: To which I have already returned an answer. Se­condly, Because (as he saith P. 31.) we [Page 137] cannot be certain of the Truth of the let­ter in any particular Text, that it was not foisted in, or some way altered in its significativeness; and if it be a nega­tive proposition, that the particle [not] was not inserted, if affirmative, not left out. And if we pretend to be certain of this, he demands P. 31. our demonstration for it. But how unreasonable this de­mand is, I hope I have sufficiently shewn. And to shew it yet further, I ask him, How their Church knows, that the particle [ not] was not left out of any Text in which it is now found in their Copies? I know he hath a ready answer, viz. by Oral Tradition. But this (according to him P. 116.) only rea­ches to Scriptures letter so far as it is coincident with the main body of Chri­stian Doctrine; concerning the rest of Scripture it is impossible (according to his own principles) that they should have any security that the particle [ not] was not unduly inserted, or left out by the Transcribers. Nay, as to those Texts of Scripture which fall in with the main body of Christian Doctrine, I demand his demonstration that the par­ticle [ not] was not unduly inserted, [Page 138] or left out, not only in those Texts, but also in the Oral Tradition of the Do­ctrines coincident with the sense of those Texts. If he say, It was impossible any Age should conspire to leave out or in­sert the particle [ not] in the Oral Tra­dition; so say I it was that they should conspire to leave it out of the written Text: But then I differ from him thus far, That I do not think this naturally impossible, so as that it can rigorously be demonstrated, but only morally im­possible, so that no body hath any reason to doubt of it; which to a pru­dent man is as good as a demonstration. Pyrrho himself never advanced any Principle of Scepticism beyond this, viz. That men ought to question the credit of all Books, concerning which they cannot demonstrate as to every sentence in them, that the particle [ not] was not in­serted (if it be affirmative) or left out (if it be negative). If so much be requi­red to free a man from reasonable doubt­ing concerning a Book, how happy are they that have attained to Infallibility? What he saith concerning the Variae Lectiones P. 32. of Scripture, hath already had a sufficient answer.

[Page 139]§. 2. In his Fourth Discourse, he en­deavours to shew P. 33., That the Scripture is not certain in it self, and conse­quently not ascertained to us. First, Not certain, materially considered P. 34. as consisting of such and such Characters, because Books are liable to be burnt, torn blotted, worn out. We grant, it is not impossible but that any, or all the Books in the World may be burnt: But then we say likewise, That a Book so univer­sally dispersed may easily be preserved; though we have no assurance that God will preserve it, in case all men should be so foolish or so careless as to endeavour or suffer the abolition of it. But it seems the Scriptures cannot be a Rule of Faith if they be liable to any ex­ternal accidents. And this (he tells us P. 34.) Though it may seem a remote and impertinent Exception, yet to one who considers the wise dispositions of Divine Providence, it will deserve a deep con­sideration; because the salvation of Man­kind being the end of Gods making na­ture, the means to it should be more setled, strong, and unalterable, than any other piece of nature whatever. But, notwithstanding this wise reason, this [Page 140] Exception still seems to me both re­mote and impertinent. For if this which he calls a Reason be a Truth, it will from thence necessarily follow, not only that the Doctrine of Christ must be conveyed by such a means as is more unalterable than the course of nature; but also by a clear parity of Reason, that all the means of our salvation do operate towards the accomplishing of their end with greater certainty than the fire burns, or the Sun shines; which they can never do, unless they operate more necessarily than any natural cau­ses; now how they can do so upon vo­luntary Agents, I desire Mr. S. to in­form me.

§. 3. He proceeds by a long Harangue to shew P. 34., That not only these material Characters in themselves are corrupti­ble, but in complexion with the causes, actually laid in the World to preserve them entire; because either those causes are material, and then they are also li­able to continual alterations; or spiri­tual, that is, the minds of men, and from these we may with good reason hope for a greater degree of constancy, than from any other piece of nature; which [Page 141] by the way, is a very strange Paradox, that the actions of voluntary Agents have a greater certainty and constancy in them, than those of natural Agents; of which the fall of Angels and Men, compared with the continuance of the Sun and Stars in their first state, is a very good evidence.

§. 4. But he adds a Caution P. 35., That they are perfectly unalterable from their nature, and unerrable, if due circum­stances be observed, that is, if due pro­posals be made to beget certain know­ledg, and due care used to attend to such proposals. But who can warrant, That due proposals will always be made to men, and due care used by them? If these be uncertain, where's the constan­cy and unerrableness he talks so much of? So that notwithstanding the con­stancy of this spiritual cause (the mind of man) of preserving Scriptures en­tire, yet in order to this (as he tells P. 36. us) So many actions are to be done, which are compounded and made up of an innumerable multitude of several par­ticularities to be observed, every of which may be mistaken apart, each being a di­stinct little action in its single self, such [Page 142] as is the transcribing of a whole Book, consisting of such Myriads of words, sin­gle letters, and tittles or stops; and the several actions of writing over each of these so short and cursory, that it pre­vents diligence, and exceeds humane care, to keep awake and apply distinct attentions to every of these distinct actions. Mr. Rushworth Dial. 2. Sect. 7. much outdoes Mr. S. in these minute Cavils, for he tells us, That supposing an Original Copy of Christs words, written by one of the Evangelists in the same language, let him have set down every word and syllable, yet men conversant in noting the chan­ges of meanings in words will tell us, that divers accents in the pronuncia­tion of them, the turning of the speakers head or body this way or that way, &c. may so change the sense of the words, that they will seem quite diffe­rent in writing from what they were in speaking. I hope that Oral and Practi­cal Tradition hath been careful to pre­serve all these circumstances, and hath deliver'd down Christ's Doctrine with all the right Traditionary Accents, Nods, and Gestures necessary for the under­standing of it; otherwise the omission [Page 143] of these may have so altered the sense of it, that it may be now quite different from what it was at first. But to answer Mr. S. We do not pretend to be assured, that it is naturally impossible that the Scriptures should have been corrupted or changed, but only to be sufficiently assured that they have not received any material alteration, from as good Argu­ments as the nature of the Subject will bear. But if his Reason had not been very short and cursory, he might easily have reflected, that Oral Tradition is equally liable to all these contingencies. For it doth as much prevent diligence, and exceed humane care, to keep awake and apply distinct attentions to the di­stinct actions of speaking, as of writing. And I hope he will not deny, that a Do­ctrine Orally delivered, consists of words, and letters, and accents, and stops, as well as a Doctrine written; and that the seve­ral actions of speaking, are as short and cursory as of writing.

§. 5. Secondly, He tells us P. 38., Scripture formally considered as to its significa­tiveness, is also uncertain. First, P. 38. Be­cause of the uncertainty of the letter. This is already answered. Secondly, [Page 144] P. 38. Because the certain sense of it is not to be arrived to by the Vulgar, who are destitute of Languages and Arts. True, where men are not permitted to have the Scriptures in their own Language, and understand no other: But where they are allowed the Scriptures transla­ted into their own Language they may understand them, all necessary points of Faith and Practice being sufficiently plain in any Translation of the Bible that I know of: And that P. 38. eminent Wits cannot agree about the sense of Texts which concern the main points of Faith, hath been spoken to al­ready.

§. 6. As for the Reverence he pre­tends to Scripture in the conclusion of his Fourth Discourse, he might have spa­red that, after all the raillery and rude­ness he hath used against it. It is easie to conjecture, both from his principles and his uncivil expressions concerning them, what his esteem is of those Sa­cred Oracles. Probably it was requi­site in prudence to cast in a few good words concerning the Scriptures, for the sake of the more tender and squea­mish Novices of their Religion, or (as [Page 145] Mr. Rushworth's Nephew Dial. 2. Sect. 14. says frankly and openly) for the satisfaction of in­different men, that have been brought up in this verbal and apparent respect of the Scripture, who it seems are not yet attained to that degree of Catho­lick Piety and Fortitude as to endure patiently that the Word of God should be reviled or slighted. Besides that, in reference to those whom they hope hereafter to convert (who might be too much alienated from their Religion, if he had expressed nothing but con­tempt towards a Book, which Pro­testants, and Christians in all Ages till the very dregs of Popery, have been bred up to a high veneration of), it was not much amiss to pass this for­mal complement upon the Bible; which the wise of his own Religion will easily understand, and may serve to catch the rest. But let him not deceive himself, God is not mocked.

SECT. VI.

§. 1. SEcondly, He comes to shew P. 41. That the Pro­perties of a Rule of Faith do not belong to Oral Tradi­tion., That the Properties of a Rule of Faith belong to Oral Tradition. And, First, He gives a tedious explicati­on of the nature of this Oral Practi­cal Tradition, which amounts to this; That as in reference to the civil Edu­cation of Children, they are taught their own and others names, to write, and read, and exercise their Trades: So in reference to Religion, the Chil­dren of Christians first hear sounds, af­terwards by degrees get dim notions of God, Christ, Saviour, Heaven, Hell, Vertue, Vice, and by degrees practise what they have heard; they are shewn to say Grace, and their Prayers, to hold up their hands, or perhaps eyes, and to kneel, and other postures. After­wards they are acquainted with the Creed, Ten Commandments, and Sa­craments, some common Forms of Pray­er, and other practises of Christianity, and are directed to order their lives ac­cordingly, and are guided in all this [Page 147] by the actions and carriage of the elder faithful; and this goes on by in­sensible degrees, not by leaps, from a Hundred years to a Hundred, but from Month to Month, and even less. If this be all that Tradition doth, this is nothing but what is done among Protestants, and that with greater advantage; because we always teach Children to say their Prayers in a known Tongue so as they may under­stand them. And we also teach them the Creed, and Ten Commandments, and the Sacraments, so many as Christ hath instituted and no more. So that if this be so infallible a way of con­veying the Doctrine of Christianity, we have it among us. And we do over and besides, instruct them in the Scriptures, which are the authentick Instrument whereby Christ's Doctrine is conveyed to us. But then we do not suppose (as his Hypothesis necessa­rily enforceth him to do) that the Christian Doctrine is equally taught and learned by all; but by some more, by others less perfectly, according to the different abilities and diligence of [Page 148] Parents and Teachers, and the vari­ous capacities and dispositions of Chil­dren; whereas his Hypothesis falls, if all or at least the generality of Pa­rents do not instruct their Children with the like exactness, and if the generality of Children do not receive this Doctrine in the same perfection that it is delivered. For if it be taught or received with any varia­tion, it must necessarily be so convey­ed, and these variations will grow daily. I had thought he would have told us, how all Parents do teach their Children the whole Body of Christ's Doctrine, and explain to them every part of it in a Hundred or a Thousand several expressions signify­ing the same sense, and not have in­stanced in two Set-forms, such as the Creed, and Ten Commandments; for according to Mr. White Apolog. P. 81., That cannot be a Tradition, which is delivered in set-words.

§. 2. Having thus explained Oral Tradition, he comes to shew that the Properties of a Rule of Faith agree [Page 149] to it. I have already shewed that the true Properties of a Rule of Faith are but two, viz. That it be plain and in­telligible, and that it be sufficiently cer­tain. The first of these, that Oral Tradition may deliver a Doctrine plainly and intelligibly, I grant him. All the difficulty is about the second Property, whether we have sufficient assurance that the Doctrine delivered down by Oral Tradition hath received no coruption or change in its con­veyance? And all that he pretends to prove in this Discourse is, That if this Rule hath been followed and kept to all along, the Christian Doctrine neither hath, nor can have received any change; that is, if the next Age after the Apostles did truly, and with­out any alteration deliver the Chri­stian Doctrine to their immediate Suc­cessors, and they to theirs, and so on, then upon this supposition the Doctrine of the present Traditionary Church must be the very same with that which was delivered to the Apo­stles. All this is readily granted to him. But that this Rule hath always [Page 150] been followed, nay, that it is im­possible there should have been any deviation from it (as he pretends) this we deny, not only as untrue, but as one of the most absurd Proposi­tions that ever yet pretended to demon­strative evidence.

THE RULE of FAITH.
PART III. In which Mr. S's Demonstrations and Corollaries are examined.

SECT. I.

§. 1. BEfore I come to speak parti­cularly to his Demonstra­tions, Considera­tions touching his Demon­strations in general. I shall premise these two Considerations. First, That (ac­cording to the Principles of the Pa­trons of Tradition) no man can by his private Reason certainly find out the true Rule of Faith. Secondly, That (according to Mr. S.) the way of De­monstration is no certain way to find out the Rule of Faith. If either of these be made out, his Demonstrations lose all their force. If the first be [Page 152] made good, then he cannot demonstrate the Infallibility of Tradition, nor con­sequently that that is the Rule of Faith. If the second, then the way of Demon­stration which he pretends to take signi­fies nothing.

§. 2. First, No man can (according to the principles of the Patrons of Tra­dition) by his private Reason certain­ly find out what is the Rule of Faith. Suppose a Heathen to be desirous to in­form himself of the Christian Faith; in order to which he is inquisitive after some Rule by which he may take a mea­sure of it, and come certainly to know what it is: He enquires of Christians what their Rule is, and finds them divi­ded about it, some saying that the Scriptures, others that Oral Tradition is the Rule. In this case it is not possi­ble (without a Revelation) for this man to find out the Rule of Faith, but by his own private Reason examining and weighing the arguments and pre­tences of both sides. And when he hath done this, unless he can by his Rea­son demonstrate that the one is a certain and infallible Rule, and the other not so, he hath not (according to Mr. S.) [Page 153] found out the Rule of Faith. But Rea­son can never do this, according to Mr. S. For speaking of demonstrating the certainty of Tradition, he tells us P. 53., That Tradition hath for its Basis mans nature not according to his Intelle­ctuals, which do but darkly grope in the pursuit of Science, &c. And again Append: 2 d. P. 183., speaking how Reason brings men to the Rule of Faith, he uses this comparison, She is like a dim-sighted man, who used his Reason to find a trusty Friend to lead him in the twilight, and then relied on his guidance rationally without using his own Reason at all about the Way it self. So that (according to him) the cer­tainty of Tradition cannot be founded on Demonstration, because it is not founded in the intellectual part of man, which only can demonstrate. Besides, if it were founded in the intellectual part, yet that can never be able to de­monstrate the certainty of Tradition, because that faculty which is dim-sighted, and does but grope darkly in the pur­suit of Science, is uncapable of framing Demonstrations. Nor can any man un­derstand how dim-sighted reason should see clearly to choose its guide, any more [Page 154] than its way, especially if it be consi­dered what a pretty Contradiction it is, to say that Reason as it is dim-sighted can see clearly.

But Mr. Cressy is not contented to call every mans Reason dim-sighted, he ven­tures a step further, and calls it hood­winkt and blind: For he tells us Append. c. 6. Sect. 8., That private Reason is apparently a most fallible guide; and he pities Ibid. Sect. 9. my Lord Falkland's case, because in the search of the true Religion he did betake himself to the casual conduct of blind, humane, natural Reason, which afterwards he calls Ibid. Sect. 11. a guide that two persons cannot possibly follow together, because no two persons (that ever followed any other guide beside Authority) did or could think all things to be reasonable that all others thought so; and by consequence such a guide that as long as he conti­nues in that office, there cannot possibly be any Church any where: which (says he) is an infallible eviction that this is an imaginary seducing guide, since it is impossible that that should be a guide appointed for any Christian, which nei­ther Christ nor his Apostles, nor any of their Followers ever mentioned, yea, [Page 155] which formally destroys one of our twelve Articles of the Apostles Creed, viz. I be­lieve the Holy Catholick Church. Thus he does by Reason clearly and infallibly evince, that Reason cannot be other­wise than a most blind and fallible guide. This it is to talk of things when a man looks only upon one side of them; as if because Reason has a blind side and is uncertain in some things, therefore we ought to conclude her universally blind and uncertain in every thing; and as if because all men cannot think all things reasonable which any one man thinks to be so, therefore it is to be doubted whether those common Princi­ples of Reason be true which Mankind are generally agreed in. And that Mr. Cressy speaks here of the use of our private Reason in the finding out of our Rule, is clear from what he says in the next Section, viz. That this hood-wink't guide (enquiring into Scripture, and searching after Tradition) may possibly stumble upon the way to Vnity and Truth, that is, the true Catholick Church. If this be true, why does Mr. S. pre­tend that he can by Reason demonstrate the Infallibility of Tradition, and by [Page 156] this hood-wink't guide lead men to the true Rule of Faith? And what a pitiful encouragement would this be to an in­quisitive Philosopher (who knowing no other guide but his Reason, whereby to find out whether Scripture or Tradition be the true Rule) to tell him that by the help of this hood-wink't guide he might possibly stumble upon the right?

A man may justly stand amazed at the inconsistency of these mens Discourses and Principles. In one mood they are all for Demonstration, and for convin­cing men in the way of perfect Science which is the true Rule of Faith: But then again when another fit takes them, there's no such thing as Science, humane Reason grows all on the sudden dim-sighted, and at the next word is struck stark blind; and then the very utmost that it can do towards the bringing of an unprejudiced and inquisitive person to the true Rule of Faith, is to leave him in a possibility of stumbling upon it; but if he be a Heretick that makes use of private Reason for his guide, then Append. c. 7. Sect. 8. it is impossible but that he with his blind guide should fall into the Pit. I cannot for my part imagine how they can reconcile [Page 157] the blindness of humane Reason with all that noise which they make about Science and Demonstration; but this I must confess that these kind of Discour­ses which I meet with in Mr. S. and Mr. Cressy, are very proper Arguments to perswade a man of the blindness of hu­mane Reason. And indeed there is one passage in Mr. Cressy, which gives me very great satisfaction concerning these matters, where he tells us Ibid., That the Wit and Judgment of Catholicks is to renounce their own Judgment, and depose their own Wit. Now he that professes to have done this may write Contradi­ctions, and no body ought to challenge him for it. However, it is a very ingenuous acknowledgment, that when he forsook our Church and turned Papist, he laid aside his Judgment and Wit; which is just such an heroick act of Judgment, as if a man in a bravery to shew his liberty should sell himself for a slave. I am glad to understand from an experienced Person, what charges a man must be at when he turns Roman-Catholique, namely, that whoever will embrace that Religion must forfeit his Reason.

[Page 158]§. 3. Secondly, The way of Demon­stration is (according to Mr. S.) no certain way to find out the Rule of Faith. In his 4th Appendix P. 253. & 254. against my Lord of Down, one of the Eight Mines (as he calls them) which he lays to blow up my Lords Dissuasive a­gainst Popery, is this, That the method he takes in dissuading cannot be held in rea­son to have power to dissuade, unless it be proper to that effect, that is, not com­mon to that effect and a contrary one. Now, that being most evidently no me­thod or way to such an effect which ma­ny follow and take, yet arrive not at that effect, 'tis plain to common sense, that my Lord of Down miscalls his Book A Dis­suasive, and that it can have in it no power of moving the understanding one way or other, unless he can first vouch some particularity in the method he takes, above what's in others in which we ex­perience miscarriage, &c. If this be true, then his method of Demonstration is no way to make men certain of what he pretends to demonstrate, be­cause that is most evidently no way to an effect which many follow and take, yet arrive not at that effect; so that 'tis [Page 159] plain to common sense that Mr. S's De­monstrations can have in them no power of moving the understanding one way or other, unless he can vouch some par­ticularity in the Demonstrations he pre­tends to bring, above what is in other pretended Demonstrations in which we experience miscarriage. Do not Tho­mas, and Scotus (as Mr. White tells us Extasis, P. 24.) all along pretend to demonstrate? and yet it is generally believed that (at least where they contradict one ano­ther) one of them failed in his Demon­strations. Did not Mr. Charles Thynne pretend to have demonstrated that a man at one jump might leap from London to Rome? and yet I do not think any one was ever satisfy'd with his Demonstra­tion. And Mr. S. knows one in the World (whom I will not name, be­cause he hath since ingenuously ac­knowledged his Errour) who thought he had demonstrated the Quadrature of the Circle, and was so confident of it as to venture the reputation of his De­monstrations in Divinity upon it, and some of those Divinity Demonstrations were the very same with Mr. S's. Since therefore the World hath experienced [Page 160] so much miscarriage in the way of De­monstration, before Mr. S's Demonstra­tions can be allowed to signifie any thing, he must (according to his own Law) vouch some particularity in his way and method of Demonstration above what is in other mens. He hath not any where (that I remember) told us what that particularity is, wherein his way of Demonstration is above other mens: Nor can I upon the most diligent search find any peculiar advantage that his Way has more than theirs above mentioned; unless this be one that he pretends to demonstrate a self-evident Principle, and herein I think he hath plainly the advantage of Mr. Charles Thynne; and unless this may be counted another ad­vantage, that he has so extraordinary a confidence and conceit of his own Demonstrations; and in this particular, I must acknowledge that he clearly ex­cels all that have gone before him: In all other things, his way of Demonstra­tion is but like his neighbours.

SECT. II.

§. 1. I Come now to examine his De­monstrations of this Self-evi­dent Principle (as he often calls it) that Oral Tradition is a certain and in­fallible way of conveying Christs Do­ctrine from one Age to another, Mr. S's de­monstration à priori. without any corruption or change; which is to say, that it is impossible but that this Rule should always have been kept to. That this is not a Self-evident Principle, needs no other evidence than that he goes about to demonstrate it. But yet, notwithstanding this, I think he hath as much reason to call this a Self-evident Principle, as to call his proofs of it De­monstrations.

§. 2. In order to his Demonstration a Priori, he lays P. 59, 60. these four grounds, which I shall set down in his own words. First, That Christian Doctrine was at first unanimously setled by the Apostles, in the hearts of the faithful dis­persed in great multitudes over several parts of the World. Secondly, That this Doctrine was firmly believed by all those faithful to be the way to Heaven, [Page 162] and the contradicting or deserting it, to be the way to damnation; so that the greatest hopes and fears imaginable were by engaging the Divine Authority strong­ly applied to the minds of the first Be­lievers, encouraging them to the adhe­ring to that Doctrine, and deterring them from relinquishing it; and indeed infi­nitely greater than any other whatever, springing from any temporal considerati­on: and that this was in all Ages the perswasion of the faithful. Thirdly, That hopes of good and fears of harms strongly applied are the causes of actual will. Fourthly, That the thing was fea­sible or within their power; that what they were bred to was knowable by them. This put, it follows as certainly that a great number or body of the first Belie­vers and after faithful in each Age, that is, from Age to Age would continue to hold themselves and teach their Chil­dren as themselves had been taught, that is, would follow and stick to Tradition, as it doth, that a cause put actually cau­sing produceth its effect. This is his De­monstration with the grounds of it.

§. 3. To shew the vanity and weakness of this pretended Demonstration, I shall [Page 163] assail it these three wayes; by shew­ing, First, That if the grounds of it were true they would conclude too much, and prove that to be impossible which common experience evinceth, and himself must grant to have been. Secondly, That his main grounds are ap­parently false. Thirdly, That his De­monstration is confuted by clear and undeniable Instances to the contrary.

SECT. III.

§. 1. IF the grounds of it were true, The First an­swer to this Demonstrati­on. they would conclude too much, and prove that to be impossible which common experience evinceth and him­self must grant to have been. For if these two Principles be true, That the greatest hopes and fears are strongly ap­plied to the minds of all Christians; and that those hopes and fears strongly ap­plied are the cause of actual will to ad­here constantly to Christ's Doctrine: then from hence it follows that none th [...] en­tertain this Doctrine can ever fall from it; because falling from it is inconsist­ent with an actual will of adhering con­stantly to it. For supposing (as he [Page 164] doth) certain and constant causes of actual will to adhere to this Doctrine, those who entertain it must actually will to adhere to it, because a cause put actually causing produceth its effect, which is constant adherence to it. And if this were true these two things would be impossible. First, That any Christian should turn Apostate or Heretick. Se­condly, That any Christian should live wickedly. Both which not only fre­quent and undoubted experience doth evince, but himself must grant, de facto to have been.

§. 2. First, It would be impossible that any Christian should turn Apostate or Heretick. Heresie according to him is nothing else but the renouncing of Tradition. Now he tells us P. 60., That the first Renouncers of Tradition must have been true Believers or holders of it, ere they renounced it; and I suppose there is the same reason for Apostates. But if all Christians or true Believers (as he calls them) have these Arguments of hope and fear strongly applied; and hope and fear strongly applied be the causes of actual will to adhere to this Doctrine; 'tis necessary all Christians [Page 165] should adhere to it, and impossible there should be either Apostates or He­reticks. For if these causes be put in all the faithful actually causing (as the Grounds of his Demonstration suppose) and indefectibleness be the proper and ne­cessary effect of these causes, as he also saith P. 75., then it is impossible, that where these causes are put, there should be any defection. For a proper and necessary effect cannot but be where the causes of such an effect are put; especially if they be put actually causing; and consequent­ly 'tis impossible that any single Chri­stian should ever either totally aposta­tize or fall into Heresie, that is, renounce Tradition.

§. 3. And that this is a genuine con­sequence from these Principles (though he will not acknowledg it here, be­cause he saw it would ruine his Demon­stration) is liberally acknowledged by him in other parts of his Discourse. For he tells us P. 54., That it exceeds all the power of nature (abstracting from the causes of madness and violent disease) to blot the knowledges of this Doctrine out of the soul of one single Believer. And P. 78. that since no man can hold con­trary [Page 166] to his knowledg, nor doubt of what he holds, nor change and innovate with­out knowing he doth so, it is a manifest impossibility a whole Age should fall into an absurdity so inconsistent with the na­ture of one single man. And P. 89., That it is perhaps impossible for one single man to attempt to deceive posterity by renoun­cing Tradition. Which passages laid to­gether amount to thus much, That it is impossible that Tradition should fail in any one single person. And though in the passage last cited he speak faintly, and with a perhaps, as if he apprehend­ed some danger in speaking too perem­ptorily, yet any one would easily see the last to be as impossible as any of the rest. And he himself elsewhere, being in the full Career of his Bombast Rhe­torick, delivers it roundly without fear or wit P. 54., Sooner may the sinews of en­tire nature by overstraining crack, and she lose all her activity and motion, that is, her self, than one single part of that innumerable multitude which integrate that vast testification which we call Tra­dition can possibly be violated.

§. 4. But it may be we deal too hard­ly with him and press his Demonstration [Page 167] too far, because he tells us he only in­tends by it to prove that the generality of Christians will always adhere to Tradition. But if he intended to prove no more but this, he should then have brought a Demonstration that would have concluded no more; but this concludes of all as well as of the generality of Christians: A clear evi­dence that it is no Demonstration, be­cause it concludes that which is evi­dently false, That there can be no Apostates or Hereticks. Besides, sup­posing his Demonstration to conclude only that the generality of Christians would always adhere to Tradition, this is as plainly confuted by experi­ence, if there be any credit to be given to History. St. Hierom tells us Chron. ad Annum Christ. 352., That Liberius Bishop of Rome (for all his particular Title to Infallibility built upon Tradition, as Mr. S. speaks, Coroll. 28.) turned Arian. And that Ad An. 363. Arianism was establish't by the Synod of Ariminum, which was a Council more general than that of Trent. And that Ad An. 364. almost all the Churches in the whole World under the names of Peace and of the Emperour, were polluted by Communion with the [Page 168] Arians. Again, That Advers. Lu­cifer. under the Em­perour Constantius (Eusebius and Hip­patius being Consuls) Infidelity was sub­scribed under the names of Vnity and Faith. And Ibid. that the whole World groan­ed and wondered to see it self turned Arian. And he Ibid. uses this as an argu­ment to the Luciferians, to receive into the Church those who had been defiled with the Heresie of Arius, because the number of those who had kept them­selves Orthodox, was so exceeding small: For (says he) the Synod of Nice which consisted of above Three hundred Bishops, received Eight Arian Bishops whom they might have cast out without any great loss to the Church; I wonder then how some, and those the followers of the Ni­cene Faith can think that three Confes­sors (viz. Athanasius, Hilarius, Euse­bius) ought not to do that in case of necessity for the good and safety of the whole World, which so many and such ex­cellent Persons did voluntarily. It seems Arianism had prevailed very far, when St. Hierom could not name above three eminent Persons in the Church who had preserved themselves untainted with it. Again In Epist. ad Galat. l. 3., Arius in Alexandria was at [Page 169] first but one spark, but because it was not presently extinguish't it broke out into a flame which devoured the whole World. Gregory Nazianzen Orat. 20. & 21. likewise tells us to the same purpose, That the Arian Heresie seized upon the greatest part of the Church. And, to shew that he knew nothing of Mr. S's Demon­stration of the indefectibility of the generality of Christians, he asks Orat. 25., Where are those that define the Church by mul­titude, and despise the little Flock, &c? And this Heresie was of a long conti­nuance, for from its first rise which hap­pened in the 20 th year of Constantine, it continued (as Joh. Abbas Chron. ad Annum octa­vum Maurit. hath cal­culated it) 266 years. And the Pela­gian Heresie (if we may believe Brad­wardine, one of the great Champions of the Church against it) did in a manner prevail as much as Arianism, as the said Author complains in his Preface to his Book Caus. Dei., That almost the whole World was run after Pelagius into Er­ror. Will Mr. S. now say, that in the height of these Heresies the generality of Christians did firmly adhere to Tra­dition? If he say they did, let him an­swer the express Testimonies produced [Page 170] to the contrary: But if they did not, then his Demonstration also fails as to the generality of Christians. And if the greater part of Christians may fall off from Tradition, what Demonstra­tion can make it impossible for the les­ser to do so? Who will say it is in Rea­son impossible that a Thousand persons should relinquish Tradition, though Nine hundred of them have already done it, and though the remainder be no otherwise secured from doing so than those were who have actually re­linquish't it? Now is not this a clear evidence that this which he calls a De­monstration a Priori, is no such thing? Because every Demonstration a Priori, must be from causes which are necessary, whereas his Demonstration is from vo­luntary causes. So that unless he can prove that voluntary causes are neces­sary, he shall never demonstrate that it is impossible for the generality of any company of men to err who have every one of them free-will, and are every one of them liable to passion and m [...] ­stake.

§. 5. From all this it appears, that his whole Discourse about the Original [Page 171] and Progress of Heresie, and the mul­titudes of Hereticks in several Ages, is as clear a confutation of his own De­monstration as can be desired. The only thing that he offers in that Discourse, to prevent this Objection which he fore­saw it liable to, is this, It is not (says he P. 65.) to be expected but that some con­tingencies should have place, where an whole Species in a manner is to be wrought upon; it sufficeth that the causes to pre­serve Faith indeficiently entire are as efficacious as those which are laid for the preservation of Mankind, the vertue of Faith not being to continue longer than Mankind its only subject does; and they will easily appear as efficacious as the o­ther, if we consider the strength of those causes before explicated, and reflect that they are effectively powerful to make mul­titudes daily debar themselves of those pleasures which are the causes of Man­kinds propagation; and if we look into History for experience of what hath passed in the World since the propagating of Christianity, we shall find more parti­culars failing in propagating their kind, than their Faith. To which I an­swer,

[Page 172] First, That it may reasonably be ex­pected there should be no contingencies in any particulars, where causes of ac­tual will are supposed to be put in all: Because (as he says truly) a cause put actually causing cannot but produce its effect. Suppose then constant causes laid in all Mankind of an actual will to speak Truth to the best of their know­ledg, were it not reasonable to expect that there would be no such contingen­cy to the Worlds end as that any man should tell a lye? Nay, it were madness for any man to think any such contin­gency should be, supposing causes actu­ally causing men always to speak Truth.

Secondly, It is far from Truth that the causes to preserve Faith indeficiently en­tire, are as efficacious as those which are laid for the propagation of Mankind. And whereas he would prove the strength of these causes which are laid to preserve Faith, because they are ef­fectively powerful to make multitudes daily debar themselves of those pleasur [...]s which are the causes of Mankinds pro­pagation; I hope no body that hath read the innumerable complaints which [Page 173] occur in their own Historians, and o­thers of the best and most credible of their own Writers, of more than one Age, concerning the general viciousness and debauchery of their Priests and Monks, will he overforward to believe that all those who debar themselves of lawful Marriage, do abstain from those unlawful pleasures.

§. 6. But nothing can be more impu­dent than what he adds, That if we look into Histories for experience of what hath past in the World since the first planting of Christianity, we shall find far more particulars failing in pro­pagating their kind, than their Faith, Do any Histories confirm it to have been the experience of the World, that the far greatest part of the World did in any Age give over propagating their kind? But Histories do confirm that the far greatest part of the Christian World did fall off to Arianism and Pe­lagianism; and consequently, as he sup­poseth, did desert and renounce Tradi­tion. Did ever whole Nations and vast Territories of the World either whol­ly, or for the far greatest part of them, take upan humour against propagating [Page 174] Mankind? And yet both History, and the experience of the present Age as­sures us, that a great part of Asia and of Africk (where the most flourishing Churches in the World once were) are fallen off from Christianity, and become either Mahometans or Heathens. In Africk almost all those vast Regions, which Christianity had gained from Heathenism, Mahometanism hath re­gained from Christianity. All the North-part of Afrique lying along the Mediterranean (where Christianity flou­rish't once as much as ever it did at Rome) is at this time utterly void of Christians, excepting a few Towns in the hands of the European Princes. And not to mention all particular pla­ces, the large Region of Nubia, which had (as is thought) from the Apo­stles time professed the Christian Faith, hath within these 150 years for want of Ministers (as Alvarez Hist. Aethiop. tells us) quit­ted Christianity, and is partly revolted to Heathenism, partly fallen off to Ma­hometanism. So that it seems, that not­withstanding the Arguments of hope and fear, the very Teachers of Tradition may fail in a largely extended Church. [Page 175] As for Asia, in the Easterly parts of it, there is not now one Christian to four of what there were 500 years ago; and in the more Southerly parts of it (where Christianity had taken deepest root) the Christians are far inferiour in num­ber to the Idolaters and Mahometans, and do daily decrease. What thinks Mr. S. of all this? Have those Christian Na­tions which are turn'd Mahometans and Pagans failed in their Faith or not? If they have, I expect from him clear In­stances of more that have failed in pro­pagating their kind.

§. 7. But, besides those who have total­ly Apostatized from Christianity, hath not the whole Greek Church with the Jacobites and Nestorians, and all those other Sects which agree with and de­pend upon these, and which taken to­gether are manifoldly greater than the Roman Church; I say, have not all these renounced Tradition for several Ages? And here in Europe, hath not a great part of Poland, Hungary, both Germany's, France, and Switzerland? Have not the Kingdoms of great Brit­tain, Denmark, Sweden, and a conside­rable part of Ireland, in Mr. S's opinion [Page 176] deserted Tradition? If I should once see a whole Nation fail, because no body would marry and contribute to the propagation of Mankind; and should find this sullen humour to prevail in se­veral Nations, and to overspread vast Parts of the World, I should. then in good earnest think it possible for Man­kind to fail; unless I could shew it im­possible for other Nations to do that which I see some to have done, who were every whit as unlikely to have done it. So that whatever cause he assigns of Heresie P. 67., as Pride, Ambition, Lust, or any other vice or interest, if these can take place in whole Nations, and make them renounce Tradition, then where's the efficacy of the causes to preserve Faith indeficiently entire in any? For the Demonstration holds as strongly for all Christians as for any.

§. 8. Secondly, From these grounds it would follow that no Christian can live wickedly; because the end of Faith being a good life, the arguments of hope and fear must in all Reason be as powerful and efficacious causes of a good life, as of a true belief. And that his Demonstration proves the one as [Page 177] much as the other, will be evident from his own reasoning; for he P. 62. argues in this manner, Good is the proper object of the will, good propos'd makes the will to desire that good, and consequently the known means to obtain it: Now infinite goods and harms sufficiently proposed are of their own nature incomparably more powerful causes to carry the will than temporal ones. Since then, when two causes are counterpoised, the lesser when it comes to execution is no cause as to the substance of that effect, it follows that there is no cause to move the wills of a World of Believers to be willing to do that which they judge would lose them­selves and their Posterity infinite goods, and bring them infinite harms, &c. in case a sufficient Proposal or Application be not wanting, which he tells us P. 6 [...]. is not wanting, because Christianity urged to execution, gives its followers a new life and a new nature, than which a nearer Application cannot be imagined. Doth not this Argument extend to the lives of Christians, as well as their Belief? So that he may as well infer from these grounds, that it is impossible that those who profess Christianity should live [Page 178] contrary to it, as that they should fail to deliver down the Doctrine of Christ; because whatever can be an induce­ment and temptation to any man, to contradict this Doctrine by his practice, may equally prevail upon him to falsifie it. For why should men make any more scruple of damning themselves and their Posterity by teaching them false Doctrines, than by living wicked Lives? which are equally pernicious with Heretical Doctrines, not only up­on account of the bad influence which such examples of Fathers and Teachers are like to have upon their Scholars, but likewise as they are one of the strongest arguments in the World to perswade them, that their Teachers do not themselves believe that Religion which they teach; for if they did, they would live according to it. Why should any man think, that those arguments of hope and fear which will not prevail upon the generality of Christians to make them live holy Lives, should be so necessarily efficacious to make them so much concerned for the preserving of a right Belief? Nay, we have great rea­son to believe that such persons will en­deavour [Page 179] as much as may be, to bend and accommodate their Belief to their Lives. And this is the true source of those In­novations in Faith for which we chal­lenge the Church of Rome; which any man may easily discern, who will but consider how all their new Doctrines are fitted to a secular Interest, and the gratifying of that inordinate appe­tite after riches and dominion which reigns in the Court of Rome, and in the upper part of the Clergy of that Church.

SECT. IV.

§. 1. SEcondly, The second Answer to his Demonstra­tion. The main grounds of his Demonstration are appa­rently false: For,

First, This Demonstration supposeth that the generality of Christian Parents in all Ages perfectly understood the Doctrine of Christ, and did not mi­stake any part of it; that they remem­bred it perfectly, and that they were faithful and diligent to instruct their Children in it; which is as contrary to experience as that the generality of Christians are knowing and honest. It [Page 180] supposeth likewise, that this Doctrine, and every substantial part of it, was re­ceived and remembred by the genera­lity of Children as it was taught, and was understood perfectly by them without the least material mistake: So he tells us P. 53., That the substance of Faith comes clad in such plain matters of Fact, that the most stupid man living cannot possibly be ignorant of it. But whether this be reasonable to be supposed or no, may easily be determined not only from every man's own experience of the World, but from a more advantagious Instance of the experience of the first Age of Christianity. Was there ever a more knowing and diligent Teacher of this Doctrine than our Saviour? and yet his Disciples fell into many mistakes concerning it. So that in order to the certain propagating of it, the wisdom of God thought it requisite to endue even those who had learned this Do­ctrine from himself with an infallible spirit, by which they might be led into all Truth, and secured from error and mistake; which had been unneces­sary had it been impossible for them to mistake this Doctrine. The Apostles, [Page 181] who taught the World by an infallible Spirit, and with infinitely more advan­tage than ordinary Parents can teach their Children, yet in all the Churches which they planted they found Chri­stians very apt to mistake and pervert their Doctrine, as appears by their frequent complaints in most of their Epistles. Nay the Apostle chargeth the Generality of the Hebrews Heb. 5.11, 12. with such a degree of dulness and stupidity, that after fitting time and means of instru­ction they were still ignorant of the very Principles of Christianity: So he tells them, That when for the time they ought to be Teachers of others, they had need that one should teach them again which be the first Principles of the Oracles of God. And St. Hierom tells us Advers. Lu­ciferian., That the Primitive Churches were tainted with many gross Errors whil'st the Apostles were alive, and the blood of Christ yet warm in Judea. But it may be there have been better Teachers since, and Children are more apt to learn now than Men were then. Who knows how the World may be changed?

§. 2. Secondly, This Demonstration sup­poseth the hopes and fears which Chri­stian [Page 182] Religion applies to Mens minds to be certain and necessary causes of actual will in Men to adhere to the Doctrine of Christ; and consequently that they must necessarily adhere to it. That he supposeth them to be necessary, I have his own word for it; for he tells us P. 75., That he hath endeavoured to demon­strate the indefectibleness of Tradition as the proper and necessary effect of those causes which preserve and continue Tra­dition on foot; and what those causes are he told us before P. 60., That they are Hopes and Fears strongly applied. But I hope that the indefectibleness of Tra­dition cannot be a necessary effect of the strong application of those Hopes and Fears, unless those Hopes and Fears be a necessary cause of that effect. And indeed this is sufficiently implied in his saying that they are the causes of actual will in Christians to adhere to Tra­dition. For if these causes of actual will be constant (as he must suppose) then they are certain and necessary and infallible causes of adhering to this Doctrine. For whatever is in act is necessary while it is so, and if it be con­stantly in act, the effect is always neces­sary. [Page 183] But what a wild Supposition is this, That Moral Motives and Argu­ments working upon a free Principle, the Will of Man, do necessarily pro­duce their Effect? Is it necessary that the hopes of Heaven, and the fears of Hell should keep Christians constant to the Doctrine of Christ? and is it not as necessary that these arguments should prevail upon them to the practice of it? It is in vain to go about to demonstrate that all men must be good who have sufficient arguments propounded to them, when experience tells us the con­trary. Nay, it is in reason impossible that Moral arguments should be of a necessary and infallible efficacy, because they are always propounded to a free Agent, who may choose whether he will yield to them or not. Indeed it is al­ways reasonable that men should yield to them, and if they be reasonable they will; but so long as they are free it can never be infallibly certain that they will. And if men be not free, it is no vertue at all in them to be wrought up­on by these arguments. For what ver­tue can it be in any man to entertain the Christian doctrine and adhere to it [Page 184] and live accordingly, if he does all this necessarily, that is, whether he will or no, and can no more choose whether he will do so or not, than whether he will see the light when the Sun shines upon his open eyes, or whether he will hear a sound when all the Bells in the Town are Ringing in his ears, or (to use Mr. S's P. 53. own similitudes) whether he will feel heat, cold, pain, pleasure, or any other material quality that affects his senses. We see then how unreasonable his Sup­positions are, and yet without these Grounds his Demonstration falls. For if it be possible that Christians may mi­stake or forget the Doctrine of Christ, or any part of it, or be defective in diligence to instruct others in it; or if it be possible that the Will of man which is free, may not be necessarily and infallibly swayed by the arguments of hope and fear, then it is possible that Tradition may fail. And is not this a good Demonstration which supports it self upon such Princi­ples as do directly affront the constant experience, and the clearest reason of Mankind?

§. 3. And here I cannot but take no­tice how inconsistent he is to himself in [Page 185] laying the Grounds of Tradition's cer­tainty. In one Part of his Book he tells us P. 53., That Tradition hath for its Basis the best Nature in the Vniverse, that is, Mans; Not according to his Moral part, defectible by reason of Origi­nal Corruption; nor yet his Intellectuals, darkly groping in the pursuit of Sci­ence, &c. But according to those Facul­ties in him perfectly and necessarily sub­ject to the operations and strokes of Na­ture, that is, his Eyes, Ears; Handling, and the direct impressions of knowledg, as naturally and necessarily issuing from the affecting those senses, as it is to feel heat, cold, pain, pleasure, or any other material quality. So that according to this Discourse, the Basis of Tradition is not Mans Nature considered as Moral, and capable of Intellectual Reflection; for in this consideration it is dark and defe­ctible: But Mans Nature considered only as capable of direct sensitive knowledg, and as acting naturally and necessarily. Which is to say, That Tradition is found­ded in the Nature of Man considered not as a Man but a Brute; under which consideration, I see no reason why he should call it the best Nature in the Vni­verse. [Page 184] [...] [Page 185] [...] [Page 186] But now how will he reconcile this Discourse with the Grounds of his Demonstration? where he tells us, That the stability of Tradition is founded in the Arguments of Hope and Fear, the Ob­jects of which being future and at a di­stance, cannot work upon a man imme­diately by direct Impressions upon his senses, but must work upon him by way of Intellectual Reflection and Considera­tion. For I hope he will not deny but that the Arguments of Hope and Fear work upon man according to his Moral and Intellectual part, else how are they Arguments? And if man according to his Moral part be (as he says) defectible, how can the indefectibility of Tradition be founded in those Arguments which work upon man only according to his Moral part? I have purposely all along (both for the Readers ease and mine own) neg­lected to take notice of several of his inconsistencies, but these are such clear and transparent Contradictions, that I could do no less than make an example of them.

SECT. V.

§. 1. THirdly, This Demonstration is confuted by clear and un­deniable Instances to the contrary. I will mention but two.

First, The Tradition of the one true God, which was the easiest to be pre­served of any Doctrine in the World, be­ing short and plain, planted in every mans Nature, and perfectly suited to the reason of Mankind. And yet this Tradition, not having past through many hands (by reason of the long Age of man) was so defaced and cor­rupted, that the World did lapse into Polytheism and Idolatry. Now a man that were so hardy as to demonstrate against matter of Fact, might by a stronger Demonstration than Mr. S's, prove that though it be certain this Tra­dition hath failed, yet it was impossible it should fail; as Zeno demonstrated the impossibility of motion against Diogenes walking before his eyes. For the Do­ctrine of the one true God was setled in the heart of Noah, and firmly be­lieved by him to be the way to happiness, [Page 188] and the contradicting or deserting of this, to be the way to misery. And this Doctrine was by him so taught to his Children, who were encouraged by these Motives to adhere to this Doctrine, and to propagate it to their Children, and were deterred by them from relin­quishing it. And this was in all Ages the perswasion of the faithful. Now the Hopes of Happiness, and the Fears of Misery strongly applied, are the causes of actual will. Besides, the thing was feasible, or within their power; that is, what they were bred to was knowable by them, and that much more easily than any other Doctrine whatsoever, being short, and plain, and natural. This put, it follows as certainly that a great num­ber in each Age would continue to hold themselves, and teach their Children as themselves had been taught, that is, would follow and stick to this Tradition of the one true God, as it doth that a cause put actually causing produceth its effect. Actually I say; for since the cause is put, and the Patient disposed, it fol­lows inevitably that the cause is put still actually causing. This demonstration which concludes an apparent falshood [Page 189] hath the whole strength of Mr. S's, and several advantages beyond it. For the Doctrine conveyed by this Tradition is the most important, being the first Prin­ciple of all Religion; the danger of cor­rupting it as great, the facility of preserv­ing it much greater, than of the Christian Doctrine, for the causes before mention­ed. And yet after all, it signifies nothing against certain experience, and unquestio­nable matter of Fact; only it sufficiently shews the vanity of Mr. S's pretended Demonstration built upon the same or weaker Grounds.

§. 2. Secondly, The other Instance shall be in the Greek Church, who re­ceived the Christian Doctrine as entire from the Apostles, and had as great an obligation to propagate it truly to Po­sterity, and the same fears and hopes strongly applied to be the actual causes of will; in a word, all the same Argu­ments and Causes to preserve and con­tinue Tradition on foot, which the Ro­man Church had: And yet, to the utter confusion of Mr. S's Demonstration, Tradition hath failed among them. For as Speculators, they deny the procession of the Holy Ghost from the Son, and as [Page 190] Testifiers they disown any such Doctrine to have been delivered to them by the precedent Age, or to any other Age of their Church by the Apostles as the Doctrine of Christ.

§. 3. To this Instance of the Greek Church, because Mr. White hath offered something by way of answer, I shall here consider it. He tells us Apology for Tradition, p. 51., That the plea of the Greek Church is Non-Tra­dition, alledging only this, That their Fathers do not deliver the Doctrine of the procession of the Holy Ghost; not that they say the contrary, which clearly de­monstrates there are no opposite Tradi­tions between them and us. But this was not the thing Mr. White was con­cerned to do, to demonstrate there were no opposite Traditions between the Greeks and the Latines, but to secure his main Demonstration of the impossi­bility of Traditions failing against this Instance. For that the Greeks have no such Tradition as this, That the Holy Ghost proceeds from the Son, is as good an evidence of the failure of Tra­dition as if they had a positive Tradi­tion, That he proceeds only from the Fa­ther; especially if we consider that [Page 191] they Phoc. Ep. 7. charge the Latin Church with In­novation in this matter, and say that the addition of that Clause, of the Procession from the Son also, is a corruption of the ancient Faith, and a Devilish Invention. Why then does Mr. White go about to baffle so material an Objection (and, I fear, his own Conscience likewise) by a pitiful Evasion instead of a solid An­swer? What though there be no oppo­site Traditions between the Greek and Latin Church, yet if their Faith be op­posite, Will it not from hence follow that Tradition hath failed in one of them? I wonder that Mr. White, who hath so very well confuted the Infallibi­lity of Popes and Councils, and there­by undermined the very Foundations of that Religion, should not by the same light of Reason discover the fond­ness of his own Opinion concerning the Infallibility of Oral Tradition, which hath more and greater absurdities in it than that which he confutes. And to shew Mr. White the absurdity of it, I will apply his Demonstration of the Infallibility of Christian Tradition in general, to the Greek Church in parti­cular; by which every one will see [Page 192] that it does as strongly prove the impossibility of Traditions failing in the Greek Church, as in the Roman-Catholick, as they are pleased to call it. His Demonstration is this De Fid. & Theol. Tract. 1. Sect. 4., Christ com­manded his Apostles to preach to all the World, and lest any one should doubt of the effect, he sent his Spirit into them to bring to their remembrance what he had taught them; which Spirit did not only give them a power to do what he encli­ned them to, but did cause them actually to do it. I cannot but take notice by the way of the ill consequence of this, which is, that men may doubt, whe­ther those who are to teach the Doctrine of Christ, will remember it, and teach it to others, unless they have that extra­ordinary and efficacious assistance of the Holy Ghost which the Apostles had; if this be true, his Demonstration is at an end, for he cannot plead that this assistance hath been continued ever since the Apostles. He proceeds, The Apostles preached this Doctrine; the Nations understood it, lived according to it, and valued it as that which was necessary to them and their Posterity in­comparably beyond any thing else. All [Page 193] this I suppose done to, and by the Greeks as well as any other Nation. These things being put, it cannot enter into any mans understanding, but that the Christian [Greeks] of the first Age, being the Scholars of the Apostles, could and would earnestly commend the Christian Doctrine to their Posterity; if so, it is evident that they did. So that the continuance of the purity of the Faith in the [Greek] Church is founded upon this, That Fa­thers always delivered the same Doctrine to their Children which they had recei­ved from their Fathers, and did believe it under this very Notion and Title as received; nor could any one [of that Church] deliver another Doctrine un­der this Title, but he would be convinced of a Lye by the rest; and if the whole [Greek] Church should endeavour to deliver a new Doctrine under that Title, [and there's the same reason if they should leave out any Article of the old Doctrine] that whole Age would be in their Consciences condemned of perfidi­ousness and parricide. Now this is as impossible as it is that all Mankind should conspire to kill themselves. And he af­terwards Ibid. Sect. 5. gives the reason why it is so. [Page 194] impossible that Tradition should fail, and it is a very bold and saucy one, That if the Tradition of the Christian Faith be not more firm than the course of the Sun and Moon, and the propaga­tion of Mankind, then God hath shewn himself an unskilful Artificer. What is there in all this Demonstration, which may not be accommodated to the Greek Church with as much force and advan­tage as to the Catholick? Unless he can shew that it is very possible that all the Men in Greece may conspire to kill themselves, but yet absolutely impossi­ble that all the Men in the World should do so; which I am sure he cannnot shew, unless he can demonstrate, that though it be possible for a Million, of as wise Men as any are to be found in the World together, to conspire to do a foolish action, yet it is impossible that an Hundred millions not one jot wiser than the other, should agree together to the doing of it.

§. 4. From all this it appears, That Mr. White's Answer to this Objection, doth not signifie any thing to his pur­pose. For if the Procession of the Holy Ghost was part of Christs Doctrine, [Page 195] then it was delivered by the Apostles to the Greek Church; if so, they could not fail to deliver it down to the next Age, and that to the next, and so on; but it seems they have failed. Where then is the force of hopes and fears strongly applied? Where are the certain Causes of actual Will to adhere to this Doctrine? Why is not the effect pro­duced, the Causes being put actually cau­sing? If the Apostles delivered this Doctrine, Oral Tradition is so clear and unmistakable, and P. 53. & 54. brings down Faith clad in such plain matters of Fact, that the most stupid man living (much less the Greeks, that were the flower of Man­kind) could not possibly be ignorant of it; nay Ibid., it exceeds all the power of Nature to blot Knowledges thus fixt out of the Soul of one single Believer (much more out of so vast a Church) And P. 78. since no man can hold contrary to his knowledg, or doubt of what he holds, nor change and innovate without know­ing he did so, 'tis a manifest impossibili­ty, a whole Church should in any Age fall into an absurdity so inconsistent with the nature of one single man. And P. 86. since 'tis natural for every man to speak Truth, [Page 196] and Grace is to perfect Nature in what­ever is good in it, it follows that one truly Christian heart is far more fixt to Veracity, than others not imbu'd with these heavenly Tenets; and consequently that a multitude of such must incompa­rably exceed in point of testifying the same number of others, unfortified by Christs Doctrine. And since P. 89. such a thought cannot enter into the most de­praved Nature, as to harm another with­out any good to himself, and yet this must be if we put Christian Fathers mis­teaching their Children unreceived Doc­trines for received (and I hope for the same reason, received Doctrines for unreceived) contrary to their knowledg. For supposing Sanctity in the (Greek) Church (and why may we not as well as in the Latin) That is, that multitudes in it make Heaven their first love, and look on spiritual goods as their main con­cern, &c. it follows, that had the Fa­thers of that Church in any Age con­sented to mislead their Posterity from what themselves (not only) conceited (but knew) to be true, they should do the most extream harm imaginable to others without any the least good to them­selves; [Page 197] which is perhaps impossible in one single man, more in few, but infinitely in a multitude, especially of good men.

§. 5. Thus I might apply the rest of his Ranting Rhetorick (but that I am weary of Transcribing it) concerning P. 90, 91. the natural love of Parents to their Children (unless we suppose the Greek Church destitute of it) which must needs engage them to use the means proper to bring them to Heaven, and save them from Hell: As also concern­ing the natural care men have of not losing their Credit by telling pernicious Lyes. And, not to omit the best part of his Demonstration P. 93. (which was there­fore prudently reserved to the last place) I might likewise shew how the Principles of each Science, Arithmetick, Geometry, Logick, Nature, Morality, Hi­storical Prudence, Politicks, Metaphysicks, Divinity, and last of all the new Science of Controversie (as he calls it) or the blessed Art of Eternal wrangling and disputing ( the first Principle whereof (he tells us) is, That Tradition is cer­tain) do all contribute to shew the certainty of Tradition, that is, the im­possibility that any part of Christs [Page 198] Doctrine should fail in the Greek Church any more than in the Latin. And surely Arithmetick, Geometry, Lo­gick, Natural Philosophy, Metaphysicks, &c. will all stand up for the Greek Church in this quarrel; for considering that Greece was the place where the Arts and Sciences were born and bred, it is not to be imagined that they should be so disingenuous and unnatural, as not to contribute their best assistance to the service of their Countrey.

§. 6. But it may be the Greeks can­not so justly pretend to Oral Tradition as the Latins. What if St. Peter, the Head of the Apostles, thought fit to share Scripture and Tradition between these two Churches, and laying his left hand on the Greek Church, and his right on the Latin, was pleased to confer the great blessing of Oral Tradition upon the Latin Church? which being to be the seat of Infallibility, it was but fitting that she should be furnish't with this in­fallible way of conveying the Christian Doctrine. And therefore it may be, that as the Scriptures of the New Te­stament were left in Greek, so Oral Tra­dition was delivered down only in La­tin. [Page 199] This I confess is not altogether without some shew of reason: Mr. S. may do well to take the matter into his deeper consideration; he hath in his time improved as weak probabilities as these into lusty Demonstrations. And if he could but demonstrate this, it would very much weaken the force of this Instance of the Greek Church; o­therwise (for ought I see) this In­stance will hold good against him; and whatever he can say for the impossibili­ty of Tradition's failing in the Latin Church, may all be said of the Greek Church, if he will but grant that the Apostles preached the same Doctrine to them both; that the arguments of hope and fear which this Doctrine contains in it, were applied as strongly to the Greeks as the Latins. And yet not­withstanding all this, Tradition hath plainly failed in the Greek Church. Let him now assign the Age wherein so vast a number of men conspired to leave out the Article of the Procession of the Holy Ghost; and shew how it was possible a whole Age could conspire together to damn their Posterity; or how the Faith of immediate Fore-fathers might [Page 200] be altered without any such Conspira­cy; and we are ready to satisfie him how the Doctrine of the Latin Church might be corrupted and altered, and to tell him punctually in what Age it was done. And until he do this, I would entreat him to trouble us no more with those canting questions (wherein yet the whole force of his Demonstration lies) How is it possible a whole Age should conspire to change the Doctrine of their Fore-fathers? And in what Age was this done? For if it be reaso­nable to demand of us, in order to the overthrowing of his Demonstration, to assign the particular Age wherein the Latin Church conspired to change the ancient Doctrine; with the same reason we require of him, in order to the main­taining of his Demonstration, to name the particular Age wherein the Greek Church conspired to alter the Doctrine of Christ (which was undoubtedly in the first Age truly delivered to them by the Apostles) and also to shew from the rational force and strength of Traditi­on, how it is more impossible for the whole Church to have failed in transmit­ting the Doctrine of Christ down to us, [Page 201] or to have conspired to the altering of it, than for such a multitude of Christi­ans as is the vast body of the Greek Church. If Mr. S. or Mr. White shew this, they do something; otherwise, I must tell them, that unless they can ma­nage these pretty things they call De­monstrations better, they must shortly either quit their Reason, or their Reli­gion; or else return to the honest old Mumpsimus of the Infallibility of the Church from an extraordinary and im­mediate assistance of the Holy Ghost; or (to make the business short, and stop all gaps with one Bush) come over to the Jesuites, and acknowledg the Popes Infallibility both in matters of Faith and Fact; by which means they may reconcile themselves to him, and pre­vent that direful stroke which threatens them from Rome, and is ready to cut them off from the Body of the Traditi­onary Church. And thus I have done with his First Demonstration; and I take it for a good sign that the Popish Cause is at a very low ebb, when such stuff as this must be called Demonstration.

SECT. VI.

Mr. S's De­monstration à posteriori.§. 1. I Come now to his Demonstration a Posteriori, which although it fall of it self if the Demonstration a Pri­ori fail; yet because it hath some pe­culiar absurdities of its own, I shall con­sider it by it self as well as with relation to the other.

§. 2. Before he comes to lay it down with the Grounds of it, according to his usual fashion, he premiseth some­thing as yielded by Protestants which, in his sense, no Protestant ever granted. Just so he dealt with us before concern­ing the Scriptures, saying, That by them the Protestants must mean unsensed Let­ters and Characters. But let us see what it is. P. 76. That this Demonstration a Po­steriori, seems a needless endeavour a­gainst the Protestants, who yield that those Points in which we agree, as the Trinity, Incarnation, &c. came down by this way of Tradition; And this (he saith) no Protestant ever denied. And then he asks. Whether the same vertue of Tradition would not have been as power­ful to bring down other Points in which [Page 203] we do not agree, had any such been? Now if he speak any thing to his own purpose, he must suppose Protestants to yield, that all those Points wherein we are agreed, were conveyed down to us solely by Oral Tradition without Wri­ting: But this all Protestants deny. So that, that only which would avail his Cause against us, is to shew, that those Points wherein we differ, have not only come down to us by Oral Teaching, but that they are likewise contained in Scri­pture, without which, we say, we can have no sufficient certainty and assurance at this distance, that they were the Doctrine of Christ, and that they were not either totally innovated, or else corrupted in the conveyance from what they were at first. And if he can shew this concerning any Point in difference, I promise to yield it to him.

§. 3. I come now to his Demonstra­tion, which I shall set down in his own words with the Principles upon which it relies. P. 77, 78. The effect then we will pitch upon, and avow to be the proper one of such a cause, is the present perswasion of Traditionary Christians (or Catholicks) that their Faith hath descended from [Page 204] Christ and his Apostles uninterruptedly, which we find most firmly rooted in their heart; and the existence of this perswa­sion we affirm to be impossible without the existence of Traditions ever indefi­ciency to beget it. To prove this, I lay this first Principle; That Age, which holds her Faith thus delivered from the Apo­stles, neither can it self have changed any thing in it nor know or doubt that any Age since the Apostles had changed or inno­vated therein. The second Principle shall be this. No Age could innovate any thing, and withall deliver that very thing to Posterity as received from Christ by con­tinual Succession. The Sum of which is this, That because a present multitude of Christians ( viz. the Roman Church) are perswaded, that Christ's Doctrine hath descended to them solely by an uninterrupted Oral Tradition, there­fore this perswasion is an effect which cannot be attributed to any other cause but the indeficiency of Oral Tradition. For if neither the present Age, nor any Age before, could make any change or innovation, then the perswasion of the present Age is a plain Demonstration that this Doctrine was always the [Page 205] same, and consequently that Tradition cannot fail.

§. 4. In answer to this, I shall endea­vour to make good these four things.

First, That these Principles wholly rely upon the Truth of the Grounds of his Demonstration a Priori.

Secondly, That these Principles are not sufficiently proved by him.

Thirdly, That Doctrines and Practi­ses, which must be acknowledged to have been innovated, have made the same pretence to uninterrupted Tra­dition.

Fourthly, That it is not the present perswasion of the Church of Rome, (whom he calls the Traditionary Chri­stians) nor ever was, that their Faith hath descended to them solely by Oral Tradition. If I can now make good these four things, I hope his Demonstra­tion is at an end.

SECT. VII.

The First An­swer to his se­cond Demon­stration.§. 1. THat these Principles wholly rely upon the truth of the Grounds of his Demonstration a Priori. For if the Doctrine of Christ was ei­ther imperfectly taught in any Age, or mistaken by the Learners, or any part of it forgotten (as it seems the whole Greek Church have forgot that funda­mental Point of the Procession of the Holy Ghost, as the Roman Church accounts it) or if the Arguments of hope and fear be not necessary causes of actual will to ad­here to Tradition; then there may have been changes and innovations in any Age, and yet men may pretend to have followed Tradition. But I have shewn, that Ignorance, and Negli­gence, and Mistake, and Pride, and Lust, and Ambition, and any other Vice or Interest, may hinder those cau­ses from being effectual to preserve Tra­dition entire and uncorrupted. And when they do so, it is not to be expected that those Persons, who innovate and change the Doctrine, should acknow­ledg that their new Doctrines are con­trary [Page 207] to the Doctrine of Christ; but that they should at first advance them as Pious, and after they have prevailed and gained general entertainment, then impudently affirm that they were the very Doctrines which Christ delivered; which they may very securely do, when they have it in their power to burn all that shall deny it.

§. 2. I will give a clear Instance of the possibility of this in the Doctrine of Transubstantiation, by shewing how this might easily come in, in the Ninth or Tenth Age after Christ. We will suppose then that about this time, when universal Ignorance, and the genuine Daughter of it (call her Devotion or Superstition) had overspread the World, and the generality of People were strongly enclined to believe strange things; and even the greatest Contradictions were recommended to them under the notion of Mysteries, being told by their Priests and Guides, that the more contradictions any thing is to Reason, the greater merit there is in believing it: I say, let us suppose, that in this state of things, one or more of the most eminent then in the Church, [Page 208] either out of design, or out of supersti­tious ignorance and mistake of the sense of our Saviour's words used in the Con­secration of the Sacrament, should advance this new Doctrine, That the words of Consecration, This is my Body, are not to be understood by any kind of Trope (as the like forms in Scripture are, as I am the Vine, I am the Door, which are plain Tropes) but being used about this great Mystery of the Sacra­ment ought in all reason to be suppo­sed to contain in them some notable My­stery; which they will do, if they be understood of a real change of the sub­stance of Bread and Wine, made by vertue of these words, into the real Body and Blood of our Saviour. And in all this, I suppose nothing but what is so far from being impossible, that it is too usu­al, for men either out of Ignorance or Interest, to advance new Opinions in Religion. And such a Doctrine as this was very likely to be advanced by the ambitious Clergy of that time, as a pro­bable means to draw in the People to a greater veneration of them; which ad­vantage Mr. Rushworth Dial. 1. Sect. 4. seems to be very sensible of, when he tells us, That the [Page 209] power of the Priest in this particular, is such a priviledg, as if all the learned Clerks that ever lived since the begin­ning of the World, should have studied to raise, advance, and magnifie some one state of men to the highest pitch of Re­verence and Eminency, they could ne­ver (without special light from Heaven) have thought of any thing comparable to this. I am of his mind, that it was a very notable device, but (I am apt to think) invented without any special light from Heaven. Nor was such a Doctrine less likely to take and prevail among the People in an Age prodigiously ignorant, and strongly enclined to Superstition, and thereby well prepared to receive the grossest Absurdities under the noti­on of Mysteries; especially if they were such as might seem to conciliate a greater honour and reverence to the Sacrament. Now supposing such a Do­ctrine as this, so fitted to the humor and temper of the Age, to be once asserted, either by chance, or out of design; it would take like wild-fire: especially if by some one or more who bore sway in the Church, it were but re­commended with convenient gravity [Page 210] and solemnity. And although Mr. Rushworth says Dial. 3. Sect. 7., It is impossible that the Authority of one man should sway so much in the World, because (sayes he) surely the Devil himself would ra­ther help the Church, than permit so lit­tle pride among men; yet I am not so thoroughly satisfied with this cunning reason: For though he delivers it con­fidently, and with a surely, yet I make some doubt whether the Devil would be so forward to help the Church; nay, on the contrary, I am enclined to think that he would rather choose to connive at this humble and obsequious temper in men, in order to the overthrow of Religion, than cross a design so dear to him by unseasonable temptations to pride: So that notwithstanding Mr. Rushworth's reason, it seems very likely that such a Doctrine, in such an Age, might easily be propagated by the in­fluence and authority of one or a few great Persons in the Church. For no­thing can be more suitable to the easie and passive temper of superstitious Ig­norance, than to entertain such a Doc­trine with all imaginable greediness, and to maintain it with a proportiona­ble [Page 211] zeal. And if there be any wiser than the rest, who make Objections a­gainst it as if this Doctrine were new and full of contradictions, they may easily be born down by the stream, and by the eminency and authority and pretended sanctity of those who are the heads of this Innovation. And when this Doctrine is generally swal­lowed, and all that oppose it are look­ed upon and punished as Hereticks, then it is seasonable to maintain that this Doctrine was the doctrine of forefa­thers; to which end it will be suffici­ent to those who are willing to have it true, to bend two or three sayings of the Ancients to that purpose. And as for the contradictions contained in this Doctrine, it was but telling the People then (as they do in effect now) that contradictions ought to be no scruple in the way of Faith: that the more impossible any thing is, 'tis the fitter to be believed: that it is not praise-wor­thy to believe plain possibilities, but that this is the gallantry and heroical power of Faith, this is the way to ob­lige God Almighty for ever to us, to believe flat and down-right contradic­tions: [Page 212] For God requires at the Peo­ples hands (as Mr. Rushworth Dial. 1. Sect. 4. tells us) a Credulity of things above and beyond Nature; nay, beyond all the Fables, be it spoken with respect, that ever man in­vented. After this Doctrine hath pro­ceeded thus far, and by the most in­humane severities and cruelties sup­prest Dissenters, or in a good measure rooted them out; then if they please even this new word Transubstantiation may pretend also to Antiquity, and in time be confidently vouched for a word used by Christians in all Ages, and transmitted down to them by those from whom they received the Doctrine of the Sacrament, as a term of Art ap­pendant to it. And when a superstiti­ous Church and designing Governors have once gained this Post, and by means of this enormous Article of Transubstantiation have sufficiently de­bauched the minds of men, and made a breach in their understandings wide e­nough for the entertaining of any Er­ror, though never so gross and sensless; then Innovations come in amain, and by sholes; and the more absurd and unrea­sonable any thing is, it is for that very [Page 213] reason the more proper matter for an Article of Faith. And if any of these Innovations be objected against, as con­trary to former belief and practice, it is but putting forth a lusty act of Faith, and believing another contradiction, that though they be contrary yet they are the same.

§. 3. And there is nothing in all this, but what is agreeable both to History and Experience. For that the Ninth and Tenth Ages, and those which fol­lowed them till the Reformation, were thus prodigiously ignorant and super­stitious, is confirmed by the unanimous consent of all Historians; and even by those Writers, that have been the great­est Pillars of their own Religion. And Experience tells us, that in what Age so­ever there are a great company of su­perstitious People, there will never be wanting a few crafty Fellows to make use of this easie and pliable humor to their own ends. Now that this was the state of those Ages of the Church, will be evident to any from these Testimo­nies. Platina In Vit. Romani. Papae 117. A. C. 900. writes of Pope Roma­nus, that he null'd the Acts of his Pre­decessor Stephanus; For (sayes he) [Page 214] these Popes minded nothing else but how they might extinguish both the Name and Dignity of their Predecessors. And if so, who can doubt, but that these Popes who made it their business to de­stroy the very memory of their Ancest­ors, would be very little careful to preserve the Doctrine of Fore-fathers. But what the care of those Times was in this particular, may be conjectured from what Onuphrius In Platin. says by way of confutation of that passage in Platina, concerning Pope Joan's reading pub­lickly at Rome at her first coming thi­ther. This (says he) is utterly false, for there was nothing that they were less sollicitous about in those Times, than to furnish the City with any publick Tea­chers. And the time which Onuphrius speaks of, was much about the begin­ning of the Tenth Century. Phil. Ber­gomensis Anno 506. says, It happened in that Age through the slothfulness of men, that there was a general decay of Vertue both in the Head and Members. Again Anno 9.8., These Times through the Ambition and cruel Tyranny of the Popes were extreme­ly unhappy — For the Popes setting aside the fear of God and his Worship, fell in­to [Page 215] such enmities among themselves, as cruel Tyrants exercise towards one ano­ther. Sabellicus Ennead. 9. L. 1. Anno. 900. says, It is wonderful to observe what a strange forgetfulness of all Arts did about this time seize upon men; insomuch that neither the Popes, nor other Princes seem'd to have any sense or apprehension of any thing that might be useful to humane life. There were no wholsome Laws, no Reparati­ons of Churches, no pursuit of liberal Arts; but a kind of stupidity and mad­ness and forgetfulness of manners had possessed the minds of men. And a lit­tle after, I cannot (says he) but much wonder, from whence these Tragical Ex­amples of Popes should spring; and how their minds should come to be so devoid of all Piety, as neither to regard the Per­son which they susteined, nor the place they were in. Sigonius De Regn. Ital. L. 6. speaking of these Times, about the beginning of the Tenth Century, calls them the foulest and blackest, both in respect of the wick­edness of Princes, and the madness of the People, that are to be found in all Antiquity, Genebrard Chron. L. 4. speaking of the same Time, This (says he) is called the unhappy Age; being destitute of men [Page 216] eminent for Wit and Learning, as also of famous Princes and Popes. In this Time there was scarce any thing done worthy to be remembred by Posterity. And he adds afterwards, But chiefly unhappy in this one thing, that for almost 150 years together, about 50 Popes, did utterly de­generate from the vertue of their An­cestors. He should have added further, but even to a miracle happy in another respect, that during this long and total degeneracy from the Piety and Vertue of their Ancestors, they did not in the least swerve from them in matter of Faith and Doctrine: A thing incre­dible, were there not Demonstration for it. Werner Fascic. Tem­por. gives this Character of that Time; About the year of our Lord One Thousand, there began an effeminate Time, in which the Christian Faith be­gun to degenerate exceedingly, and to decline from its ancient vigour; inso­much that in many Countries of Chri­stendom, neither Sacraments nor Eccle­siastical Rites were observed—And peo­ple were given to Soothsaying and Witch­crafts, and the Priest was like the People. It seems by this Testimony, that Tradi­tion did faulter a little in that Age, else [Page 217] the Christian Faith could not possibly have degenerated and declined so very much: And (which threatens Mr. S's Demonstration most of all) that the Practical Tradition of Sacraments, and other Ecclesiastical Observances did fail in many Christian Countries. Gerbert Epist. 40., who lived in that Time, gives this short Character of the Roman Church, in an Epistle of his to Stephen Deacon of that Church; The World stands amazed at the Manners of Rome. But most full is the complaint of a great Prelate of the Church Bell. Sacr. L. 1. c. 8. concerning those Times; In the West (says he) and almost all the World over (especially among those who were called the Faithful) Faith failed, and there was no fear of God a­mong them: (it seems the Argument of Fear had lost its force) Justice was perished from among men, and violence prevailing against equity governed the Nations. Fraud, Deceit, and the Arts of Couzenage were grown universal. All kind of Vertue gave way as an useless thing, and wickedness supply'd its place. The World seemed to be declining apace towards its Evening, and the second co­ming of the Son of man to draw near: [Page 218] For Love was grown cold, and Fai [...]h was not found upon Earth. All things were in Confusion, and the World looked as if it would return to its old Chaos.—All sorts of Fornication were committed with the same freedom as if they had been lawful Actions; for men neither blushed at them, nor were punish't for them.—Nor did the Clergy live better than the People.—For the Bishops were grown negligent of the Duty of their place. &c. In a word, men ran themselves headlong into all Vice, and all Flesh had corrupted its way. And farther to shew the great neglect of Priests and Bishops in the work of Teaching and Instruc­tion (which is so necessary to the pre­serving of Tradition inviolable) I will add the Testimony of one Elfric. Serm. ad Sacerdot. who lived in those Times; who tells us, That in those days, the Priests and Bishops, who ought to have been the Pillars of the Church, were so negligent that they did not mind the Divine Scripture; nor take any care to teach and instruct Scholars that might succeed them, as we read holy Men had used to do, who left many Scholars per­fectly instructed to be their Successors. If they had only neglected the Scrip­tures, [Page 219] all might have been well enough; but it seems they took no care to in­struct people in the way of Oral Tradi­tion, nor to furnish the Church with a new Generation of able Teachers who might deliver down from hand to hand the sense and faith of Fore-fathers. This last Testimony, the late Learned Lord Primate of Ierland, Bishop Vsher (in his Book De Christian. Eccles. Success. &c. C. 2. & 3. where several of the Testimo­nies I have produced, with many more to the same purpose, may be seen) cites out of a M. S. in Bennet Colledg Li­brary in Cambridg; concerning the authority of which M. S. there need be no dispute between Mr. S. and me; be­cause the whole force and effect of this Testimony is sufficiently contained in those Citations which I have brought out of publick and unquestionable Books.

§. 4. All these Testimonies which I have produced are, in general and for the substance of them, confirmed by Two of the greatest Props of the Ro­mish Church; Bellarmine, and Baronius. Bellarmine De Rom. Pontif. L. 4. c. 12. says of this Tenth Age, That there was never any either more unlearned, or more unhappy. Baronius [Page 220] Annal. Tom. 10. Anno 900. speaks more particularly, What was then the face of the Roman Church? How deformed? When Whores, no less powerful than vile, bore the chief sway at Rome; and at their pleasure changed Sees, appointed Bishops; and (which it is horrible to mention) did thrust into St. Peters See their own Gallants, false-Popes, who would not have been menti­oned in the Catalogue of the Roman Popes, but only for the more distinct Recording of so long a Succession of Times. And a little after, Christ was then (it seems) in a very deep sleep—And which was worse; when the Lord was thus asleep there were no Disciples to awaken him, being themselves all fast asleep. What kind of Cardinal Presbyters and Deacons can we think were chosen by these Mon­sters, when nothing is so natural as for every one to propagate his own likeness? It is very much that these lewd Women, and their Favourite-Popes, Cardinals, and Bishops who then swayed the Church, should, when they were so careless of their own Souls, be so tender of the salvation of Posterity; and, when they administred all other affairs of the Church so extravagantly, should [Page 221] be so careful of the main chance, as to transmit the Christian Doctrine entire and uncorrupted to succeeding Ages. Yet Mr. S. hath demonstrated this a Posteriori, which seems so very strange to a man that considers things a Priori.

§. 5. But it may be, this dismal state of the Roman Church lasted but a lit­tle while; and she did in the same Age, before Tradition could be interrupted, recover her self out of this degenerate condition. I will therefore enquire a little into the state of succeeding Times. And I find in the Thirteenth Century, St. Bernard In Convers. Sancti Pauli. Serm. 1. complaining, That the dege­neracy of the Priests was in his days greater than ever; We cannot (says he) now say, as is the People so is the Priest; for the People are not so bad as their Priests. In the Fifteenth Century, Nic. de Clemangiis, who lived in that Time, wrote a Book upon this argu­ment, Of the corrupt state of the Church; by which we may make some judgment whether in that Age it was (as Mr. S. says) impossible but that the Christi­an Doctrine should be entirely preser­ved, and faithfully and diligently taught. He says C. 3. there was an uni­versal [Page 222] degeneracy in the Church, from the very Head of it to its lowest Mem­bers. In the same Chapter he complains, Who is there that preaches the Gospel to the People? Who shews them the way to Salvation either by Word or Action? It seems there was a great failure both of Oral and Practical Tradition. Again C. 5., speaking of the Pope's taking to him­self the Collation of all vacant Bishop­ricks and Dignities; he says, one might think the Pope did this, that the Church might be provided of worthier Gover­nors, both in respect of their Learning, and their lives, did not the thing it self declare the contrary, and that ignorant and useless Persons (provided they had money) were by Simony advanced to the highest degrees in the Church. And C. 6., speaking what a vast number of Can­didates there was usually at Rome from all Parts waiting for Benefices and Dig­nities, he tells us, That many of these did not come from their Studies, or from Schools of Learning, to govern Parishes; but from the Plow, and from the meanest Professions: and that they understood La­tin and Arabick much at the same rate; and many of them could not read at all. [Page 223] But it may be (says he) their manners were such as might be some excuse for their Ignorance. No; though their Learn­ing was but little, their Vertue was less; for being brought up in Idleness, they followed nothing but Debauchery and Sports, &c. Hence it comes to pass, that in all places there are so many wicked, and wretched, and ignorant Priests— Hence it is that Priests are so contemned by the common People—Formerly the Priesthood was highly honoured by the People, and nothing was more venerable than that Order of men; but now nothing is more vile and despicable.— C. 9. I make no doubt, but there are now more Thieves and Robbers, than true Pastors in the Church.— C. 11. Why should any man now flatter himself with hopes of Prefer­ment, because of his Vertue or Learning? Men do not now (as formerly) rise in the Church by such Arts— C. 13▪ Which of those that are now adays advanced to the Pontifical Dignity, hath so much as perfunctorily read, or heard, or learn't the Scriptures; yea, or ever touched any more than the cover of the Bible? A­gain C. 14, speaking of the prodigious Covetousness of the Governors of the [Page 224] Church, and the gross neglect of their Flocks, They would (says he) much more contentedly bear the loss of ten thousand Souls, than of ten or twelve Shillings. But why do I say more con­tentedly? When without the least trou­ble or disturbance to themselves, they can bear the loss of Souls; a thing so far from their care, that it never entred into their thoughts. Had the Hereticks of those days but had Wit enough, and a little Money, they might (it seems) for a small Sum have hired the Governors of the Church to have renounced Tradi­tion, or to have ceased to propagate it; though they had known that in so do­ing they should have damned all their Posterity. He goes on, and tells us, That if there were perhaps any one who did not take these courses, the rest would all snarle at him, call him Fool, and say he was unfit to be a Priest.—So that the study of the Scriptures (together with the Professors of it) was turned in­to laughter and scorn by all; but (which is prodigious) especially by the Popes, who prefer their own Traditions many degrees before the Commands of God. I desire Mr. S. to take notice in what kind [Page 225] of Times Tradition was set up against Scripture. Again C. 16., speaking of the choice of persons to be Priests, he tells us, That there was no enquiry made in­to their Lives, no question about their Manners: As for their Learning (says he) what need I speak of that? When we see the Priests, almost universally▪ have much ado to read, though but in an haesitating and spelling fashion, drawing out one syllable after another, without understanding either the sense of what they read, or the words. I am now re­conciled to oral Tradition, and convin­ced that there was great need of it in those Ages in which scarce any of the Priests could either write or read. I omit the particulars of what he says C. 20, 21, 23. con­cerning the common Drunkenness and Incontinency of Priests, who (because they made Conscience of Marriage) kept Whores in their Houses; concerning the dissolute Lives of Monks; and con­cerning Nunneries, which instead of be­ing the Sanctuaries of God, were he abominable Stews of Venus▪ and the Receptacles of lascivious young men; insomuch (says he) that at this day it is the same thing to put a Virgin into a [Page 226] Nunnery, and to make her a common Strumpet. And to shew that he does not speak these things of a few, but with relation to the general corruption of that Age, he adds C. 25., That wickedness did so abound in all Orders of men, that scarce one among a thousand was to be found who did truly live up to his Pro­fession: And if there was any one that did not follow these lewd courses, he became ridiculous to others, and was branded either as an insolent singular Mad-man, or an Hypocrite. I wil con­clude this long Testimony with the cha­racter which he gives C. 27. of one of the Popes of his time, Clement by name, viz. That he did chiefly apply himself to gratifie and oblige all the Parasites and Buffoons that had any interest in the several Courts of Princes: And to this end, did confer upon these, and upon handsom young Boys (which he much delighted in) almost all the vacant Bishopricks, and most of the other Church-D [...]nities. It is well that oral Tradition hath the security of Infallibility, other­wise it had in all probability been lost among this lewd sort of People, which yet they gravely call the Holy Roman-Catholick Church.

[Page 227]§ 6. To this effect I might have pro­duced Testimonies concerning every Age from the Ninth to the Sixteenth; but Mr. Cressy hath saved me that la­bour, who acknowledges Exomo­log. C. 68., that these worst times of the Church, when Igno­rance, Wordliness, Pride, Tyranny, &c. reigned with so much scope: When the Popes (so wicked, so abominable in their Lives) enjoyed so unlimited a power even over secular Princes themselves, and much more over the Clergy: I say, he acknowledges that these worst times continued during the space of about six Ages before Luther: A competent time (one would think) for Tradition to have miscarried in, were it not (as Mr. S. says) indefectible. Mr. Cressy indeed tells us Ibid., That this was to him an ir­refragable Testimony of a strange watch­fulness of Divine Providence over the Church, to preserve it from the Gates of Hell (that is, established and dangerous Errors) during these worst times. And very likely it is that this might appear so to such a Catholick whose judgment, he tells us, it is to renounce his own judg­ment: but it will never appear irrefra­gable, to any man that hath his judgment [Page 228] about him, unless Mr. Cressy can prove, that by that phrase, viz. the Gates of Hell, the Scripture does not mean gross wickedness of Life, as well as dangerous errors in Opinion; and likewise, that a general viciousness and debauchery of Manners is not as pernicious to Chri­stianity, and as destructive to the end of it, as establish'd Errors in Doctrine: And if so, that the Providence of God is not equally concerned to preserve the Church from things equally pernicious. When he hath proved these three things, then this Declamatory discourse of his may signify something, but not be­fore.

§ 7. Now if this be a true represen­tation of the state of the Roman Church in those Ages, was not this a very fit time for the Devil to play his Pranks in? Will any man that reads these Te­stimonies, think it impossible that the Doctrine of Christ should have been depraved in this Age; or that the most sensless and absurd Tenets might then be brought in under the notion of Chri­stian Doctrines? When scarce any one knew what the Doctrine of Christ was: When a general ignorance of Letters▪ [Page 229] and almost an universal stupidity and madness had seized upon the minds of men: When there was a horrid depra­vation of manners, and a general failure of Vertue and Piety both in the Head and Members of the Church: When the lives of the Popes were Tragically wicked, and no footsteps of Piety ap­peared in them: When for about 150 years together, in a continued successi­on of 50 Popes, there was scarce one pious and vertuous Man (or Woman) sate in that Chair: When the Whores governed Rome, and put out, and put in Bishops at their pleasure; and made their own Gallants Popes, who would be sure to make a Colledge of Cardi­nals of such Monsters as themselves: When pretty Boys, and Parasites, and Buffoons led the Head of the Church by the Nose, and were gratified with the best Bishopricks and Dignities in the Church: When there was a general decay of knowledg, and defection of the Christian Faith: When in many Countreys neither Sacraments, nor o­ther Ecclesiastical Rites were observed: When Violence and Fraud, and all the Arts of Deceit and Couzenage, and [Page 230] blacker Arts than these, were the com­mon study and practice: When Intem­perance, and all kind of Lewdness and Debauchery, reigned in all sorts and or­ders of men: When the generality of Bishops and Priests (who, according to Mr. Rushworth Dial. 3. Sect. 3., can only teach the Traditionary Doctrine) were igno­rant in the Scriptures and in every thing else (very few of them being able so much as to read tolerably) and did neg­lect to teach the People, and to breed up any in knowledg to succeed them in their Office; and in the lewdness of their lives did surpass the vilest of the People. Was not such an Age a fit season to plant the Doctrine of Transub­stantiation in? Or if any thing more monstrous than that can be imagined, it might then have taken place; for what Weeds would not have grown in so rank a Soyl? Doth Mr. S. think it im­possible, that those that were born in the Church then, should be ignorant of the Doctrine of Christ, when scarce any one would take the pains to teach it them; or that it could then have been altered, when so few understood, and fewer practised it: When ptodigi­ous [Page 231] Impiety and Wickedness did over­spread the Church, from the Pope down to the meanest of the Laity, can any one believe that men generally made Conscience to instruct their Children in the true Faith of Christ? Was it im­possible there should be any neglect of this Duty, when all others failed? That there should be any mistake about the Doctrine of Christ, when there was so much Ignorance? unless he be of Mr. Rushworth's Dial. 3. Sect. 7. mind, who reckons Igno­rance among the Parents of Religion. Where were then the Arguments of Hope and Fear? Were they strongly applied, or were they not? Were they causes of actual will in Christians to believe well, when they lived so ill? Or is Christi­anity only fitted to form mens minds to a right belief, but of no efficacy to go­vern their lives? Hath Christ taken care to keep his Church from Error, but not from Vice? As the great Car­dinal Perron Reply to K. James. L. 4. C. 6. (stooping below his own Wit and Reason to serve a bad Cause) tells us, That the Church sings, and will sing to the end of the World, I am black, but I am fair; that is to say, I am black in Manners, but fair in Doctrine: As if [Page 232] the meaning of the Prophesies and Pro­mises of Scripture made to the Church were this, that by the extraordinary care of Gods Providence, and peculiar assistance of his Holy Spirit, she should be wicked, but Orthodox to the end of the World. Where were then the vigorous causes imprinting Christ's Doctrine, and continuing it more par­ticularly at Rome than any where else; and of securing that See and its supreme Pastor in the faith and practice of the Christian Doctrine, above any other See or Pastor whatsoever? Who is so little versed in History, as not to under­stand the dismal state of Religion in the Romish Church, in those times? Who does not know what advantages the Bishops of Rome, and their servile Clergy made of the ignorance and su­perstition of those and the succeeding Ages; and by what Arts and steps they raised themselves to that power which they held in the Church for a long while after? When they could tread upon the necks of Princes; and make a great King walk bare-foot, and yield himself to be scourged by a company of petu­lant Monks: When they could send a­ny [Page 233] man upon an Errand to visit the ho­ly Sepulchre, or the Shrine of such a Saint; and command five or six Kings with great Armies upon a needless ex­pedition into the Holy Land, that so during their absence they might play their own Game the better: When they could mint Miracles, and impose upon the belief of the People (without the authority of any ancient Books) ab­surd and counterfeit Tales of ancient Saints and Martyrs, as delivered down to them by Tradition; and could bring that foppish Book the Legend, almost into equal Authority and Veneration with the Bible; and perswade the easy people that St. Denys carried his own head in his hand after it was cut off two miles, and kiss'd it when he laid it down. Any one that shall but reflect upon the monstrous practises of the Ro­man Bishops and Clergy in these Ages, the strange Feats they played, and what absurdities they imposed upon the su­perstitious credulity of Princes and People, may readily imagine not only the possibility, but the easiness of inno­vating new Doctrines as they pleased, under the specious pretences of Anti­tiquity, [Page 234] and constant and uninterrupted Tradition.

§ 8. And this kind of Discourse concerning the possibility of Errors coming into the Church, is not, as Mr. White ridiculously compares it Apology for Tradi­tion, p. 49., as if an Orator should go about to perswade people, that George, by the help of a long staff, and a nimble cast of his body, and such like advantages, might leap over Paul 's Steeple; never considering all the while the disproportion of all these ad­vantages to the height of the Steeple: so (saith he) he that discourseth at large how Errors use to slide into mans life, without comparing the power of the causes of Error to the strength of resist­ing, which consists in this Principle, No­thing is to be admitted but what de­scends by Tradition, &c. says no more towards proving an Error's over-run­ning the Church, than the Orator for George 's leaping over the Steeple. How vain is this? When it appears, from this Instance that I have given of the state of the Roman Church, in the Ninth and Tenth Centuries, and afterwards; that the causes of Error were infinitely stronger than the power of resistance. [Page 235] The great causes of Error are Igno­rance and Vice; where Ignorance reigns, there's no Power; where Vice, no Will to resist it. And how great the Igno­rance and Viciousness of all orders of men in the Roman Church was, is too too apparent from the Testimonies I have brought. Where was the strength of resisting Error, when for 150 years together the Popes were the vilest of men, Bishops and Priests overwhelmed with Ignorance, abandoned to all man­ner of vice, and most supinely negligent in instructing the People? In such a de­generate state of a Church, what strength is there in this Principle, Nothing is to be admitted but what descends by Tradi­tion? When those, who ought to teach men what that Doctrine is which was derived to them by Tradition, are ge­nerally careless of their Duty, and ig­norant themselves what that Doctrine is; When they addict themselves whol­ly to the satisfying of their Ambition, and other Lusts, and carry on designs of Gain, and getting Dominion over the People. What can hinder men so dis­posed from corrupting the Doctrine of Christ, and suiting it to their own Lusts [Page 236] and Interests? And what shall hinder the People from embracing those Cor­ruptions? when by the negligence of their Pastors to instruct them, and not only so, but also by their being deprived of the Scriptures in a known Tongue, they are become utterly incapable of knowing what the true Doctrine of Christ is. So that in an Age of such profound Ignorance and Vice, and ge­neral neglect of Instruction 'tis so far from being impossible for Errors to over-run a Church, that the contrary is morally impossible; and George's long staff and advantagious cast of his Bo­dy are more powerful causes to enable him to leap over Paul's Steeple, than this Principle, That nothing is to be ad­mitted, but what descends by Tradition, is to keep Errors out of a Church in an ignorant and vicious Age; when few or none are either able or willing to in­struct men in the Truth. For suppose this always to have been the Principle of Christians, viz. That nothing is to be ad­mitted as the Doctrine of Christ, but what is descended to them by Tradition: How shall this Principle secure the Church from Heresy, any more than [Page 237] this, viz. That nothing but Truth is to be assented to, doth secure men from Er­ror? Or more than this, viz. That no man is to do any thing but what is wise and vertuous, does secure the generality of mankind from folly and vice?

SECT. VIII.

§ 1. SEcondly, The second Answer to his second Demon­stration. The Principles upon which this Demonstration re­lies are not sufficiently proved by him.

His first Principle is this, That Age, which holds her Faith delivered thus from the Apostles, neither can it self have changed any thing in it, nor know or doubt that any Age since the Apostles had changed or innovated any thing therein. This Proposition (he tells us) needs no proof to evidence it, but only an Explication. For since no man can hold contrary to his knowledg, or doubt of what he holds, nor change or inno­vate in the case proposed without know­ing he did so; 'tis a manifest impossi­bility a whole Age should fall into an absurdity so inconsistent with the nature of one single man. But (by his fa­vour) that which he says is no proof, [Page 238] but only an Explication, is a proof if it be any thing; and the force of it this; That which is inconsistent with the na­ture if one single man, is manifestly im­possible to a whole Age; but it is incon­sistent with the nature of any single man to hold contrary to his knowledg, &c. therefore impossible to a whole Age; and consequently, that Age which holds her Faith delivered thus from the Apostles, neither can it self have chan­ged any thing, nor, &c. So that in order to the making good of this first Prin­ciple, Mr. S. hath left nothing unpro­ved but only this Proposition, namely, That it is impossible that any one single man that holds his Faith to have been delivered uninterruptedly from the A­postles, should either himself have chan­ged any thing in it, or know or doubt that any Age since the Apostles hath changed or innovated any thing there­in: And to make out the truth of this Proposition, there only remains this to be proved, viz. That it is impossible for any single man to be mistaken. For if that be possible, then contrary to Mr. S. a man may hold that to have been deli­vered as a Doctrine of Faith from the [Page 239] Apostles which was not so delivered.

§ 2. His second Principle is this, That no Age could innovate any thing, and withall deliver that very thing to poste­rity as received from Christ by continual Succession. He proves it thus; Since man is a rational Creature, he must have some Reason or Motive, good or bad, which he proposeth to himself as an end to be achieved by his action: And whatever his remote end is, his immediate end, in telling posterity a late invented thing was held immdiately before, is to make them belive it. Wherefore since a seen impossibility cannot be a Motive to one not frantick; and since 'tis evidently impossiible they should make posterity be­lieve a thing so universally known to be false, as this must needs be, &c. it is as impossiible this Principle should faulter, as that the fore-going Age should conspire to act without a motive, or that the succeed­ing Age should believe what they know to be otherwise, that is, should hold both sides of a Contradiction in a clear mat­ter of Fact. The force of which is this, That it is impossible that any man not frantick should attempt to innovate in matter of Christian Doctrine, because [Page 240] the immediate end of such an attempt must be to have his new Doctrine belie­ved; but it is impossible he should at­tain this end, and impossible he should not see that it is impossible to attain it▪ Now a seen impossibility is an end that cannot move any one that is not fran­tick; therefore no man that is not fran­tick, can attempt to innovate in matter of Christian Doctrine. Thus he hath demonstrated it impossible that there should be any Hereticks, if a Heretick be one that attempts to innovate in matter of Christian Doctrine. For if there be any such attmpters they must be frantick, and if they be frantick they can be no Hereticks; for Heresie implies a Crime, but God will not im­pute the actions of mad men to them as faults. Again, suppose he that attempts to innovate be mistaken (and I hope Mr. S. will grant that a Heretick is fal­lible) and think that which he delivers as Christs Doctrine to be really so, though indeed it be not; why should such a person think it impossible to make men believe that to be received from Christ which he really thinks was received, and thinks he can makes it [Page 241] appear that it was so? And if this be granted, then it is not impossible that Man, though he be a rational Creature, may attempt to innovate. And if so, then his second Principle is not proved. If Mr. S. had any regard to the noble Science of Controversie (whereof he pretends to be so great a Master) he would not bring such trifling Sophisms instead of demonstrative Proofs: And nothing less than a demonstrative Proof will serve to establish any Principle up­on which a Demonstration is to be built.

SECT. IX.

§. 1. DOctrines and Practises which must be acknowledged to have been innovated, The third An­swer to Mr. S's second De­monstration. have made the same pretence to uninterrupted Tradi­tion. And of this I shall give several Instances; one among the Jews, the rest among Christians.

1. I shall instance among the Tradi­tionary Jews, whose perswasion in our Saviours time was, and still is, that their Oral Doctrine, which they call their C [...]bala, hath descended to them from [Page 242] Moses uninterruptedly. Now here is the existence of such a perswasion, as Mr. S. affirms to be impossible without Traditions ever-indeficiency to beget it. And this perswasion of theirs is most exactly parallel with the pretensions of the Romish Church according to Mr. S. For here's a multitude of Traditionary Jews, manifoldly greater in proportion to the Dissenters in that Church, than the Romish Church is in comparison to those Christians that dissent from Her. Josephus tells us Antiq. Jud. l. 13. c. 18., That the richer sort were of the perswasion of the Sadduces, but the multitude were on the Pharisees side. So that the Pharisees had this mark of the true Church (as Bellarmine calls it) common to them with the Church of Rome, that they were the greatest number, and so they con­tinue to this very day; insomuch that although they do not call themselves the Catholicks, yet I am sure they call all Jews that do dissent from them Schis­maticks. Now that the Sadduces were for the written Law against Oral Tra­dition, is I confess no credit to us; but that our Saviour reproved the Tradi­tionary Doctrines and Practises of the [Page 243] Pharisees, because by them they made void the written Law, is much more to the discredit of the Assertors of Oral Tradition. Both Romanists and Pha­risees they own alike a written Doctrine, but then they both pretend the true sense and explication thereof to have descended to them by Oral Tradi­tion. For just as the Traditionary Christians do now, so Josephus tells Ibid. l. 17. c. 3. & de Bell. Jud. l. 1. c. 4. & l. 2. c. 12. us the Traditionary Jews of old, the Pharisees, did pretend by their Oral Tradition to interpret the Law more accurately and exactly than any other Sect. In like manner he Antiq. l. 18. c. 2. tells us, That all things, that belonged to Prayer and Divine Worship, were regulated and ad­ministred according to their interpreta­tions of the Law. And they both agree in this, to make void the Word of God by their Tradition; which the Pharisees did no otherwise than Mr. S. does, by equalling Oral Tradition to Scripture; nay preferring it above Scripture, in making it the sole Rule of Faith, and interpreting the Scripture according to it. Hence are those common sayings in the Talmud, and other Jewish Books; Do not think that the written Law is [Page 244] the foundation, but that the Law Orally delivered is the right foundation; which is to say with Mr. S. that not the Scripture, but Oral Tradition is the true Rule of Faith. Again, There is more in the words of the Scribes (viz. the Testifiers of Tradition) than in the words of the written Law. Again, The Oral Law excells the Written, as much as the Soul doth the Body; which accords very well with what Mr. S. frequently tells us, That the Scrip­ture without Tradition is but a dead Letter, destitute of life and sense. Hence also it is that they required the People (as the Traditionary Church does now) to yield up themselves to the dictates of Tradition even in the most absurd things, as appears by that common say­ing among them, If the Scribes say that the right hand is the left, and the left the right (that Bread is Flesh, and Wine is Blood) hearken to them, that is, make no scruple of whatsoever they deliver as Tradition, though never so contrary to Reason or Sense. And lastly, The Doctrines of the Pharisees were many of them practical; such were all those which concerned exter­nal [Page 245] rites and observances, as washing of hands and cups, &c. So that these Pha­risaical Traditions had also that un­speakable advantage which Mr. S. says renders their Traditions unmistakeable, That they were daily practised, and came down clad in such plain matters of Fact, that the most stupid man living could not possibly be ignorant of them. Therefore, according to Mr. S's Princi­ples, it was impossible that any Age of the Jews should be perswaded that these things were commanded by Moses and ever since observed, if they had not been so: And yet our Saviour denies these Customs to have been of any such Autho­rity as they pretended.

§. 2. But I needed not to have taken all this pains to shew the agreement which is between the Traditionary Jews and Papists, their own Writers so liberally acknowledging it. Mr. White De Fid. & Theol. Tract. 1. Sect. 6. indeed says, That the Faith of the Jews was not delivered to them Orally, but by Writing; than which nothing can be more inconsistent with his Hypothesis. For if the Jewish Faith was conveyed to them not Orally, but by Writing, then either the Jewish Church had no suffici­ent [Page 246] Rule of Faith, or else a Writing may be such a Rule. But other of their Champions make great use of the Pa­rallel, between the Traditionary Jews and the Romish Church, to confirm from thence their own Traditionary Do­ctrines. Cardinal Perron hath a full passage to this purpose; As this (says he Rep. to K. James, observ. 3. c. 4.) is to preserve a sound and entire respect to the Majesty of the ancient Mo­saick Scripture, to believe and observe not only all the things which are therein actually contained, but also those things which are therein contained mediately and relatively, as the Doctrines of Para­dise, &c. which were not contained therein but mediately, and by the au­thority which it gave to the deposition of the Patriarchal and Mosaick Tradition, preserved by heart, and in the Oral Doctrine of the Synagogue: So this is to preserve a sound and entire respect to the Majesty of the Apostolical Scripture, to believe and observe all the things which it contains, not only immediately and by it self, but mediately and by reference to the Apostolical Traditions, to which in gross and generally it gives the Au­thority of Apostolical Doctrines, and to [Page 247] the Church the Authority of Guardian and Depositary to preserve▪ and attest them. Voysin in his Observations upon Raymundus Martyn, Pugio Fid. p. 145. tells us, That as in the Old Law the great Consistory at Jeru­salem was the foundation of the true Tradition, so (says he) the See of Rome is the foundation of our Traditions. And as the continual succession of the High Priests and Fathers among the Jews was the great confirmation of the Truth of their Traditions, so (says he) with us the Truth of our Catholick Do­ctrine is confirmed by a continual succes­sion of Popes.

§. 3. From all this it appears, that the Pharisees among the Jews made the same pretence to Oral Tradition which the Papists do at this day according to Mr. S. And if so, then Mr. S's Demon­stration a Posteriori is every whit as strong for the Jews against our Saviour, as it is for the Papists against the Protestants. For we find that in our Saviour's time, it was then the pre­sent perswasion of the Traditionary Jews, that their Faith, and their Rites, and the true sense and interpretation of their written Law was descended from [Page 248] Moses and the Prophets to them unin­terruptedly▪ which we find was most firmly rooted in their hearts. But the Jews had a constant Tradition among them, that the Messiah was to be a great temporal Prince: And though the Let­ters of the Prophesies concerning him, might well enough have been accom­modated to the low and suffering condi­tion of our Saviour; yet they did in­fallibly know that their Messiah was to be another kind of person, from sense written in their hearts, from the inter­pretation of those Prophesies Orally brought down to them from the Patri­archal and Mosaick Tradition preserved by heart and in the Oral Doctrine of the Synagogue, and from the living voyce of their Church essential, that is, the uni­versal consent of the then Traditionary Jews. If it be said, That the Jewish Tradition did indeed bring down seve­ral Doctrines not contained in Scrip­ture, of Paradise, of Hell, of the last Judgment, of the Resurrection, &c. (as Cardinal Perron affirms) but it did not bring down this Point of the Messi­ah's being a Temporal Prince: Then as Mr. S. P. 76. asks us, so the Jew does him; [Page 249] By what vertue Tradition brought down those other Points? and whether the same vertue were not powerful to bring down this as well as those? Then he will ask him farther, Is there not a necessary con­nexion and relation between a constant Cause, and its formal Effect? So that if its formal Effect be Points received as delivered ever, the proper Cause must be an ever-delivery; whence he will argue from such an Effect to its Cause for any particular Point, and consequently for this Point that is in Controversie between Jews and Christians, concerning the Messiah's being a Temporal Prince, in case it be a Point held ever delivered; but most certain it is, it was so held by the Jews in our Saviours time, and hath been held so ever since to this day.

I shall not trouble the Reader with transcribing the rest of this Demon­stration, only desire him as he reads it over, to imagine instead of Mr. S. a Pharisee, demonstrating against one of Christs Disciples the Infallibility of the Oral Tradition of the Jews: And I doubt not but he will find this Demon­stration, and every part of it (changing only the Names) as forcibly conclu­ding [Page 250] Christ not to be the Messiah, as it doth infer any point of Popery against the Protestants.

§. 4. Before I leave this Instance of the Jewish Tradition, I shall briefly con­sider what Mr. White Apol. 123, &c. hath offered by way of answer to it; as, First, That the matter of these Traditions is nothing else but Explications of Scripture framed and invented by their own Rabbines. So we say, that the Popish Traditions are Innovations. But then Mr. White, and Mr. S. tell us, That they can de­monstrate them to be descended from Christ and his Apostles, because it is the present perswasion of a multitude of Christians that they are so descended. In like manner, if this Demonstration be good, the Jews can prove their Traditions to be descended from Moses and the Prophets. Secondly, He says, that the form of these Traditions is more ridiculous than the Canting of Gypsies, or the jugling of Hocus-pocus, because it consists in inventing the sense of Scrip­ture from the mysteries, and numbers, and changes of Letters. This is a gross in­excusable mistake. For though the Jews have such a Cabala (called Ge­matry) [Page 251] as this which Mr. White de­scribes; yet that Cabala which is urged in this Instance, and which our Saviour reproves in the Pharisees by the name of Tradition, is quite another thing, and among the Jewish Writers known by the name of the Vnwritten or Oral Law; which they say was de­livered to Moses on Mount Sinai, and by him conveyed to Aaron and Jo­shua, and the Elders, and successively delivered down from one Age to ano­ther; and at last by Rabbi Jehuda com­piled into one Volume, which they call Mishna, or [...]. And this does not consist in the Art of Numbring, Com­bining, or changing of Letters, as Mr. White imagines. But suppose it did so, and were more ridiculous than he con­ceits it to be; the Instance would be so much the more conclusive against them, if what they affirm be true, That Oral Tradition is infallible, and that the perswasion of a Traditionary Church in any Age, that such a Doctrine de­scended to them from Christ or Moses, be a demonstration that it did so: For if this be sufficient evidence, 'tis no­thing to the purpose what the Doctrine [Page 252] be either for matter or form: For if it be once demonstrated to have come from Christ or Moses, it is without any farther dispute to be received as of Divine authority. So that Mr. White quite alters the state of the question; which was not whether the Jewish Ca­bala be absurd and ridiculous, but whe­ther the general perswasion of the Jews in any Age, that it descended to them by uninterrupted Tradition from Mo­ses, be a demonstration that it did so. If it be, then the Jewish Cabala is as demonstratively of Divine Authority as the Oral Doctrine of the Papists. Thirdly, He says, This Cabala was a Doctrine delivered to few, and that with strict charge to keep it from Publicity, and so communicate it again successive­ly to a select Committee of a few; where­in (says he) you may see as fair an opportunity for jugling and couzenage, as in our case there is an impossibility. This I think is true of the Cabala which it (seems) Mr. White had only in his view, but is a horrible mistake if he speak of the Oral Law which was contained in the Mishnah, and which this Instance only intends. For of this [Page 253] Maimonides In Praefat. Sum. Talmud. says expresly, That in every Age, from the time of Moses to Rabbi Jehudah, who compiled the Mishna, the Oral Law was publickly taught: And that after Rabbi Jehudah had compiled it into one Volume, the Israelites did ge­nerally write out Copies of it, and it was every where carefully taught, for fear lest the Oral Law should by forgetfulness be last among the Jews. So that upon account of the publickness of the Doctrine, there is as great an impossibility of Jug­ling and Couzenage in the case of the Jewish as of the Romish Tradition. Be­sides, was washing of Hands and Cups, which they also pretended to have come down to them from Moses, and to have been constantly practised in every Age, a secret thing? Was it not a practical Tradition, and performed in a sensible matter? If therefore no Age can con­spire to impose upon the next in a plain custom; and if an universal Tradition of such a thing cannot come in without such a conspiracy: How could this be the perswasion of any Age, that washing of Hands, &c. was prescribed by Moses and practised in all Ages, if it had not truly been so?

[Page 254]§. 5. Secondly, As for Instances among Christians, whereof many remain yet upon Record; as namely, the various and opposite Traditions about the time of Easter, and concerning the Baptism of Hereticks; and the Apostolical Tradi­tion (as St. Austin calls it) concern­ing the admission of Infants to the Com­munion; all which have been frequent­ly urged in this Controversie, and none of them yet sufficiently answered; I shall to avoid tediousness, passing by these, insist only upon that of the Chi­liasts; which in Justin Martyr's time was the perswasion of all Orthodox Chri­stians, that is (in Mr. S's Dialect) of all the holders to Tradition. For if notwithstanding the perswasion of that Age, that this Doctrine was descended to them from the Apostles, it was not really so descended; then the perswa­sion of Christians in any Age, that a Doctrine was brought down to them from the Apostles, is no Demonstration that it was so.

§. 6. To this Instance Mr. White an­swers Apol. p. 78, 79, &c. by telling us, that Eusebius says that this Tradition sprang from Papias (a good but a credulous and simple man) [Page 255] who it seems was mistaken in saying that it was the Apostles Doctrine. But for all this, Justin Martyr says it was re­ceived by all Orthodox Christians in his Time, as a Doctrine descended to them from the Apostles. And if Justin said true, nothing can make more against their Demonstration of the Infallibility of Tradition, than the natural conse­quence from these two sayings of Euse­bius and Justin, which is this, That the mistake of one simple and credulous man may in an Age or two give occasion to the universal entertainment of a Doctrine, as descended down to them from Christ and his Apostles, when there was no such matter. Hath not Mr. White now done his Rule of Faith great service by this Answer? But it is ac­cording to his manner in all his Wri­tings, to say any thing to remove a pre­sent Objection, though never so much to the prejudice of his main Hypothesis; then which I do not know any quality in a Writer which doth more certainly betray the want either of judgment, or of sincerity, or of a good Cause.

§. 7. And whereas he says Apol. p. 81., That Irenaeus his testimony proves it to be [Page 256] no Tradition; for he sets down the sup­posed words of our Saviour, which plain­ly shews it is a story, not a Tradition; a Tradition being a sense delivered not in set words, but setled in the Auditors hearts by hundreds of different expressi­ons explicating the same meaning. When I consider this passage of Mr. White, I confess I cannot complement him, and say (as he makes his Nephew do in the Dialogue Rushworth Dial. 4. Sect. 4. between them) I cannot but applaud your Discourse, it hath so pleasing and attractive a countenance. And a­gain Ibid. Sect. 5., I am not able to oppose what you say by any weighty Objection, your Arguments being not only strong and nervous, but of so comely and winning a complexion, &c. I cannot (I say) speak all this of his present Argument. But I may deservedly apply to it the last part of his Nephew's Complement, That it is an Argument so framed, as if without any evidence of its con­sequence it would perswade men to be­lieve it. But to return an Answer to this passage: It seems (according to Mr. White) that Irenaeus was mistaken in the very nature of Tradition: and if so learned a Father was ignorant in the [Page 257] common Rule of Faith, what can we (to use Mr. S's words P. 39.) undertaking­ly promise to weaker heads? Mr. S. in­stanceth in the Creed, and Ten Command­ments, as the principal Traditions which Parents teach their Children; but now Mr. White can shew plainly that these are no Traditions but Stories, because Tradition is a sense delivered not in set words, &c. As if Christ and his Apo­stles could deliver no Doctrine unless they expressed the same thing an hun­dred several ways. But suppose they did so (which no man hath any reason to imagine, because a thing may be ex­pressed as plainly by one way as by an hundred) can no man deliver this Tra­dition who speaks it in any one of those expressions? If one should employ his Servant to carry a Message, and (be­cause Mr. White thinks this necessary) should settle the meaning of it in his heart, by telling him the same thing in an hundred several expressions; and the Servant should go and deliver this Message in one of those very expressi­ons that his Master used to him, and should say these were his Masters very words; would not this be well enough?

[Page 258]No, if he had come to such a Philoso­pher as Mr. White, he would soon have given him to understand that he was not fit to bring a Message, or to be cre­dited in it, who had so little wit as not to know that a Message is a thing not to be delivered in set-words. And now I would entreat Mr. White to reconcile himself in this matter to his Friends. Mr. Rushworth says Dialog. 2. Sect. 6., 'Tis impossible to put fully and beyond all quarrel the same sense in divers words: Which if it be true, I would fain know what certain course Mr. White can prescribe to ex­plicate the same meaning by hundreds of different expressions, and consequently how Tradition can be infallibly con­veyed by setling the sense of it in the Auditors hearts by such variety of ex­pressions. Mr. Cressy Exomolog. c. 10. Sect. 4. likewise (a zea­lous Assertor of Tradition) does af­firm, That the Primitive Churches were even to excess scrupulous in maintain­ing the very phrases of Traditionary Doctrines; which (according to Mr. White) plainly shews these Doctrines to be stories, not Traditions, because Tra­dition is a sense delivered not in set-words. The same Author complains, [Page 259] Ibid. c. 19. Sect. 2. That few among their learnedst Masters of Controversie, propose the Points to be disputed between them and the Prote­stants, in the Language of the Church. By which I suppose he does not mean, that these Controvertists were to blame in that they did not settle the sense of these Points by hundreds of different ex­pressions explicating the same meaning, but that they did not keep to the words wherein the Church had in Councils or otherwise (if there be any other way) declared her sense of those Points. A­gain Ibid. c. 27. Sect. 2. he says, That St. Paul, referring to the Doctrine setled by Oral Instruction, to shew the uniformity of it everywhere, calls it a form of wholsom words. From whence we may conclude either that St. Paul did not well to call the Traditio­nary Doctrine (as Mr. Cressy says he does) a form of words, or else (which is more probable) that Mr. White is mistaken in saying, That a Tradition is a sense not delivered in set-words. Fur­thermore, the same Mr. Cressy Ibid. c. 28. Sect. 1. tells us, That St. Augustine was careful not only to deliver Traditional Truths themselves, but the terms also in which those Truths were conveyed to his Times. But now [Page 260] Mr. White could have informed St. Au­gustin, that this officious care of his was not only superfluous, but pernicious to Tradition.

§. 8. But to return to Justin's Testi­mony; to which the summe of Mr. Whites answer is, That Justin esteem'd it not as a point necessary to salvation; but ra­ther a piece of Learning higher than the common: Since he both acknowledges o­ther Catholicks held the contrary, and entitles those of his perswasion [...] right in all opinions, that is, wholly of his own mind. It is not material to my purpose, whether or no Justin look'd upon this as a point ne­cessary to Salvation, so long as it is evi­dent that he looked upon it as a Divine Revelation and part of the Christian Doctrine. And yet it seems he thought it a point of more than ordinary impor­tance, because he joins it with the Doc­trine of the Resurrection, and says that it was not disowned by any but those who also denied the Resurrection. But whereas Mr. White says that Justin ac­knowledges other Catohlicks to have held the contrary, I hope to make it evident from the scope and series of his Dis­course, [Page 261] that he acknowledges no such thing; but that the plain design of his Discourse, is to shew that this Doctrine was owned by all true Christians. For when Trypho asks him Dial. cum Tryph. p. 306. Edit. Lutet· 1615., Whether the Christians did indeed believe that Jeru­salem should be re-built, &c. He returns him this answer, I am not such a Wretch as to speak otherwise than I think. I have told thee before that my self and many others (as ye all know) are of the mind that this will come to pass. But, that many indeed of those Christians who, are [not] of the pure and pious perswa­sion, do not own this, I have intimated to thee. That the negative particle (though omitted in the Copy) ought to be thus inserted, will be clear to any one that considers what follows. For after he had spoken of those who disown this Doctrine, he immediately adds by way of further description of them, that though they are called Christians yet in Truth they are not Christians, in these words; For of these (viz. the Dis­owners of this Doctrine) who are called indeed Christians, but are a­theistical and impious Hereticks, I have shewed thee that they teach in all Points [Page 262] blasphemous, atheistical and absurd things. But that ye may know that I do not say this for you only; I will, according to my ability, compile all these Discourses which have past between us into one piece; in which I will by Writing make Profession of this very thing which I now declare to you. For I do not choose to follow men or the Doctrines of men, but God and such Doctrines as are from him. And though ye may have conversed with some who are called Christians, and yet do not acknowledg this; but even dare to bla­spheme the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob; who also say that there is no Resurrecti­on of the dead, but that so soon as they dye their Souls are received into Hea­ven: Do not count these men Christians; no more than a man, that considers things rightly, would own the Sadduces and such like Sects to be Jews, &c. But I my self, and as many Christians as are thoroughly of the right perswasion, do both know that there shall be a Resurrection of the Flesh, and a thousand years in Jerusalem which shall be built, adorned and enlarged, &c. Can any thing be plainer than that Justin endeavours by this Discourse to [Page 263] satisfie Trypho, that this Point they were speaking of was a Divine Doctrine, and owned to be so by all Christians; ex­cept such as did only bear the Name and Title of Christians, but were indeed blasphemous Hereticks and deniers of the Resurrection? By which Character that he intends to describe the impious Sects of the Gnosticks, will appear by and by. So that Mr. White must either allow the inserting of the negative Particle (which Mr. Mede Nov. Edit. p. 664. proves to have been omitted in the Copy) or else acknow­ledg that those who are Christians only in Name, but in Truth are impious bla­sphemous and absurd Hereticks, may pro­perly be said to be of the pure and pi­ous Opinion of the Christians. And if only these be the other Catholicks, whom Mr. White says Justin acknowledges to have held contrary to the Millenaries, I am contented he should make his best of them. If Mr. White should blame the inserting of the negative particle [not] into Justin's Text, as too great a boldness with the Fathers; it were easily answered, that the sense evident­ly requires it. And in such a case it is no boldness, but such a liberty as the [Page 264] most Learned of their own Interpre­ters and Commentators upon the Fa­thers do frequently take. And for Mr. S. if he takes offence at this, one may with reason (since the exigency of the sense plainly requires the inserting of it) demand of him (what he p. 31. unrea­sonably does of us in relation to all the affirmative Propositions of Scripture) to demonstrate that the particle [not] was not left out of this Clause of Justin, by those who Transcribed the Book. But besides the exigency of the sense in this place; that the negative ought to have been inserted, will appear by the refe­rence which Justin makes in this passage to something foregoing in the same Dia­logue. I have (says he) declared to thee before that my self and many others are of the mind that this will come to pass. But, that many indeed of those Christians, who are [not] of the pure and pious perswasion, do not own this, I have intimated to thee. For of these, who are called indeed Christians but are Atheistical and Impious Hereticks, I have shewed thee that they teach in all Points blasphemous, atheistical, and absurd things. In these words he plainly refers [Page 265] to some precedent passage, which if it can be found will be a certain Key to open to us the sense of this place. I know that Mr. Mede Ibid. (perhaps not observing it) thought that passage to have been fraudulently expunged by the Enemies of the Millenary Opinion: But it seems to me to be still extant. For I find towards the beginning of this Dialogue, after that Justin had endea­voured to prove at large out of Scrip­ture this glorious coming of Christ, and to refute those who applied the Texts produced by him to that purpose to He­zekiah, and to Solomon whose falling off to Idolatry he occasionally menti­ons; whereupon Trypho objects to him that many who were called Christians, did also communicate in the Idol-feasts: To this, I say, I find Justin returning this answer P. 253.: First, He denies not that there are such as these who own them­selves Christians, and confess the cruci­fied Jesus to be both Lord and Christ, and yet teach not his Doctrines, but the Doc­trines of seducing spirits. But, says he, We who are the Disciples of the true and pure Doctrine of Jesus Christ are from this very thing the more strength­ned [Page 266] in our Faith, and become more con­firmed in the Hope which by him hath been declared to us. For we now see those things visibly and effectually accom­plish't which he before-hand told us would be done in his Name. For he said, Many shall come in my Name, &c. By which Hope any one that reads the An­tecedents and Consequents will plainly see that Justin means the Hope of the Millennium (which he had been speak­ing of before) and consequently of the Resurrection, which he looked upon as having a strict Connexion with the Doctrine of the Millennium; because (as he tells us afterwards) this Doctrine was denied by none but such as also de­nied the Resurrection. And of these men his description runs on in these words, [...], &c. Many (saith he) both are and have been, that have come in the Name of Jesus, and taught both to speak and do atheistical and blasphemous things; and are by us denominated from those men from whom each of their Doc­trines and Opinions had its rise (name­ly as it follows Marcionites, Valentini­ans, &c.) and all these in their several ways teach men to blaspheme the Crea­tor [Page 267] of the Vniverse, and the Christ whose Coming was foretold by him, and the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. But we have no communion with them, as knowing them to be atheistical and impious, &c. This passage in hand, when I compare it with the Text before quo­ted and consider the words and cha­racters of them both, I cannot but be­lieve it the very same that he refers to in those words, I have declared to thee, I have intimated to thee, &c. If so, the matter in Controversie is clear, that the Doctrine of the Millennium was universal. If it be not the same, I could wish to be shew'd some other place in this Dialogue, where Justin makes any such Declaration or Intima­tion. In the mean while by comparison of these places, it is evident there are but two sorts of men that Justin speaks of. First, Who believe the Millennium; We the Disciples [...]. of the true and pure Doctrine, &c. viz. My self and many others; again, my self and as many Christians as are thoroughly [...]. of the right perswasion. Secondly, Who deny the Millennium; Many Christians, saith Justin; but what Christians? Of a right [Page 268] perswasion? That, saith he, I have signi­fied before. [...] &c. For I have shew­ed thee of them who are called Christi­ans, but are indeed Atheists and impious Hereticks, that they teach blasphemous and atheistical and absurd things: And true it is, he did shew before that those who deny'd the Millennium were ma­ny in number, and were called Christi­ans, &c. but were Teachers of blasphe­mous and atheistical things, &c. and known to be Atheists and Impious, &c. But he shewed it of none other besides these. So that if this Doctrine were likewise denied by many Christians of the pure and pious perswasion, than Justin Martyr had foulely forgot him­self. But if not, then it is plain that the Transcribers have wronged Justin by leaving out a Negative which ought to have been inserted. It is worth ob­serving by the way how Mr. White plea­ses himself with false and frivolous Cri­ticisms upon the words, [...] & [...]. False they are, as Mr. White shall know if he desires to hear any more of them; and frivolous they are rendered by my preceding Discourse; for which reason I say no more of them. But I [Page 269] think he may do well hereafter (as Mr. S. P. 68. warily suggests) not to engage himself, nor be hook't by others, out of his own infallible way, but leave it wholly to the P. 69. Bird-witted Hereticks (as Mr. S. calls them) to perch upon the specifical natures of Words, as he does of Things.

§. 9. Besides these Instances I have given of Doctrines and Practises which Mr. S. cannot deny to have been inno­vated, I might instance likewise in the chief Points of Popery, and shew that for all their pretence to Tradition, they are really Innovations. But because this would engage me in tedious Dis­putes about particular Points, I will on­ly single out one of their most funda­mental Doctrines, viz. that of Transub­stantiation; concerning which I shall shew that, notwithstanding it is the u­niversal perswasion of the present Ro­man Church, yet they have not, nor can have any assurance that it was the Doc­trine of Christ, and that it is descended to them by an uninterrupted Tradition. I shall not at all contend against the word Transubstantiation (which is ge­nerally acknowledged to be new) but [Page 270] only the thing signified by it, a substan­tial change of the Bread and Wine into the Body and Blood of Christ. And this I might shew at large not to have been the Doctrine of the ancient Fathers. But because Mr. White, and Dr. Holden, and Mr. Cressy do so frequently and confidently tell us, that nothing is to be reputed a Traditionary Doctrine the contrary whereof hath been publickly held by any Catholick who continued afterwards uncensured, and in the Communion of the Church: There­fore I shall content my self at present with one clear Testimony, and that of a very eminent Person in the Church, St. Theodoret, concerning whom Pope Leo (in an Epistle to him, at the end of Theodoret's Works) gives this Testi­mony, That in the judgment of the Apostolick See he was free from all stain of Heresie. The passage I intend is in his Dialogues, between a Catholick un­der the name of Orthodoxus, and Era­nistes who susteined the person of an Heretick. Eranistes Dialog. 2. maintaining that the Body of Christ was changed into the substance of the Divinity, he il­lustrates it by this similitude. As (says [Page 271] he) the Symbols of the Lords Body and Blood are one thing before the invoca­tion of the Priest; but after the invoca­tion are changed and do become ano­ther thing: So the Body of our Lord, af­ter his Ascension, is changed into the Divine substance. To which Orthodoxus returns this answer, Thou art caught in thine own Net. Because the mystical Symbols after Consecration do not pass out of their own Nature; for they remain in their former substance, figure, and ap­pearance, and may be seen and handled even as before. He does not only in express words deny the substance of the Symbols to be changed, but the oc­casion upon which these words are brought in, and the scope of them (if they be of any force against the Here­ticks illustration) renders them unca­pable of any other sense. When Mr. S. hath answered this Testimony, I have more for him.

That which I mainly urge against this Doctrine is, the monstrous Absurdities and Contradictions contained in it, to­gether with the necessary consequence of them. Several of the Absurdities of it are well brought together by Sco­tus [Page 272] Distinct. l. 4. dist. 10. qu. 1. n. 3., who tells us, That to prove the possibility of Christs Body being con­tained under the species of Bread and Wine many things must be proved which seem to involve a Contradiction; as, 1. That one quantum (or extended Body) may be together in the very same place with another. 2. That a less quan­tum may be together in the same place with a greater; i. e. a Body of less ex­tension may occupy not only the same, but as much room as a Body of greater extension does; which is to say no more but this, that a Body less than another may be as great as that other even whil'st it is less than it. 3. That a greater quantum may be together with every part of a less quantum, i. e. a Body that is greater than another, may be as little as the least part of that other Body which is less than it. 4. That a subject may be without quantity, i. e. there may be a Body which hath no kind of Magnitude. 5. That a Body may be somewhere where it was not before, without changing its place, i· e. a Body may be removed to another place, whil'st it remains still in the same place▪ 6. That a quantum may be without any [Page 273] quantitative Mode, i. e. a Body may be extended without any manner of ex­tension. The possibility of all which, he saith (and I am very much of his mind) it would be too tedious a work to prove; and therefore he only attempts to prove the two last, which (in all rea­son) is work enough for one man. All these seeming Contradictions (as he modestly calls them) are by his own acknowledgment involved in this Doc­trine. To these I might add many more; as, How a thing can be said to be chan­ged into another thing which did exist before? How a Body can be present in a place after the manner of a spirit? and yet this they affirm concerning the pre­sence of Christs Body in the Sacrament; one might as well say that Snow is black, but not after the manner of blackness, but in the way of whiteness, which is to talk non-sense after the manner of sense: How the whole Body of Christ can be contained under the least sensible part of the species of Bread, as is generally affirmed: nay, and Scotus Ibid. qu. 1. n. 12. adds, that the whole Body is under every little part in its full pro­portions; for he says expresly, That the [Page 274] Head and Foot of the Body of Christ are as far distant from one another in the sacrament, as they are in Heaven; as if one should say that a Body, all whose parts lye within the compass of a small pins-head, may yet within that little compass have parts two yards distant from one another: And lastly, how the sensible species of Bread, e. g. quantity, whiteness, softness, &c. can exist with­out any subject? to affirm the possibility of which (as generally they do) is to say that there may be quantities of white and soft nothings; For this is the plain English of that assertion, that sensible species may exist without a subject; which being strip't of those terms of Art ( spe­cies and subject) that do a little disguise it, it appears to be plain Non-sense.

Now the proper and necessary con­sequence of this Doctrine is to take away all certainty, and especially the certainty of sense. For if that which my sight and taste and touch do all assure me to be a little piece of Wafer, may notwithstand­ing this be Flesh and Blood, even the whole Body of a man; then notwith­standing the greatest assurance that Sense can give me, that any thing is this or [Page 275] that, it may be quite another thing from what Sense reported it to be. If so, then farewel the Infallibility of Tradition, which depends upon the certainty of Sense: And which is a worse conse­quence, if this Doctrine be admitted we can have no sufficient assurance that the Christian Doctrine is a Divine Revela­tion. For the assurance of that depending upon the assurance we have of the Mira­cles said to be wrought for the confir­mation of it, and all the assurance we can have of a Miracle depending upon the certainty of our senses, it is very plain that that Doctrine which takes away the certainty of Sense does in so doing over­throw the certainty of Christian Reli­gion. And what can be more vain than to pretend, that a man may be assured that such a Doctrine is revealed by God, and consequently true, which if it be true, a man can have no assurance at all of any Divine Revelation? Surely nothing is to be admitted by us as certain, which being admitted we can be certain of no­thing. It is a wonder that any man who considers the natural consequences of this Doctrine can be a Papist; unless he have attained to Mr. Cressy's pitch of [Page 276] Learning, who speaking of the difficult Arguments wherewith this Doctrine was pressed, says Exomol. c. 73. Sect. 7. plainly, I must answer freely and ingenuously, that I have not learned to answer such Arguments, but to despise them. And if this be a good way, when ever we have a mind to be­lieve any thing to scorn those Objecti­ons against it which we cannot solve; then Christian Religion hath no advan­tage above the vilest Enthusiasms; and a Turk may maintain Mahomet and his Alcoran (in opposition to Christ and his Doctrine) against all that Grotius, or any other hath said, if he can but keep his countenance, and gravely say, I have not learned to answer such Arguments, but to despise them.

§. 10. I will add one Instance more in another kind, to shew the uncertain­ty of Oral and Practical Traditions, and that shall be the Tradition concerning Pope Jone; than which scarce any was ever more generally received in the Hi­storical kind. Many and great Authors affirm it, as Testifiers of the general Fame. None ever denied it till the Re­formers had made use of it to the disad­vantage of Popery. Since that time [Page 277] not only Papists deny it, but several of our own Writers cease to believe it. Phil. Bergomensis tells the story thus: Anno 858. John the 7 th, Pope, &c. The Tradition is that this person was a Wo­man, &c. Here's an Oral Tradition. He concludes thus; In detestation of whose filthiness, and to perpetuate the memory of her Name, the Popes even to this day going on Procession with the People and the Clergy, when they come to the place of her Travel, &c. in token of abomina­tion they turn from it, and go a by-way; and being past that detestable place, they return into the way, and finish their Pro­cession. Here is one Practical Tradition. And for avoiding of the like miscarria­ges, it was decreed that no one should thereafter be admitted into St. Peter 's Chair priusquam per foratam sedem fu­turi Pontificis genitalia ab ultimo Dy­acone Cardinale attractarentur: Here is another with a Witness. Ennead. 9. L. 1. Sabellicus relates the same; and moreover says that this Porphyry Chair was in his time to be seen in the Popes Palace. He adds indeed that Platina thinks that this Tra­dition of Pope Jone was not faithfully delivered to Posterity. But however (says [Page 278] he) such a Tradition there is. Concern­ing the first Practical Tradition, Platina says that he may not deny it. For the se­cond, he thinks the Chair rather design'd for a Stool for another use, &c. He con­cludes, These things which I have related are commonly reported, yet from uncer­tain and obscure Authors: Therefore I resolved (says he) briefly and nakedly to set them down, lest I should seem too obsti­nately and pertinaciously to have omitted that which almost all affirm. It is no wonder that he says the Authors of this Report were uncertain and obscure, since so very few writ any thing in that Age. But suppose none had writ of it, so long as he acknowledges it to have been a ge­neral Oral Tradition attested by a solemn and constant Practice, it has (according to Mr. S's Principles) greater certainty than if it had been brought down to us by a hundred Books written in that very Age. So that here's an Oral and Practi­cal Tradition, continued we are sure for some hundreds of years, preserved and propagated by a solemn practice of the Popes, Clergy and People of Rome in their Processions, and by a notorious Custom at the Election of every Pope; and in a [Page 279] matter of so great importance to their Religion (the honour of the See of Rome, and the uninterrupted Succession from St. Peter being so nearly concerned in it) that, had it been false, they had been ob­liged under pain of Damnation, not only not to have promoted it, but to have used all means to have discovered the fal­sity of it. Therefore Mr. S. is bound by his own Principles either to allow it for a Truth, or else to give an account when and how it begun; which may possibly be made out by We Metaphysitians (as he P. 340. styles himself, and his Scientifical Bre­thren) but I assure him it is past the skill of P. 337. Note-book Learning.

SECT. X.

§. 1. IT is not the present perswasion of the Church of Rome, The fourth Answer to his second De­monstration. nor ever was, that their Faith hath descended to them by Oral Tradition as the sole Rule of it. And this being proved, the Supposition upon which his Demonstration is built falls to the ground.

And for the proof of this, I appeal to that Decret. pri­mum quartae Sess. Decree of the Council of Trent, in which they declare, That because the [Page 280] Christian Faith and Discipline are con­tained in written Books and unwritten Traditions, &c. therefore they do receive and honour the Books of Scripture and also Traditions [pari pietatis affectu ac reverentiâ] with equal pious affection and reverence; which I understand not how those do, who set aside the Scrip­ture, and make Tradition the sole Rule of their Faith. And consonantly to this Decree, the general Doctrine of the Romish Church is, that Scripture and Tradition make up the Rule of Faith. So the Roman Catechism (set forth by or­der of the Council of Trent) says In Praefat. that the sum of the Doctrine delivered to the Faithful is contained in the Word of God, which is distributed into Scrip­ture and Tradition. Bellarmine De Verbo Dei, &c. L. 4. 12. speaks to the same purpose, That the Scripture is a Rule of Faith, not an entire but par­tial one. The entire Rule is the Word of God, which is divided into two partial Rules, Scripture, and Tradition. Accord­ing to this, the adequate Rule of Faith is the Word of God; which is contained partly in Scripture ▪ and partly in the Tradition of the Church. And that Scripture is look't upon by them as the [Page 281] principal Rule and primary foundation of their Faith, and Tradition as only supplying the defects of Scripture, as to some Doctrines and Rites not contain­ed in Scripture, must be evident to any one that hath been conversant in the chief of their controversial Divines. Bellarmine De Verbo Dei non scrip­to. L. 4. c. 9. where he gives the marks of a Divine Tradition speaks to this pur­pose, That that which they call a Divine Tradition is such a Doctrine or Rite as is not found in Scripture, but embraced by the whole Church; and for that reason believed to have descended from the Apostles. And he tells us fur­ther Ibid. c. 11., That the Apostles committed all to Writing, which was commonly and publickly Preached; and that all things are in Scripture, which men are bound to know and believe explicitely: But then he says, that there were other things which the Apostles did not com­monly and publickly teach; and these they did not commit to Writing, but de­livered them only by word of mouth to the Prelates and Priests and perfect men of the Church. And these are the Apo­stolical Traditions he speaks of. Car­dinal Perron Reply. Ob­servat. 3. c. 4. says, That the Scripture [Page 282] is the foundation of the Christian Do­ctrine, either mediately or immediately. And that the Authority of unwritten Tradition is founded in general on these sentences of the Apostle, 2 Thess. 2.15. Hold the Tra­ditions, &c. Again, 2 Tim. 2.2. The things which thou hast heard of me among many Wit­nesses commit to faithful men, &c. And that the Authority of the Church to pre­serve, and especially to declare these, is founded in this Proposition, viz. 1 Tim. 3.15. That the Church is the pillar and ground of Truth. So that according to him, the primary Rule of Faith is the Scripture, in which the Authority of Tradition is founded. Mr. Knott Charity maintained. c. 2. Sect. 1. says expresly, We acknow­ledg the H. Scripture to be a most per­fect Rule, for as much as a Writing can be a Rule; we only deny that it excludes, either Divine Tradition, though it be un­written, or an external Judg to keep, to propose, to interpret it, &c. So that (according to him) Scripture is a perfect Rule, only it does not exclude unwritten Tradition, &c. By which that he does not understand (as Mr. S. does) a concurrent Oral Tradition of all the same Doctrines which are con­tained in Scripture, but other Doctrines [Page 283] not therein contained, is plain from what he says elsewhere Reply to Mr. Chill. c. 2. Sect. 179., We do not di­stinguish Tradition from the written Word, because Tradition is not written by any, or in any Book or Writing; but because it is not written in the Srrip­ture or Bible; Bellarmine De Verbo Dei, &c. L. 4. c. 2. also says the same. And as for the interpreting of Scripture, he tells us that this is not the office of a Rule, but of a Judg. Charity maintained. c. 2. Sect. 3. There is (says he) a great and plain distin­ction between a Judg and a Rule. For as in a Kingdom the Judg hath his Rule to follow, which are the received Laws and Customs; which are not fit or able to declare, and be Judges to themselves, but that Office must belong to a living Judg: So the Holy Scripture is and may be a Rule, but cannot be a Judg. Here he makes the Scripture as much a Rule for matters of Faith, as the Laws of the Land are for Civil matters. And in his Reply to Mr. Chillingworth, he hath a Chapter of above 150 Pages, the Title whereof is, Scripture is not the only Rule of Faith; which (had he with Mr. S. believed Oral Tradition to be the sole Rule of Faith) had been as absurd as it would be to write a Book to [Page 284] prove that Turks are not the only Chri­stians in the World. Mr. Cressy like­wise (not very consistently to himself) lays down this Conclusion; Exomol. c. 20. The entire Rule of faith is contained not only in Scripture, but likewise in unwritten Tra­dition.

§. 2. Now all this is as contrary as can be to Mr. Rushworth's new Rule of Faith. Therefore Mr. White says Tabul. Suf­frag. p. 96., They speak ill who teach that some things are known in the Church from Scripture, some by Tradition. And Dr. Holden (in opposition to those who make Scripture any part of the Rule of Faith) ad­vances one of the most wild and uncha­ritable Positions that ever I yet met withall, viz. Analys. Fid. L. 1. c. 6. That if one should believe all the Articles of the Catholick Faith, &c. for this reason because he thought they were all expresly revealed in Scrip­ture, or implicitely contained so as they might be deduced from thence, and would not have believed them had he not judged that they might be evinced from Scripture; yet this man could be no true Catholick: Because (as he tells us afterwards C. 8.) we must receive the Christian Doctrine as coming to us by Tradition; for only by [Page 285] this means (excluding the Scriptures) Christ hath appointed revealed Truths to be received and communicated. In the mean time Cardinal Perron (unless he altered his mind) is in a sad case, who believed the Authority of Tradition it self for this reason, because it was found­ed in Scripture.

§. 3. And this fundamental differ­ence about the Rule of Faith, between the generality of their Divines and Mr▪ S's small party, is fully acknowledged by the Traditionists themselves. Dr. Holden says L. 1. [...]. 9., That their Divines who resolve Faith according to the common Opinion, do inevitably fall into that shameful Circle (of proving the Divine Authority of the Scripture by the Church, and the Infallibility of the Church back again by the Scripture) because they dare not build their Faith upon the natural evidence and certainty of Tradition. So that Dr. Holden's way of resolving Faith, is different from the common Opinion of their Divines, which he says L. 1. c. 3. does not differ from the Opi­nion of those who resolve their Faith into the private Spirit; and this (accord­ing to Mr. White Exetas. p. 70.) is the very way of [Page 286] the Calvinists, and of the absurdest Sects. Nay, Mr. White says farther Ibid., That he will be content to suffer all the pu­nishment that is due to Calumniators, if the Roman Divines (he there speaks of) do not hold the same Rule of Faith with the Calvinists, and all the absurdest Sects. So that it seems that the Calvinists, &c. do not in their Rule of Faith differ from the Papists, but only from Mr. White, Mr. S. &c. Now the Divines he there speaks of, are the Censors of Doctrines at Rome, according to whose advice his infallible Holiness and the Cardinals of the Inquisition do usuall proceed in censuring of Doctrines. Concerning these Divines he goes on to expostulate in this manner; Ib. p. 73. Shall we endure these men to sit as Censors and Judges of Faith, who agree with Hereticks in the very first Principle which distinguishes Catholicks from Hereticks? Again P. 144., These are thy gods O Rome! upon these thou dependest, whil'st prating Ignorance tri­umphs in the Roman Colledg. And he says the same likewise of the generali­ty of their School-Divines, whom he calls Scepticks, because they do not own his Demonstrative way. Insomuch that [Page 287] he tells us P. 64., That few sound parts are left uninfected with this Plague of Scep­ticism P. 149.; that this is an universal Gan­grene P. 67, 68.; that there are but few that go the way of Demonstration, and these are either wearied out, or else live retired­ly, or despair of any remedy of these things. And indeed all along that Book he bemoans himself and his Traditio­nary Brethren as a desolate and forlorn Party, who have Truth on their side, but want company and encouragement. So he tells us P. 101., That the true scientifical Divines dare not profess their knowledg, lest they should be exposed by the Sophi­sters of their Church to the derision and scorn either of their Judges or of the People.

§. 4. So that upon examination of the whole matter, it appears that Mr. S's Demonstration proceeds upon a false Supposition, That it is the perswasion of their present Church, that Tradition is the sole Rule of Faith. For there is no such matter; unless Mr. S. mean by their Church a few private persons, who are look'd upon by those who have the chief power in their Church as Hereti­cal: as we may reasonably conjecture [Page 288] by the proceedings at Rome against Mr. White; many of whose Books are there condemned Exetas. p. 9., as containing things ma­nifestly Heretical, erroneous in the Faith, rash, scandalous, seditious, and false re­spectively, &c. And all this done, not­withstanding that the chief subject of those Books is the explication and de­fence of this most Catholick Principle, That Oral Tradition is the only Rule of Faith. To sum up then the whole business: If nothing be to be owned for Christian Doctrine (as the Tradi­tionists say) but what is the general perswasion of those who are acknow­ledged to be in the communion of the Roman Catholick Church; then much less can this Principle (That Oral Tra­dition is the sole Rule of Faith) which is pretended to be the foundation of the whole Christian Doctrine, be re­ceived as descended from Christ and his Apostles; since it is so far from being the general perswasion of that Church at the present, that it has been, and still is generally disowned. But Mr. White has a salvo for this. For although he grant Apol. p. 38., That very many of their School-men maintain that Tradition is necessary only [Page 289] for some Points, not clearly expressed in Scripture, whence (he says) it seems to follow that they build not the whole Body of their Faith upon Tradition: yet he tells us there is a vast difference betwixt relying on Tradition, and say­ing or thinking we d [...] so, Suppose there be; yet I hope that mens saying that they do not rely on Tradition as their only Rule, is a better evidence that they do not, than any mans sur­mise to the contrary is that they do, though they think and say they do not; which is in effect to say that they do; though we have as much assurance as we can have that they do not. Besides, how is this Rule self-evident to all, e­ven to the rude Vulgar as to its ruling power (as Mr. S. affirms it is) when the greatest part even of the Learned among them think and say that it is not the only Rule? But Mr. White endea­vours to illustrate this dark point by a- Ibid. P. 39. similitude, which is to this sense; As the Scepticks who deny this Principle, That Contradictions cannot be true at once, yet in their lives and civil actions proceed as if they owned it: So the Schoolmen, though they deny Tradition [Page 290] to be the only Rule of their Faith, yet by resolving their Faith into the Church which owns this Principle, they do also in practice own it, though they say they do not. So that the generality of learn­ed Papists are just such Catholicks as the Scepticks are Dogmatists, that is a company of absurd people that confute their Principles by their practice. Ac­cording to this reasoning, I perceive the Protestants will prove as good Catho­licks as any, for they do only think and say that Tradition is not the Rule of Faith; but that they practically rely upon it, Mr. S. hath past his word for them: For he assures us P. 30. & 31. (and we may rely upon a man that writes no­thing but Demonstration) that if we look narrowly into the bottom of our hearts, we shall discover the natural me­thod of Tradition to have unawares setled our Judgments concerning Faith; however when our other Concerns awake design in us, we protest against it, and seem perhaps to our unreflecting selves to embrace and hold to the meer guidance of the Letter of Scripture. So that in reality we are as good Catholicks, and as true holders to Tradition as any Pa­pist [Page 291] of them all, at the bottom of our thoughts and in our setled judgments; however we have taken up an humour to protest against it, and may seem per­haps to our unreflecting selves to be Protestants.

§. 5. Thus much may suffice to have spoken to his two great Arguments; or P. 173. as he (good man) unfortunately calls them Demonstrations; which yet to say truth are not properly his, but the Au­thors of Rushworth's Dialogues, the main foundation of which Book is the substance of these Demonstrations. On­ly before I take leave of them, I cannot but reflect upon a passage of Mr. S s P. 163. wherein he tells his Readers that they are not obliged to bend their brains to study his Book with that severity as they would do an Euclid; meaning perhaps one of Mr. White's Euclids; for it does not appear by his way of Demonstra­tion that ever he dealt with any other. As for the true Euclid, I suppose any one that hath tasted his Writings, will at the reading of Mr. S's unbend his brains without bidding, and smile to see him­self so demurely discharged from a study so absurd and ridiculous.

SECT. XI.

Concerning some other advantages of Tradition, &c.§. 1. I Should now take into conside­ration his Ninth Discourse, in which he pretends to open the incompa­rable strength of the Churches humane Authority, and the Advantages which ac­crue to it by the supernatural assistances of the Holy Ghost: But that there is no­thing material in it, which hath not been answered already. Only I desire him to explain, how the supernatural Assist­ances of the Holy Ghost can (accord­ing to his Principles) add to our assu­rance of the certainty of Tradition. Because we can have no greater cer­tainty of the supernatural Assistance of the Holy Ghost, than we have that there is an Holy Ghost, and of this we can have no certainty (according to Mr. S.) but by Tradition, which conveys this Doctrine to us. And if Tradition of it self can infallibly assure us that there are supernatural Assistances of the Ho­ly Ghost, then a man must know that Tradition is infallible antecedently to his knowledg of any supernatural As­sistance. And if so, what can any su­pernatural [Page 293] Assistance add to my assu­rance of the certainty of Tradition, which I do suppose to be infallible be­fore I can know of any supernatural Assistance? Can any thing be more lu­dicrous, than to build first all our cer­tainty of the Assistance of the Holy Ghost upon the certainty of Tradition, and then afterwards to make the cer­tainty of Tradition to rely upon the Assistance of the Holy Ghost? As if that could contribute to our assurance of the certainty of Tradition, which unless Tradition be first supposed cer­tain, is it self wholly uncertain.

§. 2. The Conclusion of this Ninth Discourse is somewhat Extatical; pos­sibly from a sudden disorder of his fan­cy upon the contemplation of his own performances, to see what a Man he has made himself (with the help of Rush­worth's Dialogues) or rather what his Party has made him by the Office they put upon him: For it seems (by his telling) P. 165. & 166. Mr. Cressy and the rest are ordained to cajoll the Fools, leaving him the way of Reason and Principles; and that himself is chosen out to Demon­strate to the Wise, or those who judg of [Page 294] things per altissimas causas In the dis­charge of which glorious Office he de­clares that he intends no Confutation of those Authors which Mr. Cressy and o­thers have medled with: Yet if any will be so charitable as to judg he hath so­lidly confuted them, because he hath ra­dically and fundamentally overthrown all their Arguments, &c. he shall re­joyce and be thankful. That the P. 159. in­telligent Reader (for he writes to none but such) may also rejoyce with him, I shall recite the whole passage, for it is thick of Demostration, and as likely as any in his Book to have the altissimas causas contained in it.

§. 3. P. 93. It would require a large Volume to unfold particularly how each virtue contributes to shew the inerrable inde­ficiency of Tradition, and how the Prin­ciples of almost each Science are con­cerned in demonstrating its Certainty: Arithmetick lends her Numbring and Multiplying Faculty, to scan the vast Number of Testifiers; Geometry her Proportions to shew a kind of infinite strength of Certitude in Christian Tra­dition, above those Atté stations which breed Certainty in humane Affairs; Lo­gick [Page 295] her skill to frame and make us see the connexions it has with the Princi­ples of our Vnderstanding; Nature her Laws of Motion and Action; Morality her first Principle that nothing is done gratis by a cognoscitive Nature, and that the Body of Traditionary Doctrine is most conformable to Practical Reason: Histo­rical Prudence clears the Impossibility of an undiscernable revolt from Points so descended and held so Sacred; Politicks shew this to be the best way imaginable to convey down such a Law as it concerns e­very man to be skilful in; Metaphysicks engages the Essences of Things, and the very notion of Being which fixes every Truth, so establishing the scientifical Knowledges which spring from each parti­cular Nature by their first Causes or Reasons exempt from change or motion. Divinity demonstrates it most worthy God and most conducive to bring Mankind to Bliss. Last­ly, Controversie evidences the total un­certainty of any thing concerning Faith if this can be uncertain, and makes use of all the rest to establish the Certainty of this First Principle. A very fit conclusion for such Demonstrations as went before. It is well Mr. S. writes to none but in­telligent [Page 296] Readers; for were it not a thou­sand pities, that so manly, and solid, and convincing a discourse as this should be cast away upon fools?

SECT. XII.

Mr. S's Corol­laries consi­dered.§. 1. AS for his Corollaries, suppo­sing them to be rightly de­duced from his former Discourses, they must of necessity fall with them. For they signifie nothing but upon this suppositi­on that his fore-going Discourses are true. And yet this being granted, it were easie to shew that most of them are grosly faulty. For, First, Several of them are plainly coincident. The second, viz. None can with right pretend to be a Church but the followers of Tradition, is the very same in sense with the 11 th viz No company of men hang together like a Body of a Chri­stian Commonwealth or Church, but that which adheres to Tradition. So likewise the 12 th and 14 th are contained in the 15 th: The 16 th, and 17 th, in the 19 th: The 16 th 17, 18 th, and 19 th in the 21 st. And the 32 d and 34 th in the 31 st. Se­condly, Divers of them are manifestly absurd, as the 12 th, 13 th, 14 th, 16 th, 17 th, 18 th, 19 th, the sum of which is, [Page 297] That there is no arguing against Tradition from Scripture, or the Authority of the Church, or Fathers and Councils, or from History and Testimonial Writings, or from contrary Tradition, or Reason, or any In­stances whatsoever; which is as much as to say, If this Proposition be true, That Tradition is certain, then it cannot by any kind of Argument be proved to be false. But is this any peculiar Consectary from the truth of this Proposition? Doth not the same follow from every Proposi­tion? That if it be true, it cannot be pro­ved to be false; yet no man was ever yet so frivolous, as to draw such a conse­quence from the supposed truth of any Proposition. His 23 d also is singularly ab­surd, That there is no possibility of argu­ing at all against Tradition rightly under­stood, or the living voyce of the Catholick Church, with any shew of Reason. These are large words. It might have contented a reasonable man to have said, that no good Argument could be brought against it: But he is jealous of his Hypo­thesis, and can never think it safe till it be shot-free; nor will that content him, but it must be also impossible for any one to make a shew of shooting at it. This [Page 298] were, I confess, a peculiar priviledg of Mr. S's Discourses above other mens; if they were (as he says) by evidence of Demonstration so secured, that not only no substantial Argument could be brought against them, but that even the most subtile Schoolman of them all should not be able to come near them with so much as a videtur quod non. But it may be he means no more by this Corollary, than what he said in the 18 th, viz. That no so­lid Argument from Reason can be brought against Tradition: If so, then the sense of his 23 d Corollary must be this, That there is no possibility of arguing at all against Tradition with any solid shew, or substan­tial shadow of Reason; which would be a little inconvenient. I will instance but in one more, his 40 th, which is this, The knowledg of Traditions Certainty is the first knowledg or Principle in Controver­sial Divinity; i. e. without which nothing is known or knowable in that Science. Which is to infer, that because he hath with much pains proved the certainty of Tradition, therefore it is self evident, i. e. needed no proof. Nay, it is to conclude the present matter in Controversie and that which is the main debate of his Book [Page 299] to be the first Principle in Controversial Divinity, i. e. such a Proposition as every one ought to grant before he can have any right to dispute about it. This is a very prudent course, to make begging the question the first Principle in Controversie; which would it but be granted, I am very much of his mind that the method he takes would be the best way to make Controversie a Science; because he that should have the luck or boldness to beg first, would have it in his power to make what he pleased certain.

§. 2. Were it worth while, I might fur­ther pursue the Absurdities of his Corol­laries. For they are not so terrible as he makes shew of, by his telling Dr. Casau­bon P. 330., That Sure-footing and its Corolla­ries may put him out of his Wits: Which though intended for an Affront to the Doctor, yet it may be mollified with a good interpretation; for if the reading of wild and phantastical stuff be apt to dis­order a very learned head, then so far Mr. S's saying may have truth in it.

It remains only that I requite his 41 Corol. not with an equal number, but with two or three natural Consectaries from the Doctrine of his Book.

[Page 300] First, No man can certainly understand the meaning of any Book whatsoever▪ any farther than the Contents of it are made known to us by a concurrent Oral Tradition. For the Arguments whereby he and Mr. Rushworth endeavour to prove it impossible without Tradition to attain to the certain sense of Scripture, do e­qually extend to all other Books.

Secondly, The memory of matters of Fact done long ago may be better preser­ved by general Rumor than by publick Records. For this is the plain English of that Assertion, That Oral Tradition is a better and more secure way of Convey­ance than Writing.

Thirdly, That the Generality of Pa­pists are no Christians. For if (as he affirms) Tradition be the sole Rule of Faith, and those who disown this Rule be * ipso facto cut off from the Root of Faith, i. e. unchristian'd; And if (as I have shewn) the Generality of Papists do disown this Rule: Then it is plain that they are no Christians.

THE RULE of FAITH.
PART IV. Testimonies concerning the Rule of Faith.

SECT. I.

§. 1. THus far in the way of Rea­son and Principles. The rest is Note-book Learning, which he tells us Mr. S's Testi­monies exa­mined. he is not much a Friend to; and there is no kindness lost, for it is as little a Friend to him and his Cause as he can be to it. I shall first examine the Authorities he brings for Tradition; and then produce express Testimonies in behalf of Scripture. In both which I shall be very brief; in the one, because his Testimonies require no long Answer; in the other, because it [Page 302] would be to little purpose to trouble Mr. S. with many Fathers, who for ought appears by his Book is acquainted with none but Father White, as I shall shew hereafter. By the way, I cannot much blame him for the course he uses to take with other mens Testimonies▪ because it is the only way that a man in his cir­cumstances can take; otherwise, nothing can be in it self more unreasonable, than to pretend to answer Testimonies by ranking them under so many faulty Heads; and having so done, magisteri­ally to require his Adversary to vindi­cate them, by shewing that they do not fall under some of those Heads, though he have not said one word against any of them particularly; nay, though he have not so much as recited any one of them; for then the Trick would be spoiled, and his Catholick Reader who perhaps may believe him in the general, might see Reason not to do so if he should descend to particulars, which (as he well observes) would make his P. 161. Discourse to look with a contingent Face.

§. 2. I begin with his three Authori­ties from Scripture; which when I [Page 303] consider, I see no reason why he (of all men) should find fault with my Lord Bishop of Down's Dissuasive for being so P. 320. thin and sleight in Scripture-Citations. Nor do I see how he will answer it to Mr. Rushworth, for transgressing that pru­dent Rule of his, viz. Dial. 2. Sect. 14. That the Catho­lick should never undertake to convince his Adversary out of Scripture, &c. For which he gives this substantial Reason, Ibid. because this were to strengthen his Op­ponent in his own Ground and Principle, viz. That all is to be proved out of Scrip­ture; which he tells us presently after is no more fit to convince, than a Beetle is to cut withall; meaning it perhaps of Texts so applied as these are which follow. Isa. 35.8. This shall be to you a direct way, so that Fools cannot err in it. Isa. 59.21. This is my Covenant with them, saith the Lord; my Spirit which is in thee, and my words which I have put in thy mouth shall not depart from thy mouth, and from the mouth of thy Seed, and from the mouth of thy Seeds seed from henceforth for ever. Jer. 31. I will give my Law in their bowels, and in their hearts will I write it: From which Texts if Mr. S. can prove Tradition to be the only Rule of [Page 304] Faith, any better than the Philosophers Stone or the Longitude may be proved from the 1 Cap. of Genesis, I am content they should pass for valid Testimonies: Though I might require of him (by his own Law) before these Texts can signifie any thing to his purpose, to de­monstrate that this is the Traditionary sense of these Texts, and that it hath been universally in all Ages received by the Church under that Notion; and then to shew how it comes to pass that so many of the Fathers, and of their own Commentators have interpreted them to another sense: And lastly, to shew how Scripture which has no cer­tain sense but from Tradition, and of the sense whereof Tradition cannot as­sure us, unless it be the Rule of Faith; I say, how Scripture can prove Tradition to be the Rule of Faith, which can prove nothing at all unless Tradition be first proved to be the Rule of Faith. This I take to be as shameful a Circle as that wherewith Dr. Holden upbraids the generality of his Brethren.

§. 3. I proceed to his Authorities from Fathers and Councils; all which (not one of them excepted) he hath taken [Page 305] out of Mr. White's Tabulae Suffragiales, without the least acknowledgment from whom he had them. And that it might be evident that he had not consulted the Books themselves for them, he hath ta­ken them with all their faults, and with the very same errors of Citation which Mr. White had been guilty of before him. So that though he is pleas'd to say of himself that P. 239. he he is a bad Transcriber ▪ yet I must do him that right, to assure the Reader that he does it very punctually and exactly.

§ 4. He begins with Councils, of which he tells us he will only mention three in several Ages.

The first is the First Synod of Lateran. One might have expected, after he had told us he would mention three in seve­ral Ages, he should have produced them according to the order of Time, and have begun with the Council of Sardi­ca, which was near 300 years before the Lateran. But there was a good reason why the Lateran should be first produ­ced viz. because it is mentioned before the other in Mr White's Book. Well, but what says this Synod? We all confess unanimously and consequently, with one [Page 306] heart and mouth, the Tenets and Sayings of the Holy Fathers; adding nothing, substracting nothing of those things which are delivered us by them; and we be­lieve as the Fathers have believed, we Preach so as they have taught. The force of which Testimony Mr. S. lays up­on the Word delivered, as if that Word where-ever it is met with in Councils or Fathers, must needs be understood of oral delivery; whereas it is a general Word indifferently used for conveyance either by writing, or word of mouth. In this place it plainly refers to the wri­tings of particular Fathers, out of whom a long catalogue of Testimonies against the Heresie of the Monothelites had been read just before this Declaration of the Synod. Now what signifies this to oral Tradition's being the Rule of Faith, that this Synod declares her Faith, in oppo­sition to the Heresie of the Monothelites, to be consonant in all things to those Testimonies which had been produced out of the Fathers?

The next is the Council of Sardica; out of an Epistle of which Council he cites these words, We have received this Doctrine, we have been taught so, we hold [Page 307] this Catholick Tradition, Faith and Con­fession. Which are general words, and indifferently applicable to Oral Tradi­tion, or Writing, or both. But be they what they will, Mr. S. ought not to have been ignorant, that this Council was rejected by St. Austin and other Orthodox Fathers, as Concil. Tom 1. Binnius ac­knowledges; and which is more, that the latter part of this Epistle (out of which part Mr. S. cites these words) which contains a Confession of Faith, is by An. 347. Baronius (and after him by Binnius) proved to have been surreptitiously ad­ded. For though it be found in Theo­doret, and mentioned by Sozomen; yet Baronius thinks that it was the Arian Confession composed by the false-Synod of Sardica which sate at the same time; and that Sozomen lighting upon it, per­haps mistook it for the Confession of the Orthodox Synod of the same name. However that be, he proves out of A­thanasius, and from the Testimony both of the Eastern and Western Bishops, that the Council of Sardica did not so much as add one word or tittle, no nor so much as explain any thing in the Ni­cene Faith. But Mr. White sayes no­thing [Page 308] of this, and therefore Mr. S. could not, who is no Speculator in these mat­ters, but only as a Testifier delivers down these authorities to us as he re­ceived them by hand from Mr. White; and if the word Tradition be but in them, they are Demonstrative.

As for his Testimonies from the 2 d Council of Nice (which he calls the 7 th General Council) who pretended their Doctrine of Image-worship to have de­scended to them by an uninterrupted Tradition, and proved it most doughtily by Texts of Scripture ridiculously wrested, by impertinent sayings out of obscure and counterfeit Authors, and by fond and immodest Stories (as is acknow­ledged by Pope Quodli­bet 6. cited by Espen­caeus in 2 d Epist. ad Tim. c. 4. Adrian the 6 th) of Apparitions and Womens Dreams, &c. for which I refer the Reader to the Coun­cil it self; which is such a mess of Pop­peries, that if a general Council of A­theists had met together with a design to abuse Religion by talking ridicu­lously concerning it, they could not have done it more effectually: I say, as for his Testimonies from this Council, I shall refer Mr. S to that Western Coun­cil under Charles the Great, which a [Page 309] little after at Francford condemned, and also fully confuted the Decisions of this Council, calling their pretended Tradi­tion of Image-worship [putidissimam Traditionem] a most stinking Tradition.

These are his authorities from Coun­cils; Where (says he) we see General Councils relying on the Teaching of the Fathers or fore-going Church, and on the Churches Tradition as their Rule, &c. Where does he see any such mat­ter? Or where does he see General Coun­cils? Was the Council of Lateran a General one? Or was the Council of Sardica? If it was, let him shew how the 2 d. of Nice could be the 7 th. Gene­ral Council. Mr. White must write more explicitly, and say which are General Councils, which not, otherwise he will lead his friends into dangerous mi­stakes.

§ 4. After ancient Councils (not so ancient neither) let us (says he) give a glance at Fathers. Glance is a mo­dest word, and yet I doubt whether ever the Fathers had so much as that from him. Before I speak particularly to his Testimonies from the Fathers, I shall mind him of what Mr. Rushworth [Page 310] says in general, viz. Dial. 3. Sect. 13. That who seeks Tradition in the Fathers, and to convince it by their Testimony, takes an hard task upon him, &c. Again Ibid., As in other Points, so even in this of the Resolution of Faith, as Doctors seem to differ nowadays, so might the Fathers also. If this be true, Mr. S. is not very likely by a few Testimonies out of the Fathers to prove that Tradition is the sole Rule of Faith. But let us see what he has done towards it.

He begins with a saying of Pope Ce­lestine to the Fathers of the Ephesin Council. Now therefore we must act with a common endeavor to preserve things believed, and retained to this ve­ry time by Succession from the Apostles. Binnius's other Reading [of [...] for [...]] quite spoils the force of this Citation which Mr. S. puts upon the word Succession. But read it how he will; why may not the Christian Doctrine be said to come by Succession from the Apo­stles, when it is transmitted to us by Scrip­ture, as well as when by oral Tradition? I am sure the same Celestine in an Epistle to Cyril, commends him for defending the Faith by Scripture, This (says he) is [Page 311] a great Triumph of our Faith, to demon­strate our Opinions so strongly, and to overthrow the contrary by Testimonies from Scripture. And neither in this E­pistle, nor the other, does he make any mention of Oral Tradition.

Next he cites that known place in Ire­naeus, But what if the Apostles had not left us the Scriptures, ought we not to follow the Order of Tradition, &c.? This makes clearly against him; for it implies, that now the Apostles have left us the Scriptures, we ought to follow them. The other passage he cites out of Irenae­us, Lib. 1. c. 3. is a clear eviction that he did not consult the Book. For he puts two sayings together which he had met with in Mr. White immediately one after the other; and because Mr. White had cited Lib. 1. c. 3. for the first say­ing, and brought in the other immedi­ately upon it with an (Et rursus) Again, &c. Therefore Mr. S. (who is of a right Traditionary temper, which is to take things easily upon trust himself, and require Demonstration from o­thers) concluded that these sayings were in the same place, though in truth they are in several Books. As for the [Page 312] Testimony it self, there is nothing in it to Mr. S's purpose besides the word Tra­dition, which Irenaeus does often ap­ply to Scripture as well as Oral Traditi­on; and there is nothing in this place to determine it to Oral Tradition.

His Testimonies out of Origen will do him less stead: For every one that hath been conversant in the Writings of that Father, knows what he means by the Churches Tradition preserved by order of Succession, viz. The mystical Inter­pretations of Scripture, which (he says) were delivered by the Apostles to the Governors of the Church, and by them down from hand to hand. If this be the Tradition Mr. S. contends for, Origen is at his service; if it be not, I assure him he is not for his turn.

Next comes Tertullian, concerning whom (as also Origen) the Papist up­on occasion thinks it enough to reply in St. Hierom's words Advers. Helvid., As for Tertulli­an, I have nothing to say of him but that he is not a man of the Church. Whatever he was, these are his words, If thou beest but a Christian, believe what is [traditum] deliver'd. And here's nothing again but the word de­liver'd; [Page 313] which (as I have said) is in­different to Written or Oral Tradition, if the Circumstances do not determine it to one; as here they do (very un­luckily for Mr. S.) to the Scripture. For he disputes here against Marcion, who denied the Flesh of Christ; and who to maintain that, denied his Nati­vity, and His opi­nor consiliis tot Origi­nalia In­strumenta Christi de­lere Mar­cion ausus est, ne Caro ejus proba­retur. Ex qua, oro te, autoritate, &c. expunged the whole History of it out of the Gospel; But (saith Ter­tullian) by what authority dost thou do this? If thou be a Prophet, foretell something; If an Apostle, preach publick­ly; If Apostolical, be of the Apostle's mind; If no more but a Christian, be­lieve what is delivered. And where de­livered? But in those Instruments or Books of the Gospel out of which (as Tertullian immediately before tells us) Marcion had made bold to expunge this Story.

As for his Testimonies out of Atha­nasius, the two first of them prove no­thing but that Faith comes down from our Ancestors, or was by them delivered to us; which no body denies: Nor is there a word in either of them concern­ing oral, in opposition to written Tradi­tion. The third Testimony is out of an [Page 314] Epistle to Epictetus, to whom Athana­sius writing concerning those who held Christ's Body to be Consubstantial with his Divinity, tells him this was so gross a conceit that it needed no sollicitous confutation; but that it would be a suf­ficient answer to say in general the Or­thodox Church was not of that mind, our Fathers did not think so. From whence Mr. S. infers that Tradition is held by him a sole sufficient Rule of Faith, and the only Answer to be given why we re­ject Points from Faith, &c. But if he had consulted the Book, he would not have inferred that this was the only Answer to be given, &c. For it immediately follows, But lest from our being wholly silent, these Inventers of evil things should take occasion to be more impudent, it will be good to recite a few passages out of Scrip­ture, &c. And from thence he confutes them at large. It was so gross an Error that he thought it might be sufficient, without bringing particular arguments out of Scripture against it, to say that it was contrary to the ancient Faith; but yet lest they should (if he had said no more) have taken boldness from thence, and thought that nothing more could [Page 315] be said against it, therefore he confutes it from particular Texts of Scripture. And what in his opinion was the suffici­ent Rule of Faith, Mr. S. might have seen at the beginning of this Epistle from these words, That Faith which was pro­fessed by the Fathers in that Council (viz. the Nicene) according to the Scriptures, is to me sufficient, &c. It seems that Scripture was to him the Rule and Stan­dard whereby to judg even the Creeds of General Councils.

Mr. S. says he will be shorter in the rest, and so will I. For what is to be said to Testimonies brought at a venture? when he that brings them, had he read the Books themselves, could not have had the face to have brought them. Such is this out of Stromat. L. 7. Clem. Alezand. As if one of a Man becomes a Beast, like those infected with Circes poyson; so he hath forfeited his being a Man of God and faithful to our Lord, who spurns against Ecclesiastical Tradition, and leaps into Opinions of human Election. Mr. S. knows whose way of quoting this is, to pick a bit out of the midst of a Text that sounds something towards his pur­pose, and leave out the rest which [Page 316] would make it evident to be meant just contrary. Yet I cannot charge this wholly upon Mr. S. whose implicit Faith were it not for his culpable Ignorance might excuse him. But for his Seducer Mr. White, how he can ac­quit himself of so foul an Imputation, I leave it to any ingenuous Papist to judg when I have nakedly set the whole passage before him. Clemens speaking of Hereticks who relinquish the Scrip­ture, or abuse it by wresting it to their lusts, says, Men who deal in matters of highest importance must needs commit great Errors, if they do not take and hold the RVLE OF TRVTH from Truth it self. For such men having once devia­ted from the right way, do likewise err in most particulars; probably because they have not the Faculty of distinguish­ing Truths and Falshoods perfectly exer­cised to choose what ought to be chosen. For if they had this, they would be ruled by the Divine SCRIPTVRES. [There­fore as if any of Mankind should become a Beast, in such sort as those who were [...]. bewitched by Circe; even so he hath lost his being a Man of God and abiding faithful to the Lord, who hath spurned [Page 317] against the Tradition of the Church, and skipt into the Opinions of human Sects [...].,] ( not of human Election, as Mr. S. blind­ly following Mr. Wh. does most absurdly translate it), but he that hath returned from his Errors, and hearkned to the SCRIPTVRES, and conformed his life to the Truth, is as it were advanced from a Man to a God. At the same rate he goes on for several Pages together, ta­king the Scriptures for an indemonstrable Principle, from which all Divine Do­ctrines are to be demonstrated, and for the Criterion whereby they are to be tried; and charges the Hereticks in such words as we cannot find fitter for our Adversaries, As (says he) naughty Boys shut out their School-master, so these drive the Prophecies out of the Church, suspecting that they will chide and admo­nish them; and they patch together abun­dance of falshoods and fictions that they may seem RATIONALLY not to admit the Scriptures. Again, speaking of these Hereticks affronting the Scriptures, he tells us they oppose the [...]. Divine Tradi­tion with human Doctrines [...]. by other Traditions [delivered from hand to hand] that they may establish a Sect or Heresie. [Page 318] Again he says, they adulterate the Truth, and steal the Rule of Faith, &c. but for ORAL Frauds they shall have WRIT­TEN Punishments. But enough of this; whosoever desires to see more of it, let him read on where these men to their shame have directed us, and see whether any Protestant can speak more fully and plainly in this Controversy. The whole trust of the Papists is upon the equivocal sense of the word Tradition. Which word is commonly used by the Fathers to sig­nify to us the Scriptures or Divine Tra­dition as Clement here calls it; but the Papists understand it of their unwritten Tradition, and to this they apply all those passages in the Fathers where Tradition is honourably mentioned. So Mr. S. deals with us, in the Testimonies I have already examined: And there is nothing of argu­ment in those few which remain but from the ambiguity of this Word; which I need not shew of every one of them in par­ticular, for whosoever shall read them with this Key will find that they are of no force to conclude what he drives at.

§ 5. As for his Citations out of the Council of Trent, by which he would prove it to be the perswasion of their [Page 319] present Church, that Tradition is the sole Rule of Faith; I have already shewn that that Council hath declared other­wise, and is otherwise understood by the chief of their own Writers, And therefore he did prudently to conceal in an &c. those choaking words, in which the Council declares itself to receive and honour, with equal pious af­fection and reverence, the Books of Scri­pture and unwritten Traditions. And after a great deal of shuffling, what a pitiful Account is it that he at last gives of that Council's putting Scripture con­stantly before Tradition, because Scri­pture being interpreted by Traditi­on, is of the same Authority as if an Apostle or Evangelist were present, and therefore no wonder they honour Scrip­ture-Testimony so as to put it before Tra­dition; which is to say, that because Scri­pture is subordinate to Tradition and to be regulated by it, therefore it de­serves to be put before it. Besides if Scripture and Tradition be but several wayes of conveying the Evangelical and Apostolical Doctrine, why should he imagine an Evangelist or Apostle to be more present by the Scripture than [Page 320] by oral Tradition? Especially if it be considered, that he supposes Scripture to be an uncertain, and Tradition an in­fallible way of conveying this Doctrine.

SECT. II.

Testimo­nies on the behalf of Scripture.§ 1. ALL that now remains, is to confirm the precedent Dis­course by Testimonies of the most emi­nent Persons of the Church, in several Ages. in which I shall not need to be large, being so happily prevented by that full Account which is given of the sense of the Ancients in this matter, in the Answer to Labyrinthus Cantuarien­sis; which Mr. S. may if he pleases con­sult for his further Conviction.

§ 2 I begin with the Historical Ac­count which Eusebius gives of commit­ting the Gospel to writing; which is to this purpose, viz Histor. Eccles. l. 2. c. 14.That the Ro­mans were not content with the Doc­trine Preached, unless it were also committed to writing; and therefore did earnestly beg of Mark, Peter's Companion, that he would leave them a Monument in writing of that Doctrine which had been deliver'd to [Page 321] them by word of mouth. And this was the occasion of the writing of St. Mark's Gospel. And when Peter did under­stand that this Work was publish'd (be­ing suggested by the Divine Revelation of the Holy Spirit) it is said he was ve­ry much pleased with the ready and earnest desire of those Persons; and that by his Authority he confirmed this Wri­ting, to the end that it might be every where read in the Church. As for St. Matthew and St. John, he tells us Ibid. l. 3. c. 18., That of all the Disciples they two only have left monuments in Writing; of whom it is also reported that they be­took themselves to write, being drawn thereto by necessity. Matthew after he had preached the Word of God to the Jews, and was resolved to go to other Nations, wrote his Gospel in the Lan­guage of his Countrey; and thus by the diligence and pains of Writing, did abundantly supply the the want of his presence to those whom he left. And when Mark and Luke had published their Gospel, it is reported that John (who had always used to preach the Word without writing it) being at length wrought upon by the same reason did be­take [Page 322] himself to write. From this ac­count it is clear, that the Apostles thought it necessary for the preservation and secure conveyance of the Christian Doctrine, that it should be put into Wri­ting; and that they judged this a bet­ter way to supply the want of their pre­sence, than oral Tradition. Therefore the same Author tells us Ibid. c. 31., That the Disciples, who immediately succeeded the Apostles, as they travelled to preach the Gospel to those who had not yet heard the Word of Faith, did with great care also deliver to them the Writings of the Holy Evangelists. Again Ibid. c. 30., That Ignatius as he travelled towards Rome (where he was to suffer) exhorted the Churches of every City to hold fast the Tradition of the Apostles; which (as also by Writing he testified) for greater security he held necessary to be copied in Writing.

§ 4. That the Hereticks of Old made the same pretence which the Pa­pists make now, of oral Tradition in opposition to Scripture, the same Euse­bius tells us; and withal, that Books are a sufficient confutation of this [Page 323] pretence Ibid. L. 5. c. 27.. Those (says he) who were of the Heresie of Artemon, said that all their Fore-fathers and the Apostles themselves had received and taught the same things which they also did; and had preserved the true Teaching unto the time of Victor Bishop of Rome, whose Successor Zephyrinus corrupted it. And this (saith he) would have great probability, were it not first of all contradicted by the Scripture; and next if there did not remain the Writings of other Brethren much more ancient than Victor 's time, &c. in the Books of all whom Christs Divinity is acknowledged. And afterwards he tells us that these Hereticks did change and corrupt the Scriptures to bring them to their Opi­nions; so Mr. S. tells us that the out­ward Letter of Scripture ought to be corrected by Tradition and Sense writ­ten in mens hearts.

St. Hierom also tells us Comment. in Isai. c. 19., That the Hereticks were wont to say, we are the Sons of the Wise, who did from the be­ginning deliver down to us the Aposto­lical Doctrine; but he adds, that the true Sons of Judah adhere to the Scrip­ture.

[Page 324]§ 4. That Scripture is sufficiently plain in all things necessary.

St. Chrysostome In 2 Thes. c. 2. Hom. 4., All things in the Divine Scriptures are plain and straight. Whatsoever things are necessary are ma­nifest.

St. Austin having spoken of the pro­foundness of Scripture, adds Epist. 3., Not that those things which are necessary to Sal­vation are so hard to be come at: But (saith he) when one hath there attained Faith without which there is no pious and right living, there are besides, many dark and mysterious things, &c. Again Ibid., The manner of speech in Scripture how easie is it to all, though few can penetrate to the bottom of it? Those things which it plainly contains, it speaks without dis­guise like a familiar Friend to the heart of the learned and unlearned. How will Mr. S. reconcile this with his grand Ex­ception against Scripture? And what these things are, which are plainly con­tained in Scripture, the same Father tells us else-where, in these words De Doctr. Christ. L. 2. c. 9., Among those things which are plainly set down in Scripture, all those things are to be found which comprehend Faith and good Manners. The same St. Austin (as also [Page 325] Clement in the Book which Mr. White quoted) for the understanding of obscure Texts of Scripture directs us not to Tra­dition, but to the plain Texts, without which he expresly says De Vnitat. Eccles. c. 5. there would be no way to understand them.

§ 5. That Scripture is so plain, as to be fit to determine Controversies.

Justin sure thought so, when disputing with Trypho, concerning a point where­in the Jew had Tradition on his side, he told him he would bring such proofs (to the contrary) as no man could gain-say: Attend (says he) to what I shall recite out of the Holy Scriptures, proofs which need not to be explained, but only to be heard. Mr. White might have found likewise much to this purpose in his Cle­ment.

But not to tire my Reader in a Point which the Ancients abound with, I shall only produce the judgment of Constan­tine Theodo­ret. Hist. L. 1. c. 7. in that solemn Oration of his to the Council of Nice; wherein he bewails their mutual oppositions, especially in Di­vine things; concerning which they had the Doctrine of the Holy Spirit Recor­ded in Writing; For (says he) the Books [Page 326] of the Evangelists and Apostles, and the Oracles of the old Prophets, do evi­dently teach us what we ought to think of the Divine Majesty. Therefore lay­ing aside all seditious contention, let us determine the matters in question by Testimonies out of the Divine Writings. Not a word of any other Tradition but Scripture, which was held evident enough in those days, though now Mr. S. tells us it is not sufficient to decide that Controversy about the Divinity of Christ.

§ 6. Lastly, That Scripture is the Rule of Faith.

Irenaeus L. 3. c. 1., The method of our Salvation we have not known by any other but those men by whom the Gospel came to us, which then they preached, but afterwards by the Will of God delivered it to us in the Scriptures, to be for the future the foundation and pillar of our Faith.

St. Cyprian the Church hath ever held a good Catholick; yet Mr. S. P. 314. takes notice that he erred in a Point of Faith, and perhaps the rather because Mr. Rushworth Dial. 3. Sect. 13. had told him that he was not theirs in this Controversy. For (says he) St. Cyprian seems to think that the [Page 327] Resolution of Faith was to be made into Scripture, and not into Tradition. But that we may not seem to accept of this of courtesie from him, nor yet wholly to despise it, I shall offer this one Testi­mony instead of many out of that Fa­ther; who being opposed with an Argu­ment from Tradition, demands Epist. 74., Whence have you that Tradition? Comes it from the Authority of the Lord, and of the Gospel, or from the Epistles of the Apo­stles? For God testifies that we are to do those things which are written, &c. If it be commanded in the Gospel, or con­tained in the Epistles or Acts of the Apostles, then let us observe it as a Di­vine and Holy Tradition.

Hilary Ad Con­stant. commends Constantius the Emperor for regulating his Faith only according to those things which are writ­ten. And to oblige him to deserve this commendation, he adds, He who refuses this is Antichrist, and who dissembles in it is Anathema.

Lib. 5. de Schism. Donat. Optatus, concerning the Controver­sy with the Donatists, asks who shall be Judge? and answers himself, the Scrip­tures: Which he illustrates by the simi­litude of a Father who delivered his [Page 328] Will orally to his children while he was living, but when he was dying caused it to be written in lasting Tables, to de­cide all Controversies that might happen among them after his death. The pas­sage is large, and it is obvious to apply it.

Basil maintaining the Doxology as it was used in his days, says De Sp. Sancto c. 7., Thus we re­ceived it from our Fathers; but adds immediately, This is not enough for us, that it is the Tradition of the Fathers, for they followed the Authority of the Scriptures, making its Testimonies the Principles upon which they built. He has indeed in the same Book C. 27. a passage much insisted on by the Papists concern­ing unwritten Traditions; but withal he says those Traditions were secretly con­veyed, which makes all the rest of no use to Mr. S.

Chrysostom Hom. 8. in Epist. ad Heb. c. 5. having mentioned seve­ral Heresies, directs how they may be avoided, viz. By attending to the Faith delivered, and looking upon all that disagrees from that as adulterate. For (says he) as those who give Rules do not put men upon a curious enquiry after many measures, but bid [Page 329] them keep to the Rule given; so is it in Opinions. But no body will at­tend to the Scriptures; if we did, we should not only not fall into Errors our selves, but also rescue those that are deceived. Again Hom. 52. in Joh., If we would be throughly conversant in the Scriptures, we should be instruct­ed both in right Opinions and a good life. Again, among the many Sects of Chri­stians Hom. 33. in Act. Apost. it will be easie to judge of the right, if we believe the Scriptures, because these are plain and true; If any one agree with these, he is a Christian; if he contradict them, he is far from this Rule.

St. Austin calls the Scipture De Bapt. Cont. Do­nat. L. 2. c. 6. the Di­vine Balance for the weighing of Doc­trine. Again, the Holy Scripture (sayes he) fixeth the Rule of our Doctrine. And accordingly himself uses it both in his Dispute with Maximinus, to whom he sayes Contr. Max. L. 3., Neither ought I now to al­ledg the Nicene Council, nor thou that of Arminium; for neither am I bound to the Authority of the one, nor thou of the other. Let us both contest with the Authorities of Scripture which are Wtinesses common to us both. [Page 330] And also against the Donatists in these words De Vni­tat. Eccles. c. 16., Let them if they can de­monstrate their Church not by the Talk and Rumors [or oral Traditi­on] of the Africans, not by the Councils of their own Bishops, not by the Books of their Disputers, not by deceitful Miracles, &c, but by the prescript of the Law, Prophets, &c. i. e. by all the Canonical Authorities of the Holy Books.

Hierom saith Com­ment. in Agg. c. 1., Of those things, which without the Authorities and Testimonies of the Scripture men invent of their own heads as from Apostolical Tradition, they are smitten with the Sword of God.

Theophilus Alexandr. whom Hierom hath Translated, calls Scripture more than once Paschal. L. 3. the Rule, and the Testimo­nies of it the firm foundations of Do­ctrine. And again saith L. 2., It comes from a Demonical spirit that men follow the Sophisms of humane minds, and think any thing Divine that wants the Authority of Scripture.

Theodoret Haeret. Fabul. L. 5. charges all Heresies upon the not following of Scripture, which he calls the inflexible Rule of Truth. Again, We have have learned the Rule [Page 331] of Opinions from the Divine Scripture.

After the Fathers, I shall produce the Testimonies of two Eminent Persons of latter Times, Gerson and Lyra.

Gerson in his Part 1. Consid. 2. Book of the Tryal of Doctrines, hath this remarkable passage; In the Tryal of Doctrines that which is first and principally to be considered is, Whether a Doctrine be conformable to the H. Scripture, &c. The reason of this is, because the Scripture is deliver'd to us as a SVFFICIENT and INFAL­LIBLE RVLE for the Goverment of the whole Ecclesiastical Body and its Members to the end of the world. So that it is such an Art, such a Rule or Exemplar, that any other Doctrine which is not conformable to it, is to be renounc'd as Heretical, or to be account­ed suspicious, or not at all appertaining to Religion. Again, De Di­stinct. Ve­rar. Vision. a falsis. It is evident how pernicious the rejection of the H. Scrip­ture is, and how certain a preparatory for the reception of Antichrist. Once more, Serm. in die Cir­cumcis. &c. What mischief, what danger, what confusion hath happen'd thorough contempt of the H. Scripture, which sure is sufficient for the Government of the Church (else Christ must have been [Page 332] an imperfect Law-giver) let us ask Ex­perience, &c.

Lyra Prolog. de Lib. Bib. &c. also writes thus Prolog. de Lib. Bib. &c.; As in Phi­losophy truth is discovered by reducing things to their first and self-evident Principles; so in the Writings deliver'd by the H. Doctors, Truth is discover'd as to matters of Faith, by reducing them to the Canonical Scriptures.

Sir, You know how easy it were to swell up a large Volume, with Testimonies to this purpose; especially if I should take the course that Mr. Wh. does, to hale in quotations though never so im­pertinent; or use the wretched im­portunity which Mr. S. does, to per­swade them to be pertinent. But these Testimonies which I have nakedly set down, leaving them to speak for themselves, are enough to satisfie an unpassionate Reader, such an one as dares trust himself with the use of his own eyes and reason. As for that sort of men which chuses to fol­low noise rather than light, we must be content to leave them to the blind conduct of those Guides who, having no better means to keep their Follow­ers [Page 333] to them, go halloing in the dark, and fill their ears with the insignificant sounds of Infallibility, Indefectibility, Self-evidence and Demonstration.

Concerning the Appendix wherein you are particularly challeng'd, I hope for an Account very shortly, and so take leave,

SIR,
Your Affectionate Friend, JOHN TILLOTSON.
FINIS.

A REPLY TO M r. J. S. his 3 d APPENDIX, Containing some Animadversions ON THE BOOK ENTITULED A RATIONAL ACCOUNT of the Grounds of Protestant Religion.

By Ed. Stillingfleet B. D.

London, Printed by H.C. for Henry Mortlock at the Sign of the Phoenix in St. Paul's Church-yard near the little North-door. 1675.

An Appendix to the Rule of Faith.
To his honoured Friend Mr. John Tillotson.

SIR,

AS soon as I understood your intentions to answer Mr. Serjeant, § [...] I could not but rejoice on his behalf, as well as on the truths and your own. For I have that real kindness for him, that I heartily wish him that reason and science he pretends to; which I could not but despair of his attaining, unless he were unde­ceived in that monstrous opinion he [Page 2] hath of himself and his undertakings. And I knew no person more fit than you, to let him understand the truth and himself together. In which, your performances have been so clear and sa­tisfactory, that I hope Mr. Sergeant, in stead of another Letter of directions to his Answerer, will write you one of thanks, for the reason and kindness you have shewed him throughout your Book. Unless it fares with you, as it hath done with some other Adversaries of theirs, that their civility hath been in­terpreted as an argument of their uncer­tainty, and their own confidence cried up for a demonstration. In which sense only I shall grant our Protestant Writers to build on uncertainties, and Mr. White and Mr. Serjeant to be the great De­monstrators of this age. If their own reason had been as severe as the cen­sures at Rome against them, they had saved us the labour of any answer, and would have found out their own so­phistry without a confutation. But the least thing we can imagine by their excessive confidence, is, that they are deceived themselves; and therefore it is a part of charity to them, as well as [Page 3] justice to the truth, to let the world see, that big words are quite another thing from science, and a strong pre­sumption from a regular demonstra­tion. As to which, no more need to have been said, than what you have al­ready done, if Mr. Serjeant had not thought it an accession to the glory of his atchievements, to lead two Pages of my Book in triumph after him. I confess, I was somewhat surprized to see a person who would be noted for his valour in assaulting Protestant Writers, steal so behind the main bulk and design of my Book; and when he had gotten two single Pages by themselves, fall upon them with as much pomp and ostentation, as if he had attack'd the whole. And this must be noised abroad as an Answer to me, by the same figure that his arguments are called demon­strations, which is by an hyperbole un­fit for any, but such who never flag be­low the sphere of Science in their own judgments, though they seem not to come near it in others. Yet since Mr. Serjeant is not only pleased to concern himself so far as to answer that part of my Book relating to oral tra­dition; [Page 4] but in most express terms to challenge me to reply to him, p. 236. he may now see (assoon as I could get any li­berty from greater imployments) how ready I am to give him all reasonable satisfaction. And in the first place, I return him thanks for the weapon he hath made choice of, viz. that of rea­son; there being no other I desire to make use of, in managing this debate between us: And I hope he will find as much civility towards him throughout this discourse, as he expresses towards me in the entrance to his; if that may be accounted any real civility, which is intended meerly out of design, with the greater advantage to disparage the cause I have undertaken, and yet see no reason to repent of. If in his cursory view of two Chapters of my Book he had (as he saith) quite lost me, p. 202. he had no cause to be troubled for it, if he had found far more excellent persons, such as Dr. Hammond, and the Disswader, and Dr. Pierce, instead of me. But to be sure, he intends not this in honour to any of us, but by way of a common reproach to us all, as though we did not talk out of nature or things, but words [Page 5] and imagination. I could heartily have wished, Mr. S. would have cropt so much of the victory due to anothers learning and industry, as to have shewed me one proposition in those discourses, which a rational understanding, that would be true to it self, could not settle or rely on. But if such insinuations as these must pass for answers, I must needs say, I judg M. S. equally happy in confuting our grounds, and in demonstrating his own; in both which, his greatest strength lies in the self-evidence of his bare affirma­tions. But it seems he is willing to re­sign the glory of this Victory to the ju­dicious Author of Labyrinthus Cantua­riensis, or to some others for him; and when they have once obtained it, I shall not envy them the honour of it. And I suppose those persons, whoever they are, may be able by this time, to tell Mr. S. it is an easier matter to talk of Victories than to get them. But if they do no more in the whole, than Mr. S. hath done for his share, they will triumph no-where, but where they conquer, viz. in their own fancies and imaginations. Therefore leaving them to their silent conquests, and as yet, un­heard-of [Page 6] Victories, we come to Mr. S. who so liberally proclaims his own in the point of oral tradition. Which (in a phrase scarce heard of in our language before) is the Post, he tells us, he hath taken upon him to explicate further and defend. What the explicating a Post means, I as little understand, as I do the force of his demonstrations; but this, and many other such uncouth forms of speech, up and down in his Book (which make his style so smooth and easie), are I suppose intended for embellishments of our tongue, and as helps to sure-speaking, as his whole Book is designed for sure-footing.

But letting him enjoy the pleasure and felicity of his own expressions, §. 2. I come to consider the matter in debate between us. And his first controversie with me, p. 203. is, for opposing the infallibility of oral tradition, to doctrinal infallibi­lity in Pope and Councils. A contro­versie fitter to be debated among them­selves, than between him and me: For is any thing more notorious, than that infallibility is by the far greatest part of Romanists attributed to the present [Page 7] Church, in teaching and delivering mat­ters of faith, not by virtue of any oral tradition, but the immediate assistance of the Holy Ghost; and that this is made by them the only ground of divine faith? For which Mr. S. may if he please, consult his judicious Author of Labyrinthus Cantuariensis, or any o­ther of their present Writers, except Mr. White and himself. He need not therefore have been to seek for the meaning of this doctrinal infallibility, as opposed to traditionary, if he had not either been ignorant of the opinion of their own Writers, or notoriously dissembled it. For this infallibility is not attributed to the Rulers of the Church, meerly as Doctors or Scholars, but as the representative Church, whose office it is, to deliver all matters of faith by way of an infallible testimony to every age, and thereby to afford a suf­ficient foundation for divine faith. But Mr. S. attributes no such infallibility to the representative Church, as teach­ing the rest, but derives their infallibi­lity from such grounds as are common to all parts of the essential Church. Wherein he apparently opposes himself [Page 8] to the whole current of their own Authors, who resolve all faith into the immediate assistance of the Holy Ghost; without which, they assert, there could be no infallibility at all in tradition, or any thing else; and therefore these opinions are as opposite to each other as may be. For such an infallibility is not attributed by them to the Teach­ers of the Church, meerly on some signal occasions, as Mr. S. seems to suppose, when they are to explain new matters of saith; but it is made by them to be as necessary as believing it self, because thereby the only sure foundation of faith is laid; and therefore it is very evident, they make it proper to the Church in all ages: Or else in some age of the Church men were destitute of suciffient grounds of faith. For they by no means think it a sufficient foun­dation for faith, that one age of the Church could not conspire to deceive another; for this they will tell him, at most, is but a humane faith; but that Christ by his promise hath assured the Church, that there shall never be want­ing in it the infallible assistance of his Holy Spirit, whereby they shall infalli­bly [Page 9] teach and deliver all matters of saith. And if this be not their opinion, let them speak to the contrary, which if they do, I am sure they must retract their most elaborate discourses about the resolution of faith, written by the greatest Artists among them. Let Mr. S. then judg, who it is that stum­bles at the Threshold; but of this dif­ference among them, more afterwards. By this it appears, it was not on any mistake that I remained unsatisfied in the Question I asked, Whether am I bound to believe what the present Church delivers to be infallible? To which Mr. S. answers, I understand him not. My reply shall be only that of a great Law­yers in a like case, I cannot help that. I am sure my words are intelligible e­nough; for I take infallible there as he takes it himself, for infallibly true; al­though I deny not the word to be im­properly used in reference to things; and that for the reason given by him, because fallibility & infallibility belong to the knowing power, p. 204. or the persons that have it, and not to the object. But we are often put to the use of that word in a sense we acknowledg improper, [Page 10] meerly in compliance with our Ad­versaries, who otherwise are apt to charge us with having only uncertain­ties and probabilities for our faith; if we do not use the term infallible as ap­plied to the truth of the thing. I am content therefore wherever, in what I have writ, he meets that term so appli­ed, that he take it only in his own sense, for that which is certainly true; for I mean no more by it. And in this sense Mr. S. answers affirmatively, and gives this account of it, not only because the present Church cannot be deceived in what the Church of the former age believed, but be­cause the Church in no age could conspire against her knowledg to deceive that age immediately following in matter of fact, evident in a manner to the whole world. The Question then is, whether this be a sufficient account for me to believe that to be certainly true, or to be the doctrine of Christ and his Apostles, which the present Church delivers? and consequently, whether the resolution of faith be barely into oral tradition?

§. 3.Thus we see the clear state of the Question between us. I come there­fore [Page 11] to the vindication of those things which I had objected against this way of resolving faith into oral tradition. Three things I especially insisted on: 1. That it is inconsistent with the pre­tensions of the present Roman Church. 2. That it hath not been the way own­ed in all ages of the Christian Church. 3. That it is repugnant to common sense and experience, and that the Church of Rome hath apparently al­tered from what was the belief of for­mer ages. If these three be made good, there will be no cause to glory in this last invention, to support the sinking fabrick of that Church. These three then I undertake to defend against what Mr. Serjeant hath objected against them.

1. That it is contrary to the pretensi­ons of the present Roman Church. And if it be so, there can be no reason for those who are of it, to rely upon it. For if so be that Church pretends, that the obligation to faith arises from a quite different ground from this; how can they who believe that Church infalli­ble, venture their faith upon any other principle than what is publickly owned [Page 12] by her? And whosoever thinks him­self bound to believe by virtue of an infallible assistance of the present Church, doth thereby shew, that his obligation doth not depend upon what was delivered by the former ages of the Church. As those who believed the Apostles were infallible in their doctrine, could not resolve their faith into the infallibility of oral tradition, but into that immediate assistance by which the Apostles spake; and where there is a belief of a like assistance, the foundation of faith cannot ly in the indefectibility of tradition, but in that infallible Spirit which they suppose the Church to be assisted by. For suppo­sing this oral tradition should fail, and that men might believe that it had actually failed; yet if the former suppo­sition were true, there was sufficient ground for faith remaining still. And what assurance can any one have, that the present Church delivers nothing for matter of faith, but what hath been derived in every age from Christ and his Apostles, if such an infallible Spi­rit be supposed in the present Church which was in the Apostles themselves? [Page 13] For on the same reason that those who heard the Apostles were not bound to trouble themselves with the tradition of the former age; no more ought they who believe the present Roman Church to have the same infallible assistance. They need not then en­quire, whether this age knew the meaning of the former, or whether one age could conspire to deceive ano­ther, or whether notwithstanding both these, errors might not come into the Church; it is sufficient for them, that the definitions of the present Church are infallible in all matters of faith. Therefore my demand was built on very good reason; How can you assure me the present Church obliges me to be­lieve nothing but only what, and so far as it received from the former Church? And Mr. S's answer is far from being satisfactory, That this appears by her manifest practice, never refusing com­munion to any man, that could approve himself to believe all the former age did. For this may be resolved into a principle far different from this, which is the belief of the infallibility of the present Church. For supposing, that [Page 14] they are not bound to enquire them­selves into the reasons why the traditi­on could not fail in any age; it is suffi­ent for them to believe the Church infallible; and if it be so, in proposing matters of faith, it must be so in decla­ring what the belief of the former age was. But my demands go on, What evidence can you bring to convince me both that the Church always observed this rule, and could never be deceived in it? Which question is built on these two Principles which the infallibility of oral tradition stands on: 1. That the Church must always go upon this ground. 2. That if it did so, it is impossible she should be deceived. Both which are so far from that self-evidence which M. Serjeant still pretends to in this way, that the Jesuits principles seem much more rational and con­sistent, than these do. For granting them but that one Postulatum, that there must be an inherent infallibility in the testimony of the present Church, to afford sufficient foundation for di­vine faith, all the rest of their doctrine follows naturally from it. Whereas this new way of resolving faith is built [Page 15] on such suppositions, which no man well in his wits will be ready to grant. For unless it be self-evident that the Church did always proceed on this ground, it cannot be self-evident that oral tra­dition is infallible; because the self-evidence of this principle depends on this, that in all ages of the Church, the only rule and measure of faith, was what was delivered by oral tradition from the age foregoing. Now if it be possible, that matters of faith might be conveyed in ways quite different from this, what self-evidence can there be, that the Church much always proceed upon this? Mr. S. then, must demon­strate it impossible for matters of faith to be conveyed to posterity in any other way than oral tradition; and not only that the thing is impossible, but that the Church in all ages judged it to be so; or else he can never make it at all evident, that the Church always made this her rule of faith. But if ei­ther there may be a certain convey­ance of the doctrine of faith another way, viz. by writing, or that the Church might judg that way more certain, whether it were so or not, ei­ther [Page 16] way it will appear far enough from self-evidence, that she always judged of doctrines of faith, meerly by the tradition of the preceding age. If ano­ther way be granted possible, there must be clear demonstration, that the Church notwithstanding this, did ne­ver make use of it; for if it did make use of another way of resolving faith in any age of the Church, then in that age of the Church oral tradition was not looked on as the ground of faith; and if so, notwithstanding whatever Mr. S. can demonstrate to the con­trary, that age might have believed otherwise than the immediately prece­ding did. For let us but suppose, that all necessary doctrines of faith were betimes recorded in the Church, in Books universally received by the Christians of the first ages; is it not possible, that age which first embraced these Books, might deliver them to posterity as the rule of their faith, and so down from one age to another; and doth it not hence follow, that the rule of faith is quite different from a meer oral tradition? Let Mr. S. then either shew it impossible, that the do­ctrines [Page 17] of faith should be written; or that being written, they should be uni­versally received; or that being uni­versally received in one age, they should not be delivered to the next; or being delivered to the next, those Books should not be looked on as con­taining the rule of faith in them; or though they were so, yet, that still oral tradition was wholly relied on as the rule of faith; and then I shall freely grant that Mr. S. hath attempted something towards the proof of this new hypothe­sis. But as things now stand, it is so far from being self-evident, that the Church hath always gone upon this principle, that we find it looked on as a great novelty among them in their own Church; and it would be a rare thing, for a new invention to have been the sense of the Church in all ages; which if it hath been, the strength of it is thereby taken away.

But let us suppose that the Church did proceed upon this principle, § 4▪ that nothing was to be embraced, but what was derived by tradition from the A­postles; how doth it thence follow, that [Page 18] nothing could be admitted into the Church but what was really so derived from them? Do we not see in the world at this day, that among those who own this principle, contradictory propositions are believed; and both sides tell us, it is on this account, be­cause their doctrine was delivered by the Apostles? doth not the Greek Church profess to believe on the account of tradition from the Apostles as well as the Latin? If that tradition failed in the Greek Church, which was preserved in the Latin, either Mr. S. must in­stance on his own principles in that age which conspired to deceive the next, or he must acknowledg, that while men own tradition they may be deceived in what the foregoing age taught them; and consequently those things may be admitted as doctrines coming from the Apostles which were not so, and some which did may be lost, and yet the pretence of tradition remain still. What self-evidence then can there be in this principle, when two parts of the Church may both own it, and yet believe contradictions on the account of it? It is then worth [Page 19] our enquiring, what self-evidence this is which Mr. S. speaks so much of, which is neither more nor less, but that men in all ages had eyes, ears, p. 205. and other senses, also common reason, and as much memory as to remember their own names and frequently inculcated actions. Which is so very reasonable a postulatum, that I suppose none who enjoy any of these will deny it. Let us therefore see how he proceeds upon it. If you disprove this, I doubt we have lost mankind, the subject we speak of; and till you disprove it, neither I, nor any man in his wits can doubt, that this rule depending on testify­ing, that is, sense or experience, can possibly permit men to be deceivable. Big words indeed; but such as evidence that all men who are in their wits do not constantly use them. For I pray Sir, what doth Mr, S. think of the Greek Church? Had not those in it eyes, ears, and other sen­ses, as well as in the Latin? Do not they pretend and appeal to what they re­ceived from their Fore-fathers as well as the Latins? It seems then a decepti­on is possible in the case of testifying, and therefore this doth more than per­mit men to be deceivable; for here hath [Page 20] been an actual deception on one side or other. But we need not fear losing mankind in this; for the possibility of error supposeth mankind to continue still; and if we take away that, we may sooner lose it than by the contra­ry. But what repugnancy can we imagine to humane nature, that men supposing doctrines of faith to come down from Christ or his Apostles, should yet mistake in judging what those do­ctrines are? Had not men eyes, and ears, and common sense in Christ and the Apostles times? And yet we see even then the doctrine of Christ was mista­ken; and is it such a wonder it should be in succeeding ages? Did not the Nazarenes mistake in point of circum­cision, the Corinthians as to the resur­rection, and yet the mean time agree in this, that Christs doctrine was the rule of faith, or that they ought to believe nothing but what came from him? Did not the Disciples themselves err, even while they were with Christ, and cer­tainly had eyes, and ears, and common sense as other men have, concerning some great articles of Christian faith, viz. Christs passion, resurrection, and the na­ture [Page 21] of his Kingdom? If then such who had the greatest opportunities imagina­ble, and the highest apprehensions of Christ, might so easily mistake in points of such moment, what ground have we to believe, that succeeding ages should not be liable to such misapprehensions? And it was not meerly the want of clear divine revelation which was the cause of their mistakes; for these things were plain enough to persons not possessed with prejudices; but those were so strong as to make them apprehend things quite another way than they ought to do. So it was then, and so it was in succeeding ages; for let Parents teach what they pleased for matters of faith, yet prejudice and liableness to mistake in Children, might easily make them misapprehend either the nature or weight of the do­ctrines delivered to them. So that setting aside a certain way of record­ing the matters of faith in the Books of Scripture, and these preserved entire in every age, it is an easie matter to con­ceive, how in a short time Christian Re­ligion would have been corrupted as much as ever any was in the world. [Page 22] For when we consider how much not­withstanding Scripture, the pride, pas­sion, and interests of men have endea­voured to deface Christian Religion in the world, what would not these have done, if there had been no such certain rule to judg of it by? Mr. S. imagins himself in repub. Platonis, but it appears he is still in faece Romuli; he fancies there never were, nor could be any differences among Christians, and that all Christians made it their whole busi­ness to teach their posterity matters of faith, and that they minded nothing in the world but the imprinting that on their minds that they might have it ready for their Children; and that all Parents had equal skill and fidelity in delivering matters of Religion to their posterity. Whereas in truth, we find in the early ages of the Christian Church several differences about matters of faith, and these differences con­tinued to posterity, but all parties still pleading that their doctrine came from the Apostles; & it fell out unhappily for Mr. S. that those were commonly most grosly deceived who pretended the most to oral tradition from the Apostles; [Page 23] still we find the grand debate was, what came from the Apostles, and what not? whereas had tradition been so infalli­ble a way of conveying, how could this ever have come into debate among them? What, did not they know what their Parents taught them? It seems they did not, or their Parents were no more agreed than themselves; for their differences could never be ended this way. Afterwards came in for many ages such a succession of ig­norance and barbarism, that Christian Religion was little minded either by Parents or Children, as it ought to have been; instead of that, some fopperies and superstitions were hugely in re­quest, and the men who fomented these things were cried up as great Saints and workers of miracles. So that the miracles of S. Francis and S. Dominick were as much, if not more carefully conveyed from Parents to Children in that age, than those of Christ and his Apostles; and on this account posteri­ty must be equally bound to believe them, and have their persons in equal veneration. If men at last were grown wiser, it was because they did not be­lieve [Page 24] Mr. S's principles, that they ought to receive what was delivered by their Parents; but they began to search and enquire into the writings of former ages, and to examine the opinions and practices of the present, with those of the primitive Church, and by this means there came a restau­ration of Learning and Religion toge­ther.

§. 5.But though matters of fact be plain and evident in this case, yet M. S. will prove it impossible there should any errors come into the Christian Church; and his main argument is this, because no age of the Church could conspire a­gainst her knowledg to deceive that age immediately following, in matter of fact, evident in a manner to the whole world. But before I come, more particularly, to shew the weakness of this argu­ment, by manifesting how errors might come into the Church without such a conspiracy as this is, I shall pro­pound some Queries to him. 1. What age of the Church he will instance in, wherein all persons who were not cast out of the Church, had the same appre­hensions [Page 25] concerning all points of faith i. e. that none among them did believe more things delivered by Christ or the Apostles than others did. I am sure he can neither instance in the age of the Apostles themselves, nor in those imme­diately succeeding them; unless Mr. S. the better to defend his hypothesis, will question all written records, because they consist of dead letters, and un­senc't characters, and wordish testimo­nies. Never considering, that while he utters this, he writes himself; un­less he imagins there is more of life, sense, and certainty in his Books, than in the Scriptures or any other writing whatsoever. 2. Where there were different apprehensions in one age of the Church, whether there must not be different traditions in the next? For as he looks on all Parents as bound to teach their Children, so on Children as bound to believe what their Parents teach them. On which supposition different traditions in the succeeding age must needs follow, different ap­prehensions in the precedent. 3. Whe­ther persons agreeing in the substance of doctrines may not differ in their [Page 26] apprehensions of the necessity of them? As for instance, all may agree in the article of Christs descent into Hell, but yet may differ in the ex­plication of it, and in the appre­hension of the necessity of it in or­der to salvation. So that we must not only in tradition about mat­ters of faith enquire, what was deli­vered, but under what notion it was delivered; whether as an allowable opinion, or a necessary point of faith. But if several persons, nay multitudes in the Church may have different noti­ons as to the necessity of the same points, by what means shall we discern what was delivered as an opinion in the Church, and what as an article of faith? But Mr. S. throughout his dis­course takes it for granted, that there is the same necessity of believing and delivering all things which concern the Christian doctrine; and still sup­poses the same sacredness, concern, ne­cessity, in delivering all the points in controversie between the Romanists and Us, as there was in those main ar­ticles of faith, which they and we are agreed in. Which is so extravagant a [Page 27] supposition, that it is hard to conceive it should ever enter into the head of a person pretending to reason; but as extravagant as it is, it is that with­out which his whole fabrick falls to the ground. For suppose we should grant him, that the infi­nite concerns which depend on the belief of the Christian doctrine should be of so prevalent nature with the world, that it is impossible to conceive any one age should neglect the know­ing them, or conspire to deceive the next age about them; yet what is all this to the matters in difference be­tween us? Will Mr. S. prove the same sacredness, necessity, concern, and mira­culously attestedness (as he phrases it) in the Invocation of Saints, Purgatory Transubstantiation, Supremacy, &c. as in the believing the death and resurre­ction of the Son of God. If he doth not prove this, he doth nothing; for his arguments may hold for doctrines judged universally necessary, but for no other. Therefore Mr. S. hath a new task which he thought not of; which is, to manifest that these could not be looked on as opinions, but were em­braced [Page 28] as necessary articles of faith. For unless he proves them such, he can neither prove any obligation in Parents to teach them their Children, nor in Children to believe what their Parents taught, but only to hold them in the same degree which they did themselves. When Mr. S. will undertake to prove, that the whole Church, from the time of Christ, did agree in the points in difference between us, as necessary articles of faith, I may more easily be­lieve, that no age could be ignorant of them, or offer to deceive the next about them. But when Mr. S. reflects on his frequent concession, that there are pri­vate opinions in the Church, distinct from matters of faith, he must remem­ber, before he can bring home his grounds to the case between their Church and ours, that he must prove none of the things in debate, were ever entertained as private opinions, and that it is impossible for that which was a private opinion in one age, to become a matter of faith in the next.

§ 6.But because this distinction of his [Page 29] ruins his whole demonstration, I shall first propound it in his own terms, and then shew how from thence it follows, that errors may come into the Church, and be entertained as matters of faith. His words are, It being evident, that we have but two ways of ordinary know­ledg, by acts of our soul, or operations on our body, that is, by reason and expe­rience; the former of which belongs to Speculators or Doctors, the second to De­liverers of what was received, or Testi­fiers. And this distinction he frequent­ly admits, not only in the present age of the Church, but in any; for the same reason will hold in all. From hence I propose several Queries further to Mr. S. 1. If every one in the Church looked on himself as bound to believe just as the precedent age did, whence came any to have particular opinions of their own? For either the Church had delivered her sense in that case or not; if not, then tradition is no cer­tain conveyer of the doctrine of Christ; if she had, then those who vented pri­vate speculations were Hereticks in so doing; because they opposed that do­ctrine which the Church received from [Page 30] Christ and his Apostles. If Mr. S. replies, that private speculations are in such cases where there is no matter of faith at all, he can never be able to help him­self by that distinction in the case of his own Church; for I demand, whether is it a matter of faith, that men ought to believe oral tradition infallible? If not, how can men ground their faith upon it? If it be, then either some are meer speculators in matters of faith; or all who believe on the account of the Popes infallibility are Hereticks for so doing. 2. If there were speculators in former ages as well as this, whether did those men believe their own specu­lations or no? If not, then the Fathers were great Impostors, who vented those speculations in the Church which they did not believe themselves. And it is plain, Mr. S. speaks of such opinions which the asserters of, do firmly be­lieve to be true: And if they did, then they look on themselves as bound to believe something which was not founded on the tradition of the Church; and consequently, did not own oral tra­dition, as the rule of faith. So that as many speculators as we find in the Churh, [Page 31] so many testifiers we have against the infallibility of oral tradition. 3. Whe­ther those persons who did themselves believe those opinions to be true, did not think themselves obliged to tell others they ought to believe them; and consequently, to deliver these as matters of faith to their children? Let Mr. S. shew me any inconsequence in this; but that it unavoidably follows upon his principles, that they were bound to teach their Children what themselves received as the doctrine of Christ; and that the obligation is in all respects equal as if they had believed these things on the account of oral tradition. 4. If Children be obliged to believe what their Parents teach them for mat­ters of faith, then upon Mr. S's, own concessions, is not posterity bound to believe something which originally came not from Christ or his Apostles? For it appears in this case, that the first rise was from a private opinion of some Doctors of the Church; but they believing these opinions themselves, think themselves obliged to propagate them to others; and by reason of their learning and authority, these opinions [Page 32] may by degrees gain a general accep­tance in the ruling part of the Church; and all who believe them true, think they ought to teach them their Chil­dren; and Children they are to believe what their Parents teach them. Thus from Mr. S's own principles, things that never were delivered by Christ or his Apostles, may come to be received as matters of faith in the present Church. Thus the intelligent Reader needs no bodies help but Mr. S. to let him un­derstand how Invocation of Saints, Pur­gatory, Transubstantiation, &c. though never delivered either by Christ or his Apostles, may yet now be looked on as articles of faith, and yet no age of the Church conspire to deceive ano­ther. Either then Mr. S. must say, there never were any private opina­tors or speculators in the Church, as di­stinct from testifiers, and then he un­avoidably contradicts himself; or he must deny that posterity is bound to believe what their fore-fathers deli­vered them as matters of faith; which destroys the force of his whole de­monstration. Perhaps he will an­swer, that Children are not bound to be­lieve [Page 33] what barely their Parents, or any other number of persons might deliver as matters of faith, but what the whole Church of every age delivers. This, though the only thing to be said in the case, yet is most unreasonable, be­cause it runs men upon inextricable dif­ficulties in the way of their resolving faith. For suppose any Children taught by their Parents what they are to believe; Mr. S. must say, they are not bound to believe them presently, but to enquire whether they agree with the whole Church of that age first, before they can be obliged to as­sent. Which being an impossible task either for Children, or men of age, to find out in the way of oral tradi­tion, this way of resolving faith, doth but offer a fairer pretence for infidelity. For we see, how impossi­ble it is for Mr. S. to make it appear, that their Church is agreed about the rule of faith; for by his own confession, the far greater number as speculators oppose the way asserted by him; how much more difficult then must it needs be, to find out what the sense of the whole essential Church is in all matters [Page 34] which Parents may teach their Chil­dren for doctrines of faith? So that if Children are not bound to believe what their Parents teach them, till they know they teach nothing but what the whole Church teaches, it is the most compendious way to teach them they are not bound to believe at all. But if this distinction be admit­ted, as Mr. S. makes much use of it, then it appears, how errors may come into the Church at first under the noti­on of speculations, and by degrees to be delivered as points of faith, by which means those things may be received in the Church, for such, which were ne­ver delivered by Christ or his Apostles, and yet no age conspire to deceive the next, which was the thing to be shewed.

§ 7.This is one way of shewing how errors may come into the Church, without one ages conspiring to deceive the next: but besides this, there are several others I might insist upon; but I shall mention only two more: 1. Misinterpreting the sence of Scrip­ture. 2. Supposing it in the power of some part of the Church to oblige the [Page 35] whole in matters of faith. For the first we are to consider, that no imagi­nable account can be given either of the writing or universal reception of the Books of the New Testament, if they were not designed for the preserva­tion of the doctrine of Christ. And although it should be granted possible for the main and fundamental articles of Christian faith (such as the Apostles Creed gives a summary account of) to have been preserved by the help of tradition; yet, unless we be extream­ly ungratful, we cannot but ac­knowledg, that God hath infinitely better provided for us, in not leaving the grounds of our Religion to the meer breath of the people, or the care of Mothers instructing their Children but hath given us the certain records of all the doctrines and motives of faith, preserved inviolably from the first ages of the Church. And when the Church saw with what care God had provided for the means of faith, oral tradition was little minded; thence the memory of those other things not recorded in Scripture is wholly lost; all the care was imployed in searching, preserving, [Page 36] and delivering these sacred Books to posterity. To these the primitive Church still appeals; these they plead for against all adversaries, defending their authority, explaining their sense, vindicating them from all corruptions. Tradition they rely not on, any fur­ther than as a testimony of the truth of these records, or to clear the sense of them from the perverse interpre­tation of those Hereticks who pretend­ed another kind of tradition than what was in Scripture. And when these were silenced, all the disputes that arose in the Church concerning matters of faith, was about the sense of these Books; as is evident by the proceed­ings in the case of Arius and Pelagius. Wherein tradition was only used as a means to clear the sense of the Scrip­tures, but not at all as that which the faith of all was to be resolved into. But when any thing was pleaded from tradition, for which there was no ground in Scripture, it was rejected with the same ease it was offered; and such persons were plainly told, this was not the Churches way; if they had plain Scripture, with the concurrent [Page 37] sense of Antiquity, they might produce it, and rely upon it. So that the whole use of tradition in the primitive Church (besides attesting the Books) was, to shew the unreasonableness of imposing senses on Scripture, against the universal sense of the Church from the Apostles times. But as long as men were men, it was not avoidable, but they must fall into different apprehen­sions of the meaning of the Scripture, according to their different judg­ments, prejudices, learning, and educa­tion. And since they had all this ap­prehension, that the Scripture contain­ed all doctrines of faith, thence as men judged of the sense of it, they differed in their apprehension, con­cerning matters of faith. And thence errors and mistakes might easily come into the Church, without one age conspiring to deceive the next. Nay if it be possible for men to rely on tradition without Scripture, this may easily be done; for by that means they make a new rule of faith, not known to the primitive Church, and conse­quently, that very assertion is an error in which the former age did not con­spire [Page 38] to deceive the next. And if these things be possible, M. S's. demonstra­tion fails him; for hereby a reason­able account is given, how errors may come into a Church without one age conspiring to deceive another. Again, let me enquire of Mr. S. whether men may not believe it in the power of the ruling part of the Church, to oblige the whole to an assent to the definitions of it? To speak plainer, is it not possible for men to believe the Pope and Council infallible in their decrees? And I hope the Jesuits (as little as Mr. S. loves them, or they him) may be a sufficient evidence of more than the bare possi­bility of this. If they may believe this, doth it not necessarily follow, that they are bound to believe whatever they declare to be matter of faith? Sup­posing then, that Transubstantiation, Su­premacy, Invocation of Saints, were but p [...]ivate opinions before, but are now de­fined by Pope and Council, these men cannot but look on themselves as much obliged to believe them, as if they had been delivered as matters of faith, in every age since the Apostles times. Is it now repugnant to common sense, [Page 39] that this opinion should be believed or entertained in the Church? if not, why may not this opinion be generally received? if it be so, doth it not una­voidably follow, that the faith of men must alter according to the Churches definitions? And thus private opini­ons may be believed as articles of faith, and corrupt practices be established as laudable pieces of devotion, and yet no one age of the Church conspire to de­ceive another. Thus I hope Mr. S. may see how far it is from being a self-evident principle, that no error can come into the Church, unless one age conspire to deceive the next in a matter of fact, evident in a manner to the whole world. Which is so wild an apprehen­sion, that I believe the Jesuits cannot entertain themselves without smiles, to see their domestick adversaries expose themselves to contempt with so much confidence.

Thus I come to the reason I gave, § 8. why there is no reason to believe that this is the present sense of the Roman Church. My words are, For I see the Roman Church asserts, that things may [Page 40] be de fide in one age, which were not in another; at least Popes and Councils chal­lenge this; and this is the common do­ctrine maintained there, and others are looked on as no members of their Church who assert the contrary; but as persons at least meritoriously, if not actually excommunicate. Where then shall I satisfie my self, what the sense of your Church is, as to this particular? Must I believe a very few persons, whom the rest disown as heretical and seditious? or ought I not rather to take the judg­ment of the greatest and most approved persons of that Church? And these dis­own any such doctrine; but assert, that the Church may determine things de fi­de, which were not before. In answer to this Mr. S. begs leave to distinguish the words de fide, p. 205. which may either mean Christian faith, or points of faith taught by Christ; and then he grants, 'tis non­sense to say, they can be in one age, and not in another. Or de fide may mean obligatory to be believed. In this latter sense none I think (saith he) denies things may be de fide in one age and not in another; in the former sense none holds it. Upon which very trium­phantly [Page 41] he concludes, What's now be­come of your difficulty? I believe you are in some wonderment, and think I elude it rather then answer it; I shall endeavour to unperplex you. I must confess it a fault of humane nature, to admire things which men understand not; on which account I cannot free my self from some temptation to that he calls wonderment; but I am pre­sently cured of it, when I endeavour to reduce his distinction to reason. For instead of explaining his terms, he should have shewed how any thing can be obligatory to be believed in any age of the Church, which was no point of faith taught by Christ, which not­withstanding his endeavour to unper­plex me, is a thing as yet I apprehend not; because I understand no obliga­tion to faith to arise from any thing but divine revelation; and I do not yet believe any thing in Christian do­ctrine to be divinely revealed, but what was delivered by Christ or his Apostles. And my wonderment must needs be the greater; because I suppose this incon­sistent with Mr. S's. principles. For oral tradition doth necessarily imply, [Page 42] that all points of faith were first taught by Christ, and conveyed by tra­dition to us; but if a thing may be de fide in this latter sense, which was not before, what becomes of resolving faith wholly into oral tradition? For faith is resolved into that from whence the obligation to believe comes; but here Mr. S. confesses, that the obliga­tion to believe doth arise from some­thing quite different from oral traditi­on; and therefore faith must be resol­ved into it. Besides, all the sense I can find in that distinction, is, that men are bound to believe something in one age, which they were not in another; and if so, I shall desire Mr. S. to un­perplex me in this, how every age is bound to believe just as the precedent did, and yet one age be bound to be­lieve more than the precedent. But however, I am much obliged to him for his endeavour to unperplex me as he speaks; for really I look on no civi­lities to be greater than those which are designed for clearing our under­standings; so great an adorer am I of true reason and an intelligible Religi­on. And therefore I perfectly agree [Page 43] with him in his saying, p. 206. that Christianity aims not to make us beasts, but more per­fectly men; and the perfection of our manhood consists in the use of our reasons. From whence he infers, that it is rea­sonable, consequences should be drawn from principles of faith, which, he saith, are of two sorts; first such as need no more but common sense to deduce them; the others are such as need the maxims of some science got by speculation to infer them; and these are Theological conclusions: The former sort, he tell us, the Church is necessitated to make use of upon occasion, i. e. when any Heretick questions those, and eadem opera, the whole point of faith it self, of which they were a part; as in the case of the Monothelites, about Christs having two wills. But all this while, I am far enough from being unperplexed; nay by this discourse, I see every one who offers to unperplex another, is not very clear himself. For since he makes no Theological conclusions to be de fide, but only such consequences as common sence draws, I would willingly un­derstand how common sence receives a new obligation to faith. For to my [Page 44] apprehension the deducing of conse­quences from principles by common sense, is not an act of believing, but of knowledg consequent upon a prin­ciple of faith. And the meaning is no more than this, that men, when they say they believe things, should not contradict themselves, as certainly they would do, if they deny those conse­quences which common sense draws from them. As in the case of the Monothe­lites, for men to assert that Christ had two natures, and yet not two wills; when the will is nothing else but the inclination of the nature to that good which belongs to it. So that there can be no distinct obligation to believe such consequences as are drawn by common sense; but every one that believes the principles from whence they are drawn, is thereby bound to believe all the consequences which immediately fol­low from them. Indeed the Church, when people will be so unreasonable to de­ny such things, may explain her sense of the article of faith in those terms which may best prevent dispute; but this is only to discriminate the persons who truly believe this article, from [Page 45] such as do not. Not that any new obligation to faith results from this act of the Church; but the better to prevent cavils, she explains her sense of the article it self in more explicite terms. Which, as he saith, is only to put the faith out of danger of being equivocated. Which is quite another thing from causing a new obligation to believe. As suppose the Church, to prevent the growth of the Socinian doctrine, should require from men the declaring their belief of the eternal existence of the Son of God; Would this be to bind men to believe some thing which they were not bound to before? No, but only to express their assent to the Deity of Christ in the simplest terms; because otherwise they might call him God by office, and not by nature. Now how can any one conceive, that any should be first ob­liged to believe, that Christ is God, and yet receive a new obligation after­wards to believe his eternal existence? Thus it is in all immediate consequences drawn by common sense; in all which, the primary obligation to believe the thing it self, extends to the belief of [Page 46] it in the most clear and least controvert­ed terms, which are not intended to impose on mens faith, but to promote the Churches peace. For neither is there a new object of faith; for how can that be, which common sense draws from what is believed already? neither is there any infallible propo­nent, unless common sense hath usurp­ed the Popes prerogative. But Mr. S. offers at a reason for this, which is, that none can have an obligation to believe what they have not an obligati­on to think of; and in some age the ge­nerality of the faithful have no occasion, nor consequently obligation to mind, re­flect, or think on those propositions in­volved in the main stock of faith. From whence, he saith, it follows, that a thing may be de fide, or obligatory to be belie­ved in one age, and not in another. But let Mr. S. shew, how a man can be ob­liged to believe any thing as an article of faith, who is not bound to think of all the immediate consequences of it? Because faith is an act of a rea­sonable nature, which ought to enquire into the reasons and consequences of things which it doth believe. But [Page 47] Mr. S's mistake lies here, in not di­stinguishing the obligation to believe from the obligation to an explicite de­claration of that assent. The former comes only from God, and no new ob­ligation can arise from any act of the Church; but the latter being a thing tending to the Churches peace, may be required by it on some occasions; i. e. when the doctrine is assaulted by Hereticks, as in the time of the four first General Councils; but still a man is not at all the more obliged to assent, but to express his assent in order to the Churches satisfaction.

But Mr. S. supposes me to enquire, §. 9. p. 208. how the Church can have power to oblige the generality to belief of such a point. To which his answer is, she obliges them to believe the main point of faith, by virtue of traditions, being a self-evident rule, and these implied points by vir­tue of their being self-evidently con­nected with those main and perpetual­ly used points, so that the vulgar can be rationally and connaturally made capable of this their obligation. But we are not now enquiring, what the obli­gation to believe the main points of [Page 48] faith is, nor whether tradition be a self-evident rule; but how there should be a new obligation to believe something self-evidently connected with the former points, is beyond my capacity to under­stand. And they must be vulgar un­derstandings indeed, that can rationally and connaturally be made capable of such an obligation. For if it be self-evidently connected with the main points, no one can believe the one, without believing the other; for no­thing is self-evident, but what a man assents to at the first apprehension of it; and if he doth so, how comes there a new obligation to believe it? Is it possible to believe, that any thing con­sists of parts, and not believe that that whole is greater than any of those parts? for this is a thing self-evidently connect­ed with the nature of the whole. But these are self-evident riddles, as the former were unintelligible demon­strations. And yet, though these be rare Theories, the application of them to the case of the Roman Church exceeds all the rest. Whence, saith he, the Go­vernment of our Church is still justified to be sweet, and according to right na­ture, and yet forcible and efficacious. [Page 49] Although I admire many things in Mr. S's Book, yet I cannot say I do any thing more than this passage, that because men are obliged to believe no implied points, but such as are self-evi­dently connected with the main ones, therefore the Government of the Roman Church is sweet, and according to right nature, &c. Alas then, how much have we been mistaken all this while, that have charged her with imposing hard and unsufferable conditions of com­munion with her! No, she is so gentle and sweet, that she requires nothing but the main points on the account of a self-evident rule, and implied points by reason of self-evident connexion with the former. I see Mr. S. (if he will make good his word) is the only person who is ever like to reconcile me with the Church of Rome: For I assure you, I never desire any better terms of com­munion with a Church, than to have no main points of faith required from me to assent to, but what are built on a self-evident rule, nor any implied points but such as are self-evidently connected with the former. And no work can be more easie, than to convince me up­on [Page 50] these grounds; for all endeavors of proof are taken away by the things being said to be self-evident. For the very offer of proof that they are so, self-evidently proves they are not so: For what ever is proved by somthing beside it self, can never be said with­out a contradiction to be self-evident. But not to tye up Mr. S. from his ex­cellent faculty of proving, if Mr. S. will prove to me that any of the points in difference between us, as Transub­stantiation, Purgatory, Supremacy of the Roman Church, &c. have any self-evi­dent connexion with any main point of faith in the Apostles Creed, I solemn­ly promise him to retract all I have writ against that Church; so far shall I be from needing a new obligation to believe them. But if these be so remote from self-evidence, that they are plainly repugnant to sense and reason (witness that self-evident doctrine of Transub­stantiation) what then must we think of Mr. S.? Surely the least is, that since his being a Roman Catholick, his mind is strangely inlightned, so far that those things are self-evident to him, which are contradictions to the rest of the [Page 51] world. But withal M. S. acquaints us with another mysterie; which is, how these points descended by a kind of tra­dition, and yet confesses, they were ne­ver thought of or reflected on by the ge­nerality, till the Church took occasion to explain them. Such a silent tradition doth very sutably follow the former self-evident connexion. For he that can believe Transubstantiation ro be self-evident, no wonder if he believes that to have been delivered by a constant Tradition, which was never heard of from the Apostles times to these.

Now Mr. S. is pleased to return to me, and draws up a fresh charge against me, which is, that I act like a Politici­an, and would conquer them by first di­viding them, and making odious compa­risons between two parties of Divines. But to shew us how little they differ, he distinguishes them, as faithful, and as private discoursers; in the former noti­on, he saith, they all hold the same di­vinely constituted Church-Government, and the same self-evident rule of faith; but as private discoursers he acknow­ledges they differ in the explication of [Page 52] their belief. I meddle not here with the Government of their Church, (which I have elsewhere proved to be far enough from being divinely constituted) but with the rule of faith; and the question is, whether the infallibility of oral tradition, be that self-evident rule which that Church proceeds on; Yes, saith Mt. S. they are all as faithful agreed in it, but as discourses they dif­fer about it. Which in short is, that all in the Church of Rome, who are not of his opinion, know not what they say; and that they oppose that which they do really believe. Which in plain English is, that they are egregious dis­semblers and prevaricators in Religion; that they do intolerably flatter the Pope and present Church with loud de­clamations for their infallibility, but they do really believe no such thing, but resolve all into oral tradition. But is not this an excellent agreement among them, when Mr. White and his party not only disown the com­mon doctrine of the infallibility of Pope and Councils, but dispute against it as pernicious and destructive to Christian faith? on the other side the [Page 53] far greater part of Romanists say, there can be no certainty of faith, unless there be an infallible divine testimony in the present Church, and this lodged in Pope and Councils; that those who endea­vour to overthrow this, are dangerous, seditious, heretical persons, According­ly their Books are censured at Rome, their opinions disputed against, and their persons condemned. And yet all this while, we must believe that these stick together like two smooth Marbles as faithful, though they are knocked one against another as discoursers; and that they perfectly agree in the same self-evident rule of faith, when all their quarrels and contentions are about it; and those managed with so great heat, that heresie is charged of one side, and Arch-heresie and undermining Religion on the other. Doth he think we ne­ver heard of Mr. White's Sonus Succinae, nor of that Chapter in it, where he saith, that the doctrine of Pope and Councils infallibility tends to overthrow the cer­tainty of Christian faith; De fide & Theol. tract· 2. sect. 22. p. 158. and that the propagating such a doctrine is a greater crime than burning Temples, ravishing the sacred Virgins on the Altars, tram­pling [Page 54] on the body of Christ, or the send­ing the Turk or Antichrist into Christian Countreys? Or doth he think we can believe that the Pope and Cardinals, the Jesuites and all the Papists of forreign Countreys do as faithful agree with Mr. White in this? It seems not so by the proceedings in the Court of Rome against him, in which as appears by the censure of the Inquisition against him, dated 17. November 1661. his doctrine is condemned not only as false, sediti­ous and scandalous, but as heretical and erroneous in faith. And if it were not for this very doctrine he was there censured, why doth Mr. White set him­self purposely to defend it in his Tabulae suffragiales? If these then do agree as faithful, who cannot but envy the ex­cellent harmony of the Roman Church, in which men condemn each other for hereticks, and yet all believe the same things still? Well Sir, I am in hopes up­on the same grounds Mr. S. will yield us the same charity too, and tell us that we agree with him as faithful, only we differ a little from him as discoursers; for I assure you, there is as great reason: the only difference is, we give them not [Page 55] such ill words as they do each other. For let Mr. S. shew us wherein we differ more from him about the Rule of Faith, than they do among themselves: For Mr. White when he hath said, that all kind of heresie doth arise from hence, that men make the holy Scripture, or a private spirit, the rule of faith; he pre­sently adds, it is all one, if one make Councils or Pope any other way than as witnesses to be the authors of faith. For, saith he, this is to subject the whole Church to that slavery, to receive any er­rour for an article of faith, which they shall define, or propose modo illegitimo, i. e. any other way then as witnesses of tradition. Either then we differ from Mr. S. only as discoursers, or he and his Brethren differ from each other more then as such. And so any one would think who reads the oppositions and arguments against each other on this subject, particularly Mr. Whites Tabulae suffragiales. But let Mr. White say what he will Mr. S. tells me, I am not aware how little they differ even as Divines. The more shame for them to have such furious heats and oppositions where there is [Page 56] so little difference. But as little as they differ, Mr. White thinks it safer to talk of their unity in England, than to try whether they be of his mind at Rome, by going thither to clear himself; for he justly fears he should find them differ from him some other way than as bare discoursers. Yet let us hear Mr. S's. reason; for, saith he, though some speculators attribute to the Church a power of defining things not held be­fore, yet few will say she hath new re­velations or new articles of faith. But we know the temper of these men bet­ter than to rely on what they barely say. For they say what they think is most for their purpose; and one of Mr. White's adversaries, (if himself may be credited) plainly told him, if the doctrine of the Popes infallibility were not true, Tabul. suf­rag. p. 3.18. yet it ought to be defended because it was for the interest of the Church of Rome: for which he is suffi­ciently rebuked by him. It is one thing then what they say, and another what necessarily follows from the Doctrine which they assert. But for plain deal­ing commend me to the Canonists, who say expresly, the Church (by which [Page 57] they mean the Pope) may make new articles of faith: and this is the sense of the rest, though they are loth to speak out. Else Mr. White was much too blame in spending so much time in proving the contrary. But what man of common sense can imagine that these men can mean otherwise, who assert such an infallibility in Pope and Councils, as to oblige men under pain of eternal damnation to believe those things which they were not obliged to, before such a definition? And what can this be else but to make new articles of faith? For an article of faith supposes a necessary obligation to be­lieve it: now if some doctrine may become thus obligatory by virtue of the Churches definition which was not so before, that becomes thereby an article of faith which it was not be­fore. But these subtil men have not yet learnt to distinguish a new doctrine from a new article of faith: they do not indeed pretend that their doctrine is new, because they deny any such thing as new revelation in the Church; but yet they must needs say, if they understand themselves, that old im­plicit [Page 58] doctrines, may become new ar­ticles of faith by vertue of the Churches definition. So little are they relieved by that silly distinction of explicit and implicit delivery of them, which Mr. S. for a great novelty accquaints us with. For what is only implicitly delivered, is no article of faith at all: for that can be no article of faith, which men are not bound to believe; now there are none will say that men are bound to believe under pain of damnation if they do not the things which are only implicitly delivered; but this they say with great confidence of all things defined by the Church. And let now any intelligent person judg; whether those who assert such things, do not differ wide enough from those who re­solve all into oral tradition, and make the obligation to faith wholly depen­dent upon the constant tradition of any doctrine from age to age ever since the Apostles times.

§. 11.But Mr. S. is yet further displeased with me for saying, that Pope and Coun­cils challenge a power to make things de fide in one age, which were not in [Page 59] another. For 1. he sayes, I speak it in common, and prove it not. 2. He adds, That take them right, this is both perfect­ly innocent, and unavoidably necessary to a Church. And is it not strange he should expect any particular proofs of so innocent and necessary a thing to the being of a Church? But he will tell me it is in his own sense of de fide, which I have already shewn to signifie nothing to his purpose. Let him there­fore speak out whether he doth be­lieve any such thing as inherent infal­libility in the definitions of Pope and Councils? if not, I am sure at Rome they will never believe that Mr. S. agrees with them as faithful; if he doth, whether doth not such an infal­lible definition bind men by vertue of it to the belief of what is then de­fined? if it doth, then things may be­come as much de fide by it, as if they were delivered dy Christ or his Apostles. For thereby is supposed an equal obli­gation to faith, because there is a pro­position equally infallible. But will he say, the Pope doth not challenge this? Why then is the contrary do­ctrine censured and condemned at [Page 60] Rome? Why is the other so eagerly contended for, by the most zealous sons of that Church, and that not as a school-opinion, but as the only certain foundation of faith? Mr. S. is yet pleased to inform me further, that no­thing will avail me but this, if a Pope and Council should define a new thing, and declare they ground themselves on new lights, as did their first reformers in England: but I shall find, he saith, no such fopperies in faith-definitions made by the Catholick Church. Is this the man who made choice of reason for his weapon? could there be a greater calumny cast on our Church, than to say her reformers grounded themselves on new lights: when our great charge against the Church of Rome is for in­troducing Novelties, and receding from pure and primitive antiquity. Whe­ther the charge be true or no, yet sure it follows they did not declare they ground themselves on new lights; but ex­presly the contrary. Well, but Pope and Councils neither define new things, nor ground themselves on them: but what means the man of reason? that they make no new definitions: surely [Page 61] not; for then what did they meet for? and what mean their decrees? but he intends, that they deliver no new do­ctrine: but how must that be tried? or hath Mr. S. gained the opinion of infallibility both from Pope and Coun­cils, that we must believe his bare word? but we not only say but prove that even their last Council hath defi­ned many things, which never were delivered by Christ or his Apostles. And it is to no purpose whether they say they ground themselves on new lights, or pretend to an infallible assist­ance; for it comes all to the same at last. For if the assistance be infallible, what matter is it whether the doctrine hath been revealed or no? for on this suppo­sition it is impossible that Pope and Council should miscarry. Therefore if a­ny Church be guilty of fopperies in faith-definitions, it must be that which you miscall the Catholick, but is more truly known by the name of the Roman Church. There is yet one piece of Mr. S's. sagacity to be taken notice of as to this particular, which is, p. 210. that I am at an end of my argument, because I say the opinion of the Pope and Councils [Page 62] infallibility is the common doctrin main­tained: in which I confound the Church with the schools, or some private opi­naters, and then carp at those mens te­nets, And this is the force of all that Paragraph, He tells me, I want not wit to know that no sober Catholick holds humane deductions the rule of their faith, schoolmen definers of it, nor the schools the Tribunal whence to pro­pose it authoritatively and obligingly to the generality of the faithful. Neither doth Mr. S. want the wit to know that our present enquiry is concerning the sense of their present Church about the rule of faith. Since then Mr. S. must confess it necessary to faith to know what the certain rule of it is; let me enquire further, whe­ther any particular person can know certainly what it is, unless he knows what the Church owns for her rule of faith; and whether that may be own­ed as the Churches judgement, which is stifly opposed by the most interessed persons in the Roman Church, and the most zealous contenders for it? Espe­cially when the Pope who is said to be Head of the Church, condemns the do­ctrine [Page 63] asserted, and that only by a small number of such who are as much opposed by themselves, as by any of us. Is it then possible to know the Churches judgement or not? if not, 'tis to no purpose to search for a rule of faith: if it be, which way can we come to know it, either by most voices or the sense of the Governours of the Church; either of the ways, I dare put it to a fair tryal whether oral tra­dition, or the infallibility of Pope and Councils be the Doctrine most owned in the Church of Rome? But Mr. S. still tells us, these are only private opinators and schoolmen who assert the contrary doctrine to his. But wiill not they much more say on the other side, that this way of oral trodition is a novel fancy of some few half-Catholicks in England, and tends to subvert the Ro­man Church. But is the present Pope with Mr. S. a private opinator, or was the last a meer schoolman? I am sure what ever Mr. S. thinks of him, he thought not so of himself, when he said, he was no Divine in the controver­sie of Jansenius. Doth the Court of Rome signifie no more with Mr. S. than [Page 64] a company of scholastick Pedants, that know not what the sense of the Church is, concerning the rule of faith? I meddle not with the Schools but with the authority of the present Church, and him whom Mr. S. owns for the head of it: and is it consistent with his headship to condemn that doctrine which contains in it the only certain rule of faith? Mr. S. may then see they were no such impertinent Topicks which I insisted on, and as stout as Mr. S. seems to be, I an apt to believe he would not look on the censure of the Inquisition as an impertinent To­pick.

§. 12But at last Mr. S. offers at some­thing whereby he would satisfie me of the sense of the Church, as to this particular, and therefore asks, whether I never heard of such a thing as the Council of Trent? p. 211. I must ingenuously confess I have; and seen more a great deal of it, than I am satisfied with. But what of that? there, he tells me, I may find a clear solution of my doubt by the constant procedure of that most grave Synod in its definitions. That [Page 65] is, I hope to find that oral tradition was acknowledged there as the only self-evident rule of faith. If I do this, I confess my self satisfied in this en­quiry. But how much to the contrary is there very obvious in the proceedings of it? For in the 4 th Session the Decree is, That Scripture and tradition should be embraced with equal piety and re­verence; and the reason is, because the doctrine of faith is contain'd partly in Scripture, partly in tradition; but what arts must Mr. S. use to infer from hence, that oral tradition in con­tradistinction to Scripture was looked on as the only rule of faith? I cannot but say, that the ruling men of that Council were men wise enough in their generation; and they were too wise wholly to exclude Scripture; but be­cause they knew that of it self could not serve their purposes, they there­fore help it out with tradition, and make both together the compleat rule of faith. Where I pray in all the pro­ceedings of that Council doth Mr. S. find them define any thing on the ac­count of oral tradition? instead of which we find continual bandyings [Page 66] about the sense of Scripture and Fa­thers, which might have been all spared, if they had been so wise as to consi­der, they could not but know the sense of the present Church, nor that of the precedent, and so up to the time of Christ. But they were either so igno­rant as not to light on this happy in­vention; or so wise and knowing as to despise it. It is true, they would not have their doctrines looked on as no­velties, therefore they speak much of tradition and the ancient faith; but that was not by what their Parents taught them, but what the Fathers of the Church delivered in their writings; for by these they judged of traditions, and not the oral way. And therefore I see little reason to believe, that this was either the sense of the Council of Trent, or is the sense of any number of Roman Catholicks, much less of the whole Church, p. 212. none excepted, as Mr. S. in his confident way expresses it. And if he will, as he saith, disavow the maintain­ing any point, or affecting any way which is not assented to by all, I hope to see Mr. S. retract this opinion, and either fall in with the Court of Rome, [Page 67] or return, as reason leads him, into the bosom of the Church of England. But there seems to be somewhat more in what follows, viz. that though school­men question the personal infallibility of the Pope, or of the Roman Clergy, nay of a General Council, yet all affirm the in­fallibility of tradition, or the living voice of the Church essential; and this, he saith, is held by all, held firmly, and that it is absolutely infallible. To this therefore I answer, either Mr. S. means, that none do affirm that the univer­sal tradition of the Church essential can err, or that the Church of Rome, being the Church essential, cannot err in her tradition: But which way so­ever he takes it, I shall easily shew how far it is from proving that he designs it for. For if he take it in the first sense, viz. that all the faithful in all ages could not concur in an error, then he may as well prove Protestants of his mind as Papists, for this is the foundation on which we believe the particular Books of Scripture. If this therefore proves any thing, it proves more then he intends, viz. that while we thus oppose each other, we do per­fectly [Page 68] agree together; and truly so we do, as much as they do among them­selves. But if Mr. S's. meaning be, that all of their Religion own the Roman Church to be the Church essential, and on that account, that it cannot err, (setting aside the absurdity of the opinion it self), I say from hence it doth not fol­low, that they make oral tradition the rule of faith, because it is most evident, that the ground why they say their Church cannot err, is not on Mr. S's. principles, but on the supposition of an infallible assistance, which preserves that Church from error. So that this falls far short of proving, that they are all agreed in this rule of faith; which is a thing so far from probability, that he might, by the same argument prove, that Scripture is owned by them all to be the rule of faith. For I hope it is held by all, and held firmly, that the living voice of God in Scripture, as de­livered to us, is infallible; and if so, then there is as much ground for this as the other. But if we enquire what it is men make a rule of faith, we must know not only that they believe tradi­tion infallible, but on what account they [Page 69] do so. For if tradition be believed infallible barely on the account of a promise of infallibility to the present Church, then the resolution of faith is not into the tradition, but into that infallible assistance; and consequently the rule of faith is not, what bare tra­dition delivers, but what that Church, which cannot err in judging traditi­on, doth propose to us. It is not there­fore their being agreed in general, that tradition is infallible, doth make th [...]m agree in the same rule of faith; but they must agree in the ground of that infallibility, viz. that it depends on this, that no age could conspire to deceive the next. But all persons who under­stand any thing of the Roman Church, know very well that the general rea­son why tradition is believed infallible, is, because they first believe the Church to be infallible; whereas Mr. S. goes the contrary way, and makes the in­fallibility of the the Church, to depend on the infallibility of tradition. And therefore, for all that I can see, we must still oppose private Opinators in this controversie; the Church of Rome, not having declared her self at all [Page 70] on Mr. S's behalf, but the contrary, and the generality believing on the account of the present Churches infal­libility. And it is strange Mr. S. should find no difference between mens resolving faith into common sense, and into the immediate assistance of the Holy Ghost. If this then be the first principle of controversie, as Mr. S. pretends, p. 213. we see how unlikely they are to agree about other matters, who are so much divided about the princi­ple of resolving them. And if this be the ground of faith, then most Roma­nists build on a wrong Foundation. But if the infallibility of oral tradition be the foundation on which that for­midable structure is erecting, which he speaks of, wo then to the Court of Rome, for that is known to build on quite a different foundation. And if this, as he saith, rises apace, and has advanced many stories in a small time, it only lets us know how fast their di­visions grow, and that they are build­ing so fast one against another, that their Church will not stand between them. By this discourse, Mr. S. pre­tends to answer all those If's which fol­low; [Page 71] which are these, In case the Church may determine things de fide, which were not before, whether the present Church doth then believe as the prece­dent did or no? if it did, how comes any thing to be de fide which was not be­fore? if it did not, what assurance can I have that every age of the Church be­lieves just as the precedent did, and no otherwise; when I see they profess the contrary? And if a thing may be de fide in one age, which was not in a foregoing, then a Church may deliver that as a matter of faith at one time, which was never accounted so before; by which means the present Church may oblige me to believe that as a matter of faith, which never was so in Christs or the Apostles times, and so the infallibility on the ac­count of tradition is destroyed. To all which Mr. S. gives a very easie an­swer, viz. that they do not hold any disparate or unimplied points of faith; but such as are involved and implied in the main point. This is no more easily said then understood; for if these be im­plied in the former, how can there come a new obligation to believe them? For to take his own instance, [Page 72] will any man in his senses say, that he that believes homo est animal rationale, doth not believe homo est animal? and this he makes choice of as an example, how one point of faith may be involved in another, so as to receive a distinct obligation to believe it. I grant that homo est animal is involved in the other, but he that shall say, that after he hath assented to that proposition, ho­mo est animal rationale, he may be capable of a new obligation to believe the former, which is involved in this, it may be justly questioned whe­ther such an one, as to himself, can truly say, homo est animal ratio­nale, or no. But after such rare subtilties, he doth very well to tell me, that I ought to consider what Logick tells us, that the conclusion is in the pre­mises, which reflection (in his his court-like expression) he saith, p. 214. will much un­blunder my thoughts. But let the con­clusion be as long as it will in the pre­mises, will any man in his wits say, that he that believes the truth of the pre­mises, is not hereby bound to believe the conclusion? and the more the one is involved in the other, the less is it [Page 73] possible to make the obligation to believe them distinct. And it is hard for me to believe, that this is a way to un­blunder my thoughts, when I see what horrible confusion such expressions ar­gue in his own. Let the Church then clear her thoughts never so much, yet all this cannot amount to a distinct obligation to believe those things which were involved before, but to a more explicit declaring them for the Churches peace and satisfaction. The only conclusion then involved in these premises, is, that if some things may be de fide in one age which were not in another, then the present age may believe otherwise than the prece­dent did. And if this doctrine be held in the Church of Rome, nothing can be more evident, than that Mr. S's. first principle of controversie, is far from being the doctrin of the Roman Church, which was the thing to be proved.

My second chief argument against this way of oral tradition was, § 13. that it had not been owned in all ages of the Christian Church; to manifest which, I enquired into the reason of the obli­gation [Page 74] in any age of the Church to be­lieve and practise just as the precedent did. Mr. S. rejoices in that confessi­on of mine, that the only thing to be proved in this case is, p. 216. that every age of the Church, and all persons in it, look'd on themselves as obliged not to vary in any thing from the doctrine and practise of the precedent age. And I there offer the choice of three ways to prove it, reason, testimony, or tradition; he tells me, he excepts the way of reason; yet quarrels with me for pressing for a de­monstrative medium to prove it, when yet Mr. S. seldom speaks under the rate of demonstrations. But he thereby notes the unconsonancy of my carriage, Wherein I wonder? That I should de­sire them to perform this promise, viz. to give us demonstrations for the grounds of faith? But saith withal, he will yeild me the honour of professing I have no demonstration but probability for the ground of mine, and he makes this serious protestation for himself, that he should esteem himself very dishonest, did he assert and press on others any argument for the ground of his faith, which he judged not evident, that is de­monstrative. [Page 75] What is it these men mean, when they cry up their own way for demonstrative, and say that we build our faith meerly on probabilities? Do they say, that Religion is capable of strict and rigorous demonstration? If so, let them demonstrate the being of God and immortality of the soul, with as much evidence, as that the three an­gles of a triangle are equal to two right angles. And it is strange, if they think particular problems in religion are more capable of demonstration than those Theorems on which they are built. But by all the enquiry I can make, all the difference between us is, that Mr. S. will have that called a demonstration, which is scarce a probability; and we call that sufficient reason, which any wise man may safely rely on in matters of Religi­on. In the mean time how much do we suffer by our modesty, that because we speak not as big as Mr. S. does, we must be censured presently to have no­thing but probabilities fot our faith? Are those bare probabilities which leave no suspition of doubt behind them? And such we freely assert the grounds of our Religion to do; i. e. I assert, that [Page 76] we have the highest actual certainty of the truth of our Religion, which the mind of any reasonable man can desire; and if Mr. S's. demonstrations can do any more than this, let him tell us what it is. For my part, I know no­thing higher in the mind of man than a certain assent, and if I did not think there was the greatest ground in Reli­gion for that, I abhor dissimulation so much, that I should leave off perswading men to embrace it. And if any men have made us shy of the word demon­stration and infallibility, they are such men as Mr. S. have done it, who talk of these things, when their arguments fall beneath some of the remotest pro­babilities we insist on. Nay, if there be any force in his demonstration, as to matters of fact, it hath been used by us long before his Book saw the light. But we love to give the true names to things, and not to lose our credit with all intelligent persons, by playing Mountebanks in Religion, crying up those things for infallible cures, which an ordinary capacity may discern the insufficiency of. But was it any thing but justice and reason in me to expect [Page 77] and call for a demonstration from them who talk of nothing under it? And therefore I said, that it was impossible to demonstrate this way of oral traditi­on, unless it were proved impossible for men not to think themselves obliged to believe and do all just as their prede­cessors did. For where the contrary is not only possible, but easily supposable, as that men may believe those things, as new articles of faith which are defined by Pope and Council, I wonder how Mr. S. will demonstrate, that men must look on themselves as obliged to be­lieve just as their predecessors did? For I had thought demonstrations had never place in contingent propositi­ons; but it seems Mr. S. who tells me, Logick will unblunder my thoughts, in­tends to make a new one for me. And I assure you so he had need, before I shall ever call his arguments demon­strations: and although he thinks him­self very honest in calling them so, yet I should think him much wiser if he did not.

But before I come to the particular debate of these things, §. 14. I freely tell [Page 78] him, that I grant all he requests; I shall take along with me the nature of the matter in hand, p. 236. the doctrines and practices spoken of, the manner of deli­vering them, the necessary circumstances which give weight to both; yet for all these, I cannot look on his way as de­monstrative. And that both our mean­ings may be better understood, it is very necessary the Reader should have a true account of the state of the Que­stion between us. And if he will be­lieve me, I never intended to dispute with him or any one else, whether men were bound to wear their clothes, or build houses, p. 217. or manage estates just as their predecessors did; but whether every age is obliged to believe and practise just as the precedent did, by virtue of meer oral tradition; for about that is all the controversie between us. I do not deny, but that a succeeding age may look on it self as bound to be­lieve what the precedent did; but whether that obligation doth arise purely from the delivery of that do­ctrine by the precedent in the way of of tradition, is the thing in dispute be­tween us. For in case the ground of [Page 79] faith be wholly the written Word, con­veyed from age to age, I deny not but an obligation to believe descends with the doctrine to every succeeding age. But that which Mr. S. is to prove is, that abstractly from Scripture every age is absolutely bound to believe just as the precedent did, without any enquiry whether that doctrine doth agree with Scriptures or no; but that he is therefore bound to believe all which is proposed to him, because it was the doctrine of the immediately preceding age. And this is that which I deny, and desire Mr. S. to prove. For which he first gives us a large instance in hi­storical matters, and then comes to the matters of Christian faith. His instance is, in Alexanders conquest of Asia, as to which he saith, that the memory of it is fresh and lively, p. 218. though some thousand years since; and that the universal and strong perswasion of this matter of fact was not caused by Books, as Curtius his History, but by human tradition; that the continuance of this perswasion was the notoriety of the fact to the then li­vers, which obliged them to relate it to their posterity, and that this testifying [Page 80] by the fore-fathers, was that which ob­liged posterity to believe things, as true because there could be no imaginable mo­tive why the whole world should con­spire to deceive them, or be deceivable in their sensations; on which principle it passed to the next age, and so came down by way of tradition to our dayes; & the obligation to believe in every age depended upon this, that the senses of the first could not be deceived; and having this security in every age, that no one would conspire to deceive the next, it follows, that no age could say a former age testified so, unless it did; so therefore, saith he, it follows demonstratively, that it was testified; and so the descendents in every age to the very end of the world have the same obligation to believe their immediate fore-fathers, saying it was testified by theirs, and so to the very first, who were witnesses of his actions. This is the substance of what he more large­ly discourses in several Paragraphs; which when he hath done, he tells me, he expects what I will reply to this dis­course. p. 223. Not to frustrate therefore his expectation, and in order to the Rea­ders satisfaction, we are to consider, [Page 81] that in the present case there are two distinct questions to be resolved: 1. How a matter of fact evident to the world comes to be conveyed to posterity? 2. By what means a compleat history of all passages relating to it may be conveyed? As to the first, I grant that a fact so notorious as Alexanders conquest of Asia might have been pre­served by human tradition, and convey­ed in a certain way from one age to an­other. But if we enquire into that which is alone proper to our questi­on, viz. by what means we may judg what is true and false as to the parti­culars of that conquest, then I deny that bare tradition is to be relyed on in this case. For the certainty of con­veyance of all paticulars doth depend not upon the bare veracity, but the capacity and skill of communicating from one age to another. For which one would think we need no clearer evidence than the consideration of the different account of former times in the several Nations of the world. For who can imagine, but the barbarous Nations were as unwilling to deceive their posterity as any other? yet we [Page 82] see a vast difference in the histories of former ages among them, and more civilized people. And I wish Mr. S. would rather have instanced in some history which had been preserved meerly by tradition, and not in such a one, which, if any other, hath been most carefully recorded and propa­gated to posterity. If Mr. S. would have undertaken to have told us, who they were that first peopled America, and from what place they came, by the tradition of the present inhabi­tants, and what famous actions had been done there in former ages, we might have thought indeed, that sole tradition had been a very safe way to convey matters of fact from one age to another. But since all Mr. S's. ar­guments will hold as well for the Scythians and Americans, and the most barbarous Nations, as the most civil and polite; what reason can Mr. S. give, why there is not among them as certain an account of former ages, as among the Greeks and Romans? Were not their senses, who saw those mat­ters of fact, as uncapable of being de­ceived as others? Was not every age [Page 83] among them as unwilling to deceive their posterity as elsewhere? Yet not­withstanding the force of Mr. S's de­monstration, we see for want of let­ters how grosly ignorant they are of what was done before them. And if this principle were true, why have we not as true an account of the eldest ages of the world, as of any other? Nay, why were let­ters invented, and writing ever used, if tradition had been found so infal­lible? But it is one thing superficially to discourse what is impossible should be otherwise, and another to consider what really hath been in the world. Doth not the constant experience of all times prove, that where any histo­ry hath not been timely recorded, it hath been soon corrupted by notorious falsities, or obscured by fabulous re­ports? As we see among our selves, what difference there is in point of certainty between the several stories of K. Arthur and William the Conqueror; what will Mr. S. say, that those who lived in K. Arthurs time could not know what he did, or that they conspired to deceive their posterity? But if tra­dition [Page 84] be so infallible, why have we not the ancient story of Britain as exact as the modern? If Mr. S. will impute it to the peoples ignorance, want of letters, frequent conquests by other Nations, and succeeding bar­barism, he may easily find how many ways there are for matters of fact to be soon lost or corrupted, when they have not been diligently preserved by authentick records; and that without one age conspiring to deceive another. But notwithstanding Mr. S's confi­dence, I cannot think it possible for Mr. S. to believe, that we should have had as true an account of Alexanders conquest of Asia, if Arrian Curtias, or Plutarch had never writ his story, as we have now. Yet this he must assert by vertue of his principle. And he that can believe that, I wonder he should scruple believing the Popes in­fallibility; for certainly no principle of the Jesuits is more wild and absurd than this is. Besides, I admire how it came into Mr. S's head to think, no er­ror could come into history unless one age conspired to deceive another, when we find no age agreed in the present [Page 85] matters of fact which are done in it, as to the grounds and particulars of them; to give Mr. S. an instance home to his purpose, in the late Council of Trent we see already what different repre­sentations there are made of it in so little a time as hath already passed since the sitting of it. One, though he had all the advantages imaginable of knowing all proceedings in it, living at the same time, conversing with the persons present at it, having the me­moires and records of the Secretaries themselves, yet his story is since en­deavoured to be blasted by a great person of the Roman Church, as fictiti­ous and partial. We see then it is at least supposed that interest and preju­dice may have a great hand in abusing the world in matter of story, though one age never agree to deceive another. And instead of being perswaded by Mr. S's demonstrations, I am still of the mind, that we have no suf­ficient security of the truth of any sto­ry, which was not written while those persons were in being who were able to contradict the errors of it. How­ever I deny not, but some notorious [Page 86] matters of fact, such as Alexanders bare conquests of Asia, might by the vi­sible effects of it be preserved both in Asia and Greece for a long time. But if we come to enquire particularly, whe­ther this or that was done by him in his conquest, which is alone pertinent to our purpose, we have no security at all from tradition, but only from the most authentick records of that story. p. 213. And by this, I hope Mr. S. will have cause to thank me for unblundring his thoughts (his own civil expressions), and shewing him how errors may come in­to a story without one age conspiring to deceive the next; and what a vast difference there is between preserving a bare matter af fact, and all the par­ticulars relating to it. And hereby he may easily see how far the obligation extends in believing the report of for­mer ages. For there can be no obliga­tion to believe any further than there is evidence of truth in the matter we are obliged to. If then there be not only a possibility, but a very great probability of mistakes and errors in matters of fact, I pray what obliga­tion doth there ly upon men abso­lutely [Page 87] to believe what is delivered by the preceding age? But to put an issue to this controversie, let Mr. S. exa­mine himself, and try if he can name one story that was never written, which was ever certainly propagated from one age to another by meer oral tradition; and if he cannot, he may thereby see how little real force his argument hath in the world. For all the force of tradition lies in an unque­stionable conveyance of those Books which contain in them the true reports of the actions of the times they were written in. But can Mr. S. think, that if the Roman history had never been written, it had been possible for us to have known what was done under the Kings and Consuls as now we do? Yet if his principle holds, this necessarily follows; for those of that age could not but know them, and no age since could conspire to deceive the next. And from hence, the most useful consequence of all is, that Mr. S. might have writ a history from the beginning of the world to this day, with a full relation of all particulars, if there had never been any Book written in the world be­fore. [Page 88] And doth not Mr. S. deserve im­mortal credit for so rare an invention as this is, and all built on nothing short of demonstrations.

But Mr. S. very prudently foresees, what it is I must be forced to recur to, §. 15. p. 224. viz. that being baffled with his former demonstration, I have no other shift to betake my self to, but to say the case is different between histories and points of faith. And therefore to bring his bu­siness home, he applies it at large to the delivery of the Christian faith, which that he might do in more ample sort, he very finely descants on the old Verse, Quis, quid, ubi, &c. containing the circumstances of human actions, and from every one of them derives arguments for the infallibility of oral tradition; which briefly and in plain English may be summed up thus; Since the author of this doctrine was the Son of God, the doctrine it self so excellent, and delivered in so publick a manner, in the most convincing way, by miracle and good living, and for so good an end as to save mens souls, and that by writing it in mens hearts, and testified [Page 89] to others; and all this at a time when men might judg of the miracles and mo­tives for believing it; therefore since in all these respects it was incomparably beyond the story of Alexanders conquests, it follows, that in a manner infinitely greater must the obligation be to believe Christs doctrine, than Alexanders or William the Conqerours victories, or any history of the like nature whatsoe­ver. All which I freely grant, but cannot yet see how from thence it follows; that oral tradition is the only rule of faith, or the means whereby we are to judg what is the doctrine of Christ, and what not. Those arguments I confess prove, that the Christians of the first age were highly concerned to enquire into the truth of these things, and that they had the greatest reason imagi­nable to believe them; and that it is not possible to conceive that they should not endeavour to propagate so excellent a doctrine, and of so high concernment to the world. But the question is, whether abstractly from the Books written in the first age of the Christian Church, there is so much in­fallibility in the oral tradition of every [Page 90] age, that nothing could be embraced for Christs doctrine which was not; and consequently, whether every age were bound to believe absolutely what was delivered it by the precedent for the doctrine of Christ? Mr. S. there­fore puts himself to a needless task of proving that every age was bound to believe the doctrine of Christ, which I never questioned; but the dispute is, whether every age be bound on the account of oral tradition to believe what is delivered by the precedent for Christs doctrine. But it is to be ob­served all along how carefully Mr. S. avoids mentioning the written Books of the New Testament; because he knew all his game about oral tradition would be quite spoiled by a true stating the matter of fact in the first ages of the Christian Church. I hope he will not be angry with me, for asking him that question about the Scripture, which he asks me about the Council of Trent; did he never hear of such a thing as the Scripture? or is it so hard to find it? But if he hath heard of it, I intreat him to resolve me these Questions: 1. Whether he doth not believe, that [Page 91] the Books of the New Testament were written at such a time, when the mat­ters of fact therein recorded, were ca­pable of being throughly examined? which he cannot deny upon his own principle; for tradition being then in­fallible as to the doctrine of Christ, the writers of these Books cannot be con­ceived to deliver it amiss, unless they resolved to contradict the present tra­dition of the Church; which if they had done, those Books could never have found any reception among Chri­stians. If tradition then convey the doctrine of Christ infalilbly, these Books must convey it infallibly, be­cause they contain in them the infallible tradition of the first age of the Chri­stian Church; and were written at the time when many persons living had been able to disprove any thing con­tained therein repugnant to truth. And that these Books were written by those persons whose names they bear, I appeal to Mr, S's own rule, Traditi­on; for if that be infallible in any thing, it must be in this; and if one age could conspire to deceive another in a matter of such concernment, [Page 92] what security can be had, that it may not do so in all other things? 2. Whe­ther he believes, that those whose in­tention was to write an account of the life, actions, and doctrine of Christ, did leave any thing out of their Books which did relate to them as of con­cernment for us to believe? For upon Mr. S's principles, any one may easily know what the tradition of the Church is; and especially such certainly who were either present themselves at the matters of fact, or heard them from those who were; and what satisfacti­on can any one desire greater than this? But the question is, whether this testimony were not more safely depo­sited in the Church to be conveyed by word of mouth, than it could be by be­ing committed to writing by such who were eye and ear witnesses of the actions and doctrine of Christ? Upon which I advance some further Queries. 3. If oral Tradition were the more certain way, why was any thing written at all? It may be Mr. S. will tell us, for moral instructions, and to give precepts of good life; but then why may not these be as infallibly [Page 93] conveyed by tradition as doctrines of faith? And why then were any mat­ters of fact and points of faith insert­ed in the Books of the New Testament? By which it certainly appears, that the intention of writing them was to pre­serve them to posterity. Let Mr. S. tell me whether it was consistent with the wisdom of men, much less with the wisdom of an infinite Being to imploy men to do that which might be far better done another way, and when it is done can give no satisfaction to the minds of men? 4. Whether those things which are capable of being un­derstood when they are spoken, cease to be so when they are written? For Mr. S. seems to understand those terms of a living voice, and dead letters in a very strict and rigorous manner; as though the sense were only quick when spoken, and became buried in dead let­ters. But Mr. S. seems with the sa­gacious Indian to admire how it is pos­sible for dead letters and unsenc'd cha­racters to express mens meanings as well as words. I cannot enter into Mr. S's apprehension, how 24 letters by their various disposition can express [Page 94] matters of faith? And yet to increase the wonder, he writes about matters of faith, while he is proving that mat­ters of faith cannot be conveyed by writing. So that Mr. S's. own writing is the best demonstration against him­self; and he confutes his own Sophistry with his fingers, as Diogenes did Zeno's by his motion. For doth Mr. S. hope to perswade men, that tradition is a rule of faith by his Book or not? if not, to what purpose doth he write? if he doth, then it is to be hoped some matters of faith may be intelligibly con­veyed by writing; especially if Mr. S. doth it. But by no means we are to believe that ever the Spirit of God can do it. For whatever is written by men assisted by that, is according to him but a heap of dead letters, and insignificant characters; when Mr. S. the mean while is full of sense and demonstration. Happy man that can thus out-do infi­nite wisdom, and write far beyond ei­ther Prophets or Apostles. But if he will condescend so far as to allow that to inspired persons which he confident­ly believes of himself, viz. that he can write a Book full of sense, and that [Page 95] any ordinary capacity may apprehend the design of it, our controversie is at an end; for then matters of faith may be intelligibly and certainly conveyed to posterity by the Books of Scripture; and if so, there will be no need of any recourse to oral tradition. 5. If the Books of Scripture did not certainly & intelligibly convey all matters of faith, what made them be received with so much veneration in the first ages of the Christian Church? which were best able to judg of the truth of the mat­ters contained in them, and the useful­ness of the Books themselves. And therein we still find, that appeals were made to them, that they thought them­selves concerned to vindicate them against all objections of Heathens and others; and the resolution of faith was made into them, and not tradition, as I have already manifested, and must not repeat. 6. Whether it be in the least credible, Part 1. chap. 9. since the Books of Scripture were supposed to contain the do­ctrines of faith, that every age of the Church should look on it self as ob­liged absolutely to believe the do­ctrine of the precedent by virtue of an oral-tradition? For since they re­solved [Page 96] their faith into the written Books, how is it possible they should believe on the account of an oral tra­dition? Although then the Apostles did deliver the doctrine of Christ to all their Disciples; yet since the records of it were embraced in the Church, men judged of the truth or false­hood of doctrines, by the conveniency or repugnancy of them to what was contained in those Books. By which we understand, that the obligation to believe what was taught by the precedent age, did not arise from the oral tradition of it, but by the satisfaction of the present age, that the doctrine delivered by it was the same with that contained in Scrip­ture.

It is time now to return to Mr. S. who proceeds still to manifest this ob­ligation in posterity to believe what was delivered as matter of faith, § 16. p. 229, &c. by the pre­cedent age of the Church; but the force of all is the same still; viz. that other­wise one age must conspire to deceive the next. But the inconsequence of that, I have fully shewed already, unless he demonstrates it impossible for errors to [Page 97] come in any other way: For if we re­duce the substance of what he saith to a Syllogistical form, it comes to this; Where there is no possibility of error, there is an absolute obligation to faith; but there is no possibility of er­ror in the tradition of any age of the Church: ergo in every age there is an absolute obligation to believe the tra­dition of the present Church. The minor he thus proves; If no age of the Church can be ignorant of what the precedent taught, or conspire to de­ceive the next, then there is no possi­bility of error coming into the tra­dition of the Church in any age; but the antecedent is true, and therefore the consequent. Now, who sees not that the force of all this lies not in proving the minor proposition, or that no age could conspire to deceive ano­ther? but the consequence, viz. that no error can come into a Church, but by a general mistake, in one whole age, or the general imposture of it which we utterly deny; and have shew­ed him already the falseness of it from his own concessions. And I might more largely shew it from those Do­ctrines [Page 98] or opinions which they them­selves acknowledg to have come into their Church without any such general mistake or imposture, as the doctrines of Papal infallibility, and the common belief of Purgatory. The very same way that Mr. White and Mr. S. will shew us how these came in, we will shew him how many others came in as erroneous and scandalous as those are. For whether they account these mat­ters of faith or no, it is certain many among them do, and that the far greatest number, who assert and be­lieve them to be the doctrine of their Church too. If therefore these might come in without one age mistaking or deceiving the next, why might not all those come in the same way which we charge upon them as the errors of their Church? And in the same manner that corrupt doctrines come in, may cor­rupt practises too, since these, as he saith, spring from the other. He might therefore have saved himself the trou­ble of finding out how an acute Wit, or great Scholar would discover the weakness of this way. p. 231. For without pretending to be either of these, I have [Page 99] found out another way of attaquing it, than Mr. S. looked for; viz. from his own principles and concessions; shewing how errors might come into a Church, without a total deception or conspiracy in any one age. Which if it be true, he cannot bind me to be­lieve what ever he tells me the present Church delivers, unless he can prove that this never came into the Church as a speculation or private opinion, and from thence by degrees hath come to be accounted a point of faith. Therefore his way of proof is now quite altered, and he cannot say we are bound to believe whatever the present Church delivers; for that which he calls the present Church, may have admitted speculations and private opi­nions into doctrines of faith; but he must first prove such doctrines deliver­ed by Christ or his Apostles, and that from his time down to our age they have been received by the whole Church for matters of faith; and when he hath done this, as to any of the points in controversie between us, I will promise him to be his Proselyte. But he ought still to remember, that he [Page 100] is not to prove it impossible for one whole age to conspire to deceive the next; but that supposing that it is im­possible for any errors to come into the tradition of the Church. Let us now see what Mr. S. objects against those words I then used against the demonstrating this way; It is hard to conceive what reason should inforce it, but such as proves the impossibility of the contrary; and they have understand­ings of another mould from others, who can conceive it impossible men should not think themselves obliged to believe and do all just as their predecessors. And whatever Mr. S. says to the contrary, I cannot yet see, p. 234. but that therein I ar­gued from the very nature and constitu­tion of the thing. For that which I looked for, was a demonstration, which I supposed could not be unless the im­possibility of the contrary were de­monstrated. But if it be possible for Men, Christians, nay Romanists to be­lieve on other accounts than tradi­tion of the precedent age, I pray what demonstration can there be, that men must think themselves obliged to be­lieve and do all just as their predeces­sors [Page 101] did? Surely if Mr. S's. fancy had not been very extravagant, he could never have thought here of mens being obliged to cut their Beards, or wear such Garters and Hat-bands as their fore­fathers did. For do I not mention be­lieving first, and then doing? by which it were easie to apprehend, that I meant matters of faith, and such pra­ctices as flow from them. Neither was there any such crafty and sophisti­cal dealing as he charges me with; p. 235. for I am content his doctrine be taken in his own terms; and I have now given a larger and fuller account why I am far from being convinced by the way he hath used for resolving faith. Passing by therefore his challenge, which I ac­cept of, as long as he holds to the weapon of reason and civility, I come to consider his last enquiry, why I should come to doubt of such an obligati­on in posterity, p. 236. to believe their ancestors in matters of faith; and he judiciously resolves it into a strange distortion of hu­man nature, but such as it seems, is the proper effect of the Protestants temper, p. 237. which is, saith he, to chuse every one his faith by his private judgement, or wit, [Page 102] working upon disputable words. Which as far as we own it, is not to believe what we see no ground for; and if this be such a distortion of human na­ture, I envy not Mr. S's. uprightness and perfection. If he means that we build our faith on our private judg­ments, in opposition to Scripture, or the universal tradition of the Church in all ages, let him prove it evidently in one particular, and I engage for my self and all true Protestants, we will re­nounce the belief of it. If he hath any thing further to object against the grounds of our Religion, he knows where to attaque me; let him under­take the whole, or else acknowledg it a most unreasonable thing thus to charge falsities upon us, and then say we have nothing else to say for our selves. We pretend not to chuse our faith, but heartily embrace whatever appears to have been delivered by Christ or his Apostles; but we know the Church of Rome too well to believe all which she would impose upon us, and are loth to have her chuse our Religi­on for us, since we know she hath chosen so ill for her self. But if Mr. S. [Page 103] will not believe me in saying thus, what reason have I to believe him in saying otherwise? Such general charges then signifie nothing, but every one must judg according to the reason on both sides.

I now come to the last part of my task; which is to shew, §. 17. that this way is repugnant to common sense and experi­ence, and that the Church of Rome hath apparently altered from what was the belief of former ages. To which pur­pose my words are, It is to no purpose to prove impossibility of motion when I see men move; no more is it to prove that no age of the Church could vary from the preceding, when we can evi­dently prove that they have done it. And therefore this argument is intend­ed only to catch easie minds that care not for a search into the history of the several ages of the Church, but had ra­ther sit down with a superficial subtilty, than spend time in further enquiries. But two things M. S. tells me are re­quired ere I can see that their faith va­ries from the former; p. 238. first to see what their Church holds now, and then to see [Page 104] what the former Church held before; and he kindly tells me, if he sees any thing, I see neither well. It seems I want Mr. S's. spectacles of oral tradition to see with; but as yet I have no cause to complain of the want of them, but I see much better without them than with them. He tells me, I cannot see what their present Church holds, and therefore I cannot assure any what was held before; because, if I renounce tradi­tion, I take away all means of knowing. The reason why I cannot candidly see (as he phrases it) what their Church holds now, is, because I cannot distin­guish between faith and its explication, some Schoolmen and the Church. By which it seems it is impossible for me to know what their Church holds con­cerning Invocation of Saints, Worship of Images, Communion in one kind; for those are the points I there mention, wherein it is evident, that the Church of Rome hath receded from the do­ctrine and practise of the primitive Church. Or are these only the opi­nions and practises of some Schoolmen among them, and not the doctrine and practise of their Church? But that we [Page 105] might come to some fuller state of these controversies, I wish M. S. would settle some sure way whereby we might know distinctly what are the doctrines and practices of their Church. If the Council of Trent and Roman Catechism be said to be the rule of doctrine, I de­sire no other; so that those may be interpreted by practices universally al­lowed among them. As when that Council only defined, that due honour be given to Saints; the general practice of that Church may tell us what they mean by that due honour; and if that be not fair, I know not what is. But I see all the shift Mr. S. hath, is, when he is pinched, to say these are the opini­ons of Schoolmen and private specu­lators, and not the doctrine of their Church. And if such shifts as these are must serve the turn, I should wonder if ever he be to seek for an answer. But the shortest answer of all would be, that none but those of their Church can know what she holds; and there­fore it is to no purpose for Protestants to write against her; or it may be, that none but Mr, S. and one or two more can tell; for many among them say, [Page 106] those are the doctrines of their Church which they deny to be. So that ex­cept Mr. White and Mr. S. and some very few demonstrators more, all the rest are School-men, private Opinators, and not to be relied on. But I cannot see what their Church held formerly nei­ther. p. 236. No wonder at all of that; for if I cannot see an object so near me as the present Church, how can it be ex­pected I should see one so much further off as the doctrine of former ages? And his reason is so strong, as may well perswade me out of one, at least, of my five senses. For, saith he, if I question tra­dition, I question whether there be any doctrine delivered, and so any Fathers. And is not this argued like a Demon­strator? First he supposes there never was any way used in the world but oral tradition, and then strongly in­fers, if I deny that, I can know no­thing. But I can yet hardly perswade my self that the Fathers only sate in Chimney-corners teaching their Chil­dren by word of mouth, and charging them to be sure to do so to theirs; but as they loved preserving the do­ctrine of faith, they should have a great [Page 107] care never to write down a word of it. But why, I wonder, should Mr. S. think, that if I do not allow of oral tradition, I must needs question whether there were any Fathers? I had thought I might have known there had been Fathers by their Children; I mean the Books they left behind them. But if all Mr. S. pleads for be only this, that no Books can be certainly conveyed without tradition, he dispute's with­out an adversary; but as I never op­posed this, so I am sure it doth him lit­tle service. It is then from the Books of the Fathers that I find what the sense of the Church of their age was, and from thence I have shewed how vastly different the opinions and practices of the Roman Church are from those of the primitive. Although then I may not think my self obliged to believe all that the present Church delivers for matter of faith; yet I hope I may find what the opinions and practice of the former Church were by the records that are left of it. And the reason why I cannot think any one obliged to believe what every age of the Church delivers, is, because I think no [Page 108] man obliged to believe contradictions; and I see the opinions and practices of several ages apparently contrary to each other.

Well, but I call this way a superfici­al subtilty; § 18. and so I think it still; so little have Mr. S's. demonstations wrought upon me. But, saith he, is that which is wholly built on the na­ture of things superficial? No; but that which pretends to be so built, may. And of that nature I have shewed this way to be, and not the former. But that I may not think him superficial as well as his way, he puts a profound Question to me, What do I think Con­troversie is? and that he may the bet­ter let me know what it is, he an­swers himself. I deal plainly with you, saith he, you may take it to be an art of talking, and I think you do so, though you will not profess it; but I take it to be a noble science. But to let him see that I will deal as plainly with him, as he doth with me, I will profess it, that I not only think Controversie as usually managed, but some mens way of de­monstrating (Mr. S. may easily know [Page 109] whom I mean) to be a meer art of talking, and nothing else. But he takes it to be a noble science; yes doubtless, if Mr. S. manage it, and he be the judg of it himself. His meaning I suppose is, by his following words, p. 240. that he goes upon certain principles, and we do not. We have already seen how certain his principles have been, and I should be somewhat ashamed of my Religion if I had no better. But what our rule of faith is, hath been amply discoursed already by you, and that in Mr. S's clearing method, that nothing is left for me to do, but to touch at what remains, and concludes this an­swer. I had the better to illustrate the weakness of that argument from oral tradition, brought an instance in that case parallel, viz. that if one ages delivering to another would prove that the faith of Christ was in every age unalterable, because no age did testifie any such alteration to be in it; by the same argument the world might be proved eternal, because no age did ever testifie to another, that the world was ever otherwise than it is. So that if oral tradition were only to be re­lied [Page 110] on, there could be no evidence given of the worlds being ever other­wise than it is, and consequently the world must be believed to have been always what we see it is. This, as far as I can apprehend, is a clear and distinct ratiocination, and purposely de­signed to prove that we must admit of other rules to judg of alterations in the Church by, besides oral tradition. But Mr. S. (in his own expression) strangely roving from the mark I aimed at, professes there is not a tittle in it pa­rallel to his medium, p. 241. nay, that he never saw in his life more absurdities couched in fewer words. But I must take all patiently from a man who still perches on the specifical nature of things, and ne­ver flags below the sphere of science. Yet by his good leave, he either appre­hends not, or wilfully mistakes my meaning; for my argument doth not proceed upon the belief of the worlds eternity, which, in his answer, he runs wholly upon as far as eighthly and last­ly, p 242. but upon the evidence of oral traditi­as to no discernable alteration in any age of it. For the Question between us, is, whether in matters of alteration in [Page 111] the faith or practice of the Church, we are bound to rely only on the testi­mony of oral tradition; so that if no age can be instanced in wherein any alteration was made, and this delive­red by that age, then we are bound to believe there hath been no altera­tion since Christ and the Apostles times; now I say, if this hold good, I will prove the world eternal by the same argument; taking this for our principle, that we are bound to re­ly only on oral tradition in the case, originally derived from the matter of fact seen by those of the first age; for that which never was otherwise then it is, is eternal; but we cannot know by oral tradition that the world ever was otherwise then it is; for no age of the world can be instanced in, wherein we have any testimony of any alteration that was in it. Either then we must believe that the world ever was what it is, i. e. eternal; or else we must say, that we are not to rely barely on oral tradition in this case, but we must judg whether the world were made or no, by other mediums of Scripture and reason. And [Page 112] this was all which I aimed at, viz. to shew that where there is no evidence from oral tradition; yet if there be Scripture and reason, there is suffici­ent ground for our faith to stand upon. And so I apply it to the pre­sent case; though we could not prove barely from the tradition of any one age, that there had been any altera­tion in the faith or practice of the Church; yet if I can prove that there hath been such from Scripture and reason, this is sufficient for me to be­lieve it. And now I dare appeal to the indifferent Reader, whether this be so full of absurdities, or it be such a rambling Chimerical argument (as he calls it), l. 243. no two pieces of which hang together with themselves, or any thing else. Which being expressions of as great modesty as science, I am con­tent Mr, S. should bear away the ho­our of them and his demonstrations together.

The last thing he quarrels with me for, §, 19. is, that I say, if we can evi­dently prove, that there have been alte­rations in the Church, then it is to no [Page 113] purpose to prove that impossible which we see actually done. And this appears not only because the Scripture supposes a degeneracy in the Christian Church, which could never be, if every age of the Church did infallibly believe and pra­ctise as the precedent up to Christs time did; but because we can produce clear evidence that some things are delivered by the present Church, which must be brought in by some age since the time of Christ; for which I refer the Reader to what I had said about com­munion in one kind, invocation of Saints, and worship of Images: In all which, I say, I had proved evidently that they were not in use in some ages of the Christian Church; and it is as evi­dent that these are delivered by the pre­sent Church, and therefore this principle must needs be false. In answer to this, Mr. S. wishes, I would tell him first what evidence means, whether a strong fancy, or a demonstration? I mean that which is enough to perswade a wise man, who judges according to the clearest reason, which I am sure is more than ever his demonstrations will do. But it is a pleasant specta­cle [Page 114] to see how Mr. S, layes about him, at my saying that the Scripture sup­poses a degeneracy in the Christian Church. Incomparably argued! saith he, why, see we not the place? does it evi­dently speak of faith, or manners; the Vniversal Church, or particular persons? but be it in faith, be it universal, does it suppose this degeneracy already past, which is only proper to your purpose, or yet to come? That is, does it say there must be a total Apostacy in faith before the year 1664? Alas, he had forgot this. Most incomparably answered! For if the degeneracy be in 1665. or any years after, what becomes of M. S's demonstration then, that no errors could come into the Church? but it seems his demonstration holds but till 1664. and I easily believe ano­ther year will never believe the truth of it. But if such a thing as a degeneracy be possible, how then stands the infallibility of tradition, when there can be no degeneracy without falling from the doctrine and practices of Christ and his Apostles? But that such a degeneracy hath already been in that which calls it self the Catholick Church, [Page 115] and that both in faith and manners, I shall refer Mr. S to the learned Au­thor of the late Idea of Antichristia­nism and Synopsis Prophetica, where he may find enough to perswade him that his demonstration was far from holding so long as 1664. And now I leave the Reader to judg whether the foregoing evidences against the infalli­bility of oral tradition, or Mr. S's. de­monstrations have the greater force of reason in them. And if he will not stoop so far from the height of his perch, as to take notice of what I have else­where said, I am resolved to let him see I am not at all concerned about it: I begin to understand him so well by this Appendix, that I can give my self a reasonable account why he thought it not fit to meddle with any other part of my Book. But if Mr. S. be resolved not to answer any of the testimonies I there produce, p. 244. unless I single them out, and print them at the end of this Answer, (i. e. remove them from that evidence which attends them in the series of the discourse) I can only say, he is the most imperious answerer I have met with, who is re­solved [Page 116] never to deal with an adversa­ry, but on his own unreasonable terms. Thus heartily wishing. Mr. S's. Science as great as his opinion of it, and a good effect of our endeavours to promote the one, by removing the other, I am

Sir,
Your affectionate friend and servant, Edward Stillingfleet.
FINIS

Postscript.

SIR,

SInce the dispatch of the former Papers, I have met with ano­ther Treatise, wherein I find my self concerned, written by the Author of Fiat Lux, the Title whereof is Diaphanta: I am afraid the Title affrights you; for I assure you it is the most formidable thing in his whole Book. But the man is a very modest man, and hugely different from Mr. S's. humor; for he is so far from offering to demon­strate [Page] the grounds of faith; that all he pretends to in the title of his Book, is to excuse Catholick Religion against the opposition of several Adversaries. What fault I pray hath the Catholick Religion committed, that it must now come to be excused instead of being defended? But when I look into that part which concerns my self, I presently understand the meaning of it, which is not to ex­cuse Catholick Religion, but themselves for not being able to defend it. For he very ingeniously tells us, that faith is firm and constant, p. 210. though all his talk for it be miserably weak: i. e. he is sure they have an excellent Religion, though he knows not what to say for it; and their faith is a very good faith, but it hath not yet had the good fortune to be understood by them. For he acknow­ledges, that as often as they dispute, they are beyond the business, p. 209. (so may any one believe, who reads their late Books,) which is in effect to say, there is no way left of disputing any longer with adversaries about their faith; on­ly they must believe it stoutly them­selves; [Page] but it is to no purpose to of­fer to defend it. Nay, it doth their faith a great deal of mischief; for, saith he, in reading controversies, we see not so much the nature of the faith, as the wit of him who opposes or defends it. From whence we may easily gather what unspeakable mischief they do their cause by writing for it. By which ex­pressions, we may guess at what a low ebb the defence of their faith is among them: for the way now taken to defend it, is by disowning the defenders of it, and by saying that they only vent their own opinions; and though we confute them never so much, yet their faith holds good still. Was ever a good cause driven to such miserable shifts as these are, especially among those who pretend to wit and learning? One, he saith, T. C. vents a private opini­on of his own, and it is not a pin matter whether it stand or fall; ano­ther, he saith the same of I. S. a third of J.V.C. and yet for all this, their religion is very firm and sure, and they are all at perfect agreement [Page] about it. Is this the victory over me, Mr. S. mentions to be so easie a thing? I see that by the same figure M. S. calls his way of arguing demonstration, run­ning out of the field shall be accounted conquering. For I never saw any person do it more openly than this Author does. For he plainly confesses, that his Catho­lick Gentleman went quite besides his business, that he built upon indefensible principles, that his theological ratioci­nation was indeed pretty, but too weak to hold. And are not we hugely too blame, if we do not cry up such migh­ty Conquerors as these are? Truly, Sir, I expect the very same answer should be returned to your Book; that Mr. S's argument is a pretty theologi­cal ratiocination; and that your answer is not unwitty: but though that way will not hold, another will. Thus, when they are beaten off Infallibility, they run to Tradition: and when they are again beaten off Tradition, then back again to Infallibility. So that the short of all their answers is, though such a one cannot defend our faith, yet I [Page] can; though I cannot, yet the faith is firm and constant still. I wonder what their Superiors think of this way of proceeding among them; we should imagine, if they be so weak as they say themselves, they had much better keep them from appearing abroad, and expo­sing their cause so ridiculously to con­tempt. But it may be, they think their faith is the better as well as their devo­tion, for their ignorance: and that it would be a mighty disparagement to their cause, for such silly people to be able to defend it. It is enough for them to admire it themselves, and to say as their common people use to do, though they cannot defend it, yet there are some that can. And although it may be no particulat person can do it, yet their cause is able to defend it self, But for all that I can see, by such kind of answers, the intention of them is, to intreat us not to tri­umph over the weakness of their pre­sent Writers, but to wait till the Cause it self thinks fit to write. And when it doth so, they may expect a [Page] further answer; but it were a great piece of cruelty for us to hasten their ruine, who fall so fast before us by each others Pens.

FINIS.

Books Printed for, and Sold by Henry Mortlock at the Phoenix in St. Pauls Church-yard, and at the white Heart in VVestminster-hall.

  • A Rational account of the grounds of Protestant Re­ligion; being a Vindicati­on of the Lord-Archbishop of Canterbury's Relation of a Conference▪ &c., from the pretended Answer of T.C. folio.
  • Sermons preached upon several oc­casions, with a discourse annexed con­cerning the true reasons of the suffer­ings of Christ, wherein Crellius's Answer to Grotius is considered, fol.
  • Irenicum: A Weapon-Salve for the Churches wounds: in quarto.
  • [Page] Origines Sacrae; or a Rational Ac­count of the Grounds of Christian Faith, as to the Truth and Divine Authority of the Scriptures, and mat­ters therein contained, quarto.
  • A Discourse concerning the Idolatry practised in the Church of Rome, and the hazard of Salvation in the Com­munion of it, in Answer to some Pa­pers of a revolted Protestant, wherein a particular account is given of the Fanaticisms and Divisions of that Church, octavo.
  • An Answer to several late Treatises occasioned by a Book entituled, A Discourse concerning the Idolatry pra­ctised in the Church of Rome, and the hazard of Salvation in the communion of it, the first Part, octavo.
  • A second Discourse in vindication of the Protestant grounds of Faith, a­gainst the pretence of Infallibility in the Roman Church, in Answer to the Guide in Controversie, by R. H. Pro­testancy without Principles, and Rea­son and Religion; or the certain Rule of Faith, by E. W. with a particular enquiry into the Miracles of the Ro­man Church, octavo.
  • [Page]An Answer to Mr. Cresey's Epistle Apologetical to a person of Honour, touching his Vindication of Dr. Stil­lingfleet, octavo. All written by Edw. Stillingfleet, D. D. Chaplain in Ordi­nary to his Majesty.
  • Knowledg and Practice: or a plain Discourse of the chief things necessary to be known, believed and practiced in order to Salvation: by S. Cradock, quarto; A Book very useful for Fa­milies.
  • The Remains of Sir Walter Raw­leigh, in twelves.
  • A Discourse of War and Peace, by Sir Robert Cotton, in octavo.
  • The Moral Philosophy of the Stoicks, in octavo.
  • Hodders Arithmetick, twelves.
  • The Triumphs of Rome over de­spised Protestancy, octavo.
  • The Original of Romances, octavo.
  • The Advice of Charles the Fifth, Emperor of Germany and King of Spain, to his Son Philip the Second, upon resignation of his Crown to his said Son, twelves.
  • Observations upon Military and Political affairs, by the Right Ho­nourable [Page] George Duke of Albemarle, folio, published by Authority.
  • A Fathers Testament: by Phineahs Fletcher, in octavo.

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