AS among all the Civiliz'd part of Mankind, no Honors, and Commendations have been judg'd great enough to bestow upon Virtue in ge­neral; so no task has been found more difficult and perplext, than to deduce it readily, and safely into all the single Offices of Humane Life.

Not to insist at present on the immedi­ate bounden expressions of Piety towards God, about which men always have been, and needs must be at the greatest loss, where his own express declarations conduct them not, from the infinite distance of the object: In the more common, and obvious instances of [Page 2] Justice, and Benignity one towards another, which most acknowledg in the gross reasona­ble, and advantagious; yet few are thought so happy, or so faithful, as to follow them by straight, and uninterrupted lines in their several deductions, and to accommodate them aright to all the emergent cases inci­dent to our converse one with another.

After the relief, and directions lent us from Laws Divine, or Humane, the clearest Re­velations of God, the most studied, and em­prov'd Reasonings of the wisest of men spent therein, whether through ignorance, or pre­judice, stubbornness, or malice, scarce any pre­cept hath been found so plain, any conviction so unexceptionable, which some men will not evade, or elude, first make intricate, and then frustrate, dispute themselves into a loss about it, and then conclude with al­most a full exemption from it, and that in pursuit of every fancied (however lawless) interest, or groundless humor.

Farther, The circumstances of our actions are open to such almost infinite variety, and accordingly the reasons, and measures of Com­mands, and our Obligations altering; It will be found a matter of some intricacy to the [Page 3] most upright and wary, without danger or mistake, duly and hastily to apply all ge­neral injunctions to each single act. Where­fore after the largest provisions of particular Precepts of all sorts, some general Rules we have given to direct us, where others may come short, or we seem at a loss about them. Among which, none more full and comprehensive than this of my Text, which hath gaind it the most universal admiration and applause, even from those that observe, or those that observe it not; from the Ene­mies, as Friends to our sacred profession. So that Alexander Severus the Roman Emperor, Aelius Lam­pridius. p. 376. in vita ejus. is reported to have Engrav'd it on the Walls of his Palace, and other Publick Buildings, as it were a standing Law of his Empire, and the best square of his own, and others pro­ceedings in the Administration thereof. As our Lord in my Text declares it to have been of God himself under the Old Testament. He no less Establishing it for future Gene­rations under the New.

In Treating of which I shall, First, in­quire into the proper extent of this Rule, to vindicate it from some false applications, and assign it, as near as I can, its true boundaries.

2. The apparent Reasonableness, Justice, and Equity thereof.

3. The plain easiness, and suitableness of it to present use.

4. The Divine Authority, and Sanction of it from the last words.

In order to the former I observe, First, This does not make other mens dealings with us, the Rule of our dealing with them.

It is not whatsoever men do to you, but, Whatsoever ye would they should do to you, &c. Which otherwise might open a gap to all in­justice, fraud or violence. It must not pass for a Maxim here, whatever it do in mens Practice, Fallere fallentem non est fraus. Men are very apt to think it a warrantable excuse, in the worst of their Actions, if they can but with any pretence say, I do but to him as he did to me, and give him, as they call it (I know not by what Figure) as good as he brought. So injuries, as well as animosities, are multiplied, and bandied from one to a­nother, and contrary to all other violent mo­tions, lose nothing, but gain still more and more in their rebound. Another mans in­justice or cruelty doth not warrant, or al­ter the nature of mine, and though he be­gan [Page 5] first, yet no Reason or Precept will justifie my following him therein, which the more I complain of, the greater distance I ought to keep from it: and if in some in­stances it be no more than what may be just for him to suffer, yet in all, it's more than I have power to inflict; not to mention how partial Judges, and Executioners men would be in their own Causes, while the justest punishment, where it goes no farther, is not committed to every ones management; and private Revenge, in all Societies especially, stands convicted by the Laws of God, Na­ture, and Compact; and can have no shelter from this. If in any case of extreme violence, I may, Vim vi repellere, rather Kill than be Killed, when openly Assaulted, against the common rights of Human Society, by Thieves and Murderers; It is not so much their de­sert as my necessity, that must bear me out, wherein all Reason, and all Laws of God and Man judg it more equal, that the guilty should suffer, rather than the innocent, where one must presently, and in such an unavoid­able exigence, may have affixt somwhat of a Publick Character on the last for his most necessary defence. But where this may be [Page 6] otherwise secured, I must make my recourse, and yield up my cause to the common guard, and most impartial determination of the Com­munity, and of Him above all that judges there­in, who hath said Vengeance is mine: So I should be willing to have done unto me, and if this seem to leave me under disadvantage with those who will not yet deal so with me; as it justifies them not in the least, so will it more severely condemn them for it hereafter; and in the mean time this restraint however uneasie, may be lookt on as part of that Self denial, and taking up the Cross, necessary not only to follow our Lord, but to ensure the peace and welfare of Humane Society.

2. Our own will and desire for other mens dealings with us, taken in the gross may be oft an unwarrantable, and at other times an incom­petent Guide to ours with them. As if through any Distemper of body, or mind, prejudice, or misapprehension, I wish for any thing that is really hurtful to my self, I may not hence justly force it upon another. In opposition to which the Ancient Latin Copys, T. 4. De Ser­mone Domini in monte. l. 2. p. 1168. as St. Augustin observes, read it quaecunque bona, &c. But because it will be yet controverted, what these good things are, and how to distinguish them; [Page 7] and besides the case of those who are un­capable of judging of any Law; and for whom another restraint is provided; beside the case of Inferiors, and Superiors, as such, which admits different considerations, that I shall meet with in my next; The misapplica­tions of this Rule in which our own inclina­tions may be aptest, to impose on us, I reduce chiefly under this particular to two instances. I do not as I would be done unto, if I urge that upon another which he thinks hurtful, though I do not; because I do not put my self in his circumstances, intirely, and so not to him, what I would expect from another, were I in his place, as this supposes.

Again, When the ground of my desire, or expectation is some other by-consideration, and not the equity of the Case it self. As when I am willing any should do somwhat to me, that I may have the advantage of doing the like to him; which in effect proves not the same. If I think my self stronger than ano­ther, and so should desire he might take from me, what he could, that I might have the same liberty towards him, or others; here I do not really, what I would be willing to suffer, and yet where this may be materially [Page 8] the same, it varies much in the different con­dition of persons and other circumstances, too many to reckon up. In all which, as in the case before, I do not truly, and fully put my self in his place, and stead. In opposition to them, the order of the words is exactly to be observed; the first part to be considered by it self absolutely, and not to follow any sinister re­spect to the last, that is, abstracted from other aims and designs: Whatever I should choose, and think desireable in it self, and due to me in the same case, that I hereby bind my self to, towards another, at least when in my power. But not to invert the order of the words; Do what you will to any one, so you be willing they should do it to you: Wherein we shall be easily mistaken and blinded with prejudice and partiality, when we begin with that, and so proceed to this; as appears by too woful experience.

3. I may reasonably suppose this Rule given not so much for a compleat System of all Ju­stice, and Equity: But rather as a conveni­ent relief, and Additionary Supply to all o­thers, wherein seems to be the best, and safest, and constant use of it; where we are to seek for any other, or wholly at a loss about its in­terpretation, [Page 9] there this may extricate us out of a great many doubts. For though I suppose most of the Precepts, which concern our con­verse with each other, may be fairly deduced from this (of which more in the Close,) yet if any do not presently appear so, they do not thence lose their Obligation, neither are we free to every Action, which our judgment may make reconcileable herewith. For the Authority of God, which binds antecedently to this, or any other Law, may lay many en­gagements of Duty upon me towards other men, which I may be apt to think I should not require from any, nay be unwilling to receive. Again I may have somwhat impos'd upon me by my Lawful Superiors, which I may be inclin'd to judg, I should not injoin on them. In which the Case is not left to even debate, or my judgment to be determi­ned by the reason of the thing alone, as it seems in the Text. In which also mankind are known naturally partial, and I may be sup­posed also more easily mistaken than they, who stand upon much higher ground, and have a fuller and larger Prospect of all about them, however the necessary Rights of just Authority to guard, and advance the true Honor and [Page 10] Service of God, and his Religion, with the Pub­lick Peace, weigh much more (that I say not oblige much farther) than any private judg­ment, or interest: and wherein nothing ab­solutely unlawful is enjoined, he that has the Commanding Power clears himself fully of this Rule, if, after all others, he do as he would be done unto, others cannot without that Reverence, and Obedience, which in like circumstances they would expect from all, though they now obstinately deny it. How­ever the wills and inclinations of men in their own concerns, as well as others, are oft fickle, and various, received upon very uncertain grounds, and governed by very unaccount­able prejudices, and it seems no way conve­nient, that the strength of all Laws Divine, as Humane should stand, or fall with such weak and tottering supports, and be so long precarious, till they have stood their tryal, and received their doom from so frequent a parti­al, but always an inferior Judg. This Rule may superadd a farther Obligation, but was never designed to exclude, or excuse us from any former; where others fail this may supply the place of a particular injunction, and en­gage us to somwhat beyond what we thought [Page 11] ourselves bound to before, not discharge us of any other Duty, seeing we can hardly imagine any good beyond what we wish to ourselves, and are hereby so far engaged to others.

4. Some have thought this rather a Rule of Justice, than Charity. Indeed one of the Oriental Translations renders it quicquid aequum ducitis. The ground of their limitation is, that I may lawfully desire, or be willing another should give me all he can without prejudice to himself; But am not hereby bound to do so to every other man, nay cannot. Yet I am not willing so to restrain it, seeing the use, and design of it seems to reach Acts of Cha­rity, as common Justice, it may be to join them in one. So the way of our Saviours introdu­cing, and connecting it to the former Verse, may more clear under the last particular. In the mean time, for the mentioned instance, I may be willing to receive, what I do not think another bound to give. So Whatsoever ye would in my Text, is, whatever ye think or judg reasonable, and equitable to expect from o­thers, or that they are any way obliged to be­stow; that reciprocally binds, and that in Justice too. But in Acts of Liberality, I ought even in my desires to leave another, as free, as I would be my self, to lay them out where [Page 12] the best Prudence may direct him. Chari­ty is a large, and diffusive Principle, not to be tied up to one Method, or confined always to the same measures; seeketh not her own, much more with common Justice restrains our co­veting what is other mens. He that desires always to be forgiven, and to be ever re­ceiving, had need be as free in giving to, or forgiving others; or else he will not only fall short of the Mercy, he asks, but fall under the stroke of that Justice, he violates. So I think I may determine, I ought to bestow that upon another, which interchangeably in the like case, I should think it reasonable for me to hope, and expect from him; or else my de­sires, or actions will be obnoxious to more guilt, than ordinary partiality. So far of the Explication in General, which it would be endless to pursue into extreme niceties, more apt to perplex, and confound, then ex­plain the Precept to our readier observance.

Yet more particularly by way of Para­phrase. No man is willing to be defrauded, or injured; to be imposed on by falshood, or treachery. None is desirous to be reviled, or despised: every man is supposed to wish well unto himself; to have his person, and all that appertains to him safe from outward [Page 13] violence, or secret fraud; an evil eye, or as bad a Tongue, to have his Actions interpreted in the most favourable sence, they are capa­ble: all his good things advanc't; his evil as much as may be diminish't: In all instances go and do likewise. (Nemo cùm ignorantiâ tenetur, non cupit doceri; quum libatur, amanter ac secretò moneri, potius quam traduci; nemo quum eget, non velit sibi subveniri: Nemo velit obtrectari famae suae; Nemo fraudari, &c. Erasmus par.)

I am in the second place to consider the ap­parent reasonableness, justice, and equity of the Rule, which has all the evidence possible to re­commend it to the Universal approbation of mankind. Indeed it lies so near the first Princi­ples, and Originals of all right Reason, and Equity, that it seems hard to derive it from any more clear, and self-evident, and so far difficult to prove, as to find any other proposition, that less needs proving: and yet some such imme­diate ones, we must have recourse to, or else all discourse must be fruitless, we can have no foundation whereon to begin, or end to stop at. It hath oft fared the worse with very important Truths, for lying near the Fountain head of all; while through Pride, Obstinacy, or vain Curiosity, some men will hardly receive the prime verities of Nature, as well as Reli­gion, [Page 14] without requiring a previous proof, which all men are not alike happy in mana­ging, nor bind themselves to the same Methods therein: Neither are under the same appre­hensions of Principles, and their consequen­ces; of which others, (though most unrea­sonably) have taken such advantage, as more to distrust, or contemn that proved, which barely propounded, they could not but Re­verence. The proposition in my Text, seems as liable to run this hazard (if it have not al­ready suffered thereby) as most others; which therefore I rather premise, that it may under­go no prejudice by my short offers, which I reduce to a small compass: and in which every ones own Meditations may add what possibly to him may seem more convincing.

Now with respect to those who (if any) are most like to object against it, I may begin by considering how reconcileable it is with their own dearest (if not only) Principle of Self-Love supposed therein, and truely con­firmed thereby: than which nothing with such may, sooner conclude it reasonable. For because it's taken for granted, that as we do, so we ought to wish well unto ourselves, and can hardly knowingly do otherwise, there­fore it's made the fairest Rule, but not the [Page 15] only or best ground of our dealing so with others. Wherefore they who most contradict the purport of it towards them; are as rigid, and hasty as any, in exacting it towards themselves. When we are bid to love our Neighbour as our­selves, it's implied as we do, so we must and cannot but love ourselves: Whereto infinite Appeals are made in all parts of Religion; and were it not presupposed inviolably strong, and universal, the Bands of Humane Society, and Commerce, as Converse would be much loosened, which are now more straightned by this Precept: We are hereby more than warranted to will what is good to our­selves, while our doing it to others is ruled thereby; which (as all commands rightly considered) is so far from clashing with true Self-Love, that it proves its safest guard. We do not what we ought by this Rule to others, if we wish not what is really best to ourselves. But if this reach not the evidence of an intire proof, it may remove a considerable preju­dice out of its way, which not done, scarce any other would be admitted.

2. To proceed gradually in matters where­in there is no necessary competition between my own and my Neighbours concerns, that is, where mens interests do not really interfere, [Page 16] or what I do to another takes nothing properly from my self, which yet oft happens, there no­thing can carry more unexceptionable Evi­dence, than the Precept before us. As for instance to give good words, rather than bad; can­did, and benign, rather than peevish, and fret­ful; to be more forward to comfort, than to vex; to heal, than to wound, to lift up, rather than to beat down; to conceal, rather than to expose anothers imperfections; to defend, sooner than to accuse; yea in many Offices of Beneficence, wherein I may relieve anothers necessity, or much promote his convenience, by that which I cannot keep, or if I do, it must be useless, or so insignificant, that I shall be ashamed to own it.

In these and such like instances, what can carry greater conviction, than that the one part is more excellent, and eligible than the opposite, and yet almost as soon, and easily done? For I appeal to the most stupid, and prejudic'd, is it not better to save Life, than to destroy it? to be an instrument of anothers hap­piness, than misery? to love, than to hate? &c. that is, to do good, than to do evil? If there be no difference in things at all, but only in our Opinions: if, abstracted from other conside­rations, one includes as much perfection as the [Page 17] other (for what dare not some men assert?) Why in our own behalf are we so constantly determined in our choice to the one? so fear­ful of, and ready to fly from the other? need­ing neither force of Argument, or length of Meditation to secure our preference. An im­mediate Conviction, that they are as oppo­site in their own Natural tendency as our thoughts; and that we can as soon cease to de­sire what is good, as such, as not think it to be placed in those things, which this Rule directs us in to all. Now if what I wish to my self, or would have others do to me be better than the opposite (or else why do I choose it?) then by the same reason it is better to all, and at least when my own prejudice, or interest comes not between, I have no pretence of ob­jection that involves not a contradiction; and accuse my self of the breach of all the Laws of Conscience, Reason, and Equity, if I do not what I cannot but judg, and do so every day, really best, and most eligible.

3. In other Cases where my thus dealing may seem to restrain those benefits, which otherwise I could wish to my self, yet is it most reasonable, and equal, that the conve­niencies of Humane Life should be distributed by such measures, while no axiom upon which [Page 18] Mathematical demonstration is built can plead clearer evidence than the Foundati­on of this. If there it must be received as undeniably and immutably true. Si aequalia aequalibus addas, tota sunt aequalia. Si ab aequalibus aequalia demas, quae remanent erunt aequa­lia. The same is this, at least on the one side, changing but things into persons, paria paribus conveniunt: like things agree to like persons. So that whatever is fit for, or due to me, must be by the same reason for, and to another in the same circumstances. All men naturally, as such, are equal, stand upon even terms, and level ground; and if Society, Compact, and the consequences thereof have made any dif­ference in the conditions of men, that alters not the Case here; because the present Pre­cept puts, or supposes us intirely in the same state, or capacity, ere it determine, or equa­lize our mutual dues, and obligations.

So that as sure as there is any such thing as right or wrong, reasonable, or unreasona­ble, equal, or unequal, and those must be as certain, and evident as any other Relati­on whatever; of agreeable, or disagreea­ble; beneficial, or hurtful; true, or false; straight, or crooked, &c. which all Self-Love must derive from the supposed dif­ference [Page 19] of, and subsist by: So unavoida­bly must the better part be involved in this direction.

But that I may begin, and end with same persons here (who too oft before make violent attempts upon those fixt boundaries, and so are like to be little moved by such Topicks) I add in the Fourth and Last place, in their own way of reasoning, There is no other possible Foundation of Society, and so of Peace, and Self-preservation involved therein, than the supposed observance of this Law. For if you love your self, so does every one beside, and may do as much, and therefore can never be supposed to agree in any thing, which pro­vides not equally for his concerns as yours, and puts him not in a like capacity of enjoying what he desires. I appeal to the most par­tial, whether all persons are like to meet in what only takes care for one, or whether any other Rule, or misapplication of this, give so large as well as so equal, a provision for more, yea for all; so that it has not only as much of abstracted reason, but of private interest, and safety, as it's possible for any general one to have; wherein alone the concerns of the com­munity are most nearly united: and does not only follow that order in which God, and Na­ture [Page 20] have plac'd us: But the other fancied Originals of Society fall in pieces without it. Diog. Laert. [...]. 5. p. 313. Compare A­ristotle de mo­ribus. l. 9. c. 4. p. 148. [...]. Dion Cassius [...]. 52. p. 492. 493. [...], &c. Whence Aristotle in his Life by Laertius, is made to give it as a Rule of Friendship, which would most difficultly be reduc'd to any other; and Mecaenas in that famous Oration of his to Augustus in Dion Cassius (one of the Monuments of Antiquity of greatest name left us from the common Deluge) concerning the under­taking, and management of the Roman Em­pire; gives it him as the great and compleat­est Rule of Government, which challenges an eminency of all most transcendent, So govern others as you would be governed your self. But our Blessed Lord more wisely, and charitably prescribes it, as an universal Law to all, while he supposes, or makes them mutually cordial Friends, and intirely concerned for each o­thers good, and welfare, as their peculiar care and trust.

3. What may yet farther commend this Rule is its plain easiness, and suitableness to present use; while Laws, if otherwise never so rational, and useful, if withall obscure, perplext, and over-numerous, may prove a snare, rather than a support; make more Controversies than they decide; lose much of their strength, and force by being spun [Page 21] out into nice and subtle disputes: and fall short of their aim by not reaching the greater part of them, whom they designed to direct: who either have not leisure sufficient to attend, or capacities to understand them, or ready sagacity to apply them in opportunities of Action. In contradistinction to which, and such like inconveniencies, here is a Law al­ways at hand, which every man carries about in his own breast, legible to him that knows no Letters, open and obvious to the most rude and ignorant, which the worst memory cannot forget, the suddenest surprize prevent, nor the most wilful blindness conceal: to come at which, we are not forced to search Ancient Records, or dark Repositories; to revolve and ruminate upon old dark sentences, or new fi­ner glosses; not to rove about the world to examine the various Customs and Constituti­ons of Countries; not to soar as high, as Hea­ven, or dive as low, as Hell, in quest of our Duty; after all other pains return into your self, and look into your own heart, where you may oft find it sooner, and read it clearer than any where beside. The Gentiles, says St. Paul, Rom. ii. 14, 15. Having not the Law, do by na­ture the things contained in the Law, these having not the Law, are a Law unto themselves, and shew [Page 22] the work of the Law written in their hearts, their Conscience in the mean time accusing, or excusing one another. Where can we discern more lively Characters, and a fairer Transcript of this non scriptae sed natae legis, Tom. 2. p. 545 orat. pro T. Annio Milone. Tom. 2. edit. Savil. p. 165. as the Orator stiles it, than in this Maxim? whence St. Chrysostom on my Text, [...], &c.

Of which what farther evidence can be ex­pected than the experience of the even In­fant Age, where the knowledg of other Laws never yet came, amidst the little transactions of which, how oft do we hear such like com­plaints and expostulations with each other when aggrieved? This I would, or this I would not have done to you; implying their native sence of a like obligation on the other.

Again, this will readily descend to each sin­gle Case, and may be easily accommodated to every emergence thereof, which other Pre­cepts must infinitely, and endlesly multiply in their attempts towards: However involved with difficulties, or full of various windings and turnings, this question is soon ask'd, and almost as soon answer'd, What we should de­sire, and expect to be done unto us (rebus sic stantibus)▪ that if not always absolutely, yet is most likely to be our present Duty to others; [Page 23] if not what we are strictly bound to, yet is usually what is most safe and innocent; if no other command bind it upon us, yet our own choice generally does, and convicts us of guilt in the Breach.

This proves the most faithful, and impar­tial Monitor, a voice still sounding in our Ears, flee we never so fast from it, This is the way, walk in it. Every man may soon, and is very ready to put himself in his Neigh­bours circumstances, and is as quick in deter­mining what he would have done unto him, you need not doubt his choice, or that he should take up short of his due; less we cannot a­scribe, more we may add to him.

And because we are so sagacious in finding, and improving every hint, that makes for our own interest, therefore we are here most ad­vantagiously directed to put our selves into his Case; which, if any thing, is like to give us the fairest, and fullest prospect of his due, and the most pathetick motive not in the least to detract from it.

Neither lies there any exception against so suitable a Precept, according to which we are made our own Judges, and our own Law­givers; our own Accusers, or our own Com­purgators; can you desire more kind, and in­dulgent, [Page 24] ones? Can you complain of that Bur­den, which you impose on your self; and think that a grievance, with which your own hap­piness is so twisted? Must your will be a Law to others, and ought it not to be so first to your self? What you have already judged best, when to be done to you, is it quite contrary, when to be done by you, and the case in no­thing else altered? So that whatever suspition, or prejudice may lie against any other, none sure can against our own voice, and determina­tion, which this only ties us up to. Wherefore no Precept can be conceiv'd prest with fewer incumbrances, darkned with less intricacy, open to larger use, readier to present applica­tion, more obvious to all apprehensions, fit­ter to supply all other defects and losses, and more safely to interpret most other injunctions, than this of my Text. Summa omnium quae do­cet lex, & Prophetae, quos si aut non vacat, aut per inscitiam non potest evolvere, habet domi re­gulam, &c. as Erasmus in his Paraphrase.

Which brings me to the Fourth and Last par­ticular, and part of my Text, the Divine Au­thority, and Sanction of this Rule exprest in the last words, This is the Law and the Prophets.

I have hitherto considered it as the dictate of uncorrupt Nature, and unbyast Reason by its [Page 25] own innate light, and so have purposely omit­ted other confirmation thereof. But if any thing seem still wanting to compleat the far­ther establishment of it for a Law, and to raise a more Religious Veneration to its Observance, that is abundantly supplied by this last clause: this is not only to act agreeably to the most improved Reason, but also Divine Revela­tion; nor meerly to follow the Laws of Na­ture, but of God over and above: being strengthened by this his double Sanction, which twofold Cord sure is not easily broken; to its own intrinsick loveliness, it hath all the positive enforcements, and authority of an immedi­ate Heavenly injunction, This is the Law; &c.

In which words our Saviour seems to go far­ther yet. It is not only a single Command, however solemnly Enacted in the Law, con­firmed, and renewed by the succeeding Pro­phets; but as it were the sum, and recapitula­tion of the whole: As if all together reduc'd into one short Epitome, and Breviate, running through every Precept, and almost as oft re­peated, as there are any Instructions given; So that go through the intire Scripture, at least that part of it which concerns our deport­ment towards each other, wheresoever you pitch, on whatsoever you sit, you cannot but [Page 26] meet the true purport, and design of this; though not in the same terms, yet in sence. So that if all the Offices, and single Duties of Hu­mane Life scattered in the Sacred Volumes, may be included in one common direction, it can hardly be done in fewer words, and more comprehensive of all, than this.

Also it's not only the Law, and the Prophets, but the Gospel too, where our Lord most ex­presly enjoins it, here, and in St. Luke vi. 31. and some Copys added it to the Apostolick Cannons, Acts xv. 29. His Precepts also are more nearly suited, and accommodated there­to, where there seems any difference, being more covertly, and by consequence deli­vered of old. Wherefore some Copys Read it in my Text [...] or [...], so, or to this effect are the Law, and Prophets; others, as we, [...], This is the Law, &c.

Here I shall, (1.) mark out some general Commands of each Testament, which seem of the same import with this.

2. The Universal extent ascribed to such Commands.

3. How far involved in other more parti­cular and remote.

4. The relation it may stand in to, and the influence it hath upon even the Duties of the [Page 27] First Table, which we owe most immediately to God himself, to give it so great a Character, as in the close of my Text.

In order to the first may be observed indeed, that it is no where in express terms in the Old Testament, or the Canonical Books; that which comes nearest, is in the Apocryphal, Tobit v. 15. Do that to no man which thou hatest, where the negative part of it, is somwhat the same. But the positive sence is in many places, as Levit. xix. 18. Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self, oft referred to in the New Testament. Now no consequence can be more direct and natural, than that if we love him as our selves, we shall do to him what we would have done to our selves, that only in the strictness of the Letter, determining the inward Principle, and Disposition of the mind; this the outward suitable Expression thereof, and Action. To the same purpose may be Interpreted those many places concerning not only their Just, but Charitable, Humane, and Friendly de­portment towards all, especially the Poor, the Widow, the Fatherless, Deut. xv. 12, &c. Yea, the stranger, and their very servants, Deut. xvi. 11, 12, &c. While it comes in so often in the close, and as the strongest enforcement of all, Thou shalt remember thou was a bond-man, or a [Page 28] stranger in the Land of Egypt; implying their obli­gation to recollect, what though they had not, yet they could not but have wisht for, and might reasonably have expected to have been done to them, and therefore so should now do to others; nay this very consideration is expresly annext to the fore-cited Precept of loving our Neigh­bor as our selves, Levit. xix. 34. Alike may be applied that concerning helping an Enemy in his distress, Exod. xxiii. 4. Yea most in the beginning of that Chapter, so also concerning not rejoycing at his calamity. Prov. xxiv. 17. Yea rather multiplying benefits upon him. Prov. xxv. 21. So the Psalmists appeal and profession, Psal. vii. 4. If I have rewarded evil to him that was at peace with me, &c. See also Heb. xiii. 3. Remember them in bonds as bound with them, and them which suffer adversity as your selves in the body: To omit others in the New Testament, where many things seem added; to return Good for Evil; Blessing, for Curses; to love them that hate us, to be merciful and kind to all, even the unthankful; less cannot, more may, be included, than what is here exprest.

2. The large extent ascribed to such Com­mands, especially in the New Testament, suitable to the declaration in my Text, Matth. xxii. 36, &c. in answer to that question, Which [Page 29] is the great Commandment of the Law? Our Lord re­plies, first, Thou shalt love the Lord thy God, &c. and the second is like unto it, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self, on these two Command­ments hang all the Law and the Prophets. So Mark xii. 30, &c. suitably St. Paul, and more close to my Text, Gal. v. 14. For all the Law is ful­filled in one word, even in this, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self; which St. James, c. ii. 8.9. calls the Royal Law, which fulfilling we shall do well. Again others particularly are summed up in it, Rom. xiii. 9. After reckoning up the five negative Precepts of the second Table, he subjoins, If there be any other Commandment, it's briefly comprehended, or recapitulated in this saying, namely, Thou shalt love thy Neighbour as thy self; In the Verse before, He that loveth another hath ful­filled the Law; in the Verse after, Love is the ful­filling of the Law. So our Lord seems to sum up many in it, Matth. xix. 18, 19.

3. Other Precepts more remote severally involve the same sence with this, whatever expressions of Justice, and Charity are pro­vided for in them singly, are here universally, and together; that is for instance, just Weights and Measures, an equal Ballance, that we have not an Ephah, and an Ephah, as the Hebrew phraseth the false and deceitful, one to buy, and [Page 30] another to sell with, so in all other cases most straightly forbid, as a plain intrenchment upon this Rule, not doing as we would be done by. So to be true to our trust, to speak as we think, and act as we speak, to do violence to no man, to defraud, defame, or reproach none, to preserve every ones dues, and secure his right, what is it but to keep close to this Rule? Also to find pity, and relief in our distress, and ex­tremity; to have our wounds closed, and not widened; our distractions composed, and not heightned; our misery as much as may be di­minished, and our happiness advanc'd, are every ones choice for himself, and so more become his Duty to others. It were easie to go through most Commands, take almost any of them severally, and consider what it is they in­join upon all, and bethink your selves whe­ther you would not choose it rather than the contrary; in all cases to receive your due, oft over and above, good will, and friendly as­sistance from all; and can any thing be as more equal, so more desirable?

If there be any case like an exemption, it seems that of severe, especially capital punish­ments, which as they are not excluded by all the Precepts of Christian mercy, and compas­sion, which would be cruelty to the far greater, [Page 31] as better part (and this must not as I said, be in­terpreted to certainly vacate, and frustrate any other;) so though he that suffers may pos­sibly always desire pardon, and think himself as ready universally to give it: Yet he that in­flicts it, being under less prejudice, may con­clude that were he in the same case, he ought not to expect it, and that where so many others are concerned, by this Rule barely, it can hardly be in his power always to give it.

4. In order to the enlargement of this Rule, and it's truly Religious, and Spiritual, as meer Moral worth, may be considered the respect it bears to, and the influence it hath upon even the Duties of the First Table immediately to­wards God, which though not directly, yet by some consequence may be included, or sup­posed therein. This contains an universal Prin­ciple of Justice, and Equity; of giving to every one what belongs to him, is due and pro­per to his state; and so may be applied to all acts of Piety indispensably due to God, as such, without the almost Blasphemous presumption of but supposing our selves in his place. Also the true love of our Neighbour, which this supposes, and expresses, must be founded in, and can only be preserved, and quickned by the true love of God, which is the sum of the first [Page 32] Table: But these I need not pursue, nor yet St. Augustines Argument in the matter in hand, Qui proximum diligit, T. 3. De Tri­ [...]ate l. 8. c. 7. p. 355. ipsam diligit dilectionem, Deus autem dilectio est, according to that, John i. 4, 8, 16. which especially as improved by the School­men, would lead to somewhat too nice, or too mystical for me.

In the mean while may be observed, the Scripture seems much more frequent, and partial in stating the mutual Offices we ow each other in acts consequent on this Rule, than the immediate outward expressions of Devotion towards God; seldom expostulates the want of these, but the defect of those fill the Law, and the Prophets, and the Gospels too with complaints. See the first of Isaiah throughout, and many more exhorting them to show the truth of their Religion, that Faith, that Fear, and Love of God in acts of Justice, and Mercy, rather than Pompous Oblations, or Adorations, of which among others may be consulted, Prov. xxi. 3. Jer. vii. 4, 5, &c. xxii. 16. Hos. vi. 6. Mich. vi. 7, 8. Mark xii. 33. So in the account which our Saviour gives of the proceedings of the last day, ( Matth. xxv. lat­ter end) all the sentences to the good or bad, are proportioned to the observance, or breach of these.

And as our future doom, so the success of our present Praiers, and Devotions is made much to depend on this performance. In which may be observed the connection of this Verse to the foregoing, in that it is, If ye being evil know how to give good gifts unto your Children, how much more shall your Father which is in Heaven, give good things to them that ask him? Therefore all things, &c. As if he should say, there is nothing wanting to secure your petitions from disap­pointment, but your not answering other mens equal requests from you. God is infinitely more good, and so more ready to supply you, than the most indulgent Parent his own Son. But if you expect God should fulfil your de­sires, you must (if I may speak it with reve­rence) his. He is far removed in person, and can receive nothing properly from you; in part therefore transfers his right to his Crea­tures, for their necessary support, and makes your dealing with them, the ordinary Rule, and Measure of his Dispensations to you. That this is no forc'd interpretation (insisted particularly on by St. Chrysostom, on my Text) appears by other express places; our Lords reflection upon his own prayer, Matth. vi. 14. 15. If ye for­give men their Trespasses, your Heavenly Father will also forgive you, &c. and to the same purpose [Page 34] he denounces upon the omission, Ch. xviii. 35. In which also may be farther consulted, Matth. vii. 1, 2. Luke vi. 37, 38. Rom. ii. 1, 2, 3. By which and divers like, he shews how much he makes our actions dependant on this Rule, the square of his distributions, whether of Justice, or Mercy; and that he measures chiefly our performances even of Piety to himself, and mainly proportions our after-rewards, and hopes from him by these like Offices, more than by other even directer and immediate outward expressions of De­votion to himself; which he seems sparing in requiring or commending; cautious in ex­tending to their utmost bounds; or cherishing every plausible pretence thereto, farther than may strongly guard, and minister Spiritual Life to the other; knowing how oft we are mistaken, how easily seduc'd out of the way, how soon transported beyond our line in pre­tences to such raised, and still aspiring Pas­sions; and how unfit ordinarily we are to manage, and govern them, especially in the highest transports towards such objects, so much above the level of Human circumstan­ces: that when sincere, but not the best grounded, or guarded, yet rarely are they un­mixt with some Allay of Superstition, or En­thusiasm. [Page 37] But when heedlesly indulg'd, and let loose, soon pass into the most Phrensical ex­travagances. Wherefore the Scripture seems to take more care to fence in, than minister fuel to those however sacred flames; and expresses mostly our Duty to God in general terms, and inward acts of loving him with all your heart, fearing him, walking humbly with him, &c. But Offices of Righteousness, and Charity fill every page, are more positive, punctual, and express; the chief subject matter of Laws respecting us in society, wherein we stand upon even terms one with another; and the effects of which are presently, and sensibly beneficial, the stay and support of mankind; the common con­veyance of all the comforts of this Life, and the most advantageous opportunity of pro­vision for the next. So though this Pre­cept seem literally, and most strictly to re­spect the Second Table only: yet hath it ma­ny signatures, and evidences of the completi­on of the First: The Bond of all Society, and nearest Original of all Justice, and Equity: The grand Pattern, and exemplar of all Laws, and Constitutions: The Epitome of our whole Duty revealed, or innate: The Law, Pro­phets, and Gospel in one: The end of the Com­mandments: The fairest transcript of the first, and [Page 36] everlasting Righteousness: The most perfect summary of Gods will, and the exactest mea­sure of his present, and after Dispensations; which may justly give it so high a Character in the close of my Text. This is the Law and the Prophets.

From whence we may, first, admire the most apparent Equity, and impartiality of the Divine Laws, that so unexceptionably, and uni­versally as much as possible provide for the good of all: God As one common Parent producing all alike, so equally takes care of, and guards the Concerns of all; and made their happiness run in the same Channel, that one part might not rejoyce alone, nor be put to seek, nor hope to find it apart from others: Thus forcing us into all amicable Society supposed, and much strengthned by these prime dictates of God and Nature: adding all the force of his authority and injunction to fasten our mutual dependences, and enlarge the most diffusive felicity. He has thus given every other man as sure hold of, and as good an interest in you, as you in him; and made your willingness to receive, an equal obligation in you to give, and so may appeal to your own judgment, Are not my ways equal? shews that he is no respecter of persons in what [Page 37] he commands, no more than in what he di­stributes.

2. Here also we ought to adore the infinite condescension of our great Law-giver, that not only makes his own will, but our will our law; and shews how tender he is of our good, that he makes our own desires the frequent measure of his Precepts; and how far he de­lights in the welfare of his creatures, in that he abridges them not the loving and doing good to themselves, [...]. Orat. 13. [...] Pop. antioe p. 549. but makes it the matter and pattern of their actions to others; and never finds fault with the excess of the one, when not perverted to obstruct or vacate the other. He is pleased you should love your self as much as you can, the more the better, so you love your Neighbour as your self. St. Chryso­stom proving in us a natural knowledge of good and evil, and that from my Text, as be­fore, subjoyns this excellent gloss thereon, There is no need of many words, long laws, or va­rious instructions, let your own will be your Law. You would receive good, do good to another: you would find mercy, shew it to your Neighbour: you would be praised, praise others: you would be loved, love: you would enjoy preheminence, or ad­vantages, be as forward to yield them first to others: Be you thus your Judg, and Lawgiver of your own life.

Nothing may more ingratiate unto us his most Divine and excellent Precepts, than the consideration how, as near as possible, they stoop to our own wishes, and desire nothing may more shame, and confound, convict, and condemn all obstinate disobedience thereto, or transgression thereof, than to consider it as a violence offered to our selves, as God: and one way, or other the not doing as we would be done unto.